SRI LANKA: SINHALA NATIONALISM AND THE ELUSIVE SOUTHERN CONSENSUS

Transcription

1 SRI LANKA: SINHALA NATIONALISM AND THE ELUSIVE SOUTHERN CONSENSUS Asia Report N November 2007

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS... i I. INTRODUCTION... 1 II. POLITICAL CULTURE... 2 III. THE EMERGENCE OF SINHALA NATIONALISM... 3 A. PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL SINHALA IDENTITY...3 B. NATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE Sinhala Only legislation Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact Sinhala nationalism and constitutionalism...6 C. THE ECONOMICS OF NATIONALISM: LAND, WELFARE AND BUSINESS...7 D. THE INDIAN INTERVENTION...8 E. CHANDRIKA KUMARATUNGA S DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS...9 IV. THE RESURGENCE OF SINHALA NATIONALISM A. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF A FLAWED PEACE PROCESS...10 B. THE JVP From Maoist insurgents to king-makers Support base and political style Relations with the military and the Sangha JVP unions What the JVP wants...13 C. THE JHU...14 V. WHAT SINHALA NATIONALISTS BELIEVE Sri Lankan Tamils are not a nation Tamil grievances Myth of one nation Sri Lanka as Sinhale Sinhalese as a majority under siege...18 VI. THE NEW NATIONALIST PROJECT A. BUILDING A NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: JVP AND THE SLFP The Patriotic National Movement The United People s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) The 2005 presidential election...20 B. THE MAHINDA VISION AND THE NEW REGIME...20 VII. THE MYTHICAL SOUTHERN CONSENSUS A. THE SLFP-UNP MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE UNP CROSSOVERS...22 B. THE ALL-PARTY REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE Majority and minority reports SLFP proposals and Vitarana s progress Unitary, federal or neither? The UNP s repositioning The way forward...26 VIII. CONCLUSION... 27

3 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SRI LANKA...29 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS...30

4 Asia Report N November 2007 SRI LANKA: SINHALA NATIONALISM AND THE ELUSIVE SOUTHERN CONSENSUS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sinhala nationalism, long an obstacle to the resolution of Sri Lanka s ethnic conflict, is again driving political developments on the island. Nationalist parties, opposed to any significant devolution of power to Tamil areas of the north and east and to negotiations with the Tamil Tigers, help set President Mahinda Rajapaksa s agenda. The government takes a hardline stance, responding in part to opposition to the flawed ceasefire and peace process. Would-be peacemakers need to better understand Sinhala nationalism, which is too often dismissed as merely irrational and racist. With little likelihood of a new formal peace process soon, the longterm challenges it poses to the conflict s resolution need to be addressed. The search for a political solution to nearly 25 years of war has repeatedly foundered as a result of competition between mostly Sinhala parties in the south as well as excessive Tamil demands. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) have never been able to agree on a proposal for power sharing with the Tamil community. Instead, they have engaged in recurring bouts of ethnic outbidding, with each undermining the other s devolution policies. Opposition from more overtly nationalist parties, notably the left-wing People s Liberation Front (JVP) and more recently the extreme Buddhist National Sinhala Heritage Party (JHU), has helped sustain this pattern. Both have flourished in opposition to the 2002 ceasefire and oppose any political settlement involving devolution to the predominantly Tamil regions. Sinhala nationalism goes back to the British period, when it was part of a broader anti-colonial, anti-foreign movement, accentuated by Buddhist revivalism. It grew stronger with independence and electoral democracy. With society divided along caste, class and political lines, it has been a powerful unifying force, giving radical parties a platform for populist agitation and established politicians a diversion from their failure to address economic weakness, social concerns and pervasive corruption. As the ethnic conflict grew more violent, the UNP and SLFP came to accept the existence of legitimate Tamil grievances and the need for devolution and other constitutional reforms, but LTTE brutality and intransigence have kept strong currents of Sinhala nationalism alive. Together the two competing ethnic nationalisms have sapped the ability of governments to develop a consensus for a negotiated settlement and power sharing. The election of President Rajapaksa in November 2005 halted the slow movement towards reforms. While many had hoped he would abandon the hardline approach that won him office and move to the centre to govern, the opposite has been the case. His government has increasingly adopted a hardline nationalist vision, leaving little room to be outflanked in the name of Sinhalese interests. The JHU has joined the government, and Sinhala ideologues are influential advisers. Since mid-2006 the government has been fighting the LTTE with the aim of defeating or at least severely weakening it militarily. At the same time, Rajapaksa has repeatedly stated his commitment to a political solution. With international prodding, several efforts have been made to form a united front to promote a settlement. An October 2006 SLFP- UNP memorandum of understanding (MOU) expressed a superficially common position on the conflict but quickly collapsed, undermined by mistrust, a lack of commitment and ultimately the defection of opposition deputies to the government. The All-Party Representative Committee (APRC) set up in 2006 is developing constitutional proposals intended to be endorsed by all parties. The progress made so far against stiff resistance from the JHU and JVP and the president s delaying tactics threatens to unravel due to Rajapaksa s insistence on maintaining the unitary definition of the state and the UNP s decision to abandon the process. Unless domestic and international pressure can shift both Rajapaksa and the UNP, it seems unlikely the APRC will produce a proposal that can achieve the

