Christopher P. Chambers
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1 Christopher P. Chambers Professor of Economics Georgetown University Department of Economics ICC th and O Streets NW Washington DC Phone: (202) B.S., Mathematics and Economics, with honors in mathematics, May University of Maryland, College Park. M.A., Economics, June 2001, University of Rochester. Ph.D., Economics, June 2003, University of Rochester. Supervisor: William Thomson. Professional Experience Professor of Economics, Georgetown University, August 2017 present. Professor of Economics, University of California San Diego, July 2016 June Associate Professor of Economics, University of California San Diego, July 2010 June Associate Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology, July 2006 June Assistant Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology, July 2003 June Grants NSF award SES , Revealed Preference Tests in Individual and Collective Choice, Co-Principal Investigator with Federico Echenique. NSF award SES , Dynamic Elicitation of Unobservable Information, Principal Investigator. Journal Publications 1. Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims, with William Thomson, Mathematical Social Sciences 44 (2002), Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model, Journal of Mathematical Economics 40 (2004), Virtual repeated implementation, Economics Letters 83 (2004), Allocation rules for land division, Journal of Economic Theory 121 (2005),
2 Christopher P. Chambers 2 5. Multi-utilitarianism in two-agent quasilinear social choice, International Journal of Game Theory 33 (2005), Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto, with Takashi Hayashi, Games and Economic Behavior 54 (2006), Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity, Games and Economic Behavior 54 (2006), Profit sharing (with workers) facilitates collusion (among firms), with Dan Bernhardt, RAND Journal of Economics 37 (2006), Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning, Economic Theory 33 (2007), An ordinal characterization of the linear opinion pool, Economic Theory 33 (2007), Ordinal aggregation and quantiles, Journal of Economic Theory 137 (2007), Consistent representative democracy, Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008), Proper scoring rules for general decision models, Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008), Ordinal notions of submodularity, with Federico Echenique, Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008), An axiomatic theory of political representation, Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009), Intergenerational equity: Sup, inf, lim sup, and lim inf, Social Choice and Welfare 32 (2009), An axiomatization of quantiles on the domain of distribution functions, Mathematical Finance 19 (2009), Supermodularity and preferences, with Federico Echenique, Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009), Profit maximization and supermodular technology, with Federico Echenique, Economic Theory 40 (2009), Bayesian consistent belief selection, with Takashi Hayashi, Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010), A measure of bizarreness, with Alan D. Miller, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 5 (2010), Rules for aggregating information, with Alan D. Miller, Social Choice and Welfare 36 (2011), On behavioral complementarity and its implications, with Federico Echenique and Eran Shmaya, Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010),
3 Christopher P. Chambers Testable implications of gross substitutes in demand for two goods, with Federico Echenique and Eran Shmaya, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (2011), Inequality aversion and risk aversion, Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012), Updating toward the signal, with PJ Healy, Economic Theory 50 (2012), Reversals of signal-posterior monotonicity for any bounded prior, with PJ Healy, Mathematical Social Sciences 61 (2011), Money metric utilitarianism, with Takashi Hayashi, Social Choice and Welfare 39 (2012), Choice and individual welfare, with Takashi Hayashi, Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012), When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?, with Federico Echenique, Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012), On the consistency of data with bargaining theories, with Federico Echenique, Theoretical Economics 9 (2014), Inefficiency measurement, with Alan D. Miller, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (2014), Measuring legislative boundaries, with Alan D. Miller, Mathematical Social Sciences 66 (2013), The axiomatic structure of empirical content, with Federico Echenique and Eran Shmaya, American Economic Review 104 (2014), Preference aggregation with incomplete information, with Takashi Hayashi, Econometrica 82 (2014), Scholarly influence, with Alan D. Miller, Journal of Economic Theory 151 (2014), The core matchings of markets with transfers, with Federico Echenique, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (2015), Spatial implementation, with Richard L. Brady, Games and Economic Behavior 94 (2015), Taxation and poverty, with Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Social Choice and Welfare 48 (2017), A spatial analogue of May s Theorem, with Richard L. Brady, Social Choice and Welfare 47 (2016), A test for risk-averse expected utility, with Ce Liu and Seung-Keun Martinez, Journal of Economic Theory 163 (2016),
