Euroscepticism, still the right concept?

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1 Euroscepticism, still the right concept? Draft version prepared for the ECPR General Conference Prague 7 th - 10 th September 2016 Please do not cite without permission of the author Benedetta Carlotti PhD Student in Political science and Sociology Scuola Normale Superiore Palazzo Strozzi, Florence benedetta.carlotti@sns.it Abstract Literature about the evolution and conceptualization of Euroscepticism has proliferated since the 90s. Starting from the dichotomy hard vs. soft, various typologies have been created to understand the meaning of this concept, typically attributed to parties at the periphery or to the extremes of the political spectrum. Despite the huge progresses done by scholars it is undeniable that talking about Euroscepticism is still unsatisfactory. The concept suffers, in fact, from at least two main biases. First, in terms of its substantive meaning, if it is easy to understand what hard Euroscepticism entails, the boundaries of its softer counterpart are still fuzzy. Is an actor (e.g.: a political party) opposing specific policies enacted by the EU for a specific period of time to be considered as Eurosceptic? Second, can we still think about Euroscepticism as a phenomenon at the margin of the political spectrum? Recent developments of the European political scenario seem to answer to this question with a strong No!. At least after the last EP election that saw the boom in consensus for parties extremely opposed to the EU. As a consequence, will we still be able to use the concept of Euroscepticism? This paper proposes a theoretical reflection on the possibility to abandon it in favor of the one of opposition. After briefly presenting its evolution in the academic literature, this paper conceptualizes opposition within the EU political environment, with two main aims. Firstly it unpacks its meaning through a description of its dimensions. Secondly, it reflects upon its character: are we facing a pragmatic or a principled opposition? Is it negative by default or may we find an opposition, which is more Europhile than mainstream parties are? This paper opens the floor for future research about the concept of opposition as applied to the European panorama, its conceptualization and operationalization. Keywords: Euroscepticism, European Union, opposition, concept formation 1. Introduction As the title suggests, the central aim of this paper is to understand if Euroscepticism can still be regarded as the right concept to label the phenomenon critical positions toward the European Union (EU).! 1

2 Born in the British context mainly to identify the anti-marketeers faction of the Conservative party (Flood: 2002, Harmsen, Spiering: 2004), Euroscepticism has evolved and became viral in the mass media, the political speech and academic research. Understanding the nature of this phenomenon is, nowadays, of crucial importance, at least for two main reasons. First, the European integration issue has increased in its salience all around Europe (Usherwood, Startin: 2013). While, just few years ago, scholars in the field were stating that one of the most striking features of the issue of European integration is how little salience it has among voters in any country (Taggart and Szczerbiak: 2008a, 6), the EU political landscape seems to have changed. Despite their second order nature (Reif and Schmitt: 1980, Schmitt: 2005), last European Parliament (EP) election results, underline a situation where so-called Eurosceptic parties were able to increase their vote share gaining seats in the consensual arena of the EP. Among the most prominent examples, we may observe the electoral success obtained by the British UKIP (scoring 26,77 % of votes), the French Front National (that got 24,86% of the vote share in France), the Greek coalition of the radical Left- Syriza- (scoring 26,57% of votes), the Danish Peoples Party (26,60% of the vote share), the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) party (that became the second most voted party in Poland with 31,78% of the vote share) 1 or the Hungarian FIDESZ (scoring 51,48% of votes) 2. Nevertheless, also in countries generally labelled as pro-european, Eurosceptic parties were able to score good results, like in Italy where the Five Stars Movement scored 21,15% of the vote share 3, in Spain, where Podemos (We can) at its first election got 7,98% of the vote share and even in the stable Germany, were the new right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany AfD) was able to score 7,1% of votes getting 7 seats in the EP. These scores are coupled together, on one side, with the results of the British referendum that ended with the Brexit, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, on the other side, with the on-going economic, immigration and political crises that are hitting Europe. Second, member states whose party system can be defined as system of limited contestation toward the EU (Szczerbiak, Taggart: 2008a: 350) are diminishing all around Europe (Kný, 1 We should notice that the PiS (Law and Justice) was not the only party critical toward the EU that was able to attract voters attention in Poland. Another, relatively new, political formation, the Congress of the New Right increased its vote share of 6,1% points when compared to the 2009 EP elections and got 4 seats in the EP. 2 For a complete overview of the last EP elections results see: 3 Even though the EP electoral result for this party has been described by some scholars as a political setback (Bordigon, Ceccarini: 2014), we should not forget that this party, at its first EP election was able to attract 21,2 % of the vote share becoming the second most voted party in Italy (a country commonly described as pro-eu), owning 17 seat in the EP.! 2