5 Crisis Group Asia Report N 141, 7 November 2007 Page ii necessary two-thirds support in parliament and acceptance by Muslim and moderate Tamil parties. The failure of the MOU and the president s lack of enthusiasm for the APRC suggest the government is not serious about a political solution. Instead of working for a compromise the UNP could endorse, it has coerced most of the political establishment to support its military strategy, which has been accompanied by serious human rights abuses. Yet that strategy, especially if it remains unattached to serious political proposals, is unlikely to succeed. The international community has struggled to come to terms with Sinhala nationalism, frequently misunderstanding its nature and legitimacy. Interventions, even including the Norwegian-sponsored 2002 ceasefire, which most Sinhalese ultimately judged as too favourable to the LTTE, have tended to stimulate xenophobic elements in the Sinhala community and help the extreme nationalist parties gain ground. With the present administration one of the most nationalist in the country s history, however, there is a need to review approaches to peacemaking. Domestic and international actors should begin to fashion new, long-term strategies that take into account the power of Sinhala nationalist ideology, while aiming to minimise the sources of its appeal and its ability to set the political agenda. While this report, with its recommendations summarised below, deals wholly with the issue of Sinhala nationalism, Crisis Group of course accepts that this is not the only factor contributing to the present conflict. Subsequent reporting will address, with appropriate recommendations, the challenges posed to peacemaking by Tamil nationalist ideas and organisations. RECOMMENDATIONS To the Government of Sri Lanka: 1. Actively pursue a concerted policy of state reform designed to ensure equal treatment and opportunities for all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity or religion and in particular: (a) (b) expedite the conclusion of negotiations by the All-Party Representative Committee (APRC) and agree to endorse constitutional proposals for devolution of power that go beyond the constraints of the present unitary definition of the state; develop with a sense of urgency a program of language rights for all, featuring: i) expanded incentives and training opportunities for government (c) (d) ii) iii) servants to learn Tamil and full provision wherever needed of Tamil translators, government signs, and forms in Tamil; expanded and improved instruction in Tamil for Sinhala-speaking students and in Sinhala for Tamilspeaking students; and expanded access to quality English instruction for all students throughout the country; ensure that reconstruction and economic development work in the Eastern Province is directed by the civil administration, not the military, is carried out with the active participation of local political leaders and civil society groups from all ethnic communities and makes no changes in the ethnic balance or administrative organisation of the province; and reconstitute immediately the Constitutional Council and expedite the appointment of new members to the full array of independent commissions established under the Seventeenth Amendment, most crucially the Human Rights, Police and Judicial Services Commissions. To the United National Party: 2. Publicly express the party s commitment to cooperate with the government in devising a political consensus for maximum devolution within a united Sri Lanka and agree to rejoin the APRC and to be a full and constructive member of the All-Party Conference when it considers the APRC recommendations. To Tamil, Muslim, and Left Parties in the Government: 3. Endorse the importance of the APRC proposals for devolution of power moving beyond the limitations of the unitary state. To the European Union (EU) and the Governments of India, Japan, the UK and the U.S.: 4. Publicly encourage the government to bring the APRC process to a rapid conclusion and to state its willingness to accept devolution proposals that avoid both unitary and federal definitions of the state. 5. Urge the government publicly to reestablish the Constitutional Council and appoint new members

6 Crisis Group Asia Report N 141, 7 November 2007 Page iii to the full array of independent commissions established under the Seventeenth Amendment. 6. Make it a priority of aid policies to support government initiatives for state reform, good governance, human rights and inclusive language policies designed to ensure equal opportunities and treatment for all citizens regardless of ethnicity or religion. 7. Appoint a joint donor task force to investigate allegations of ethnic bias in land use and settlement policy in the Eastern Province and agree to provide development assistance only after the government establishes procedures for meaningful consultation with representatives of all ethnic communities, ensures the full participation of elected leaders and local civil administration and agrees not to change the ethnic balance or administrative organisation of the province. 8. Begin planning support for a future, more principled peace process that emphasises human rights, good governance and state reform and that aims to respond seriously to Sinhalese fears and sense of insecurity. Colombo/Brussels, 7 November 2007

