IDEJE I PRAKSA KVARTALNI ČASOPIS IZ OBLASTI EKONOMIJE, POSLOVNE EKONOMIJE I MENADŽMENTA, STATISTIKE I POSLOVNE INFORMATIKE

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1 EKONOMSKEBROJ 24 IDEJE I PRAKSA KVARTALNI ČASOPIS IZ OBLASTI EKONOMIJE, POSLOVNE EKONOMIJE I MENADŽMENTA, STATISTIKE I POSLOVNE INFORMATIKE EKONOMSKI FAKULTET UNIVERZITETA U BEOGRADU / BEOGRAD, MART U OVOM IZDANJU: ALEKSANDRA PRAŠČEVIĆ // LJUBODRAG SAVIĆ // DRAGANA RADIČIĆ // VLADIMIR MIĆIĆ // GORANA KRSTIĆ // YILMAZ BAYAR // DRAGAN ALEKSIĆ // NEMANJA VUKSANOVIĆ // AMIR FEJZIĆ // MILUTIN JEŠIĆ

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4 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA KVARTALNI ČASOPIS IZ OBLASTI EKONOMIJE, POSLOVNE EKONOMIJE I MENADŽMENTA, STATISTIKE I POSLOVNE INFORMATIKE

5 Izdavač Centar za izdavačku delatnost Ekonomskog fakulteta u Beogradu Kamenička 6, tel , faks cid@ekof.bg.ac.rs Dekan Ekonomskog fakulteta Prof. dr Branislav Boričić Priprema i štampa ČUGURA Print, Beograd Godina Članovi Redakcije prof. dr Marko Backović prof. dr Predrag Bjelić prof. dr Zoran Bogetić prof. dr Božidar Cerović prof. dr Čedomir Čupić prof. dr Radmila Dragutinović - Mitrović prof. dr Ðorđe Ðukić prof. dr Nikola Fabris prof. dr Miomir Jakšić prof. dr Nebojša Janićijević prof. dr Radovan Kovačević prof. dr Vlade Milićević prof. dr Aleksandra Praščević prof. dr Gojko Rikalović prof. dr Žaklina Stojanović prof. dr Miroslav Todorović prof. dr Saša Veljković prof. dr Siniša Zarić REDAKCIJA ČASOPISA EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA Glavni urednik časopisa prof. dr Miomir Jakšić Urednici časopisa prof. dr Marko Backović prof. dr Vlade Milićević prof. dr Aleksandra Praščević prof. dr Saša Veljković Sekretar redakcije Milutin Ješić Tehnički sekretar Iva Dimitrijević Kontakt redakcije Telefon: Faks: ekonomskeideje-praksa@ekof.bg.ac.rs International Editorial Board Snježana Brkić, professor, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Veselin Drašković, professor, University of Montenegro, Montenegro Davor Dujak, professor, University of Osijek, Croatia Gordana Ðurović, professor, University of Montenegro, Montenegro Rana Eskinat, professor, Anadoly University, Turkey Irena Kikerkova, professor, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, FYRM Yoji Koyama, professor emeritus, Niigata University, Japan Perica Macura, professor, University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina Ðuro Medić, professor, University of Zagreb, Croatia Božo Mihailović, professor, University of Montenegro, Montenegro Mićo Radović, professor, University of Montenegro, Montenegro Srđan Redžepagić, professor, University Nice Sophia Antipolis, France Yannis Tsekouras, professor emeritus, University of Macedonia, Greece

6 SADRŽAJ OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA Aleksandra Praščević JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA Ljubodrag Savić Dragana Radičić Vladimir Mićić WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? Gorana Krstić PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Yilmaz Bayar IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - Dragan Aleksić Nemanja Vuksanović SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 Amir Fejzić ZNAČAJ FINANSIJSKOG OBRAZOVANJA U ODRASTANJU DECE Milutin Ješić

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8 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART ALEKSANDRA PRAŠČEVIĆ 1 alja@ekof.bg.ac.rs OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA FROM THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS TO THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF CAPITALISM JEL KLASIFIKACIJA: F50, F2, P10 APSTRAKT: Cilj ovog rada je da se razmotre konsekvence koje je globalna ekonomska kriza imala na promene ne samo svakodnevne ekonomske politike, već i na globalni kapitalizam. Kriza savremenog kapitalizma svoje uporište ima u dugotrajnoj ekonomskoj stagnaciji (tokom «ere sekularne stagnacije») koja još uvek traje, a koja je dovela do pooštrovanja konflikata u okviru nacionalnih ekonomija, usled pogoršane ekonomske perspektive građana, ali i konflikata između zemalja koji potiču od konfrontiranja dva ekonomska modela: liberalnog i merkantilističkog, čija je uspešna kohabitacija u prošlosti omogućavala globalni ekonomski rast, ali i korist za obe strane. Odgovor u vodećim ekonomijama u vidu uspona politike ekonomskog nacionalizma, protekcionizma i ograničavanja slobodnog kretanja roba, kapitala i ljudi koji je prisutan u populističkoj retorici je neadekvatan jer zanemaruje prave izvore problema tendencije da se razlike između kolektivnih društvenih aktera povećavaju u svetu neoliberalizma. Rešenja koja se predlažu govore o krajnje po- 1 Ekonomski Fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu

9 8 OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA jednostavljenom pristupu koji ne može dovesti do prevazilaženja ekonomskih i društvenih problema, već je neophodan novi društveni konsenzus. KLJUČNE REČI: GLOBALNA EKONOMSKA KRIZA, KAPITALIZAM, EKONOMSKA POLITIKA ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to consider the consequences that the global economic crisis has had on the changes not only of everyday economic policy conducting, but also on the global capitalism. The crisis of modern capitalism has its foundation in the long-term economic stagnation (during the "era of secular stagnation"), which is still ongoing, and that led to escalation of conflicts within the national economy, due to reduced economic perspective of citizens, as well as conflicts between countries stemming from the confrontation between two economic models: the liberal and mercantilist, whose successful cohabitation allowed in the past global economic growth, but also the benefit for both sides. The answers provided in populist rhetoric of politicians in leading economies in the form of the rise of economic nationalism, protectionism and numerous restrictions for the free movement of goods, capital and people are inadequate because they ignore the true source of the problem - the tendency of capitalism to widen differences between collective social actors in the world of neoliberal globalization. Suggested solutions include extremely simplified approach that can not lead to overcoming the economic and social problems in modern capitalism; instead of them a new social consensus should be made. KEY WORDS: GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS, CAPITALISM, ECONOMIC POLICY

10 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART UVOD Deset godina nakon što je zvanično otpočela dvogodišnja recesija u SAD-u (decembar 2007 jun 2009), a koja je ubrzo prerasla u globalnu ekonomsku krizu, svetska ekonomija ukazuje da je i dalje zarobljena u epizodi prolongiranog usporenog rasta. Objašnjenja ovakvih nepovoljnih ekonomskih kretanja tokom protekle decenije su bila mnogobrojna, zasnovana na različitim teorijskim konceptima. Slično se može reći i za primenjene mere ekonomske politike. Iako je sama globalna recesija imala sve elemente standardnog cikličnog pada, specifičnost se odnosila na njenu oštrinu, brzinu globalnog širenja i nepoznanicu o efektima preduzetih mera ekonomske politike. Svi navedeni elementi su ukazivali na zaključak da se ona može porediti sa Velikom Depresijom iz 1930-ih, a mere ekonomske politike su bile kontraciklične u pokušaju da se oporavi agregatna tražnja i to na globalnom nivou. Ekspanzivne monetarna i fiskalna politika koje su ekstenzivno primenjivane u velikom broju zemalja, u cilju podsticanja privredne aktivnosti i izlaska iz recesije, bile su kejnzijanskog karaktera a na scenu su posle više decenija stupili tzv. «pragmatični kejnzijanci». Slično se može reći i za povratak originalnoj teoriji Džona Majnarda Kejnsa, koja je iz različitih teorijskih i pragmatičnih razloga gotovo u potpunosti zanemarivana u glavnom toku makroekonomije od monetarističke revolucije i uspona neoliberalnog ekonomskog, ali i političkog projekta. Međutim, na početku recesije nije bilo moguće predvideti ne samo njeno trajanje, već još više u kojoj će meri oporavak biti slab i dugotrajan. Slično je i sa problemima javnih finansija koji su primarno nastali kao posledica kombinacije preduzetih mera ekonomske politike, finansijske krize i oštre recesije, ali i post-recesione stagnacije. Upravo su ovi problemi doveli do toga da se nakon kejnzijanskih mera za otklanjanje recesije, preduzmu potpuno suprotne mere štednje (engl. austerity measures) i fiskalne konsolidacije u velikom broju zemalja, izazivajući dodatne recesione pritiske i produžavajući stagnaciju. Pored mnogih pitanja vezanih za konkretne mere ekonomske politike, tokom poslednje decenije su pokrenuta i dublja konceptualna i teorijska pitanja karaktera kapitalizma i naročito njegovih oscilacija. U prvi plan je tako došlo pitanje rastuće nejednakosti u raspodeli kao jedno od ključnih mogućih uzročnika prolongirane krize. Istovremeno, kreatori ekonomske politike suočili su se i sa problemom gubitka poverenja građana u buduća ekonomska kretanja, ili konkretnije u kapitalizam. Ovo je naročito prisutno u vodećim ekonomijama. Upravo su navedene teme u fokusu ovog rada, kao i pitanje da li se mogu očekivati konceptualne promene u pravcu značajnijeg prihvatanja tzv. državnog kapitalizma, ali i protekcionizma i ekonomskog nacionalizma, kao posledica prolongirane stagnacije, ili je u pitanju samo pooštrena i populistička retorika kreatora politike koji pokušavaju da povrate poverenje svojih građana u politiku i budućnost kapitalizma i obezbede izbornu pobedu.

11 10 OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA 2. STANJE GLOBALNE EKONOMIJE U ERI SEKULARNE STAGNACIJE Među mnogim teorijskim objašnjenjima stanja svetske privrede u protekloj deceniji je i ono koje prati koncept razvijen od strane jednog od najvažnijih američkih kejnzijanaca Alvina Hansena (Summers, 2016), koji je baveći se američkom privredom tokom ih govorio o «eri sekularne stagnacije» utvrđujući faktore koji su do nje doveli i ukazujući na moguće načine za njeno prevazilaženje. Hansen je, naime, izdvojio kao najznačajniji problem nemogućnost sistema da dostigne punu zaposlenost u uslovima nepostojanja programa kojim bi se stimulisala potrošnja 1. Objašnjenje se zasniva na uključivanju i Vikselovog koncepta neutralne kamatne stope, a dugotrajna stagnacija može nastati kao rezultat povećane sklonosti štednji koja nije praćena odgovarajućim povećanjem investicija, već upravo suprotno i to usled smanjene agregatne tražnje. Posledice se ogledaju i u snižavanju realne kamatne stope koja se spušta ispod nivoa neutralne stope, ne pridonoseći, međutim, rastu održivih investicija, već eventualno rizičnom ponašanju koje može izazvati pregrevanje i pucanje ekonomskog balona i otpočinjanje bolne recesije. Slično se može očekivati i od pada kamatne stope koja je posledica monetarne ekspanzije 2. Upravo je globalnoj krizi prethodila i globalna neravnoteža između štednje i investicija zbog zasićenja povećanjem štednje na svetskom nivou. 3 Diskrepanca između štednje i investicija može biti posledica raspodele dohotka i bogatstva u korist bogatih koji imaju manju sklonost potrošnji. Ovo je veoma blisko Kejnsovom konceptu efektivne tražnje (Keynes, 1936). Upravo je problem nejednakosti u raspodeli dohotka aktuelizovan od vremena uspona neoliberalnog koncepta i insistiranja na liberalno-tržišnoj ekonomiji, koja počiva na kapitalu i odustajanju od kejnzijanske države blagostanja i kapitalizma pune zaposlenosti. To je vremenom u posebno nepovoljnu poziciju stavilo one koji primaju radne dohotke (radničku i srednju klasu). Nedostatak intervencije u raspodeli kroz bilo kakvu politiku raspodele, što se duguje neoklasičnom političkom projektu, decenijama je u vodećim zapadnim ekonomijama prevazilažen stabilnim ekonomskim rastom, kao i olakšanim zaduživanjem stanovništva. Međutim, globalna kriza je stavila tačku na takve mogućnosti, doprinoseći da problem raspodele, koji nije preko noći nastao, postane očigledan. Na probleme raspodele koji su intenzivirani od 1980-ih i pobede neoliberalnog koncepta, ukazao je Piketi, o čemu će u radu još biti reči (Piketi, 2015). Stanje globalne ekonomije danas u mnogome nalikuje na objašnjenja koje je ponudio Hansen (Praščević, 2016). To se prvenstveno odnosi na nisku stopu rasta svetske ekonomije (WGP), koja značajno zaostaje za decenijom pre krize prosečna stopa od godine je 2.5%, za razliku od pretkriznih 3.4% ( ) 4. Ovakve tendencije se 1 Hansen (1939), str. 4 2 Primer se može naći u američkoj monetarnoj politici u periodu pre krize, na tržištu nekretnina godine i sloma tržišta hipotekarnih kredita, kada su napravljene očigledne greške u prevazilaženju blage i kratke recesije iz godine, odstupanjem od Tejlorovog pravila previše ekspanzivna monetarna politika koja je omogućila da novac postane jeftin i lako dostupan. (Praščević (2008), str. 50) 3 To je za posledicu imalo sniženje neutralne kamatne stope širom sveta. Ovo je prvenstveno poticalo od visokih neto suficita zabeleženih u Nemačkoj, Japanu, Srednjem Istoku, a najznačajniji su bili u Kini i na Dalekom Istoku. (Praščević (2012), str. 52) 4 World Economic Situation and Prospects, United Nations (2017)

12 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART duguju niskim stopama rasta u mnogim regionima sveta prvenstveno u razvijenim ekonomijama, ali i padu ekonomija u tranziciji, pa i usporavanju ekonomija sa nastajućim tržištima. To se duguje značajnom usporavanju rasta investicija u mnogim vodećim ekonomijama, ekonomijama u razvoju i naročito ekonomijama u tranziciji. Iako su kamatne stope i dalje na istorijsko niski nivoima (naročito u EU, uz blagi rast u SAD-u) to ne podstiče u dovoljnoj meri investicije već je i dalje prisutan nepovoljan uticaj u začaranom krugu: tražnja investicije trgovina produktivnost. U njemu se pokazuje da je agregatna tražnja od ključnog značaja i da su nepovoljni faktori koji su na nju uticali na globalnom nivou, od političkih (nestabilnosti, geopolitičkih konflikata i rizika) do ekonomskih (primena mera štednje, problemi javnih finansija i zaduženosti, izostanak značajnijeg fiskalnog stimulansa i jasne ekonomske politike da se potrošnja podstiče), odlučujući za slab ekonomski rast. Potvrdile su se tako tokom ove prolongirane stagnacije pouke vezane za monetarnu i fiskalnu politiku 5 koje su se pokazale kao tačne tokom poslednje globalne krize, a koje su upravo u skladu sa Hansenovim konceptom samo-generišuće stagnacije. Kao jedan od simptoma globalne stagnacije svakako se pojavljuje usporavanje rasta svetske trgovine koje je je godine zabeležilo jednu od najnižih stopa rasta u poslednjih 30 godina, od svega 1,2%. 6 Pored cikličnih faktora to se duguje i strukturi globalne agregatne tražnje, povećanoj ekonomskoj i političkoj neizvesnosti, ali i ograničavanju dalje liberalizacije koja je tokom 1990-ih i 2000-ih dovela do ekspanzije svetske trgovine. Zbog toga i brinu najave mera ekonomske politike kojima bi se slobodan protok ljudi, kapitala, roba i usluga dalje ograničavao, naročito kada potiče od vodeće svetske ekonomije SAD-a. Reč je, naravno, o najavljenim promenama politike novog predsednika SAD-a koje u velikoj meri podsećaju na elemente merkantilističkog sistema 7 u domenu protekcionizma i ekonomskog nacionalizma (korišćenjem različitih formi zakonskih ograničenja slobodnih tokova kapitala i roba carinske i necarinske barijere, zabrana seljenja proizvodnje iz SAD-a u druge zemlje sveta pod pretnjom plaćanja penala), ograničavanja protoka ljudi i sl. Bez obzira što najavljene mere ne nailaze na podršku ostalih poluga vlasti u SAD-u, one i dalje predstavljaju pretnju za buduća globalna kretanja, u najmanjoj meri povećavajući neizvesnost i podstičući i kreatore ekonomske politike u drugim zemljama da se slično ponašaju. Posebno su važna i nepovoljna kretanja na tržištima rada širom sveta, kao i usporeni rast produktivnosti rada zabeležen u većini razvijenih, kao i ekonomija u razvoju i tranziciji. To se takođe duguje nedovoljnom investiranju zbog čega izostaju inovacije, poboljšanje veština radne snage, kao i poboljšanje kvaliteta infrastukture. Zbog toga su od odlučujućeg značaja ulaganja u ključna područja, kao što su istraživanje i razvoj, obrazovanje i infrastruktura, a koja su tesno povezana sa državom i njenom ekonomskom politikom jer su u pitanju javne investicije. Davno napuštanje kejnzijanskog koncepta kapitalizma pune 5 Mishkin (2010), Romer (2011) 6 World Economic Situation and Prospects, United Nations (2017) 7 Iako je merkantilizam davno napuštena ekonomska doktrina koja je dominirala u surovom periodu prelaska u kapitalizam u kome su nastajale nacionalne države, nacionalna tržišta, ali i obrisi svetskog tržišta, zapravo je ona predstavljala prvu ekonomsku teoriju koja se zalagala za državnu intervenciju i to specifičnu u ograničavanju uvoza i podsticanju izvoza Bez obzira što je ova doktrina zamenjena superiornijom klasičnom političkom ekonomijom sa idejama ekonomskog liberalizma, univerzalnih ekonomskih zakonitosti i slobodne trgovine, neki elementi merkantilističkog sistema su ostali prisutni do današnjih dana. To se prvenstveno odnosi na podršku države nacionalnoj privredi (izvozno orijentisanoj industriji) i oslanjanju ekonomskog rasta na izvoznoj tražnji, uz suzbijanje domaće tražnje (politikom zarada i deviznog kursa, kao i ograničavanjem uvoza carinama i kvotama). U novijoj istoriji takav primer možemo najočiglednije pronaći u ekonomskoj politici Kine. (Jakšić and Praščević (2011), str. 13).

13 12 OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA zaposlenosti i prepuštanje tržišnim rešenjima na fleksibilnim tržištima rada kojima je trebalo osloboditi profite i obezbediti izvore za buduća investiranja, koje se u decenijama pre krize pokazalo opravdanim, danas nije tako primamljiva opcija. U velikom broju zemalja se očekuje od države da svojim merama podstakne zapošljavanje, pa čak i u vodećim svetskim ekonomijama, koje su pri tome i kolevke ekonomskog liberalizma. 3. PROMENE DOMINANTNIH TEORIJSKIH KONCEPATA I VARIJETITI KAPITALIZMA Poslednja globalna kriza i post-recesiona stagnacija podsetile su nas da je kapitalizam nestabilan ekonomski sistem i da je tu karakteristiku ispoljavao od samih početaka svog razvoja. Uporedo sa beleženim oscilacijama privredne aktivnosti i ostvarenim ekonomskim rezultatima, kapitalizam se takođe menjao uključujući različite karakteristike više ili manje konkurentska tržišta, veću ili manju intervenciju države, značajniju ili manje značajnu regulaciju, čak i državno vlasništvo nad privrednim subjektima i sl. Sve je to određivalo različite varijetete (tipove) kapitalizma koji su se kroz istoriju smenjivali, što je često bila posledica ekonomskih kriza. Uporedo sa ovim promenama išle su promene u dominaciji ekonomskih teorija, koje su se od XX veka prvenstveno odnosile na makroekonomke škole koje su na različite načine videle mesto i ulogu države i njene ekonomske politike, sposobnosti ekonomskih subjekata da na tržištima deluju, ali i razlike u funkcionisanju tržišta veće ili manje postojanje tržišnih neuspeha (engl. makret failures). Takođe treba istaći da se razlike u tipovima kapitalizma mogu i geografski posmatrati: anglosaksonski (atlanski), kontinentalno evropski i razvojni (azijski). Postoje i mnoge druge kategorizacije koje razlikuju tipove kapitalizma «liberalno-tržišne ekonomije» od «koordinisano-tržišnih ekonomija» (Hall and Soskice, 2001) 8, ili «racionalni kapitalizam» od «akcionarskog kapitalizma» (Dore, 2002), ili «privatno (liberalni) kapitalizam» naspram «državnog kapitalizma» (Wolff and Resnick, 2012) 9 ili tri tipa kapitalizma «tržišni kapitalizam», «rukovođeni kapitalizam» i «državni kapitalizam» (Schmidt, 2002). Ove razlike se tiču prvenstveno razlika u karakteristikama: institucija tržišta rada i regulacije, uloge države, karaktera konkurencije, uloge radničkih sindikata, značaja i uloge fiskalne politike, obrazovne politike, inovacija, korporativnog upravljanja i načina finansiranja. 3.1 Posleratne promene u kapitalizmu i globalna ekonomska kriza Posleratni razvoj kapitalizma otpočeo je značajnom promenom u formi prihvatanja državne intervencije i razvoja tzv. kejnzijanske države blagostanja. Razloga i opravdanja za primenu državnog kapitalizma bilo je mnogo od straha od pojave nove recesije, preko potrebe za ubrzanim privrednim oporavkom, izgradnjom infrastrukture i podizanjem proizvodnih kapaciteta zemalja koje su iz Drugog svetskog rata izašle razorene. Koncept kapi- 8 Hall and Soskice (2001), str Wolff and Resnick (2012), str. 311

14 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART talizma pune zaposlenosti koji je u tom periodu primenjivan imao je i političko uporište jer je trebalo da obezbedi da kapitalističke ekonomije zaštiti od prodora komunističkih ideja sa Istoka (Sovjetskog bloka), kao i od eventualnog povampirenja u ratu poraženih političkih snaga 10. Zbog toga je kapitalizam morao da omogući poboljšanje životnog standarda većeg dela stanovništva, poboljša njihovu obrazovnu strukturu i smanji razlike između društvenih klasa (bogatih i siromašnih). Sve je to relativno uspešno obezbedio kejnzijanizam, sve do trenutka kada su se 1970-ih pojavile atipične recesije, praćene visokim i upornim inflacijama. Uz visoku nezaposlenost i inflaciju, privrede su patile i od pada u visini profitne stope, a rast nadnica je prevazilazio rast produktivnosti. Sve je to zahtevalo radikalni zaokret u formi povratka tržištu i odricanja od kenzijanske države blagostanja. SLIKA 1: PROMENE U KAPITALIZMU I DOMINANTNE EKONOMSKE TEORIJE Kejzijanska država blagostanja: ubrzan posleratni ekonomski razvoj, smanjila razlike između društvenih aktera, zasnovana na konceptu kapitalizma pune zaposlenosti i perspektivi radne snage Recesije 1970-tih, epizode visokih inflacija Ekonomija slobodnog tržišta: ideološka promena u upravljanju kapitalizmom (deregulacija, liberalizacija i privatizacija), smanjena uloga rada i povećan značaj kapitala, radikalni antikejnzijanizam u makroekonomiji: nova neoklasična sinteza, uspeh u brobi protiv inflcije i značajnim stopama ekonomskog rasta (smanjenje cikličnih privrednih fluktuacija) Globalna ekonomska kriza ( ) Era sekularne stagnacije: Pragmatični kejnzijanizam ( ), Mere fiskalne konsolidacije i štednje zbog problema javnih finansija (od 2010) Usporen ekonomski rast i problemi tržišta rada Državna intervencija («pro-biznis» država) i elementi merkantilizma Nakon decenija uspešne primene koncepta makroekonomije slobodnog tržišta i dominacije nove neoklasične sinteze zasnovane na poznatim makroekonomskim neutralnostima 11 (hipoteza o životnom ciklusu potrošnje, Modiljani Milerova teorema, hipoteza o prirodnoj stopi, hipoteza o racionalnim očekivanjima, Rikardo Barova teorema ekvivalencije), otpočela je poslednja globalna recesija, koja je podsetila na činjenicu da su ciklične fluktuacije karakteristika tržišnih ekonomija. Ne čudi uspeh radikalnog antikejnzijanizma i njegov intelektualni monopol u prethodnim decenijama koji se ogledao i u uticaju na ekonomsku politiku čije su okosnice bile 10 Praščević (2012), str Akerlof (2007), str. 9.

15 14 OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA preporuke monetarističke i novoklasičarske makroekonomije uvođenje pravila umesto diskrecionih prava, jedinstveni cilj monetarne politike u vidu cenovne stabilnosti, uključivanje fiskalnih pravila kojima bi se održavalo zdravlje javnih finansija, unapređenje institucionalnih okvira vođenja makroekonomske politike nezavisnost centralne banke i obavezivanje monetarnih vlasti, obezbeđenje kredibiliteta i reputacije kreatora ekonomske politike. Naime, izgledalo je da se zbog produžavanja perioda ekonomskih ekspanzija i skraćenja i ublažavanja recesija, na ciklične padove može gledati kao na primere iz ekonomske istorije koji se u savremenom kapitalizmu neće ponoviti, prvenstveno zbog napretka u vođenju ekonomske politike koji je poticao iz razvoja savremene makroekonomije. Tome je doprineo i važan faktor globalnog prihvatanja neoliberalnog koncepta vođenja ekonomije, kao i uspeh neoliberalnog političkog projekta, koji se ispoljavao u talasima demokratizacije i ekonomske tranzicije u bivšim socijalističkim ekonomijama, ali i u promenama ekonomske politike u zemljama Latinske Amerike nametnutim Vašingtonskim konsenzusom, koje nisu uvek bile i uspešne. Upravo je Vašingtonski konsenzus zbog svoje jednostavnosti i jasnosti postao sinonim za program ekonomskih reformi izgradnje «tvrdog slobodnotržišnog kapitalizma» namenjen tranzicionim zemljama, ali i svim ostalim ekonomijama sa nastajućim tržištima. Takođe je predstavljao i sinonim za glavni tok makroekonomije i preovlađujući liberalni model razvoja Liberalni naspram merkantilističkog modela Poznati ekonomista Dani Rodrik odredio je razvoj ekonomske nauke kao borbu između dve suprotstavljene škole: liberalizma i merkantilizma (Rodrik, 2013). On ovu borbu smešta u širi kontekst koji prevazilazi samu merkantilističku doktrinu ili klasičnu političku ekonomiju i neoklasičnu školu, vezujući je za okvir sukoba dve forme kapitalizma: privatno-liberalnog i državnog kapitalizma. Oni počivaju na različitim ekonomskim modelima, a kao što je u radu već istaknuto u prošlosti se smenjivala njihova dominacija, isto kao što je moguće uočiti i njihovu uspešnu «kohabitaciju» u svetu globalizovane ekonomije. Već je istaknuto da nisu sve zemlje usvojile liberalni model. Neke su se opredelile i za «merkantilistički model» uključivanjem državne intervencije, direktnih podsticaja domaćoj privredi u formi različitih subvencija, značajne implementacije industrijske politike, pomoći države nastupu domaće privrede na svetskim tržištima, ali i ograničenjima pristupa stranih kompanija domaćem tržištu, politikom podcenjenog deviznog kursa, ograničenjima domaće tražnje, održavanjem veštački niskih troškova rada (nadnica) radi obezbeđenja konkurentnosti na svetskom tržištu, ali i radi ograničenja uvoza i sl. Ovakav model bio je prisutan u mnogim azijskim ekonomijama, a najekstremniji je primer Kine. Iako ona ne predstavlja primer kapitalističke ekonomije, ona veoma uspešno dobija bitku na svetskim tržištima sa vodećim tržišnim ekonomijama i danas predstavlja drugu ekonomiju sveta, pod i dalje vođstvom Komunističke partije Kine, što ne predstavlja značajno opterećenje za primenu merkantilističkog modela. Naime, merkantilistički metod ne zahteva nužno političku demokratiju, niti politički liberalizam, već je upravo poželjno suprotno ograničenje političkih sloboda koje olakšava delovanje države i njenog aparata. 12 Praščević (2014), str. 14.