3 Kratochvíl: 2015). Here again parties like the FSM in Italy (and potentially also Podemos in Spain) entered in the national parliamentary arena. The Polish PiS was able to get the absolute majority during the last national election in Poland. While the French Front National won the first round of the last regional elections in France (scoring around 27% of the vote share) even though it was excluded during the second round of vote where it was able to get only 19% of consensus. Nonetheless, maybe, the most striking results were scored by the AfD during the last regional elections where the party performed successfully in three of the most prominent Lands in Germany (Baden-Württemberg with 15,1% of votes; Rhineland-Palatinate where it got 12,6% of the vote share and Saxony Anhalt where the party got its best result scoring 24,3% 4). In summary, a better understanding of the phenomenon of scepticism toward the EU is important to better explain the current development of the EU political system, even because one of the problems is that Euroscepticism as such has not been rigorously defined by the academic community (Sørensen: 2004, 2). Researchers in the field focused their attention on the study of Euroscepticism from, at least, two main perspectives, a party-based one (parties expressing critical views toward the EU) and a popular-based one (oriented to understand critical attitudes toward the EU coming from the masses), engaging themselves in two tasks: providing a definition of the concept (see, for example, Taggart: 1998, Szczerbiak and Taggart: 2002, Mudde and Kopecký: 2002), and understanding the causes behind its existence (Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Gabel 1998; Carrubba 1997; Inglehart, 1977; Hooghe and Marks: 2009). Regarding the first point, we may track a real and dynamic dialogue between scholars criticizing each other and trying to propose an all-encompassing and commonly shared definition of Euroscepticism. Despite all these efforts, it still remains a contested concept that entails different problems. Among them we should just think about its normative construction and the potentiality of conceptual stretching when we try to operationalize it (Usherwood: 2014a, Flood: 2002, Leconte 2010). In other words, should we continue to view Euroscepticism as a negative phenomenon? What does it mean to be Eurosceptic, and, conversely, what does it mean to be pro-eu? Is Euroscepticism still a valid and portable concept or should we move our attention toward a more neutral concept like the one of opposition? As aforementioned, this paper seeks to provide some answer to the just posed questions. It first reviews the development in the literature regarding the evolution of the concept of Euroscepticism, 4 For a complete overview of the regional elections results see: 3

4 summarizing the dynamic dialogue in which scholars engaged. It then moves to underline which are the biases related to the use of such concept in academic research. Furthermore, it proposes a way to avoid such biases, framing Euroscepticism in terms of opposition to EU. Moving away from the traditional role of opposition (as an alternative to the current government) it provides a definition of it that may be potentially applicable to the EU realm, moreover unpacking the dimensions that it may entail. It then proposes some potential ways to observe opposition to the EU empirically also from the inside of institutional arenas both at national and at EU level. In the conclusive remarks, it stresses the potential advantages that the use of such neutral concept can provide to the literature, proposing some ways to empirically measure it and underlining avenues for further research in the field. 2. Euroscepticism: its evolution and the dynamic dialogue between scholars. As reported in the introduction to this work, Euroscepticism was born in the UK to describe the specific British phenomenon of intra-party division especially among the Conservatives (Flood: 2002). It first appeared in The Times in 1985 were Euro-scepticism was equated with the opposition toward the creation of a single market: Britain does not oppose the idea of removing the barriers to trade, only the idea that this and other measures should be written into the Treaty of Rome 5. It then increased in popularity in the media (especially during the 80s), the political sphere and the academic environment, but was still limited to scholars interested in understanding the problem of critical stances toward the EU. It increasingly attracted attention during the negotiations for the construction of the single European market and in the context of the Single European Act. Margaret Thatcher s famous Bruges speech acted as a catalyst for the diverging views developing among elites toward the European Project (Hooghe, Marks: 1997; Usherwood: 2007; Usherwood, Startin: 2013). The speech represented a response to Jacques Delores ambitions for a closer cooperation among Member States in economic and political field. From that point on, opposing views toward the EU started to crystallize in any meaningful, mainstream way (Usherwood, Startin: 2013, 3) Nevertheless, the major increase in attention toward the phenomenon happened during the 90s. The Maastricht Treaty can be regarded as a watershed in this field (Ray: 1999; Taggart: 2006; Taggart Szczerbiak: 2013; Usherwood, Startin: 2013; Brack, Startin: 2015) for three main reasons, first it 5 Tomatoes Throw Europe s Summit Progress, The Times, 11 November 1985, 19. Consulted through LexisNexis! 4

