Thursday 2:10-4: IAB Office hours: Tuesday 1-2 or by appt. Final Version: September 7, 2010

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1 Comparing Institutions G8492 Timothy Frye Fall 2010 Thursday 2:10-4: IAB 1219 IAB Office hours: Tuesday 1-2 or by appt. Final Version: September 7, 2010 Course Description This course aims to make graduate students familiar with the major concepts, theories and debates on the causes and consequences of institutions in comparative politics. Requirements One referee report on any of the articles or books on the syllabus. The report must be circulated to the class by 5:00 on the Wednesday prior to our meeting. is fine. These are not literature reviews, but should demonstrate your analytical skills. Also they should identify the strengths and weakness of the work and then make a recommendation (reject, major revision, minor revision, publish essentially as is) to the editor. No more than five pages. (10% of the final grade). Due at any time. One seminar paper is due on December 17 at 5:00. (70% of the final grade). In week 1, we will discuss research strategies. The papers can be either: a) a research proposal that identifies a theoretical or empirical puzzle worth exploring, reviews and critiques existing literature, lays out hypotheses to be tested, identifies appropriate methods for testing the argument, and discusses the potential strength and weaknesses of the proposal. Research proposals need not actually collect the data and conduct the analyses, although it is hoped that this can be done in the future. b) Research papers that are written with the goal of submission to an academic journal. It includes all the steps of a research proposal, but also conducts some preliminary data collection and analysis. One-page research proposals describing the research question, dependent variable, possible sources of data, etc. are due before the 9 th week and outlines are due by week 12. Data Analysis. Each student will critique a quantitative or qualitative analysis from an academic article, book, or data-set. You can either replicate and critique the use of a data-set or simply analyze the data-set itself. Data-sets can be quantitative or qualitative. Qualitative analysis might examine the sources cited by an author for their veracity and potential sources of bias. It is important to start early as data analyses always take longer than expected. (10% of the final grade). Due by week 6. No more than 5 pages. Class participation. Thoughtful participation based on extensive preparation is essential. (10% of the final grade). To promote discussion, everyone will a question or comment based on the week s readings for the group to discuss by 5:00 on Wednesday prior to class. This question/comment should not exceed a half page, but should be sufficiently developed to provoke discussion. Please read others comments. Most works are available from JSTOR or the Columbia Electronic Library. These are marked with J. I will also post works on the Courseworks website. These are marked with a C. Many are also available via Google and other electronic sources. The readings may change in some weeks based on student interest. Depending on class size, we may also have students present their research proposals. For Purchase at Book Culture, 536 W 112 th, , Carles Boix. Democracy and Redistribution Cambridge University Press ISBN , Paper John Huber and Charles Shipan Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge U. Press, ISBN , Paper 1

2 Douglass C. North Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, ISBN , Paper Fiona McGillivray Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy. Princeton U. Press, ISBN , Paper Beatriz Magaloni Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. Cambridge University Press. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub, and Fernado Limongi Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World. Cambridge University Press. Academic Honesty: All of the work you do in this course is expected to be your own. The complete text of the GSAS statement on academic honesty is at 9/pages/honesty/index.html. It includes the following definition of plagiarism: Plagiarism includes buying, stealing, borrowing, or otherwise obtaining all or part of a paper (including obtaining or posting a paper online); hiring someone to write a paper; copying from or paraphrasing another source without proper citation or falsification of citations; and building on the ideas of another without citation. There is a fine line between sloppy citations and punctuation and intentional plagiarism. It is your responsibility to learn and use proper attribution and citation. Be safe and determine in advance that you are being both ethical and orderly so as to avoid questionable work that could create an accusation of academic misconduct. You are responsible for asking questions about policies and about my expectations for your work If you are not certain you are doing the right thing. You also are violating the GSAS academic integrity policy if you self-plagiarize, i.e. if you turn in for this course a paper that you already have written for another course. Although scholars do build on their early ideas as they advance their scholarship, I expect that written work you do for this course does not duplicate your earlier work. Please talk to me if your paper for this course pursues a topic on which you have written and submitted a paper for another course. There are many websites that address academic integrity. The comprehensive Avoiding plagiarism, selfplagiarism, and other questionable writing practices: A guide to ethical writing by Miguel Roig is at it includes samples of illustrative good and bad practices as well as a useful and detailed table of contents. is a relatively brief overview of academic integrity, written for students, with sections on originality and reliance on earlier work, when and when not to include citations, and how to write so as to avoid unintentional plagiarism. Week 1. September 9. Introduction Barry R. Weingast Rational Choice Institutionalism. Political Science: The State of the Discipline. Edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner. Norton Press C Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science. Political Science: The State of the Discipline. Edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner. Norton Press C Gary Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. University of California Press. Chapters 4 and 5. C Paul Milgrom, et al. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs, Economics and Politics 1990: J Robert Bates Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development, in ed. J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge University Press C 2