16 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABELA 1: MERKANTILISTIČKI NASPRAM LIBERALNOG MODELA Merkantilistički model Centralno mesto: PROIZVOÐAČ Državna intervencija i to u formi države orijentisane na pomoć privrednim subjektima (tzv. «pro-biznis» država) Korporativistički pristup: država i privatni biznis imaju zajedničke ciljeve koje treba realizovati i korišćenjem ekonomske politike i državne intervencije Značaj IZVOZNE TRAŽNJE kao izvora ekonomskog rasta izvoz je pokazatelj ekonomske vitalnosti ekonomije, a uvoz zavisnosti nacionalne ekonomije. Liberalni model Centralno mesto: POTROŠAČ Konkurentska tržišta «ekonomija slobodnog tržišta» Striktna razdvojenost države i privatnog biznisa jer državu opterećuje predatorska priroda, a ponašanje poslovnih ljudi je zasnovano na aktivnostima traganja za rentom. Njihova simbioza je pogubna za ekonomiju Makroekonomski cilj je obezbediti što veći obim uvoza za manji obim izvoza (Fridman, 1978). Uvoz može pomoći ekonomski razvoj i rast trgovinske razmene. Kineska velika ekonomska transformacija kako se naziva kineski ekonomski razvoj u proteklih 35 godina primenio je metode koji nalikuju onima primenjenim u periodu prelaska u kapitalizam. Bez obzira na osporavanja ili negodovanje javnosti i političke elite u vodećim ekonomijama usmerenim prema zemljama koje primenjuju merkantilistički model, treba ukazati da su obe strane od toga imale koristi. 4. KRIZA GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA I USPON POLITIČKOG POPULIZMA Poslednja globalna kriza nije nas samo podsetila na nestabilan karakter kapitalističkog sistema već i na činjenicu da njega karakterišu dva suprotna procesa smanjenje i povećanje razlika između kolektivnih društvenih aktera (društvenih klasa). Upravo ove tendencije imaju i ekonomske i političke konsekvence. Nakon što je u periodu kejnzijanske države blagostanja došlo do smanjenja ovih razlika u razvijenim tržišnim ekonomijama, što je bilo i posledica političkih ciljeva u posleratnom periodu kada je bilo potrebno zaustaviti mogući prodor komunističkog uticaja sa istoka, uspon neoliberalnog ekonomskog i političkog projekta imao je potpuno suprotne efekte. Konsekvence neoliberalne globalizacije, pada socijalističkog bloka i političke demokratizacije bivših socijalističkih zemalja, kao i intenzivnog ekonomskog razvoja ekonomija sa nastajućim tržištima značajno su uticale na promenu ekonomske pozicije ne samo čitavih ekonomija, nego i njihovih građana, a naročito pojedinih segmenata društva. U razvijenim ekonomijama to se prvenstveno odnosi na položaj radničke i srednje klase i to u dva važna elementa: - promena u ekonomskoj poziciji unutar nacionalne ekonomije koja potiče od rastuće nejednakosti u raspodeli dohotka koja se duguje upravo neoliberalnom konceptu oslobađanja kapitala od preobimnog oporezivanja (snižavanjem poreskih stopa i smanjivanjem progresivnog oporezivanja) 13, 13 Piketi (2015)

17 16 OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA - promena u poziciji na globalnom nivou usled ekonomskog rasta ekonomija sa nastajućim tržištima, a u Evropi i ekonomija u tranziciji, u kojima je došlo do poboljšanja ekonomske pozicije građana i naročito njihove buduće perspektive (bez obzira što u mnogim od tih zemalja i dalje postoji značajno siromaštvo, teški uslovi rada, neispunjenost standarda zaštite životne sredine i sl.). Sve to čini građane vodećih ekonomija nezadovoljnim ekonomskim i političkim sistemom, uključujući i sam koncept demokratskog upravljanja. Ovo nezadovoljstvo se primarno odnosi na nacionalne države, ali u EU je usmereno i na sam koncept i način ustrojstva Evropske Unije. Političke partije na političkoj levici i desnici nemaju odgovore na ovakve ekonomske i društvene izazove, delimično i zato što su oni neočekivani, odnosno zato što je razvoj savremene makroekonomije ukazivao na uspešnost ostvarenog makroekonomskog konsenzusa u kome je čitav niz danas aktuelnih pitanja bio u potpunosti zanemaren. To se prvenstveno odnosi na zanemarivanje značaja postojanja i delovanja kolektivnih društvenih aktera, insistiranjem na reprezentativnom ekonomskom subjektu, što je prisutno još od mikroekonomske revolucije krajem XIX veka, ali je delimično bilo osporeno Kejnsovom i kejnzijanskom ekonomijom, da bi ponovo bilo aktuelizavano u makroekonomskoj teoriji monetarizma i Nove klasike. Drugo, zanemarivan je uticaj funkcionalne raspodele dohotka (između faktora proizvodnje rada i kapitala) na ukupna makroekonomska kretanja, na koga su inače u razvoju ekonomske misli ukazivali različiti teoretičari tražnje (od Fransoa Kenea u XVIII veku, preko Marksa u XIX, do Kejnsa i kejnzijanaca u XX veku). Treće, pretpostavljalo se da kapitalizam osigurava i demokratiju. 4.1 Konvergencija ekonomskih ciljeva političkih partija i globalna ekonomska kriza Uspeh koncepta neoliberalne globalizacije i moderne makroekonomije u vodećim ekonomijama (SAD-a, EU, Japana) bio je praćen, ili tačnije uslovljen i konvergencijom ekonomskih ciljeva različitih političkih opcija, u formi približavanja levičarskih i desničarskih partija. To je dovelo do brisanja razlika u domenu ekonomskih ciljeva između partija koje su tradicionalno imale različito biračko telo koje je poticalo od razlika u političkim ideološkim programima u oblasti ekonomije. Posebno je uočljivo odustajanje od socijal-demokratskih i levičarskih ideja. Zbog toga su mnoge partije prestale da budu partije radničke i srednje klase (npr. Demokratska partija u SAD-u ili Laburalistička partija u Britaniji), postavši kontrolisane od liberalne elite koja nije mnogo zainteresovana za pogoršanje pozicije miliona radnika (naročito je to očigledno u SAD-u). Tehnološki napredak i promena proizvodne strukture dovela je do rasta sektora usluga, tako da je smanjen broj proizvodnih radnika u razvijenim ekonomijama što je takođe doprinelo smanjenom interesovanju za ovaj segment društva od strane političkih partija. Približavanje ekonomskih politika u vidu odustajanja od ideoloških ciljeva radničke klase bilo je uslovljeno i postojanjem uspešnog konsenzusa u makroekonomiji koji je značio odustajanje od originalnih Kejnsovih i kejnzijanskih postavki i prihvatanje klasičarskih ideja. S obzirom na decenijski uspeh ovakve ekonomske politike, ove partije nisu imale problem pobede na izborima. Posledice ovakvog približavanja su bile, međutim, dalekosežne, a danas, u periodu postrecesione stagnacije, su posebno očigledne. Iako su pozitivne posledice bile u smanjenju

18 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART uticaja političke nestabilnosti usled smanjenog faktora političke neizvesnosti na makroekonomsku nestabilnost jer je postalo manje važno koja će politička opcija pobediti na izborima pošto sve imaju veoma slične ekonomske ciljeve, negativne posledice su danas mnogo vidljivije. One se odnose na gubitak poverenja glasača građana u etablirane političke partije. To se posebno odnosi na levičarske ili socijal-demokratske partije, zbog čega, paradoksalno, raste zainteresovanost radničke i srednje klase za desničarske partije koje uspešnije koriste populističu retoriku, naročito svaljujući krivicu za loš ekonomski položaj domaćeg stanovništva na ostatak sveta, neretko videvši krivca u globalizaciji, ekonomskoj politici drugih zemalja ili međunarodnim integracijama. Uz uspon populizma, dolazi i do pojave novih političkih pokreta koji lakše od političkih partija okupljaju glasače, ali i dalje sa nejasnim ciljevima koje tek treba artikulisati, gde postoji jasna opasnost da se nakon izbora promene najavljeni ekonomski ciljevi i proklamovana ekonomska politika. 4.2 Primeri SAD-a i Evropske Unije U uslovima izrazitog raslojavanja i rasta nejednakosti u vodećim ekonomijama 14, koje sasvim sigurno nisu posledica samo globalne ekonomske krize, moderni kapitalizam se nalazi u krizi, uvodeći u krizu i sam koncept demokratskog upravljanja. Za razliku od ranijih iskustava, kada je izrazito socijalno raslojavanje bilo vezano za nerazvijene ekonomije sa nekonsolidovanim demokratskim sistemima, ovakva pojava u razvijenim ekonomijama i konsolidovanim demokratijama predstavlja iznenađenje. Odgovori, politički i ekonomski, međutim, ne mogu se smatrati iznenađujućim. U domenu politike, pored uspona populizma koga uglavnom obezbeđuje politička desnica, uočljiva je i pojava autoritarnih političkih vođa koji nude građanima jednostavna rešenja njihovih ekonomskih problema, a koja često prate anti-liberalne ideje (u ovom slučaju u domenu politike), proklamovanje ekonomskog nacionalizma i svaljivanje odgovornosti na druge zemlje, a u mnogo manjoj meri se ističe istinski problem raspodele dohotka i bogatstva na nacionalnom nivou. Tako se u još većoj meri zaoštrava politička trilema svetske ekonomije između: 1) nacionalnog suvereniteta, 2) hiper-globalizacije svetske ekonomije i 3) demokratske politike (Rodrik, 2007). Ona svoje specifičnosti dobija u novim političkim i ekonomskim pojavama i kretanjima u SAD-u i EU, koje karakteriše izraziti uspon političkog populizma, dokazujući da će nacionalne države ostati «fundamentalni teren za borbu između konkurentskih društvenih snaga» 15. Najavljena politika novog predsednika SAD-a, Donalda Trampa izazvala je značajne kontroverze, kako u američkoj javnosti i društvu, tako i među ekonomistima. Elementi ove ekonomske politike mogu se podvesti pod primere merkantilističkog sistema i to njegovo zalaganje za: ponovno pregovaranje oko pojedinih trgovinskih sporazuma (jer međunarodna trgovina treba da bude slobodna, ali «fer» za Ameriku), uvođenje barijera uvozu proizvoda u SAD, pomoć američke države američkom biznisu, otežavanje mogućnosti ulaska stranih kompanija na američko tržište, ograničavanje američkim kompanijama preseljenje proizvodnje iz SAD-a u druge zemlje pod pretnjom plaćanja penala, odusta- 14 Od perioda globalne krize prisutno je značajno usporavanje rasta produktivnosti rada u većini razvijenih ekonomija, a rast realnih nadnica čak zaostaje za rastom produktivnosti. Istovremeno došlo je do porasta bogatstva najbogatijih u okvirima nacionalnih ekonomija i na globalnom nivou. Prema Piketiju ove tendencije teže da svet vrate u stanje pred Prvi svetski rat kada je samo 10% stanovnika raspolagalo sa 90% procenata ukupnog kapitala u Evropi. Danas, 10% populacije raspolaže sa oko 60% kapitala u Evropi, a u SAD-u sa čak 70%. 15 Robinson (2010), str. 306

19 18 OD GLOBALNE EKONOMSKE KRIZE DO KRIZE GLOBALNOG KAPITALIZMA janje od potpisanog učešća u programu zaštite životne sredine i borbe protiv klimatskih promena, ograničavanje slobodnih tokova ljudi ograničavanje ulaska građanima pojedinih zemalja u SAD i sl. Navedenim merama bi trebalo obezbediti posao za američke radnike, povećati konkurentnost američke privrede, poboljšati devastiranu američku infrastrukturu, poboljšati poziciju SAD-a u međunarodnoj politici. Sve ovo je praćeno oštrom retorikom u kojoj se problemi američkih građana prvenstveno pripisuju efektima ekonomske politike drugih zemalja (naročito Kine), kao i poboljšanju ekonomske pozicije građana u drugim zemljama, kao i ponašanju političke elite SAD-a koja je zaboravila na američke radnike i američke građane. Detaljnija analiza predloženih mera, međutim, ukazuje na značajna ograničenja, odnosno da one ili ne mogu biti implementirane, ili da će ukoliko i budu primenjene imati potpuno suprotne efekte od onih koji se žele. Naročito zabrinjava izraziti ekonomski nacionalizam koji se propagira. U Evropskoj Uniji je institucionalni kontekst u kome dolazi do uspona desničarskog populizma još složeniji nego u SAD-u. Evropski integracioni procesi su originalno bili motivisani ciljem otklanjanja unilateralnih i destruktivnih politika evropskih zemalja, ne samo u domenu ekonomske politike. U specifičnim posleratnim uslovima hladnog rata bilo je neophodno izbeći ekonomski nacionalizam, protekcionističku politiku i pokušati sa izgradnjom jedinstvene evropske, u prvom redu ekonomske politike. Sa razvojem i implementacijom evropskih integracionih procesa se otpočelo u kejnzijanskim okvirima kapitalizma pune zaposlenosti. Ipak na promene u ciljevima, ali i u institucionim okvirima i u ovom slučaju uticao je uspon neoliberalnog ekonomskog i političkog projekta, koji je u okvirima EU imao posebne specifičnosti. Tome je svakako doprineo pad Berlinskog zida koji je okončao podelu Evrope i čime su otpočeli procesi ekonomske tranzicije i političke demokratizacije, ali i proširenja EU. Za mnoge građane bivših socijalističkih zemalja koncept kapitalizma slobodnog tržišta bio je sinonim za slobode (političke i ekonomske), a pridruživanje EU postao im je primarni cilj koji će omogućiti ekonomski prosperitet. Pre globalne ekonomske krize podrška procesima evropske integracije u svim evropskim zemljama bila je značajna. Za građane iz novopridruženih zemalja ovo je bio način da obezbede korist od zajedničkih javnih dobara i politika EU, a za građane «starih» članica korist se ogledala u proširenju zajedničkog tržišta, kao i u političkoj kontroli i uticaju nad većim delom Evrope. Ipak, globalna ekonomska kriza je i u ovom slučaju podstakla ekonomske i političke procese koji su doveli u sumnju samu evropsku integraciju, njene motive, ograničenja i institucionalne okvire. Ovo je najočiglednije u slučaju izglasavanja «bregzita», odnosno izlaska Velike Britanije iz Unije, ali i u usponu desničarskih, izolacionističkih i evro-skeptičnih politika u mnogim zemljama članicama. Problemi su daleko dublji i kompleksniji, a u dobrom delu su posledica činjenice da je većina Evropljana izgubila veru u sopstveni ekonomski progres u okvirima Evropske Unije. Delimično je to posledica i činjenice da su decenijama zanemarivani elementi evropskog socijalnog modela. Evropski socijalni model koji se zasnivao na kombinaciji ekonomskog rasta, visokog životnog standarda i dobrih radnih uslova, a koji je bio primamljiv svim Evropljanima, doveden je u pitanje procesima globalizacije i još više globalnom krizom, ali i procesima

20 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART proširenja Unije. Ne treba zaboraviti da je proširenje imalo uticaja na tržište rada jer su se kao konkurencija pojavili radnici iz novih zemalja Unije, a došlo je i do preseljenja proizvodnje u ove zemlje zbog nižih troškova proizvodnje, prvenstveno usled nižih nadnica. Dakle radnici u vodećim ekonomijama Unije dobili su konkurenciju koja je značila i manje radnih mesta za njih i moguće pogoršanje radnih uslova. Post-recesiona stagnacija nametnula je potrebu reformi tržišta rada u pojedinim članicama EU, koja bi značila povećanu fleksibilnost, kao i reformu radnog zakonodavstava uključujući i produženje radnog veka zaposlenih. Usled izrazitih makroekonomskih problema u pojedinim zemljama Unije koji uključuju prvenstveno probleme javnih finansija primenjeni su paketi mera štednje koji su još više pogoršali poziciju građana (npr. Grčka), pokazujući nedostatak solidarnosti između zemalja članica i dovodeći u pitanje institucionalni okvir evropske integracije. Naime, postalo je aktuelno pitanje da li EU garantuje minimum socijalne pravde za sve svoje građane, bez obzira u kojoj zemlji članici žive. Negativan odgovor, je danas aktuelizovao ulogu nacionalnih kreatora ekonomske politike zemalja članica i njihovu odgovornost prema sopstvenim građanima za ekonomske rezultate. Evropska administracija trpi kritike usled očigledne birokratizacije i nesposobnosti da se realizuju ciljevi zbog kojih su integracije preduzete promocija ekonomskog rasta, obezbeđenje ekonomskog prosperiteta, dostizanje pune zaposlenosti i promocija blagostanja. Još jedan važan faktor koji je uticao na negativna politička i ekonomska kretanja u Evropi je svakako migrantska kriza, kao i problemi bezbednosti i česti teroristički napadi u zemljama EU. Oni su dodatno podstakli okretanje nacionalnim državama, izolacionizam i zatvaranje granica, kao i odbijanje da se učestvuje u podeli tereta prihvata migranata. Ovo je važan faktor koji je takođe doprineo uspehu populističke retorike i procesima koji umanjuju perspektivu značajnije političke integracije u okviru EU. 5. ZAKLJUČAK Nakon decenije od početka dvogodišnje globalne ekonomske krize svet je suočen sa prolongiranom samo-generišućom stagnacijom čija je posledica i kriza kapitalizma, koja ima različite forme od društvene krize u kojoj se intenziviraju sukobi između različitih društvenih snaga i zbog koje građani gube poverenje u budući ekonomski prosperitet, do nedostajućih izvora ekonomskog rasta. Ovo se prvenstveno odnosi na vodeće ekonomije sveta visoko-industrijalizovane zemlje konsolidovane demokratije. U njima su do izražaja došle i ranije poznate tendencije funkcionisanja kapitalističkog sistema ciklične fluktuacije, kao i tendencija povećanja razlika između kolektivnih društvenih aktera. Iako poznate, ove su tendencije zanemarivane u decenijama stabilnog prosperiteta pre globalne krize, tokom koga je uspešno primenjivan neoliberalni ekonomski i politički projekat. Međutim, izgleda da ni danas nisu obezbeđeni adekvatni odgovori ekonomske politike, niti konceptualne promene funkcionisanja tržišnih ekonomija koje bi podrazumevale uspostavljanje novog društvenog dogovora koji bi u obzir uzeo interese svih društvenih grupa, neku vrstu «novog dogovora» između kapitala, rada i države, umesto retoričkog populizma.

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22 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Rodrik, D. (2007), The inescapable trilemma of the world economy, [Online] at rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2007/06/the-inescapable.html [Accessed ] Rodrik, D. (2013), The new mercantilist challenge, [Online] at [Accessed ] Romer, D. (2011), What Have We Learned about Fiscal Policy from the Crisis?, IMF Conference on Macro and Growth Policies in the Wake of the Crisis, external/np/seminars/eng/2011/res/pdf/dr3presentation.pdf Schmidt, V. A. (2002), The Futures of European Capitalism, OUP, Oxford Summers, L. H. (2016), The Age of Secular Stagnation: What It Is and What to Do About It, [Accessed ] Wolff, R. D. and Resnick, S. A. (2012), Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) World Economic Situation and Prospects, United Nations (2017), development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/2017wesp_full_en.pdf

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24 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART LJUBODRAG SAVIĆ 1 ljubas@ekof.bg.ac.rs DRAGANA RADIČIĆ radicic.dragana@yahoo.com VLADIMIR MIĆIĆ 2 micicv@kg.ac.rs JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AS A POSSIBLE MODEL OF FUNDING LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS JEL KLASIFIKACIJA: H41, H54, R53 APSTRAKT: Za potrebe ubrzanog i održivog ekonomskog razvoja i realizacije poslovnih poduhvata, javnih nabavki odnosno izgradnje infrastrukture i pružanja usluga od javnog značaja, a zbog nedostatka finansijskih sredstava u budžetu lokalnih nivoa javne vlasti, njihove poslovne neefikasnosti i odsustva znanja i veština da adekvatno reaguju na različite nepredviđene okolnosti i podmiruju mnogobrojne i raznovrsne potrebe građana i društva u celini, u ze- 1 Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu 2 Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Kragujevcu

25 24 JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA mljama tržišne privrede, pristupa se savremenim modelima finansiranja, prvenstvenom primenom koncepta javno-privatnog partnerstva. Uvreženo je mišljenje da javno-privatna partnerstva predstavljaju ogromni potencijal za lokalni i sveukupni ekonomski razvoj jedne zemlje. U Republici Srbiji, nasuprot iskustvima dobre prakse, realnim mogućnostima i očekivanjima, još uvek nisu iskorišćeni potencijali koje ovaj model finansiranja neosporno nudi. KLJUČNE REČI: JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO, ODRŽIVI LOKALNI EKONOMSKI RAZVOJ, JAVNE INVESTICIJE, JAVNI INTERES. ABSTRACT: For the purpose of rapid and sustainable economic development and the realization of business ventures, public procurement, construction of infrastructure, and the provision of public service interests, and due to the lack of funds in the budget of local levels of public authorities, their business inefficiency and lack of knowledge and skills to adequately react to various unforeseen circumstances and settled many and varied needs of citizens and society in general, in the countries of market orientation, access to the latest models of financing, the primary application of the concept of public-private partnerships. The conventional wisdom is that public-private partnerships represent a huge potential for local and overall economic development of a country. In the Republic of Serbia, in contrast to the available experiences of good practice, the benefits and real possibilities and expectations that this indisputable funding model provides, are not yet exploited. KEY WORDS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP, SUSTAINABLE LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC INVESTMENTS, PUBLIC INTEREST.

26 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART UVOD Sve je izvesnije da države i njihovi subcentralni (lokalni) nivoi vlasti nisu u mogućnosti da same zadovolje rastuće potrebe za infrastrukturom i uslugama, što iziskuje podršku ostalih sektora društva. Tradicionalni izvori nedovoljni su za potrebe finansiranja investicija na subcentralnom (lokalnom) nivou. Angažovanje kapitala privatnog sektora, posredstvom projekata javno-privatnih partnerstava (JPP), rešenje je kojim se nastoji premostiti jaz između realizacije javnih investicija i budžetskih ograničenja lokalnih nivoa javne vlasti. JPP se vezuje za reformu sistema neefikasne državne uprave i ono je alternativa konvencionalnom modelu obezbeđivanja (finansiranja, izgradnje, rekonstrukcije, upravljanja i održavanja) infrastrukturne i pružanja usluga od javnog značaja. Ovaj model zasnovan je na raspodeli resursa, rizika, troškova, odgovornosti i koristi u svim fazama realizacije investicionih projekta, čime se obezbeđuje potencijal za privredni razvoj. Upliv privatnog menadžmenta u javne poslove ima brojne pozitivne efekte, u smislu povećanja efikasnosti poslovanja, lakšem pristupu resursima, većoj pokretljivosti i prilagodljivosti privatnog kapitala tržišnim kretanjima. Privatni sektor je inovativniji, kompetentniji i fleksibilniji u odnosu na javni sektor, čiji je primarni cilj opšti interes društva. Koncept JPP poželjan je u uslovima nedostataka ekonomskog i fiskalnog sistema, a saglasno propisima, poslovnim običajima, dobroj praksi i javnom interesu. U nekim zemljama sve više i zastupljen model saradnje javnog i privatnog sektora sa svrhom realizacije investicionih projekata i izgradnje infrastrukture i pružanja komunalnih javnih usluga, koji su inicijalno u nadležnosti subcentralnih (lokalnih) nivoa vlasti. Važno je napomenuti da javni i privatni interesi, mada u datoj situaciji i odnosu partnerski koncipirani, ostaju u stanju permanentne i latentne konkurencije. 2. DRUŠTVENI I EKONOMSKI ZNAČAJ JPP -- DOMETI I OGRANIČENJA Poslednjih decenija primena koncepta JPP beleži snažan uspon u evropskim zemljama, a odnedavno i u svetu. 3 Gotovo da nema razvijenije zemlje koja nije uvela ovaj model finansiranja javnih investicija. Inače, ekspanzija u primeni JPP otpočinje sedamdesetih i osamdesetih godina XX veka u projektima izgradnje javne infrastrukture, poznatih pod nazivom BOT (eng. Built-Operate-Transfer, odnosno sagradi upravljaj-predaj). Ovaj model naročito je dobio na popularnosti početkom devedesetih godina XX veka kada je u Velikoj Britaniji predstavljen nov oblik saradnje javnog i privatnog sektora pod nazivom Inicijativa za privatno finansiranje (Private Finance Initiative - PFI). JPP nemaju jedinstvenu i opšteprihvaćenu definiciju, pre svega zbog kompleksnosti i velikog broja varijanti modela JPP. U srži ovih koncepata jeste dugoročna i kooperativna ugovorna saradnja između javnog i privatnog partnera za potrebe finansiranja javnih in- 3 U vidu koncesija udruživanje javnog i privatnog sektora u realizaciji infrastrukturnih projekata potiče iz XVIII i XIX veka.

27 26 JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA vesticija (javne infrastrukture i usluga javnog karaktera), koje su tradicionalno u domenu javnog sektora. Vremenom je došlo do diversifikacije u razvoju koncepata JPP. Pored BOT i PFI modela, razvijeni su novi oblici saradnje javnog i privatnog sektora, kao i raznovrsni ugovorni aranžmani među njima. U praksi postoji oko dvadesetak različitih modela JPP koji se međusobno razlikuju u stepenu uključivanja javnog i privatnog sektora u projektovanje, izgradnju, održavanje, finansiranje, operacionalizaciju i upravljanje infrastrukturnim projektima, kao i u odnosu na raspodelu rizika. U literaturi se uglavnom identifikuje pet osnovnih modela udruživanja javnog i privatnog sektora, i to: (a) ugovori za usluge tzv. servisni ugovori (Service contracts/outsourcing); (b) menadžerski ugovori (Management contracts); (c) iznajmljivanje/lizing (Leases); (d) BOT modeli (Build-Operate-Transfer) i njegove varijante (DBO (Design-Build-Operate), DBFO (Design-Build-Finance-Operate), i dr.) i (e) koncesije (Concessions). U praksi primenjeni aranžmani JPP obično su hibridi navedenih modela. 4 Danas postoji značajna osnova za razvoj novih koncepata JPP. S obzirom na očekivanu diversifikaciju potreba i preferencija od strane građana i modeli JPP tokom godina evoluiraju u kompleksnije, inovativnije i fleksibilnije, kako bi se ispunila očekivanja i realizovale dodatne, veće koristi za javni sektor i društvo u celini. Empirijska istraživanja pokazuju da su ovi koncepti saradnje izuzetno perspektivni i kao takvi doprinose privrednom i društvenom razvoju zemlje. S tim u vezi, neophodna je: detaljna analiza i ocena finansijske isplativosti projekta, efikasna alokacija rizika između ugovornih strana kao i primena načela zaštite javnog interesa, efikasnosti, transparentnosti, jednakog i pravičnog tretmana, slobodne tržišne utakmice, proporcionalnosti, zaštite životne sredine, autonomije volje i ravnopravnosti ugovornih strana. Saradnja je zasnovana na shvatanju da i javni i privatni sektor imaju koristi od udruživanja finansijskih resursa, znanja, umeća i stručnosti kako bi se zadovoljile različite potrebe društva. 5 JPP nude alternativu potpunoj privatizaciji i omogućavaju javnom sektoru da određuje, kontroliše i zadržava odgovornost zarad očuvanja opšteg interesa društva. Interesantna su zapažanja nekih autora koji konstatuju da je JPP izraslo na napetosti i kontroverzi temeljnih karakteristika javnog i privatnog sektora. Njegova suština jeste saradnja, a ne konkurencija, i to objedinjavanjem preduzetničkog način razmišljanja i ponašanja javnopravnih subjekata i javne odgovornosti i obavezu čuvanja javnog interesa privatnopravni sektor, čime izostaje borba za prevlast. 6 Privatni sektor ili investitor obezbeđuje novi vid menadžmenta, tržišnu i finansijsku disciplinu i odvažniji je u finansiranju velikih i kompleksnih projekata. Suština JPP svodi se na alokaciju rizika i to na onog partnera koji poseduje bolje performanse u smislu kontrole i upravljanja nepredviđenim događajima. S druge strane, ovaj koncept omogućava privatnom sektoru pristup dugoročnim investicijama kojima obezbeđuje profit posredstvom sigurnih i ugovorenih cena, naplaćenih od krajnjih korisnika. Sagledavajući i kombinujući performanse oba sektora, i to društvenu odgovornost javnog sektora sa finansijama, integracijom novih tehnologija, upravljačkom efikasnošću i preduzetničkim duhom privatnog sektora, odluka da li prihvatiti JPP ili primeniti tradicionalno finansiranje, bazirana je na poređenju troškova i dobiti investicije. 4 Đorđević (2012), str i Vasiljev (2015), str Ilić (2012), str Videti opširnije: Cvetković (2013), str. 15.

28 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Kapitalne investicije subcentralnih nivoa i lokalnih samouprava čine značajan udeo u javnom sektoru. Stoga i ne iznenađuje činjenica što politika EU ističe značaj JPP. Njima se ostvaruje: 7 smanjenje fiskalnog pritiska na budžete svih nivoa javne vlasti (čak i onih koji zakonom imaju sposobnost zaduživanja 8 ); porast obima infrastrukturnih ulaganja; transfer rizika; realizacija projekata unutar planiranog finansijskog i vremenskog okvira; porast vrednosti za novac poreskih obveznika kao krajnjih korisnika; smanjenje nivoa javnog duga; poboljšanje kvaliteta javnih usluga i sniženje njihovih cena, i dr. Kako bi se obezbedila unificiranost sprovođenja projekata JPP na nivou EU, godine Evropska komisija donela je Smernice za uspešna JPP, 9 a godine i Zelenu knjigu o JPP. 10 Njihova svrha su rasprave o konceptu i oblicima JPP, podsticanje i unapređenje saradnje između javnog i privatnog sektora i razmena iskustava najbolje prakse članica, a s obzirom na odsustvo jedinstvene zakonske regulative. Države EU stvorile su sopstvene normativne okvire za projekte JPP koje čine zakoni o JPP, koncesijama i javnoj nabavci i podzakonska akta. EU nastoji da kroz JPP privuče dodatne resurse u javni sektor kako bi investicijama u inovacije postala konkurentnija. Ideja finansiranja posredstvom JPP, kao jednog od perspektivnih načina kojim se mobilišu sredstva iz privatnih izvora, istaknuta je u Strategiji Evropa 2020, 11 a u funkciji održivog rasta, povećanja produktivnosti, smanjenja nezaposlenosti, socijalne kohezije, očuvanja životne sredine i boljeg kvaliteta života. U njenoj realizaciji ulogu imaju regionalne i lokalne vlasti, kao i privatni investitor. U svrhu jačanja organizacionih kapaciteta javnog sektora u realizaciji projekata JPP, promocije i razmene dobrih iskustava, saradnjom Evropske investicione banke, Evropske komisije, država članica EU i zemalja kandidata, godine oformljen je Evropski centar znanja za JPP (European PPP Expertise Centre - EPEC). Globalna ekonomska kriza usporila je ove procese saradnje u Evropi, pa i u EU, s obzirom na činjenicu da su finansijska sredstva ponestala i u kasama privatnog sektora. 7 Ilić (2012), str Zakon o javnom dugu, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 61/05, 107/09, 78/11. i 68/15. 9 European Commission (2003). 10 European Commission (2004). 11 Kronja (2011), str

29 28 JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA GRAFIKON 1. EVROPSKO JPP TRŽIŠTE OD , VREDNOST I BROJ PROJEKATA Vrednost (u milijardama evra) Broj projekata Vrednost projekata tokom prve polovine godine Vrednost projekata tokom druge polovine godine Broj projekata Izvor: European Investment Bank (2016), Market Update, Review of the European PPP Market in 2015, EIB, Luxembourg, str. 1. Periodi fiskalnih restrikcija i pritisaka u pravcu smanjenja broja zaposlenih i ukupnih troškova rezultirali su smanjenjem vrednosti projekata JPP. Tokom godine na evropskom kontinentu ugovoreno je 49 projekata posredstvom JPP, ukupne vrednosti 15,6 milijardi evra. Najveći broj projekata zaključila je Velika Britanija (15 projekata tokom godine u odnosu na 24 projekta tokom godine), u vrednosti od 2,4 milijarde evra što je za 4,2 milijarde evra manje u odnosu na godinu. Inače, po vrednosti projekata, Turska zauzima prvo mesto (9,2 milijarde evra tokom godine u odnosu na 3,5 milijarde evra u godini).

30 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART GRAFIKON 2. PREGLED ZAKLJUČENIH JPP PROJEKATA U GODINI, U ODABRANIM ZEMLJAMA Ukupna vrednost projekata po zemljama (u milionima evra) Broj projekata po zemljama Turska V. Britanija Francuska Holandija Irska Španija Nemačka Belgija Finska Danska Grčka Poljska Izvor: European Investment Bank (2016), Market Update, Review of the European PPP Market in 2015, EIB, Luxembourg, str. 2. Ukoliko posmatramo projekte sa aspekta učešća pojedinih sektora, uočava se izrazita dominacija sektora saobraćaja i transporta po vrednosti, odnosno sektora obrazovanja po broju projekata. Prosečno, vrednost projekta ugovorenog posredstvom ovog oblika finansiranja u godini iznosila je 319 miliona evra, u odnosu na 229 miliona evra tokom godine. 12 GRAFIKON 3. PREGLED ZAKLJUČENIH JPP PROJEKATA U GODINI, PO SEKTORIMA Ukupna vrednost projekata po sektorima (u milionima evra) Broj projekata po sektorima Transport Zdravstvo Obrazovanje Javne usluge Zaštita životne sredine Rekreacija i kultura Izvor: European Investment Bank (2016), Market Update, Review of the European PPP Market in 2015, EIB, Luxembourg, str EIB (2016), str. 7.

