Russian Debate on the Northern Dimension Concept

Transcription

1 Dr. Dmitri A. Lanko Associate Professor Department of European Studies School of International Relations St. Petersburg State University Russian Debate on the Northern Dimension Concept Paper presented to the 6 th Pan-European International Relations Conference Making Sense of a Pluralist World Torino, Italy, September 12 15, 2007 Abstract. The Northern Dimension concept, proposed by Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 and modified by Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen ten years later, has been approached by Russian politicians and scholars as an idea, an initiative, a concept, a program, and a policy. The current state of the Russian debate on the Northern Dimension should be studied from the two viewpoints. First, it is the Northern Dimension as a four-lateral forum. Second, it is the Northern Dimension as a political filter. The Northern Dimension concept has created the opportunity to reject the transition discourse on Russia via replacing the approach to Russia as a country between East and West with the approach to the country as a part of the North. Introduction The Northern Dimension concept was proposed by Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev twenty years ago. Fifteen year ago, when Finland faced the challenges of EU enlargement, Finnish politicians of both ruling parties and opposition started speaking about the Northern Dimension. Ten years ago the debate on the Northern Dimension reached Russia. Five years ago most Russian agents concluded that the Northern Dimension does not meet Russia s national interests. Today they are reconsidering it. The aim of this paper is to uncover the context, in which Russian debate on the Northern Dimension concept led to the change of the mainstream approach from negative to neutral, as well as to sketch the factors that may lead to further change of the approach to positive. Sixteen years ago then Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared that Russian is located between East and West and is moving westwards. This move westwards became popular in international relations literature under the name of transition. Seven years ago new Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that transition is over. However, Russia did not find its place in the West, neither it returned to the East. This situation created background for various scholars and foreign policy-makers to claim that transition is continuing; and that the transition does not only includes breakthroughs, but also backslides. The Northern Dimension provides Russia with an opportunity to end its trip between East and West and find its stable place in the global North. This paper consists of four sections. The first section underlines the common feature of the Russian debate on the Northern Dimension concepts on any of its stages: Russian agents have always discussed it as something just invented, despite ten years of the debate passed by. The second section describes Russian debate on the Northern Dimension concept in , when the debate was most active, but mainstream approach to the concept was generally negative. The third section uncovers the reasons, while Russian debate on the Northern Dimension concept slowed down in 2002 through The fourth section provides brief overview of the recently renewed debate on the Northern Dimension concept in Russia. Northern Dimension as a Peace Project The Northern Dimension (ND) has been first proposed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in his Murmansk (1987) speech. Finnish proponents of ND frequently remind about that proposal in their writings (cf. Heininen, 1996: 306) in order to underline that it is not a concept that has become

2 fashionable among social scientists for a short term, but is a concept, which has a history and consequently has been firmly established in the discourse and the practice of international relations in the North of Europe. Under concept that has a history I hereinafter mean a concept, an important part of the contemporary discourse on which is the belief that this concept used to be debated in the past too. The belief that a concept has a history correlates with the belief that this concept has a future too. Under concept that has a future I hereinafter mean a concept, an important part of the contemporary discourse on which is the belief that this concept will continue to be debated in a long run. To put it simple, what has last for long will last for long, but what has just appeared can disappear soon. Examples are Russian debates on the Russian nation, on democracy, on globalization and on the Westphalian system of international relations. Russian debate on the Russian nation does not differ much from Western debate on nationalism in general in terms that primordialists and modernists meet in the debate. Modernists insist that Russian nation emerged almost at the same time with other European nations; and an important shift to the formation of Russian nation was given by the Patriotic, as it is called in Russian historiography, war against French invasion in In their turn, primordialists insist that Russian nation emerged together with the Russian state in the 9 th century. Rhetoric of extreme right political parties in Russia is mostly based on the primordialist argument. For example, Alexander Solzhenitsyn s widely criticized book Two Centuries Together (2001) on Russian Jewish relations in the Russian Empire and later in the Soviet Union is at the same time widely quoted in the arguments of Russian extreme nationalists. The book approaches the relations between Russian and Jewish ethnic groups through the past two hundred years like the groups had transformed into nations before the story began, rejecting nation-building process that both groups underwent during that time. Consequently, the book provides the ground for extreme nationalists beliefs in the supremacy of thousand-year-old Russian nation facing, for example, Estonians, whose nation, from the point of view of the extreme nationalists, was created together with the Estonian state in the early 20 th century. The debate on the Westphalian system is closely interconnected with the debate on nationalism. The very name Westphalian is a declaration that the system of international