5 signals an increase in politicization of Europe that passes from being a community to be a Union. Second, it constitutes the moment when the borders between national and supranational competencies began to fade. Third, from this point on, referenda became a regular expression all around Europe (Usherwood: 2014a, on the last point see also Taggart: 2006). Connected to this last point, the Treaty marked the demise of the so-called permissive consensus what was previously seen as an elite-led project, was now open to the criticism of the masses. In other words, once disengagement and disillusion began to set, the elite became vulnerable ( ) so too did their project (Mair: 2013, 114) The first effort in defining the concept of Euroscepticism was done by Taggart (1998). His seminal early definition of party-based Euroscepticism saw it as a form of contingent and conditional opposition to the EU integration as well as a total and unconditional opposition to it (Taggart: 1998, 366). To fine-tune the definition of a concept already addressed as broad, Taggart and Szczerbiak broke it down into two distinct poles, a hard one (parties fundamentally rejecting the EU as such) and a soft one (parties expressing dissatisfaction either with some policies enacted at the supranational level or with the current state of the European integration project). Several scholars, including the same authors, have addressed critiques toward this definition, which can be summarized into three main points. First, the soft pole of the continuum is too broad, thus not enabling the researcher to understand which party should be classified as Eurosceptic and which not (Kopecký, Mudde: 2002; Flood: 2002; Krouwel, Abts: 2007; Vasilopoulou: 2009; Leconte: 2010; Verzichelli, Cammino: 2016). Second, there is no clear-cut distinction between the hard pole and the soft one (Kopecký, Mudde: 2002). Third, this definition takes into consideration only the strategic moves of fringes parties that behave Eurosceptically to attract consensus against the mainstream. It thus follow that Euroscepticism should be consider as a characteristic pertaining to parties at the margins of the political system, with no space for ideology. Kopecký and Mudde (2002) formulated this latter critique when proposing a new definition of party attitudes toward the EU. Based on Easton seminal distinction between diffuse and specific support 6 for different political regimes (Easton: 1965), the two scholars formulate a four-fold typology of position toward the EU ((Euroenthusiasts; Europragmatists; Eurosceptics; Eurorejects) 7, aiming at 6 With specific support, the author intends the direct result of outputs that satisfy specific demands, in other words outputs that are perceived by members to meet their demands as they arise or in anticipation (Easton: 1965: 437). While, on the other hand, is less dependent to specific benefits and makes reference to a sense of attachment to the political regime, the authorities and the political community. 7 The typology presents two main dimensions: the Support for European integration (dichotomy distinction between Europhile and Europhobes) and the Support for the EU as it realizes (dichotomy distinction between EU-Optimist and EU-pessimist).! 5

6 including both party ideology (how much a party is in favour of the European Project) and party strategy (a utilitarian support for the current state of the EU). Although able to encompass both positive and negative stances of parties toward the EU, also this typology has been the target of several critiques from the academic community. We may point out four critical points. First, ideology is here considered in too broad terms, according to Flood (2002) the Europhile-Europhobic dichotomy is, in fact, unable to catch all the nuances of the fluid party positions toward the EU. Second, the two scholars identify as Eurosceptic only a sub-set of parties that would generally be considered as such in popular terms (Szczerbiak, Taggart: 2002, Postscript). Thirdly, the typology identifies the Europragmatist category (Europhobic parties who sustain the current state of the EU) which is an unlikely one (the same authors also sustain this point, Kopecký, Mudde: 2002, 303. See also Szczerbiak and Taggart: 2002 Postscript, Vasilopoulou: 2009). Lastly, if diffuse support identifies the general ideas underlying the European integration project, and specific support refers to the practice of the EU, what is still not clear is what does constitute the general ideas of European integration and which are the general practices of the European integration. In fact, as Ray (1999) points out, the very meaning of European integration changes over time and across national political context. In other words, even if these terms were specified, the key difficulty is that there is no trans-historical general practice of European integration since the integration practice can and indeed does change quite fundamentally (Kný, Kratochvíl: 2015, 209) 8 Rejecting the idea to have a fixed univocally applicable typology to encapsulate party position toward the EU, Flood (2002) suggests a set of six categories that should work as a merely practical aid to describing approximate locations along a continuum ranging from EU-rejectionist toward EU-Maximalist. Even if it has been defined as the most ambitious and comprehensive attempt to develop a classificatory schema (Taggart Szczerbiak, 2008: 246), it is not free from problems. The six proposed labels are, in fact, not mutually exclusive and point to a broader issue: the more fine-grained a typology is, the more difficult it is to categorize and operationalize parties position toward the EU (Taggart, Szczerbiak: 2008). In summary, there still is a vivid dialogue among scholars in the field aimed at finding the right definition of Euroscepticism. Of course, it is not only restricted to the few cited examples. It is in fact to be noted that the main aim of this critical literature review is to understand which are the 8 A similar idea is expressed also By Vasilopoulou (2009) who is stating that the typology is imprecise in delineating which type of cooperation among member states would the party be keen to sustain.! 6