7 Asia Report N November 2007 SRI LANKA: SINHALA NATIONALISM AND THE ELUSIVE SOUTHERN CONSENSUS I. INTRODUCTION The legacy of colonialism hangs over Sri Lanka, not least in the form of competing nationalisms that intensified in the last years of British rule. Soon after independence in 1948, the pan-ethnic Ceylonese nationalism of the elites was eclipsed by the self-assertion of the Sinhala 1 and Buddhist majority. Rooted in a desire to overcome the humiliation of colonial rule, Sinhala nationalism also aimed to resist what it saw as the excessive political demands of Tamil leaders and the disproportionate power and positions Tamils had gained under British rule. Tamil nationalism began as a peaceful movement for minority rights, partly in reaction to Sinhala control of the state. Failure to achieve a political settlement eventually led to armed militant movements fighting for a separate Tamil state in the north east of the island. The Tamil nationalist movement came to be dominated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a group many states have banned because of its terrorist tactics. 2 Sinhala nationalism has also spawned violent offshoots but has mainly been channelled through political parties, which have used it to mobilise popular support. The competition between the two major parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), has led to destructive ethnic outbidding, as each claims to be the authentic representative of the majority. Both major parties also have faced repeated challenges from smaller groups agitating in the name of the Sinhala people s endangered rights. Sinhala nationalism and opposition to foreign interference were central to the revolutionary program of the People s Liberation Front (JVP) in its 1971 and uprisings. In addition, a 1 In everyday usage, Sinhala and Sinhalese are often interchangeable, though Sinhala is more frequently used to name the language and culture and Sinhalese the ethnic group. In this paper, Sinhala will be used in all cases except when referring to the ethnic group as a collective entity, as in the Sinhalese or Sinhalese interests. 2 For background, see Crisis Group Asia Report N 124, Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, 28 November politically organised section of the Sangha (Buddhist clergy) has formed, together with activist laymen, an even smaller but influential minority, whose frequent interventions in the name of the Sinhala Buddhist majority have had major political effects. Sinhala nationalism has waxed and waned in response to the political context. At times, there has been strong Sinhala support for a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, competition between the two main parties and their inability to neutralise smaller nationalist parties have prevented governments from compromising with Tamil nationalists. The LTTE has been equally important in blocking the elusive southern consensus. Its violence and intransigence have provided political ammunition for the most extreme Sinhala nationalist elements. Since President Rajapaksa s election in November 2005, Sinhalese dynamics have changed. In part to avoid being challenged by hardline nationalist parties, he has adopted many positions formerly associated with extremist parties. Reacting to what many saw as a peace process dangerously biased in favour of the LTTE, the government is pursuing the kind of military strategy many nationalists have long urged. But facing international pressure not to abandon a political solution, it still says it seeks a southern consensus on constitutional reforms. This is the second in a series of Crisis Group reports that explore tensions and political dynamics within the major ethnic communities in Sri Lanka, and a future report will examine changing political dynamics in the Tamil community. 3 It examines the main currents of modern Sinhala nationalism, including the recent growth in support for nationalist policies and parties, and assesses the government s willingness and ability to overcome party divisions and extreme nationalist positions and reach a constitutional reform consensus that could lay the basis for a lasting peace. 3 The first report in this series was Crisis Group Asia Report N 134, Sri Lanka s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire, 29 May 2007.

8 Crisis Group Asia Report N 141, 7 November 2007 Page 2 II. POLITICAL CULTURE The mansions and tree-lined streets of the exclusive Colombo 7 district testify to the lingering power of Sri Lanka s Anglicised, post-colonial elite. The families that have dominated politics since independence live there, many passing power from father to son. The UNP the Uncle-Nephew Party to detractors has drawn its leaders from an extended clan of Senanayakes, Jayewardenes and Wickremesinghes. D.S. Senanayake, the first prime minister, was followed as party leader by his son, Dudley, from 1952 until J.R. Jayewardene (president, ) was succeeded by his nephew, the present leader and twice prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe. The only break in the pattern was the presidency of Ranasinghe Premadasa ( ), the first leader to emerge from outside this cosy elite. Nevertheless, the UNP cannot match the SLFP as a dynasty. It is the creation of Solomon West Ridgeway Dias (S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike, who began a political line that remains potent, even if now under great pressure. After his 1959 assassination, his widow, Sirimavo, took over and ruled as prime minister in the 1960s and 1970s. The family returned to power in 1994, after years of UNP rule, when Chandrika Kumuratunga, the daughter, became president, serving until November These and other ruling families have traditionally dominated the higher echelons of the mainstream parties. They are largely distant from the lives of ordinary citizens due to class and language. To a large degree, the elite is still fluent in English, sends its children to schools with quality English teaching and pursues advanced education overseas. Dominated by its class and caste hierarchies, the postcolonial state has only ever been partially democratic. Essentially, politics has been for the socio-economic elite, even its apparently grassroots institutions. Thus, while Sri Lanka has been a welfare state, the system is paternalistic rather than egalitarian. In its heyday from the 1950s to the 1970s, the welfare state improved living standards but it was built on top of exclusive hierarchies. In the absence of serious efforts to democratise governance, either at the national or local levels, patronage relationships have endured. The political elite remains largely beyond popular challenge or accountability. Sri Lankan voters are mostly entwined in party patronage, and parliamentarians are elected for their ability to redistribute resources, provide access to public sector goods and jobs, and develop infrastructure for supporters. The winner takes all; supporters of losing parties have traditionally been denied government jobs and services. 4 This patron-client system has major repercussions on political culture. Members of parliament (MPs) are under pressure to obtain a cabinet post to get access to state resources, so change parties easily, as eighteen UNP members did in January Such switches from opposition to government generally have little to do with policy or principle. As a recent UNP crossover to the government put it, you can t give anybody a job if you re in the opposition. 6 Despite its democratic appearance, including regular relatively free elections, the system is largely exclusive and unresponsive to popular concerns, in part because there is little space for ideological or issue-based movements. As a result, it has provoked political violence from groups which feel excluded from or sidelined by uneven patronage distribution. Such feelings and the lack of response from elite-led politics contributed to the JVP insurrections in the 1970s and 1980s as well as the LTTE insurgency, which began in The patron-client nature of governance is also a cause of election violence. 7 While recent polls have been comparatively peaceful, there is a long tradition of violence by the cadres of the two main parties. Little behaviour is off limits when it comes to winning power. Likewise, the patron-client system has negative economic effects in that it tends to result in regionally and ethnically uneven long-term development. Political leaders have tried to find ways to mobilise voters that ensure their election, while not undermining the system that they seek to dominate. Nationalism has offered both parties the simplest and most effective mobilisation strategy in the south. 8 Nationalist arguments are often presented as posing a challenge to the English-speaking elite that has lost touch with the people and with local traditions and values. Sinhala nationalism, however, is regularly used by those same elites to cement their hold on power or oust political rivals, while simultaneously papering over deep economic fissures and the mostly unrepresentative nature of politics. 4 Dilesh Jayantha, Electoral Allegiance in Sri Lanka (Cambridge, 1992). 5 For discussion of the relationship of caste to patron-client relationships in Sri Lankan politics, see Dilesh Jayantha, Electoral Allegiance in Sri Lanka (Cambridge, 1992); Janice Jiggins, Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese (Cambridge, 1979). 6 Crisis Group interview, Colombo, December See reports of the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, at 8 This is not to say that ethnic outbidding is always the most effective mode of political opposition. The 1977, 1994 and 2001 elections were won on moderate, even explicitly pro-negotiation platforms. The current main opposition alliance has a more moderate position than the ruling coalition.