relations consisting of nation-states has existed since the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in mid-17 th century. Thus, scholars, who continue approaching states as major, if not only, actors in international relations, claim that the Westphalian system has existed for over three centuries and, consequently, will exist for at least as long as that. Some of them go further and declare that its roots go deep into history of Hundred Years War. To the contrary, scholars, who declare the rising importance of non-state actors and approach the Westphalian system as disappearing, tend to locate its birth time in history as close to the present as possible: to the times of the French Revolution and even to the times of German and Italian unification (Ouellet, 2004). Globalization, which has become a popular concept in international relations literature no longer ago than 1990s, was among rare concepts that Russian international relations scholars did not adopted Western approaches to, but globalization was a concept that Russian and Western scholars debated on together. Most Russian scholars agree that globalization concept challenges the concept of the Westphalian state system, bringing new actors and new global challenges, like those of the environment, to the agenda of international studies. At the same time, Russian proponents of globalization concept often use the same argument to prove that globalization is an important issue in international relations: the historic argument. Above it has been described how proponents of the Westphalian approach to international studies prove that the Westphalian system is a concept that has a history. Proponents of globalization in Russia do the same. Some of them mention in their writings that globalization as a concept was used by American journalists already in the early 20 th century (cf. Achkasov & Lantsov, 2002: 103). Others notice that globalization as a concept was used in other disciplines than social sciences already in 1960 (cf. Lebedeva, 2004: 99). There is no common opinion on the relationship between globalization and democracy; Russian scholars tend to avoid raising that issue at all. Proponents of globalization claim that it affects democratization positively (cf. Bhagwati, 2004: ); opponents of it, especially among

3 leftist non-governmental organizations, insist that transnational corporations support corrupt political regimes in the Third World. Regardless of the effect that globalization poses on democratization; Russian debate on democracy is another example of the belief that concepts having a history have a future too. And, consequently, the future of a concept that does not have a history in the discourse of some country will be troublesome as well. Namely, an important part of Russian debate on democracy is the belief that the country s difficulties in democratization are rooted in the fact that the country does not have experience of democratic governance comparable to that of Western European countries. That belief used to be (and still is) so popular in Russia and other post-communist countries in the early 1990s that critique of this thesis found a place in Fukuyama s (1993: 69) End of History. Similarly to other cases, proponents of ND claim that this concept has a long history, while opponents of it avoid noticing earlier mentions of it. Above it was noticed that Finnish proponents of ND underline its roots going back into Gorbachev s speech. Russian scholars in general frequently underline concepts that have been created by Russians; however, in the case of ND they very seldom notice that ND was first proposed by a Russian. That observation illustrates and simultaneously explains the generally suspicious relation to ND concept by participants of corresponding Russian debate. Another explanation of the suspicion that dominated Russian debate on ND is the difficulty of definition of it in terms of practice of Russian political discourse. Russian debate on ND entered its active phase in 1998 after Rovaniemi (1997) speech by Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen. Since then, ND has been defined in Russian debate as an idea, an initiative, a concept, a program, a policy, a forum, a political filter, and a political image. This paper will uncover those definitions; as for the current section, the most important definition is the definition of ND as an idea. ND as an idea may be defined as an attempt to promote Nordic ideas and values to the whole ND area. Russian agents view the Nordic countries positively in comparison to, for example, America; Russians would have preferred the Nordic model of government and society, if they had to choose between several Western models. According to Sergey Kara-Murza (2000: 256), in late 1980s the Nordic model used to seem to vast part of the Soviet elite as an acceptable alternative to both wild capitalism of the West and Leonid Brezhnev s zastoy (stagnation). Under Nordic values Russian scholars usually mean a unique combination of rationalism, rule of law, corporatism, pluralism, instrumentalism, and ability to compromise (Isaev et al., 2000: 241). At the same time, that set of values, which was so popular in late 1980s, lost much of its popularity among the elite after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1980s terms, Russia has chosen the way of wild capitalism, despite its 1993 Constitution s article 1 describes the Russian Federation, among other features, as a socially-oriented state. Rejection to Nordic values, in Russian understanding as describes above, in general and to Nordic, and widely, Protestant rationalism can be illustrated with the example of Russian debate on the global climate change and Kyoto protocol. On the one hand, global climate change has been frequently reported by not only Western, but also Russian meteorologists. On the other hand, interpretation of the meteorological data is different in Russia and in Protestant countries. While the latter tend to believe that human activities are to blame for the global climate change, in Russia it is widely believed that the climate change is taking place due to natural reasons; and human activities have little impact on it. That explains mostly negative approach to the Kyoto protocol among Russian elite. In general, the idea of Russia s uniqueness is widely spread in the country; its spiritual background includes the geopolitical school of Eurasianism, the anthropological school of Lev Gumilev, etc. In other words, Russian agents would prefer to invent their own model, rather than borrow any models from either West or East. According to Vadim Tsymburskiy, the vision of Russia as located between East and West dominated in the country s geopolitical debate in late 1990s early 2000s. At the same time, such vision splits at least into two approaches. First, it is the approach that Russian political system and political culture bears elements of both Western and Eastern political systems and political cultures as perceived by Russians themselves. Russia is the place, where Western political culture built on

