A SELECTIVE WAR ON TERRORISM?

Transcription

1 South Asia 227 SOUTH ASIA A SELECTIVE WAR ON TERRORISM? Walter K. Andersen ABSTRACT Adjustments in foreign and domestic policies in post-cold War Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India have provided opportunities for the growth of terrorism. The mixed record of the war on terrorism in South Asia has resulted from challenges posed by differing interpretations of terrorism among South Asian states, the U.S. emphasis on counter-terrorism at the expense of addressing social and political causes of radical sentiment, and the distraction of Iraq. Tough measures against terrorist groups in Pakistan and closer economic cooperation among South Asian states could expand the number of important stakeholders in regional peace. Terrorism will continue to pose a regional challenge unless key problems are addressed. These are the strengthening of the central government in Afghanistan, an end to cross-border terrorist movement into India, a serious attempt on the Indian side to address Kashmiri Muslim discontent, and a regional consensus of what constitutes terrorism among South Asian states. Walter Andersen is Associate Director of the South Asia Studies Program and Professor of South Asian Studies at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. He is grateful to the South Asia Studies research assistants Shakti C Ganti and Ravi Satkalmi for their many hours of assistance collecting data for this project.

2 228 Strategic Asia Introduction South Asia remains at the epicenter of the fight against international terrorism. The participants in the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington had links to leaders of the Al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan. 1 Prior to September 11, the Taliban authorities in Afghanistan had hosted Osama bin Laden and other senior figures in the Al Qaeda network as well as a large part of its international cadre. Even after the defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda after the U.S.-led military efforts in late 2001, many of their cadre remain in the mountainous area straddling the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they are increasingly a threat both to the new political order in Afghanistan and to Pakistan s President Pervez Musharraf. Also contributing to regional tensions are Pakistan-based radical Islamist groups, some with Al Qaeda links, that use violent methods in the pursuit of a theocratic state at home and an end to Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim majority state claimed by both India and Pakistan and the dispute over which has been the cause of two wars and several military confrontations since the partition of British India in India was the first country to sign up unconditionally to Operation Enduring Freedom to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban inside Afghanistan, and saw this as part of a larger effort to defeat the terrorism that confronted it in Jammu and Kashmir. 2 The geographic position of Pakistan made it a more central player in that effort than India and the recipient of substantial military aid. Washington s perception of President Musharraf as critical in keeping his country committed to the war on terrorism has contributed to a U.S. reluctance to hold Musharraf accountable for his backsliding on commitments to build democratic institutions at home and to prevent the movement of Pakistan-based Islamic fighters into India. One consequence of this is that Indian leaders are skeptical about U.S. counter-terrorism objectives and have dropped references to a strategic relationship in which the United States and India would work together to keep peace in the Indian Ocean littoral area. A new Indian government elected in mid-2004 has said it will keep a principled distance from U.S. security policies while maintaining a close working relationship with the United States so as to benefit from trade and investment considered necessary for the continued growth of its economy. A more independent Indian foreign policy is likely to show a renewed emphasis on relations with Iran and an independent Iraq, two countries with which India historically has had close political and economic ties, as well as with China and Russia. This chapter first addresses the different efforts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to adjust their foreign policies of the pre-september 11 period to fit the new circumstances and analyzes why those differences

3 South Asia 229 contributed to the rise of terrorism in the region and to continued tensions among regional states. It then analyzes the mixed record of the war on terrorism in South Asia, focusing on the challenges posed by differing definitions of terrorism by regional states, as well as the U.S. emphasis on military responses at the expense of efforts to address the social and political causes that give rise to radical anti-western sentiment. 3 Addressing causes is most urgent in the case of Pakistan, where considerably more attention and money needs to be directed to expanding education and strengthening the country s weak civil society and its political and governmental institutions. 4 Finally, it analyzes the benefits for the United States of a foreign policy that aims to build a long-term relationship with India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to enhance U.S. interests in South Asia. Among the more important of those interests are denying terrorist groups a regional safe haven and popular support, reducing tensions among regional states (two of them India and Pakistan nuclear-capable), and increasing U.S. influence in the region. The continuing Indo-Pakistani tensions over Kashmir have an adverse impact on all of these interests, an important reason for the United States to retain influence with both countries. A ceasefire along the Line of Control in November 2003 laid the groundwork for a decision by President Musharraf and then-indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee two months later to revive bilateral talks on all outstanding issues after a five-year hiatus. Pakistan must keep a rein on movement of cross-border Islamic militants in order for these talks to continue, and Washington can play a constructive role by pressuring President Musharraf in this direction as it continues its diplomatic efforts to get the two sides to bridge their differences. Such pressure may be critical to sustain these bilateral talks because President Musharraf s present conciliatory stance could represent a tactical position rather than a strategic change in policy regarding the use of Pakistan-based militants to confront India in Kashmir. South Asia on the Eve of September 11 On the eve of September 11, 2001, only India among the three South Asian states had made a relatively smooth transition in the decade following the end of the Cold War. While India lost its superpower benefactor with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian security in the post-cold War period was enhanced by the termination of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and improved relations with China. India consequently had the diplomatic space to pursue good relations with countries that helped it achieve the faster annual economic growth rates that are an important goal of the market reforms adopted in the early 1990s. Good relations with the United States