7 pros and contra of the most widely used typology in the field. Nevertheless, the review does not intend to be complete at all (just to cite some other important efforts in the field see: Tiersky: 2001; Rovny: 2004; Sørensen: 2008; Vasilopoulou: 2009; Leconte: 2010; Conti and Memoli: 2012; Skinner: 2012; Usherwood and Startin:2013). What is clear is that Euroscepticism is still a contested concept and still presents problems during its application. Next section explores in more details which are the potential biases connected to the use of such a complex concept. 3. Why is Euroscepticism a problematic concept? As observed in the previous paragraph, the vivid dialogue among scholars in the field suggests that there are still some uncertainties connected to the use of Euroscepticism as a central concept. This section highlights which are the most important problems, connected to it. The best point to start from is the word s composition. It consists of three main parts; the Euro component refers to Europe but as a proxy of the EU (even if there is generally a bit of confusion regarding these two realities -Cotta: 2016), pointing at least toward an identifiable object (Flood: 2002, 3). The sceptic element identifies a lack of trust, a position opposed to a sort of religious affiliation toward the EU (Cotta: 2016) that may translate itself in a sort of wait and see posture. It is different from a contrast or an opposition, words that seem to better identify some position present on the contemporary EU stage (Varsori: 2016). Finally, the ism suffix is generally used to identify a set of ideologies. Thus, this word could be incorporated in the domain of the political belief systems (Flood: 2002). Nevertheless, this last point is in contrast to the finding of the literature that describe the fluid nature of the phenomenon. Critical postures toward the EU changes, in fact across time and space (context), in other words, it is a fluid concept, a moving target, that does not imply a single and stable set of ideas (Ray: 1999; Flood: 2002; Taggart: 2006; Leconte: 2010; Usherwood, Startin: 2013; Leconte: 2015). Secondly, using Euroscepticism as a concept to describe opposition toward the EU, we risk being self-referential. As such, Euroscepticism is a term suitable and related exclusively to the sphere of the EU (Cotta: 2016). A third important problem connected to this concept relies in its normativity. Euroscepticism is a negatively constructed concept, it implicitly recognizes that someone is sceptic about the EU but the reasons behind these attitudes are not intrinsic in its definition (Usherwood: 2014a). It seems that using words like opposition or even hostility toward the EU is something to be ashamed of, it seems! 7

8 that the political sphere is open to accept only a sort of distrust toward the EU (Varsori: 2016). Euroscepticism is, in fact, generally used to disparage political challengers (Leconte: 2010, Usherwood: 2014b), to put them in a sort of subordinate position among the losers of history (Pasquinucci, Verzichelli: 2016, 23). Moreover, due to its normative nature, Euroscepticism implicitly recognizes a positive side, a pro-european one. But, what does it mean to be pro- European? As we have seen before, it is difficult to provide a precise definition of pro- Europeanism just because it is difficult to provide a clear-cut definition of which are the principles behind it. Furthermore, applying the concept of Euroscepticism hinders the possibility to identify the different nuances of criticism toward the EU. In other words, wouldn t it be possible to find positions currently opposed to some specific aspects of the EU but in a constructive way? Should we label these latter as Eurosceptic? The fourth major problem connected to the use of Euroscepticism is related to the potential for conceptual stretching when it comes to its operationalization (Flood: 2002; Usherwood: 2014a; Cammino, Verzichelli: 2016). As such, the EU represents an extended package deal between many different actors, engendering potential payoffs alongside with boosters of conflict. If it may be true that the hard side of the concept means a complete rejection of the entire structure of the EU, what does it mean to be soft Eurosceptic? There is probably no one inside of the EU institutions that is completely in favour of what the EU does. Does this mean that they are all Eurosceptic? Just to mention an example, in his speech held after the defeat of his party at the last EP election, President Hollande said: Europe has become illegible, I am aware of it. It is distant and really unintelligible also to the Member States. All this cannot last. Europe has to be simple and clear in order to be effective where it is required to be, and to pull back where it is not necessary 9. We may describe Hollande speech as a strategic move after his parties electoral defeat done to catch the growing disaffection of the electorate, nevertheless, he is stating that Europe needs to change its structure and how it faces its problems, especially with regards to the economic crisis and the implemented austerity measures, defined by the President himself as a too high price that discourages people. Should we, thus, describe Hollande speech as Eurosceptic? Maybe a strategic form of it (Szczerbiak, Taggart: 2002)? According to Kopecký and Mudde typology, the answer to this question is positive. In fact, Hollande s speech combines a general Europhile 9 Original text in French: L Europe, elle est devenue illisible, j en suis conscient, lointaine et pour tout dire incompréhensible, même pour les Etats. Cela ne peut plus durer. L Europe, elle doit être simple, claire, pour être efficace là où elle est attendue, et se retirer là où elle n est pas nécessaire. Available at: Citation inspired by Brack Startin (2015).! 8

