The Theory of Political Development. by Gianfranco Pasquino. University of Bologna and Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University. Premise.

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1 The Theory of Political Development by Gianfranco Pasquino University of Bologna and Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University Premise. Now almost entirely forgotten, perhaps because replaced or superseded by the theme of democratization, the wealth of studies on political development contained quite a number of significant and useful theoretical threads. This paper will, first of all, try to disentangle what was theoretical from what was simply, though, often, in an important way, analytical. Second, it will then identify and analyze the most important processes of political development and their changes through time. Third, it will focus on the lasting, positive as well as negative, contributions made and left by the scholars who participated in the collective enterprise devoted to the study of political development. Therefore, it will also provide a reliable guide to the most interesting contributions to the literature. The leading concepts of political development, most of them still significantly alive and considerably useful, are: nation-building, state-building, political culture. Though problematically, they all contain both theoretical threads and empirical challenges. The paper will argue that there is a lot to be learned from the way these concepts were formulated and how the historical experiences were analyzed in order both to understand the processes of democratization and democratic consolidation and to evaluate the sociopolitical dynamics of failed states. Moreover, most scholars who contributed to the studies on political development have relied, more or less successfully, on a historical-comparative method (see the chapters by Goldstone and Mahoney in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003) that has shown to be highly appropriate for the understanding of contemporary political transformations. Therefore, in those studies one can also find some methodological lessons. In the end, the paper will very briefly focus on relatively new problems concerning the states. The not so minor problem of definition. In the atmosphere of great excitement that accompanied the processes of decolonization of the late fifties and early sixties, quite a number of political and social scientists were drawn to the study of what was called political development. Both for political and analytical purposes, the fact that many countries were acquiring their independence and hence the possibility to start constructing their own regime, as they desired, represented a major opportunity to revitalize the field of political science. As Almond and Powell (1966) wrote, it became possible to break the walls of parochialism, descriptivism, formalism and fruitfully to increase the number and the variety of cases to be analyzed in a comparative way.

2 Five decades after the publication of the first studies that were consciously and explicitly devoted to political development, it has become possible, avoiding all ideological traps, to assess their contributions. My goal is twofold. First, I want to focus on few rather different theories of political development and, second, I will suggest how to identify the connections between those theories with the (subsequent) analyses of democratization. I will start quoting what Lucian Pye (1966, 50) wrote with reference to the need for a theory: The lack of doctrine has paralyzed constructive criticism and permitted the political dialogue in the new countries to become mired down in cant. Somewhat counter-intuitively, when most political scientists were beginning their research and their analysis trying to avoid being influenced by their national cultural ethos, Pye pointed to the negative impact of a certain kind of belief in cultural relativism that could be cruelly degrading precisely to whom it was intended to give respectability (Ibid., 52). A similar belief remains at work today when discussing democracy. Quite a number of scholars are fond of declaring that, of course, democracy Western style is definitely not what non-democratic countries should be offered or should be looking for. While the discussion concerning the many faces of democracy, from the perspective of the institutions and the party systems, deserves much more space, what is at the core of the best analyses of the processes of democratization concerns the possibility of combining free and fair political competition with the promotion and protection of human rights. When and whether cultural relativism rejects this combination, it will deny the very possibility of constructing democratic regimes. Though often they were indeed cultural relativists, many scholars who were engaged in analysing political development shared the optimistic view that positive changes were possible and that they could come together. But, as we will see, optimism was not the best guide to the analysis and the interpretation of those processes in the sixties and seventies (as convincingly argued by Packenham 1973). Returning to the need for a theory, it is useful to refer to what Almond and Powell had in mind when committing themselves to the theoretical enterprise. We believe that the ultimate test of the strength of a scientific theory is its ability to generalize and predict. Indeed, unless a theory designates relationships between variables in such a way that predictions can be made about the consequences of their interaction, it is hard to establish whether a theory is valid or invalid, whether it should eventually be discarded, revised, or accepted. The advancement of knowledge comes through the testing and reformulation of theories (p. 300). What we are aiming at in political science cannot be but probabilistic theories which state that if conditions a, b, and c make their