9 Crisis Group Asia Report N 141, 7 November 2007 Page 3 Nonetheless, the nationalist policies these leaders have endorsed and implemented have led, among other changes, to the gradual Sinhalisation of the political class, while weakening the hold of the old Anglicised elites over the major parties. The 2005 transfer of control of the SLFP from Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to Mahinda Rajapaksa, known for his deep roots in the southern town of Hambantota, is symbolic of a slow, larger shift from an Anglicised political elite to a new bilingual one, with a foot in both the Sinhala- and English-speaking worlds. III. THE EMERGENCE OF SINHALA NATIONALISM A. PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL SINHALA IDENTITY Sri Lankan scholars argue that the island has been multiethnic and multi-cultural from pre-historic times, contrary to popular Sinhala belief that it primarily belongs to the Sinhalese, who arrived first. 9 Sinhalese and Tamils come from the same South Indian-Sri Lankan gene pool; early Buddhist Pali chronicles refer to the Tamils (Damelas) in the Early Iron Age. Scholarship also rejects popular theories of mass migration or invasion. Demographic changes occurred gradually, over long periods, through trade, cultural, religious, political and military movements. Nor was the movement only from South India to Sri Lanka. Sinhalese entered South India even as South Indians entered Sri Lanka. Sinhala and Tamil kings cooperated in peace and war and protected each other s religions. By the twelfth century, Sinhalese and Tamils were distinct identities, with Tamils identified with the north east and Sinhalese with the rest of the island. 10 While Buddhism mostly disappeared from India in the thirteenth century, Sinhala Buddhism became a politico-religious category between 1236 and 1815, with Sinhalese viewing the island as a Dhammadipa (a place blessed by the Buddha), entrusted to them to protect his teachings. 11 Concepts of the people of the land and foreigners or strangers took root. The heroics of Sinhala kings in battles against the Tamil outsider were celebrated. 12 Though Sinhala religion and culture showed a mix of influences, the Buddha s supremacy, the Sangha and kingship had to be accepted and could not be compromised. 9 K. Indrapala, The Evolution of an Ethnic Identity: C 300BCE to C 1200BCE (Sydney, 2005); R.A.L.H. Gunawardena, The People of the Lion: Sinhala Consciousness in History and Historiography, in Ethnicity and Social Change in Sri Lanka (Colombo, 1984). 10 A distinctive Sinhala identity emerged through the assimilation of tribal, linguistic and ethnic communities about five to six centuries BCE. The language was a mixture of several local languages and Pali. The Tamil language in the island developed in a similar way, though Sanskritic or Pali influence was less. Over time, Sinhala speakers in Tamil areas were Tamilised and Tamil speakers in Sinhala areas were Sinhalised. 11 Michael Roberts, Sinhala-ness and Sinhala Nationalism, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation, no. 4, Colombo, Michael Roberts, Burden of History: Obstacles to Power Sharing in Sri Lanka (Colombo, 2001).

