How to study the (Belgian) EU Presidency? A Framework for Analysis for the Research Network 2010 Belgian EU Presidency

Transcription

1 1 How to study the (Belgian) EU Presidency? A Framework for Analysis for the Research Network 2010 Belgian EU Presidency Steven Van Hecke and Peter Bursens Universiteit Antwerpen steven.vanhecke@ua.ac.be / peter.bursens@ua.ac.be Politicologenetmaal 2010, Leuven, May 2010 Workshop Governance in/of the EU Preliminary remarks: This draft paper outlines the research design of the edited volume on the 2010 Belgian EU Presidency (and will serve as the backbone of the introduction). It further elaborates the two questions of the kick-off workshop of the research network: (1) how to study an EU Presidency; and (2) what to study on the Belgian EU Presidency? It also takes into account suggestions made during the workshop. In other words, in this paper a number of choices about how to do research on the (Belgian) EU Presidency are presented. The aim of this concise presentation (that does not claim exhaustivity) is twofold: to make clear to the authors of the various chapters what the overall research design of the edited volume will be as well to link the various chapters within this framework. It should be noted, however, that the rationale of single chapters (its research question, its approach, etc.) is not necessarily the same as the overall research design. Some chapters, for instance, analyse one or more independent variables while other chapters focus on the dependent variable.

2 2 How to study the (Belgian) EU Presidency? A Framework for Analysis for the Research Network 2010 Belgian EU Presidency 1. Introduction In the second half of 2010 Belgium assumes the presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU). As Belgium is one of the founding member states and as the rotating presidency dates back to the earliest stages of post-war European integration, the presidency is Belgium s twelfth and the third time since the establishment of the EU in Belgium is therefore an experienced member state with, moreover, a rather strong reputation of running successful presidencies. So, despite some particular country characteristics (and unforseen events such as the early elections of June 2010) and ongoing changes within the EU and beyond, at first sight the 2010 Presidency does not seem to pose a real challenge. However, with the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the institutional framework in which the Belgian Presidency will have to operate has changed fundamentally. Since the changes introduced by this new treaty are rather recent and in some cases ambivalent weakening and strengthening the rotating presidency at the same time the outcome is everything but clear. In fact, the 2010 Belgian EU Presidency serves as a laboratory in which the new style rotating presidency can be tested. In this edited volume the 2010 Belgian Presidency of the EU will be assessed in a systematic way. Generally speaking, this volume tries to answer the question whether the rotating presidency still matters, given the recent substantial institutional changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. And if the rotating presidency still matters, new questions arise: to what extent, in which way, in which policy domains and under what circumstances does it matter? Answering these questions will be done by collecting evidence about the performance of Belgian officials, diplomats and politicians within the EU institutional framework during the second half of 2010, when Belgium will hold the rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers. This strategy serves a double aim: it will enable to evaluate the Belgian Presidency as well as to gain insight into the mechanisms of the post-lisbon rotating presidency. The edited volume will therefore contribute to a better understanding of the rotating presidency in the post Lisbon environment while at the same time delivering empirical data on the Belgian Presidency as part of comparative research agenda on EU presidencies.

3 3 What ultimately needs to be explained in this study is the Belgian EU Presidency (dependent variable). The question is, however, what we mean by the Belgian EU Presidency (definition) and which variables contribute to the particular outcome of this Presidency (independent variables). The answers to this question will first of all be looked for in the existing literature on rotating presidencies. In addition, a closer look at two important parts of the puzzle we are examining the Treaty of Lisbon and the Belgian case will also help us to distinguish (or modify) factors that condition a presidency s success. These analyses will transform the problematique of the rotating presidency into a clear-cut research question and a number of hypotheses, accompanied by a short description of the methodology. This introductory chapter first presents a concise literature review on EU presidencies. It then turns to two particular contextual factors: the new post-lisbon presidency system and Belgium as the case under scrutiny. The fifth part discusses the research design. Given the particular set-up of independent and dependent variables that will be examined in this study, the final section presents the organisation of the volume under construction. 2. Rotating Presidencies Obviously, doing research on the 2010 Belgian EU Presidency does not need to start from scratch. A clear benchmark for our design is offered by the research done on small states holding the Council Presidency by Bunse (2009). Here, the rotating EU Presidency is conceptualised as a separate institution (independent variable) that equalises power between the EU s member states and, above all, shapes the EU s agenda and policy outcome. According to Bunse, an EU Presidency shapes the EU s agenda and policy outcomes (in other words: it matters) when it can show leadership and exercise influence. Leadership is defined as an asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or redirects the behaviour of others towards a certain goal over a certain period of time (cited in Bunse 2009: 5); influence is defined as the capacity to change an outcome from what it otherwise would have been in the absence of an action (cited in Bunse 2009: 5). Based on these definitions and on a number of cases (single as well as comparative studies) in the Presidency literature, Bunse generates the hypothesis that influence depends on (or that variance in influence can be explained by) (1) the leadership environment; (2) the heterogeneity, intensity and distribution of preferences in the Council; (3) inter-institutional relations; and (4) skill and