appearance and hold, then consequences x, y, and z are highly likely to materialize. Therefore, the first task of a theoretical approach consists in identifying (some of) the most important conditions leading to those consequences that are associated with political development. The starting problem that scholars interested in political development had to face was twofold. On the one hand, they had to define with some precision what they meant when referring to political development On the other hand, they had to identify the political components of political development. On the whole, in Giovanni Sartori s words, their paramount task should have been defined as the attempt to explain politics with politics. This is not to deny that the processes of socio-economic modernization are important, but they must be studied with reference to their specific components and variables. The complexity and the contradictions of the various definitions of political development were almost immediately brought to light by Lucian Pye (1966, 33-45). Not surprisingly, though significantly, he found no agreement and much confusion. Reviewing the existing literature, already quite abundant in terms of number of research and published studies, he counted ten meanings of political development: 1) Political

3 Development as the Political Prerequisite of Economic Development; 2) Political Development as the Politics Typical of Industrial Societies; 3) Political Development as Political Modernization; 4) Political Development as the Operation of a Nation-State; 5) Political Development as Administrative and Legal Development; 6) Political Development as Mass Mobilization and Participation; 7) Political Development as the Building of Democracy; 8) Political Development as Stability and Orderly Change; 9) Political Development as Mobilization and Power; 10) Political Development as One Aspect of a Multi-Dimensional Process of Social Change. With the benefit of hindsight and taking into account exclusively the political aspects of political development, today it has become possible clearly to identify three overarching processes. For some scholars, political development fundamentally meant the process leading to the construction of a viable autonomous state. This process would combine points 4 and 5, and possibly 9, of Pye s list of meanings. For others, it was the creation of political order, Pye s points 5 and 8. Finally, a third group of scholars thought of political development as the process leading to democracy, Pye s points 7 and 8, possibly 9 as well. Inevitably, of course, almost all scholars shared the belief that western states (and the Soviet Union) had to be considered politically developed. Interestingly enough, more or less in the same period, the theory of convergence of industrial states, that is, the conviction that economic and industrial imperatives would lead advanced political systems toward very similar political arrangements, made its appearance (Aron 1962, and Brzezinski and Huntington 1964). No wonder, therefore, that some political scientists felt justified in thinking that most developing countries would have to go through a path not dissimilar from that followed by Western political systems (in a way, this view was also entertained by Barrington Moore 1966). Even though the achievement of Western-style democracy was generally considered an appropriate goal to be indicated to the developing countries and, in some cases, a standard by which to evaluate the process of political development, most scholars suggested that it would be, at least in the short run, a rather unrealistic outcome. On the whole, nevertheless, the mood of very many political scientists was somewhat enthusiastic and the overall climate was marked by optimism. The precondition of political development, that is self-determination acquired through the process of decolonization, having been satisfied, all Third World countries could initiate their political development. In a similar way, though much later, the demise of some authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and the collapse of Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe appeared to open the way to the democratization of all those political systems (Huntington 1991). Not incidentally, some of the problems to be faced, though by no means all, shared several important and interesting similarities. Having studied some instances of political development, Dankwart Rustow (1967) found himself at the intersection of a variety of processes of democratization, hence in the optimal position to write a seminal article (Rustow 1970) whose importance, however, was recognized only ten years of so later. Unfortunately, though, perhaps, inevitably, when political development became a fashionable topic for research and for Ph. D. dissertations, conspicuously funded by US Foundations, the consequences consisted essentially in an outpouring of a-theoretical case-studies (Pasquino 1974a reviewed any systematized the relevant literature). Also, there was often a disturbing combination of socio-economic explanations mixed with political factors that never amounted to a serious attempt at theorizing. However, two books played a highly significant role in the theoretical analysis of political development. I will focus the rest of the paper on them and on their impact. Two theoretical contributions