10 Crisis Group Asia Report N 141, 7 November 2007 Page 4 The process of ethnic assimilation, common in the pre- British era, largely ceased under colonial rule, when communal identities were fostered and emphasised. 13 Modern Sinhala nationalism emerged in the nineteenth century as a counter-colonial movement that used Buddhist identity to mobilise popular support. Buddhism was portrayed as under threat, first from Christian missionaries and later from British capitalist interests, especially in the form of the plantation industry and its perceived deleterious effects, including the rising use of alcohol. 14 As a challenge to the missionaries and a response to the state s failure to provide the traditional patronage to Buddhism, monks began to challenge Christians to religious debates. 15 Pioneering Sinhala nationalists such as Anagarika Dharmapala developed a revivalist movement, which began publishing journals dedicated to promoting Buddhism, Buddhist religious (Dhamma) schools, a Buddhist flag, codes of disciplinary conduct, the codification of Buddhist dogma in opposition to popular folk religious practices, and the empowerment of laity to engage actively in Theravada Buddhism and of the Sangha to participate in social and political action. 16 This early Sinhala Buddhist revivalism which some have termed Protestant Buddhism 17 deliberately mixed nationalist politics and religion. Its leaders agitated for restoring the tie between state and religion. Their interpretation of history propounded a sense of mission, in which the Sinhalese were bound to protect Sri Lanka as an outpost of Buddhism against invaders, colonisers and other religions. 18 The revival of ancient narratives, according to which the Sinhala nation is surrounded by 13 Ibid; Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, Democracy and the Problem of Representation: The Making of Bi-polar Ethnic Identity in Post/colonial Sri Lanka, in Joanna Pfaff- Czarnecka, Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, Ashis Nandy and Edmund Terence Gomez (eds.), Ethnic Futures: The State and Identity Politics in Asia (New Delhi, 1999). 14 Mick Moore, The Ideological History of the Sri Lankan Peasantry, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, (1989), p K.M. de Silva, Religion and Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Sri Lanka: Christian Missionaries and Their Critics, Ethnic Studies Report, vol. xvi, no. 1 (1998). 16 Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka (Princeton, 1988). 17 Ibid. 18 This world view was partly informed by the Mahavamsa chronicle, a remarkable historical document written by Buddhist monks in the sixth century, which charted the rise and fall of Buddhist civilisation in Sri Lanka. While it contains rich historical material, it has a profoundly religious-nationalist subtext. An important section taught to virtually all Sinhala children is devoted to battles in which Sinhala King Duttugamunu defeats the Tamil King Elara. and so conquers almost all the island. Mahanama Thera, The Mahavamsa: The Great Chronicle of Sri Lanka (Colombo, 2005). threats, gave rise to what is often called a majority-witha-minority-complex vis-à-vis the millions of Tamils in India. 19 At the same time, the perception that Tamils are essentially tied to a homeland in Tamil Nadu, India, remained, and remains, quite widespread. A substantial part of Sri Lanka s modern history involves the Sinhala struggle against Indian immigrants, mainly labourers and traders who came in the wake of the British and the introduction of a globalised, capitalist economic system in which many Sinhalese felt outsiders had the upper hand. By 1910, there were more than 400,000 Indian immigrant plantation workers and by ,000, a fifth of the island s population. Non-plantation worker immigrants were more than 100,000 by No other event in the island s history has had such an impact on the polity of Sri Lanka. 20 By 1920, Sinhala nationalism, nurtured on Buddhist fears of Christianity since the late nineteenth century, had taken up the Indian immigrant issue. Nationalist leaders like S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and D.S. Senanayake of the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) argued that Indian immigrants were pampered by the colonial rulers despite being only temporary residents with no commitment to Sri Lanka. They were seen as limiting employment opportunities for Sinhalese, from whom the tea and rubber plantations and Indian money lenders had taken vast areas of land. What irked Sinhala nationalists most was the attitude of the British Indian government and the Indian nationalist leaders, who seemed to support the immigrants blindly for narrow economic and political reasons. The first major act of government after independence in 1948 was to deny citizenship and voting rights to some 800,000 Indian workers. 21 This was supported by parts of the Sri Lankan Tamil leadership, undermining their own later claims for minority rights. B. NATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE Upon independence, and with the granting of universal franchise, it was inevitable the Sinhalese 70 per cent of the population would be able to redefine ethnic relations as they wished, so long as they were persuaded to vote on 19 Stanley J. Tambiah, Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago, 1986). See also K.M. De Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi, 1999). 20 W.T. Jayasinghe, The Indo-Ceylon Problem: The Politics of Indian Immigrant Labour (Pannipitya, 2002). 21 According to the 1946 census, Indian Tamils totalled 781,000. The 1953 census figure was 974,000.