9 perspective 10 together with a pessimistic view of the practices of the EU. Another example is the German CDU s opposition toward the proposal for the implementation of Eurobonds (stability bonds with the central aim to redistribute debts among Member States) as Werner Langen s words in the plenary section of the EP exemplify: The communitarisation of debt fosters sloppiness and not solidarity, penalises those with higher taxes and interest rates, those who are competitive and who have done what they were supposed to do in accordance with treaty commitments. Eurobonds, a debt redemption fund, blue bonds or red bonds are a mistake 11. Should this statement be considered, in practice, against the value of solidarity (thus maybe Eurosceptic) as expressed by Title 1, Article 3, Comma 3 of the TEU: It (the Union) shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States 12. Thus, the fuzziness of the concept is moreover emphasized by the general mainstreaming of the phenomenon. Using Taggart and Szczerbiak s words (2013, 34): Euroscepticism has come in from the cold. It is now part of the mainstream of European politics, and it finds a breeding ground for its development in the, at least two, on-going crises: the economic and the immigration one (we could even add a political one). Thus, if it is true that Euroscepticism is an increasingly mainstreamed phenomenon, is the concept still a valid one? Does it represent only a temporary attitude common to all the parties, or more generally actors, critical of the EU? A chameleonic characteristic changing whenever there is a change in the external environment? Lastly, and connected to previous point, we should go beyond the study of political parties general views on European integration. Literature both focused in understanding the causes behind the phenomenon (as for example Marks and Steenbergen: 2004; Marks and Wilson: 2000; Hix et al: 2006) and in proposing different typologies (see previous paragraph) that either analyse general party preference for European integration or focus on the issue of Europe as a whole (Leruth: 2015, 817), these studies do not take potential differentiation into account. As stressed by and Krouwel and Abts (2007) beside the intensity of the sentiment expressed toward the EU (that may be positive, critical, negative or outright opposite), the targets toward which this sentiment is directed may vary from context to context and from time to time. Critical stances toward the EU 10 Hollande in his speech states that he feels European. 11 Debate held on the 12 th of June 2012 in the occasion of the approval of the so-called Two Pack. For the complete texts of the debate see: EN&language=HR 12 Treaty on the European Union (TEU) as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon in its EU official Journal version dated 17 th December Emphasis (the Union) added. Entire text of the Treaty available at: Documents/Reader_friendly_til_nettet.pdf! 9

10 can, in fact, be directed toward the policies enacted by the EU, toward the elite responsible for the European project, toward the institutional assessment of the EU or toward the European community per se. Nevertheless, these targets do not emerge clearly from the above-mentioned conceptualization of Euroscepticism. Taking back Szczerbiak and Taggart hard vs. soft dichotomy (2002), the soft hand identifies an opposition toward one (or a number of) policy area(s), but it does not make any reference to any other potential targets of opposition toward the EU. Here again if it is true that being hard Eurosceptic means rejecting the EU as a whole how should we categorize a party that for example asks for further democratization of EU institutions? For Kopecký and Mudde (2002) the EU-pessimist, EU-optimist dimension identifies a critical position expressed toward the EU as it is or as it is developing. Nevertheless, the two scholars states that a critical attitude toward certain EU policy does not itself disqualify a party from being an EUoptimist. Thus the question is: What does disqualify a party from being a EU-optimist? Being against a certain amount of policies? Being against the technocratic Brussels élite? Or being against how the EU institutions are structured? Even in Flood s typology (2002), despite it is more articulated, the target are not clearly defined. In other words, how should we understand which are the differences among EU-pessimist or soft-eurosceptic or EU-minimalist, EU-gradualist and so on? Taking into consideration all the biases reported in this paragraph, next section shifts its attention toward a more neutral concept, the one of opposition. It does not intend to disregard all the advances made by the literature, on the contrary, based on both advantages and drawbacks coming from the use of Euroscepticism as a central concept, it proposes a way to see the phenomenon in terms of opposition. In the end what is Euroscepticism if not a form of opposition directed toward specific targets and mirroring specific tendencies (e.g.: constructive or principled)? 4. Shifting our attention toward a more neutral concept: opposition a viable definition in the EU context Opposition lies among the three great milestones in the development of democratic institutions : the right to participate in governmental decisions by casting a vote, the right to be represented, and the right of an organised opposition to appeal for votes against the government in elections and in parliament (Dahl: 1966). According to Mair (2007) One of the principal reasons to address the issue of political opposition in the context of the European Union is that there seems to be a lot of it! 10