4 230 Strategic Asia have been of great importance for economic development. In the final years of the Clinton administration, Indians, impressed by the U.S. criticism of cross-border incursions from Pakistan, began to look at the United States as a potential security partner, replacing the long-held view that America was hostile to India s interests in South Asia and beyond. 5 India also began to take a more relaxed view of China s South Asia policy in the late 1990s, and rapidly expanding Sino-Indian trade assumed an important role in driving the relationship. 6 Indian relations with Pakistan, however, remained tense during the decade prior to September 11, as Pakistan-based militants became increasingly assertive in Jammu and Kashmir and even in the Indian capital, New Delhi. Periodic efforts to revive talks between the two states broke down over differences on the Kashmir issue, with each side unwilling to compromise on long-held positions rejected by the other. In its own counter-terrorism moves, India began in the late 1990s to cooperate with Iran and Russia to support the Northern Alliance, a group opposed to the Taliban. Contributing to the Indian decision to help the Northern Alliance was the training of anti-indian militants headed for Kashmir at camps in Afghanistan run by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 7 In contrast to India, Pakistan was wracked by domestic political crises and a stagnant economy, which exacerbated its sense of vulnerability to its much larger next-door neighbor. Pakistan supported the Taliban in Afghanistan to ensure itself a safe western border and backed anti-indian Islamic militants to tie up Indian forces on Pakistan s eastern border and elicit international sympathy for the Kashmir insurgency. Not only did these intrusive policies undermine Pakistan s relations with India, Iran, and Russia, but it also brought the three states closer together in their efforts to support the Northern Alliance a loose and often fractious alliance of mainly ethnically non-pushtun commanders who constituted the last remaining obstacle to complete Taliban control of Afghanistan 8 and by extension to undermine Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. By the late 1990s Pakistan s ties with the Taliban also strained relations with the United States. The Taliban drew international attention because its leader, Mullah Omar, provided a safe haven for Al Qaeda operatives. Afghanistan was plunged into a civil war among the various mujahidin groups that had once fought the Soviet Union and its client regime. This chaotic situation provided an opening for radical Islamic groups to establish a presence in the country. The most successful of these groups, Osama bin Laden s Al Qaeda, developed a symbiotic relationship with the Taliban after his return to Afghanistan in Despite the U.S. identification of Al Qaeda as the source of several attacks on U.S. targets prior to September 11, the Clinton

5 South Asia 231 administration, lacking support for any direct military action in Afghanistan from such key neighbors as Pakistan, used diplomacy in an unsuccessful effort to contain Al Qaeda. India s Successful Post-Cold War Transition While the end of the Cold War had deprived India of its great power patron, the USSR, its security was in fact enhanced by the improvement of relations with China and the suspension of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. In this less-threatening security situation, India had room for maneuver to pursue a foreign policy aimed at benefiting from newly implemented market reforms in ways that would help stabilize the domestic political situation and enhance India s international status. Achieving these goals required improved relations with the United States as well as other sources of international trade, investment, and high technology like Southeast Asia, Europe, and Japan. The gradual politicization of India s formerly disadvantaged groups following the country s independence in 1947, especially the peasant castes that constitute almost half of the population, required a significant improvement of India s sluggish economy to avoid the destabilizing violence that often accompanies rising expectations amidst continuing economic scarcity. With the emergence of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998 as the core party in the governing coalition, the notion of a great India became a part of the national agenda. The new government put good relations with the United States at the top of its policy agenda in the hope of winning economic gains as well as closer security cooperation with the world s remaining superpower. The market reform policies adopted in the early 1990s produced results that seemed to address both the social issues and the question of national prestige: the economy sustained annual growth rates of more than seven percent between 1995 and Since then, India s economy has maintained moderate growth at least four percent even in years when poor weather led to a decline in agricultural output. This performance contrasts sharply with the slower and much more variable pace of past decades. 10 Growth in fiscal year jumped significantly and is expected to exceed eight percent, 11 the goal set by the former government of Prime Minister Vajpayee ( ), and about the same rate as China s. India has also become more exposed and more confident in dealing with the global economy. Government policy now welcomes foreign portfolio investment, which reached a total of $8.2 billion in calendar year Merchandise trade is now equivalent to more than 21 percent of GDP, up from less than 12 percent in the 1980s as barriers to the imports of