31 30 JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA Neke od manjkavosti ometaju uspešnost JPP. U izvesnim slučajevima domaći privatni sektor je finansijski slab ili je nedovoljno zainteresovan za određen investicioni aranžman, dok međunarodni finansijeri nisu kadri sagledati potencijal koji određen projekat nosi. Pored toga, projekti JPP pate od: 13 nedostatka javne kontrole; sumnje da će težnja za profitom zaseniti javni interes; korupcije i netransparentnosti; neizvesnosti i nedostatka iskustava; neadekvatne procene i podele rizika; nerazvijenih ili nedovoljno razvijenih mehanizama za rešavanje eventualnih sukoba interesa; različitih strategija i prioriteta JPP; neretko lošeg planiranja; manjka informacija i/ili nespremnosti njihove razmene; nedostatka liderstva i posvećenosti; negativnog publiciteta, itd. U većini slučajeva je dugotrajan proces ugovaranja saradnje javnog i privatnog sektora usled nedostatak znanja i političke volje. Sve navedeno može dovesti do zloupotrebe ovog koncepta. Javne, a posebno lokalne, vlasti vrlo teško opredeljuju se za promene, gajeći sumnju u ovakav način poslovanja. Ciljevi javnog i privatnog sektora ne moraju biti identični, a ni kompatibilni. 3. TRANSFER RIZIKA I REALIZACIJA VREDNOSTI ZA NOVAC PREDUSLOVI USPEHA KONCEPTA JPP U suštini koncepta JPP nalazi se potreba upravljanja investicijama, a svaka investicija i partnerstvo nose širok spektar interesa, konflikata i rizika. Za razliku od tradicionalnog modela finansiranja projekata, pri realizaciji JPP, rizici se transferišu onima koji su sposobniji da njima efikasnije upravljaju, preduzimajući potrebne mere u pravcu njihovog smanjenja i otklanjanja štete kao posledice njihovog delovanja. U projektima JPP stepen uključenosti privatnog sektora srazmeran je stepenu alociranog rizika. Što je manje učešće privatnog sektora u JPP, manji je i rizik, i obratno. Privatizacijom se celokupan rizik alocira na privatni sektor. U uslovima tradicionalnog finansiranja svi rizici trošak su javnog sektora, odnosno građana kao poreskih obveznika. S obzirom da su brojni i značajni rizici involvirani u realizaciju javnih investicija, neophodan je sistemski pristup u identifikaciji, analizi, evaluaciji i alokaciji rizika, kao i utvrđivanju dinamike javljanja i težine posledica koje ovi rizici nose, usled čega se konstituiše registar rizika. 14 Kako determiniše uspeh JPP, u njegovom koncipiranju angažovani su ekspertski i konsultantski timovi. Praćenje izvesnih i potencijalnih rizika, njihova podela i uspešno upravljanje njima, najznačajniji su segment ugovaranja saradnje između javnog i privatnog sektora i ostvarivanja vrednosti za novac, što je i osnovni kriterijum isplativosti i efikasnosti modela JPP. 15 Činjenica je da se poslovnim rizicima efikasnije upravlja u privatnom sektoru, dok se na javni sektor uobičajeno alociraju pravni, politički i ekološki rizici. Identifikacija i alokacija rizika koje projekat nosi izuzetno je kompleksna, a sam proces može trajati. Pri tom, težnja da se rizik prenese na privatnog partnera nije garancija da će javni sektor u većoj meri ostvariti i zaštititi interes društva. Sagledavanje matrice rizika integrisano je u izradu komparatora troškova javnog sektora (Public Sector Comparator, PSC), instrumenta kojim se 13 Ilić, (2012), str Ilić (2012), str European Investment Bank (2015).

32 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART porede ukupni životni troškovi projekta realizovanim posredstvom JPP u odnosu na one koji bi nastali da je izabran tradicionalni način finansiranja. Vrednost za novac 16 (Value for money) predstavlja pozitivnu razliku između sadašnje vrednosti ukupnih životnih troškova nastalih kao produkt tradicionalnog načina finansiranja i finansiranja modelom JPP. Konceptom JPP ostvaruje veća vrednost za novac ukoliko su ispunjene sledeće pretpostavke: (a) efikasno upravljanje rizicima i njihova adekvatna alokacija između javnog i privatnog partnera u svim fazama realizacije projekta; (b) angažman stručnjaka 17 koji razumeju tržišne prilike i imaju sposobnost da učine projekat bankabilnim; 18 (c) ugovorom o JPP definisane realne potrebe za infrastrukturnim projektima, čime je osigurana njihova efikasna i odgovorna dugoročna isporuka; (e) precizna procena troškova osiguranja od eventualnih nepredviđenih događaja; (f) detaljan plan finansijskih i investicionih aktivnosti tokom životnog veka projekta. Veću vrednost za novac moguće je ostvariti skraćivanjem roka izgradnje objekta, porastom kvaliteta usluga, povećanjem obima usluga za istu cenu, isporukom istih usluga po nižim cenama, prenosom dela ili celokupnog rizika sa javnog na privatnog partnera, itd KONCEPT JPP U REPUBLICI SRBIJI Usled potrebe za izgradnjom nove javne infrastrukture, JPP predstavlja potencijal i razvojnu šansu i za Republiku Srbiju. Ulaganjem u dobra od opšteg interesa i efikasnijim pružanjem usluga od javnog značaja ukazala se neophodnost stvaranja institucionalnog okvira. U Republici Srbiji, donošenjem zakonske regulative u ovoj oblasti, uspostavljen je sistem finansiranja putem JPP i ustanovljene su smernice za korišćenje benefita udruživanja javnog i privatnog sektora. Zakon o JPP-u i koncesijama, 20 usvojen godine, u saglasnosti je sa praksom koja postoji u većini zemalja EU, na temeljima evropskog kontinentalnog prava. Istovremeno, donet je i Zakon o komunalnim delatnostima, 21 a godinu dana kasnije i Zakon o javnim nabavkama. 22 Komisija za javno-privatna partnerstva, kao međuresorno javno telo, formirana je godine, sa osnovnim zadatkom pružanja stručne pomoći pri realizaciji projekata JPP. Komisija je sačinjena od eksperata čiji je cilj zaštita javnog interesa i utvrđivanje metodologije proračuna vrednosti za novac i komparatora troškova javnog sektora, kao indikatora isplativosti modela JPP. Bez saglasnosti Komisije nijedan predlog JPP ne može biti procesuiran, odnosno ne može biti pokrenut postupak izbora privatnog partnera ili postupak javne nabavke. Na bazi zvaničnih izvora ove institucije objavljenih na internet stranici, Komisija je dala pozitivno mišljenje na ukupno 45 projekata Agencija za javno-privatno partnerstvo (2014). 17 Brdarević (2012), str [Pristup: 31/01/2017], str Brdarević (2012), str Zakon o JPP-u i koncesijama, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 88/11, 15/16. i 104/ Zakon o komunalnim delatnostima, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 88/11. i 104/ Zakon o javnim nabavkama, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 124/12, 14/15. i 68/ Videti opširnije: [Pristup: 14/02/2017]

33 32 JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA Komisija je godine sačinila Metodologiju 24 kao važan korak u procesu donošenja odluke da li određeni projekat realizovati posredstvom JPP ili tradicionalnim finansiranjem iz kredita. Na taj način se izbegava favorizovanje JPP na štetu tradicionalnog finansiranja i uprkos činjenici da JPP ne opterećuju kreditnu sposobnost javnog sektora jer samostalno obezbeđuju potrebna sredstva za projekat. Izbor javnog i privatnog partnera sprovodi se kroz postupak javne nabavke, u skladu sa Zakonom o javnim nabavkama. 25 Bitnu ulogu u realizaciji i nadzoru realizacije ugovora o JPP ima i resorno ministarstvo, kao i odgovarajući organi autonomne pokrajine i lokalnih samouprava, nadležni za poslove finansija. Podzakonski akti za sprovođenje Zakona o JPP usvojeni su godine kada je donesena Uredba o nadzoru nad realizacijom javnih ugovora o javno-privatnom partnerstvu 26 i Pravilnik o načinu vođenja i sadržini Registra javnih ugovora. 27 Time je konstituisan zakonodavni i institucionalni okvir za implementaciju projekata JPP. Takođe, i drugi zakoni utiču posredno ili neposredno na koncept JPP. Kompleksnost modela JPP usled: velikog broj učesnika, nedostatak znanja i iskustava, nereformisanog javnog sektora, nerazvijenog tržišta, nedostatka finansijskih sredstava, nedostatka podrške i inicijative od strane države, kao i nerazvijena svest o prednostima JPP, prepreka su intenzivnijem razvoju ovog koncepta u našoj zemlji. Zbog toga je uglavnom korišćena privatizacija ili tradicionalan način finansiranja javnih dobara i usluga. Slabosti domicilnog ambijenta, od makroekonomske nestabilnosti, nerazvijene infrastrukture, nezaposlenosti, siromaštva, korupcije, međusobno recipročnog nepoverenja i nerazumevanja interesa partnera, kao i odsustva relevantnih informacija za potrebe njihove dugoročne saradnje, do nedovoljnog saznanja o neophodnosti investiranja u očuvanje životne sredine, ozbiljno ugrožavaju potencijal koji bi implementacija koncepta JPP mogla da ponudi u našoj zemlji. 28 Svi ovi nedostaci imaju za posledicu duge pregovore i veće troškove čineći ove projekte manje atratkivnim potencijalnim investitorima. Uslov efikasnosti ovog procesa su reforme i inovacije savremenih na domaćem finansijskom tržištu. Primenom koncepta JPP efekti bi se odrazili na pospešivanje ekonomskog rasta i razvoja, smanjenje inflacije, stope nezaposlenosti, javnog duga i uravnoteženје budžeta. U Republici Srbiji javljaju se domaći i inostrani finansijeri projekata JPP. Pored domaćih finansijera i finansijskih institucija, finansijeri i finansijske institucije iz drugih zemalja su veoma važan izvor ne samo finansijske već i savetodavne podrške. Među njima se izdvajaju Evropska banka za obnovu i razvoj, Međunarodna finansijska korporacija i Svetska banka (koja je nadležna za prikupljanje informacija najbolje prakse iz celoga sveta i koja poseduje najveću bazu projekata realizovanih posredstvom ovog koncepta). 29 Lokalni nivoi javne vlasti u našoj zemlji učestvuju u konkursu dodele sredstava posredstvom koncepta JPP u okviru jedne od jedanaest tematskih oblasti i to: unapređenje gradske/opštinske uprave; održivi razvoj i zaštita životne sredine; podrška lokalnom ekonomskom razvoju; komunalne usluge i stanovanje; socijalna politika; prostorno i urbanističko 24 Komisija za javno-privatno partnerstvo (2013). 25 Pavlović- Križanić (2012), str Uredba o nadzoru nad realizacijom javnih ugovora o javno-privatnom partnerstvu, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 47/ Pravilnik o načinu vođenja i sadržini Registra javnih ugovora, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 57/13 i 110/ Videti opširnije: Kronja (2011), str The World Bank (2017).

34 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART planiranje; inicijative namenjene mladima; učešće građana u odlučivanju; unapređenje položaja manjina; etika i transparentnost, kultura i sport. Može se oceniti da kod nas još uvek ne postoji značajnija praksa u pogledu primene projekata JPP. Primeri dobre prakse JPP na lokalnom nivou vlasti tiču se upravo jednostavnijih projekata. Do sada je priliv privatnog kapitala na lokalnom nivou zabeležen najviše u oblastima koje zahtevaju manje investicije, kao što su: usluge linijskog prevoza putnika (Loznica, Ruma, Novi Sad, Niš, Šabac, Srbobran, Topola, Negotin, Paraćin, Kanjiža, Beograd), izgradnja i održavanje sistema javnog osvetljenja (Kruševac, Bor, Petrovac, Vrbas, Vranje, Varvarin, Žabalj), izgradnja i održavanje kanalizacione mreže (Stara Pazova), proizvodnja i distribucija toplotne i električne energije i grejanje na biomasu (Zrenjanin, Niš, Batočina, Vrbas, Pirot), upravljanja čvrstim otpadom (Topola, Žagubica, Grocka), usluge parkiranja (Šabac). Ovo su JPP čija su finansijska ulaganja do 40 miliona evra i rizici najmanji. Važno je da primeri dobre prakse budu neki osnov za razvoj i korišćenje JPP od strane drugih gradova i lokalnih nivoa vlasti, mada je svaki projekat JPP specifičan, jer svaki grad i opština ima svoje specifične potrebe. Najveće investicije iziskuju sektori vode i kanalizacije, a procena je da je za Beogradski vodovod i kanalizaciju potrebno obezbediti investicije od 987 miliona evra. Iako ga prate brojne kontroverze, najpoznatiji projekat JPP je u oblasti javnog prevoza u Beogradu (Bus Plus). Što se tiče trenutnog svetskog trenda JPP, najviše ovakvih projekata je u oblasti saobraćaja i puteva, izgradnje mostova, sportskih hala i telekomunikacija. 30 Iako postoje primeri dobre prakse JPP na lokalnom nivou u Republici Srbiji njihov dosadašnji razvoj pokazuje brojne manjkavosti. Nedostatak modela JPP predstavlja transparentnost ugovora, praćenje i mehanizmi izvršenja ugovornih obaveza partnera. Veliki problem je i mehanizam zaštite od moguće korupcije i efikasna primena antikorupcijskih mera koji su predviđeni u Zakonu o JPP i koncesijama. Takođe, i odgovor na pitanje da li je model JPP u najbolje i najefikasnije rešenje za pružanje usluga i izgradnju infrastrukturnih objekta zahteva ozbiljne i sveobuhvatne investicione i tržišne analiza. 5. ZAKLJUČAK Dugoročne investicije neophodne su ekonomijama naročito u kontekstu krize javnih finansija. Stoga je i cilj iznalaženje novih načina zadovoljenja sve raznovrsnijih potreba društva koje se povećavaju gotovo svakodnevno. U projektima JPP partneri zadržavaju sopstveni identitet, a njihova međusobna saradnja bazirana je na jasnoj i preciznoj podeli odgovornosti, prava, obaveza i rizika. Ključna karakteristika koncepta JPP jeste porast efektivnosti i ekonomičnosti, odnosno ispunjavanje visokih standarda u obezbeđivanju javnih dobara i pružanju usluga, kao i smanjivanje pritiska javnih investicija na budžet. Praksa je pokazala da je uspeh JPP srazmeran stepenu uređenosti javnog sektora u smislu ekonomskih sloboda, demokratskog društva i tržišnog načina privređivanja. Što je 30 [Pristup: 05/03/2017]

35 34 JAVNO-PRIVATNO PARTNERSTVO KAO MOGUĆI MODEL FINANSIRANJA LOKALNIH SAMOUPRAVA javni sektor jedne države slabiji u pogledu navedenih vrednosti, time je otvoreniji prostor za zloupotrebe. Strateško planiranje podrazumeva izradu sveobuhvatnog pristupa u postupku traženja rešenja. Politički ciklusi i želja za brzim rešenjima i instantnim boljitkom neretko rezultiraju poslovanjem u neusaglašenim vremenskim okvirima koji su nekad isuviše kratki za realizaciju projekata. Takve kratkoročne agende i ograničeni horizonti dovode do nerealnih očekivanja i neodrživih rešenja. Uspostavljanje kvalitetnih partnerskih odnosa, optimalna raspodela i upravljanje rizicima, saradnja na svim nivoima javne vlasti u cilju eksploatacije prednosti svakog od nivoa, stvaranje dodatne vrednosti putem međusobne razmene veština i znanja javnog i privatnog sektora, podizanje konkurentskog nivoa učešćem većeg broja finansijera u implementaciji projekata JPP, podizanje kvaliteta pruženih javnih usluga i dr., ključne su odrednice njihove uspešne implementacije. 6. LITERATURA Agencija za javno-privatno partnerstvo (2014), Značenje i postupak izračuna vrijednosti za novac kod projekata JPP, br. 6, verz. 2, Agencija za JPP, Zagreb. Brdarević, Lj. (2012), Motivi lokalne vlasti za uspostavljanje javno-privatnih partnerstava, Polis br. 2, Stalna konferencija gradova i opština i PALGO centar, Beograd. Cvetković, P. i Sredojević, S. (2013), Javno-privatno partnerstvo, Priručnik za sprovođenje na nivou lokalne samouprave, Stalna konferencija gradova i opština, Beograd. Đorđević, S. (2012), Javno-privatna partnerstva: komparativna praksa, Polis br. 2, Stalna konferencija gradova i opština i PALGO centar, Beograd. European Commission (2003), Guidelines for successful Public-Private Partnership, EC, Brussels. European Commission (2004), Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions, EC, Brussels. European Investment Bank (2011), Priručnik za pripremu projekata JPP, Priprema, nabava i provedba projekata JPP, EPEC, Luxembourg. European Investment Bank (2015), Value for Money Assessment Review of approaches and key concepts, EPEC, Luxembourg. European Investment Bank (2016), Market Update, Review of the European PPP Market in 2015, EIB, Luxembourg en2, [Pristup: 14/02/2017] Ilić, N. (2012), Osnovne ideje koje stoje iza novih zakonskih rešenja, Polis br. 2, Stalna konferencija gradova i opština i PALGO centar, Beograd.

36 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Komisija za javno-privatno partnerstvo (2013), Metodologiju za analizu dobijene vrednosti u odnosu na uložena sredstva (value for money) u javno-privatnom partnerstvu i koncesijama, Vlade Republike Srbije, Beograd. Kronja, J. et al. (2011), Vodič kroz strategiju Evropa 2020, Evropski pokret Srbija, Fond za otvoreno društvo, Beograd. Pavlović-Križanić, T. (2012), Lokalna javno-privatna partnerstva u Srbiji- između propisa i realnosti, Polis br. 2, Stalna konferencija gradova i opština i PALGO centar, Beograd. Vasiljev, V. (2015), Javno-privatna partnerstva u Evropskoj uniji i Srbiji - razvoj modela, tržišta i zakonskog okvira, doktorska disertacija, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd. The World Bank (2017), Benchmarking PPP Procurement: Assessing Government Capability to Prepare, Procure, and Manage PPPs, WB, Washington. Zakoni, uredbe, pravilnici Pravilnik o načinu vođenja i sadržini Registra javnih ugovora, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 57/13 i 110/13. Uredba o nadzoru nad realizacijom javnih ugovora o javno-privatnom partnerstvu, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 47/13. Zakon o javnim nabavkama, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 124/12, 14/15. i 68/15. Zakon o javno-privatnom partnerstvu i koncesijama, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 88/11, 15/16. i 104/16. Zakon o javnom dugu, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 61/05, 107/09, 78/11. i 68/15. Zakon o komunalnim delatnostima, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 88/11. i 104/16. Internet stranice: pdf [Pristup: 31/01/2017] [Pristup: 14/02/2017] [Pristup: 05/03/2017]

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38 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART GORANA KRSTIĆ 1 gkrstic@ekof.bg.ac.rs WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? DA LI BI POVEĆANJE NISKOG INTENZITETA RADA DOVELO DO SMANJENJA SIROMAŠTVA I NEJEDNAKOSTI U SRBIJI? JEL CLASSIFICATION: D31, D63, P2 ABSTRACT: This paper presents a relationship between low work intensity, poverty and inequality in Serbia over period, based on data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). Low work intensity contributes significantly to the risk of poverty, considering that approximately two out of three persons living in households with very low work intensities run the risk of poverty. On the other hand, only 40% of persons at risk of poverty live in such households, which indicates that there are other causes of poverty, such as low wages and social transfers that have not been sufficient to raise equivalised income above the risk of poverty threshold. The results suggest that an increase in work 1 Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade

39 38 WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? intensity of household members would result in a poverty decrease, but would also decrease income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. KEY WORDS: POVERTY RISK, LOW WORK INTENSITY, INEQUALITY, SERBIA APSTRAKT: Ovaj rad prikazuje vezu između niskog intenziteta rada, siromaštva i nejednakosti u Srbiji u periodu na osnovu podataka Ankete o prihodima i uslovima života (SILC). Nizak intenzitet rada značajno doprinosi riziku od siromaštva budući da približno dva od tri lica koja žive u domaćinstvima sa veoma niskim intenzitetom rada je i u riziku od siromaštva. Sa druge strane, samo 40% lica koja su izložena riziku od siromaštva živi u ovakvim domaćinstvima, što ukazuje i na druge uzroke siromaštva, kao što su niske zarade i socijalni transferi koji nisu bili dovoljni za povećanje ekvivalentnog dohotka iznad praga rizika od siromaštva. Rezultati pokazuju da bi povećanje intenziteta rada članova domaćinstva dovelo do smanjenja siromaštva, ali i do smanjenja nejednakosti dohotka, merene Gini koeficijentom. KLJUČNE REČI: RIZIK OD SIROMAŠTVA, NIZAK INTENZITET RADA, NEJEDNAKOST, SRBIJA

40 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART INTRODUCTION The at-risk-of-poverty rate and percentage of persons living in households with very low work intensity are two out of three components of the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion indicator formulated by the EU in 2010 with the aim of encompassing other intangible aspects of poverty and exclusion from the labour market. The at-risk-of-poverty rate, low work intensity and income inequality in Serbia can be monitored since 2013, when the first Survey of Income and Living Conditions was conducted, according to the internationally harmonized Eurostat methodology. These indicators for Serbia are among the highest compared to EU countries. Every fourth person in Serbia (25.4%) in 2014 had equivalised disposable income below the national at-riskof-poverty threshold, while every fifth person below the age of 60 lived in a household with very low work intensity (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, SORS 2016). Income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient was 38.2 (SORS, 2016). Despite that, research on income inequality is sporadic (Milanović 2003; Krstić 2011, 2016; Ranđelović and Žarković-Rakić 2011), unlike research on poverty and unemployment, and this topic has not been a priority on the agenda of policy makers. The number of persons exposed to poverty risk increased in 2013, while it remained almost unchanged in 2014, although the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line) increased, which indicates that persons at risk of poverty also benefitted from an income increase. The percentage of persons under the age of 60 living in households with very low work intensity increased by 17% in 2014 compared with 2012, which is primarily a consequence of the increase in the share of persons living in these households in the first two income quintiles. Income inequality in this period, although very high, remained almost at the same level. The main objective of the paper is to analyse and quantify the relationship between low work intensity, poverty and inequality in Serbia using the Survey of Income and Living Conditions data. In accordance with the set objective of research, the following hypotheses have been formulated: H1: Increase in work intensity of household members may result in a lower at-risk-ofpoverty rate; H2: Increase in work intensity of household members would result in a reduction of income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. Having in view the objective of research, as well as defined hypotheses, the paper is structured in six sections. After the introduction, the poverty measurement methodology, work intensity and inequality, as well as data used will be presented in section two. The results of the relative poverty analysis (i.e. the risk of poverty) will be presented in part three. The impact of low work intensity on poverty will be analysed and quantified in section four, while the impact of low work intensity on inequality in income distribution will be analysed in section five. Relevant conclusions will be derived at in the last part, along with implications for public policies, and a proposal for the direction of further research.

41 40 WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? 2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA At risk of poverty rate According to the concept of relative poverty, the at-risk-of-poverty rate is defined as the share of people (in the total population) with an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income (Eurostat, 2012). The main advantage of poverty measurement according to this methodology is in its comparability with poverty indicators among EU countries using this concept, considering that the poverty line is determined relative to a certain percentage of the national income median (60%) in every country. Relative poverty indicators in Serbia are fully comparable with relevant EU indicators. The disposable net income of a household includes monetary labour income, income from property, pensions, social and other transfers which the household receives from persons who are not members of their household. That is income, after taxes and contributions have been paid, that is available to the household for spending or saving. Following the Eurostat methodology, income in-kind of the household is not included. The equivalised disposable income is calculated by dividing a household s disposable income by the modified OECD equivalence scale (the first adult member of a household is given a weight of 1, other adult members of a household are given a weight of 0.5, while a weight of 0.3 is given to each child under the age of 14). The relative poverty line is alternatively referred to as the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (Eurostat, 2012a). It is necessary to stress that the at-risk-of-poverty rate, according to the Eurostat definition, does not measure poverty, but low income in comparison to other residents of the country, which does not necessarily imply a low standard of living. 2 This concept of relative poverty is based on financial assets (or lack thereof) which should enable individuals to satisfy needs that are considered standard within their particular society. The concept of relative poverty is not most appropriate for monitoring changes in the atrisk-of-poverty rate over time, since a change in this indicator may be a consequence of a rise or fall of the poverty line (resulting from a change in income distribution), rather than the consequence of a change in income of persons who were at risk of poverty. If the poverty line and the at-risk-of-poverty rate move in the same direction (increase or decrease), we cannot arrive at a proper conclusion regarding the at-risk-of-poverty rate trend. However, if these two indicators move in opposite directions, we can conclude with certainty that a change in the at-risk-of-poverty rate has occurred, not as a consequence of a changed poverty line, but due to a change in income of the population. For example, if poverty line increases and the at-risk-of-poverty rate decreases, then the income increase of a part of the population was such that it rescued them from an at-risk-of-poverty situation. Similarly, if the poverty line is lowered, like in many EU28 countries due to the economic crisis, and poverty risk increases, then the decline in the population s income contributed to the fact that many found themselves at risk of poverty (Krstić, 2014). To avoid possible misinterpretation of changes in this rate, Eurostat calculates the at-risk-of- 2

42 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART poverty rate fixed in time (that is year 2008), as well as the persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate (Eurostat, 2012). The rate of persons living in households with low work intensity is defined as the share of persons under the age of 60, living in households in which adults (aged 18-59) worked, on average, less than 20% of the total number of months in which they could have worked during the reference period (Eurostat, 2012). The reference period refers to 12 months in a year preceding the year of the survey. For example, a two-member household with very low intensity is a household in which none of the working-age members work or one member works four hours two days a week, assuming a full-time 40-hour workweek. This indicator points to exclusion from the labour market, which is the main reason for social exclusion. A significant number of these persons receive social assistance; periodically participate in the labour market, and have hindered access to health, educational and cultural services (Еurostat, 2013). Other categories of work intensity are the following: low (from 20% to less than 45%), medium (from 45% to 55%), high (over 55% to 85%) and very high (over 85% to 100%). Income inequality To measure income inequality we have used the Gini coefficient, defined as the average difference between all possible income pairs in a population (x i, j ), expressed as a part of the total income (Gini, 1912): (1) where µ is the average income, and N is the number of households. GE generalised entropy is defined by the following formula (Shorrocks, 1980): (2) where µ is the average income, α is a parameter which represents a weight allocated to the income distance between different parts of distribution which may take any real value. For lower α values, GE is more sensitive to changes in the lower part of income distribution, while for higher α values, GE is more sensitive to changes in the upper part of income distribution. The most frequent values for α are 0, 1 and 2. G(2) is one half of the square of the coefficient of variation. GE-generalised entropy may be decomposed according to selected population groups (Cowell and Jenkins, 1995) so that total income inequality (I) equals the sum of inequalities between selected groups (I b ) and residual inequality within the group (I w ): I= I b + I w (3)

43 42 WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? I b is defined as: (4) I w is defined as: (5) where f j is the share in total population, and v j the share in total income of every group j. Inequality within a group is defined as the weighted sum of inequalities within each group, where weights are population shares and income shares. Inequality between the groups is calculated for the entire population when every individual income y within a group is replaced by the average income of that group, so that this inequality reflects j the difference in average income between the groups. The decomposition of inequalities between groups and within a group has been made for α=2 i.e. for one half of the coefficient of the variation square. Data The paper draws on the data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) which is carried continuously since 2013 and is a regular annual statistical survey used to assess financial poverty, on the basis of household income, according to a methodology which is comparable with EU standards. In 2015, the survey encompassed 5,680 households and 15,552 persons aged 16+. The reference period for income and labour market activity is the previous year. The survey is representative at the national and regional levels. SILC provides data on total income of households and of household members, and on income components, and therefore presents the best source of data for measuring poverty and inequality, given that the risk of poverty and inequality estimates are based on the household income. SILC also provides data on the social and demographic characteristics of persons, their professional activities (for persons aged 16 and over), education, quality of life, and/ or their health condition, material deprivation and living conditions, as well as data on characteristics of households, housing conditions and costs. On the basis of these data, it is possible to measure not only financial poverty, but also intangible aspects of poverty, such as material deprivation and low work intensity of household members. (6)

44 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATE According to SILC data (for ), in the period, approximately one fourth of Serbia s population was exposed to poverty risk (Table 1). This does not necessarily mean that these persons are poor, but that they are at greater risk than others to become poor, as their equivalised income is below the income considered necessary to achieve a normal living standard in Serbia. This amount at-risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line) per person per month in Serbia was RSD 13,680 in Although the concept of relative poverty is not the most suitable for comparison over time, as already explained in the section on methodology, the increase in the at-risk-of-poverty rate in Serbia by one percentage point in 2013 relative to 2012, together with the drop in the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line), indicates that the number of persons at risk of poverty increased in The at-risk-of poverty rate remained almost unchanged in 2014, although the at-risk-of-poverty threshold increased by 11%, which indicates that persons at risk of poverty also benefitted from an income increase. Had there been no increase in income of these people, the at-risk-of-poverty rate would be much higher. TABLE 1. AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATE IN SERBIA, At-risk-of-poverty rate, % Relative at-risk-of-poverty gap, % At-risk-of-poverty threshold, monthly, in RSD (60% of the median equivalised income) One person 13,680 13,480 14,920 Household with two adults and one child under the age of 14 24,624 24,134 26,856 Household with two adults and two children under the age of 14 28,728 28,157 31,332 Source: SORS (2016), Communication: Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) No Data for relevant years based on SILC for 2013, 2014 and Serbia s at-risk-of-poverty rate is significantly above the average value for 28 EU countries (17.3%), and at the level of this indicator in the country with the highest at-risk-ofpoverty rate in the EU (Romania). 3 The relative at-risk-of-poverty gap measures the difference between the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line) and median equivalised income of persons who are below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold and is expressed as a percentage of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (Eurostat 2012). Unlike the at-risk-of-poverty rate, which shows who is exposed to poverty risk, the relative at-risk-of-poverty gap shows how much funds they lack (in % of at-risk-of-poverty threshold) to escape poverty risk status. An increase in the relative at-risk-of-poverty gap from 36.6% in 2012 to 39.9% in 2013 indicates that the position of people at risk of poverty had deteriorated, because their income was further from the at-risk-of-poverty threshold in 2013 than in 2012, although the value of the at- 3

45 44 WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? risk-of-poverty threshold was lower due to a decline in the population s income. In 2014, although the at-risk-of-poverty rate remained unchanged, the relative at-risk-of-poverty gap was reduced, indicating that the position of persons at risk of poverty somewhat improved, because they lacked less income than in the previous year to escape the situation of poverty risk. 4. LOW WORK INTENSITY Serbia s labour market is characterised by low activity among the working-age population, a low employment rate and high unemployment. In contrast to these labour market indicators, which relate only to the number of active or employed persons, the work intensity of household members indicates the amount of work, i.e. how many household members worked, in relation to the potential number of months. The other significant advantage of this indicator is in the fact that activity and work intensity are not observed at the level of the individual, but rather at the household level, as a person s welfare is not solely dependent on the intensity of one s work but also on the work intensity of the other members of one s household. Work intensity of household members is very low in Serbia, with a significantly higher share of these people under the age of 60 (21.2%) than the European average (10.5%) (Figure 1). Compared with individual EU countries, only Ireland had a higher share of persons living in households with very low work intensity than Serbia (Krstić, 2015) in 2013 (21.1% vs. 20.5%). FIGURE 1. THE PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS (0-60 YEARS) LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH VERY LOW WORK INTENSITY IN SERBIA AND EU Source: RZS (2016), Saopštenje Anketa o prihodima i uslovima života br. 084 [Communication: Survey of Income and Living Conditions No. 084]. Data for EU according to Eurostat (2016).