11 about. This last assertion is even more true if we think about the recent development in the EU as stressed in the previous paragraph. Traditionally, this concept has been assimilated with the notion of checks and balances or with an institutionalized form of conflict between the governing majority and the opposing minority aiming to take its place. This is, at least, what emerges if we take as an example the minimal and all-inclusive definition by Dahl: Suppose that A determines the conduct of some aspects of the government of a particular political system during some interval. [ ] Suppose that during this interval B cannot determine the conduct of the government; and that B is opposed to the conduct of government by A. Then B is what we mean by an opposition. Note that during some different interval, B might determine the conduct of the government, and A might be in opposition (1966, p. xviii). Despite its importance, this minimal definition, and, more generally, the traditional literature dealing with the concept of opposition is not free from problems. Generally, we may list three main biases connected to it (Weinblum and Brack: 2011). Firstly, traditional literature provides a definition of the concept that tends to exclude all the political system where alternation in government is not possible for a variety of reasons. This is for example the case of the EU, as we will see below (Mair: 2007; Neunreither: 1998). Nonetheless, even if there is no alternation between governing and non-governing parties, this does not mean that we will not find opposition. Opposition parties can, in fact, check the activity of the executive (whatever shape it does take), this might be considered anyhow as a form of opposition (De Giorgi: 2007). Secondly, the classical view of opposition depicts a normative picture of the phenomenon. Traditional literature has, in fact, generally differentiated between a classical and legitimate opposition and an anti-systemic one. The main consequence of this was the establishment of two separate fields of research (Weinblum and Brack: 2011). The one dealing with observing opposition performed by mainstream parties (the so-called classical - Kirchheimer: 1964, Dahl: 1966-; or real -Sartori: 1966-; or normal Schapiro: 1967) and the other dealing with opposition framed as a protest toward the very political system (the anti-system - Kirchheimer: 1966, Sartori: 1966; or principled - Dahl: 1966). A similar line of reasoning can be found if we draw a parallel with the concept of Euroscepticism. The literature has, in fact, always differentiated between the normal type of opposition (generally absent in the consensual arena of the EP), the pro-eu parties from the opposition exercised by Eurosceptic parties (even if at different degrees). Nowadays, as we have seen before, this distinction is becoming more and more blurred due to the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism.!11

12 Lastly, traditional definitions of opposition recognize a restricted arena where it can take place, the parliaments. Doing this, they automatically exclude the presence of other potential forms of opposition coming from outside of the institutionalized arenas: the so-called extra-parliamentary forms of opposition (Blondel: 1997). To escape the above-presented biases, Weinblum and Brack formulated a broad definition of opposition, which has the nice property to be extremely flexible and applicable to all political system and to every type of organized actors. A disagreement with the government or its policies, the political elite, or the political regime as a whole, expressed in public sphere, by an organized actor through different modes of action (Weinblum, Brack: 2011, 74) In line with what has been said in the previous paragraph, this definition of political opposition is able to clearly distinguish between the targets toward which it is directed. From this definition it is possible to recognize four different targets: 1. The government, with the main aim to take its place; 2. The policies that the government enacts; 3. The political establishment (both governmental and opposition elites); 4. The political regime (e.g.: proposing a reformation of the institutions it encompasses) This definition can potentially be applied to the context of the EU, nevertheless, it is important to pay some attention. It seems in fact logical to think that an organized group, such as a political party, may oppose the policies enacted by the EU in different fields. Similarly, it may oppose the political establishment responsible and leading the integration project. Critiques can be oriented also to the European institutions and their organization, calling, for example, for their strong reformation (e.g.: the call for more accountability of the European institutions, such as the European Commission). Nevertheless, two further points deserves more attention. First, dealing with the supranational environment of the EU, we should also consider an opposition, which is directed to the entire European community (the one exercised by the so-called hard Eurosceptic or even rejectionist groups). Thus, the supranational community should be added among the potential targets of opposition. Forms of opposition addressing it have the main aim to change more or less radically! 12

13 the borders of the community they live in. At its extremes, this opposition may even claim the secession from the community and aim at organizing a new polity, where the secessionist groups could hold governmental positions 13 (Cotta: 2016). It is to be noted that with the notion of political community actors may address the EU as such or some components of it, for example the Schengen agreement or the European Monetary Union. The second point that deserves more attention is related to the first aforementioned target: the government. Thinking about the opposition exercised in the parliamentary arena of the EP, it is in fact still difficult to understand how should we define the government at the EU level. In other words, who is the target of opposition viewed in a more traditional way? Is it the Commission? The Council? Both? These doubts emerge, of course, from the complex institutional articulation of the EU that has been rightly described as a separation of power system (Hix et al: 2006). The literature is still divided on where to place the government at the supranational level. There are scholars like Simon Hix promoting the idea of a dual-executive where both the Commission and the Council share governmental functions. While scholars like Helms (2008) sustain the idea that the EU should be associated to a two chambers system. Where the Commission, being the only institution entitled of legislative initiative, plays the role of the government, while the Council embodies a powerful Senate and works mainly together with the EP, the lower chamber of the EU. This problem of identification of the locus of the government at the EU level is moreover complicated by the multilevel-structure of the European governance (Hooghe, Marks: 2001), where parties governing at national level cover also governmental position at the EU level 14. The interesting thing to notice is that, after the last EP election, this dynamic seems to have (only partially and maybe not influentially) changed, just to mention an example we may think of the Greek case where Syriza (generally considered as a Eurosceptic party from the left) is now represented in the Council but not in the European Commission, where the actual commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos is affiliated to New Democracy. A similar case can be mentioned for the Poland, where the right wing Law and Justice is now holding the majority at national level, being affiliated to the ECR in the EP (19 seat) but with a Commissioner, Elżbieta Bieńkowska, who does not belong to the governing majority. 13 The results of the last UK referendum see UKIP as a protagonist. This case may teaches us that the complete rejection of the European Community per se may lead to a potential secession of the member state. Nevertheless, further research is needed to assess what are the causes behind what happened in the UK. 14 Even though the commission should be considered (according to article 245 of the Treaty on European Union) as a super partes body, all the commissioners (at least to my knowledge) have a party affiliation, which generally corresponds with the governing majority at national level.! 13