4 Almond and Powell (1966) tried to avoid all ethnocentric traps when formulating their theory of political development. Their probabilistic theory is based on three major variables: role differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and cultural secularization. The first one refers to the appearance of a variety of roles performing different important activities. Subsystem autonomy stresses the existence of several structures endowed with some autonomy in their own specific fields. Probably, it is better defined a contrario, that is, indicating those situations where no single system emerges as dominant over all the others. Finally, cultural secularization suggests that as the political system becomes differentiated from other social systems, the rulers begin to develop secular goals, and a rational sense of the relationship between means and ends and of one set of ends as over against other ends (p. 305). If and when there is a process leading to a growth of differentiation, autonomy and secularization, the political system becomes more developed because it increases its regulative, extractive, distributive, responsive, and symbolic capabilities. In capability terms, those with high subsystem autonomy have relatively versatile and continuous capability, while those characterized by limited subsystem autonomy tend to have a fluctuating pattern of capability (p. 311). At this point I venture to state that the structure of the theory deriving from Almond and Powell s statements can be constructed as follows. If there is a growth in the differentiation of roles, in the number of subsystems that are autonomous, and in the decision-making processes characterized by a sober evaluation of means and end, then the political system will become more developed, that is, it will acquire greater capabilities. In order to test the theory, on one hand, Almond encouraged and supervised a series of country-studies. Leaving aside whether they were valuable in themselves (most certainly were, illuminating the politics of a specific country), none of them provided a convincing test of the theory. On the other hand, several books were devoted to specific issues affecting political development. Though, again, their application and testing of the theory of development were certainly not satisfactory. Finally, Almond redefined his overall approach and invited some scholars to identify and deal with important episodes in the process of political development (Almond, Flanagan, and Mundt 1973). His conclusion was not especially enthusiastic: This book shows all the marks of unfinished business, of work in progress. The reader in search of hard theory, of hypotheses deduced from axioms and subjected to rigorous tests of proofs, will find little in this analytical framework and our collection of case studies (Almond and Mundt, 1973, 619). Written when the study of political development had entered its last phase (as documented in the dense essay by Huntington and Dominguez 1975), these words seem an admission of a theoretical defeat. In all likelihood, they were also the consequence of Almond s eclecticism and his dissatisfaction with his own previous theoretical experimentation. Usually, Almond and Powell s theory of political development has been criticised because it appeared unable to make room for the process of political decline. In my opinion this criticism is somewhat misplaced. The theory can easily accommodate a reduction in role differentiation, for instance, when some roles become performed by the same actor. It can account for a shrinking of subsystem autonomy, for instance, when one subsystem takes over another one, or more (for example, a party coming to dominate over the State, its bureaucracy, the military organization). The theory is also capable of providing for phenomena of cultural de-secularization when the integrity of the sphere of politics is violated and invaded by economic, military, religious actors. It is true that all these processes are neither mentioned nor analyzed in Almond and Powell s theory. Nevertheless, they can all easily found a place within it. As to the capabilities, they too can be made more specific and more precise. They could even be measured. What remains rather unclear and not convincing is the type of changing relationships between role differentiation, subsystem autonomy and cultural secularization and the capabilities of the political system. To be more precise, the authors never explain how far role differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and

5 cultural secularization can go. Nor do they give convincing examples of the three processes successfully producing political development. The web of interactions appears very complex and quite difficult to disentangle. In one sentence, the theory is neither parsimonious nor elegant. At the most, one would get a wide research griddle. Of course, one could attempt to link some of the above-quoted capabilities with the three processes in order to assess which process would affect the capabilities deemed necessary to produce political development. 1 This is a task that Almond and Powell have shunned and, as I have anticipated, Almond s subsequent research interests led him into another, though not more satisfactory, direction. In the light of these drawbacks or unsolved puzzles, no wonder that few scholars have followed in Almond and Powell s footsteps (even though, as already said, an entire series of country studies have been published according to guidelines provided in Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach). Nevertheless, at least one research area was clearly suggested by Almond and Powell focused on four factors, later labelled crises, that affect the differentiation, the secularization and the subsystem autonomy of all political systems, respectively: state-building, nation-building, participation, and distribution. By state-building we refer to the problem of integration and control; by nation-building, the problem of group identity and loyalty; by participation, the involvement of members of the society in the decision-making processes of the system; and by distribution, the problem of allocation of goods, services, and other values by the political system (Almond and Powell, 314). These factors have made the object of a major book meant to provide a comprehensive and definite overview of political development: Crises and sequences in political development (Binder et al. 1971). Can one find a probabilistic theory of political development in