4 stable settlements that grew into towns and cities in Medieval Age and thus became bedrocks of democracy meets Eastern political culture based on nomadic tribalism, an important feature of which is strong centralist power. A similar approach can be found in other post-communist countries, for example, in Estonia, which according to Rein Taagepera, stands one leg in Protestant Europe and the other in Orthodox marshes (Taagepera, 2002: 245). Second, it is the approach that elements of both Eastern and Western political systems and political cultures compose a minor part of Russian political system and political culture, while major part of them are unique. In other words, Russia is neither East, nor West. When speaking about Nordic values, Russian agents very frequently mention Nordic approach to peace, which has been developed through the past forty years; an important shift to its creation was given by Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung (Vesa, 2004a). This approach rejects liberal peace theory, which is widely criticized in Russia, and declares that provision of basic needs such as water, food, shelter, medical care and education are important prerequisites of peace, while deficit of basic needs creates a conflict. This approach correlates greatly with the new thinking for the Soviet Union and the whole world proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev (1988); ND should thus be understood not as an independent initiative of Gorbachev, but as a part of the new thinking. Gorbachev s new thinking was based on three pillars: conflict prevention on the local scale, regional integration on the regional scale, and nuclear disarmament on the global scale. Concerning regional integration, Gorbachev proposed the concept of common European home, of which an important room could be Northern Europe without borders ND area. ND Area without borders was proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in late 1980s and again by Urpo Kivikari (1993) in early 1990s. By late 1990s, when proposals turned into political initiatives, ND Area had been transformed from a bi-partite, as it was perceived by majority of Russian agents immediately after fall of the Iron Curtain, into a tri-partite. The parts were old European countries (Nordic countries and Germany), new European countries (Baltic State and Poland) and Russia. The main task for ND suggested by Gorbachev to eliminate consequences of the Iron Curtain in Northern Europe appeared to be even more difficult. In 1997 it had to eliminate three different borders. First, it was the border between Russia and the Nordic countries, which at that time was as contrast as the U.S. Mexican border in terms of disparity social standards on its different sides. Second, it was the border between Russia and Baltic States and Poland. Third, it was the border between old and new Europe; in such situation it was no surprise that many Russian agents started perceiving ND as a instrument of upcoming EU enlargement and thus as an initiative that was not very interesting for Russia. Northern Dimension as an Effectiveness Project Russian debate on ND concept started in early 1998 (Deryabin, 2002) after the above mentioned Rovaniemi speech by Finnish ex-prime Minister Paavo Lipponen. At that time the three groups of ND Area countries were already in place; consequently, the Finnish initiative to launch ND had to take their existence into consideration. Both Russian agents and those of the Baltic State and Poland, despite their mutual conflicts, hoped that ND would be aimed at re-distribution of values among the three groups: in other words, that rich countries of the old Europe would share some of their values with neighbors. However, ND as understood by both Russian agents and their counterparts in the Baltic States and Poland was based on the effectiveness model as described by Shapiro (1988). In other words, ND was suggested as an effort to join values in order to meet some aims common for the whole ND area, not for significant groups existing in the area. However, the debate in Finland on the common aims for ND area went differently from corresponding debate in Russia, Baltic States and Poland. As a result, ND failed to receive warm welcome in the Baltic States and Poland, for agents in those countries considered it a Nordic Dimension. Differently, ND as an initiative was warmly welcomed in the Northwest Russia, mostly thanks to its Finnish origin. Viktor Shlyamin, ex-foreign Minister of the Republic of Karelia, Russian region that borders Finland and is involved in a vast number of cross-border networks with Finnish partners, did much to promote ND in Russia. His book Russia in ND (Shlyamin, 2002) became