4 4 use of the Council secretariat (see figure 1). This model is then applied to three case-studies Finland 1999, Belgium 2001 and Greece 2003 and cases from two policy domains internal market and foreign affairs. According to Bunse, the rotating Presidency offers small states opportunities to provide leadership and shape policy outcomes according to national preferences. These national preferences should not be understood as typical national interests (especially in the case of small states: those interests are said to be limited and therefore do not interfere or interfere less with other member states interests) but as presidential priorities. Influence is therefore depending on what the presidency has set as its priorities. At the same time, Bunse concludes that circumstances where presidency constraints matter a lot less, i.e. crisis situations (or the unforeseen and thus not part of the presidency programme) also offer opportunities for leadership. Figure 1: The Council Presidency s Resource/Constraint Structure (source: Bunse 2009: 207) Political Economic Context and Institutional environment Country specific Leadership Environment 1. Domestic political and economic environment 2. External political and economic environment Council Preferences Inter-Institutional Skill and Use of Relations Council Secretariat 1. Heterogeneity 4. Commission 6. Preparation Condition level 2. Intensity 5. EP 7. Interministerial of Council 3. Distribution Coordination 8. Management and advocacy 9. Exploitation of Info Advantages presidency influence Within a body of literature which is by the way relatively sparse, several more sources might be of particular interest for our research design. Compared to Bunse, the comparative study edited by Elgström (2003) takes a slightly different perspective by questioning the neutrality or impartiality of the Presidency. Similar to Bunses concept of policy entrepreneur, introduced as an alternative to honest broker, Elgström focuses on actual behaviour based on formal rules and informal procedures, assuming that institutions affect outcomes (neo-institutionalism). Indeed, formal structures, such as inter-institutional relations do influence the rotating presidency s performance (see, again, figure 1). Elgström

5 5 (2003a) also emphasises that the same goes for informal norms. These soft institutions influence the negotiation strategies and behaviour of actors. The functions, rules and norms associated with and surrounding the Presidency are therefore independent variables that may affect EU decision-making and Presidency role performance (2003a: 3). Elgström distinguishes four main functions: administrative co-ordination, setting political priorities, mediation and representation. In order to explain that member states choose to play the Presidency role in different ways (Elgström 2003a: 2), two contrasting approaches are introduced next to country characteristics: the logic of expected consequences and the logic of appropriateness. In this model, actions taken by the presidency are driven by anticipated consequences (rationalist approach) or by perceptions of anticipated behaviour (sociological approach). A rationalistic approach conceives of the Presidency as a strategic actor, seeking to satisfy exogenously given national preferences within the confines of its formally designated institutional role (2003a: 10); [a] sociological approach views the Presidency as an identity-driven actor, who tries to determine what is the appropriate response to a given situation (2003a: 10-11). Within the rationalist approach the presidency s goals (or preferences/priorities) can be socio-economic, constitutional or regional (depending on a country s geographical position); negotiation strategies can be forcing, accommodating, problem-solving, competitive or compromise-oriented. Within the sociological approach the presidency s performance is determined by expectations (the impartiality norm, previous experiences or country characteristics). These expectations trigger a number of roles leader, bargainer, broker or bureaucrat that compete with each other. Kerremans and Drieskens applied the Elgström framework to the 2001 Belgian EU Presidency. They found that interests and anticipated consequences seem to have been the most important motive for the Belgian performance (Kerremans & Drieskens 2003: ), next to appropriate behaviour and country characteristics. Belgium heavily relied on a problem-solving negotiation strategy combined with the role of broker. Besides, unexpected events such as the attacks of 11 September 2001 gave Belgium the opportunity to act as a leader, despite its pragmatic approach, caution about its priorities and limited ambitions (as they were procedural rather than substantive or aimed at reaching specific agreements). Considering the role of broker, Warntjen (2008) found that member states benefit from holding the rotating Presidency in the final stages of the legislative procedures, thanks to time pressure and informational asymmetries. Schout & Vanhoonacker (2006) focus on a number of additional presidency roles. They identify four roles organiser, political leader and