46 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART The high rate of very low work intensity of household members in Serbia can be attributed to the high inactivity of the working-age population, as well as the fact that a low percentage of such persons live with other adults who work. Serbia has the highest share of people who do not work, particularly the unemployed, in the working-age population compared with EU countries (Krstić, 2015, pp. 83). It is even higher than in countries with the greatest share of these persons (Ireland, Greece and Croatia). The profile of persons living in households with very low work intensity indicates that pensioners and the unemployed, persons with lower levels of education, as well as children whose parents have less than an elementary level of education or who have finished primary school only, are at greatest risk of living in such households (Krstić, 2015). The risk of an individual to belong to this category of households decreases with an increase of their level of education or their parent s level of education, since a higher level of education is in negative correlation with unemployment and inactivity. FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS (0-59) LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH VERY LOW WORK INTENSITY BY INCOME QUINTILES, 2012 AND 2014 Source: Author on the basis of Eurostat base data: lvhl13&lang=en Observed by income quintiles, the percentage of persons living in households with very low work intensity decreases with an increase of equivalised income (Figure 2), which is expected because low equivalised income is the result of low work intensity of household members. Pensioners and the unemployed account for the greatest share among these people, and employed persons account for only 1.6%. The number of persons under 60 who live in households with very low work intensity has increased by 132,000 in 2014 relative to 2012, representing a 17% increase. This increase is primarily the consequence of an increase in the number of people living in these households from the first two income quintiles (Figure 3).

47 46 WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? Poor results achieved in poverty reduction in the period of economic boom during the 2000s in the EU can partially be explained by the fact that there was no reduction in the number of jobless households, despite an increase in the employment rate (Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011; Cantillon, 2011). FIGURE 3. AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS LIVING IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH VERY LOW WORK INTENSITY IN SERBIA, 2014, % At-risk-ofpoverty rate Very low work intensity, 15.7 Source: RZS (2016), Saopštenje Anketa o prihodima i uslovima života br. 084 [Communication: Survey of Income and Living Conditions No. 084]. Figure 3 shows relationship between the proportion of persons exposed to risk of poverty and the proportion of persons living in households with very low work intensity in Serbia. Almost 10.1% of the population are exposed to both risks. These are persons in households where members do not work or work very little, and who also have relatively low incomes. Out of total number of persons living in households with very low work intensity, almost two thirds face risk of poverty, as work and work intensity of household members is the main precondition for higher income and a better living standard. However, only 40% of persons in risk of poverty live in households with very low work intensity. This indicates that low wages, in combination with work intensity above very low, are the main reasons for poverty within this population segment, in addition to social transfers which were insufficient to increase equivalised income above the at-risk-of-poverty threshold.

48 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART FIGURE 4. AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATE FOR EMPLOYEES (AGED 18-59) BY WORK INTENSITY OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, 2012 AND 2014 Source: Author on the basis of Eurostat base: iw03&lang=en Work intensity of household members has considerable effect on the at-risk-of-poverty rate of employees. The greatest risk of poverty among employed is in households with low work intensity (34.1% in 2014), meaning that approximately one in three employed persons living in these households with low work intensity is exposed to the risk of poverty (Figure 4). The at-risk-of-poverty rate further decreases with an increase of work intensity, from 19.3% in households with medium work intensity to 7% in households with very high work intensity, similarly, as shown by the data for the EU28 average. 4 This means that only a very high work intensity of a household may result in a significant reduction of the at-risk-of-poverty rate, having in mind that the average at-risk-of-poverty rate of employed equalled 13% in 2014 (SORS, 2016). In 2014 as compared to 2012, at risk of poverty of employed decreased the most in households with very high work intensity, and the least in households with low work intensity. 5. INEQUALITY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION According to SILC data, inequality of income distribution in Serbia measured by the Gini coefficient is very high and was relatively stable in the period (Table 2). The Gini coefficient in Serbia equalled 38.2 in 2014, which is a slightly higher value than the average for the 28 EU countries (31) and higher than the value of the Gini coefficient of countries with the greatest inequality, such as Lithuania (37.9), Romania (37.,4) and 4

49 48 WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? Bulgaria (37). 5 Compared with countries in the region, the greatest income inequality, after Serbia, was recorded in Macedonia (35.2) which is not in the EU, but is included in the EU-SILC reporting system (Figure 5). TABLE 2. GINI COEFFICIENT AND EQUIVALISED INCOME QUINTILE SHARE RATIO IN SERBIA, Gini coefficient (*100) Quintile share ratio Source: RZS (2016), Saopštenje Anketa o prihodima i uslovima života br [Communication: Survey of Income and Living Conditions No. 084] Note: Income in kind is excluded from the total income. Income inequality in Serbia is also high when measured by the quintile share ratio, which was 9 in This means that 20% of the wealthiest population in Serbia had 9-fold higher equivalised income relative to 20% of the poorest. The value of this indicator is significantly higher compared to the average value for 28 EU countries, which equalled 5.2 in 2014, but also higher than in countries with the highest values recorded in Romania (8.3), Lithuania (7.5), Macedonia (7.2 in 2013) and Bulgaria (7.1). 6 FIGURE 5. THE GINI COEFFICIENT FOR SERBIA, MACEDONIA AND EU COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST GINI COEFFICIENT, 2014 Note: The Gini coefficient multiplied by 100. Source: Author on the basis of Eurostat database data. Data for Macedonia refer to

50 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Bearing in mind that the first Survey of Income and Living Conditions was carried out in 2013, we may discuss fluctuations in income inequality over the previous period based on the Household Budget Survey data. Data from this Survey show that income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, dropped from 2006 until the start of the global economic crisis in 2009 (from 35.4 to 31.2; Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2012), then began to increase. A significant increase in income inequality is evident in the period from 2010 to 2012 (from 33 to 38), which is to some extent the result of the various sources of data (the HBS in 2010, and SILC in 2012). One of the reasons for this leap in income inequality over a period of two years may be explained by the fact that all of the components of income, especially wages, which most contribute to inequality, are better covered by SILC than by the HBS, taking into account that the HBS was designed first and foremost to cover expenditures and not income. Although comparable data over a long-term period is not available, making it difficult to discuss trends, it is certain that income inequality in Serbia in comparison to the EU average was higher over the entire preceding decade. SILC results point out that actual income inequality is somewhat lower than presented due to underestimated social transfers in SILC and due to the exclusion of income in kind according to Eurostat methodology. Both factors affect mainly the population with the lowest income. However, their impact on the presented inequality is not more than 1.5 percentage points (Krstić, 2016). Many factors have contributed to such high-income inequality in Serbia. Besides others, these include a high rate of very low work intensity of household members, high share of non-standard forms of employment (part-time, temporary jobs, self-employment), predominantly within the shadow economy, as well as a modest redistributive role of direct taxes and social transfers (Krstić, 2016). Low coverage with social transfers, particularly monetary social assistance and child benefits, and very low progressiveness of the Serbian tax system explain the relatively modest, according to international standards, redistributive role of direct taxes and social transfers. Ranđelović and Žarković-Rakić (2011) and Žarković-Rakić (2015) also point to a relatively low redistributive role of direct taxes and social transfers in Serbia on the basis of the 2007 Living Standards Measurement Survey, relative to EU countries (Medgyesi, 2014). Their role is also modest compared to the countries in the region, such as Croatia and Slovenia (Čok, Urban and Verbič, 2013). TABLE 3. INCOME INEQUALITY BY WORK INTENSITY OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS AND TOTAL INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITION, 2012 Share in persons Share in equivalised income Gini GE(2) Very low Low Medium High Very high Total Inequality within a group Inequality between groups Source: Calculations by author. SILC 2013.

51 50 WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? Table 3 presents income inequality by work intensity of household members. It also shows the decomposition of total income inequality (measured as G(2), i.e. half the squared coefficient of variation) to inequality between households with different work intensity and residual inequality within these households using the formula given in the methodological section for α=2. Income inequality is the highest for households with very low work intensity and decreases with rising work intensity of household members. Both inequality measures, the Gini coefficient and G(2), show similar trends with change in work intensity of household members. Differences between households with different work intensities explain 19% of the total income inequality, based on the G(2) inequality indicator between groups. This means that 81% of the total income inequality can be attributed to inequality within households with different levels of work intensity. From a policy point of view, elimination of the difference in average incomes between these households would result in reduced inequality by only 19%. Therefore, reduction of inequality within these households would result in a significant reduction of inequality by 81%. 6. CONCLUSION Serbia is characterised by very low work intensity, a high at-risk-of-poverty rate and high income inequality in the period. These indicators are much higher than the EU average, but also among the highest compared to individual EU countries. The contribution of this paper is that the effects of work intensity of household members on poverty and income inequality in Serbia are quantified for the first time on the basis of individual data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions. The results show that higher work intensity of household members reduces the poverty risk of employed persons. This confirms the first hypothesis of this paper. The highest poverty risk of employed persons is faced by households with low work intensity, where approximately one employed person in three is exposed to poverty risk, and the lowest in households with very high work intensity (7%). This means that only a very high work intensity of a household may lead to a significant reduction in the at-risk-of-poverty rate. An analysis of inequality by work intensity of household members indicates that income inequality is the highest for households with very low work intensities and it decreases with an increase in work intensity of household members. This confirms the second hypothesis of this paper. The decomposition of income inequality by work intensity of household members shows that a reduction of income inequality within households with different work intensity has the biggest impact on reducing income inequality in Serbia, while the elimination of differences in average income between these households would result in the reduction of inequalities by only 19%. Policies that contribute to greater employability of individuals, such as education, lifelong learning and active employment measures, would reduce inequality in market income - income that an individual earns on the labour market, before redistribution policies start to produce effects (Krstić and Žarković-Rakić, 2017).

52 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART The main prerequisite for poverty reduction is GDP growth, accompanied by a rise in employment, as well as a decrease of income inequality. Data show that employment significantly reduces poverty risk, however, it does not always guarantee better welfare or an escape from poverty, as the quality of employment is a key determining factor of this. Adverse effects of dismissal of workers from enterprises undergoing transition on total demand and living standards in the forthcoming period may be partially compensated for by the positive effects of better-quality employment in more productive sectors, as well as extended coverage of the poor with the right to monetary social assistance. In addition, striking a balance between social protection and employment incentives is particularly important for poverty reduction, as it would provide incentives to social assistance beneficiaries to find employment. In conclusion, it is necessary to mention that one of the limits of this paper is in that we cannot track the dynamic changes of these three indicators over an extended previous period, bearing in mind that the Survey of Income and Living Conditions began to be carried out from Also, we believe that actual income inequality is lower 1.5 percentage points than those presented, due to underestimated social transfers in SILC and due to the exclusion of income in kind. Further research in this area should provide answers to the questions; what additional factors, besides increased work intensity, such as education, work experience, type of employment, sector of activity, etc., could contribute to reducing poverty and income inequality in Serbia and what is their importance. This would enable the analysis of other policies that may contribute to reducing poverty and income inequality in Serbia. LITERATURE Cantillon, B. (2011), The paradox of the social investment state: growth, employment and poverty in the Lisbon era, Journal of European Social Policy, 21(5), Cowell, F.A. and S.P. Jenkins (1995), How Much Inequality can we Explain? A Methodology and an Application to the USA, Economic Journal, Vol.105, pp Eurostat (2010), Income poverty and material deprivation in European countries Eurostat (2012a), Working paper with the description of the Income and living conditions dataset, Lot 1: EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on income and Living Conditions): Methodological studies and publications Eurostat (2013), Smarter, greener, more inclusive? Indicators to support the Europe 2020 strategy Eurostat (2016), Newsrelease 199/2016 Government of the Republic of Serbia (2012), Praćenje socijalne uključenosti u Srbiji

53 52 WOULD AN INCREASE IN LOW WORK INTENSITY CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SERBIA? Gini, C. (1912), Variabilita e Mutabilita, Bologna Krstić, G. (2014), Pokazatelji siromaštva i socijalne isključenosti u Srbiji i EU: Metodologija, kretanje i karakteristike in B. Jovanović Gavrilović i J. Žarković Rakić (red.), Reforme i razvoj: Stanje, rezultati i početak pregovora Srbije sa EU (pp ), Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade Krstić, G. (2015), Work conditions and work intensity of household members, in Serbia Income and Living Conditions 2013 (pp.73-96), Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade Krstić, G. (2016), Why income inequality is so high in Serbia: Empirical evidence and measurement of key factors, Economic Annals LXI, No.220, pp Krstić G. i Žarković-Rakić J. (2017), Dohodna nejednakost u Srbiji: uzroci i preporuke za politiku, Zbornik radova sa Naučne konferencije Naučnog društva ekonomista Srbije i Ekonomskog fakulteta u Beogradu Ekonomska politika Srbije u Milanović, B. (2003), Incidence of Social Transfers; Inequality, in Bogićević et al., Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the Poor (pp.43-66). Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Social Affairs and Center for Liberal Democratic Studies, Belgrade Medgyesi, M. (2014), Components of income inequality and its change in EU countries, , ImPRovE Discussion Paper 14(01). Antwerp Ranđelović, S. & Žarković-Rakić, J. (2011), Adressing Inequality and Poverty with Tax Instruments, Economic Annals LVI, No.190, pp.7-26 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2016), Communication: Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) No. 084 Shorrocks, A. F. (1980), The Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality Measures, Econometrica Vol. 48 (3), pp Sen, A. (1977), On Economic Inequality (2nd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press Vandenbroucke, F., and Vleminckx, K. (2011), Disappointing poverty trends: is the social investment state to blame?, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 21, pp Čok, M., Urban, I., & Verbič, M. (2013), Income Redistribution Through Taxes and Social Benefits: The Case of Slovenia and Croatia, Panoeconomicus, Vol 5, pp Žarković Rakić, J. (2015), Employment effects of tax cuts in a transition country: evidence from Serbia, Post Communist Economies, 27(3), pp

54 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART YILMAZ BAYAR 1 yilmaz.bayar@usak.edu.tr PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES JEL CLASSIFICATION: G10, G20, G28, H83, C33 ABSTRACT: Financial development has been accepted as an important component of economic growth together with the considerable improvements and expansions in financial sector during the recent years. Therefore, the determinants of financial development have gained importance. This study researches the interaction between public governance and the development of financial sector in 15 Central and Eastern European countries over the period employing panel regression. The results of the paper revealed that most elements of the public governance are important factors for the development of financial sector. KEY WORDS: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 1 Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economics, Usak University.

55 54 PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1. INTRODUCTION Financial development has become an important factor behind the long-run economic growth in the context of endogenous growth theories, because an improved financial sector allocates resources efficiently and thus can boost long term economic growth (e.g. see Valickova et al., 2015; Nyasha and Odhiambo, 2015; and Sehrawat and Giri, 2015). In this context, the drivers underlying the development of financial sector have gained importance in the recent years and many empirical studies have revealed that institutions, trade and financial openness, geography, economic growth, economic development, population, religious, language and ethnic characteristics have been major factors behind the development of financial sector (Huang, 2010). In this regard, the quality of public administration comes into prominence as a key determinant of financial development, because public administration is the dominant actor which designs and regulates the financial environment and the functioning of financial system. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries experienced significant changes in public governance during the economic transformation with transition to liberal market economies from closed centrally planned economies over the period 1990s-2010s. In the transition process, CEE countries have experienced an institutional and economic transformation in both public sector and private sector. On the other side, the integration process of some CEE countries with the EU (European Union) supported and accelerated the transformation through the existing EU criteria and financial support. As a consequence the CEE countries have come a long way in terms of good governance over time. This study researches the effects of improvements in the public administration and legal infrastructure on the development of financial sector in 15 CEE countries over period employing panel regression analysis. Our paper will be one of the early studies researching the interaction between the quality of public administration and financial development and make contribution to the relevant literature with this aspect. Within this framework, we scrutinize the relevant studies in the next part of the paper. Then we introduce the data and method employed in the study. We implement econometric analysis and discuss the findings in the section of empirical analysis. Finally the study draws to the close with the Conclusion section. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW Three main hypotheses, law-finance hypothesis of La Porta et al. (1997), the hypotheses of endowment and economic institutions Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004), have been developed to explain the interaction between institutional development and development of financial sector. La Porta et al. (1997) asserted that solid legislative institutions and regulations towards the protection of the investors and creditors may affect the development of financial sector positively by way of adaptability and political. Acemoglu et al. (2001) also specified that states form different legal systems including regulations about the protection of investors and property depending on their endowments and influence development of financial sector. Lastly, Acemoglu et al. (2004) claimed that institutional

56 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART development may affect the economic activity positively by means of shaping the economic incentives such as property rights, allocation of the resources. Consequently institutional development has potential to affect financial development through increasing protection of investors and creditors, provision ownership rights and efficiently allocation of funds theoretically. Therefore we expect a positive impact of institutional quality on development of finance sector. The empirical studies have reached the findings supporting the theoretical considerations stated above (institutional development affects the development of financial sector positively) (e.g. see La Porta et al., 1997; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Law and Demetriades, 2006;, Baltagi et al., 2007; Billmeier and Massa, 2007; Gries and Meierrieks, 2010; Huang, 2010; Le et al., 2015; Mbulawa, 2015). These empirical findings verified that regulations and environment in which financial institutions work are important determinants for development of finance sector. In one of the pioneering studies, La Porta et al. (1997) investigated the interaction between financial development and law in 49 countries and found that the countries with weaker investor protection in terms of law had less developed capital markets. On the other side Chinn and Ito (2006) investigated the interplay among financial openness, institutions and financial development in 108 countries during the period and found that financial openness began to make contribution to the development of stock markets after reaching a certain threshold level of institutional quality. Law and Demetriades (2006) also examined the relationship among openness, institutions and financial development in 43 developing countries over period with dynamic panel regression and revealed that institutional improvement affected the development of financial sector positively. In another study, Baltagi et al. (2007) investigated the relationship among financial development including banking sector development and capital market development, openness and institutions in different groups of countries during changing time periods employing dynamic panel regression and revealed that institutional development influenced development of banking sector and capital markets positively. On the other side, Billmeier and Massa (2007) researched the factors behind the development of stock markets in 17 countries from Middle East and Central Asia over 1995 and 2005 period with panel regression and revealed a positive interaction between stock market development and institutional progress. Zoli (2007) also investigated the determinants of financial development in emerging European countries over period with panel regression and revealed that institutional improvement affected the development of financial sector positively. Huang (2010) researched the interaction between institutional development and development of financial sector in 90 non-transition economies over period employing panel regression and revealed that institutional development affected financial development positively. Gries and Meierrieks (2010) also examined the factors behind the development of financial sector in 19 African countries during the period and revealed that institutional improvements influenced the development of financial sector positively. In another study, Law and Azman-Saini (2012) researched the influence of institutional development on the capital market development and banking sector de-

57 56 PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES velopment in 94 countries consisting of developed and developing countries over period employing dynamic panel regression and discovered that high institutional development was important especially for the development of banking sector, but the nexus between institutional improvement and capital market progress was contingent. In another study, Cherif and Dreger (2014) examined the determinants underlying the development of banking sector and capital market in MENA states for the period of period employing panel regression and revealed that institutional development influenced the development of banking sector and capital market positively. Le et al. (2015) also investigated the factors behind the development of financial sector in 26 Asia and the Pacific states over period with regression analysis and revealed that public governance and institutional improvement had positive influence on financial development in developing countries. Finally, Mbulawa (2015) investigated the major determinants of financial development in 11 Southern Africa Development Community states over the period employing panel regression and discovered that improvements in the public administration affected the development of financial sector positively. 3. DATA AND METHOD We researched the interaction between various indicators representing public governance and the development of financial sector in 15 CEE countries including (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) during period with panel regression analysis. The existence of data formed our sample and the time dimension of the all cross-sections were the same in the panel, in other words we used a balanced panel in the study Data Financial development was represented by domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) in the paper extracted from World Bank (2017a), because it was used by most of studies about the financial development (e.g., see Lane and McQuade, 2013; Petrovski and Kjosevski, 2014) and the share of banking sector in the whole financial system. On the other side, six components of public governance indicators of World Bank (2017b) were employed as proxy for quality of public administration. The components of public governance and their symbols are displayed in Table 1 and each indicator shows the political stability, functioning of the public sector and legal system with a scale changing from -2.5 (weak) and 2.5 (strong) (see World Bank (2017b) and Kaufmann et al. (2010) for the detailed information about definitions and calculation of six public governance indicators).

58 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABLE 1. DATASET DESCRIPTION Variables SYMBOL SOURCE DCRD Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) World Bank (2017a) VAA Voice and accountability World Bank (2017b) PS Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism World Bank (2017b) GE Government effectiveness World Bank (2017b) RQ Regulatory quality World Bank (2017b) ROL Rule of law World Bank (2017b) COC Control of corruption World Bank (2017b) Source: Authors own elaboration. Gauss 11.0, WinRATS Pro. 8.0, and Stata 14.0, programs were utilized for implementation of econometric analysis. The summary and correlation matrix of the dataset were presented in Table 2 in Appendix and the correlation matrix indicated that there were no multicollinearity problems among the explanatory variables Econometric model and method The econometric model seeks to research the effect of public governance or public administration quality on financial development. In this regard, the model is established as follows: (1) The subscripts i and t index in Equation 1 symbolize the countries and time respectively. Two dummy variables (respectively D1 and D2) representing the EU membership and recent financial crises were included in the model to see the impact of EU membership and the crises on the development of financial sector. Furthermore, μ indicates unobservable country specific effects in the model, while ε shows the error term in the model. First, cross-sectional dependency was investigated within the scope of econometric analysis, because the results of the cross-sectional independency test give an idea to us about the selection of proper unit root tests. The first generation unit root tests (e.g. Maddala and Wu (1999), Hadri (2000), Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003)) do not take notice of cross-section dependence probably causing low power and size distortions, while second generation unit root tests (e.g. Bai and Ng (2004) and Pesaran (2007)) consider the cross-section dependence (Hurlin and Mignon, 2007). In this paper Pesaran (2004) LM CD (Lagrange Multiplier Cross-sectional Dependency) test and LM adj. test of Pesaran et al. (2008) were employed to investigate the existence of cross-sectional dependency, because time dimension of the (T=14) was found to be lower than cross-section dimension (N=15). CIPS (Cross-sectionally augmented IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)) test

59 58 PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES was implemented to analyze the integration levels of the series considering the results of cross-sectional dependency. In the next stage of the study, Chow (F)(1960), Hausman (1978) and Breusch and Pagan (1980) tests were implemented for the determination of FEM (fixed effects model) or REM (random effects model) to be estimated. Finally, serial correlation problem was tested with Wooldridge (2002) test, while heteroskedasticity problem was tested with Greene (2003) test. 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 4.1. Cross-sectional Dependency Test The existence of cross-sectional dependency among the series was investigated with LM CD test of Pesaran (2004) and LM adj. test of Pesaran et al. (2008) and the test results were displayed in Table 3. The null hypothesis (there is cross-sectional independency) was declined at 5% significance level, since the probability values were found to be lower than So we concluded that there was cross-sectional dependency among the series. Furthermore, the homogeneity of the slope coefficients were investigated by the adjusted delta tilde test of Pesaran and Yamaga (2008) and the results showed that there was heterogeneity among the slope coefficients (Table 3, Appendix) CIPS Unit Root Test Pesaran (2007) CIPS panel unit root test dependent on CADF (covariate-augmented Dickey-Fuller) test was implemented to analyze the stationarity level of the series considering the cross-sectional dependency among the series and the results were displayed in Table 4 in Appendix. CIPS statistics are attained with averaging the CADF statistics of each series. All the variables were found to not be stationary at the level, since the CADF and CIPS statistics were higher than the critical values, but they became stationary after first-differencing Model Selection First Chow (1960), Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Hausman (1978) pretests were implemented to decide whether REM or FEM model and the results of pretests were displayed in Table 5. The result of BP model suggests the REM, while the result of Chow test suggests the FEM. Lastly, the result of Hausman test offered the use of REM between FEM and REM.

60 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABLE 5. MODEL SELECTION PRETEST RESULTS TEST P VALUE DECISION Chow (F) test (H 0 : Pooled OLS is effective) FEM BP (χ 2 ) test (H 0 : OLS is effective) REM Hausman test (H 0 : REM is efficient) REM Source: Authors own elaboration based on the results of the pre-tests Model Estimation We employed different algorithms in the context of the regression analysis and implemented the estimation using the algorithm of white cross-section having the minimum sum of the squared errors; the outcomes of the estimated model were displayed in Table 6. The outcomes indicate that all the public governance indicators except voice and accountability (VAA) had positive impact on financial development. Our explanatory variables explained 59% of the changes in the dependent variable and the coefficients indicated that rule of law (ROL) and political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS) had the largest influence on the financial sector development. Finally, the coefficients of the dummy variables representing the EU membership and the recent financial crises (global financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis) revealed that the EU membership affected the development of financial sector positively, while the recent crises affected the development of financial sector negatively.

61 60 PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TABLE 6. PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS Dependent variable: DCRD COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STATISTIC PROB. DVAA DPS DGE DRQ DROL DCOC D D C Effects Specification S.D. Cross-section random Period random Idiosyncratic random Weighted Statistics R-squared Mean dependent var Adjusted R-squared S.D. dependent var S.E. of regression Sum squared resid F-statistic Durbin-Watson stat Prob (F-statistic) Rho 4.5. Diagnostic Tests The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, which are major assumptions behind the regression, were investigated for the reliability of the findings. We investigated autocorrelation problem with autocorrelation test of Wooldridge (2002) and investigated heteroskedasticity problem with Greene (2003) test and results were presented in Table 7. Given the findings of the test, no autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems were revealed in the model. TABLE 7. RESULTS OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTS Test P VALUE Wooldridge test Greene heteroskedasticity test Source: Authors own elaboration based on test results.

62 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Discussion of the Results The relevant theoretical literature (law-finance hypothesis of La Porta et al. (1997), the hypotheses of endowment and economic institutions of Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2004)) asserted that institutional development affects the development of financial sector positively, because the quality of public administration and rule of law have direct impact on the designing, regulating, and the functioning of the financial system. On the other hand the findings of the relevant empirical literature (e.g. see La Porta et al., 1997; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Law and Demetriades, 2006;, Baltagi et al., 2007; Billmeier and Massa, 2007; Gries and Meierrieks, 2010; Huang, 2010; Le et al., 2015; Mbulawa, 2015) were found to be consistent with the theoretical expectations. The regression coefficients of the study denoted that political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law had positive impact on the development of financial sector, but voice and accountability did not have significant impacts on the financial development. So our results were found to be consistent with the findings of both theoretical and empirical studies. Furthermore, the coefficients of the dummy variables representing the EU membership and the recent financial crises (global financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis) revealed that the EU membership affected the development of financial sector positively, while the recent crises affected the development of financial sector negatively. The EU membership is expected to influence the development of financial sector positively through making contribution to the development of institutions and legal infrastructure. On the other hand the financial crises can block the development of financial sector negatively by affecting both demand and supply sides of financial markets through leading loss of confidence and increasing the bankruptcies of financial institutions. 5. CONCLUSION Financial sector has become an important factor behind the economic expansion by mobilizing the funds and directing the funds to the most productive ventures in the economy. Therefore, many researches have focused on the factors underlying the development of financial sector during the past three decades. In the paper, we researched the interaction between various dimensions of public governance and the development of financial sector in 15 CEE economies over the period employing panel regression. We discovered that all the components of public governance including political stability, quality of governing institutions and regulatory environment (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption), and rule of law except voice and accountability had positive influence on the development of financial sector. We also revealed that a dummy variable representing the recent financial crises had negative impact on financial development, while the dummy variable representing the EU membership affected the development of financial sector positively. The EU membership made a positive contribution to the development of financial sector with raising the development level of institutions, while the financial crises affect the development of financial sector negatively through loss of confidence and increasing the bankruptcies of financial institutions

63 62 PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Consequently, the results of the study are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature and the relevant empirical findings and suggest that improvements in the quality of both public administration and legal infrastructure will contribute to the development of financial sector. 6. REFERENCES Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J.A. (2001), The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation American Economic Review, Vol.91, Pp Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. (2004), Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth NBER Working Paper Bai, J., and Ng, S. (2004), A Panic Attack on Unit Roots and Cointegration Econometrica, Vol.72 No.4, Pp Baltagi, B., Demitriades, P., and Law, S.H. (2007), Financial Development, Openness and Institutions: Evidence from Panel Data Conference on New Perspectives on Financial Globalization Research Department, Washington. Billmeier, A., and Massa, I. (2007), What Drives Stock Market Development in the Middle East and Central Asia Institutions, Remittances, or Natural Resources? International Monetary Fund Working Papers, WP/07/157. Breusch, T.S., and Pagan, A.R. (1980), The Lagrange Multiplier Test and Its Applications to Model Specification Tests in Econometrics, Review of Economic Studies, Vol.47, Pp Cherif, M., and Dreger, C. (2014), Institutional Determinants of Financial Development in MENA Countries Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin Discussion Papers, No:1422. Chinn, M.D., and Ito, H. (2006), What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interactions Journal of Development Economics, Vol.81, Pp Chow, G.C. (1960), Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficient in Two Linear Regressions Econometrica, Vol.28, Pp Greene, W.H. (2003), Econometric analysis, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. Gries, T., and Meierrieks, D. (2015), Institutional Quality and Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Meierrieks_-_Institutional_Quality_and_Financial_Development_in_Sub-Saharan_Africa.pdf [Accessed: 23/12/2015].