the eight chapters of this book that in a way represent the culmination of more than a decade of studies? To the extent that there is a theory, that is, a tight explanation organized around a chain of causation running from conditions to consequences, one ought to speak of a multilevel theory. The key variable of the theory is represented by capability. Political development occurs when the processes of state and nation-building are accompanied by or led to the increase in the capabilities of the power-holders (or of the political and institutional structures) 2. The theory of the crises and sequences of political development is formulated as follows. If the processes of state and nation-building are accomplished successfully, then the structural outcome of both processes will be in a position to accommodate the crises of participation, penetration and distribution. The overall endproduct will be represented by a polity that can be defined politically developed. However, a major note of caution is in order. If the crisis model is to become a theory of development, it seems likely that the propositions in it or the hypotheses generated by it will have to do with the sequence by which crises arise: the consequences, for instance, of one crisis emerging before the other, of the simultaneity of crises, and the like (Verba 1971, 283). Sidney Verba was certainly right in pointing at the importance of the sequence through which the crises appeared and had to be faced and solved. However, none of the contributors to that book felt fully 1 Certainly the product of some dissatisfaction with the vagueness of some concepts and processes, two papers deserve to be mentioned: Eckstein (1971) and Sigelman (1971 because they neatly provide some precision. 2 I am perfectly aware that there is a major analytical and theoretical problem in the necessary distinction between power-holders and political and institutional structures. In Easton s words (1965) the distinction runs between the authorities and the regime.

6 necessary to elaborate on the sequence/s and the attempt to do so by Barrington Moore (1966) 3 was not even quoted. Somewhat surprisingly, at the end of his chapter, Verba raised a question that could have entirely changed the focus of theorizing about political development: how capable is the government in coping with the environment and satisfying the demands and needs of the citizenry? (1971, 293). In a way, then, political development could be defined as the capacity [of a government] to adapt to and manipulate the environment that involves the relatively central coordination of societal resources and activities (292). The driving hypothesis is that those political systems that have successfully undergone the crises of state and nation-building, of participation, penetration and distribution, will find themselves endowed with governmental structures capable to manipulate the environment and to mobilize societal resources. Unfortunately, there was no follow-up to this hypothesis and no consequential theory of political development was formulated. An overall evaluation of the theoretical efforts made by Almond and Powell and in the seven books published under the auspices of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (in which Almond played a prominent role) has to be highly nuanced. While most of the chapters were certainly of high quality, on the whole, one cannot subscribe to a positive evaluation because the inherent theoretical enterprise shows two major drawbacks. The first drawback derives from an underestimation of what would become, but, perhaps, had been from the very beginning, the two most difficult challenges to be faced: ethnicity and religious fundamentalism. 4 Neither was taken into account when describing the process of cultural secularization. Both strongly indicated the persistence of cleavages, not simply primordial, to be seriously dealt with on the way to political development. The second drawback was represented by a significant neglect of the probability that some of the processes might go wrong and would produce not political development, but its opposite: political decay. Political development, political order, political decay First published in 1968 and frequently reprinted, most recently in 2006, Political Order in Changing Societies has represented by far the most successful attempt to provide a theory of political development. Working with the most classical concepts of political science: authority, order, participation, Samuel P. Huntington offers a truly parsimonious and elegant theory of political development. No matter which factors have initiated the process of modernization, several groups are mobilized into politics. The way they will or will not succeed in constructing institutions capable of dealing with their demands, conditions, indeed, determines whether there will be political order, the essential precondition of political development. Otherwise, un-institutionalized mobilization will lead to political decay. Huntington s probabilistic theory is formulated with special reference to the relationship between political participation and institutionalization. If and when the growth in the level of participation is accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the degree of institutionalization, then successful political development will be achieved. If, for whatever reason, the growth in the level of participation exceeds the degree of institutionalization, then 3 The bourgeois, the fascist, and the communist roads to modernization were, in fact, put in a sequence and the second and the third were, naturally, affected by the way in which the bourgeois road had deployed itself. 4 In the series edited by Almond, Flanagan, and Pye, one book was devoted to ethnicity (Enloe 1973) and one to religion (Smith ). It took some time, before Almond (together with Appleby and Sivan 2003) decided to devote scholarly attention to religious fundamentalism.