6 6 national representative, next to broker that are linked to the conditions (constraints) of the environment in which the rotating Presidency takes place. The idea is that external conditions, i.e. pressures from outside the country holding the presidency, demand certain roles while the country holding the presidency supplies roles that are influenced by the internal presidency environment. The success of the presidency is then determined by the degree to which the demand equals the supply. Given the danger of poor evaluations and the importance of the rotating presidency for EU decision-making, Schout & Vanhoonacker (2006: 1073) underline that the presidency has too many dimensions not to have a systematic evaluation mechanism, hence calling for a more systematic study of the EU Council Presidency. A final aspect of the rotating presidency that deserves closer attention is its assumed agenda-setting powers. The literature is rather sceptical about these powers, labelling the rotating presidency as responsibility without power. Tallberg (2003) challenges this thesis by making a distinction between three forms of agenda-shaping that are mutually exclusive. First, agenda-setting refers to the introduction of new issues on the policy agenda ; second, agenda-structuring refers to the emphasising or de-emphasising of issues already on the agenda; and third, agenda exclusion refers to the active barring of issues from the policy agenda (2003: 5). Agenda-setting can take the form of raising the awareness of problems hitherto neglected or develop concrete proposals for action. Agenda-structuring is determined by the frequency of meetings, the formal or informal character of these meetings, the structuring of actual meeting agendas and the possibility of first reading agreements within the co-decision procedure. In offering empirical evidence, Tallberg (2003: 9-10) also refers to the 2001 Belgian EU Presidency and its priorities that were regional (Africa), socio-economic (reduce social exclusion and poverty) and institutional (Laeken Declaration). Finally, presidencies can use agenda exclusion by remaining silent on a particular topic, by excluding items from the decision agenda of the Council (at working group, COREPER or ministerial level) and by presenting impossible compromise proposals. In sum, the rotating presidency has a lot of agenda-shaping opportunities at its disposal. Its capacity is much larger and wider than the stamp responsibility without power might suggest. Before turning to our own research design and to how we incorporate the theoretical findings in the literature so far, we set the scene of the Belgian 2010 Presidency, discussing the Lisbon Treaty reforms as well as structure and policy related features of Belgium.

7 7 3. The Treaty of Lisbon The Treaty of Lisbon that entered into force on 1 December 2009 contains the most far-reaching reform of the rotating presidency ever. Given the fairly frequent treaty reviews it is a surprise that the rotating presidency has never been the subject of change, be it minor or major. During the Convention on the Future of Europe ( ) the rotating presidency was heavily discussed, often with large countries (favouring efficiency) opposing smaller ones (favouring proximity). The final compromise of the negotiations between member states is rather ambivalent: the rotating presidency is decapitated but at the same time enforced in some of its functions. It is clear, however, that we have to deal with a new type of rotating presidencies, one that can politically seen no longer be called Presidency of the EU but only Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the EU - except for the Foreign Affairs Council. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty changes the rotating presidency in a number of ways directly. First, the introduction of a permanent President of the European Council, a full time position during 2,5 years (renewable by another 2,5 years) ends the period in which the head of state or government of the rotating Presidency presides over the European Council. It is now the permanent President that invites for the European Council (whether regular or extraordinary), sets the agenda, chairs the meetings, takes care of the follow-up, runs the General Secretariat, represents the European Council vis-à-vis the other EU institutions (for instance debriefing the European Parliament after each European Council meeting, even the one that marks the end of each six month Presidency), and represents the EU at the level of heads of state and government with third countries, including the multilateral EU summits, leaving no role for the prime minister or head of state of the country holding the rotating presidency (except for presenting the Presidency s priorities to the European Parliament). Second, together with the introduction of the permanent President, the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy is upgraded. It is now called High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the person holding this position is also Vice-President of the European Commission and permanent Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (instead of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country holding the rotating presidency). The High Representative does not only have to rely on the General

