SPECIAL REPORT: Brazil's Battle Against Drug Traffickers

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1 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX Tel: SPECIAL REPORT: Brazil's Battle Against Drug Traffickers F e b. 8,

2 Brazil's Battle Against Drug Traffickers In a continued pacification campaign to wrest control of Rio de Janeiro s hillsides from drug trafficking groups, Brazilian security forces occupied nine favelas in northern Rio in less than two hours Feb. 6. Though on the surface it appears Rio police are making rapid headway in their counternarcotics efforts, the operations are contributing primarily to the displacement, not removal, of major drug trafficking groups. If and when the state expands its offensive to Rocinha, a large cluster of favelas where most drug traffickers have fled, the backlash is likely to be fierce. Brazil s decision to take on that fight or reach an accommodation with the main criminal groups will be heavily influenced by its lack of resources and tight timeline before it falls under the global spotlight for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. Analysis Backed by tanks and helicopters, nearly 700 police forces (380 military police, 189 civilian police, 103 federal police and 24 federal highway police) along with 150 marines and an unspecified number of officers from Brazil s elite Special Operations Battalion (BOPE) launched a massive operation Feb. 6 to occupy the favelas of Sao Carlos, Zinco, Querosene, Mineira, Coroa, Fallet, Fogueteiro, Escondidinho and Prazeres in the northern Rio hills of Estacio, Catumbi and Santa Teresa. The operation was swift and effective and was curiously met with virtually no resistance from the drug trafficking groups that had been operating in the area. The UPP Model The crackdown is part of a Pacification Police Unit (UPP) campaign that began in Rio in 2008 to flush out longentrenched drug trafficking groups and bring the city s lawless hillsides under state control. The UPP plan involves special operations by BOPE forces, followed by a heavy-handed offensive involving police and military units, flushing drug traffickers out from the territory, the installation of a UPP command post at the top of the main favela hillsides and finally a long-term police occupation. During the police occupation phase, which could last for up to 25 years according to some Rio police sources, social workers are brought in to work alongside the police occupants to help build trust between the state and favela dwellers and integrate the territory with the state by providing business licenses, home addresses, electricity and water services, satellite dish installations, and schooling. STRATFOR A mural in Santa Marta, the first favela to be pacified under the UPP campaign in The mural reads, Freedom in the favela, nightmare to the system, in reference to the campaign. 2

3 The UPP model has worked remarkably well in smaller favelas, such as Santa Marta, which has evolved into a tourist attraction for the state to show off its success to skeptical cariocas (Rio inhabitants) and curious outsiders. But critical challenges to the UPP effort remain, and the risks to the state are intensifying the more this campaign spreads. 3

4 Challenges Ahead The most immediate issue is a lack of resources, specifically police resources, for a long-term occupation of Rio s sprawling favelas. The Santa Teresa area targeted Feb. 6 has 12 favelas and houses around 560,000 people. Some 630 police are expected to comprise the occupying force for this area. Morro Sao Joao, where the 14th UPP was installed Jan. 31, has 6,000 inhabitants, but that one UPP will also be responsible for the pacification and security of about 12,000 inhabitants living in the surrounding communities of Morro da Matriz, Morro do Quieto Abolicao, Agua Santa, Cachambi, Encantado, Engenho de Dentro, Engenho Novo, Jacare, Lins de Vasconcelos, Riachuelo, Rocha, Sampaio, Sao Francisco Xavier and Todos os Santos. Another UPP is likely to be installed in the Engenhao area, where a stadium that was built for the Pan American Games and that likely will be used for the 2016 Olympics is located. Maracana stadium, near Morro do Borel in the Tijuca area of Rio where UPPs have already been installed, will be the main stadium used for the 2014 World Cup. Salaries for Rio police are notoriously low and have a difficult time competing with those offered to people working for drug trafficking groups, from the young kite flyers who alert their bosses when the police approach to the middle men to the chief dealers. This, in turn, makes the police a major part of the problem as well. Police militias have sprung up in various occupied favelas, where they take a handsome cut of the profits from the drug trade and other basic services in the favelas in exchange for weapons, forewarning of police operations and general immunity. Comando Vermelho (CV) and Amigos dos Amigos (ADA), the two chief drug trafficking groups of Rio, are consequently well armed, often with AK-47s and military explosives trafficked by police allies as well as arms dealers from Angola who benefit from the vibrant arms market in Rio. ANTONIO SCORZA/AFP/Getty Images Police commandos raise the Brazilian flag after occupying the Prazeres favela in Rio de Janeiro on Feb. 6 4 According to STRATFOR sources in the Rio security apparatus, ADA is most closely tied to the police militias, which may explain why most of the favelas that were first targeted in northern Rio (Complexo Alemao, Villa Cruzeiro, Santa Marta, Zinco, Querosene, Mineira, Coroa, Fallet, Fogueteiro, Escondidinho and Prazeres) have been CV strongholds. Notably, however, the more recent crackdowns in and around the Santa Teresa area and Morro Sao Joao have been ADA strongholds. As the UPP campaigns have spread, CV and ADA appear to have united against the common enemy of the state and are reportedly cooperating to provide each other with refuge and supplies. Moreover, it appears that the drug trafficking groups are often given ample lead time ahead of major police offensives. For example, in the latest offensive targeting the Santa Teresa favelas, which are concentrated in a major tourist area of the city where many wealthy cariocas also live, Rio state Gov. Sergio Cabral announced the impending operation Feb. 1, effectively removing the element of strategic surprise from the Feb. 6 operation and allowing drug traffickers plenty of time to flee. Due to rampant police corruption, Rio has had to depend heavily on military forces to carry out these offensives and make way for UPP occupations. The military is far more immune to the corruption tainting many of Rio s police officers, but Brazil s military leadership is also wary of involving its forces too deeply in these operations for an extended period of time; it fears the military may fall prey to