5 one of the two monographs published in Russia, which were especially devoted to ND. The other monograph, written by Yuriy Deryabin, Russian ex-ambassador to Finland, approaches ND in a more skeptical way (Deryabin, 2000). Other Shlyamin s articles tackle practical implementations of ND to the Northwest Russia (Shlyamin, 2001a), contribution of ND to sub-regional cooperation (Shlyamin, 2001b), as well as the future of ND (Shlyamin, 2001c). Like Shlyamin, Voronov considers Finland s reputation as an honest broker (Voronov, 2003: 77) one of the most important reasons for positive approaches to ND in the Northwest Russia. As the initiative of Helsinki turned to be an initiative of Brussels, Northwest Russia s approaches to ND changed radically. First, unlike Finland, which is a nation, the EU is seldom considered an important international actor in Russian domestic discourse. It has become common to say in Russia that the EU is an economic giant, political pygmy and military zero. Second, many Russian agents perceive the EU institutions as over-bureaucratized. According to Yabloko party leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, the bureaucrats in Brussels cannot see farther than the tip of their noses (Yavlinskiy, 2003: 357); the majority of Russian agents would have agreed with this statement. As a result, according to Shlyamin, the Action Plan for ND with external and crossborder policies of the EU, drafted by the European Commission, turned to be not an action plan, but an intentions plan (Shlyamin, 2002: 95). The Russian agents, who perceive ND as a concept, tend to compare it with, first, the southern dimension of the EU and, second, with the U.S. Northern European Initiative. The confrontation of the North and the South in the EU, widely discussed in the West, found a place in Russian domestic discourse, too (see, for example, Churov, 2001). While Vladimir Churov and other Russian experts considered the Northern and the Southern Dimension as competing for the same money, they viewed their aims differently. According to Voronov, the aim of the Southern Dimension is to influence the politics of countries in the South and East Mediterranean region in order to soften the clash of civilizations between them and the EU member states (Voronov, 2003: 80). As to ND, it envisages acceptation of Poland and the three Baltic States into the EU in the short term and creation of a common European economic space, including Russia, in a longer term. As to the U.S. Northern European Initiative, Russian agents see almost no differences between it and ND. According to Gennadiy Tkachev, ex-vice Governor of St. Petersburg, responsible for external relations, and Vladimir Churov, ex-deputy Head of the External Relations Committee of the St. Petersburg Administration, the two concepts are similar in both aims and priorities (Tkachev & Churov, 2001). They consider promotion of cooperation between the Northwest Russia and its Nordic and Baltic neighbors as the aim of both concepts. Among the priorities of the concepts they underline energy, infrastructure, civil society, nuclear safety and other aspects of soft security. The only difference between the two concepts is that the Northern European Initiative envisages also military cooperation, first of all, within the Partnership for Peace framework. The Northwest Russia, as a sub-region without an army, is not able to participate in any kinds of military cooperation; at the same time, Churov has proposed the Green Helmets program for St. Petersburg, allowing draftees from the city to choose between the federal army and local ecological forces, aimed on liquidation of consequences of environmental catastrophes. ND as a program has been frequently compared with the TACIS program in Russia. Agents of the Northwest Russia view the ability of ND to coordinate TACIS, PHARE (through PHARE is mostly targeted on Central European and Baltic States, about 30 PHARE programs tackle Russian border areas) and other EU technical assistance programs. At the same time, many experts have noticed the focus of both ND and TACIS on environmental projects. Today there are over 150 TACIS projects under way in Russia, about 70 of them focus on protection of the environment. According to Viktor Khristenko, Russian ex-deputy Prime Minister, then responsible for cooperation with the EU, sometimes it seems that there is nothing [in ND] but environment (Bovt, 2001). One cannot help mentioning here that both the referred to article on the 3 rd ND Ministerial Conference in Lappeenranta (October 2001) and a related interview with Finnish Prime

6 Minister Paavo Lipponen was published in the Economy section of the Izvestia Daily (Lipponen, 2001). Northwest Russia s experts tend to agree with Deputy Prime Minister Khristenko. For example, Leonid Yogman, Vice Governor of the Vologda Region, responsible for external relation, writes that Russian actors cannot enjoy the environmental bias of ND priorities (Yogman, 2001). At the same time, Northwest Russia s agents distinguish ND and TACIS. Yogman writes in the same article that ND is not another program of technical assistance, like TACIS, it is a program, in which both Russia and the EU are interested, it is a development project for the North of Europe. At the same time, in , when an action plan for ND was under consideration, regions of the Northwest Russia treated ND as another TACIS and proposed a vast number of projects to become priorities of ND. Consequently, they were dissatisfied, when only four priorities concerning Russia were mentioned in the 1st Action Plan; as a result, the imaging of ND in the Northwest Russia went in the negative direction. Some agents in the Northwest Russia, like Andrey Krashevskiy (Krashevskiy & Lanko, 2002), considered ND a policy, i.e. a special policy of the EU towards Russia. Indeed, all countries in ND area are members of the EU since 2004, except Russia, Iceland and Norway. The EU has worked out special cooperative policies towards Norway and Iceland, which have been effective through decades. Norway s membership in the Schengen regime is the best example here. Consequently, ND will become a special EU policy towards Russia starting To some extent, ND has become a breakthrough in Russian-EU relations. For example, the EU has continuously declined Russia s proposals to establish a special commission on Kaliningrad within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Many Russian agents enjoyed the fact that Kaliningrad was mentioned as a special focus of ND in the 1 st Action Plan, together with fight against organized crime, nuclear safety and protection of the environment (see, for example, Sergounin, 2003). These agents consider that ND as an EU policy towards Russia competes with the New Neighbors Initiative, which is also targeted on deepening cooperation with Russia. Agents in the Northwest Russia have split in their relation to this initiative. Some of them considered the including of Russia into the initiative as devaluation of Russia s foreign political image: though the initiative mentions Russia as a key partner, at the same time, it equated Russia to other postcommunist countries, as well as East and South European states