8 8 Secretariat and the diplomatic network of the rotating presidency; it has a new European Department of Foreign Affairs at its disposal, called European External Action Service (EEAS). The only position within the rotating Presidency that escapes these reforms (or has been forgotten in the treaty) is the Permanent Representative of the country holding the rotating presidency as he or she will continue to chair COREPER II when dealing with the foreign policy of the EU, unlike the national minister and the working groups. The third substantial reform is the introduction of a trio presidency in all other Council formations. Three member states holding consecutive rotating presidencies will have to work together within an 18 months trio presidency. They are formally only obliged to present a common priorities programme at the beginning of their three semesters, but the new system also introduces the legal possibility that the presidency of one of the Council of Minsters is delegated to another country of the trio. The first trio presidency operating under new Treaty provisions affects the Spanish (2010/1), Belgian (2010/2) and Hungarian (2011/1) presidencies. Whatever the practical implementation of this trio presidency will be, the preparations of this first trio already delivered increased coordination efforts. Next to the triple introduction of new institutions, also a number of indirect changes will affect the rotating presidency. First, from 2014 onwards a new definition of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) will be applied in the Council of Ministers. Second, co-decision is the post Lisbon standard (ordinary) legislative procedure (unanimity the exception) leading to a larger involvement of the European Parliament in the drafting of EU legislation. In addition to the legislative procedure, also a number of policy domains have been added to the competences of the European Parliament, the budget being probably the most important one. Finally, the remaining third pillar issues (police and justice cooperation) have been supranationalized, granting the European Commission and the European Parliament more involvement and power and hence redefining the balance between Commission, Parliament and Council, including its presidency. As a result of these reforms, the Council will have to alter its behaviour and dedicate more time for negotiations with the Parliament and the Commission. One of the ways to study these effects, is to look at how the rotating Presidency operates in the new institutional environment. The formalisation of the European Council into a separate EU institution might in the long run also affect the agenda setting role of the rotating Presidency. It is expected that the leading role of the European Council, especially in terms of agenda setting, will grow to the detriment of the European Commission (which formally keeps its exclusive right of initiative)

9 9 and of the different Council formations. Long term and horizontal policy agenda s such as EU 2020 severely decrease the scope of the Council of Ministers, limiting its meetings to executing decisions taken by the European Council. For sure, these direct and indirect changes (with no less than three presidents Commission, European Council and Council of Minsters, next to the President of the European Parliament, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank) as well as the status quo in many other areas will increase the coordination cost. The way in which Belgium will handle these coordination efforts will be critical since it assumes the rotating Presidency so shortly after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty: Belgium will set the course to be followed by successive rotating Presidencies in the years to come. 4. The Belgian Case Belgium has a small and open economy and is highly dependent on international trade. As a small state, Belgium, left to itself, is unlikely to make a mark on international politics. Hence, it relies on international cooperation to provide for its international security and economic prosperity. Belgium has therefore been at the forefront of European integration. The Benelux Treaty, which originates from 1944 and was renewed in 2008, can be even seen as a precursor of European integration. Later, Belgium was among the founding members of the European Communities in the 1950s. Up to today it is a full member of the EU without invoking any opt-outs. In addition, it has been involved in avant garde initiatives such as the Schengen cooperation and the single currency. The relevance for studying the Belgian 2010 Presidency not only stems from the new post Lisbon institutional environment, but also from some specific Belgian features. This paragraph elaborates upon the institutional set-up of Belgian foreign and EU policies as well as upon the position of Belgian elites and public opinion towards the European integration, as these domestic features are hypothesised to affect the way Belgium runs the 2010 rotating Presidency. Domestic organisation of EU policy-making Article 1 of the 1993 Belgian Constitution stipulates that, Belgium is a federal State composed of Communities and Regions. According to Articles 2 and 3, these entities are the

10 10 French Community (Communauté française de Belgique); the Flemish Community (Vlaamse Gemeenschap); the German Community (Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft); the Walloon Region (Région wallonne); the Flemish Region (Vlaams Gewest); and the Capital Region of Brussels (Région de Bruxelles-Capitale or Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest). Consequently, Belgium has a double federal structure composed of two types of constituent units resulting from the divergent Walloon and Flemish concerns. Regions, created for economic reasons because of demands by Wallonia, were granted competences tied directly to territorial space. These include transport, road works, employment policy, industrial policy (economic development), environmental policy, spatial and structural planning, agriculture, housing policy and trade. Communities, demanded by Flanders for linguistic and cultural reasons, are responsible for education, personalized services, preventive health care, culture, media, and use of language ( les matières personnalisables ). The federal level remains in charge of social security, justice, law and order, external security and defence policies (see Deschouwer 2005 and 2008; Dumont Lagasse, Van Der Hulst and Van Droogenbroeck, 2006 for a comprehensive overview of the Belgian federal system). While also other EU member states are organised in a federal (Germany, Austria) or quasi-federal way (Spain, UK, Italy), the Belgian federal system has some unique features that substantially affect its foreign and EU policy-making, and hence also the way it tackles the rotating EU Presidency. The most relevant of these features is the way foreign policy competencies are organised. The constitutional reform of 1988 introduced the in foro interno in foro externo principle for Community competences. This principle gave the Communities the powers to conduct foreign policy for those competences they have been granted by the Constitution. The 1993 constitutional reform expanded this principle to the competences of the Regions. In other words, the 1993 Constitution created the full alignment between internal and external competences. According to Article 167 of the 1993 Constitution, the King (i.e., the federal government) conducts Belgium s international relations without prejudicing the competency of the Communities and the Regions to deal with international cooperation, including the conclusion of treaties, for the fields that fall within their competences in conformity with the Constitution or by virtue of the latter. The same article also stipulates that the governments of the Communities and the Regions as defined in Article 121 each conclude, for those areas that concern them, the treaties that fall within the realm of their Council s (i.e., parliament s) competency. In other words, the federal government lost the privilege of exclusively representing constituent units abroad with respect to a substantial