3 Kenneth Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach. Journal of Theoretical Politics (July) J s Barbara Geddes. Paradigms and Sand Castles C William Riker Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. American Political Science Review 74:2, June (also comment by Peter Ordeshook in American Political Science Review :2 June ). J Simeon Djankov et al The New Comparative Economics. Journal of Comparative Economics January. Peter Evans. The Challenges of the Institutional Turn and the Field of Development. Week 2. September 16. Institutions and Institutional Analysis: What is it and What is it Good For? Paul Krugman, International Economics, pp , C Douglass C. North Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance New York Cambridge University Press Robert Cooter Administering The Strategic Constitution. Princeton University Press C Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy. 113:5. Skim Steven Levitsky and Victoria Murillo Variations in Institutional Strength. Annual Review of Political Science. Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Growth Paths Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. H0066. C Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel Institutionalism as a Methodology, Journal of Theoretical Politics 15:3, J Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions. How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Cambridge University Press. Week 3. September 23. Institutions, Endogeneity, and Path Dependence Adam Przeworski, The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Development? European Journal of Sociology 45:2, C J 3

4 Herbert Kitschelt Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity: What Counts as a Good Cause? In Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Gregorz Ekiert and Stephen Hanson, Cambridge University Press. C Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development. American Economic Review. 91: J. Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer Do Institutions Cause Growth? Journal of Economic Growth, September, 2004 J Peter Hall Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press. C Stefan Voigt How (Not) to Measure Institutions. Ms. C Abhihijit Banerjii and Lakshmi Iyer History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Land Tenure Systems in India. Ms. C Pauline Grosjean and Claudia Senik, Should Market Liberalization precede Democracy? Causal Relations between Political Preferences and Development. Ms. C Scott Page Path Dependence. Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 1: J David Laitin and Avner Grief, Endogenous Institutions. American Political Science Review, 98: J J. Frankel and D. Romer Does Trade Cause Growth? American Economic Review. 89, Steven D. Levitt and Jack Porter, Sample Selection in the Estimation of Air Bag and Seat Belt Effectiveness, The Review of Economics and Statistics, November, (4): Paul Pierson Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press. James Mahoney Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge. Week 4. September 30. Regimes: What Are They and How Do They Emerge? Carles Boix. Redistribution and Democracy. Cambridge, 1-131, Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub, and Fernado Limongi Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World. Cambridge University Press. Chapters. Chapters 1 and 2. Barbara Geddes What Do We Know About Democratization. Annual. Review of Political Science. 2: J Benjamin F. Jones, Benjamin A. Olken. Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War. Ms. C Pamela Paxton Women s Suffrage in the Measurement of Democracy: Problems of Operationalization. Studies in Comparative Development. 35, J 4

5 Epstein, David, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran Democratic Transitions. American Journal of Political Science 50 (July): Juan Linz Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Lynne Rienner. Introduction and Chapter 1. C Carles Boix and Susan Stokes Endogenous Democratization. World Politics July, 55, J Adam Przeworski, and Fernando Limongi Modernization: Theories and Facts. World Politics. 49: J Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics November, 115, J Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico Why Did the Elites Extend the Franchise?: Democracy and the Scope of Government with An Application to Britain s Age of Reform. Quarterly Journal of Economics May 2, On measurement of democracy Shawn Trier and Simon Jackman Democracy as a Latent Variable. David Collier and Robert Adcock Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts. Annual Review of Political Science. Datasets on Regimes. Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh, 2000, The Database of Political Institutions (World Bank, Washington, DC)., Freedom House, POLITY IV.; Przeworski et al data. Week 5. October 7. Democracy In Action Fiona McGillivray Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industry Policy. Princeton UniversityPress. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini Constitutions and Economic Policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Volume 18: 1, J. Mancur Olson Dictators, Democracy, and Development. American Political Science Review. 87, J Dani Rodrik Institutions for High Quality Growth. Studies in Comparative Development. Lisa Blaydes and Mark Kaiser Counting Calories: Democracy and Distribution in the Developing World. Ms. Irina Denisova, et al. Who Wants to Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions. American Political Science Review, May Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins Electoral Politics in a Redistributive Game. Journal of Politics. 48, Avinash Dixit and Johnathan Londregan The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics. Journal of Politics. 58,