6 232 Strategic Asia manufactured goods have fallen sharply. 13 India during the 1990s became a major global competitor in exports of software and business services, which now account for almost three percent of global spending on information technology. 14 Meanwhile, foreign exchange reserves grew to $110 billion in early 2004 from only a few billion dollars in the early 1990s; the present sum is more than adequate to cope with any foreseeable disruptions to the global or domestic scene. 15 Viewing Indian foreign policy as a series of concentric circles, 16 India s new economically oriented foreign policy could eventually make the smaller South Asian neighbors in the first circle more closely tied to and dependent on India. With over three-quarters of the region s wealth and population, India is South Asia s economic driver. Not only is it the fastest growing economy in the region, but there is also a significant basis for increased economic interaction with its neighbors that will benefit them all. 17 India needs significantly greater amounts of energy for its expanding economy; its neighbors, possessing substantial reserves of hydroelectric power (Nepal) and gas (Bangladesh), need the capital that would be generated from energy sales to India. Until recently, however, only a tiny fraction of the trade among regional states was with each other, a situation sustained by the autarkic policies adopted throughout the region after World War II. The compulsions of globalization have forced India and all its neighbors during the past several years to look outward for trade, investment, and high technology. India s South Asian neighbors are beginning to realize that, like it or not, their future economic well-being depends on closer economic ties with India. Motivated by the goal of higher economic growth rates, they all backed the January 2004 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) agreement to work for a South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA). 18 India s new foreign policy thrust has also increased chances of its becoming a player in the second circle (the Indian Ocean littoral, Southeast and East Asia) and give it an opportunity to assume a role in the third circle, on the world stage. Key to its goal of playing a more important role in the second circle has been the improvement of relations with China. India has assumed a more relaxed view of China s South Asia policy, encouraged by its call in 1996 to put the Kashmir issue on a back burner and China s refusal to support Pakistan during the Kargil incursion and subsequent confrontations between India and Pakistan. 19 India consequently appears more confident about a diplomatic approach to the long-festering boundary dispute and other differences. For the first time, India and China appear ready to give economics a key role in driving the relationship. Two-way trade with China has grown by about 30 percent per year since the late 1990s and reached some $8.4 billion in

7 South Asia 233 President Clinton, in his high-profile March 2000 visit to India, showcased the country as an emerging world power and potential partner. The new Bush administration further underscored India s potential geo-strategic importance as an Asian power by selecting it in mid-2001 as one of the few countries to be consulted on the U.S. missile defense initiative. India, eager to strengthen its ties to Washington, responded favorably to the U.S. missile defense initiative. In the wake of September 11 India further signaled its desire for a closer relationship by offering unconditional military support in the fight against terrorism, an effort many Indians interpreted as forging a strong strategic relationship around an issue in which the vital interests of both sides coincided. Supporting Militants Undermines Pakistan s Position Pakistan followed a trajectory very different from India s in the decade following the Cold War. Instability marked the country s political system as military pressure forced one elected government after another to step down. A tumultuous decade culminated in a military coup in October Its economy was in a shambles, and sectarian violence was on the rise, leading some analysts to characterize Pakistan as a failed state. During the 1990s chronic political and social instability hastened the deterioration of the economy, as did the recurrent crises with India over Kashmir. Continued tensions with India led to high military expenditures that crowded out capital spending for economic growth. 21 Investment in infrastructure and industry were low; underemployment and unemployment grew, and the percentage of the population defined as living in poverty expanded from 18 percent to 34 percent. 22 In the last five years of the twentieth century, per capita economic growth in Pakistan averaged just 0.5 percent, significantly lower than that of other South Asian countries such as Sri Lanka (3.7 percent), Bangladesh (3.4 percent), and India (4 percent). The 1990s was the first time since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 that Pakistan s annual economic growth rate lagged behind that of India. 23 Pakistan also found itself increasingly isolated regionally in the decade prior to September 11. Supporting Afghanistan s Taliban movement, prompted partly by a desire to have a secure western border, produced a backlash among other neighboring countries, resulting in closer cooperation by Iran, India, and Russia against the Taliban, and by extension against Pakistan. This took concrete form with support to the Northern Alliance. Assistance to the Taliban was managed by Pakistan s military intelligence branch, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which has a long history of involvement in Afghan politics. Among the recipients of this massive assistance were thousands of madrassahs, which taught