and Mediterranean countries of Asia and Africa. Others enjoyed the new initiative, since such equation of Russia to other East European countries meant to them that the EU is no longer considering Russia a threat, but more a challenge and sometimes an opportunity (see, for example, Khudoley, 2003). However, the endorsement of the New Neighbors Initiative devaluated the image of ND as an effective EU policy for both groups of agents. As one may note from the references list below, the number of writings on ND published in Russia reached its peak in 2001 and quickly declined in Consequently, the Russian discussion on ND was most active between 1998 and One should take a look at Russian domestic context of those years in order to understand the conditions, in which the above examined transdiscourses of ND appeared. The most famous event in Russia in 1998 was the financial crisis in August. As a result of the crisis, Yevgeniy Primakov replaced Sergey Kirienko as the Prime Minister of Russia. Besides Primakov s attempts to improve the economic situation in the country through posing more state regulation on the economy (Primakov nominated Yuriy Maslyukov, affiliated with left-wing parties, to be First Deputy Prime Minister, responsible for macro-economic growth), he became famous for his efforts to prevent the Russian Federation from a collapse. For this sake, he nominated Vadim Gustov, Governor of the Leningrad Region, to the post of First Deputy Prime Minister, responsible for relations between the federal center and the regions. It is not widely known, what exactly Gustov has done in order to prevent Russia from a collapse according to the same scenario, as the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in the early 1999 Gustov was fired (after that he ran for Governor of the Leningrad Region twice: in 1999 and 2003, but both times he came second, leaving the chair to Valeriy Serdyukov), and nobody else was nominated to

7 this post after Gustov. Some experts may say that such decision of Primakov (who was fired from post a month after Gustov) was based on low professionalism of Gustov, who was good as governor, but failed to become an effective federal minister. However, this decision meant also that Russia has recognized: the threat of collapse of the Russian Federation is overestimated (with the exception for Chechnya). At the same time, confrontation between the federal government and regional elites continued; this confrontation reached its peak during the 1999 parliamentary campaign, in which the Fatherland All Russia Bloc, representing regional elites, defeated to the federal-oriented Unity Bloc. This confrontation turned into less acute competition after the presidential elections in the country in March 2000: victorious President Vladimir Putin launched his vertical of power policy, which re-imposed federal regulations over regional governments (Makarychev, 2000). In the situation of confrontation between the federal government and regional elites the federal government perceived suspiciously any attempt of an external power, including the EU, to launch an international cooperation program with part of Russia s regions, not with the country in whole, such as ND. For example, Deryabin, a representative of the federal-oriented part of Russian elite, writes that many Russian proposals did not find a place in the 1 st ND Action Plan, because the proposals coming from the regions were delivered to the EU in one basket, without preliminary discussion and expertise [by federal authorities] (Deryabin, 2002). Second ND Action Plan and the Decline of Russian Debate The Second Action Plan for the Northern Dimension (ND) with external and cross-border policies of the European Union was endorsed in late However, the adoption of the new action plan, which is very different from the previous one, did not evoke a discussion in Russia, similar to what had happened three years before. Konstantin Voronov s article (Voronov, 2003) published several months prior to the event may be regarded the only exception. Absence of special financing in the framework of ND became one of the factors of that, but this factor had already been discussed above (see, for example, Tkachev & Churov, 2001), therefore, there is no need to tackle it again in this section. Among the other factors of the poor image of ND in Russia the writer wants to underline securitization factor. The date on ND in Russia was taking place in the years, when decentralization of the country was a highly securitizes issues, consequently, external relations of its sub-regions, like those expected to be launched by ND, were viewed suspiciously on both federal and regional levels. Securitization of collapse of the country is an important factor of policy-making in Russia also today. At the same time, as the threat of collapse in the short term disappeared, Russian debate on ND slowed down. It would be wrong to say that all regional leaders of the Northwest Russia were on the regional side in the confrontation. In some cases it is so, for example, St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev was among the founding fathers of the Fatherland All Russia Bloc. At the same time, Pskov Governor Yevgeniy Mikhaylov openly supported the Unity Bloc. Similarly, approaches to ND vary in different regions of the Northwest Russia. One may find a correlation between local approaches to ND and the geography of priorities in Russia, listed in the 2 nd ND Action Plan. The main focus of its Arctic priority concerns the Nordic countries, including westernmost Iceland and Greenland. At the same time, some specific projects in the Barents regions of Russia are worth being mentioned. In the field of trade and transport it is the Cleaner Production Programs in Murmansk, Archangelsk and Karelia, and the ambitious plan to conjoin the Northern Maritime Corridor of the Nordic Calotte and the Northern Sea Route of the Russian Arctic. Telemedicine Bridge between Archangelsk and Tromso, as well as Barents Youth Cooperation Center in Murmansk have been created in order to enhance information and knowledge cooperation. Finally, in the sphere of energy and nuclear safety it is the Energy Efficiency Centers in Murmansk, Kirovsk, Petrozavodsk and Archangelsk, Norwegian environmental programs in Andreeva and Gremikha Bays, and short-lived radioactive waste repository on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago. This list of programs indicates that Russian Barents regions face the same problems as the entire Northern Dimension area, i.e. difficult geographical conditions for agriculture and