6 Ronald Rogowski and Mark Kayser Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price Level Evidence from the OECD Countries American Journal of Political Science 46, J Benjamin Olken Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. NBER Working Paper No C Week 6. October 14. Autocracy: Emergence and Maintenance Stephen Haber Authoritarian Government. In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. C. Beatriz Magaloni Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. Introduction and Chapter s C. Jennifer Ghandi and Adam Przeworski Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion Under Dictatorships. Economics and Politics. 18,1, J Andreas Schedler. The New Institutionalism in the Study of Authoritarian Regimes APSA annual meeting. Toronto. Benjamin Smith, 2004, Oil wealth and regime survival in the developing world, American Journal of Political Science 2, Jessica L. Weeks Accountable Autocrats? Post-War Punishment in Authoritarian Regimes. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Toronto, Ontario Scott Gehlbach and Phil Keefer Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies. ms. C.. Jennifer Ghandi Political Institutions Under Dictatorship. Cambridge University Press. Jason Brownlee Authoritarianism in an Age of Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Bruce Buena de Mesquita and Alistair Smith Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change. Comparative Political Studies. 42:2, J. Ronald. Wintrobe. 1990, The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship. American Political Science Review 3, J Milan Svolik Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation. The American Political Science Review. 102:2, J Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu Making Autocracy Work. LSE STICERD Research Paper 48. C. Benjamin Smith Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single-Party Rule. World Politics 57, Stathys Kalyvas The Decay and Breakdown of Communist One-Party Systems. Annual Review of Political Science. 2, J. 6

7 Week 7. October 21. Institutions and Economic Development Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramian and Francesco Trebbi Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth 9: 2, J Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Credible Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, Journal of Economic History, 49, J David Stasavage Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 18, J Ronald Coase The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law and Economics 3:1, 1-44, J C Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer and Simon Johnson Coase Against the Coasians. Quarterly Journal of Economics August, 116: 3, J Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken Do Leaders Matter? National Leaders and Growth Since World War II. Quarterly Journal of Economics.Vol. 120, No. 3, J Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy. 113: 5, J Stephen Haber et al The Politics of Property Rights:Political instability, Credible commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, Cambridge University Press. Philip Keefer and Steven C. Knack Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth. Public Choice 111 April 1-2, C Jeffrey Sachs, Institutions Don t Rule: Direct Effect of Geography on Per Capita Income, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No C Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Growth Paths Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. H0066. C Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics November, J Gallup, J. L., J. D. Sachs, and A. D. Mellinger. (1998). Geography and Economic Development, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w6849. Joel Hellman, Winners Take All: The Pitfalls of Partial Reform, World Politics, January Mukand, S., and D. Rodrik. (2002). In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation, and Economic Performance. Harvard University, mimeo. A. Hirschman, The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic Determinants. David Collier ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton University Press. Robert Wade. Governing the Market. Princeton University Press

8 Barry Weingast The Political Foundations of the Rule of Law: American Political Science Review June, 91:2, J Stephen Holmes Lineages of the Rule of Law. In Democracy and the Rule of Law. Edited by Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski. Cambridge University Press. William Riker and Itai Sened A Political Theory of the Origins of Property Rights: Airport Slots. American Journal of Political Science. 35:4, November, Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh Constitutions and Commitment: Evidence on the Relation Between Institutions and the Cost of Capital. CEPR Discussion Paper No Week 8. October 28: Governance and Bureaucracy John Huber and Charles Shipan, Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York Cambridge University Press. Chaps 1-4, 6. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, J Barbara Geddes, A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies," American Political Science Review 85:2 (1991), (for more see her book, Politicians Dilemma.) Marcus Kurtz and Andrew Schrenk. Growth and Governance: Models, Measures and Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms. Journal of Politics Vol. 69:2 (May) also Growth and Governance: A Defense Journal of Politics 69:2. May. J Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi Growth and Governance: A Reply. Journal of Politics 69, 2: J Terry Moe. Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. Journal of Law Economics and Organization : Also Comment by Williamson. C, J Dan Treisman What Have We Learned about Corruption. Ms. Andrei Shleifer and Edward Glaeser Legal Origins. Quarterly Journal of Economics November, J Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean Francois-Richard The Transplant Effect. American Journal of Comparative Law 51: J Some Reading on Federalism Jonathan A. Rodden, Hamilton s Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism. Cambridge University Press, Daniel Treisman. The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization. Cambridge University Press C William Riker Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little Brown. Alberto Diaz Cayeros Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America. New York. Cambridge University Press. 8