14 In this complex situation, ruling parties (generally considered as the mainstream parties belonging to the most important party group in the EP: EPP, S&D and ALDE) have to build up coalitions in the EP on a case-by-case basis (Hix et al: 2006; Braghiroli: 2015). This mechanism can potentially result in a shifting opposition (toward the government) depending on the issue at stake. It thus follows that opposition parties, at least in the EP are not able to build a stable opposition (toward the government) in the EU and they may find convenient to build an opposition to the EU from the inside of the parliamentary arena (Mair: 2007, 2013). Nevertheless, it can still be regarded as a form of opposition and not relegated to a specific type of phenomenon. It seems thus possible to reformulate a definition of opposition able to highlight the feasible targets that may be addressed following a structure similar to the one proposed by Weinblum and Brack (2011). Along these lines, opposition to the EU can thus be defined as: A disagreement with the policies enacted by the EU, its political elite, its institutions or the political community as a whole, expressed in the public sphere, by and organized actor through different modes of action This definition of opposition to the EU is explicitly broad and applicable not only to the institutional arenas, such as the one of the EP. In fact, it can potentially be applied to study extraparliamentary opposition to the EU. We may think about Civil Society Actors (Fitzgibbon: 2013) opposing certain aspects of the EU 15, or about citizens in opposition to some aspects of the EU like, for example, the implemented policies to face the economic and immigration crises. Starting from this definition it is moreover possible to avoid the normativity bias related to the concept of opposition asking, only after a first analysis, which are the modes and the characteristics that the opposition assume. In other words, further analysis can indicate if the actor in question is opposing some aspects of the EU in a pragmatic way (proposing a constructive type of opposition) or in a principled way (proposing an opposition of principle toward the EU). Nevertheless, this step should be performed only afterwards; this should be done in order to avoid the normativity trap that characterizes both the literature on Euroscepticism and the one on opposition. Understanding Euroscepticism in terms of opposition to specific aspects of the EU can help us avoiding the biases that have been mentioned in the previous paragraph. Next section deals with 15 Moreover, Della Porta and Caiani (2009) in their study of the European Social Forum participants, rejects the definition of Euroscepticism for these actors. This is due to the fact that they are generally in favour of further integration but propose an alternative Europe, a Europe that does not have the markets and the élite as central priorities.! 14

15 some proposal for the measurement of opposition to the EU, it does not intend to be an allencompassing road map to the measurement and its main focus will be on political parties. Nevertheless, as it will be stressed in the conclusive remarks of this work, the provided definition of opposition can potentially be applied to all more or less organized actors 5. Opposition to the EU: some possible measures of it from a party-based perspective. This section is intended to provide some guidelines to understand how to measure opposition and, consequently, support to the targets that we have highlighted before. Literature about Euroscepticism relies on several instruments that can potentially be applied also to the concept of opposition. The analysis of electoral manifestos (in this case Euromanifestos), following an already consolidated method can help researchers in performing this task. This may be coupled together with data coming from other different sources such as expert surveys, like the one conducted by the Chapel Hill group 16 or élite data such as the IntUne 17 and ENEC project 18 (Cotta: 2016). Nevertheless, despite the usefulness of these data, the study of opposition tendencies performed by parties, cannot disregard the observation of parties behaviour inside the institutional arenas both at national and at European level. One of the most important branches of study regarding party positioning toward and in the EU uses Roll Call Votes (RCVs) 19 produced in the institutional arena of the EP as central data source 20 (Hix, Noury and Roland: 2005). This branch of studies came to some main conclusions. First, the EP is a highly consensual body where voting cohesiveness is 16 Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, Filip Kostelka, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Gijs Schumacher, Marco Steenbergen, Milada Vachudova, and Marko Zilovic " Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File." Version 1.1. Available on chesdata.eu. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. And Ryan Bakker, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova "Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, " Party Politics 21.1: Integrated and United: a Quest for CItizenship in an ever closer Europe. IntUne Project coordinated between 2005 and 2009 by the University of Siena 18 ENEC (European National élites and the Eurozone Crisis) is a research project aiming to evaluate the effects of the economic and political crisis affecting European countries (particularly those in the Eurozone) since 2008 upon the attitudes of national political (and, eventually, economic) elites towards the EU. For further information see: 19 Rules of procedure of the EP accounts for three types of votes. As general rules the majority of the votes are taken with the show of hands (Rule of procedure n.178 (1)).. If the President of the EP decides that the vote is doubtful, a new vote shall be taken using the electronic voting system (sitting and standing if this latter does not work). The third possibility is Roll Call Votes (RCVs). According to the rule of procedure 180 the use of RCVs can be requested by a political group or by 40 MEPs who can vote either positively, negatively or abstain. RCVs are the only nominative one and are recorded in the minutes of the plenary sittings. 20 The main initiator of the practice of using RCVs for the analysis of party positioning in the EP is Simon Hix, for further information about the study of such rolls consult: 15