8 industry, vast sparsely populated areas and vulnerable environment. As to other regions of Northwest Russia, there are only few records on them in the 2 nd ND Action Plan. There is no mention of Pskov, Novgorod or Vologda Regions, or of Komi Republic. Specific programs for St. Petersburg include city s Southwest Wastewater Treatment Plant and cooperation between city s police forces with police forces of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Also St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region take part in such crossborder cooperation projects as The Gulf of Finland Growth Triangle, Baltic Palette and Metropolitan Areas. The reason is that St. Petersburg, on the one hand, failed to become the capital city of Northwest Russia, but on the other hand, considers itself a world-level city, with its Representative Office in London and numerous summits held (Khudoley & Tkachenko, 2001: 58-60). What concerns Pskov, Novgorod, Vologda and Komi, these regions remain introvert parts of Russia (Andrey Makarychev s terminology; see Makarychev, 2000) that consider relations with the Federal Government in Moscow more important than external links. Karelia and St. Petersburg lead among regions of the Northwest Russia according to the number of publications on ND. In Karelia, besides the optimistic writings by Shlyamin, one cannot help mentioning Oleg Reut, who is rather skeptical to both ND and Euregio Karelia, the crossborder network, uniting Russian Karelia and three sub-regions in Eastern and Northern Finland (Reut, 2001). Unlike in Karelia, in St. Petersburg the administration is skeptical to ND, while the academic community is more optimistic. Tkachev and Churov from the St. Petersburg Administration tend to underline the weak points of ND, such as absence of special financing and a special institution, as well as little attention to technological development and a bias towards energy and environment. Kontantin Khudoley from the St. Petersburg University is optimistic about ND, though he points at the fact that Germany, the leading EU country with vast interests in the Baltic Sea Region, or Nordic countries have not announced ND as their foreign political priority (Khudoley, 2000). Stanislav Tkachenko from the St. Petersburg University also considers ND an effective framework for cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region (Tkachenko, 2000). Conferences on ND frequently take place in the Arctic sub-regions of the Northwest Russia: Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. At the same time, Russian agents prefer discussing the impact of ND on the economy of their regions, rather than any other topics (see, for example, Zalyvskiy, 2001). Economy is the dominating topic also in Yogman s writings (Yogman, 2001). As to Pskov, Novgorod and Komi Republic, the writer failed to find any local discourses on ND, besides short newspaper articles. Finally, Kaliningrad falls out from the correlation between the number of mentions of the Northwest Russia s region in ND Action Plans and the intensity of the local discourse on ND. Though Kaliningrad has been mentioned as priority in both the 1 st and the 2 nd Action Plans, there are only few publications on ND there, and the majority of them date back into 1999 (see, for example, Songal, 1999). The 2 nd ND Action Plan in its part, devoted to Kaliningrad, demonstrates the transformation of the Common Europe s attitude towards Kaliningrad from threat into challenge and opportunity (Unto Vesa s terminology; see Vesa, 2004b). In European actors viewed Kaliningrad only as a source of soft and sometimes even hard (for example, Chris Patten s claim that Kaliningrad might become Balkanized ; see Patten, 2001) security threats. The new action plan treats Kaliningrad not only as a source of environmental concerns and threats posed by organized crime, but also as a trade and investment partner, source of human resources and important actor in cross-border cooperation. Among specific priorities of the 2 nd ND Action Plan in Kaliningrad one should mention new border-crossing points with Poland and Lithuania, energy saving initiative and NIDA project, EuroFaculty of the Kaliningrad State University and various cross-border cooperation projects. Transformation of the discourse on Kaliningrad from a threat into a challenge took place in Russia as well. In the 1990s the federal government in Moscow was concerned about Kaliningrad s possible floating away from the Russian Federation. The government did its best to prevent this scenario, both in political and economic spheres. In the political sphere it refused to de-militarize Kaliningrad, though the cost of the deployment of military forces in Kaliningrad was high. It

9 became especially high after Russian army started transition from drafting to enlistment recruiting system. Wages in Russian army continue being very small, therefore, Kaliningraders tend not to enlist. As to soldiers from mainland Russia, Kaliningrad lacks real estate to host many newcomers. In the economic sphere Russia introduced the Special Economic Zone regime for Kaliningrad, which resulted in deeper dependence of the exclave on transfers from the federal budget (Smorodinskaya, 2001). In such circumstances Russian federal government used to condemn any attention to Kaliningrad from outside of the country. Sometimes it was done officially, like in cases of organizations of German expellees or proponents of Lithuanian Minor, sometimes it was unofficial pressure, for example, on international organizations. This may be mentioned among the reasons, why the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Council of Europe and the OSCE issued their official opinions on Kaliningrad only in the early 2000s (see, for example, Council of Europe, 2002). Similarly, Russian federal authorities were concerned about the including of Kaliningrad into the 1 st ND Action Plan. A special concern was about the famous Recommendations of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 2002), which have been prepared by a business organization