8 234 Strategic Asia young Pakistanis and refugee Afghans a radical brand of Sunni Islam that inspired thousands to fight for the Taliban in the Afghan civil war and with Pakistan-based groups in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Saudi and Pakistani intelligence facilitated the efforts of Saudi charities and wealthy Saudis like Osama bin Laden to fund religious schools and various projects associated with the war against the Soviets. When the Soviets pulled out, thousands of young men in Pakistan had guns, battlefield experience, and a fervent desire to fight for a purified Islamic order. Many of them were to join the civil war in Afghanistan; some were drawn to the anti-indian insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir that began in the late 1980s at the same time the Soviets were withdrawing from Afghanistan; and still others joined sectarian groups that fought each other on the streets of Pakistani cities. Al Qaeda during the 1990s was to play a bridging role between many of the groups that attracted these individuals. Afghanistan s Civil War Attracts Radical Pan-Islamists Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet departure in 1989 was the scene of a civil war in which all its neighbors held a stake. Taliban activists pushed the fractious Northern Alliance into a small mountainous area of northeastern Afghanistan at the end of the 1990s. Bin Laden, who found refuge in Afghanistan in 1996, 24 developed a close relationship with Taliban leader Mullah Omar and contributed men and money to the effort to defeat other contending groups. He also worked with the Taliban to establish training camps that prepared a generation of terrorists for the fight against variously defined enemies of Islam, like the Indians in Jammu and Kashmir. A dramatic decline in U.S. involvement in Afghan affairs in the late 1980s was the result of a combination of disinterest and distraction with significant foreign policy issues elsewhere, particularly the collapse of the Soviet Union. 25 It took the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by groups believed to be associated with Al Qaeda to revive U.S. interest in Afghanistan. 26 Lack of cooperation from neighboring countries like Pakistan worked against any direct U.S. military action. Although there was an American missile attack on an Al Qaeda camp in August 1998, it failed to kill any key members of bin Laden s entourage. Rather, Washington adopted an ineffectual contain and isolate strategy featuring both unilateral and UN-sponsored sanctions. By 1999 the Taliban had transformed Afghanistan into a terrorist-sponsored state, so reliant on Al Qaeda money and fighters that there was no hope of expelling Al Qaeda operatives or even restricting their activities. Even after the scattering of their forces in late 2001, the two groups have maintained close links in the mountain refuges that straddle the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

9 South Asia 235 The Limits of Post-September 11 Cooperation The anti-western compulsions of Al Qaeda guarantee long-term U.S. commitment to the amorphous existential terrorist challenge, thus ensuring a sustained U.S. security involvement with India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. After September 11, the United States and the three South Asian states were for the first time united, at least in principle, on a security issue important to all of them. Differing interpretations of what constitutes terrorism, however, impede cooperation among them and constitute a threat to regional stability. While Pakistan has cracked down on Al Qaeda activists in its territory, President Musharraf s government does not regard Kashmiri militants or the anti-karzai Taliban rebels as genuine terrorists. The United States, dependent on Musharraf to fight Al Qaeda and confident it can resolve Indo-Pakistani tensions, has yet to put real pressure on the Pakistani president to stamp out Islamic radical groups that engage in violence within India or against the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan. 27 The Karzai government lacks the security forces necessary to assert political authority against powerful warlords and to contain an increasingly assertive Taliban/Al Qaeda challenge, which in turn impedes economic reconstruction. President Karzai has repeatedly called for substantially greater security assistance from the international community, especially critical as the country prepares for presidential elections scheduled for October Propping up an Unstable Regime in Afghanistan The U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, which started on October 7, 2001, involved a massive air offensive, Northern Alliance forces, and employed Special Operations forces. While this was a war on the cheap designed to minimize American losses, the Taliban/Al Qaeda front collapsed after about two months of fighting. Kabul was occupied by U.S. forces on November 13, 2001, and Kandahar, the Taliban/Al Qaeda center, was taken on December 7, Outsourcing the hunt on the ground to the Northern Alliance forces saved many American lives, but at the same time enabled Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar and most of their closest entourage to evade capture. The use of Northern Alliance forces to capture areas north of the Hindu Kush, moreover, enabled the return of warlords responsible for much of the inter-ethnic violence that developed during the early 1990s. Many of these warlords were given key positions in the new government. 29 While defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda in ground battles proved relatively easy, constructing a viable government has been much more difficult. Under the Bonn Accords signed by four major non-taliban groups in December 2001, a six-month interim government was formed under the chairmanship of a Pushtun tribal leader, Hamid Karzai. Much of the real