7 political disorder will follow and, in the majority of cases, the outcome of this imbalance will produce political decay. Political participation is roughly measured with reference to the number and density of the groups that are actually mobilized and find themselves in the position to take part in the political process: cliques and clans, middle classes, the masses, and in which manner and how much they are organized by political parties. Political institutionalization is defined with reference to four major concepts: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of the organizations and procedures. These four concepts are operationalized and for each of them several indicators are suggested. Adaptability can be measured by the age of the organization: chronological age, generational age, that is the successful surmounting of succession crises by different sets of leaders, and changes in the type of functions performed by the organization. Complexity involves both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits (p. 18). Autonomy can be evaluated with reference to the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behaviour (p. 20). Finally, coherence is the ability to set the boundaries of the organization and to impose the procedures for the resolution of internal conflicts. Most appropriately, Huntington clearly indicates the opposite poles of the concepts he used, that is, respectively, rigidity, simplicity, subordination, and disunity. Hence, his theory of political development also offers a specific view of the contrary process, that is, political decay. To a large extent, decay derives from the inability of the political organizations and the political procedures to acquire a degree of institutionalization such as to accommodate the level of participation reached in any political system and society at all specific points in time. Societies in which participation does not exceed institutionalization are defined civic, while societies in which participation is higher than institutionalization are labelled praetorian. In a splendid sentence, capturing the state of turmoil characterizing disorderly societies, that he labels praetorian, Huntington wrote: the wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup (p. 196). Praetorian societies are only way step away from political decay. However, military interventions may prevent political decay if the military are capable of becoming institution-builders. According to Huntington in some selected cases the military may in fact be capable of doing so. Going against the wave of optimism prevailing in the midsixties, Huntington s theory indicated that what was most important, yet rather difficult to achieve, was a society in which, not a democratic framework, but political order could be established and maintained. There is another element that clearly distinguishes Huntington s theory of political development from all the other contemporary and subsequent theoretical attempts: his emphasis on the need for authority. Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is authority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students (Huntington 1968, 8). Finally, his theory of political development, a goal accomplished only through the successful establishment of political order, is to be commended because it is fully political. All the explanatory variables are looked for and found with reference to politics, to what is specifically and peculiarly political in the process of political development, that is, participation and institutionalization. In its simplest form, Huntington s theory may be formulated and summarized as follows: if the existing authority is challenged by an increase in the rate of political participation, new organizations and procedures must be institutionalized. Then, political development will be the outcome. Where and when the organizations and the procedures will prove too weak, not adaptable, not complex, not autonomous, not coherent, then political decay will most certainly follow.

8 Huntington conceived political order as the fundamental pre-requisite of any type of positive transformations. In a very controversial way, he suggested that in modernizing countries two types of structures were in a position to create a stable political order: single-party systems and military organizations. In the political climate of his times, both solutions could be, and were, widely criticized. In my opinion, they were only partially compatible with Huntington s own theory. On the one hand, singleparty systems were meant, at the same time, to control the rate of political participation and selectively to filter and channel societal demands. 5 Therefore, they could be considered capable of providing political order, if necessarily at the expense of several sectors of a mobilized society. In addition, single-party systems, by far, organizationally and politically, the most modern element of their respective societies, were in the position to provide an arena for the recruitment, selection, and promotion of political leaders. They were performing indispensable tasks for any and all political systems of the developing world. On the other hand, military organizations had, first, to demobilize their society, and, therefore, were obliged to repress most participatory demands. In a second phase, military organizations could resort to one of four quite different alternative strategies. Keeping in mind that the crucial variable is once more represented by political participation, Huntington wrote that four strategies were/are available to the military organization: 1) return power to the civilians, but restrict political participation; 2) return power to the civilians and expand political participation; 3) retain power and restrict political participation; 4) retain power and expand political participation (pp ). Where the military, as in post-1964 Brazil, attempted to characterize themselves as institution-builders, they could even encourage, not without some success, the structuring of a (relatively new) party system. All this said, the best summary of his theory is offered by Huntington himself in three simple and significant equations: 1) whenever social mobilization exceeds economic development, social frustration follows; 2) whenever social frustration exceeds mobility opportunities, political participation follows; 3) whenever political participation exceeds political institutionalization, political instability follows (p. 55). Let me repeat that, according to Huntington, the solutions had to be looked for and found in the political sphere. They had to be aimed at the construction and strengthening of the organizations, the procedures, the institutions. Interestingly, no reference to the State and its institutions appears either in Huntington s book or in Crises and Sequences in Political Development as if the process of state-building could be achieved without the construction of a well-staffed and competent bureaucracy. Unfortunately, in the sixties most US political scientists were not especially interested in the analysis of the State and of its specific structures. In spite of the fact that the challenges or the crises of state-building had been clearly identified, few analyses were specifically devoted to the structures and the articulations of the State. 6 Indeed, the discovery of the existence and the significance of the State took place about twenty years after and, I must hasten to add, was all but complete and satisfactory. 7 At the end of the sixties, it was quite clear that in most countries the problems identified by Huntington had made their devastating appearance. While in Africa the solution had been looked for in the creation of 5 Later, in a slightly different vein, Huntington (1970) explored the very important topic of the dynamics of one- party systems. 6 A most useful exception is the book edited by LaPalombara (1963) 7 For instance, the importance of a competent, autonomous, and efficient judiciary has been recognized only very recently (Transparency International 2007).