11 Crisis Group Asia Report N 141, 7 November 2007 Page 5 ethnic lines. 22 Constitutional arrangements at independence lacked sufficient safeguards for minority rights Sinhala Only legislation The political logic of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism emerged with full force in 1956, when S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the SLFP won power on an uncompromising nationalist platform. Its central plank was the promise known as Sinhala Only to establish Sinhala as the single official language for government business within 24 hours of election. 24 Retention of English the language of elites and the colonial regime as in effect the state language had excluded most of the population from active involvement in public affairs. Bandaranaike s language policy was designed to capture the votes of rural, Sinhala-educated elites local administrators, indigenous (ayurvedic) physicians and teachers, who felt marginalised by the English-speaking elites of all ethnic groups and viewed the dominance of English as the source of many of their socio-economic ills. Sinhala Only also gained support from elements of the Sangha, including the Eksath Bikkhu Peramuna (United Bikkhu Front), a political movement of Buddhist monks. Although few in number, the Sangha spearheaded vernacular-speaking, Sinhala Buddhist interest groups, even as national political leadership remained with the Anglicised, Western-educated elites. 25 With Tamils having a disproportionate share of government, university and professional jobs largely due to better education many Sinhalese felt excluded from political and economic power. 26 The 1956 victory of the SLFP-led Mahajana 22 For an analysis of how majority rule under conditions of ethnic block voting can undermine the moral legitimacy of apparently democratic systems, see Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 2000), especially pp Section 29(2) of the Soulbury Constitution, independent Ceylon s first, states: No law shall make a person or any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions are not made liable. No law shall confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons of other communities or religions. Any law made in contravention of sub section (2) shall to the extent of such contravention be void. This only restricted parliament from enacting discriminatory laws but gave no protection against discriminatory practices. 24 Bandaranaike s policy had particular resonance at the time, since Sri Lanka was celebrating the Buddha Jayanti, which commemorated 2,500 years of Buddhism. 25 Michael Roberts, Exploring Confrontation (Switzerland, 1994), pp ; Kenneth Bush, The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read between the Lines (New York, 2004), pp In 1956, Tamils were 30 per cent of the Ceylon Administrative Service, half the clerical service, 60 per cent of engineers and doctors and 40 per cent of the armed forces, Urmila Phadnis, Eksath Peramuna (People s United Front, MEP) sought to reverse, according to Sinhala nationalist logic, the preferential colonial treatment of Tamil elites. Although Sinhala Only was a disastrous policy which prompted decades of confrontation between Tamils and Sinhalese, it was the product of the untenable contradiction between a democratic system in which 70 per cent of voters were Sinhala and a state system in which Sinhalese were seriously underrepresented. It was a landmark in the populist mobilisation of ethnic nationalism that eventually affected the policies of all Sinhala-dominated parties: the SLFP, the UNP and the Old Left, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP). It set in train a process in which all dropped support for the Tamil language having equal legal status. 27 It also set in motion processes of ethnic outbidding in which attempts by government coalitions to come to an agreement with the Tamil Federal Party (or subsequent Tamil parties) were undermined by those in opposition. 28 Inevitably Sinhala Only provoked protests by Tamils, who were now the ones who felt excluded by language policy and its effects on the availability of public sector jobs and services. Peaceful protests by S.J.V. Chevanayagam s Federal Party (FP) in 1956 and 1958 were repressed violently and led to deadly anti-tamil riots across the island. 29 By the end of the decade, most of the small community of English-speaking Burghers (descendants of Dutch and other European settlers) had Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia: the Case of Sri Lanka, India Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 3, p For Sinhala nationalists this evidenced British favouritism and Tamil, specifically Jaffna-elite, collaboration with the colonial rulers. Many scholars have argued that the colonial success of Jaffna Tamils had more to do with the scarcity of fertile land in the north and the abundance of good missionary, English language schooling. See Anthony Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict (London, 1988), pp ; Jane Russell, Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution: (Colombo, 1982). Other scholars add that most non-british plantation owners were Sinhalese; primarily Sinhalese and Muslims prospered in the private sector under British rule. See Michael Roberts, Caste, Conflict and Elite Formation: The Rise of the Karava Elite in Sri Lanka (Cambridge, 1982). 27 Anthony Jeyaratnam Wilson, SJV Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, : A Political Biography (London, 1994), pp See Neil De Votta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford, 2004); Bush, Intra-Group Dimensions, op. cit. 29 Stanley J. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence in Contemporary Sri Lanka (Chicago, 1992), pp

12 Crisis Group Asia Report N 141, 7 November 2007 Page 6 emigrated, concerned they would no longer have a place in an independent Sri Lanka Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact It is not certain Bandaranaike really believed Sinhala Only was a good idea, but it was effective for getting elected. On entering office, he delayed passage of the language bill and began talks with Tamil parties on concessions to minority interests. Tamils were worried not only about jobs and government services. They also demanded greater protection of minority rights generally, including citizenship for Indian Tamils on plantations, as well as guarantees for some form of regional autonomy for the traditionally Tamil-speaking Northern and Eastern Provinces, to balance the overwhelming power of the Sinhala majority. Bandaranaike came up with a three-point proposal: reasonable use of the Tamil language, limited devolution of power to regional councils and constitutional amendments to guarantee the fundamental rights of minorities. Negotiations produced the 1956 Bandaranaike- Chelvanayakam pact, which was notable for the compromises both leaders were willing to make, though the balance was decidedly in Bandaranaike s favour. The proposals for regional autonomy, for instance, remained vague, including the promise to grant local control over state schemes to settle landless Sinhalese in Tamil areas of the Eastern Province. On citizenship for Indian Tamils, Bandaranaike merely conceded that FP proposals would receive early consideration. 31 With a political expediency that was to become all too familiar, the main opposition party, J.R. Jayewardene s UNP, rallied Sinhala Buddhist opinion in protest. Banadaranaike eventually abrogated the pact, leading to a new civil disobedience campaign by Tamil parties, which sparked deadly ethnic riots across the island in Thus started the first cycle in a pattern which has recurred as a central and poisonous feature of the political process at critical junctures. The party in power strives to foster communal accommodation. The major party in opposition manipulates Sinhalese parochialism to wreck that attempt Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact The same dynamics recurred in 1965 but with party roles reversed. The UNP, needing FP support for a solid parliamentary majority, reached agreement with Tamil leaders. The Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact covered familiar ground, offering use of the Tamil language in the north and east for administrative and court matters and a framework for creating district councils, with powers to be allocated after further negotiation, though since the Government should have power under the law to give directions to such Councils in the national interest, there would probably have been only minimal devolution. 33 Finally it covered issues involving the Land Development Ordinance and colonisation, prioritising landless Tamils rights to resettlement in parts of the north and east. Regulations under the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958 were passed in 1966, 34 despite hostility from the SLFP, now backed by leftist parties, including the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the CP, which seemed eager to jump on the Sinhala bandwagon. 35 The plan for district councils, however, was defeated by the opposition, backed by much of the Sangha and by Muslim interest groups fearful of the impact on the political balance in the Eastern Province. 4. Sinhala nationalism and constitutionalism The Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact remained a fading landmark in attempts at inter-ethnic accommodation. The 1972 and 1978 constitutions promoted Sinhala Buddhist hegemony, further centralised the state and failed to provide adequate protection of minority rights. The 1972 document, a product of the SLFP/Marxist United Front (UF) coalition which took power in 1970, eradicated the few remaining minority safeguards and gave Buddhism foremost status. To an extent it and the UF regime s policies were responses to the 1971 JVP insurrection, most directly in university standardisation procedures that expanded education opportunity for rural Sinhala youth at the expense of Sinhalese and Tamils from educationally advanced districts like Colombo and Jaffna. These measures worsened the existing divide. Jaffna-led Tamil students and politicians interpreted university standardisation as 30 Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, Buddhist Burghers and Buddhist Fundamentalism in Bartholomeusz and C. R. De Silva (eds.), Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka (New York, 1998), p Bush, Intra-Group Dimensions, op. cit.; James Manor, The Expedient Utopian Bandaranaike and Ceylon (Cambridge, 1989), pp See also the text of the Bandaranaike- Chelvanayakam Pact, in De Votta, Blowback, op. cit., pp Manor, Expedient Utopian, op. cit., p See Agreement between Dudley Senanayake and SJV Chelvanayakam (1965) in De Votta, Blowback, op. cit., pp See Wilson, SJV Chelvanayakam and the Crisis, op. cit., pp For an interesting analysis of the left parties decision to abandon support for language parity, see Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, op. cit., p. 336.