10 236 Strategic Asia power, however, rested with three ethnic Tajiks who had been close associates of Ahmed Shah Masood, the charismatic Tajik leader who had mounted the most effective military resistance to the Taliban from his Panjshir Valley base before his assassination on the eve of September This team continued in the second phase of the Bonn Accord, a Transitional Administration starting in June 2002 selected by a traditional representative body, the Loya Jirga. This was a worrisome development for Pakistan, which remains concerned about the emergence of an unfriendly government that might work together with India to foment trouble within Pakistan s often restless western provinces. The transition to the third and more permanent phase resulting in a popularly elected parliament and president has been delayed from June to October 2004 for the presidential election, and to April 2005 for the parliamentary election. A significant revival in 2003 of Taliban and Al Qaeda activities in Afghanistan, mainly in Pushtun majority regions of the west and southwest, underscores that Operation Enduring Freedom is incomplete. 31 Lacking a state sponsor, an elaborate system of training camps, or cities to protect, Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters no longer need to maintain a system of conventional military training or a headquarters staff to coordinate global activities. Suicide bombers and hit-and-run guerrilla fighters can easily be trained and housed in the caves of south and eastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. The amorphous network of Islamist radicals now operate in virtually autonomous cells, reducing their ability to manage large spectacular attacks like those on September 11, but not their ability to inflict damage and to mobilize support. 32 The United States has recently increased its troop deployment in Afghanistan from 14,000 to 20,000 troops, concentrated mainly in the restive south and east, compared to over ten times that number in Iraq. Several hundred of the U.S. troops are assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which, as of June 2004, provided security for reconstruction efforts at 13 sites; but their major task is not to hunt for Al Qaeda or Taliban fighters. The focus on Iraq has stretched U.S. Army personnel resources to the breaking point, making it highly unlikely that significantly more U.S. troops will be sent to Afghanistan unless international contingents replace U.S. forces in Iraq. 33 Hobbled politically by an inadequate security presence, domestic unrest limits the country s ability to make use of economic assistance. Since the fall of the Taliban, donors pledged at Tokyo in January 2002 to provide some $5 billion for reconstruction, about one-half the amount requested by Afghanistan; donors at a March 2004 meeting in Berlin pledged to raise $12 billion for three years, about the amount requested by Kabul. 34 This may be all that Afghanistan can absorb now because of continuing vio-

11 South Asia 237 lence in much of the country. In late 2003 Washington pledged additional financial assistance, promised to speed up the training of the Afghan army and police, and increased troop deployments, but these efforts are not likely to make much difference unless the United States more aggressively targets warlords and drug smugglers and puts pressure on Pakistan to crack down on the Taliban. 35 Reaping Benefits But a Potential Spoiler The events of September 11 presented Pakistan s military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, with a dilemma. Pakistan had nurtured the Taliban to ensure a friendly neighbor to the west, and looked the other way when the Taliban leadership developed close links to Al Qaeda and adopted much of Osama bin Laden s pan-islamic ideology. But Pakistan s geographic position made its support essential in the fight against Al Qaeda. Not to back the United States in the war on terrorism would risk making it part of the problem at a time when India was offering unconditional military support. President Musharraf s dramatic shift in Afghan policy resulted in a major improvement in Pakistan s international situation. Sanctions imposed by the United States at the time of the May 1998 nuclear tests were lifted (as they were for India); Washington began to provide substantial military and economic assistance, including debt forgiveness; and in March 2004 Pakistan was informed that it would be designated a major non-nato ally, qualifying it for the speedy delivery of military equipment that can be used in the fight against terrorist enclaves in Pakistan. 36 The country thus moved from the category of a problematic and perhaps even failed state to that of a close ally of the United States in the war on terrorism. The war on terrorism has also generally benefited Musharraf politically at home. He has gained international status, and most importantly, substantial military assistance from the United States, firming up his legitimacy within the military, the ultimate source of power in Pakistan. Washington has lavished public praise on his leadership and demonstrated great tolerance of his lapses in promoting democracy, the continued activities of terrorist groups on Pakistani soil, and the nuclear proliferation activities of Abdul Qadir Khan, long-time head of Pakistan s major government-run nuclear research institution. Pakistan, however, approaches its counter-terrorist tasks with conflicted foreign policy goals. 37 It wants a friendly Afghan government, but is pledged to the destruction of the Taliban that could give Pakistan the secure western borders that it wants. It wants to force India to negotiate the Kashmir issue and has supported the Muslim insurgency as a way to reopen the issue, but Washington specifically and the international com-