4 Christopher P. Chambers Testing theories of financial decision making, with Federico Echenique and Kota Saito, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113 (2016), Gains from trade, with Takashi Hayashi, International Economic Review 58 (2017), General revealed preference theory, with Federico Echenique and Eran Shmaya, Theoretical Economics 12 (2017), Resource allocation with partial responsibilities for initial endowments, with Takashi Hayashi, International Journal of Economic Theory 13 (2017), Choice and matching, with M. Bumin Yenmez, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9 (2017), Reverse Bayesianism: A comment, with Taksahi Hayashi, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10 (2018), A characterization of combinatorial demand, with Federico Echenique, Mathematics of Operations Research 43 (2018), Incentives in experiments: A theoretical analysis, with Yaron Azrieli and PJ Healy, Journal of Political Economy 126 (2018), Note on symmetric utility, with John Rehbeck, Economics Letters 162 (2018), Flaws in the efficiency gap, with Alan D. Miller and Joel Sobel, Journal of Law & Politics 33 (2017), Benchmarking, with Alan D. Miller, Theoretical Economics 13 (2018), On multiple discount rates, with Federico Echenique, Econometrica 86 (2018), A simple characterization of responsive choice, with M. Bumin Yenmez, Games and Economic Behavior forthcoming. 55. On lexicographic choice, with M. Bumin Yenmez, Economics Letters forthcoming. Refereed Conference Proceedings (Computer Science) 1. Dynamically eliciting unobservable information, extended abstract, with Nicolas S. Lambert, Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2014, Invited Publications (non-refereed) 1. Introduction to dynamic belief elicitation, with Nicolas S. Lambert, ACM SIGecom Exchanges 14 (2015),
5 Christopher P. Chambers 5 Manuscripts 1. Additive rules for the quasi-linear bargaining problem, with Jerry R. Green. 2. What s on the menu? Deciding what is available to the group, with David S. Ahn. 3. Incentives in experiments with objective lotteries, with Yaron Azrieli and PJ Healy (under review). 4. Dynamic elicitation of unobservable information, with Nicolas Lambert (under review). 5. Closure and preferences, with Alan D. Miller and M. Bumin Yenmez. 6. Dual scoring, with PJ Healy and Nicolas Lambert. 7. Can everyone benefit from economic integration?, with Takashi Hayashi. 8. Preference identification, with Federico Echenique and Nicolas Lambert. 9. Nonseparable costly attention and revealed preference, with Ce (Will) Liu and John Rehbeck (under review). 10. Can everyone benefit from innovation?, with Takashi Hayashi (under review). 11. The Pareto comparisons of a group of exponential discounters, with Federico Echenique (under review). 12. The structure of household preference, with Takashi Hayashi. 13. A characterization of Phelpsian statistical discrimination, with Federico Echenique. 14. Behavioral influence, with Tugce Cuhadaroglu and Yusufcan Masatlioglu. 15. Market supply with variable particpants, with John Rehbeck. Book Revealed preference theory, with Federico Echenique, Cambridge University Press Econometric Society Monographs, Professional Service Program committee: Eighth International Meeting for the Society of Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, Istanbul Bilgi University. Program committee: 2009 NSF/NBER/CEME Conference on General Equilibrium and Mathematical Economics Program committee: International Meeting for the Society of Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, Seoul National University.
6 Christopher P. Chambers 6 Program committee: European Econometric Society, 2019, Manchester Program committee: RUD 2019, Paris Associate editor, Mathematical Social Sciences, Co-editor, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014 present Associate editor, B.E. Press Journals in Economic Theory, Associate editor, Social Choice and Welfare, Associate editor, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013 present Associate editor, Journal of Economic Theory, 2014 present Council for Society of Social Choice and Welfare, NSF Panel member, 2011 February, 2019
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