11 11 number of policy fields. The federal level no longer conducts treaties in the sphere of culture or education, for example. Consequently, unlike most federal governments in other countries, the Belgian federal government cannot always play the role of gatekeeper between domestic and international political arenas. In Belgium, the federal government cannot intrude in competences that belong to the constituent units. On the contrary, Belgian constituent units enjoy full legitimate and legal direct access to the international stage. At the same time, however, Article 167 is accompanied by a series of mechanisms providing for information, cooperation, and substitution in order to ensure the coherence of Belgium s overall foreign policy. These accompanying measures are not redundant because most competences and therefore also their external dimension are shared by the constituent units and the federal government. Most EU policies resort in the Belgian federation under both federal and regional jurisdiction (Massart-Piérard and Bursens 2008). As a result, the strong foreign policy powers of the Belgian federated entities reveal themselves above all with regard to Belgian European policy making. In 1994, Regions, Communities and the central government concluded a Cooperation Agreement on EU policymaking which outlines (1) the internal arrangement for the coordination of common positions and (2) the Belgian representation at the EU level. We succinctly summarize the main issues of this agreement. Coordination. The most important body in the coordination process is the Directorate European Affairs (DEA) of the Federal Public Service (Ministry) for Foreign Affairs. This body organizes coordination meetings with representatives from a wide range of federal and regional executive agencies. It is crucial to note that this federal body needs to reach consensus to back specific negotiation positions for the Council. If no consensus is reached, a similar exercise is made at the level of the Inter-Ministerial Conference for Foreign Policy (ICFP) and eventually at the level of the Concertation Committee (CC). In practice, consensus is nearly always reached at the DEA-level; only a handful of cases are discussed in inter-ministerial meetings and almost no cases are discussed at the highest political level of the Concertation Committee. In addition, the 1994 Cooperation Agreement makes the Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs a crucial player, because it is this Ministry that hosts the coordination meetings. On top of this, meetings are prepared and chaired by federal administrative and political officials. This makes clear that, despite the in foro interno in foro

12 12 externo principle, the role of the federal level remains more than substantial. At the same time, however, the nature of the DEA considerably changed. By incorporating representatives from other governmental levels and by granting these the same voting rights as the federal level, the Directorate European Affairs is no longer an exclusive federal body: it has become a cooperative inter-federal agency within a constitutionally defined dual federal logic. Figure 2 presents a schematic overview of the Belgian co-ordination procedure for EU policy-making. Figure 2: The organization of Belgium s EU policy (source: Beyers and Bursens 2006a) EUROPEAN UNON BELGIUM (federal en regional level) European Commission Permanent Representation (federal / regional) Foreign Affairs (DEA) W orking groups or Permanent Representation ( sectoral Attachés) Foreign Affairs (DEA) o r no consensus Formal or informal, sectoral or general coordination at the different governmnetal levels COREPER Permanent Representation (ambassador or adj.) Foreign Affairs (DEA) no consensus Concertation Com. Interminist. Conference on Foreign Policy no consensus Council federal / regional ministries Foreign Affairs (DEA) no consensus Interminist. Conference on Foreign Policy no consensus Concertation Com.

13 13 Representation. Once a common position is defined within the coordination mechanism, the 1994 Cooperation Agreement provides a system that determines who must represent this position at the European level. This system is based on six categories and functions as follows (see Figure 3). First, the issues on the agendas of the Council meetings are compared with the domestic division of competencies. Next, the delegation leaders and assessors are determined, with rotation when necessary (i.e. where Community or Regional representatives are involved). For most policies, the Community (Germanspeaking, French or Flemish) or Regional (Flemish, Walloon or Brussels Capital) representatives rotate on a six-monthly basis. Summarizing, no other federal system has granted its subnational entities so much foreign policy powers as Belgium. In all areas of external relations, Regions and Communities enjoy full foreign policy powers for the competences they posses in the domestic realm. This becomes above all manifest with respect to Belgium s European policymaking, including the organisation of the rotating presidency. Indeed, the federal set-up has severe repercussions on the preparations of the presidency (defining priorities and positions) and the implementation (host locations, chairs,...). The chapter on intra-belgian coordination will discuss these issues in greater detail. Figure 3: Rotation of representation in the Council of Ministers (source: Beyers and Bursens 2006b) 1 Cat. Internal European Rotation Representation in the Council of division of Council Ministers competencies Configurations Delegation Leader Assessor I Dominantly General affairs, - federal / federal EcoFin, Budget, Justice, Telecom, Consumers, Development and Civil Defence 1 Notice that the 1994 Cooperation Agreement uses the Council Configurations as they existed before its number was reduced from fifteen to nine in 2002.