12 238 Strategic Asia munity more broadly has told Pakistan that it should end such support and that Kashmiri militants should not cross the Line of Control (LOC). Pakistan has suffered major foreign policy setbacks on both Afghanistan and Kashmir. Afghanistan s Karzai government is cool and often publicly critical of what it alleges to be continuing Pakistani interference in domestic affairs. To make matters worse, Kabul has established close relations with India, which maintains a large official presence and is also well represented in the NGO community in Afghanistan. Regarding Kashmir, the war on terrorism has focused international attention on the terrorist aspects of the anti-indian struggle rather than on the issue of self-determination that Pakistan has employed to buttress its case. Musharraf has responded, to a point, when Washington has put pressure on him to stop cross-border terrorist incursions into India. Following the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, he reacted with a January 12, 2002, speech to the nation claiming that Pakistan would not tolerate terrorism in any form. Eight groups were officially banned, including the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, which were among the most active Pakistan-based groups mobilizing and training young men to fight the Indians. However, these groups reappeared under new names and almost all their leaders were released after short periods of detention, a pattern that was to be repeated. 38 Following the May 14, 2002, killing of the military dependents of Indian soldiers in a residential area of a military camp, an incident that many feared could lead to war, Musharraf told visiting U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage that he would end such activity permanently. In both cases, however, the crackdown was more tactical than strategic and designed to please the United States, and was followed soon after with revived activity of the ostensibly banned groups. 39 In late 2003 Musharraf again banned newly named versions of several previously banned groups, including the Jaish-e-Mohammed operating under its new name, the Khuddam al-islam. The renamed Lashkar-e- Toiba, now calling itself the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, however, was not put on the latest ban order, even though it is one of the most active Pakistan-based extremist groups. This exception might be due to the relative popularity that Lashkar-e-Toiba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa enjoys in Pakistan in light of its public welfare activities and close links to Pakistan s security services. Moreover, it does not fit the new ban s official definition of being an organization engaged in sectarian violence within Pakistan; Musharraf has a record of dealing harshly and quickly with groups involved with domestic sectarian violence. 40 Musharraf has carried out his obligation to hunt for Al Qaeda operatives, and Pakistan s security forces have captured and handed over to

13 South Asia 239 the United States some 500 of them, including such key figures as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al Qaeda s former head of operations who was captured in March Senior Al Qaeda activists have responded by lashing out against Musharraf and his government. In December 2003 assassins tried twice to kill him as he traveled between Islamabad and his military headquarters in nearby Rawalpindi. Within the next few months, efforts were made to kill the military corp commander of Karachi and the person selected by Musharraf to be prime minister, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz. Musharraf himself publicly charged that Al Qaeda was responsible, stating that the organization and its collaborators are at the front of a queue of people who want to kill me. 41 These attempts occurred only months after Osama bin Laden s deputy, Ayman al-zawahiri, called on Muslims to oust Musharraf. When Musharraf launched an attack in the mountains of Pakistan s northwestern Federally Administered Tribal areas to capture key Al Qaeda figures in early March 2004, al-zawahiri issued another threat to Musharraf, calling again on Muslims to topple this agent government, which will continue to surrender to the Americans until it destroys Pakistan. 42 Musharraf took a considerable risk of alienating the tribal population in a region that been virtually self-governing, even during the colonial period. 43 No significant Al Qaeda figures were caught when the operation ground to a halt in late March While Pakistan has succeeded in capturing Al Qaeda operatives since September 11, not a single key Taliban operative has been captured, almost certainly demonstrating both popular support for them among the large ethnic Pushtun population of western Pakistan and the government s continuing interest in using them to serve Pakistan s interest in Afghanistan. 45 Musharraf has been equally reluctant to crack down on groups that are fighting Indian sovereignty in Kashmir because they too are potential assets in serving national interests. Musharraf s shifting stance on the various Islamic groups underscores the conflicting pressures on him. 46 He walks a fine line as a partner in the global war on terrorism. Polls in Pakistan have consistently revealed that the war on terrorism is not popular, with many Pakistanis viewing it as a fight against Islam. Ironically, the religious parties, which are critical of Pakistan s participation in the war, are politically allied to Musharraf, and their votes in the National Assembly give him a majority there. Moreover, many ethnic Pushtuns in Pakistan sympathize with the largely Pushtun Taliban; the religious parties and others see Kashmir as the unfinished business of the partition of the subcontinent in Pakistan is in many ways a victim of the terrorist activity that has flourished because of the contradictory features of its political system: a weak

14 240 Strategic Asia state structure that cannot prevent sectarian violence or shut down radical Islamic groups; and state agencies, most notably the ISI, that nurture terrorist groups to advance Pakistan s foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir. 47 A fragile state structure threatens chronic instability, posing a major complication in the global war on terrorism. Much of the U.S. assistance to Pakistan has aimed at reviving its faltering economy. 48 Generous U.S. assistance, combined with efforts to stabilize the national budget, has enabled the country to resolve its balance of payments crisis. Pakistan now has over $11 billion in hard currency reserves, the equivalent of 11 months imports, and real GDP growth was a healthy 5 percent in The country s major stock exchange had one of the highest growth rates in Asia in recent years. More problematic however is the micro-economic situation. The investment rate has hovered at a very modest rate of between 15 and 16 percent of GDP. Fixed investment creating new productive facilities and ultimately new jobs has been stuck at slightly less than 14 percent of GDP. Unless there is a substantial improvement, Pakistan will continue to face the prospect of social instability that flows from high rates of unemployment and poverty, which the World Bank estimates to have risen to one-third of the population. 50 The other areas that need substantially more investment are education and health. While there has been increased spending in these areas over the past few years, decades of anemic budgetary allocation have left a large percentage of Pakistan s population ill and illiterate, a gap that various Islamic groups have sought to fill, earning them considerable popular goodwill among the poor. Musharraf, moreover, has yet to make an effort to create a viable political system, largely because that would undermine moves to institutionalize a role for the military in the evolving political order. 51 An April 2002 referendum endorsing a five-year extension of Musharraf s rule had no constitutional standing; his unilateral changes to the constitution were not his to make and he manipulated the electoral process leading up to the October 2002 national elections to strengthen an opportunistic grouping of politicians calling itself the Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-e-Azam), cobbled together to back him and weaken the mainstream secular Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, respectively, both in exile). Musharraf s manipulations produced a fractured assembly that required him to rely on the six-party alliance of Islamic parties, the Muttahada Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), to insure himself the two-thirds majority needed to pass key constitutional amendments, such as the one extending his presidency to