16 generally high (and connected to the size of the political group, generally the bigger the group the higher the voting cohesiveness). Second, competition is mainly structured along the traditional leftright divide. Parties from both extreme hands of the ideological spectrum (left and right) generally tend to be in contrast to centrist, mainstream (and usually defined pro-eu) parties. Third, the proanti EU integration divide seems to play only a secondary role in the structure of competition in the EP. Nevertheless, the use of such data is still not free from problem. Contrary to the common belief Carruba et al (2006) show that RCVs are not only used for significant issues, but also that such rolls are taken disproportionally on (inconsequential) resolutions rather than on (consequential) legislative proposals under the co-decision procedure (Proksch, Slapin: 2010). Second, according to rule of procedure 180 the use of RCVs can be requested by a political group or by 40 MEPs, thus meaning that both EP party group and national parties can use such rolls to control for the presence of rebels. Third, such data are useful if we want to understand opposition as an institutionalized phenomenon in the EP. This, as we have seen before, and according to the opinion of different scholars (Mair: 2007; Mair: 2013; Cotta: 2016), does not seem to be the case. Moreover, opposition to the EU is such a nuanced concept that cannot be encapsulated in a yea, nay or abstention vote. Nevertheless, there is another way to observe opposition to Europe as exemplified by parties behaviour inside of the EP 21, using speeches, the other option left to the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to express their opinion. Usually considered as cheap talk or soap talk, the value of these data has for long time been neglected. While it is true that votes account for legislative outcomes and speeches do not, this latter provide the researcher with a more nuanced picture which may enables the building of a support-opposition index potentially applicable to all parties represented inside of the supranational arena 22. Through the use of both quantitative and qualitative instruments of texts analysis, it is, in fact, not difficult to understand which are the targets that parties, represented in the EP are addressing. Moreover, as stated before, this first part of the study could be coupled together with an in-depth qualitative analysis to understand also the character of opposition (if it is principled or constructive). The use of text analysis as a tool to 21 Literature dealing with Euroscepticism still lack an appropriate assessment of how Euroscepticism is translated in the supranational arena of the EP. The only available study particularly focused on this poi is the one by Brack: Recent developments in the literature have accounted for the use of such data not only in the study of the European Parliament but also for the analysis of national parliaments (e.g.: Laver, Benoit: 2002; Slapin, Proksch: 2010; Schwarz et al 2015; Proksch et al: 2010)! 16

17 understand party position and opposition to the EU is not restricted only to the supranational arena of the EP but can also be open to the national environments. It is, in fact, not difficult to imagine a comparative study of the speeches held in national parliamentary arenas in the occasion, for example, of the approval of economic measures imposed by Brussels. How did the so-called Eurosceptic parties react? Which targets of opposition do they address? Do they have some points in common? What about their mainstream counterpart? It is not difficult to imagine a comparison across time and space to see how the rhetoric of opposition to Europe changes, both in its intensity and in its characters. In other words, is opposition to Europe to be intended only as a principled phenomenon or are we able to find also constructive forms of opposition? Moreover, a comparison between findings coming from different data-sources may help us better understand how the phenomenon of opposition to Europe evolves and to explain the causes behind it. Next section focuses on the potential advantages for the literature that may derive from framing Euroscepticism in terms of opposition to the EU. 5. Conclusions: why using opposition to Europe? In need for further research Starting from a brief representation of the last changes in the European political space, specifically the results of the EP elections 2014, this work has reviewed the step forward done by the literature in the study of Euroscepticism. Scrutinizing the dynamic dialogue among scholars in terms of conceptualization efforts, this work focused on the biases related to the Euroscepticism that may lead to difficulties in its application, especially in terms of classification. It then moved to propose a re- frame of the concept of Euroscepticism in terms of opposition. After a brief review of the pros and cons of using opposition as a central concept (especially related to the absence of a defined government toward which opposition in the traditional sense may be directed), this work proposes a viable definition of opposition to the EU and highlights which may be its main targets: its policies; its élite; its institutions and its community. Lastly, it proposes some indication about the instrument to be used to measure opposition to the EU on its various dimensions, highlighting the strength of new tools of textual analysis that may provide a nuanced characterization of it. There are four potential advantages in the use of opposition as a central concept for the analysis of critical stances toward the EU. First, using the proposed definition of opposition is useful to avoid the normative biases. It in fact treats critical voices as an existing phenomenon and not as a malaise of the EU. As Usherwood (2014b) rightly stresses when talking about! 17