14 14 II Shared, but Internal Market, Yes federal Regions / Communities more federal Health, Energy, (assessor) Transport and Social Policy III Shared, but Industry, Research Yes (leader) Regions federal more and Environment regional IV Dominantly Education, Youth, Yes Communiti / regional Culture, Tourism, es Housing and Spatial Planning V Exclusively Fisheries No Flemish / regional Region VI Dominantly regional Agriculture No federal Walloon Region and Flemish Region Belgian EU position Next to the institutional particularities of Belgian federation, also the positions of the political elites and the public opinion have to be taken into account when assessing the Belgian rotating presidency, as these can potentially colour and affect the Belgian performance. Belgian political elites are clearly among the most pro-integration actors within the entire EU. Data from expert surveys reveal this manifest euro-enthusiasm. Figure 4 shows the appreciation of the Flemish political parties since All major political parties, including the regionalists and the Greens, heavily support European integration. Even the radical right wing Vlaams Blok / Vlaams Belang is not perceived as a die hard Eurosceptic party. Figure 6 makes clear that, although on the rise in the last few years, there is hardly intra-party dissent.

15 15 Figure 4: Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European Integration in (combined data from the Chapel Hill expert surveys) (1 = strongly opposed 7= strongly in favour) Figure 5 Dissent of conflict in the party leadership on European integration in 2006 (combined data from the Chapel Hill expert surveys) (0 = completely united 10 = completely divided) In addition, the pro-eu positions are also translated in political action. One illustration of this is shown in Figure 6, presenting the voting behaviour of the Belgian political parties in the Federal Parliament on the occasion of EU Treaty ratifications. Ever

16 16 since the Single European Act in 1987, an overwhelming majority of parties voted in favour. Some negative votes were even inspired by the opinion that the Treaty changes were too meagre, i.e. not introducing enough transfer of competencies or enhanced powers for Commission and Parliament. Again only right wing radicals and populists expressed themselves against further integration. Concluding on the elites, Belgian political parties are rather unisono in favour of European integration. Hence, regardless of the federal and regional governments in power during the 2010 Belgian Presidency and regardless the fact that the Presidency will probably have to start with a caretaker government at the federal level (as well as a new government that is expected to take over at some point during the Presidency), pro-integration politicians will be in the driver seat. Our volume will therefore tackle the question how such a position affects the Presidency performance. Figure 6 Political parties position with respect to EU Treaties (SEA through Lisbon, own data). In favour Against Abstention SEA CVP PSC, SP PS, PVV PRL-FDF, Agalev Ecolo,Volksunie Maastricht CVP PSC, SP PS, PVV PRL-FDF Agalev Ecolo,Volksunie Vlaams Blok Rossem, Front National Amsterdam CVP PSC, PS SP, VLD PRL-FDF Agalev Ecolo, Volksunie, Vlaams Blok, Front National, (1 PRL-FDF, 1 PS) Nice CVP, PS SP, VLD PRL-FDF, Agalev Ecolo PSC, Vlaams Blok, Front National, (1 PS) N-VA, (2 PSC, 2 CD&V) Lisbon CD&V cdh, Open VLD MR, Sp.a PS, Groen! Ecolo, N-VA Vlaams Belang, Front National LDD, (2 Ecolo) In addition, political elites are not the only group favouring integration. Also the Belgian population has expressed continuous support for its country s EU membership, as can be observed from Eurobarometer data. The Belgian public opinion is among the most pro-eu of all member states.