9 Barry Weingast The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11: 1, J Johnathan Rodden and Susan Rose-Ackerman Does Federalism Preserve Markets? Virginia Law Review 83:7, J Alfred Stepan Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model. Journal of Democracy 10:4, J Week 9. November 4. The State: Two choices Charles Tilly Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD B. Blackwell, Chapters 1-3. C Douglass North Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton Press. Part C Gary Cox Predatory states and the market for protection. Ms. Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press. Introduction and Appendix. C Jeffry Herbst States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton University Press. TBA. C Krasner, Stephen Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics. Comparative Politics. 16, (January) J OR Anna Grzymala-Busse The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions. Comparative political Studies For the longer version see, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Postcommunist Democracies. Cambridge University Press. Conor O Dywer, Runaway State-Building. World Politics. 56: For the longer version see Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development. Johns Hopkins Scott Gehlbach The Consequences of Collective Action: An Incomplete Contracts Approach. American Journal of Political Science. 50:3, For the longer version see, Representation Through Taxation Cambridge University Press Timothy Frye Building States and Markets After Communism. Introduction, Chapters 1 and 3. Ganev, Venelin "The Dorian Gray Effect: Winners as Statebreakers in Postcommunism." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34: J. C. Scott Gehlbach, What is a Big Bureaucracy? Reflections on Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State Building. Czech Sociological Review. 44:6, Diego Gambetta. The Sicilian Mafia. Harvard University Press Peter Evans, States as Problems, States as Solutions. The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Edited by Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufmann. Princeton University Press. 9

10 Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, State Formation in Asia: Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study, The Journal of Asian Studies, 1987, 46:4, Fred Block. The Ruling Class Doesn t Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State. The Political Economy. Eds. Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers. Pp Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean Francois-Richard Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect. European Economic Review 47: Avner Grief Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge University Press P.J. O Rourke. Eat the Rich. Leonard Wantchekon. The Paradox of Warlord Democracy American Political Science Review. 98, 1, J Carpenter, Daniel P State Building through Reputation Building: Coalitions of Esteem and Program Innovation in the National Postal System, Studies in American Political Development 14 (2): Week 10. November 11. Informal Institutions and Politics by Other Means Steve Wilkinson Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. Cambridge University Press. Susan Stokes Political Clientelism. Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Oxford University Press. Philip Keefer and Razvan Vlaicu Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. October. 24 (2), pp Timothy Frye, Reputation and the rule of Law in Russia: Complements or Substitutes? ms. David Kreps Corporate Culture. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, in ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle. New York: Cambridge University Press. Vadim Volkov Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. Week 12. November 18. Either Legislatures and Presidents, Or Political Parties Legislatures and Presidents Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Legislative Studies Quarterly 19: Jose Antonia Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 6. Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3: John Carey, Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge University Press. OR 10

11 Political Parties: Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kolman Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States. American Political Science Review 92:2 June J Gary Cox, Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination. Annual Review of Political Science 2: J Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V. Shvetsova Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties. 38:1, February, J Martin Shefter. Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy, Politics and Society : C Carles Boix The Emergence of Parties and Party Systems. Oxford Handbook of Political Science. Oxford University Press Cox, Gary W The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cain, Bruce E., John A. Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament, American Political Science Review 78 (1): Londregan, John B Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. Bonnie Meguid, The Role of Mainstream Parties in Niche Party Success. American Political Science Review 99:3 (August 2005) Week 13. December 2. To Be Determined based on class interest. Some possibilities include A) Institutions and Ethnicity B) Institutions and the Resource Curse C) Institutions and the Rule of Law D) Federalism E) Institutions F) Or Student Presentations with Discussants. Week 14. December 9. Student Presentations with Discussants. 11

12 Appendix: Advice on the paper: Strategies for writing papers and becoming famous with some examples. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theory and Facts: World Politics New data for an old problem. (JSTOR). Mancur Olson. The Logic of Collective Action. Yale University Press. pp * New theory for an old problem. Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Political Alignments Import a theory and apply to a political question. Theda Skocpol. A Critical Review of Barrington Moore s Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship, Politics and Society. 4:1, Fall (1973), pp Take on a Big Fish. James Vreeland, The IMF and Economic Development. Cambridge University Press. Chapters, 1, 2. New Method for an Old Problem. Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter. Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production, American Journal of Political Science :4 October Also Sebastio Rosato. The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. American Political Science Review. 97:4 November (JSTOR) Attack from Below Give Microfoundations to Macroarguments.. John H. Donahue and Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, Quarterly Journal of Economics. May 2001, 2: * Be Provocative. Ted Hopf, Polarity, The Offense-Defense Balance, and War. American Political Science Review :2, June New Old Data for an old Problem. Stefanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were. Puncture a myth by showing that the received history is wrong. Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Interpret an inherently interesting topic with a simple theory. Richard Samuel, Machiavelli s Children. Cornell University Press. Make an unexpected comparison. Rebecca Morton, Methods and Models. Use a formal model to get a counterintuitive prediction. Other Examples of Great Importations. Steven Krasner, Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics, Comparative Politics, 1984 pp (JSTOR) and James Scott. Seeing Like a State. Yale University Press Roger Van Oech. A Whack in the Side of the Head: How You Can Be More Creative Warner Books. General Strategies for coming up with new ideas. 12