64 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Hadri, K. (2000), Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panel Data Econometrics Journal, Vol.3 No.2, Pp Hausman, J.A. (1978), Specification Tests in Econometrics Econometrica, Vol.46, Pp Huang, Y. (2010), Determinants of Financial Development. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Hurlin, C., and Mignon, V. (2015), Second Generation Panel Unit Root Tests halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs /document [Accessed: 23/12/2015] Im, K.S., Pesaran, M.H., and Shin, Y. (2003), Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels Journal of Econometrics, Vol.115 No.1, Pp Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Mastruzzi, M. (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No Lane, P.R. and McQuade, P. (2013). Domestic Credit Growth and International Capital Flow, European Central Bank Working Paper Series, No La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silane, F., Shleifer, A, and Vishny, R. W. (1997), Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, Vol.52, Pp Law, S.H., and Demetriades, P. (2006), Openness, Institutions and Financial Development World Economy & Finance Research Programme Working Paper Series, WEF Law, S.H., and Azmani-Saini, W.N.W. (2012), Institutional Quality, Governance and Financial Development Economics of Governance, Vol.13 No.3, Pp Le, T.H., Kim, J., and Lee, M. (2015), Institutional Quality, Trade Openness, and Financial Development in Asia: An Empirical Investigation Asian Development Bank Working Papers, No.452. Levin, A., Lin, C.F., and Chu, C.S.J. (2002), Unit Root Test in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties, Journal of Econometrics, Vol.108, Pp Maddala, G.S., and Wu, S. (1999), A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with Panel Data and a New Simple Test, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics Special Issue, Pp Mbulawa, S. (2015), Determinants of Financial Development in Southern Africa Development Community (SADC): Do Institutions Matter? European Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance Research, Vol.3 No.6, Pp

65 64 PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Nyasha, S., and Odhiambo, N.M. (2015), Banks, Stock Market Development and Economic Growth in South Africa: A Multivariate Causal Linkage, Applied Economics Letters, Vol.22 No.18, Pp Petrovski, M. and Kjosevski, J. (2014). Does Banking Sector Development Promote Economic Growth? An Empirical Analysis for Selected Countries in Central and South Eastern Europe, Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, Vol.27 No.1, Pp Pesaran, M. H., (2004). General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels. CESifo Working Papers, No. 1233, Pp Pesaran M.H. (2007), A Simple Panel Unit Root Test in the Presence of Cross-Section Dependence, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol.22, Pp Pesaran, M. H., Ullah, A., and Yamagata, T. (2008). A Bias-adjusted LM Test of Error Cross-section Independence, Econometrics Journal, Vol.11 No.1, Pp Pesaran, M. H., Yamagata, T. (2008). Testing Slope Homogeneity in Large Panels, Journal of Econometrics, Vol.142 No.1, Pp Sehrawat, M., and Giri, A.K. (2015), Financial Development and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from India Studies in Economics and Finance, Vol.32 No.3, Pp Valickova, P., Havranek, T., and Horvath, R. (2015), Financial Development and Economic Growth: A Meta-analysis, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol.29 No.3, Pp Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross-section and Panel Data. Cambridge: MIT Press. World Bank (2017a), Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP), [Accessed: 08/05/2017] World Bank (2017b), Worldwide Governance Indicators [Accessed: 08/05/2017] Zoli E. (2007), Financial Development in Emerging Europe: The Unfinished Agenda, International Monetary Fund Working Papers, WP/07/245

66 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART APPENDIX TABLE 2. DATASET SUMMARY Variables OBS. MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX DCRD VAA PS GE RQ ROL COC VAA PS GE RQ ROL COC VAA PS GE RQ ROL COC TABLE 3. RESULTS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DEPENDENCE AND HOMOGENEITY TESTS Cross-sectional dependency tests Test Statistic p-value LM (Breusch and Pagan (1980)) LM adj* (Pesaran et al. (2008)) LM CD* (Pesaran (2004)) Homogeneity tests Test Statistic p-value Delta_tilde Delta_tilde_adj *two-sided test TABLE 4. UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS Test DCRD VAA PS GE RQ ROL COC CADF CIPS Maximum lag length for CADF was taken as 4 and optimal lag length was determined considering Schwarz information criterion. Critical values for trend and intercept were provided from Pesaran (2007). The critical values at 1, 5, and 10% level of significance for CADF are -5.46, -4.17, and respectively. The critical values at 1, 5, and 10% level of significance for CIPS are -3.09, and respectively.

67

68 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART DRAGAN ALEKSIĆ 1 aleksic@ekof.bg.ac.rs NEMANJA VUKSANOVIĆ 2 vuksanovic@ekof.bg.ac.rs IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - IS THERE A DISCRIMINATION ON THE LABOUR MARKET? - CASE OF SERBIA IN THE MIDST OF ECONOMIC CRISIS - JEL KLASIFIKACIJA: J24, J31, J71. APSTRAKT: Istorijski razvoj modernog društva zasnovan na patrijarhalnom obrascu funkcionisanja porodice, jasno je podelio uloge muškaraca i žena. Tek u godinama nakon industrijske revolucije, podela na žene - koje obavljaju poslove unutar domaćinstva, i muškarce koji rade da tržištu, počela je polako da nestaje. Masovno uključivanje žena na tržište rada, koje se dogodilo tokom 20. veka, doprinelo je tome da se ovaj jaz između muškaraca i žena drastično smanji. Međutim, čak i u praskozorju trećeg milenijuma, izvesne razlike u položaju na tržištu rada između muškaraca i žena i dalje postoje. Diskriminacija žena, 1 Ekonomski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu. 2 Ekonomski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu.

69 68 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - posmatrano u okvirima svetske privrede, prisutna je u kontingentskom (employment gap) i cenovnom (wage gap) obliku. Očekivano, Srbija nije izuzetak po ovom pitanju. Cilj ovog rada jeste da ispitamo stepen kontingentske i cenovne diskriminacije žena na tržištu rada u Srbiji, kao i uticaj svetske ekonomske krize na njen intenzitet. Rezultati sugerišu da umerena diskriminacija žena svakako postoji, kao i da kriza nije u značajnoj meri doprinela pogoršanju relativnog položaja žena. KLJUČNE REČI: DISKRIMINACIJA ŽENA, TRŽIŠTE RADA, RAZLIKE U ZARADAMA, ZAPOSLENOST. ABSTRACT: The historical development of a modern society based on patriarchal family pattern clearly divided the roles of men and women. Years after the industrial revolution, division on women who are producing family goods at home, and men who are working on the labour market, began to slowly disappear. The vigorous rise of women participation on the labour market, which occurred during the 20th century, made its contribution in narrowing this gap between men and women. However, even in the dawn of the third millennium, some differences of main labour market indicators between men and women still exist. Discrimination of women, speaking in terms of the world economy, has had quantitative (employment gap) and price (wage gap) form. As expected, Serbia is no exception in this regard. The aim of this paper is to examine the degree of employment gap and wage gap of women on Serbian labour market, as well as the impact of the global economic crisis on its intensity. The results are showing that moderate discrimination of women undeniably exists, but on the other hand, the global economic crisis has not contributed to the deterioration of their relative position on the labour market. KEY WORDS: DISCRIMINATION OF WOMEN, LABOUR MARKET, GENDER PAY GAP, EMPLOYMENT.

70 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART UVOD Iako su svi vidovi diskriminacije, među koje spada i rodna, u razvijenim zemljama sveta zabranjeni najvišim pravnim aktima 3 i regulisani velikim brojem specifičnih zakona i podzakonskih akata, oni de facto i dalje postoje. Različiti oblici diskriminacije, koji svoje korene vuku iz daleke prošlosti i klasnih podela, egzistiraju i u današnjem vremenu i to čak u najrazvijenijim, i po shvatanjima najtolerantnijim, društvima koja, i pored značajnog napredovanja na razvojnoj lestvici, još uvek nisu uspela da je se reše. Jedan od segmenata društva i ekonomije u kojem je takođe prisutna diskriminacija, jeste tržište rada, na kojem ona ima veliki broj pojavnih oblika, a mi ćemo se u nastavku ovog rada fokusirati na onaj koji u podređeni položaj stavlja žene. I pre samog stupanja na tržište rada, žene se, usled svojih prirodnih karakteristika, susreću sa najmanje dva problema koji ih u samom startu stavljaju u nepovoljniji položaj u odnosu na muškarce. Radi se o (1) egzogenim uticajima na donošenje odluke o tome koliko i na koji način će se neki posao obavljati, kao i o (2) diskriminatornom pristupu prilikom razgovora za posao. Prvo, primera radi, samohrana majka sa malim detetom mora u znatno većoj meri da prilagodi optimalan izbor između rada i dokolice za razliku od muškarca i drugo, čitav korpus pitanja prilikom konkurisanja za posao, a koja se tiču fizičkog izgleda i planiranja porodice imaju znatno veći ponder u procesu izbora kandidata kod žena, nego što je to slučaj kod muškaraca. Ukoliko za trenutak zanemarimo navedene inicijalne poteškoće sa kojima se žene suočavaju prilikom traženja posla i posmatramo isključivo zaposlene žene, videćemo da diskriminacija ne prestaje, naprotiv još je izraženija, dok posledice koje ona prouzrokuje postaju sve ozbiljnije. Diskriminacija zaposlenih isključivo na osnovu pola, u užem smislu se može klasifikovati u dve podgrupe. Prvu, koja podrazumeva fizička i psihička maltretiranja od strane nadređenih (vertikalni mobing) ili kolega (horizontalni mobing) na radnom mestu, od čega su najčešći slučajevi neka vrsta seksualnog uznemiravanja, zatim očekivanje od žena da obavljaju različite vanposlovne aktivnosti poput kuvanja kafe, održavanja higijene radnog mesta i sl. Druga podgrupa diskriminacije na radnom mestu se manifestuje nejednakim vrednovanjem rada pojedinaca na istim pozicijama isključivo usled pola kojem pripadaju. Drugim rečima, iako apsolutno istih karakteristika, žena i muškarac nemaju jednaku platu, pri čemu je potonji u favorizovanom položaju. Motivacija za pisanje ovog rada sastoji se iz potrebe da se ovako važnoj temi ozbiljnije posveti pažnja u naučnim i pre svega ekonomskim krugovima, jer njome nije dovoljno da se bave samo psiholozi i sociolozi, već ona svojom interdisciplinarnošću zahteva interakciju pomenutih nauka sa ekonomijom. Pored rezultata koji su dobijeni na bazi raspoloživih podataka i koji će biti prezentovani u radu, ukazaćemo na dalje smernice koje treba slediti ne bi li se ovaj fenomen još detaljnije istražio i u skladu sa tim preduzele adekvatne mere za njegovo efikasno rešavanje. Rad osim uvoda obuhvata još četiri celine i strukturiran je na sledeći način. Najpre, da bismo shvatili rastući problem diskriminacije, moramo poći od istorijskih kretanja koja su se u prošlosti dogodila i koja svedoče o povećanoj aktivaciji žena na tržištu rada. Upravo sekularni trendovi i razlozi koji objašnjavaju njihovu putanju biće predmet drugog dela našeg rada. Treći deo sačinjavaće nadasve bizarni primeri polne diskriminacije sa kojima se susrećemo u svetskoj i posebno u praksi 3 Primera radi, američkim ustavom u USA, Ugovorom Evropske zajednice iz (tzv. Rimskim ugovorom) na teritoriji sadašnje EU.

71 70 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - u Srbiji. U četvrtom delu bavićemo se slučajem Srbije i ispitati stepen diskriminacije u dva nivoa količinskom (koji podrazumeva razlike u kontingentima na tržištu rada) i cenovnom (u šta spada razlika u zaradama između muškaraca i žena). Za indikatore kod kojih je to moguće, osvrnućemo se na stanje koje je važilo pre ekonomske krize, a zatim i na trend koji je prisutan nakon godine, kako bismo sagledali posledice koje je kriza ostavila na rodnu diskriminaciju u Srbiji. Rezultati dobijeni u trećem delu poslužiće nam da iznesemo zaključne stavove, kao i da na bazi njih formulišemo određene preporuke i smernice za dalja istraživanja. 2. ISTORIJSKI OKVIR I TEKUĆA KRETANJA NA TRŽIŠTU RADA Premda statistika tržišta rada nije toliko stara nauka, te ne raspolažemo egzaktnim podatkom, procenjujemo da je napredak koji su žene na tržištu rada ostvarile nakon Drugog svetskog rata veći od onog koji su napravile od postanka sveta pa do početka 20. veka. Tradicionalno patrijarhalno društvo, što je bio primarni obrazac po kojem se svet razvijao u prošlosti, rezervisalo je mesto ženama u domaćinstvu, u kome je trebalo da obavljaju mnoštvo kućnih poslova u koje spada i negovanje dece. Izlazak iz takvog okvira nije bio prihvatljiv, tako da je, osim u pojedinačnim slučajevima, radna aktivnost žena van domaćinstava bila marginalizovana. Ovome su dodatno doprinela i različita religijska i verska učenja koja ili ograničavaju ili u potpunosti zabranjuju ženama da uzmu aktivno učešće na tržištu rada, od kojih su neka važeća i danas. Tek emancipacijom žena i razvojem pokreta za ljudska prava, odnosno prava žena, otpočela je faza ubrzanog rasta njihove participacije na tržištu rada, i posledično, dolazilo je do sve veće zaposlenosti. Pored toga što su žene u poslednjih 75 godina napravile veliki iskorak u sustizanju muškaraca prema osnovnim indikatorima tržišta rada, one su napredovale i u pogledu kvaliteta poslova na kojima se zapošljavaju kao i stepenu uključenosti u obrazovni sistem. Primera radi, većinu fakultetskih studenata u razvijenim zemljama, a takođe i u Srbiji (55%) 4, čine žene. Ipak, iako se situacija drastično popravila i iako je jaz između muškaraca i žena po ovom osnovu smanjen, i dalje postoje razlike u stepenu participacije na tržištu rada i visini plate. TABELA 1 STOPA AKTIVNOSTI I STOPA ZAPOSLENOSTI U SAD (U %) Stopa aktivnosti Stopa zaposlenosti Izvor: Women in the Labor Force, BLS. U Tabeli 1 prikazani su podaci koji u potpunosti potvrđuju uvodnu rečenicu ovog dela rada. Ako pogledamo stope aktivnosti i stope zaposlenosti nakon Drugog svetskog rata i u godini, kao poslednjoj godini za koju je bio dostupan ovaj podatak, možemo 4 RZS Žene i muškarci u Srbiji (2014),

72 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART uočiti da su one gotovo udvostručile svoju vrednost - preciznije, porasle su za 25 i 22 procentna poena. Imajući u vidu da su za isti vremenski period oba analizirana pokazatelja kod muške populacije porasla za oko 10 procentnih poena, jasno je koliko su žene uspele da poboljšaju svoj položaj. Zanimljiva je činjenica da su obe stope nešto više u nego u godini. Razlog negativnog kretanja bazičnih pokazatelja tržišta rada ženskog stanovništva, koje je u ovom desetogodišnjem periodu zabeleženo prvi put posle šezdesetogodišnjeg rasta, jeste ekonomska kriza. Kako kretanja analiziranih indikatora tržišta rada koincidiraju sa kretanjima odgovarajućih indikatora kod muškaraca, jasno je da, generalno gledano, kriza nije imala diskriminatorni karakter 5. Objašnjenje sekularnog trenda određeni autori nude u obliku praćenja putanje razvoja privrede (Becker, 1985). Nakon industrijske revolucije propulzivnost se razvijala kod onih proizvodnih i prerađivačkih grana u kojima su tradicionalno bili zaposleni samo muškarci i u kojima su se obavljali teški fizički poslovi. Pridodajući ovome ekstenzivan oblik bavljenja poljoprivredom u kome takođe konvencionalno prednjače muškarci, ženama nije ostavljeno mnogo prostora da pronađu zaposlenje. Tehnološki napredak koji je potom usledio, u velikoj meri je doprineo rapidnom usponu tercijarnog sektora, što je imalo za posledicu postepeno smanjenje relativnog učešća dveju, do tada vodećih, privrednih grana - poljoprivrede i industrije. Sektor usluga doživljava neverovatnu ekspanziju sa razvojem informacionih tehnologija što je u razvijenim zemljama sveta dovelo do drastičnog povećanja zarada određenom broju žena koje su u njemu zaposlene. Neaktivnim ženama u tom periodu sa jedne strane visoka zarada na tržištu se čini izuzetno privlačnom, dok sa druge strane proizvodnja porodičnih dobara postaje previše skupa, zbog prevelikog opurtunitetnog troška. Time je mladim majkama bivalo isplativije da svoje vreme provode na tržištu zarađujući naprasno uvećane dohotke i njima plate nekog ko će brinuti za decu u njihovom odsustvu, umesto da i dalje samostalno brinu o deci. Međutim, upravo povećana zarada, koja je bila glavni uzrok veće participacije i zaposlenosti žena, modifikovala je obrazac funkcionisanja porodice usled finansijskog osamostaljenja žena, te je tako zabeleženo sve manje onih koje su se opredeljivale da imaju više dece, broj razvoda je bio u porastu, kao i broj domaćinstava u kojima ima dece, a u kojima je žena glava porodice. TABELA 2 STOPA AKTIVNOSTI I STOPA ZAPOSLENOSTI ŽENA U IZABRANIM EVROPSKIM DRŽAVAMA (U %) Stopa aktivnosti Nemačka Francuska Velika Britanija Stopa zaposlenosti Nemačka Francuska Velika Britanija Izvor: Obrada autora na bazi podataka Eurostat. 5 Naravno, reč je o tome da su se indikatori muškog i ženskog stanovništva kretali u istom smeru. Potrebna su detaljnija merenaj kada je reč o intenzitetu posledica krize po svaki od polova.

73 72 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - Slična slika o aktivnosti i zaposlenosti žena, bez obzira što su podaci dostupni za nešto kraći interval, dobiće se ukoliko pogledamo neke od najrazvijenijih evropskih država. Podaci iz Tabele 2 pokazuju da su žene u tri navedene zemlje za samo dvadesetak godina uspele značajno da unaprede svoj položaj, posebno u Nemačkoj gde je za tako kratak vremenski period stopa aktivnosti porasla za više od 12 procentnih poena, a stopa zaposlenosti za skoro 15 procentnih poena. Usled dostupnosti podataka za ove tri evropske zemlje u mogućnosti smo da analiziramo šta se dešava u pogledu sužavanja rodnog jaza kada su u pitanju ovi pokazatelji. Naredna dva grafika pokazuju racio stopa aktivnosti i zaposlenosti kod muškaraca i žena 6, gde vrednosti bliže jedinici označavaju veću rodnu ravnopravnost, i obratno, bliže nuli - veći stepen diskriminacije. Posmatranjem linija trenda na graficima, moguće je uočiti nekoliko zanimljivih tendencija. Prvo, žene u Velikoj Britaniji su početkom 90-ih godina prošlog veka bile u relativno dobrom položaju u odnosu na muškarce (posmatrano prema ostalim evropskim zemljama), prilikom čega je njihova stopa zaposlenosti činila čak 83% stope zaposlenosti muškaraca. Drugo, inicijalno dobru startnu poziciju žene u Velikoj Britaniji nisu mnogo poboljšale u proteklih skoro četvrt veka, što potvrđuje vrednost racia stopa zaposlenosti koji se u ovom periodu uvećao za svega 0,04 (4pp). Dodatno, sudeći po trajektoriji kretanja vrednosti racia oba pokazatelja stiče se utisak da je ekonomska kriza, relativno posmatrano, najteže pala ženama u Velikoj Britaniji. Treće, bez obzira na to što su žene u Nemačkoj imale, u odnosu na žene u ostalim posmatranim zemljama, inicijalno najlošiju poziciju, u prethodnom periodu bile su najuspešnije u smanjivanju jaza u odnosu na muškarce, te je tako nivo stope zaposlenosti žena čak na 90% stope zaposlenosti njihovih muških sunarodnika. GRAFIK 1 RACIO STOPE AKTIVNOSTI MUŠKARACA I ŽENA, IZABRANE ZEMLJE Izvor: Obrada autora na bazi podataka Eurostat. 6 Racio stopa aktivnosti je definisan kao količnik stope aktivnosti žena i stope aktivnosti muškaraca. Analogno tome, racio stopa zaposlenosti predstavlja količnik stope zaposlenosti žena i stope zaposlenosti muškaraca.

74 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART GRAFIK 2 - RACIO STOPE ZAPOSLENOSTI MUŠKARACA I ŽENA, IZABRANE ZEMLJE Izvor: Obrada autora na bazi podataka Eurostat. 3. POJAVNI OBLICI DISKRIMINACIJE Diskriminacija žena je danas prisutna u raznim oblicima i intenzitetima. Ipak, akcenat ćemo staviti na primere koji se često mogu zapaziti na tržištu rada. Činjenica koja možda i više zabrinjava od same diskriminacije, jeste ta što se slučajevi neadekvatnog ponašanja prema osobama ženskog pola relativno slabo prijavljuju nadležnima. Žene, usled nedostatka informacija o tome kome da se obrate za pomoć i posebno iz straha od gubitka posla, nerado javno govore o diskriminaciji koju doživljavaju i posledično, retko takve slučaje prijavljuju. U nastavku ovog dela rada navešćemo nekoliko tipičnih slučajeva diskriminacije i mobinga nad ženama koji se u praksi često sreću. Najčešći slučaj diskriminacije dešava se pri samom konkurisanju za posao. Veliki broj oglasa za posao, posebno onih u kojima se eksplicitno navodi da se traži ženska osoba, zahteva da se uz biografiju obavezno dostavi i slika kandidata, odnosno kandidatkinje. Iako su zahtevi ovog tipa zabranjeni zakonom, u praksi se ovakvi oglasi neretko sreću i predstavljaju primer diskriminacije na bazi fizičkog izgleda. Još ozbiljnija diskriminacija događa se prilikom intervjua za posao, gde, ne samo da u pojedinim slučajevima fizički izgled ima veoma veliki ponder pri finalnom odabiru, već se, isključivo ženama, postavlja čitav set osetljivih pitanja intimne prirode koja su zakonski zabranjena. Pitanja koja su najučestalija odnose se na to da li imaju ili planiraju decu, kada planiraju da zasnuju porodicu, kao i da li imaju stalnog partnera. Ukoliko žena odbije da odgovori na bilo koje od ovih pitanja, po automatizmu se njena konkursna prijava ne uzima u razmatranje, dok se od žena koje su pristale da na ova pitanja daju odgovore biraju samo one podobne, odnosno one koje u skorijoj budućnosti ne planiraju da rađaju decu. Neretko se događa da prilikom potpisivanja ugovora sa poslodavcem žene budu primorane da sklope i neku

75 74 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - vrstu prećutnog dogovora sa njim, gde se obavezuju da - u određenom vremenskom periodu - neće ostati u drugom stanju. Nadalje, zabeleženi su i slučajevi gde bi, nakon što poslodavac sazna da se žena nalazi u drugom stanju, ista dobijala otkaz pre otvaranja trudničkog bolovanja. Nakon što se žena zaposli nastupa drugi vid diskriminacije koji bi delimično mogao da se okarakteriše i kao mobing. Od žena se uglavnom očekuje da na poslu, pored radnih zadataka, obavljaju i tzv. tradicionalno ženske poslove. Tako se žene često nalaze u situaciji da se od njih očekuje da kuvaju nadređenima kafu, obavljaju ulogu sekretarice iako to nije u opisu njihovog posla i sl. Poseban vid uznemiravanja kojem su žene na radnom mestu izložene, jeste seksualno uznemiravanje, najčešće od strane nadređenih. Ukoliko žena pak ne prihvati nepristojnu ponudu nadređenog dva su moguća ishoda ili (1) izgubi posao ili (2) zadrži radno mesto, ali uz limitiranu mogućnost za napredovanjem, kao i uz visok stepen psihičkog maltretiranja koje u dužem vremenskom periodu može dovesti do ozbiljnijih zdravstvenih problema. Međutim, da diskriminacija nije karakteristična samo za nerazvijene zemlje i zemlje u razvoju, svedoči najnoviji primer multinacionalne kompanije Google. Ova kompanija, pod velom stimulisanja žena, koje u njoj rade, da što više napreduju u karijeri, ponudila im je mogućnost da zamrznu sopstvene jajne ćelije o trošku kompanije i zasnuju porodicu kada budu na vrhuncu svoje karijere i pošto se u potpunosti profesionalno ostvare. Jasno je da se, iza ove podsticajne politike i navodne brige o zaposlenima krije veoma perfidan vid diskriminacije žena, kojima se ovom prilikom narušava prirodni proces i potencijalno oduzima prilika da dožive iskustvo materinstva. Pri čemu, rezultati medicinskih studija koje su vršile kredibilne institucije pokazuju da žene koje nisu rađale do 30. godine znatno češće oboljevaju od različitih oblika neizlečivih bolesti (MacMahon, B et al, 1970; The American Cancer Society, 2017). Iz ovog razloga postoji bojazan da bi, ukoliko se i druge kompanije, ugledajući se na Google, odluče na ovakvu stimulativnu politiku, dugoročno posmatrano došlo do značajnih demografskih promena, što bi u krajnjem slučaju uticalo na prirodne tokove radne snage. Dakle, zaključujemo da Srbija nije izolovan slučaj po pitanju diskriminacije i da se protiv iste treba boriti svim raspoloživim sredstvima i uključiti sve nadležne institucije. 4. DISKRIMINACIJA U SRBIJI 4.1. Žene kao ranjiva grupa na tržištu rada Tržište rada je visoko fragmentirani deo realne ekonomije na kome se uparuju međusobno nejednako kvalifikovani radnici sa heterogenim poslovima iz različitih privrednih delatnosti. U slučaju takvih raznorodnosti koje dolaze i sa strane ponude i sa strane tražnje, mnogo je teže očekivati njihovo efikasno uparivanje i postizanje tržišnog optimuma. Uglavnom, ravnoteža koja se na ovom tržištu postiže je suboptimalna, a jedan od razloga je taj što na njemu postoje određene osetljive grupe koje se, zbog svojih prirodno-demografskih, obrazovnih i fizičkih karakteristika tradicionalno nalaze u lošijem položaju od

76 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART proseka ukupnog stanovništva. Takve grupe nazivamo ranjivim, a njihova ranjivost predstavlja multidimenzionalni pojam i može se sagledati prema širini, dubini, heterogenosti i tranzitornosti (Aleksić, 2014.). Upravo zbog lošijih osnovnih pokazatelja na tržištu rada stope zaposlenosti, stope nezaposlenosti i stope aktivnosti kao i relativno nižih zarada u odnosu na muškarce, koje su delimično posledica i diskriminacije, žene spadaju u ranjive grupe na tržištu rada. Ne samo to, već gledajući kroz prethodno definisanu multidimenzionalnu prizmu, žene sačinjavaju apsolutno najširu ranjivu grupu, odnosno najbrojniju grupu čiji članovi imaju osetljiv položaj na tržištu rada. S obzirom na to da je brojnost grupe visoko korelisana sa heterogenošću njenih članova, odnosno većom raznorodnošću unutar grupe, javljaju se dodatne poteškoće prilikom kreiranja specifičnih programa aktivne politike tržišta rada, kako bi se njeni pripadnici doveli u bolji položaj. Ukoliko posmatramo slučaj Srbije videćemo da je, prema poslednjem popisu iz godine, broj žena ne samo približan broju muškaraca, već je njihov broj za oko veći od broja muškaraca 7. Međutim, i pored toga što su osobe ženskog pola brojnije, ako upoređujemo ukupno stanovništvo, situacija na tržištu rada bitno je drugačija. Posmatrano prema Anketi o radnoj snazi iz godine, aktivnu populaciju radnog uzrasta čini za oko više muškaraca nego žena 8. Već na prvi pogled jasan je problem koji žene imaju u vezi sa participacijom na tržištu rada. Dodatno, podaci o ukupnoj zaposlenosti pokazuju da je broj zaposlenih muškaraca za čak veći od broja žena, a da je pritom broj nezaposlenih muškaraca tek za oko veći od broja nezaposlenih žena. Dakle, posmatrano prema osnovnim kontingentima, čak i one žene koje participiraju na tržištu rada, nalaze se u bitno lošijem položaju od pripadnika suprotnog pola. Rezultati istraživanja koje je sprovedeno neposredno pre izbijanja aktuelne ekonomske krize, a koje se bavilo položajem žena na tržištu rada u Srbiji (Babović, 2007.), ukazuju da se, sa pravnog aspekta, položaj žena u Srbiji značajno poboljšao, čemu je uglavnom doprinelo unapređenje radnog zakonodavstva. Ipak, kao glavni nedostaci ističu se relativno dugi sudski procesi čija je osnova diskriminacija, veliki broj nerešenih slučajeva kao i neadekvatna evidencija kršenja radnih prava žena. Kada su u pitanju ekonomski aspekti analize, pored tradicionalno lošijih osnovnih pokazatelja tržišta rada (za koje vidimo da su i danas nepovoljniji u odnosu na iste pokazatelje kod muškaraca), kao poseban problem ističe se nedostatak vertikalne mobilnosti žena. Drugim rečima, mogućnosti za napredovanje žena daleko su manje nego kada su u pitanju njihove kolege muškarci. Imajući u vidu da po svim navedenim pokazateljima žene predstavljaju najobimniju ranjivu grupu na tržištu rada u Srbiji, bilo kakav dodatni vid diskriminacije može značajno narušiti njihov dalji položaj 9. Iz tog razloga u nastavku ćemo se baviti intenzitetom diskriminacije koja ima dva pojavna oblika oblika: (1) količinski (gender employment gap) i (2) cenovni (gender pay gap), kao i pitanjem da li je, i u kojoj meri, ekonomska kriza doprinela povećanju diskriminacije na tržištu rada. Količinska ili bolje rečeno kontin- 7 RZS. 8 Republički zavod za statistiku (2015), 9 Naravno, jasno je da između ranjivosti na tržištu rada i diskriminacije postoji multikolinearnost, te da diskriminacija može da bude odgovorna za ranjiv položaj u kojem se žene nalaze. Međutim, postoje i ostale ranjive grupe (mladi, stariji, osobe sa niskim i bez kvalifikacija i sl.), za čiju ranjivost diskriminacija nije direktno odgovorna, tako da nećemo detaljnije ulaziti u kauzalnost između ovih dveju varijabli.