5 corruption or unsettle Brazil s delicate civil-military relationship, a balance that is still being tested considering Brazil s relatively recent transformation from military rule to democracy. Moreover, even if a more concerted effort were made to imprison Rio s worst-offending drug traffickers, Rio lacks an effective prison system to house them. Overcrowded prison cells, where isolation barriers are often broken down to make more room, have more often evolved into highly effective command centers for the leadership of these groups to coordinate the activities of their drug cartels. Indeed, a memory often invoked in the minds of many Brazilian officials is the violent 2006 campaign ordered by a handful of imprisoned crime bosses belonging to Sao Paulo s most powerful drug trafficking group, First Capital Command, against police and security officials when the state went too far in isolating the leaders of the group in maximum security prisons. A view of urban Rio de Janeiro from Santa Marta STRATFOR Similarly, when Rio police officials began impinging on the CV s money laundering operations in 2009, attacks were ordered on police and public transportation to pressure the police and state officials into backing off their investigations. According to a STRATFOR source, many of the police involved in those money laundering investigations used the operation to bribe jailed crime bosses into keeping their names off the guilty list, but when they went too far with the bribes, the CV did not hesitate to use violence to retaliate. When Brazil entered its election year in 2010, the confrontation between the police and the jailed drug traffickers over the money laundering investigations subsided. In many cases, the drug trafficking groups are often careful to spare civilians in these violent campaigns, and the state authorities are usually quick to reach an accommodation with the crime bosses to contain the unrest. Eyeing the Threat of Backlash The main challenge that lies ahead for not only Rio but for the political authorities in Brasilia is how to recognize and pre-empt a major backlash by Rio s chief drug trafficking groups. The Brazilian state has a more immediate interest in demonstrating to the world that it is making a concerted effort to combat well-entrenched organized crime in the country, as well as a broader geopolitical interest to bring significant swathes of territory under state control a goal in line with Brazil s growing reputation as an emerging power. However, the UPP occupations thus far have been far more effective at displacing the drug traffickers than in removing them altogether. The market for marijuana, crack and cocaine appears to be just as large as it was prior to the UPP initiative, thereby providing an incentive for drug traffickers to move more of their business into urban Rio neighborhoods a trend already developing, according to several STRATFOR sources in Rio. Critically, the bulk of drug traffickers have reportedly relocated to Rocinha as well as the nearby city of Niteroi. Rumors of an impending Rocinha operation have been circulating for some time, but Rocinha is a massive cluster of favelas housing roughly 120,000 people, where Rio s most wanted drug traffickers are now most heavily entrenched. 5

6 Already the CV has been issuing warnings to Rio authorities that their pacification campaign is going too far and that there will be consequences. Working in favor of the drug traffickers are the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics to be hosted by Rio. The preference of these groups is to reach an accommodation with the state and go on with business as usual, but the potential marring of these two highprofile events in the midst of Brazil s rise to global prominence is a powerful threat to Brazilian state authorities, who are not interested in having international media fixate on images of burning buses, police fatalities and shootouts in favelas in the lead-up to the events. The more the UPP campaign spreads, the more the risk of backlash to the state increases. And with time, resources and money in short supply for the state, the drug traffickers are not as pinched as many may have been led to think. In STRATFOR Before the UPP was installed in 2008, the yellow church Igreja do Nazareno was the command center for Comando Vermelho, one of the main drug trafficking groups in Rio. STRATFOR s view, an expansion of the UPP campaign into Rocinha likely constitutes a redline for Rio s chief drug trafficking groups. Whether the state chooses to cross that line arguably remains the singlemost important factor in assessing Rio s stability in the months ahead. 6