13 Crisis Group Asia Report N 141, 7 November 2007 Page 7 hostile and mobilised support for a militant Tamil nationalist movement. 36 The UNP s landslide 1977 victory produced a new episode in constitution-building the next year, led by J.R. Jayewardene. It had equally disastrous results. Creation of an immensely powerful executive presidency and a relatively weak judiciary, reinforcement of Buddhism s special status and failure to develop meaningful devolution to predominantly Tamil areas all resulted in a further centralisation of power, in part deliberately designed to buttress the ruling party s domination. The 1978 constitution did have two advantages. First, it created a bill of civil and political rights, which could be used in limited ways to hold the state accountable for abuses. Secondly, the proportional electoral system for parliament allowed minority parties somewhat greater political power than the old first-past-the-post system though party leaders have used this new power regularly to form and break coalitions in a quest for ministerial positions and patronage. 37 C. THE ECONOMICS OF NATIONALISM: LAND, WELFARE AND BUSINESS Sirimavo Bandaranaike s government presided over a huge expansion of the welfare state, as well as nationalisation of much of the economy. The welfare system, which made the state critical in all aspects of economic and social life, became an important mechanism for cementing nationalism in the political system. Political leaders became even more susceptible to nationalist pressure, and welfare policy increasingly began to operate through the same ethno-populist and discriminatory logic as other aspects of state policy, even as it allowed Sri Lanka to achieve some of the best indicators of social well-being outside the industrialised world. The welfare system was built on the foundations of colonial state intervention and was strengthened by the popular mobilisation led by the communist and other Marxist parties, which remained strong through the 1970s. For its income level, Sri Lanka developed high quality-of-life 36 On another reading, university standardisation was meant to give weight to backward districts, whether Sinhalese or Tamil, but was misinterpreted as anti-tamil by the Jaffna-dominated Tamil movement. Crisis Group interviews, D. Sidharthan, politician, and Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, researcher, October In any event, the Tamils sorely missed Section 29 (2) of the Soulbury Constitution, which would have remedied distortions. 37 Asanga Welikala, Towards Two Nations in One State, Liberal Times, vol. 10, no. 3, This practice has become a major source of resentment for many Sinhalese, who see minority parties as unfairly inhibiting the will of the majority. indices in health and literacy. However, the connection between welfare and exclusivist Sinhala nationalism was apparent in the increasing Sinhalisation of government services. 38 The state s role was widely seen as providing jobs to the Sinhala majority. Reforms designed to assist poor and landless peasants contributed to contentious land issues. Successive resettlement schemes most famously the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Program sought to move poor farmers from predominantly Sinhala areas of the south to areas populated by Tamils and Muslims. 39 These schemes changed the demography of Eastern Province substantially. 40 Expanded educational opportunities in the 1970s and 1980s raised the expectations of growing numbers of young people, who placed demands on the state that were impossible to meet in an economy based on volatile agricultural exports. 41 The UNP s decision in 1977 to liberalise the economy and diversify exports was an attempt to address this problem but the reforms further weakened the welfare state and helped fuel the turn to political violence by both Sinhala and Tamil youth. The state s capacity though not yet its size has withered under the pressures of globalisation, poor economic management and military spending. Today the national budget is no longer capable of funding any significant 38 See Roberts, Exploring Confrontation, op. cit., pp , and De Votta, Blowback, op. cit., pp See Mick Moore Ideological History of the Sri Lankan Peasantry, Modern Asian Studies, no. 23 (1) (1989), pp ; Patrick Peebles, Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 49, no. 1 (1990), pp According to the 1946 census, Tamils constituted 48.7 per cent of the population of the Eastern Province, while Moors [Muslims] made up 38.6 per cent and Sinhalese 9.9 per cent. By 1981, Sinhalese accounted for almost 25 per cent of the population, Tamils 42 per cent and Moors While it has been impossible to get accurate population statistics since then, conventional wisdom holds that the Eastern Province is divided roughly equally between the three major communities estimates by the Northeast Provincial Council, based on figures from district secretariats, found Tamils accounted for 42.8 per cent of the province, Moors 36.2, and Sinhalese 20.4 per cent. As a result of these demographic changes, the Eastern Province s history is hotly disputed by Sinhala nationalists and Tamil nationalists alike, with arguments for and against the east as part of a homeland of the Tamil-speaking people. See Jonathan Spencer, Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict (London, 1990) and Qadri Ismail and Pradeep Jeganathan, Unmaking the Nation: The Politics of Identity and History in Modern Sri Lanka (Colombo, 1995). 41 The terms of trade, especially the value of tea, rubber and coconut in world markets, turned sharply against Sri Lanka between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. Crisis Group correspondence, John Rogers, researcher, October 2007.