77 76 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - gentska diskriminacija odnosi se na podređeni položaj koji žene imaju u pogledu bazičnih indikatora tržišta rada i zbog kojih nemaju jednake šanse u pronalaženju zaposlenja na tržištu rada. Potonja se odnosi na one žene koje su pronašle zaposlenje, ali za svoj rad, isključivo zbog pola kome pripadaju, zarađuju niže radne dohotke Diskriminacija žena na tržištu rada merena kontingentskim pristupom Najbolji pokazatelj kojim se može izmeriti stepen kontingentske diskriminacije žena na tržištu rada, prema makro pristupu, jeste izračunavanje dubine njihove ranjivosti. Pod dubinom ranjivosti podrazumeva se stepen odstupanja osnovnih indikatora tržišta rada ženskog stanovništva u odnosu na ukupno ili neku drugu referentnu grupu stanovništva (Krstić i dr, 2010.). U praksi je moguće pratiti apsolutna i relativna odstupanja pojedinih pokazatelja od proseka stanovništva. U okviru naše metodologije, prednost ćemo dati relativnim pokazateljima. Za relativne indikatore smo se odlučili iz prostog razloga što, generalno gledano, ekonomija kao nauka prednost daje ovoj grupi pokazatelja, a u konkretnom slučaju, iz razloga što bolje mere relativni položaj, a samim tim i stepen diskriminacije kod žena. Egzaktniju sliku o položaju žena korišćenjem relativnih pokazatelja dobićemo zbog toga što se, prilikom njihovog izračunavanja vodi računa i o iznosu promene (što je zajedničko sa apsolutnim pokazateljima), ali i o početnoj vrednosti posmatranih veličina (što apsolutni pokazatelji zanemaruju). U skladu sa izloženom metodologijom, posmatraćemo trend dva najvažnija osnovna indikatora na tržištu rada stopu aktivnosti i stopu zaposlenosti koji ukazuju na dve veoma važne stvari prvo, kakva je uključenost žena u tokove na tržištu rada i drugo, kakva je pozicija onih žena koje se nalaze na tržištu rada. U Tabeli 3 prikazane su vrednosti stopa aktivnosti, zaposlenosti i nezaposlenosti muškog i ženskog stanovništva u godini. Kao dodatak, za detaljniju analizu, ovi indikatori su ne samo razvrstani po polovima, već i po obrazovnom nivou. Iz prikazanih podataka se jasno može videti inferioran položaj žena i to na osnovu svakog od predstavljenih pokazatelja. Stopa nezaposlenosti žena je za skoro 4 procentna poena viša u odnosu na stopu nezaposlenosti muškaraca, što će reći da je ta vrednost ovog pokazatelja veća za 25% kod ženskog stanovništva u odnosu na istu vrednost kod muškaraca. Ako se dodatno udubimo u sadržinu indikatora i nastavimo da analiziramo nezaposlenost prema obrazovnom nivou, doći ćemo do još interesantnijeg rezultata. Najveći jaz između stopa nezaposlenosti žena i muškaraca postoji kod osoba sa nižim i srednjim obrazovanjem, što je nekako i očekivano, dok je kod osoba sa visokim obrazovanjem taj jaz manji od 2 procentna poena, što je upola manje od prosečnog jaza. U najnepovoljnijem položaju, kada se posmatra stopa nezaposlenosti, sigurno se nalaze žene koje imaju III, IV i V stepen obrazovanja, jer odstupanje nezaposlenosti žena ovog obrazovnog nivoa u odnosu na odgovarajuću kategoriju muškaraca je skoro 5,5 procentnih poena, što je znatno iznad proseka.

78 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABELA 3 OSNOVNI INDIKATORI TRŽIŠTA RADA U GODINI STOPA NEZAPOSLENOSTI STOPA ZAPOSLENOSTI STOPA AKTIVNOSTI Ukupno (15-64) MUŠKARCI ŽENE MUŠKARCI ŽENE MUŠKARCI ŽENE 12,40% 16,10% 62,30% 46,00% 71,10% 54,80% NIŽE 11,40% 15;00% 49,10% 32,10% 55,40% 37,80% Obrazovanje SREDNJE 13,90% 19,20% 65,30% 46,80% 75,80% 57,90% VIŠE 7,70% 9,50% 75,40% 75,80% 81,60% 83,80% Izvor: Krstić, G. i dr., (2010), Položaj ranjivih grupa na tržištu rada Srbije Fren. Stopa zaposlenosti, takođe, ukazuje na diferencijalni tretman među polovima. Ukoliko posmatramo sve obrazovne nivoe, jasno možemo uočiti poražavajuću realnost koja se manifestuje razlikama u stopi zaposlenosti od čak 16,3 procentna poena. U poređenju sa vrednošću od 62,3%, koja predstavlja stopu zaposlenosti muškaraca, vrednost 46% čini se zabrinjavajuće niskom, taman toliko da žensko stanovništvo kategoriše kao ranjivu grupu koja treba da ima prioritetan tretman prilikom vođenja politike zapošljavanja i politike tržišta rada. Gledano prema obrazovnom nivou, slično kao i stopa nezaposlenosti, stopa zaposlenosti žena najviše zaostaje za istom stopom muškog stanovništva upravo kod osoba sa nižim i srednjim nivoom obrazovanja, uz malu različitost, a to je da su ta zaostajanja još veća. Ipak, kao delimična uteha ostaje činjenica da je za žene sa visokim i višim obrazovanjem imalo posla. I ne samo to, već je njihova stopa zaposlenosti, bila veća nego stopa zaposlenosti njihovih muških kolega. Stopa aktivnosti se zajedno sa stopom zaposlenosti može kvalifikovati kao vodeći osnovni indikator tržišta rada koji nam sugeriše da žensko stanovništvo treba svrstati u posebno osetljivu grupu. U godini, oba pokazatelja identično ukazuju na relativno nepovoljniji položaj žena. Diskrepanca i u stopi aktivnosti, kao i u stopi zaposlenosti, je ista i iznosi oko 16 procentnih poena. Po obrazovnoj strukturi zanemarljivo veći jaz, u odnosu na stopu zaposlenosti, prisutan je kod žena sa nižim nivoom obrazovanja, dok je kod onih sa srednjim, gotovo nepromenjen. I u ovom slučaju, žene sa višim obrazovanjem su u povoljnijem položaju od njihovih kolega suprotnog pola. Učešće žena sa višom školom i fakultetom na tržištu rada je veće od učešća muškaraca za više od 2 procentna poena. Na narednim graficima prikazano je kako se relativni položaj žena na tržištu rada menjao sa protokom vremena i kako je na njega uticala tekuća ekonomska kriza. Na apcisama sa leve strane nalaze se podaci o stopama aktivnosti/zaposlenosti muškaraca i žena, dok su sa desne strane iskazani podaci o vrednosti količnika ovih pokazatelja (racio zaposlenosti i racio aktivnosti). Važno je napomenuti da podaci iz godine nisu u potpunosti uporedivi sa podacima iz pređašnjeg perioda. Do prekida uporedivosti dveju vremenskih serija je došlo usled metodoloških promena koje su se dogodile prilikom sprovođenja Ankete o radnoj snazi od strane Republičkog zavoda za statistiku 10. Proširivanje uzorka, prelaženje na sistem permanentnog ispitivanja u toku čitave godine, primena kvartalnog umesto polugodišnjeg izveštavanja, samo su neki od benefita do kojih se došlo nakon ovih metodoloških promena, a koje su pritom bile nužne da bi se upitnik koji se sprovodi 10 Saopštenje za javnost o revidiranim podacima, RZS.

79 78 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - u Srbiji uskladio sa odgovarajućim LFS om koji se sprovodi na teritoriji EU. Upravo iz tog razloga važno je napomenuti da je metodološki nekorektno direktno porediti, posebno apsolutne brojeve (broj zaposlenih, nezaposlenih i sl.). Pošto je u našem slučaju reč o stopama i trendu, metodološke promene ne mogu imati toliko snažan uticaj da promene smer kretanja pomenutih vrednosti, te smo iz tog razloga u period posmatranja uključili i godinu. GRAFIK 3 - STOPA AKTIVNOSTI MUŠKOG I ŽENSKOG STANOVNIŠTVA U SRBIJI I VREDNOST NJIHOVOG RACIA, * Muškarci Žene Racio ak vnos 135% 134% 133% 132% 131% 130% 129% 128% 127% 126% 125% Izvor: Obrada autora na bazi podataka Ankete o radnoj snazi, RZS. GRAFIK 4 - STOPA ZAPOSLENOSTI MUŠKOG I ŽENSKOG STANOVNIŠTVA U SRBIJI I VREDNOST NJIHOVOG RACIA, Izvor: Obrada autora na bazi podataka Ankete o radnoj snazi, RZS.

80 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Posmatrajući prikazane trendove moguće je izvući nekoliko ključnih zaključaka o položaju žena na tržištu rada u proteklih osam godina. Prvo, trend kretanja oba posmatrana indikatora i kod žena i kod muškaraca pratio je identičan obrazac i odgovara subperiodima ( i ) kroz koje je tržište rada u Srbiji prošlo od početka ekonomske krize. Inicijalni talasa krize, koja se sa finansijskog tržišta veoma brzo prelila na realni sektor, najpre je prouzrokovao oštar pad svih osnovnih pokazatelja tržišta rada, da bi potom usledio postepeni oporavak prilikom kojeg je porasla aktivnost i zaposlenost, kako muškog tako i ženskog stanovništva. Iz tog razloga, zadržavajući se samo na gruboj proceni obrasca kretanja posmatranih indikatora, pogrešno se može zaključiti da kriza nije imala bilo kakav uticaj na intenzitet diskriminacije. Drugo, da bismo utvrdili uticaj krize koristićemo nešto sofisticiraniju meru koja se sastoji iz količnika oba pokazatelja kod muškaraca i žena. Upoređivanjem vrednosti racia tokom perioda ekonomske krize steći ćemo precizan utisak o tome koliko se relativni položaj žena promenio, i samim tim, kako se kretao intenzitet diskriminacije. Vrednosti racia (zelena linija na graficima) od 130 kada je u pitanju stopa aktivnosti i 135 kada je reč o stopi zaposlenosti pokazuju da su, u godini koja je prethodila krizi, stope aktivnosti i zaposlenosti kod muškaraca bile za 1,3 i za 1,35 puta veće nego kod žena, respektivno, što je ukazivalo na prisustvo značajne diskriminacije i pre početka krize. Praćenjem trenda racia uočavamo da su njegove maksimalne vrednosti (134 i 138) zabeležene u 2012, tj. u godini koja je nastupila nakon poslednje recesije koju je Srbija zabeležila, a da je direktna posledica ekonomske krize 11. Nakon toga usledio je privredni oporavak, i paralelno sa njim, oporavak na tržištu rada. Tako da se za merenje uticaja ekonomske krize na diskriminaciju ne sme uzeti ceo posmatrani interval, jer bi to imalo uticaj na pristrasnost dobijenih rezultata. Posmatrano na ovaj način, možemo zaključiti da su negativne posledice koje je ekonomska kriza proizvela po privredu uticale na to da se kontingentska polna diskriminacija na tržištu rada neznatno poveća. Treba imati u vidu da je reč o porastu vrednosti racia od svega nekoliko procentnih poena, te ne treba prenagljivati u donošenju zaključaka o snažnom porastu diskriminacije usled ekonomske krize. Treće, iako bi nas posmatranje čitavog vremenskog perioda navelo da donesemo pogrešne ocene o uticaju krize na intenzitet diskriminacije, ono nam može poslužiti da sagledamo trenutni položaj žena. U fazi oporavka, koja je nakon godine primetna na tržištu rada, kuriozitet je to da su žene beležile bolje rezultate, mereno prema osnovnim indikatorima. Relativno brži oporavak žena doveo je do toga da se njihov relativni položaj, za svega tri posmatrane godine ( ) u odnosu na položaj muškaraca, značajno poboljšao. Tako je u godini stopa aktivnosti muškaraca za 1,28, a stopa zaposlenosti za 1,31 puta veća od stopa aktivnosti i zaposlenosti žena, respektivno. Poredeći ove vrednosti racia sa vrednostima iz godine dolazimo do zaključka da je nivo diskriminacije u niži od onog pre 7 godina. Međutim, kao i u slučaju donošenja zaključka o uticaju krize, i ovde treba biti obazriv, jer zabeleženo smanjenje diskriminacije, mereno prema našoj metodologiji, iznosi tek nekoliko procentnih poena. 11 Recesija u Srbiji zabeležena je potom i u godini, ali su njeni uzročnici visoki fisklani deficit i u vezi sa tim smanjen priliv kapitala iz inostranstva, razorne poplave koje su se te godine dogodile i ostali interni nedostaci unutar privrede.

81 80 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE Diskriminacija žena na tržištu rada merena cenovnim pristupom Najprihvatljiviju teoriju o tome zbog čega se plate muškaraca i žena razlikuju dao je G. Becker u svojoj knjizi o ljudskom kapitalu (Becker, 1964). Po ovom pristupu, podsticaji za ulaganje u neku aktivnost zavise od koristi koje će se tom aktivnošću kasnije ostvariti. U kontekstu participacije na tržištu rada, odnosno u skladu sa tim koliko vremena planiraju da provode radeći na tržištu umesto unutar porodice, žene će doneti odluku o tome koliko da ulažu u svoj ljudski kapital. Drugim rečima, s obzirom na komparativne prednosti koje iz prirodnih razloga žene imaju u odgoju dece, smatra se da će one relativno manje vremena provoditi na tržištu rada proizvodeći tržišna dobra i usluge, a da će relativno više učestvovati u proizvodnji porodičnih (netržišnih) dobara i usluga. Ovako racionalno percipiranje od strane žena uticaće na to da njihov optimum po pitanju ulaganja u obrazovanje ili ljudski kapital koji se može valorizovati na tržištu, bude nešto ispod optimuma koji biraju muškarci. Posledično, niži nivo ljudskog kapitala dovodi do nižih zarada, usled kojih se žene nalaze u podređenom položaju. Takođe, podela odgovornosti unutar porodice može uticati na podelu rada na tržištu, te će tako žena prihvatiti manje plaćen posao, a koji je bliže mestu stanovanja ili posao sa radnim vremenom kraćim od punog i manjom dnevnicom, što agregatno dovodi do jaza u zaradama. Iako je ovaj teorijski pristup i danas potpuno validan i može da objasni veći deo razlika u zaradama između muškaraca i žena, postoji jaz u platama koji se ne može zasnivati samo na razlici u ljudskom kapitalu. Sa protokom vremena, žene ne samo da su povećale svoje učešće na tržištu rada, već su drastično povećale učešće u ukupnom broju studenata, pri čemu one u većini razvijenih zemalja, ujedno i u Srbiji, čine većinski deo na gotovo svim fakultetima. I pored smanjenja obrazovnog jaza, ili štaviše, pravljenja jaza u sopstvenu korist, žene i dalje bivaju manje plaćene. Da bi se utvrdio precizan razlog nejednakog tretmana polova i eventualno postojanje diskriminacije, bilo je neophodno kontrolisati veliki broj varijabli, uključujući i one koje se odnose na ljudski kapital (godine provedene u obrazovnom sistemu, obrazovni profil, uspeh tokom studiranja i sl.). Izolovanjem ovih varijabli, određeni autori su pokazali da i dalje postoje značajne razlike u zaradama između muškaraca i žene, na štetu potonjih (Oaxaca, 1973.). Dekompozicijom muškaraca i žena u dve grupe i kontrolisanjem njihovih individualnih karakteristika, neobjašnjeni deo regresije predstavlja prisustvo diskriminacije. Naravno, pored diskriminacije uticaj na velike razlike u platama bi mogle da imaju i druge varijable koje nisu uključene u model, ali pošto su se istraživanja ovakvog tipa u prethodne četiri decenije masovno sprovodila, a modeli stalno unapređivali i tako nadograđeni pronalazili prisustvo diskriminacije u određenoj meri, nedvosmisleno je da deo razlike u platama predstavlja direktan oblik diskriminacije. U ovom radu bavićemo se isključivo razlikom u platama muškaraca i žena na bazi podataka o zaradama prosečnog radnika/radnice po određenim karakteristikama i na taj način proceniti platni jaz koji trenutno postoji na štetu žena. Za te svrhe poslužiće nam podaci iz Ankete o radnoj snazi koja je sprovedena godine. Predmet naše analize biće zaposlene osobe, starosti godine, koje su pristale da daju odgovor na pitanje o visini zarade u prethodnom mesecu. Podatke o prijavljenim zaradama ćemo najpre podeliti sa brojem sati koje je osoba radila u toku tog meseca, a zatim ćemo tako dobijenu satnicu

82 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART logaritmovati. Ovoj transformaciji pribegavamo zbog toga što podaci o iznosu zarade po satu nemaju normalnu raspodelu (asimetrična je ulevo), tako da poređenje aritmetičkih sredina između polova ne bi bila adekvatna mera. Logaritmovanjem podataka dobijamo raspodelu koja je sličnija normalnoj, dok u tom slučaju za poređenje polova koristimo logaritme geometrijske sredine originalnih satnica, jer na geometrijsku sredinu daleko manji uticaj imaju ekstremne vrednosti (kojih ovde ima pre svega na desnom repu raspodele), nego što je to slučaj sa aritmetičkom sredinom. Kako bismo procenili razliku u zaradama muškaraca i žena primenićemo regresioni model u čijoj specifikaciji je pol jedina objašnjavajuća promenljiva. Dobijena vrednost regresionog koeficijenta u ovako specifikovanom modelu ekvivalentna je razlici logaritmovane satnice muškaraca i žena i predstavlja vrednost neprilagođene cenovne diskriminacije. Rezultati koje budemo dobili biće indikativni i u kombinaciji sa obrazovnom strukturom u zemlji će nam omogućiti da izvršimo indirektne grube procene o stepenu diskriminacije u Srbiji. Razlika u zaradama između prosečnog muškaraca i žene u Srbiji data je u Tabeli 4. Cenovna diskriminacija na tržištu rada itekako je prisutna, što se može videti i po poslednjoj koloni tabele, u kojoj vrednost svakog polja počinje sa negativnim predznakom. Poređenjem logaritmovane satnice prosečnog zaposlenog muškarca i prosečne zaposlene žene na tržištu rada u Srbiji, vidimo da je zarada žena u proseku niža za 3,3%. Kako bismo istražili koja podgrupa žena trpi najveću cenovnu diskriminaciju, u nastavku ćemo da uporedimo logaritmovane satnice prosečnih muškaraca i žena po grupama koje smo formirali na osnovu individualnih karakteristika zaposlenih, preduzeća, kao i vrste posla koji se obavlja. TABELA 4 RAZLIKA U PLATAMA IZMEÐU MUŠKARACA I ŽENA U SRBIJI, PROSEK LOGARITMOVANE SATNICE MUŠKARCI ŽENE ß1 Ukupno Nivo obrazovanja Nisko Srednje Visoko Tip vlasništva Privatno Javno Radno vreme Puno Kraće od punog Vrsta zaposlenja Formalno Neformalno Izvor: Obrada autora na bazi podataka Ankete o radnoj snazi 2013, RZS.

83 82 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - Posmatranjem 3 velike grupe obrazovnih nivoa 12 ispostavlja se da je najniža nadnica po satu za one sa najmanjim nivoom obrazovanja, što i jeste u skladu sa teorijom o ljudskom kapitalu. Takođe, sasvim je i očekivano da niskoobrazovane žene trpe najviši nivo cenovne diskriminacije od svih obrazovnih nivoa, primajući u proseku 11,4% nižu platu od muškaraca istog obrazovnog nivoa. Razlika u zaradama muškaraca i žena srednjeg obrazovnog nivoa, u proseku je ispod 10%, u korist muškaraca, dok u slučaju visokog obrazovanja, prosečna primanja žena zaostaju svega 5,5%. Ispostavlja se da, posmatrano prema tipu vlasništva, diskriminaciju većeg intenziteta trpe žene koje su zaposlene u privatnom sektoru, čije su plate u proseku za 7% niže od plata muškaraca. Situacija u javnom sektoru gotovo da je dvostruko bolja, gde žene iako zaostaju za svojim kolegama, to zaostajanje u zaradi iznosi nešto manje od 3%. Postoje najmanje dva objašnjenja zbog čega je razlika u platama manja nego u privatnom sektoru. Prvo, za razliku od privatnog sektora koji obuhvata i preduzeća koja zapošljavaju radnike na osnovu formalnog ugovora o radu i ona koja to čine bez formalnog ugovora ili sa ugovorom, ali uz uskraćenje nekog od dodatnih prava iz radnog odnosa 13, javna preduzeća posluju isključivo u granicama zakona. Pošto javnim preduzećima upravlja država ili češće kontroliše barem jedan njihov deo, u radu opisani oblici kontingentske diskriminacije znatno su ređi, nego što je to slučaj u privatnom sektoru. Drugo, karakteristike žena zaposlenih u javnom sektoru po pravilu su nešto iznad karakteristika prosečne zaposlene žene u privredi, prvenstveno posmatrano prema obrazovnom nivou i radnom iskustvu. Tako da su, uslovno rečeno, nadprosečno obrazovane žene koje rade u javnom sektoru zaslužne što je platni jaz značajno manji nego onaj u privatnom sektoru. Međutim, ovde dolazimo i do suštinski možda najvažnije stvari kad govorimo o cenovnoj diskriminaciji žena. Naime, kako smo to u uvodnom pasusu ovog dela rada naveli, tek kontrolisanjem individualnih karakteristika muškaraca i žena može se videti koji deo razlike u zaradama je posledica nedostatka obrazovanja, a koji direktne diskriminacije. Intuitivno, pošto znamo da su žene u javnom sektoru obrazovanije od muškaraca, a takođe uočavamo da u proseku primaju za oko 3% nižu platu, to nesumnjivo znači da je stepen stvarne cenovne diskriminacije prema ženama u javnom sektoru visoko iznad dobijene razlike u zaradama od svega 3%. U pogledu radnog vremena, zaostajanje u zaradama gotovo da je identično kada se posmatraju žene koje rade puno radno vreme i one koje rade radno vreme kraće od punog i ono iznosi oko 4%. Ipak, neznatna razlika od 0,5 procentnih poena postoji na štetu žena koje rade radno vreme kraće od punog, što jeste statistički beznačajno, ali kada se uzme u obzir struktura zaposlenosti, ova razlika može da ima šire konsekvence. Naime, uključujući sve grupe koje su navedene u tabeli 4, jedino u slučaju osoba koje rade radno vreme kraće od punog, žene čine veći broj u uzorku od muškaraca. Tako da, iako razlika nije mnogo velika, velik je broj žena koji biva diskriminisan po ovom osnovu, zbog činjenice da part-time poslovi zbog svojih karakteristika mnogo više odgovaraju ženama (posebno određenim podgrupama žena) i one ih češće prihvataju. 12 U prvu grupu spadaju osobe bez obrazovanja, osobe sa 4 razreda osnovne, osobe sa nedovršenom osnovnom školom i osobe sa završenom osnovnom školom. Druga grupa je sačinjena od zaposlenih lica koja imaju srednje i srednje stručno obrazovanje, dok poslednja grupa obuhvata one koji su završili više škole, fakultete pa sve do onih koji imaju naziv doktora nauka. 13 Prava na bolovanje, prava na godišnji odmor, na uplaćivanje radnog staža i sl.

84 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Poslednji nalaz do koga smo došli tiče se jaza u platama na formalnom i neformalnom tržištu rada. Pomalo neočekivano, žene na neformalnom tržištu u proseku bivaju mnogo manje cenovno diskriminisane (0,7%) od svojih koleginica na formalnom tržištu (4,2%). Potencijalno objašnjenje za, na prvi pogled, kontraintuitivne rezultate, može biti to da tipovi neformalnih poslova koje žene prihvataju zahtevaju viši nivo kvalifikacija, i samim tim donose veću zaradu u odnosu na vrste poslova koji se nude muškarcima na neformalnom tržištu. Takođe, uzrok ove gotovo rodne jednakosti po pitanju plata u neformalnom sektoru može biti i izuzetno mali broj opservacija koji je postojao za muškarce i žene u neformalnom sektoru, što svakako delimično baca senku na dobijene rezultate. Za potrebe poređenja stepena diskriminacije tokom krize koristićemo nalaze studije o razlikama u platama po polovima za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana, koja je obuhvatala i tržište rada u Srbiji i koja je rađena prema sličnoj metodologiji (Avlijaš i dr, 2013). Analiza se zasnivala na podacima iz Ankete o radnoj snazi koji su prikupljani u polugodišnjim talasima od do godine (sa par izuzetaka). Stavljanjem naših prethodno dobijenih rezultata iz godine u kontekst studije koja se odnosila na prosek pomenutog trogodišnjeg perioda, dolazimo do zaključka da se intenzitet neprilagođene cenovne diskriminacije, posmatrano na ukupnom nivou, nimalo nije promenio. Prosečna žena, i dve godine kasnije, i dalje prima za 3,3% manju platu od prosečnog muškarca na tržištu rada u Srbiji. Sa druge strane, kada je reč o detaljnijim pokazateljima, do određenih promena je ipak došlo. Tako se recimo stepen diskriminacije zaposlenih žena sa niskim i srednjim nivoom obrazovanja smanjio sa 12,5% na 11,4% i 10,7% na 9,3% respektivno, dok je kod žena sa visokim obrazovanjem on neznatno porastao sa 5,1% na 5,5%. Još jedno značajno smanjenje intenziteta diskriminacije tokom krize dogodilo se u javnom sektoru, gde su žene sa platnim jazom od 3,7% svoj položaj poboljšale za 1 procentni poen, te sada ova razlika iznosi 2,7%. Navedeno kretanje još jednom ukazuje na činjenicu da je javni sektor znatno otporniji na negativne posledice krize, te su tako i žene koje su proporcionalno više zastupljene u njemu uspele da u određenoj meri poprave svoj položaj. 5. ZAKLJUČCI I PREPORUKE Tradicionalistički obrazac društva, verska shvatanja i patrijarhalni način funkcionisanja porodice doprineo je tome da žene pre 20. veka budu veoma malo uključene u tržišne aktivnosti, i pre svega bivaju okrenute proizvodnji porodičnih dobara i usluga. Emancipacija žena, kao i razvoj privrednih delatnosti sredinom prošlog veka, u kojima su one svoje porodične obaveze mogle da usklade sa radom na novonastalim tržištima, doprinelo je njihovoj sve većoj participaciji. Drastičnim porastom učešća žena u strukturi radne snage, pitanje diskriminacije dobilo je na značaju. Ispostavlja se da su, čak i pošto se kontrolišu varijable poput nivoa obrazovanja, radnog iskustva i sl, primanja žena značajno niža, te je ova razlika u primanjima pripisana diskriminaciji. Iako je primetno da sa protokom vremena intenzitet diskriminacije slabi, ona i dalje ostaje važan faktor nejednakih zarada između polova u svetu. Ni Srbija nije izuzetak po ovom pitanju. Žene se na tržištu rada u Srbiji nalaze u nimalo zavidnom položaju. I pored toga što su brojnije, a u proseku čak i obrazovanije od muškaraca, njihovi osnovni indikatori tržišta rada znatno su lošiji od istih indikatora kod muš-

85 84 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - karaca, a njihove zarade znatno niže. Upravo zbog postojećeg stanja, žene danas čine svakako najbrojniju ranjivu grupu na tržištu rada u Srbiji. Na osnovu analize dostupnih podataka potvrđeno je postojanje kako kontingentske tako i cenovne diskriminacije i to umerenog intenziteta. Aktivnost i zaposlenost muškaraca na tržištu rada viša je za oko 30%, dok u slučaju zarada ta razlika u korist muškaraca iznosi 3,3%. Dobijene vrednosti se u potpunosti kreću u opsegu proseka evropskih zemalja, što je i bio glavni razlog da stepen diskriminacije u Srbiji ocenimo kao umeren. Rezultati pokazuju da su tekuća ekonomska kriza i negativne posledice koje su iz nje proistekle, dovele do blagog porasta kontingentske, ali ne i cenovne diskriminacije. Dok je jaz u platama tokom krize ostao nepromenjen (3,3%), uključenost i zaposlenost žena na tržištu rada se pogoršala u prvim godinama ekonomske krize. Međutim, njihov oporavak, koji je usledio nakon godine, doprineo je tome da žene, posmatrano po kontingentskom pristupu, budu manje diskriminisane u odnosu na godinu koja je prethodila krizi. Sa druge strane, iako je intenzitet cenovne diskriminacije ostao nepromenjen tokom krize, on se promenio kod pojedinih grupa žena. Tako se stepen cenovne diskriminacije od izbijanja ekonomske krize povećao u privatnom sektoru i neznatno kod žena sa visokim obrazovanjem, dok su razlike u zaradama u odnosu na muškarce uspele da smanje žene zaposlene u javnom sektoru i žene sa niskim i srednjim nivoom obrazovanja. Ako za trenutak zanemarimo uticaj krize na intenzitet diskriminacije i njeno povećanje kod žena sa visokim obrazovanjem, posmatrano po svim obrazovnim nivoima visokoobrazovane žene su u mnogo boljem položaju od ostalih žena, iz prostog razloga što su njihova zaostajanja u zaradama (5,5%) značajno manja u odnosu na zaostajanja ostalih obrazovnih nivoa (srednje 9,3% i nisko 11,4%). Upravo iz ovog razloga potencijalni spas od diskriminacije žene mogu pronaći u obrazovanju, jer je razlika u platama, i posledično cenovna diskriminacija, obrnuto proporcionalna nivou obrazovanja i godinama koje je ženska osoba provela na školovanju. Ovo može da predstavlja korisnu smernicu i za kreatore ekonomske politike i politike tržišta rada, koji bi trebalo da žene proporcionalno više uključuju u aktivne programe tržišta rada iz grupa dodatnog obrazovanja i obuka, kako bi doprineli rešavanju problema polne diskriminacije. Pored ovoga, neophodno je primeniti i neki od standardnih paketa mera koji doprinose postizanju rodne ravnopravnosti na tržištu rada (Eurofund, 2016.), kao na primer: promovisanje inicijativa i politika koje imaju za cilj podsticanje uključivanja žena na tržištu rada, stvaranje fleksibilnog zakonodavnog okvira u pogledu prava na roditeljsko odsustvo i fleksibilnijeg sistema predškolskog obrazovanja, uspostavljanja poslovne kulture koja omogućava fleksibilan rad i sl. Kao najvažnija preporuka Eurofund-ove studije (koja je u saglasnosti i sa našim nalazom), ističe se doprinos koje obrazovanje ima u smanjenju diskriminacije žena na tržištu rada, te je stoga neophodno insistirati na podsticanju žena da se permanentno usavršavaju. Štaviše, obrazovanje predstavlja ključno sredstvo u politici Evropske uniji u borbi protiv rodne neravnopravnosti i polnih stereotipa. Kao što smo to prethodno pomenuli, da bi se utvrdio precizan nivo diskriminacije neophodno je na dostupnim podacima primeniti metod dekompozicije prilikom čega bi se, kontrolisanjem varijabli koje predstavljaju individualne karakteristike zaposlenog, izolovao čist uticaj cenovne diskriminacije na stepen razlike u zaradama. Pošto je za korišćenje navedenog metoda potreban veći uzorak koji trenutno nije moguće obezbediti, zadržaćemo se na rezultatima koje smo dobili prilikom izračunavanja neprilagođenog nivoa cenovne diskriminacije, sa namerom da u narednom periodu dobijene rezultate pro-

86 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART verimo izračunavanjem prilagođene cenovne diskriminacije. Rezultati naše grube procene dovoljno su validni da nesumnjivo možemo da potvrdimo da diskriminacija, bilo cenovna, bilo kontingentska, u Srbiji postoji, te se protiv nje mora boriti uključenošću i interakcijom velikog broja različitih institucija i podizanjem globalne svesti o prisustvu ovog fenomena u našem društvu. Time će sa jedne strane biti manje onih koji će se odlučiti da diskriminišu žene na tržištu rada, dok će sa druge biti veći broj žena koje prepoznaju i koje su spremne da prijave bilo kakav oblik diskriminacije. 6. LITERATURA Aleksić, D (2014), Položaj ranjivih grupa na tržištu rada Srbije, master rad, Ekonomski fakultet u Beogradu. Avlijaš i dr (2013), Gender Pay Gap in The Western Balkan Countries: Evidence From Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, Fren. Babović, M, (2007), Položaj žene na tržištu rada, Beograd: Program UN za razvoj. Becker, G, (1964), Human Capital, New York: Columbia University Press. Becker, G, (1985), Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. S33 S58. The University of Chicago Press. BLS, (2012), Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Eurofound (2016), The gender employment gap: Challenges and solutions, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. ILO, (2014), Maternity and paternity at work: law and practice across the world International Labour Office, Geneva: ILO. IMF, (2013), Women, work, and the economy: Macroeconomic gains from gender equity, IMF Staff Discussion Note, Washington DC. Krstić i dr, (2010) Ranjive grupe na tržištu rada, Fren. MacMahon, B et al, (1970), Age at first birth and breast cancer risk, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 43(2), 209. Oaxaca, R, (1973), Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets, International Economic Review 14: RZS, (2014), Žene i muškarci u Republici Srbiji, Republički zavod za statistiku, Beograd. RZS, Anketa o radnoj snazi, Republički zavod za statistiku, različite godine.