15 South Asia 241 India-Pakistan: An Uncertain Relationship The war on terrorism should have advanced the goal of improved Indo- Pakistan relations because both countries are technically on the same side in that strategic fight. The two states, however, have had a tense relationship for most of the period since September 11, including a confrontation in the first half of 2002 that involved the dispatch of more than a million troops to their frontiers. The root cause of this tension has been the movement of Pakistan-based anti-indian fighters across the LOC in Kashmir. Following a November 2003 ceasefire and a successful January 2004 meeting between President Musharraf and then-prime Minister Vajpayee in Islamabad, 53 the two countries reopened talks that included the contentious Kashmir question. 54 At the initial working-level meetings in February 2004, the two sides formulated a road map for the talks, agreeing to a comprehensive agenda of issues basically repeating the repertoire of issues agreed to at the February 1999 Lahore summit when Vajpayee and then- Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif charted an ambitious schedule of negotiations on all the major bilateral differences. The two sides are scheduled to review progress on this set of talks in August The outpouring of public goodwill in Pakistan toward a visiting Indian cricket team 55 and the large number of Indian fans (including the children of Indian Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi) attending the March-April 2004 India-Pakistan matches suggests that there is considerable public sentiment for improved bilateral relations. 56 This cricket diplomacy has been followed by cultural, sports, and business exchanges prompted by the hope for sustained peace in the subcontinent. The potentially significant economic gains from closer bilateral Indo- Pakistani relations provide an important incentive for Musharraf to make a strategic shift on the issue of cross-border terrorism. He and other participants at the January 2004 SAARC summit in Islamabad focused on the gains from closer regional economic cooperation. The seven participating countries agreed to start a negotiating process to launch a South Asia Free Trade Area by January Pakistan s Janus-faced approach to terrorism in the past, however, had earlier stymied Prime Minister Vajpayee s efforts to place Indo-Pakistani relations on a stable footing, a problem that could confront his successor as well. The new Congress-led coalition in India may react even more harshly than its predecessor to a major terrorist attack in order to avoid being labeled as soft on terrorism by the Hindu nationalist BJP. Indians, moreover, remain suspicious that Musharraf s recent conciliatory moves are tactical and not strategic, easy to make during the winter months when severe weather severely reduces movement across the moun-

16 242 Strategic Asia tainous LOC in Kashmir. At a March 2004 conference sponsored by the prestigious India Today magazine in New Delhi, Musharraf reverted to earlier language that Kashmir is at the center-stage of Indo-Pakistani relations. 58 For Indians, such language connotes Musharraf s unwillingness to take tough action against terrorist groups that operate in Kashmir. Musharraf went on to say that Pakistan might be forced to go back to square one unless there is substantial progress on the Kashmir issue, raising concerns that he might condone cross-border activities if not satisfied by progress made by the negotiators on the specific issue of Kashmir within the basket of issues identified at the 2004 SAARC summit. Indians, moreover, are concerned that Musharraf will interpret the designation as a major non-nato ally as a sign that Pakistani support is so critical to Washington that it will not hold him accountable for revived cross-border activity. Keeping the talks on track, a major goal of U.S. foreign policy in South Asia, therefore, requires that the United States leverage its aid to get Musharraf to minimize the cross-border movement of terrorists and to close their training camps inside Pakistan. Despite the outpouring of Indian and Pakistani public goodwill after the 2004 SAARC summit and the cricket matches two months later, there is a deep residue of suspicion in each country about the other. 59 Among the most outspoken critics in Pakistan of improved relations with India are the Muslim parties, which are de facto political allies with President Musharraf. Radical Muslim groups, which thrive on the tensions linked to the Kashmir question, can be expected to try to sabotage any peace process. In India, the Hindu nationalist right is equally critical of any improvement of relations with Pakistan. Not only is Islam portrayed as an existential threat to the kind of culturally homogenous nation the Hindu right seeks, but it uses the issue of terrorism to whip up support against Indian Muslims and Pakistan. This was most dramatically demonstrated in the buildup to mid state assembly elections in the western Indian state of Gujarat when a BJP chief minister abetted murderous rioting against the state s Muslims by the most radical elements on the Hindu right, and likely even lent support to it. 60 While the BJP s national leadership did not back the hard line of its chief minister in Gujarat, the BJP in its new role in New Delhi as the major opposition party might more openly pursue a Hindu nationalist cultural agenda. It will certainly demand a tough Indian response to any major revival of terrorist activity in India. Something Less than a Strategic Partner The apparent U.S. reluctance so far to exert real pressure on Musharraf to take firm action against the Pakistan-based groups that operate in India