9 single party systems (Zolberg 1966), in Latin America a powerful wave of military coups had opened the door to military governments and, possibly, military regimes. 8 However, in almost no instance, one could speak of political development. Political disorder was quite widespread, in Africa being the consequence of the poor performance of, weak and highly personalized single party system often degenerating into sultanistic experiences. Overall, practically, no process of political institutionalization had made its successful appearance. Unable to renew itself, the field of political development vanished almost entirely, overnight, in the earky seventies. Even its positive contributions to the analysis of the dynamics of political systems suffered the not totally deserved fate of being almost completely forgotten. 9 The scholarly focus changed entirely. In many, not only non-western countries, the analytical and political problem to be faced was how to create (or reconstruct) democratic regimes. 10 As a consequence, the next phase of theorizing was bound to deal with the conditions and the strategies through which transitions away from authoritarian regimes could occur. 11 Obviously, the construction and /or the re-establishment of a democratic regime were processes that could be analyzed with the help of some of the tools utilized by the scholars who had done work in the field of political development. After all, though not necessarily the most widely shared, one definition of political development was the achievement of democracy. From political development to democratization It is my contention that, with a handful of exceptions, the studies on democratization have, more or less consciously and deliberately, been unable to make good use of the literature on political development taking into serious account both its achievements and its liabilities. 12 Here, I will confine myself to few concluding remarks meant to suggest how one could better utilize what is already known in order to guide the processes of democratization. Once more, my focus is on the theories. What should be clear from the outset is that democratizations are likely to occur only where the political arena is satisfactorily defined. That is to say that the processes of democratization require the existence of a State. Second, as strongly argued by Huntington, no democratization is possible in situations in which the rate of political participation exceeds the degree of institutionalization of organizations and procedures and where there is a clear lack of authority. Political disorder cannot lead to a democratic outcome. Indeed, it is the best avenue for the return of an authoritarian regime of a different kind. Political disorder is quite likely where the State is not endowed with a bureaucracy and with a judicial system. Third, political parties are paramount among the organizations capable of producing democratization because they constitute the structures most capable of accommodating and channelling political participation and of selecting and promoting accountable political leadership. Situations in which neither bureaucratic and security forces nor 8 Pasquino (1974a) has reviewed, organized, and critically assessed the literature available at the time. 9 In fact, the review essay by Hagopian (2000) seems to miss most of the truly positive contributions. 10 With reference to Latin America, see Garretòn The seminal monumental book was edited by O Donnel, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), but most papers had been circulated few years before. 12 The neglect of the potential contributions from the literature on political development tothe processes of democratization can be clearly gleaned from the review essay by Bunce (2000).