87 86 IMA LI DISKRIMINACIJE NA TRŽIŠTU RADA? - SLUČAJ SRBIJE U JEKU EKONOMSKE KRIZE - INTERNET IZVORI The American Cancer Society, Pregnancy and breast cancer risk html#references, [Pristup: 23/03/17].

88 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART AMIR FEJZIĆ 1 amir.fejzic@efsa.unsa.ba SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 JEL CLASSIFICATION: F23, F36, F43 ABSTRACT: The countries of the SEE5 or the Western Balkans countries are less developed European countries. Per capita GDP of the EU economies is a few times higher than in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, foreign capital inflows into the SEE5 are much lower than into the EU. The SEE5 countries see FDI as an important factor in resolving the problem of low productivity and scarce local capital. Although it is a well-accepted thesis that foreign direct investment could boost economic growth of host countries, this paper examines the real effects of the aggregate and sectorial FDI net inflows to SEE5 countries. The empirical estimates typically based only on the aggregate FDI data may not be the appropriate way because the growth effects of FDI are likely to depend on the sector in which FDI takes place. Empirical analysis, using time series cross section data for the period , shows that the impact of FDI net inflows on growth at the aggregate level is positive and strong, in the primary sector inclines to have a negative effect on growth, in the manufacturing sector have positive effects on growth and in the service sector exerts strong and positive effect on growth. KEY WORDS: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, SECTORIAL COMPOSITION, SEE5, SPILLOVER, PRODUCTIVITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH. 1 School of Economics and Business, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

89 88 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 1. INTRODUCTION Various international organizations and financial institutions recommend foreign direct investment (FDI) as the source of direct capital financing, which brings enormous positive externalities such as technology transfer, knowhow and management skills to the host country. That is, the positive externalities may arise when a foreign firm is more efficient than domestic firms. In such a case, domestic firms can improve their productivity by copying the technology and management skills of a foreign firm. Based on the assumption that FDI is an important incentive for economic growth, many developing countries undertake reforms in order to attract higher FDI net inflows. Southeast Europe (SEE5): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia struggle to achieve sufficient growth rates and to converge with the standard of living of the developed EU members. For the analyzed time period, there is a considerable cross country variation in growth rates between SEE5 countries, which have been low and negative in some countries. Low domestic savings and investment rates in the SEE5 countries appear to be a consequence of large current account deficits. Levels of unemployment and poverty are continuously high. The level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in SEE5 countries is especially high. According to the World Bank data, at the end of 2015 Serbia recorded the highest value of non-performing loans with 22.8% and Macedonia, FYR the lowest level of non-performing loans with 11, 0%. A high level of non-performing loans could have a significant impact on credit, unemployment, real GDP growth and inflation. At the same time, governments cannot find the right formula to solve this problem. In these small open economies, monetary policy is constrained and public expenditure is limited. Therefore, the need to attract foreign investors is evident. FDI give SEE5 countries an opportunity to speed up their economic growth and to converge with the standard of living of the developed EU members. Both the transition process and the European Union (EU) accession process have further supported the call for FDI inflows. On the other hand, the impact of FDI may largely vary depending on characteristics of the sector and its linkages to the rest of the economy and not all forms of foreign investment seem to be beneficial to host economies. For example, even if a foreign firm is not more efficient, domestic firms might be forced to improve their efficiency because of the increased competition from foreign firms through so called horizontal linkage. That is, the increased market share of the foreign company might also crowd out the domestic firms and push them to less efficient production levels (Aykut and Sayek, 2007). As reported by UNCTAD (2001), the linkage potential differs across primary, manufacturing and services sectors. The scope for linkages between foreign affiliates and local suppliers in the primary sector is often limited and production processes tend to be continuous and capital intensive. Still, it is easier to source externally when the technology is divisible into discrete stages and services than to do it as a continuous process. By contrast to the primary sector, often mentioned benefits, such as transfers of technology and management knowhow, introduction of new processes, and employee training tend to relate to the manufacturing sector rather than the agriculture or mining sectors (Alfaro, 2003). UNCTAD (2001) see the manufacturing sector as the sector with a wide broad range of linkage intensive activities, which largely varies by industry. To summarize, FDI flows in the manufacturing sector is expected to have larger impact in the economy through

90 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART a broad range of potential linkage intensive activities. The service sectors are found to receive considerably larger amounts of foreign investment in SEE5 countries, which account for 69.24% of total recorded FDI. Service sectors are almost entirely non-tradable, which makes, to a great extent, FDI in the service sector market seeking FDI that aims to access local markets of host countries with large markets, per capita income, market growth prospects, access to regional and global markets and structure of domestic market. In this context, participation of SEE5 countries in free trade agreements, regional trade integration schemes and EU approximation processes increases regional demand and potential market size. The objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of FDI net inflows on the SEE5 economic growth during the period. That is, this paper examines the effects of aggregate and sectorial FDI net inflows to SEE5 and possible implications for economic growth. The empirical estimates typically based only on aggregate FDI data may not be the appropriate approach due to the fact that the growth effects of FDI are likely to depend on the sector in which FDI takes place. Also, this paper analyzes the specific area of Europe, which despite many positive developments during the last two decades, may still face an image problem. Regardless to this possible image problem, FDI to the SEE5 are driven by factors, similarly to other transition economies, which are related to the absorption capacity of the country that receives the foreign investment. The importance of the absorption capacity of a country in this paper is represented by control variables like the human development index, inflation, government spending, private credits by banks, institutional quality, openness and unemployment. The paper is structured as follows: literature review in section II, model specification, data description and estimation method in section III, empirical results are presented in section IV and section V ends with the conclusion. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW The vast amount of literature on the impact of FDI on economic growth can be basically grouped into three main approaches. The first approach, which is used in this study, sees FDI as an important factor in resolving the problem of low productivity and scarce local capital in many developing countries (Alfaro et. al, 2000, Carkovic and Levine, 2002, Alfaro and Charlton, 2007, Tang, 2015, Apostolov, 2016, among others). That is, inflow of foreign direct capital is assumed to have significant impact on the economic growth of a host country. The second approach recognizes the importance of economic growth itself as an important determinant of attracting FDI to the host countries (Agosin and Mayer, 2000, Hansen and Rand, 2006, Estrin and Uvalic, 2013, Iamsiraroj and Doucouliagos, 2015, among others). In other words, FDI inflow into the host countries might be the result of economic growth. Finally, the third approach examines the possibility of a two way causality between FDI and growth (Choe, 2003, Zhao and Du, 2007, Argiro and Dimitrios, 2011, among others). There are also two well-known methods in the literature to measure the relevance of FDI on growth based on FDI stocks data and on FDI flows data. Few studies clearly explain

91 90 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 why they use a specific measure of FDI, but rather assume that the different data have to be equivalent to each other. Wacker (2013) discusses the measurement of foreign direct investment and highlights that there is no a priori best way to measure Multinational Corporations activities or to estimate its determinants and concludes that the choice rather depends on the circumstances. Different approaches to the FDI impact on economic growth are the result of various opinions and standpoints of authors. For instance, Aykut and Sayek (2007) see the shift to the sectorial composition of FDI inflows, as well as its variation among countries, as a partial explanation of the shortfalls of results in terms of the FDI impact on economic growth. On the other hand, Kumari (2014) in his literature survey pointed out that the positive effects of FDI vary across different regions, sectors and countries, therefore, a country specific studies must be done to check the relation between FDI and economic growth. Also, it is important to consider the composition of the sample of countries covered by panel studies (Alfaro, 2003). However, most of the empirical studies assert that FDI are beneficial to economic growth (Alfaro et al., 2000, Zakari et al., 2012, Hong, 2014, Iamsiraroj and Doucouliagos, 2015, among others) but there are also some studies that begun to question FDI s role on growth (Agosin and Mayer, 2000, Carkovic and Levine, 2002, Tang, 2015, among others). Thesis that FDI can have important positive effects on economic growth of host counties is a well-studied subject in the economics literature, which argues that FDI can be a source of capital accumulation, knowhow, good governance, increased labor force productivity and decreased unemployment, increased exports and technology while encouraging the development of local companies and economic growth. On the other hand, the impact of FDI may largely vary depending on characteristics of a sector and its linkages to the rest of the economy and not all forms of foreign investments seem to be beneficial to host economies. Hence, Alfaro (2003) suggests differentiated efforts towards attracting different forms of FDI flows and pointed out that countries, which might want to target certain sectors, need to be weighed against bureaucratic costs and increased potential for corruption. Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) indicate that resource seeking FDI stock in the primary sector tends to involve a large up front transfer of capital, technology and knowhow, and to generate high foreign exchange earnings. For the manufacturing sector, they conclude that efficiency seeking FDI in some parts of manufacturing draws on the relative factor endowment and the local assets of host economies. According to authors, this type of FDI is more likely to bring in technology and knowhow that is compatible to the host countries level of development, and to enable local suppliers and competitors to benefit from spillovers through adaptation and imitation. They state that market seeking FDI in services and other parts of manufacturing can benefit host countries consumers by introducing new products and services, by modernizing local production and marketing and by increasing the level of competition in the host economies. However, fiercer competition may also lead to the crowding out of local competitors, especially if foreign affiliates command superior market power. In addition, high resource FDI flows to the primary sector tend to reduce the competitiveness of the country in other sectors (Dutch disease), increase rent seeking behavior and deterioration of institutions (Aykut and Sayek, 2007). In contrast to all these unlikely positive growth effects, Nunnenkamp and Spaz (2004) conclude that the typically high export orientation of FDI in the primary sector may counterbalance negative factors. Aykut and Sayek (2007) also agree that, in the

92 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART presence of solid institutions, FDI to the primary sector may generate positive impact in a country. In the same way, Kee (2011) looks at how the product scope and productivity of domestic firms may improve due to increased access to new and better varieties of local intermediate inputs caused by the larger presence of foreign direct investment firms in the same industry and conclude that when FDI and domestic firms share common local input suppliers, an exogenous increase in the presence of FDI firms in the industry will cause domestic firms to perform better in terms of product scope, sales per worker, output per worker and productivity. Aykut and Sayek (2007) see market seeking FDI in the service sector, where forward linkages for FDI are well-defined, as massive potential impact of FDI in the sector. For example, FDI in the banking sector can have an important impact on both the efficiency and stability of the banking system through increased competition and increased access to global financial markets. On the other hand, Nunnenkamp and Spaz (2004) are of the view that although market seeking FDI in services can benefit host countries consumers by introducing new products and services, by modernizing local production and marketing and by increasing the level of competition in the host economies, these benefits in the case of strong competition may also lead to the crowding out of local competitors, especially if foreign affiliates command superior market power. Obviously, various sectors may require different conditions to cause a positive impact on the economy, as well as specific factors that may influence the impact of FDI ranging from motivation to financing of the investment. Alfaro (2003) uses cross country data of 47 countries for the period and suggests that total FDI inflows exert an ambiguous effect on growth, but also concludes that although it may seem natural to argue that foreign direct investment can convey great advantages to host countries, the benefits of FDI can largely vary across sectors. When she distinguished among different sectors, she found little support for FDI spillovers or positive effects in the primary sector, a positive effect of FDI on growth in manufacturing, while impact was ambiguous in the service sector. Aykut and Sayek (2007), using cross country data between 1990 and 2003, investigate the impact of sectorial composition of FDI inflows on the host country s economic growth and conclude that not only the magnitude of FDI is important but also the sector in which the FDI occurs. Their empirical evidence suggests that, as the sectorial composition of FDI gets skewed towards the manufacturing sector, there is a significant and positive effect on economic growth. On the contrary, when the sectorial composition of FDI gets skewed towards the services or the primary sector there is a negative and mostly significant effect on economic growth. That is, the growth effects of FDI may be puzzling not only due to the characteristics of the host economy but also due to the sectorial characteristics of the FDI themselves. Botric (2010) pointed out that FDI in South Eastern Europe between 2000 and 2010 was biased toward the non-tradable sector and consumption and that FDI was more frequently related to the privatization process, and repeatedly to service sector privatization, while the greenfield investment share was rather low. Khaliq and Noy (2007) investigated the impact of FDI on economic growth using detailed data for FDI inflows to Indonesia over the period and found that on the aggregate level, FDI were observed to have a positive effect on economic growth. However, on the sectorial level, they conclude that the composition of FDI matters in terms of its effect on economic growth and varies across sectors. Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008) investigated the relationship between FDI and economic growth in India by applying cointegration and causality analyses on the basis of industry specific FDI stock data for the period At the aggregate level, they conclu-

93 92 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 ded that the impact of output growth in attracting FDI was relatively stronger than that of FDI in inducing economic growth. It turns out that the growth effects of FDI in India widely vary across sectors and they found no evidence at all of any causal relationship between two variables in the primary sector and only transitory effects of FDI on output in the services sector. Most macroeconomic studies identify the linkage between FDI and growth in combination with factors which are related to the absorption capacity of a country (Carkovic and Levine, 2002, Alfaro, 2003, Aykut and Sayek, 2007, Blin and Ouattara, 2008, Zakari et al., 2012, Hong, 2014, Tang, 2015, among others). Inclusion of all related control variables in the conditioning set highlights the importance of a supportive environment in the country. These considerations give the impression that the sector in which FDI occurs plays an important role, but also implies that effects of FDI on a host economy might depend on global trends, local conditions and policies. Rojec and Penev (2011) analysed local conditions of five Western Balkan countries (WB5) and concluded that the most competitive disadvantages inhibiting more FDI inflows in WB5 countries were small domestic market with low per capita income, relatively high country risk, slow progress in structural and institutional reforms, underdeveloped infrastructure, inefficient government bureaucracy and high administrative barriers. According to Rojec and Penev (2011) the best way for Western Balkan countries to attract more FDI in the future is to strengthen structural reforms and to speed up their EU approximation processes. 3. THE MODEL, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 3.1. Model Specification Following Tang (2015), Estrin and Uvalic (2013), Aykut and Sayek (2007), Alfaro (2003), Carkovic and Levine (2002), I will focus on the direct effect of the different types of FDI on economic growth by using of time series cross section (TSCS) regressions with 5 countries for the time period However, this approach differs from previous literature in that I incorporate a set of additional variables and use more quality FDI data. Data are measured at regular yearly time intervals, well arranged by both cross sectional and time series variables and organized as a balanced panel. Initially, I calculated the impact of overall FDI net inflows on economic growth based on the following equation: GROWTH it = ß 0 + ß 1 Y it + ß 2 X it + ß 3 I it + u it. (1) In equation (1) GROWTH it above is GDP per capita growth (annual %) and Y it is initial GDP per capita in PPP. X it is a matrix of the following control variables: the Human Development Index (HDI) as a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and income per capita indicators; investment as the ratio of gross capital formation and GDP; inflation as the measure of the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator; government spending as final consumption expenditure, which includes all current government expenditures for purchases of goods and services; PCBANK as the ratio of private credit in Banks and GDP; IQALITY as the aggregated indicator of institutions quality measured as the

94 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART average of the 8 sub-indices, which is constructed from the EBRD indices of structural and institutional reforms; openness as average of exports plus imports as a share of GDP for the period; unemployment as the percentage of total labor force. Finally, I it represents total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) net inflows. u it represents error and coefficients ß 0, ß 1, ß 2 and ß 3 refer, respectively, to the intercept and to the slope parameters. The findings of initial attempts to statistically identify externalities from FDI suggest that the presence of FDI creates positive external effects in host economies. However, recent new empirical results seriously challenge these findings in two important ways. First, not only do they suggest that positive spillovers may be less prevalent as previously thought, but, more importantly, they also indicate that the presence of foreign firms may lead to significant negative externalities (Jordaan, 2005). Hypothesis that FDI in primary, manufacturing, and services sectors exerts different effects on economic growth in SEE5 countries is tested trough formulas 1 and 3 and presented in tables 4 to 8. GROWTH it = ß 0 + ß 1 Y it + ß 2 X it + ß 3 I j it + u it. (2) In equation (2) I j represents total Foreign Direct Investment net inflows in primary, manufacturing, or services sectors, respectively and all other variables in equation (2) are it analogous to equation (1). According to Alfaro (2003), the inclusion of only foreign investments in each sector does not capture the effects of other foreign direct investments. Hence, equation (3) is intended for the estimation of FDI net inflows for each sector. GROWTH it = ß 0 + ß 1 Y it + ß 2 X it + ß 3 I P it + ß 3 IM it + ß 3 IS it + u it. (3) Where P denotes foreign investment in the primary sector; M in the manufacturing sector, and S in the service sector Data Description In order to explore the roles of different types of FDI the dataset of a real data panel has been constructed for the period , for 5 observed SEE5 countries. The GROWTH as a core variable in the model, will be traded as a dependent variable together with a matrix of the control variables. This variable is presented as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. The GROWTH dependent variable is log (annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita). The FDI net inflows represent the value of inward direct investment made by a non-resident. Accurate construction of FDI data by sectors for a cross section of countries over the last decade and a half for SEE5 countries was quite demanding. In order to overcome these difficulties, I collected FDI data from different sources. Detailed information on FDI net inflows by sector for SEE5 countries is available in various reports by countries. FDI variable is log (1+Total FDI inflows/gdp). Data of FDI by sectors are as follows: FDIPRIM is log (1+FDI inflows in Primary Sector/GDP); FDIMANUF is log (1+FDI inflows in Manufacturing Sector/GDP) and FDISERV is log (1+FDI inflows in Service Sector/GDP). Y it is initial GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP), which represents gross domestic

95 94 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 product converted into international dollars using the purchasing power parity rates and it is calculated as the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. The Initial GDP variable is the log (real GDP per capita) at the beginning of the period. The Human Development Indicator (HDI) is a common measure for economic and social development and it is intended to quantify the entire socio economic aspect of progress, referring to achievements of a country in fundamental human development dimensions. The HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: life expectancy, attended education and achieved living standard. The scores for three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using the geometric mean. 2 The HDI variable is log (HDI). Investment, as the ratio of gross capital formation and GDP, consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. The investment variable is log (Gross Capital Formation/GDP). Inflation, as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator, shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The inflation variable is the log of (average inflation of the period). Government spending includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most national defense and security expenditures, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation. TABLE 1. LIST OF VARIABLES. NAME UNIT SOURCE country code state_id year year log(growth) log_growth per cent WDI log(fdi) log_fdi per cent National Banks of analysed countries/ Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency log(fdiprim) log_fdi_prim per cent National Banks of analysed countries/ Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency log(fdimanuf) log_fdi_manuf per cent National Banks of analysed countries/ Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency log(fdiserv) log_fdi_serv per cent National Banks of analysed countries/ Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency log(initial GDP) log_initial_gdp US$ WDI log(hdi) log_hdi index UNDP log(investment) log_investment per cent WDI log(inflation) log _inflation per cent WDI log(government spending) log_gov_spending per cent WDI log(pcbank) log_pcbank per cent WDI log(iqality) log_iquality index EBRD-own estimation log(openness) log_openness per cent WDI log(unemployment) log_unemployment per cent WDI Source: author s interpretation 2 For more details refer to Technical notes of UNDP for calculating the human development indices.

96 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART The government spending variable is log (average share of government spending/gdp) over the period. PCBANK is the ratio of private credit in Banks and GDP. Domestic credit to private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by other depository corporations. The PCBANK variable is log (private credit in Banks/ GDP). The IQALITY is the aggregated indicator of the quality of institutions measured as the average of the 8 sub-indices, which is constructed from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) indices of structural and institutional reforms (see Sachs, 2001; Di Tommaso et al., 2007). The main components of the IQUALITY institutional proxy are markets and trade, the financial sector and enterprises. The IQA- LITY variable is log (aggregated institutional proxy). Openness is the average of exports plus imports as a share of GDP for the period. The openness variable is log (average of Exports + Imports as a share of GDP) for the period. Finally, total unemployment (% of total labor force), refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available and seeking employment. The unemployment variable is log (unemployment). Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 2. There is considerable cross country variation. For instance, the mean GDP growth rate for SEE5 countries is 3.596% per annum, with a standard deviation of The growth rate range from 5.859% in Montenegro to 10.51% also in Montenegro. The aggregate mean of FDI, as a percentage of GDP inflows for SEE5 countries, less than 1% does not look much. According to Estrin and Uvalic (2013), FDI net inflows to Western Balkans countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) are less than it would be expected on the basis of the size and location of their economies in comparison with all 27 transitions economies. Total FDI inflow less than 0.02% in all SEE5 countries at the beginning of 21st century is probably the result of the political risk and economic instability, as well as competition from more promising transition economies. The situation in SEE5 countries has improved along with the progress of the accession process to the European Union. Unfortunately, the financial crisis of , also known as the global financial crisis, negatively affected FDI net inflows into SEE5 countries. For instance, maximum FDI as a percentage of GDP inflow into Bosnia and Herzegovina was 0.145% in 2007 before the crisis started with the minimum about 0.02% in 2009 and The situation in other countries is almost the same. The sectorial distribution of FDI as a percentage of GDP has been different across sectors and countries. For example, the services sector accounted for most FDI net inflows in all SEE5 countries for the period, on average 69.11% of total. Botrić (2010) analyzed the FDI determinants on the overall economy level with an aim to provide the answer whether the same factors as in Central and Eastern European countries are relevant for the SEE5 countries and concluded that determinants of foreign direct investment in the region also fits the overall picture which is biased towards the service sector.

97 96 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, SEE5 COUNTRIES ( ). (2) (3) (4) (5) VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Growth Rate Aggregate FDI FDI in Primary Sector e FDI in Manufacturing Sector FDI in Service Sector Initial GDP 2, ,986 3,248 Human Development Index Investment/GDP Inflation Government Spending Private Credit by Bank Institutional Quality e Openness Unemployment Source: author s calculation based on World Bank s Development Indicators The argument for such development according to Botrić (2010) could have been the relatively slow progress in government reform, which has created barriers to a different structure of investment. Concerning the manufacturing sector, there are subnational differences across countries: Albania 17.47%, Bosnia and Herzegovina 36.05%, Macedonia, FYR 28.93%, Montenegro 25.53% and Serbia 22.49%. The lowest percentage of FDI inflow is in the primary sector ranging from 3.84% in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 13.23% in Albania. Table 3 and Figures 1 to 4 suggest that there is a positive correlation coefficients between per capita growth rates and the share of total FDI in GDP, manufacturing FDI and growth and service FDI and growth. However, the relationship between growth and FDI in the primary sector is very weak and negative.

98 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABLE 3. THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. Variable log_growth log_initial_gdp log_fdi log_fdiprim log_fdi_manuf log_fdi_serv log_hdi log_investment log_inflation log_gov_spending log_pcbank log_iquality log_openness log_unemployment log_growth 1 log_initial_gdp log_fdi log_fdiprim log_fdi_manuf log_fdi_serv log_hdi log_investment log_inflation log_gov_spending log_pcbank log_iquality log_openness log_unemployment Source: author s calculation

99 98 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 FIGURE 1-4. CORRELATION BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH AND FDI ( ). Source: World Bank s Development Indicators 3.3. Estimation Method A panel data set contains 5 entities, each of which includes 15 observations measured at 1 through t year time period. Hence, the temporal units are more numerous (T>N), the pool is called temporal dominant (Stimson 1985). Data are measured at regular year time intervals, well arranged by both cross sectional and time series variables and organized as a balanced panel. The panel data set is a fixed panel, hence the same individuals are observed for each period (Greene, 2008). The methodological approach is the Pooled TSCS analysis. This methodology solves many problems of traditional methods of comparative research. First, concerns about small N problem is relaxed because pooled TSCS cases are country-year. Second, the regression analysis of pooled data combining space and time may depend on higher variability of data. Third, the pooled TSCS analysis deal with the possibility of capturing not only the variation of what emerges through time or space, but the variation of these two dimensions simultaneously (Podestà, 2002). However, using the OLS procedure and pooled data tends to generate several econometric problems. First, the total FDI net inflows variable in I it is assumed to be endogenous.

100 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Because causality may run in both directions, from foreign direct capital inflows to growth and vice versa, these regressors may be correlated with the error term. Second, time invariant country characteristics (fixed effects), such as geography and demographics, may be correlated with the explanatory variables. The fixed effects are contained in the error term, which consists of the unobserved country specific effects and the observation specific errors. Third, because the serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the standard errors and causes less efficient results, it is necessary to examine the serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term in a panel-data model. Fourth, the problem of heteroscedasticity where variance of error term is different across observations. While pooled OLS based methods adequately deal with violations in assumptions of homoscedasticity, non-autocorrelation and cross sectional independence they have two shortcomings (Hoehn at al., 2014). First, pooled OLS treats the data set as a pure cross section where each N-T observation is effectively seen as a separate observation. Second, pooled OLS based estimation critically depends on the assumption of strict exogeneity. The most widely used models for addressing these shortcomings are random effect(s) models, also called a variance components model (RE) and a fixed effects model (FE). The main difference between these two models is their treatment of the unobserved N specific effect. While in an RE framework the unobserved N specific effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the unobserved N specific effect in FE is, in a manner of speaking, simply an additional parameter to be estimated. Before any econometric estimation technique is applied, I tested whether to use FE or RE. In the panel model data, I found both significant fixed and random effects. To decide between fixed or random effects, I ran a Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects (see Green, 2008). The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that unique errors (u it ) are not correlated with regressors. I do not reject the null hypothesis (Proba > chi2 = ), and I may conclude that individual effects (u it ) are not correlated with regressors in the model and thus the random effect model is preferred. Reverse causality between FDI and economic growth might be a possibility in the equations specification. Higher FDI inflows cause higher economic growth rates, but it is also possible that higher economic growth rates may lead to greater FDI inflows. If this holds true, then coefficient estimates may be higher. To check the potential endogeneity between economic growth and FDI inflows, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest an augmented regression test (DWH test). The null hypothesis of the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests is that the variable under consideration can be treated as exogenous. Here both test statistics are highly significant, Durbin (score) chi2 (1) = (p = ); Wu- Hausman F (1,64) = (p = ), so the results of the endogeneity test rules out reverse causality between economic growth and FDI net inflows. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data yields results p value of Hence, the test rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity. Hence, the panel data set has problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. To solve possible problems of contemporaneous correlations, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, several models have been developed to deal with these complications. Parks (1967) proposes a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) based algorithm de-

101 100 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 veloped to account for heteroscedasticity, as well as for temporal and spatial dependence in the residuals of TSCS models method that Kmenta (1986) made popular. However, the Parks-Kmenta method could be inappropriate for use because of at least two reasons. First, this method is infeasible if the panel s time dimension, T, is smaller than its cross sectional dimension, N, and second, Beck and Katz (1995) show that the FGLS produces coefficient standard errors that are underestimated. They report on Monte Carlo experiments in which the PCSE estimator produces accurate standard error, or little loss in efficiency compared to the FGLS. On the other hand, Reed and Webb (2010) were able to reproduce Beck and Katz s results when they used the same experimental parameters that Beck and Katz employ and they find that the PCSE estimator fell short of the claims made by Beck and Katz. According to Reed and Webb (2010), the PCSE estimator could be less efficient than FGLS. Another possibility to deal with serial correlation and heteroscedasticity is the use of regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors procedure developed by Hoechle (2007) 3. The error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic, auto correlated, and possibly correlated between the groups (panels). Finally, I ran the pooled OLS regressions without any dummy variables. Many studies have attempted to study the effect of foreign direct investment on growth by employing pooled OLS with White s correction of heteroscedasticity regression method (Alfaro, 2003; Tintin, 2012). 4. ESTIMATION RESULTS Tables 4 to 8 show five different regression results, which are carried out on TSCS data using four regression analysis techniques: Pooled OLS regression; XTSCC regression; FGLS regression and PCSE regression. Table 4, showing results of the estimation that uses the aggregate FDI net inflows, presents the main results of the estimation. The regressions show the aggregate FDI to have significant and positive effect on growth. That is, efficiency spillovers exist and higher foreign presence increases economic growth in host countries. The pooled OLS and XTSCC report slightly higher coefficient values of aggregate FDI compares to FGLS and PCSE, and respectively. As shown in Table 4, the coefficient of estimation is quite similar between Pooled OLS and XTSCC and between FGLS and PCSE techniques of estimation. The three other capital flow variables (investment, government spending and private credit in banks) show the interesting results. The parameter estimates of investment and government spending have a positive and significant effect on growth in the context of SEE5 countries across different specifications. The coefficient of the private credit in banks variable across different specifications has a negative and statistically insignificant value. The investment and government spending coefficients are very significant with the expected signs across all four estimations. These results suggest that domestic investment and public investment contributes to growth. 3 Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors procedure (xtscc). The program produces Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors for linear panel models. That is, xtscc estimates pooled ordinary least-squares/weighted least-squares regression models with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors.