17 17 Figure 7 Generally speaking, do you think that [your country] s membership of the EU is a good thing? Percentage and ranking of Belgian public opinion (Source: Eurobarometer). % rank EB 57 (Spring 02 EU 15) 58 9 EB 63 (Spring 05 EU 25) 67 4 EB 66 (Autumn 06 EU 25) 69 4 EB 69 (Spring 08 EU 27) 66 4 EB 72 (Autumn 09 EU 27) 64 6 Important to underline at this point, however, is that there still seems to exist some kind of permissive consensus in Belgium. The EU is hardly an issue among the larger public, mass media only rarely report on substantive EU-issues and political parties hardly play out their positions on the EU in party platforms or during electoral campaigns. In all, the general public does not endanger the pro-integration strategy of their government(s). In this way, it is doubtful whether the public has any impact on how the authorities deal with the forthcoming Presidency. Nevertheless, the chapters in the volume discussing the intra-belgian features will tackle the impact of pro-integration elites and absent public on the Belgian performance during the 2010 Presidency. 5. Research strategy of the volume The overall aim of the project is to assess the performance of the Belgian EU Presidency, defined as the success of the Belgian EU Presidency. Hence, in terms of research design, the success, defined as having realised the priorities and goals, is the dependent variable. The concluding chapter will use all data, analysis and appreciation made by the preceding chapters in order to assess the success rate. This requires that the substantive chapters of the volume address both a description of the performance and a wide range of potential explanations, i.e. independent variables or conditions of success (Bunse 2009: 207), stemming from the existing literature on EU presidencies. In terms of the structure of the volume, this implies five major parts, dealing with related issues (see also the annex):

18 18 1. Introductory chapters: research design and historical overview. 2. The institutional perspective: What is the institutional role of the Belgian Presidency? How is this role affected by the inter-institutional environment (relations with permanent President of the European Council, High Representative, European Commission and European Parliament) and by the intra-institutional context (heterogeneity, intensity and distribution of Council preferences, cf. Bunse 2009)? And how is the this role affected by the international political and economic environment (global economic situation, financial markets/euro, events, etc.)? This part includes chapters on the Lisbon Treaty reforms. 3. The intra-belgian perspective: How is the Belgian Presidency organised? How is the organisation affected by the domestic political environment (Belgian interests and positions, federal structure, 2010 federal elections, coordination mechanisms, etc.). And how do leadership variables affect the performance (preparation in terms of contacts, resources/budget, agenda-shaping, priorities, presidency roles/functions, negotiation strategies etc.)? This part includes chapters on the intra-belgian peculiarities with respect to constitutional set-up and preferences. 4. The policy perspective: is the Belgian Presidency successful? As success is defined as having realised the priorities and goals, these chapters should describe and evaluate the Belgian performance within particular policy fields (without yet claiming causal relationships, which will be established in the concluding comparative chapter). This part includes chapters on what is expected to be priority areas of the Belgian presidency: (1) social-economic issues (crisis management, EU 2020), (2) climate change, energy and environment, (3) social affairs, (4) the Stockholm Programme and (5) enlargement. These chapters should address the following questions. What were the presidential priorities/preferences in the selected policy areas and how far did they reflect national priorities, values and ideas? Are the presidency priorities national interests, issues that can be framed as European concerns or issues which have a reasonable likelihood of progress during the Presidency period (Elgström 2003b: 193)? What were the obstacles the Presidency was facing in pursuit of its aims? How were objectives pursued and obstacles overcome/deals being struck? To what extent did the Presidency reach its

19 19 goals and what shape did agreements take? What factors shaped the Presidency success or failure? To what extent can the outcome be attributed solely to the Presidency? Are there plausible counterfactual scenarios? Hence, the authors of the chapters are asked to refer to the analytical framework and to use the conceptual distinctions presented in this introduction. Every chapter should evaluate the performance of the 2010 Belgian Presidency by focussing on preferences, roles, negotiation strategies and agenda-setting capacity. 5. In the concluding chapter the editors aspire to compare policy areas as they have been analysed separately within parts 3 and 4 and to explain variance within by making reference to analysis in parts 2 and 3 of the book, hence addressing the following overall causal model: role and organisation as the independent variables explaining the variance of success as the dependent variable. A separate chapter will also report on the overall changing nature of the rotating Presidency: How will the three presidencies (Council of Ministers, European Council and Foreign Affairs Council) relate and coordinate? How is the trio presidency functioning in practice? Hypotheses discussed in these concluding chapters include: - Under the Lisbon Treaty, the leadership of the rotating Presidency will not come in a crisis situation (or, in other words, opportunities to show leadership) as the president of the European Council and the High Representative will deal with crisis situations. - Under the Lisbon Treaty the focus of the rotating Presidency will be on legislative work and less on external representation. - Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of the rotating Presidency will act as substitutes of the permanent President and the High Representative respectively. - Given its pro-federal attitude, Belgium will support the communautarisation of EU Foreign Policy through its support to the High Representative and its services (instead of trying to keep certain arenas, such as working groups and bilateral summits, under control of the rotating Presidency). - Given the widespread support for further European integration among Belgian political parties, the current political instability will not affect the policy and strategic choices of the rotating Presidency.