10 political parties exist and in which nobody appears in control have recently been defined failed States. 13 We have come full circle. Today, failed states represent the best example of political decay and, at the same time, the worst starting point for any process of democratization. This paper is not meant to analyze the processes of democratization and, if any, their accompanying theories. 14 Therefore, my conclusion will simply point to the possibility of deriving from the theories of political development some useful elements that may allow scholars better to theorize about democratization. In a very simple way, I believe that a theory of democratization ought to be formulated around some rigorous conditions concerning the State. Once political institutions, especially a bureaucracy and security forces, but we now know that the judicial system has a tremendous importance, have made their appearance and once it is clear to all relevant actors that the functioning of those institutions revolves around agreed upon rules of the game, then the path to a democratic outcome is open. 15 From the previous theories of political development we have learned that the degree of institutionalization of the various organizations and procedures must be such as to accommodate the rate of political participation. Obviously, this relationship would today call into the picture also the new field of research, that is, the quality of democracy. However, at this point we must be satisfied with our conclusion. Democracies will make their appearance and are more likely to survive and function satisfactorily when and where state institutions define the perimeter and the rules of the game. 16 We can confidently maintain that only viable states have the chance of becoming democratic regimes and that exclusively those regimes where politics is in command will in practice have the possibility of becoming politically developed and democratic. In order not to fall into the teleological pitfall, one must hasten to add that process of de-democratization 17 are most certainly possible. Indeed, democratization and de-democratization may interact more frequently than foreseen and expected. Neither political development nor (the quality of) democracy are achieved forever. REFERENCES 13 In a slightly different perspective, the serious problem of failed States had been identified by Migdal (1987) 14 Needless to add, there is a lot of confusion also in the field of democratization studies. Fortunately, the practice has gone well beyond the so-called theories. Unfortunately, many of the theories of democratization are not sufficiently grounded in the theories of democracy. 15 The probabilistic theory may be formulated as follows: If and when the challenges of political mobilization are accommodated through the institutionalization of organizations and procedures capable of redefining the political authority, then it is highly likely that a politically developed democratic regime will be inaugurated. 16 Some scholars claim that state-building and nation-building are recurring challenges, but I am not aware of significant instances of recurrence. Nevertheless, Afghanistan and Iraq offer food for thought, but both can be analyzed along the lines of political development as a precondition for democratization (Fukuyama 2006). 17 A useful survey of a handful of European cases is provided in the chapters of the book edited by Frőschl, Kozeluh, and Schaller (2008). Latin America offers a full variety of important cases.

11 Almond, G.A. and Powell, G.B. Jr. (1966) Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. Almond, G.A., Flanagan S.C., and Mundt, R.J. (eds.) (1973) Crisis, Choice, and Change. Historical Studies of Political Development, Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. Almond, G.A., Appleby, R.S., and Sivan, E. (2003) Strong Religion. The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press. Aron, R. (1962) Dix-huit leçons sur la société industrielle, Paris, Gallimard Binder, L. et al. (1971) Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press Brzezinski, Z. and Huntington, S.P. (1964) Political Power: USA/USSR, New York, Viking Press. Bunce, V. (2000) Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations, in Comparative Political Studies, vol. 33, nn.6-7, August-September, pp Easton, D. (1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York-London-Sydney, John Wiley and Sons. Eckstein, H. (1971) The Evaluation of Political Performance: Problems and Dimensions, Beverly Hills-London, Sage. Enloe, C. H. (1973) Ethnic conflict and political development, Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. Frőschl, E., Kozeluh, U. and Schaller, C. (eds.) (2008) Democratisation and De-democratisation in Europe?, Innsbruck-Wien-Bozen, Studien Verlag. Fukuyama, F. (ed.) (2006) Nation-Building. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press Garretòn, M.A. (1984) Dictaduras y Democratizaciòn, Santiago, FLACSO. Hagopian, F. (2000) Political Development, Revisited, in Comparative Political Studies, vol.33, nn. 6-7, August-September, pp Huntington, S.P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven-London, Yale University Press Huntington, S.P. (1970) Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems, in S.P. Huntington and C.H. Moore (eds.), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society, New York-London, Basic Books, pp Huntington, S.P. (1991) The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman-London, University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington, S.P. and Dominguez, J.I. (1975) Political Development, in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, vol. 3, pp LaPalombara, J. (ed.) (1963) Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Migdal, J.S. (1987) Strong States and Weak States: Power and Accommodation, in M, Weiner and S.P. Huntongton (eds.), Understanding Political Development, Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., pp

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