102 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABLE 4. THE EFFECT OF AGGREGATE FDI ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.336) (0.316) (0.273) (0.278) log_fdi 1.093** 1.093** 0.942** 0.942** (0.375) (0.383) (0.377) (0.377) log_hdi *** ** ** (1.123) (0.584) (0.775) (0.785) log_investment 0.408** 0.408*** 0.422*** 0.421*** (0.101) (0.1000) (0.121) (0.121) log_inflation 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.101*** (0.0172) (0.0332) (0.0288) (0.0286) log_gov_spending 0.318* 0.318* 0.369** 0.371** (0.135) (0.171) (0.174) (0.177) log_pcbank (0.0795) (0.0354) (0.0476) (0.0478) log_iquality * 0.450* 0.457* (0.298) (0.231) (0.259) (0.259) log_openness * * (0.227) (0.222) (0.134) (0.134) log_unemployment (0.154) (0.0946) (0.107) (0.108) Constant (2.547) (2.864) (2.031) (2.064) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The coefficient of domestic investment estimated by pooled OLS and XTSCC amounts to a value of and by FGLS and PCSE to The coefficient on government spending varies between and The other control variables (human development indicator, inflation, institutions quality, openness and unemployment) differentially affect economic growth. By comparison with the pooled OLS and XTSCC, FGLS and PCSE estimations yield more different results on the control variables. The coefficient on HDI remains negative for all four estimation techniques, while its significance changes from

103 102 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 insignificant for pooled OLS to significant for the other three regressions. A negative correlation between HDI and growth is also found in the study of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). Using the cross country estimates of physical and human capital stocks, they ran the growth accounting regressions implied by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function and found that human capital enters insignificantly in explaining per capita growth rates. Van Leeuwen (2007) gave a credible explanation of a negative HDI sign and pointed out that the problem with inserting physical capital in growth equations with human capital was that during periods with declining growth rates of production (which is the case of SEE5 countries), physical capital investments also declined. If the human capital stock exhibits a constant growth rate or even an increasing growth rate, it would create an insignificant or even negative human capital coefficient. Korotayev and de Munck (2013) indicate that the negative correlation between HDI levels and economic growth rates can also be detected among countries with HDI scores over 0.7 (SEE5 countries have an average HDI score of and negative pairwise correlation between the HDI and economic growth rates, -0,254). Inflation, as a proxy for macroeconomic stability, is significant and has a positive sign. Although there is a huge disagreement on the relationship between inflation and economic growth both on a theoretical and empirical basis, it can be concluded that in the case of SEE5 countries inflation is positively correlated with economic growth. As noted in Table 4 the pooled OLS coefficient of institutional quality is positive and statistically insignificant, but for all other three regression techniques coefficients on institutional quality are as expected positive and statistically significant. This suggests that institutional quality exerts a substantial influence on economic growth. Finally, this study also examines the impact of openness to international trade and unemployment on growth. As shown in Table 4, both coefficients on openness and on unemployment are statistically insignificant and have negative sign, except for openness in FGLS and PCSE estimations, where both coefficients are statistically significant. A negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate of the trade, as a share of GDP in FGLS and PCSE regressions, implies that international trading is not beneficial for SEE5 countries economic growth. Researchers have not been able to provide an explicit answer to the question of whether trade openness support a higher economic growth. Huchet-Bourdon et al. (2011) suggest that trade may impact growth negatively in countries which have specialized in low quality products. According to Dowrick and Golley (2004) marginal impact of trade on growth in the 1980s and 1990s is higher for the richer countries than it is for the poorer countries and marginal impact is estimated to be negative for countries below the productivity level, approximately $3,000 per capita. For selected developing and least developed economies, Abbas (2014) concluded that the increase in trade liberalization deteriorates economic growth of developing and least developing countries. Tables 5 to 8 present the pooled OLS, XTSCC, FGLS and PCSE results for the estimation that uses FDI net inflows in each sector. Results for FDI in the primary sector are shown in Table 5. As in the primary sector, the scope for linkages between foreign affiliates and local suppliers is often limited and production processes tend to be continuous and capital intensive, therefore a negative and insignificant effect of FDI on growth in the primary sector is not surprising. FDI in the primary sector, which also usually use few local intermediate goods, have limited linkages to domestic economy and they are largely export oriented. But Aykut and Sayek (2007) concluded that the negative economic impact of FDI in the primary sector is not the inevitable outcome and that FDI in the primary sector may, in the presence of solid institutions, generate a positive impact in a country.

104 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABLE 5. THE EFFECT OF FDI IN PRIMARY SECTOR ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.327) (0.307) (0.292) (0.298) log_fdiprim (5.622) (3.451) (4.220) (4.218) log_hdi ** * * (1.112) (0.681) (0.790) (0.798) log_investment 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.507*** 0.508*** (0.0864) (0.0756) (0.118) (0.118) log_inflation 0.117*** 0.117*** *** *** (0.0228) (0.0381) (0.0294) (0.0293) log_gov_spending 0.300* 0.300* 0.340* 0.338* (0.120) (0.154) (0.200) (0.204) log_pcbank (0.103) (0.0443) (0.0497) (0.0498) log_iquality 0.798* 0.798*** 0.675** 0.678** (0.324) (0.255) (0.265) (0.265) log_openness ** ** (0.232) (0.241) (0.139) (0.139) log_unemployment (0.133) (0.118) (0.110) (0.110) Constant (2.278) (2.632) (2.070) (2.102) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Walsh and Yu (2010) also indicated that local conditions matter and that countries are generally interested in attracting FDI into the primary sector. FDI in the SEE5 countries could therefore be further increased by profound institutional reform. Compared with the main results of estimation, the control variables, except for private credit in banks, kept their sign and significance. Table 6 provides the estimation results of regressions which are related to the effect of foreign investment in the manufacturing sector on growth. FDI in the manufacturing sector have a positive and significant effect on growth, except for pooled OLS, where the

105 104 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 coefficient is statistically positive but statistically insignificant. Positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate of FDI in the manufacturing sector in XTSCC, FGLS and PCSE regressions range from to The obtained results seem to be in correlation with the notion that FDI in the manufacturing sector play a positive role in economic growth generation. Although the manufacturing industry according to Estrin and Uvalic (2013) has, after the strong process of deindustrialization in the 1990s, actually continued to decline in most SEE5 countries, FDI in the manufacturing sector are more likely to bring in technology and knowhow, generate foreign exchange earnings for host economies and as a result, one would expect a relatively strong growth impact of FDI in the manufacturing sector (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004). TABLE 6. THE EFFECT OF FDI IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (3) (4) (5) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.295) (0.296) (0.281) (0.287) log_fdi_manuf *** 1.234** 1.230** (0.675) (0.364) (0.599) (0.599) log_hdi ** ** ** (1.127) (0.625) (0.756) (0.764) log_investment 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.455*** 0.456*** (0.0927) (0.0684) (0.118) (0.118) log_inflation 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.110*** 0.110*** (0.0229) (0.0378) (0.0291) (0.0290) log_gov_spending 0.301* 0.301* 0.360** 0.362** (0.118) (0.157) (0.176) (0.179) log_pcbank (0.0860) (0.0409) (0.0480) (0.0481) log_iquality 0.669* 0.669*** 0.570** 0.572** (0.292) (0.216) (0.249) (0.249) log_openness (0.240) (0.248) (0.138) (0.139) log_unemployment (0.133) (0.101) (0.109) (0.109) Constant (2.183) (2.617) (2.071) (2.100) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

106 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Table 7 presents the estimation results for FDI in services equation. The results are in line with the expectation that FDI in the service sector exert positive impact on economic growth. The coefficients are positive and statistically significant between 1 and 5 percent significance level. The size of FDI in the service sector ranges between and Even though market seeking FDI in the service sector may create fiercer competition and may also lead to the crowding out of local competitors, especially if foreign affiliates command superior market power, the presented results suggest that SEE5 countries benefit from this type of FDI. That is, FDI in the service sector support introducing new products and services, by increasing the level of competition and by modernizing local production and marketing, as well as by providing the necessary funding, efficiency, stability and by lowering the cost of services. TABLE 7. THE EFFECT OF FDI IN SERVICE SECTOR ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.355) (0.342) (0.274) (0.280) log_fdi_serv 1.796** 1.796** 1.543*** 1.542*** (0.640) (0.741) (0.568) (0.568) log_hdi *** ** ** (1.127) (0.593) (0.790) (0.802) log_investment 0.388** 0.388*** 0.414*** 0.414*** (0.110) (0.127) (0.122) (0.122) log_inflation *** *** *** *** (0.0189) (0.0308) (0.0289) (0.0288) log_gov_spending 0.323* 0.323* 0.360** 0.363** (0.125) (0.171) (0.176) (0.179) log_pcbank (0.0743) (0.0334) (0.0458) (0.0461) log_iquality * (0.257) (0.283) (0.265) (0.265) log_openness ** ** (0.222) (0.201) (0.131) (0.132) log_unemployment (0.160) (0.102) (0.106) (0.107) Constant (2.803) (3.132) (2.044) (2.080) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

107 106 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 Table 8 presents the estimation results of the FDI net inflows for each sector. The results are to a certain degree consistent with previous findings. Negative and insignificant effect of FDI net inflows in the primary sector on growth changed from negative and insignificant to negative and significant, except for the pooled OLS where estimated coefficient remains negative and insignificant. On the other hand, FDI in the manufacturing sector remain positive but significance changed from significant to statistically insignificant. The size of coefficient decreased (e.g. PCSE regression) from to The coefficients for FDI in the service sector remain positive and significant. There may exist the lagged FDI due to delayed effect on growth. In empirical studies very often the lagged FDI variable is used with intention to deal with endogeneity or time lagged effects (Alfaro, 2003, Agosin and Machado, 2005, Aykut and Sayek, 2007, Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp, 2008, Tang, 2015 among others). FDI would bring about technology transfer and management skills, but these benefits would take some time to exert influence on the SEE5 growth. Hence, the FDI net inflows would have a lagged effect on SEE5 growth. Optimal one period lag length for this model is calculated on the comparison of regression results with alternative lag structures (see, Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp, 2008). The findings are reported in Tables 9 to 13. The coefficients in Table 9, regarding the impact of the lagged aggregate FDI on growth in comparison with the aggregate FDI, remain positive for the pooled OLS and XTSCC regressions, changed sign to negative for FGLS and PCSE regression and changed to statistically insignificant for all four regressions..

108 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABLE 8. THE EFFECT OF FDI FOR EACH SECTOR ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.392) (0.357) (0.268) (0.274) log_fdiprim ** ** ** (6.156) (3.324) (3.917) (3.913) log_fdi_manuf (0.264) (0.429) (0.731) (0.729) log_fdi_serv 2.017* 2.017** 1.805*** 1.809*** (0.795) (0.898) (0.621) (0.620) log_hdi ** ** ** (1.177) (0.693) (0.777) (0.789) log_investment 0.330* 0.330** 0.351*** 0.349*** (0.137) (0.132) (0.119) (0.119) log_inflation 0.107*** 0.107*** *** *** (0.0119) (0.0338) (0.0281) (0.0279) log_gov_spending (0.178) (0.175) (0.180) (0.183) log_pcbank (0.0825) (0.0320) (0.0443) (0.0446) log_iquality ** 0.552** (0.337) (0.308) (0.259) (0.259) log_openness ** ** (0.231) (0.189) (0.128) (0.128) log_unemployment (0.169) (0.113) (0.105) (0.107) Constant (3.114) (3.319) (1.991) (2.028) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Lagged FDI in the primary sector, Table 10, as expected, has a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient. Positive and statistically significant effect of FDI on growth in the manufacturing sector for XTSCC, FGLS and PCSE regressions, when lagged FDI is included, changed to negative and statistically insignificant, Table 11. The coefficients for lagged FDI in the service sector, presented in Table 12, remain positive but significance turn to insignificant. That is, the lagged aggregate FDI and the sectorial composition of FDI don t have an important impact on SEE5 countries growth since the 95% confidence interval crosses the threshold for what is considered to have an important effect. Finally,

109 108 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 Table 13 reports estimated coefficients of the lagged FDI net inflows for each sector. In the primary sector coefficient remain negative and insignificant, except for XTSCC regression where significance decrease from 0.05 to 0.1. On the other hand, lagged FDI in the manufacturing sector changed from positive to negative and from statistically insignificant to statistically significant at 10 per cent level for FGLS and PCSE regressions. The coefficients for lagged FDI in the service sector remain positive but significance decreases to insignificant, except for the XTSCC regression where significance decreases from 5 per cent to 10 per cent. TABLE 9. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED AGGREGATE FDI ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.325) (0.366) (0.291) (0.296) lag_fdi (0.374) (0.409) (0.376) (0.375) log_hdi ** (1.149) (0.657) (0.804) (0.812) log_investment 0.487** 0.487*** 0.523*** 0.525*** (0.111) (0.0941) (0.123) (0.123) log_inflation 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.101*** 0.100*** (0.0258) (0.0372) (0.0300) (0.0299) log_gov_spending 0.323* 0.323* 0.368** 0.368** (0.121) (0.164) (0.183) (0.187) log_pcbank (0.0984) (0.0401) (0.0494) (0.0495) log_iquality 0.707* 0.707*** 0.677*** 0.680*** (0.301) (0.209) (0.260) (0.260) log_openness ** ** (0.256) (0.223) (0.142) (0.142) log_unemployment (0.138) (0.124) (0.112) (0.113) Constant (2.267) (3.160) (2.098) (2.124) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

110 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABLE 10. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED FDI IN PRIMARY SECTOR ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.319) (0.330) (0.287) (0.294) lag_fdiprim (4.466) (2.783) (3.336) (3.328) log_hdi ** * * (1.223) (0.728) (0.803) (0.811) log_investment 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.509*** 0.510*** (0.0977) (0.0758) (0.119) (0.119) log_inflation 0.119** 0.119*** *** *** (0.0279) (0.0371) (0.0297) (0.0296) log_gov_spending 0.323* 0.323* 0.360* 0.361* (0.127) (0.165) (0.185) (0.189) log_pcbank (0.106) (0.0382) (0.0498) (0.0498) log_iquality 0.772* 0.772*** 0.662*** 0.665*** (0.279) (0.213) (0.256) (0.256) log_openness ** ** (0.231) (0.248) (0.139) (0.140) log_unemployment (0.143) (0.125) (0.113) (0.114) Constant (2.272) (2.780) (2.068) (2.098) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

111 110 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 TABLE 11. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED FDI IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.283) (0.328) (0.288) (0.295) lag_fdimanuf (0.731) (0.465) (0.629) (0.628) log_hdi ** (1.190) (0.653) (0.796) (0.805) log_investment 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.525*** 0.527*** (0.109) (0.0796) (0.118) (0.118) log_inflation 0.119** 0.119*** *** *** (0.0284) (0.0376) (0.0294) (0.0293) log_gov_spending 0.336** 0.336* 0.382** 0.381** (0.112) (0.161) (0.184) (0.188) log_pcbank (0.0905) (0.0440) (0.0467) (0.0467) log_iquality 0.771* 0.771*** 0.700*** 0.703*** (0.299) (0.206) (0.255) (0.255) log_openness ** ** (0.251) (0.245) (0.139) (0.140) log_unemployment (0.129) (0.116) (0.111) (0.111) Constant (2.054) (2.777) (2.073) (2.105) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

112 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART TABLE 12. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED FDI IN SERVICE SECTOR ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.339) (0.359) (0.292) (0.297) lag_fdiserv (0.522) (0.576) (0.567) (0.567) log_hdi ** (1.142) (0.653) (0.802) (0.811) log_investment 0.449** 0.449*** 0.484*** 0.486*** (0.115) (0.103) (0.126) (0.127) log_inflation 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.102*** 0.101*** (0.0228) (0.0357) (0.0300) (0.0299) log_gov_spending 0.318* 0.318* 0.371** 0.371** (0.130) (0.167) (0.182) (0.185) log_pcbank (0.0927) (0.0402) (0.0507) (0.0509) log_iquality 0.663* 0.663*** 0.624** 0.628** (0.267) (0.221) (0.259) (0.259) log_openness ** ** (0.254) (0.212) (0.142) (0.142) log_unemployment (0.145) (0.121) (0.113) (0.114) Constant (2.389) (3.156) (2.127) (2.153) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0

113 112 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 TABLE 13. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED FDI IN EACH SECTOR ON GROWTH. Dependent Variable: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES OLS XTSCC FGLS PCSE log_initial_gdp (0.368) (0.379) (0.286) (0.292) lag_fdiprim * (4.382) (2.010) (3.695) (3.688) lag_manuf * * (0.630) (0.437) (0.682) (0.682) lag_fdiserv * (0.780) (0.653) (0.638) (0.638) log_hdi ** * * (1.276) (0.647) (0.796) (0.804) log_investment 0.413** 0.413*** 0.457*** 0.459*** (0.115) (0.114) (0.127) (0.127) log_inflation 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.101*** 0.100*** (0.0228) (0.0366) (0.0293) (0.0292) log_gov_spending 0.290* ** 0.381** (0.133) (0.183) (0.177) (0.180) log_pcbank (0.100) (0.0406) (0.0510) (0.0511) log_iquality 0.661* 0.661** 0.647** 0.651** (0.264) (0.238) (0.255) (0.255) log_openness * ** (0.238) (0.213) (0.141) (0.142) log_unemployment (0.157) (0.130) (0.113) (0.113) Constant (2.667) (3.234) (2.099) (2.126) Observations R-squared Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p< CONCLUSION Stable and well-developed government policies of SEE5 countries, investing conditions, financial and institutional policies are important sources of GDP growth and FDI inflows. Political history of the SEE5 countries, with conflicts, economic uncertainty and low

114 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART growth, have sharply limited the inflow of FDI and still give the impression to have a negative effect on FDI inflow. However, FDI inflow to the SEE5 countries could be further increased by market economic reforms which will result in economic and political stabilization. That is, economic and political stabilization of SEE5 countries, together with the implementation of a common market in the SEE5 countries, could increase the attractiveness of this region and lead to an improvement of investment conditions. Therefore, SEE5 countries should support the business climate and positive institutional changes which will in return promote the urgently needed increase of FDI inflows in the SEE5 countries. For the SEE5 economies as a whole, this paper finds that there is a statistically significant connection between FDI flows and growth. At the aggregate level, the impact of FDI net inflows on growth is positive and strong. At the sector level, it becomes apparent that FDI net inflows into the primary sector inclines to have a negative effect on growth. Unlike to the primary sector FDI, FDI net inflows in the manufacturing sector have positive effects on growth in the SEE5 countries. Plausible reason for this positive correlation between FDI net inflows in the manufacturing sector and growth may be found in its deeper backward and forward linkages. Strong and positive of FDI net inflows in service sector on growth suggests that the service sector might be source of positive spillover effects from FDI in the SEE5 countries. These findings suggest that both the aggregate FDI net inflows and the sectorial composition of these flows are important factors of economic growth. Although, not all forms of FDI net inflows have the same effect on growth, targeting different types of FDI net inflows shouldn t be based on selective FDI policies. According to Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008) for a selective approach to be successful in attracting growth promoting FDI, policymakers would have to know exactly about the quality of each FDI project and its effects on the local economy, which appears to be an overly heroic assumption. This means that SEE5 policymakers, instead of choosing selective approach towards FDI, should help to maximize the benefits of FDI. 6. LITERATURE Agosin R. Manuel and Mayer Ricardo (2000), "Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: Does it Crowd in Domestic Investment?, UNCTAD Discussion Paper Alfaro Laura (2003), "Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does the Sector Matter?", Harvard Business School. Abbas Shujaat, (2014) "Trade Liberalization and its Economic Impact on Developing and Least Developed Countries", Journal of International Trade Law and Policy, Vol. 13 Iss: 3, pp Alfaro Laura and Charlton Andrew (2007), "Growth and the Quality of Foreign Direct Investment: Is All FDI Equal?", Harvard Business School Working Paper

115 114 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 Alfaro Laura, Ozcan Kalemli, Chanda Areendam and Sayek Selin (2000), "FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets", Working Paper (University of Houston). Aykut Dilek and Selin Sayek (2007), "The Role of the Sectorial Composition of Foreign Direct Investment on Growth", In Do Multinationals Feed Local Development and Growth?, edited by L. Piscitello and G. Santangelo. London: Elsevier. Bellemare Marc F. and Masaki, Takaaki and Pepinsky, Thomas B. (2015), "Lagged Explanatory Variables and the Estimation of Causal Effects", SSRN: Benhabib Jess and Spiegel M. Mark (1994), "The Role of Human Capital in Economic Development, Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country Data", Journal of Monetary Economics. Blin Myriam and Ouattara Bazoumana (2009), "Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Mauritius: Evidence from Bounds Test Cointegration", Économie internationale 117. Botrić Valerija (2010), "Foreign Direct Investment in the Western Balka ns: Privatization, Institutional Change, and Banking Sector Dominance "ECONOMIC ANNALS, Volume LV, No. 187 / October - December Carkovic, M. and Levine R. (2002), "Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic Growth?" University of Minnesota, University of Minnesota, Working Paper. Chakraborty Chandana and Nunnenkamp Peter (2008), "Economic Reforms, FDI, and Economic Growth in India: A Sector Level Analysis", World Development Vol. 36. DeMello, L.R., Jr. (1999), "Foreign Direct Investment-Led Growth: Evidence from Time Series and Panel Data", Oxford Economic Papers. Di Tommaso, M. L., Raiser, M., and Weeks, M. (2007), "Home Grown or Imported? Initial Conditions, External Anchors and the Determinants of Institutional Reform in the Transition Economies", The Economic Journal, Vol Dowrick Steve and Golley Jane (2004), Trade Openness and Growth: Who Benefits, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 20, No. 1, pp Drukker M David (2003), "Testing for Serial Correlation in Linear Panel-Data Models", The Stata Journal (2003), Number 2. Eicher T. and Schreiber T. (2007), "Institutions and Growth: Time Series Evidence from Natural Experiments", University of Washington, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. UWEC

116 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART Estrin Saul and Uvalic Milica (2013), "Foreign Direct Investment into Transition Economies: Are the Balkans different?", LSE Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series. Hansen H. and Rand J. (2006), "On the Causal Links between FDI and Growth in Developing Countries", World Development 29. Hoechle D. (2007), "Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Ccross-Sectional Dependence", Stata Journal 7(3), Hoechle Daniel (2007), "Robust Sstandard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-Sectional Dependence", The Stata Journal (2007), Number 3. Hoehn Balthasar, Schuberth Florian and Steiner Manuel (2014), "Dealing with Heteroskedasticity, Autocorrelation and Endogeneity in German Audit Fee Panel Data - Comparing Approaches", Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. Hong Liming (2014), "Does and How does FDI Promote the Economic Growth? Evidence from Dynamic Panel Data of Prefecture City in China", IERI Procedia 6, Huchet-Bourdon M., Mouel L. C., and Vijil M. (2011), "The Relationship Between Trade Openness and Economic Growth: Some New Insights on the Openness Measurement Issue. XIIIeme Congres de I'Association Europeenne des Economistes Agricoles AAE), pp Iamsiraroj Sasi and Doucouliagos Hristos (2015), "Does Growth Attract FDI?", Economics Open-Access, Oppen-Assesment E-Journal. Jordaan A. Jacob (2005), "Determinants of FDI-Induced Externalities: New Empirical Evidence for Mexican Manufacturing Industries", World Development Volume 33, Issue 12. Keey Hiau Looi (2011), "Local Intermediate Inputs, Foreign Direct Investment and the Performance of Domestic Firms: When Firms Share Common Local Input Suppliers, Journal of Development Economics. Khaliq Abdul, Noy Ilan (2007), "Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Sectorial Data in Indonesia", No , Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. Korotayev Andrey and de Munck Victor (2013), "Advances in Development Reverse Global Inequality Trends", Journal of Globalization Studies. Volume 4, Number 1. Maodatsou Argiro and Kykilis Dimitrios (2011), "FDI and Economic Growth: Causality for the EU and ASEAN", Journal of Economic Integration. Melnyk Leonid, Kubatko Oleksandr and Pysarenko Serhiy (2014), "The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth: Case of Post Communism Transition Economies, Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 12.

117 116 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GROWTH: THE CASE OF THE SEE-5 Nunnenkamp Peter and Spaz Julius (2004), "FDI and Economic Growth in Developing Economies: How Relevant are Host-Economy and Industry Characteristics", United Nations. Podestà F. (2002), "Recent Developments in Quantitative Comparative Methodology. The Case of Pooled Time Series Cross-Section Analysis", Universität Brescia: Discussion Paper. Reed W. Robert and Webb Rachel (2010), "The PCSE Etimator is Good, Just not as Good as you Think", Journal of Time Series Econometrics, 2(1). Rojec Matija and Penev Slavica (2011), "Attractiveness of Western Balkan Countries for FDI" In: Serbia and the European Union: economic lessons from the new member states. Facultade de economia Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra, pp ISBN Ruth A. Judson Ann L. Owen, 1996, Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Practical Guide for Macroeconomists. Sachs, J. D. (2001), "The Transition at Mid Decade", Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 86, No. 2. Stimson, J.A. (1985), "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay", American Journal of Political Sciences, 29(4). Tang Donny (2015); "Has the Foreign Direct Investment Boosted Economic Growth in the European Union Countries?", Journal of International and Global Economic Studies, 8(1). UNCTAD (2015), "World Investment Report 2015", United Nations Publication. van Leeuwen Bas (2007), "Human Capital and Economic Growth in India, Indonesia, and Japan: A quantitative analysis, ", International Institute for Social History. Wacker M. Konstantin (2013), "On the Measurement of Foreign Direct Investment and its Relationship to Activities of Multinational Corporations", European Central Bank (ECB). Working Paper. Walsh James P. and Yu Jiangyan (2010), "Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Sectorial and Institutional Approach. IMF Working Paper, WP/10/187, July. Zakari Yahya Abdullahi, Haruna Mohammed Aliero and Musa Adamu Yusuf (2012), "Does FDI Cause Economic Growth? Evidence from Selected Countries in Aafrica and Asia", African Journal of Social Sciences. Zhao Changwen and Du Jiang (2007), "Causality Between FDI and Economic Growth in China", The Chinese Economy.

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120 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART MILUTIN JEŠIĆ 1 milutinjesic@ekof.bg.ac.rs ZNAČAJ FINANSIJSKOG OBRAZOVANJA U ODRASTANJU DECE PRIKAZ KNJIGE: NIKOLA FABRIS I RADOICA LUBURIĆ, FINANSIJSKO OBRAZOVANJE DECE I OMLADINE, HERAEDU I MEDEON, THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE CHILDREN GROWTH BOOK REVIEW: NIKOLA FABRIS AND RADOICA LUBURIĆ, FINANCIAL EDUCATION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, HERAEDU AND MEDEON, UVOD O FINANSIJSKOM OBRAZOVANJU U okviru formalnog obrazovanja, na prostoru našeg regiona, oduvek se malo pažnje pridavalo finansijskom obrazovanju. Retki su đaci koji su tokom svog formalnog obrazovanja zaslugom pojedinaca učitelja i nastavnika čuli bar nešto o osnovnim pojmovima koji spadaju u ovaj domen. Stoga je uglavnom sve što deca treba da nauče još u ranoj mlado- 1 Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu

121 120 ZNAČAJ FINANSIJSKOG OBRAZOVANJA U ODRASTANJU DECE sti ostavljeno na odgovornost roditeljima. Međutim, zbog izmenjenog tipa sistema, premalo slobodnog vremena koje roditeljima stoji na raspolaganju da ga provedu sa svojom decom, propagiranja lošeg sistema vrednosti i društvenog nagrađivanja neodgovarajućeg ponašanja u normalnom sistemu vrednosti, omladina po završetku obaveznog formalnog školovanja ostaje gotovo finansijski nepismena. A upravo je to period u životu, kada temelji koji se tada postave igraju ključnu ulogu u budućoj mogućnosti opterećenja koje svaki pojedinac može podneti u toku života. Finansijska edukacija stvara mogućnost da osoba bude finansijski pismena i finansijski sposobna. 2 Finansijsko obrazovanje posebno je važno jer se u kasnijem periodu života po jedinici mogu susresti sa važnim finansijskim odlukama koje ih mogu ponekad odvesti i na pogrešan put. Makroekonomske posledice finansijske nepismenosti su očigledne pre svega kada se privreda nalazi u zoni recesije. Nedostatak ušteđevine za slučaj nezaposlenosti, prezaduženost, problemi u otplati kredita, neadekvatne metode finansiranja kapitalnih dobara i dobara za tekuće potrebe, samo su neke od konsekvenci nedovoljnog stepena finansijskog obrazovanja. Finansijsko obrazovanje formalno ili neformalno, treba da počne što ranije. Prema OECD publikaciji, u Velikoj Britaniji 52 % tinejdžera pre 17 godine je postalo zaduženo. 3 U manje razvijenim zemljama taj procenat je svakako manji, ali jasno je da finansijske instrumente počinje da koristi sve mlađa populacija. Na nacionalnom nivou mora se napraviti plan razvoja u oblasti finansijske edukacije. Taj plan treba da uključi sve zainteresovane strane, da jasno definiše ciljeve, sredstva, obaveze i evaluacije. Podrška finansijskoj edukaciji može da bude viđena kao glavni javni, privatni i cilj svih drugih zainteresovanih strana, kao kritična dugoročna investicija u ljudski kapital. 4 2 Child Social and Financial Education (2012), p Financial Educations in Schools (2012), p Ibid., p. 7.

122 EKONOMSKE IDEJE I PRAKSA BROJ 24 MART ILUSTRACIJA 1. PROCES RAZVOJA NACIONALNOG PLANA FINANSIJSKE EDUKACIJE DECE I OMLADINE Izvor: Fabris, N. i Luburić, R. (2016), p. 71. Treba imati na umu da čak i da formalno obrazovanje bude upotpunjeno sa nekim od predmeta koji se tiču finansijskog obrazovanja, ipak najveći deo posla ostaje na roditeljima da na vreme nauče svoju decu o veštini upravljanja novcem. Najlakše je to učiniti usputno, uključivanjem dece u svakodnevne odluke porodice o finansijama, prvo kao pasivne posmatrače, a potom u kasnijem periodu kao članove sa aktivnim glasom. Knjiga koja je predmet ovog prikaza, predstavlja važan iskorak u odnosu na dosadašnje pridavanje značaja neformalnom finansijskom obrazovanju dece i omladine. U nastavku sledi kratak prikaz najznačajnijih smernica roditeljima koje se mogu naći u knjizi.