and therefore the preliminary discussion on the recommendations was not transparent. Besides Kaliningrad used to pose a threat on both Russia and its European partners in the 1990s, it used to have two more specific features, which made it a central problem for both the Baltic Sea Region and Russian-EU relations. First, it used to be closed, i.e. the cost of information on it was higher that on other issues, though officially it was opened to foreigners in spring For example, in autumn 2002 the writer was surprised being there, when he found it prohibited making pictures in many places around the city. Second, Kaliningrad used to have many discourses about it, both inside the exclave (see Joenniemi & Browning, 2002), and outside it (see Janusuauskas, 2001). As information on Kaliningrad spread over Europe, and the many discourses on it turned into common opinions, the importance of the exclave for Russian-EU relations declined. In such situation a special trans-discourse for ND will hardly appear in the Kaliningrad local context. A brief analysis of Russian approaches to Kaliningrad as part of ND shows that federal elite tends to view ND as a concern, while regional elites consider it an opportunity. This does not mean that federal elite in Russia is mostly isolationist, while regional elites are more cooperative. To the writer s consideration, such difference in approaches is rooted in the organization of the Russian Federation, where in the majority of cases of center-periphery relations the federal government plays the role of decision-maker, while regional authorities are receivers of federal policy with very few possibilities to influence it. As a result, the federal elite views everything that comes from outside as an actor, including ND. To the contrary, regional elites perceive ND as an international regime, which is very difficult to influence. It is important to stress here that there is not clear line between what has been referred to above as federal and regional elites: there are agents with federal thinking in the Northwest Russia and agents with regional thinking on federal posts. Russian Debate on ND concept slowed down in thanks to two main reasons. First, it is the domestic context of the debate that changed between late 1990s and mid-2000s. While in late 1990s collapse of the country was considered possible in the short term, majority of Russian agents tend to perceive suspiciously any efforts to enhance international relations of Russia s regions uncontrolled by federal authorities. To the contrary, in mid-2000s collapse of the country did not seem possible in the short term to most agents; consequently, efforts like ND were not perceived suspiciously any more. Second, it is the 2 nd ND Action Plan itself. Differently from the 1 st Action Plan, it did not contain a strategic, but it was rather a list of the project being implemented at the moment. The text of the Action Plan did not make strategic goals of ND clear to Russian agents. As to the specific projects listed in the Action Plan, Russian agents on both federal and regional level were disappointed with the fact that they were deprived from defining the projects to be given priority status. As a result, many Russian agents started perceiving ND as an internal EU policy,

10 which does not have much in common with neither strategic vision, not tactics of implementation of a suitable development program for Northwest Russia. Contemporary Russian Debate on the Northern Dimension Russian debate on ND concept restarted on November 2006 after Political Declaration on ND Policy and ND Policy Framework Document were adopted. The latter document transformed ND from an EU policy into a four-lateral forum among the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. A forum itself is a relatively new concept in international relations theory, which has not been thoroughly studies neither in Russian, nor in a wider international relations tradition. At the same time, a forum is an international relations concept that has recently gained a significant sound in practical implementation of Russian foreign policy. The World Economic Forum, or simply the Davos Forum appeared to be important already in mid-1990s, when Russian ex-president Boris Yeltsin was seeking international support for his re-election; and it was in Davos, where he gained it. St. Petersburg Economic Forum, which was originally established as a meeting of politicians and entrepreneurs from Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, has recently transformed into one of most successful efforts of Russian external economic relations. Concerning ND Area, Russian authorities have recently started paying attention to the Baltic Development Forum. As a result, many Russian agents have started perceiving ND as another forum; consequently, they change their attitude of it. Contrary to the negative approach to ND as a policy, they perceive ND as a forum positively. According to Russia s President Vladimir Putin (2006), the country s participation in ND has a great meaning from the point of view of political power, substance and resources. The experience of Finland, which, from the point of view shared by many Russian agents, has greatly benefited from ND, raises corresponding Russian expectations. Indeed, when Finland proposed ND among other means to soften consequences of the country s accession to the EU in 1995, it set three goals to be achieved. First, it aimed at attracting attention to specific issues of far northern territories of Finland and Sweden. As a result, a special instrument of EU Structural Funds was created aiming at support to those territories. Second, Finland aimed at improving international image of the country; in Cold War times Finland used to bear the image of a country next to Russia in Western European countries. This aim was also achieved; today Finland bears the image of the country that proposed ND. Third, Finland aimed at relocating the burden of relations with Russia to the shoulders of a more powerful partner. Relations between Finland and the Soviet Union have never been predictable, which was perceived as a threat by many Finns. In the Soviet Union attacked Finland and occupied a vast part of its territory. In Finland fought WWII on the German side and was defeated again by the Soviet Union. There had