Lucie Ménager. Personal data

Transcription

1 Lucie Ménager Personal data LEM, 5-7 avenue Vavin, Paris, FRANCE Tel. : lucie.menager@gmail.com Web page : Born in 1979 Nationality : French Status : single, one child Positions Professeur des Universités (Full professor), Université Lille 1, since september 2010 Maître de Conférences (Assistant professor), Université Paris 2, sept august 2010 ATER (Teaching assistant), Université Paris 1, Allocataire-moniteur (Teaching assistant), Université Paris 1, Member of LEM, EA 4442, Université Paris 2, since september 2007 Member of EQUIPPE, Université Lille 1, since september 2010 Awards and distinctions Prix «Jeune chercheur en économie» («Best» Young researcher in economics) from Banque de France, 2011 Premier concours d agrégation du supérieur (French national contest of agregation in economics), 2010 Accessit au prix de thèse de l Association Française de Sciences Economiques (special distinction of the French Economics Society), septembre

2 Education 2006 Doctorat de l Université Paris 1, (Doctoral thesis obtained with highest honors) Title of the thesis: «Communication, common knowledge and consensus» Advisor: J.M.Tallon (CNRS, CES). Comittee: D. Encaoua (Paris 1), F. Forges (Paris- Dauphine), F. Koessler (CNRS, PSE), J.M. Tallon (CNRS, CES), N. Vieille (HEC) 2002 DEA de Macroéconomie, (pre-doctoral degree in Macroeconomics) Université Paris I 2002 Diplôme d Ingénieur-Statisticien de l ENSAE (French National School of Statistics and Economic Administration) 2000 Maîtrise MASS, (MSc in Applied Mathematics) Université Paris I Research interests Theoretical economics : interactive epistemology, common knowledge, unawareness, informational cascades. Game theory : bargaining games, strategic communication, auctions, bandits models. Publications Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?, (with N. Houy), Journal of Economic Theory, (2008), 143 (1), Consensus and Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Decisions, Games and Economic Behavior, (2008) 62, Consensus, communication and knowledge: an extension with Bayesian agents, Mathematical Social Sciences, (2006) 51, Connaissance commune et consensus, Revue d Economie Industrielle, (2006), 114, Fondements épistémiques en théorie des jeux, (with O. Tercieux), Revue d Economie Industrielle, (2006) 114,

3 Proceedings Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?, (with N. Houy), Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, (2007), ed. Dov Samet, Communication, consensus et ordre de parole, (with N. Houy), Modèles Formel de l Interaction, (2007), eds. J. Lang, Y. Lespérance, D. Sadek, N. Maudet, Working papers and work in progress Strategic observation in exponential bandits models (with Chantal Marlats, CORE) We generalize Keller, Rady and Cripps's [2005] model of strategic experimentation by assuming that transfers of information between players are costly. We introduce costly communication in three different ways. First, we consider the Paying to exchange information game: the exchange of information between players occurs if and only if both payed the communication cost. Second, we consider the Paying to observe information case, where players pay the cost to observe their opponent's action. Finally, we study the Paying to give information case, where players pay the communication cost to display their actions and outcomes. We study the existence and the structure of equilibria in each setting. We show that making communication costly is efficient, in the sense that it decreases free-riding, and increases the speed of learning at equilibrium. Strategic intimidation in competitive bidding This paper analyzes the role of communication between bidders in a first-price procurement game in which bidding is costly and participation endogenous. We show that the intuition that all bidders would claim to have low costs of fulfilling the contract is incorrect. True information is conveyed at equilibrium, because cheap talk affect not only whether bidders bid, but also what they bid. More precisely, bidders trade off bidding positions against the probability of participating in the auction. We show that communication raises the social welfare. More precisely, bidders improve their payoffs by engaging in cheap talk before making their bidding decisions, whereas the bidding authority is worse off when bidders communicate, but the overall effect on social surplus is positive. Market power and voluntary land reform (with Christine Valente, University of Sheffield) Inequality in land ownership remains a major issue in many developing countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa. Donors advocate a new model of willing-buyer willing-seller, market-led land redistribution, but the volume of transactions related to this type of land redistribution programs has fallen short of expectations. Little effort has been made so far to formalise the obstacles to marketled land redistribution. In this paper, we show that oligopolistic owner-producers may resist land sales to poorer candidate-buyers not only because they have a lower willingness to pay for land but also because the entry of poorer entrants threatens tacit collusion. 3

4 Agreeing to Disagree: a review Reinterpreting informational cascades in semantics Social learning is the influence resulting from rational processing of information gained by observing others. Rational learning models point out that if individuals make public and sequential decisions, social learning may stop in finite time, in what is known as an informational cascade. The aim of this paper is to reinterpret the key concepts of social learning models, namely herding and informational cascade, in a semantic model of knowledge, which is essentially equivalent, but allows to derive tractable results from the hypotheses that some events are common knowledge. We use this bridge between the two approaches to discuss some avenues of research for informational cascades literature. Modelling knowledge Unawareness in games and the common prior assumption (with O. Tercieux, PSE), Refereeing activity Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, RAIRO Operational Research, Revue Economique, Theory and Decision. Conferences and seminars Microeconomics Workshop of Universiteit Antwerpen, the Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) of Xiamen University, and Université Lille 1, Anvers (june 2011) ; Seminar Economic Theory X-HEC, Ecole Polytechnique (february 2011) ; Seminar SIUTE, Université Lille 1 (march 2011) ; First Workshop on Strategic Information Transmission, PSE, Paris (dec. 2010) ; Seminar Economic Theory, CORE, Louvain la Neuve (nov. 2010) ; Seminar Parisien de Théorie des Jeux, IHP, Paris (oct. 2009) ; Seminar Théorie et Oragnisation des Marchés, PSE (sept. 2009) ; Seminar PhilForm, IHPST (june 2008) ; Seminar Décision et Rationalité, IHPST et HEC (june 2008) ; Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge XI, Bruxelles (2007) ; Modèles Formels de l Interaction, Paris (2007) ; Seminar Game Theory and Social Choice, UAB, Barcelone (avril 2007) ; Seminar, Université du Maine (april 2007) ; Seminar, Université Cergy-Pontoise (april 2007) ; RES Second PhD Presentation Meeting, London (march 2007) ; Journées Doctorales de l ADRES, Paris (jan. 2007) ; 4

5 Congrès de l Association Française de Sciences Economiques, Paris (sept. 2006) ; Summer school Learning and Game Theory, Aix-en-Provence (sept. 2006) ; Econometric Society European Meeting, Vienne (aug. 2006) ; Seminar Théorie des Jeux, Institut Henri Poincaré, Paris (june 2006) ; Seminar EUREQua, Paris (may 2006) ; Congrès de l Association Française de Science Economique, Paris (sept. 2005) (by co-author) ; Workshop on Informational Rational Herding, Copenhague (sept. 2005) ; European Economics and Finance Society, Coimbra (août 2005) (by co-author) ; Seminar Microéconomie, Université de Cergy-Pontoise (fev. 2005) ; Summer school Bounded Rationality, Aix-en-Provence, (sept. 2004) ; Congrès de l Association Française de Science Economiques, Paris (sept. 2004) ; Econometric Society European Meeting, Madrid (aug. 2004) ; Seminar Microéconomie, Université de Cergy-Pontoise (april 2004) ; Seminar EUREQua, Paris (april 2004). 5