20 20 6. References Beyers, J. en Bursens, P. (2006a) Europa is geen buitenland, Leuven: Acco. Beyers J, and Bursens, P. (2006b) The European Rescue of the Federal State. How Europeanization Shapes the Belgian State, West European Politics, 29(5), Beyers, J., Bursens P. and B. Kerremans, (2001) Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg: Diversity among the Benelux Countries, In: Eleanor E. Zeff and Ellen Pirro (ed.), The EU and the Member States: Co-operation, Co-ordination and Compromise, Boulder: Lynne Rienne. Beyers, J., Delreux, T. and C. Steensels, (2004), The Europeanisation of Intergovernmental Cooperation and Conflict Resolution in Belgium, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 5(1), Bursens P. and K. Geeraerts, (2006) Who Keeps the Gate? Joint Preference Formation and Representation in Belgium s European Environmental Policy-making, Journal of European Integration, 28(2), Bunse, S. (2009) Small States and EU Governance. Leadership through the Council Presidency, Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan. Deschouwer, K. (2005) Kingdom of Belgium, In: John Kincaid and Alan Tarr (ed.), Constitutional Origins, Structure and Change in Federal Countries, Montreal: McGill- Queen s University Press, Deschouwer, K. (2009) The Politics of Belgium, Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan. Dumont, H., Lagasse, N., Van Der Hulst, M. and S. Van Droogenbroeck, (2006) Kingdom of Belgium, In: Akhtar Majeed, Ronald Watts and Douglas Brown (ed.), Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, Montreal: McGill-Queen s University Press, Elgström, O. (2003a) Introduction. In: O. Elgström (Ed.), European Union Council Presidencies. A Comparative Analysis, London & New York: Routledge, Elgström, O. (2003b) Conclusion: Rationalist and Sociological Perspectives on the Council Presidency. In: O. Elgström (Ed.), European Union Council Presidencies. A Comparative Analysis, London & New York: Routledge, Kerremans, B. and Drieskens, E. (2003) The Belgian Presidency of 2001: Cautious Leadership as Trademark. In: O. Elgström (Ed.), European Union Council Presidencies. A Comparative Analysis, London & New York: Routledge,

21 21 Massard-Piérard, Françoise and Peter Bursens (2008) Belgian Federalism and Foreign Relations: Between Cooperation and Pragmatism, In: H.S. Michelmann (ed.), Foreign Relations in Federal Countries, Montreal: McGill-Queen s University Press. Tallberg, J. (2003) The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the EU Council Presidency, Journal of European Public Policy 10(1): Vanhoonacker, S. and Schout, A. (2006) Evaluating Presidencies of the Council of the EU: Revisiting Nice, Journal of Common Market Studies 44(5):

22 22 Annex: Table of Contents ( ) Part Topics Authors 1. Introductory Chapters 2. Horizontal Chapters 3. Intra-Belgian Chapters 4. Area Chapters 5. Concluding Chapters Introduction to the edited volume / Framework for Analysis The Belgian EU Presidency in historical perspective New and Old Institutions under the Lisbon Treaty: the Rotating Presidency vis-à-vis the permanent President EC/(High Representative)/European Commission/European Parliament Steven VAN HECKE, Peter BURSENS Peter VAN KEMSEKE Simone BUNSE, Yann-Sven RITTELMEYER, Steven VAN HECKE Comitology/delegating acts Mathias DOBBELS External Representation: Rotating Presidency and the High Sophie VANHOONACKER, Karolina Representative/interaction between trade-development-cfsp/eeas POMORSKA, Heidi MAUER, Foreign Policy (Coordination) and the Rotating Presidency: multilateral Summits (Africa), G7/G20), UN, Iran Coordination of public authorities: horizontal (Prime Minister's Office/Foreign Ministry/Permanent Representation) and vertical (regions and communities) Non-state actors: political parties, interest groups, media/public opinion Exit from the financial-economic crisis, EU2020 Strategy Climate change, energy and environment Social affairs Stockholm Programme Enlargement 'Towards a new EU Leadership Architecture' Conclusion Edith DRIESKENS, Arnout JUSTAERT, Skander NASRA, Peter DEBAERE, Tom SAUER David CRIEKEMANS, Ferdi DE VILLE, Régis DANDOY, Jorge TUNON NAVORRO Yves DEJAEGHERE, Bert FRAUSSEN Dirk DE BIEVRE, Pieter BOUWEN Tom DELREUX, David Criekemans Danielle DIERCKX, Peter VERMEERSCH Geert VERVAEKE, Kelly VERBIST An SCHRIJVERS, Eline DE RIDDER Sabina KAJNČ, Theo JANS, Aurélie COURTIER Peter BURSENS, Steven VAN HECKE