17 South Asia 243 has raised doubts in India about whether the U.S. strategy to defeat terrorism includes the terrorist threat to India and whether Washington continues to take Indian security interests seriously. Moreover, there is some hesitancy in both Washington and New Delhi to move beyond past legacies that have impeded cooperation, such as the U.S. perception of India as a threat to various nonproliferation regimes and the Indian view of the United States as a threat to its independent action as an international player and as a victim of U.S. policies, including the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. While the United States lifted sanctions, imposed in 1998 at the time of India s nuclear tests, and embarked on military sales and cooperation, including joint maneuvers with Indian naval, air, and ground forces, it has not taken steps in other areas that Indians have defined as key signposts of a close U.S.-Indian bilateral relationship. Preeminent among these is the transfer of high technology that could bolster India s international economic position. High technology transfer from the United States to India is at the center of the issues that the two sides have talked about since soon after September 11 and now go under the name of Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership. 61 Most of the ideas incorporated in this rubric are in the conceptual stage, and steps to implement them are unlikely unless senior U.S. administration officials take a personal interest and break the logjam caused by bureaucratic wrangling. The lack of movement is further complicated by a new set of officials in India who, having been out power for eight years, have to determine how the Next Steps fit into their larger foreign policy framework. India s inability to establish a strong partnership with the United States was further demonstrated when Secretary of State Colin Powell and the State Department s Assistant Secretary for South Asia in their March 16, 2004, visit to New Delhi did not inform their hosts about U.S. plans to name Pakistan a major non-nato ally during their next stop in Islamabad. This was especially embarrassing for the Vajpayee government, as it was in the midst of a national election campaign and the prime minister s enemies were questioning his ability to safeguard Indian security interests as well as the value of his government s close identification with U.S. security policy. The early foreign policy pronouncements of the victorious Congress Partyled coalition suggest a more independent foreign policy that is less concerned about U.S. interests and is less inclined to involve Washington in any discussion of South Asian security issues. 62 Challenges and Opportunities for the United States The global war on terrorism provides the United States an opportunity to bring the South Asian states closer together than they have been since

18 244 Strategic Asia Pakistan and India became independent states in Washington maintains close links with both countries and, for the first time, both India and Pakistan view the United States as a friendly state capable of assisting the resolution of regional problems. Good relations between India and Pakistan help in the war on terrorism and serve larger U.S. interests as well. Present U.S. policy, however, risks squandering the leverage it now possesses, especially with a new Indian government determined to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Terrorism in South Asia is a regional phenomenon requiring a regional approach. A regional approach, however, is impeded by differing definitions within the region of what constitutes terrorism, and Washington s reluctance to work for a consensus of views. Challenges The new zero-sum fallacy in South Asia. U.S. policymakers indicate they want to avoid the previous zero-sum character of U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan, 63 but this is unrealistic since U.S. policy toward one country invariably has an impact on the other. The negative Indian reaction to the surprise U.S. announcement of Pakistan s status as a major non-nato ally is a clear example of the consequences of ignoring the linkage between the two countries. The lack of a common definition of terrorism has the potential of triggering a conflict between India and Pakistan, and the lack of a regional perspective in U.S. policy has resulted in widely differing definitions of what constitutes terrorism in South Asia. Pakistan does not view groups that operate in Kashmir as terrorists, and it has a similarly benign view of the Taliban. The argument emanating from Washington that the United States must first confront the Al Qaeda threat overlooks both the regionally destabilizing activities of the other groups that employ terrorist tactics and the interests of key regional states such as India. Negative consequences of the Iraq war in the fight against terrorism. The focus of U.S. global policy on Iraq has put South Asia on a backburner. A major challenge for U.S. policymakers will be to sustain attention on South Asia while continuing to work in Iraq to establish a democratic order. The use of the mountainous areas of western Pakistan by the Taliban as a safe haven threatens the democratic regime in Kabul, and Pakistan-based terrorists operating in India risk another round of Indo-Pakistani confrontation, which since the late 1990s has occurred almost every other year. Even the threat of hostilities would force Pakistan to shift troops from the western front with Afghanistan and thus reduce pressure on concentrations of Al Qaeda/Taliban forces in Pakistan. An insidious consequence of Indo- Pakistani hostilities would be the emboldening of Islamic radical groups in Pakistan as a valuable asset in the fight against India.