14 Crisis Group Asia Report N 141, 7 November 2007 Page 8 development projects; almost all revenue goes to public sector salaries and pensions, debt payment and the military. 42 Nonetheless, Sinhala nationalists continue to view the state not just as the rightful protector of the Sinhala Buddhist nation but as their prime source of development, relief and welfare. The private sector has also had a role in the evolution of Sinhala nationalism. In the 1970s, the nationalisation of many sectors prevented private businesses from providing opportunities that might have mitigated minorities grievances. Instead, the public sector and good relations with its political masters became the key elements in economic success. Conversely, when the economy was liberalised in 1977, increased competition from Muslim and Tamil business contributed to a new round of nationalist agitation. A thuggish element emerged in Sinhala nationalism, led by overt racists such as Cyril Mathew, a minister in the UNP government who campaigned against supposed Tamil and Muslim domination of business. Mathew, who also headed a labour union, was implicated in the infamous 1983 pogrom in which Tamil businesses and shops were systematically attacked in Colombo and other towns. 43 This extreme current of Sinhala nationalism, combining politically connected thugs, business interests, and organised crime, became a key part of ethnic politics. The 1983 violence, in which at least 1,000 Tamils died, began a new spiral, with the militant Tamil response provoking more extreme positions by Sinhala nationalists. D. THE INDIAN INTERVENTION India holds an important and complex place in Sinhala nationalist world views. Some contemporary nationalists consider its influence more acceptable because more culturally sensitive than that of Western states. Others regard India with suspicion, drawing, for instance, on historical narratives of ancient Tamil invasions. Delhi s intervention remains highly controversial. In July 1987, troops arrived to enforce the 42 In 2006, debt service payments were 24.5 per cent of current government expenditure, public sector pensions 11 per cent and defence costs 19 per cent; salaries and wages were 32 per cent of recurrent expenditures in the 2006 budget. According to the appropriation bill the government presented in early October 2007, defence expenditure is projected to increase 19 per cent in 2008, amounting to 17.9 per cent of the projected budget. See Annual Report 2006, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, pp , ; also Kelum Bandara, Yohan Perera and Gihan de Chickera, Defence expenditure for 2008 up by 19 percent, Daily Mirror, 11 October Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, op. cit., p. 73. hastily agreed Indo-Lanka Accord, which brought the first real devolution to the north and east. The accord led to the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution and the accompanying Provincial Councils Bill, which extended executive and legislative power to eight provinces, including a newly merged Northeast Province. The attempt to force devolution was deeply resented, 44 provoking violent opposition from both Sinhala and Tamil nationalists. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was designed to protect Tamil civilians from an army offensive against Tamil militants and to police a political agreement but soon found itself fighting the most radical of the Tamil groups, the LTTE, which ultimately forced a humiliating withdrawal after a loss of 1,500 men. Many Sinhala nationalists now argue that the Indian intervention saved the LTTE from an imminent defeat by the Sri Lankan military. 45 Sri Lanka was in no position to oppose Indian pressure. It faced rebellion not only in the Tamil north and east, but also in the south, where a new JVP uprising had broken out. Jayewardene used the Indo-Lanka Accord to redeploy troops to the south, but the accord only gave the insurrection more energy. Political forces in the south were quickly polarised between those that vehemently objected to a loss of Sri Lankan sovereignty and those that felt the intervention had created an opportunity to implement a viable political solution. The Sinhala nationalist reaction took the form of shared mobilisation among parties such as the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), sections of the SLFP, the JVP and the militantly nationalist sections of the Buddhist Sangha. These groups began to coalesce around such bodies as the cross-party Maubima Surakima Vyaparaya (Movement for the Protection of the Motherland, MSV). Founded in 1986, it achieved rapid (albeit short-lived) expansion in the aftermath of the accord. 46 If Sinhala nationalists saw the Thirteenth Amendment and the Provincial Council system as the product of India s violation of Sri Lanka s sovereignty, 47 others, both Tamil and Sinhala, viewed the devolution plan as inadequate. The Provincial Councils were grafted on to a centralised polity and premised on the light devolution or quasi-federalism of the Indian model. Executive control of Provincial Councils was placed in the hands of governors appointed 44 A major source of Sinhalese resentment of India was its covert but well known support for Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, between 1983 and Many believe that without this early support the LTTE would not have become so powerful. 45 See De Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind, op. cit., pp Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, op. cit., pp This view continues to be strong among many Sinhala nationalists and colours the attitude of many toward any form of international mediation to end the conflict.