been at least two serious crises in Soviet-Finnish relations during the Cold War times. Finally, collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was among reasons for economic crisis that Finland suffered of in early 1990s. As a result, Finland decided to rely on a more power partner in its relations vis-à-vis Russia. Unlike Sweden, Finland supported establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy from the very beginning. As a result, today Finland does not have a special Russia-policy. Its relations with Russia are based on CFSP provisions, decisions by the Nordic Council of Ministers, ND documents and Finnish Strategy towards nearby areas, which may be regarded a Finnish policy towards Northwest Russia, but not towards Russia in general. Among the various events that have taken place within ND framework, one of the most remarkable was the 2002 Ministerial Meeting, which took place in the Greenland. It was not that important from the point of view of the documents adopted there. At the same time, Greenland appeared to become the most suitable place to illustrate three main challenges of ND Area. First, the climate in ND Area is generally colder than in any other sub-region of Europe, consequently, costs of production of both agricultural and industrial products are higher here. Second, ND area is relatively large, while its population is relatively sparse. Third, the environment of ND Area is more vulnerable than in areas located to the south. There three challenges provide the background for the

11 other definition of ND as a political filter. ND plays the role of an umbrella for different policy projects that can be implemented both separately by ND partners and as a joint effort. The selection of those policy projects takes place in accordance with the extent, to which those projects meet the aims of tackling the above listed challenges. ND Area is the place, where Russia borders the European Union. As a result, ND is often perceived as a pilot project on the road towards four common spaces: the common economic space, common space of freedom, security and justice, common space on external security and common space on education, research and culture to be built between Russia and the EU in the future. Taking that into consideration, it is very difficult to avoid sketching the approaches by various Russian political parties towards cooperation with the EU. Among agents on federal posts with regional thinking one should mention key officials of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation before the 2004 party reform, which started in response to the failure of the party at December 2003 parliamentary elections. They consider both ND and the EU in general an international regime. For example, only half a year ago KPRF member Oleg Leonov considered that the war in Iraq will bury the United Europe (Leonov, 2003), like the Kosovo war in 1999 led to devaluation of the Euro. According to Leonov, the EU is just an international regime and not an actor; consequently, it is not able to meet challenges, like the wars in Iraq and Yugoslavia. An approach to the EU as an international regime, favorable to business of the member states, may be found not only among Russian politicians, but also among intellectuals. For example, Timofey Bordachev from the Institute for Foreign and Defense Policy, coming from St. Petersburg originally, claims that in order to create a common economic space between Russia and the Union, Russia will have to adopt a complex of European legal norms in the situation, when nobody has promised that Russia would participate in working out of those norms (Bordachev, 2003). Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, the basic think tank for this Institute, sees this as the main reason, why the European Union is promoting the erosion of economic relations between the candidate countries and their neighbors, which are neither candidate nor member states (SVOP, 2000). Though ND is not a complex of legal norms, its structure clearly dominates over agents in the Northwest Russia. In the concluding paragraph to his article Voronov evaluates on what ND has given to Helsinki, to Brussels and to Moscow (Voronov, 2003: 86). There is no analysis of what it has given to the Northwest Russia, since in case of ND the latter found itself in a situation of double dependence. First, it is the dependence on the EU institutions, which are free in defining the priorities of ND. Second, it is the dependence on Russian federal government, which can allow or prohibit participation of the Northwest Russia in this or that ND initiative, defined as a priority by the EU. Indeed, in the 1 st ND Action Plan the EU has indicated four priorities concerning Russia: besides Kaliningrad, they were fight against organized crime, nuclear safety and protection of the environment. According to the Constitution of Russia, only one of the three priorities falls in common responsibility of the federal government and the regions: it is protection of the environment. As to fight against organized crime, it is the exclusive responsibility of the federal Interior Ministry; regions in Russia are not allowed to create their own interior ministries, with the exception for the republics of the Northern Caucasus. It is remarkable that all gubernatorial candidates in the Northwest Russia at both 1995/1996 and 1999/2000 elections that based their campaigns on victory over criminality have failed, while those with the image of effective manager won. Similarly, nuclear safety is the exclusive responsibility of the federal Ministry of Atomic Energy. This corresponds to the main concerns of the population. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the Chernobyl catastrophe, nuclear energy used to be securitized in Russia to a great extent. However, those times are over. Moreover, Russian people have little possibility to receive information about nuclear safety in the country, since the towns, where Russian nuclear power plants are located, like Sosnovy Bor hundred kilometers to the west from St. Petersburg, are closed territories for foreigners and implement restricted access to Russian citizens. As a result, many Russian agents consider environmental cooperation the most successful aspect of ND (Deryabin, 2002). As to other fields of cooperation, regions of the