The Conservative Party and the Centre Ground of British Politics

Transcription

1 The Conservative Party and the Centre Ground of British Politics Thomas Quinn Department of Government University of Essex Wivenhoe Park Colchester CO4 3SQ This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in the Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, Vol. 18, No 2 (May 2008): [copyright Taylor & Francis], available online at:

2 The Conservative Party and the Centre-ground of British Politics ABSTRACT This paper examines the claim that the British Conservative Party has been too right-wing and must shift to the centre-ground if it is to win the next general election. Using data from the British Election Study and the Comparative Manifestos Project, it is shown that the Conservatives policies since 1997 have not been extremely right-wing. Indeed, both data sets indicate policy convergence between the major parties in recent years, although New Labour s electoral strategy of targeting some centre-right voters created problems for the Tories. However, the general perception among voters, as evident in polling data, that the Conservatives were fairly right-wing was more indicative of the party s image problem, whereby they were seen in the post-1997 period as angry, stuck in the past, and socially intolerant. Shifting to the centre-ground, therefore, is more likely to entail softening the Conservatives image, toning down their language, and appearing more socially inclusive, rather than the wholesale abandonment of policies that were not particularly different from Labour s. KEYWORDS: Conservative Party; centre-ground of politics; left-right; British politics; David Cameron; party image 1

3 The election of David Cameron as the British Conservative Party s leader in December 2005 was widely greeted by media commentators as the first step towards the modernisation of the party. 1 Until then the Conservatives had trailed the Labour Party in the polls almost continuously for 13 years. Two years later, the Tories had established a steady lead in the polls (after a brief dip when Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair as prime minister). Although part of this reversal of fortunes reflected dissatisfaction with the Blair and Brown governments, the Conservatives were at last benefiting from Labour s unpopularity whereas before, disgruntled voters had defected to the Liberal Democrats or one of the smaller parties that increased their support after The Tories electoral problems since 1997 and their tentative revival since 2006 have been the subject of an increasing quantity of academic analysis. In addition to post-election commentaries in the major books on British general elections (e.g. Norton, 2002, 2006; Cowley and Green, 2005), there have been volumes and articles on the party s lack of progress under William Hague (Garnett and Lynch, 2003) and the search for lessons from previous periods of Tory opposition (Ball and Seldon, 2005; Denham and O Hara, 2007). The party s travails have also been the subject of a special issue of the journal Political Quarterly. 2 Figures connected with the party have been engaged in a debate about what its problems are and how they might be addressed (Ashcroft, 2005; Gyimah, 2005; Philp, 2006). It is frequently claimed that the Conservatives must shift back to the centre-ground of British politics (see Dorey, 2007 for an overview). This injunction is often accompanied by comparisons with the modernisation of the Labour Party in the 1980s and 1990s (Portillo, 2007a). In the latter case, party leaders jettisoned Labour s ideological baggage and adopted moderate policies that appealed to middle-of-the-road, middle-class voters (see Shaw, 1996: 2

4 ). The implication sometimes stated and sometimes not is that the Conservatives have been too right-wing, and must discard their own ideological baggage if they are to win elections (see Norris and Lovenduski, 2004; Seldon and Snowdon, 2005). In contrast, a smaller number of observers have questioned whether the Tories really have been as rightwing as suggested (e.g. Green, 2005). This paper examines the claim that the Conservatives must shift to the centre-ground. It uses polling evidence, British Election Study data and Comparative Manifestos Project data to question the claim that the Tories policies have been too right-wing. It is shown that a major problem for the party, in terms of policy appeal, has been New Labour s electoral strategy, which has entailed adopting policies similar to those of the Tories and initially positioning themselves to the right of the median voter. However, electoral strategy has been only part of the Conservatives problem. They have also suffered from deep image problems and these too are examined. It is these image problems that must be rectified before the Conservatives can significantly improve their electoral prospects. Were the Conservatives Right-wing? Media commentators and Tory modernisers often spoke (and continue to speak) of the party s need to shift to the centre-ground. In his first party conference speech as leader, in October 2006, Cameron told his audience, Our Party s history tells us the ground on which political success is built. It is the centre ground The centre ground is where you find the concerns, the hopes and the dreams of most people and families in this country. (Cameron, 2006) It was (and remains) common to hear comparisons with the Labour Party in the 1980s and 1990s. The question is whether voters felt the same way about the Conservatives. At first glance, it appears they did. The pollsters YouGov regularly ask respondents to say whether 3

5 Proportion of voters (%) the parties and their leaders are very left/right-wing, fairly left/right-wing, slightly left/rightof-centre, or in the centre. Figure 1 below shows the results of a poll conducted a few months before the 2005 general election, when Michael Howard led the Tories. Both the leader and his party were seen as fairly right-wing, whereas voters placed themselves (on average) and Tony Blair in the centre. Gordon Brown, Labour MPs as a whole and the Liberal Democrats were all deemed slightly left-of-centre. A word of caution is needed in interpreting this data, as one-in-three respondents replied don t know to the survey question, possibly indicating a lack of familiarity with the notions of left, right and centre. Nevertheless, there was enough of a perception that the Tories were not in the centre-ground. Figure 1: Perceptions of Left-Right Positions in British Politics (September 2004) Very leftwing Fairly left-wing Slightly left-ofcentre Centre Slightly right-ofcentre Fairly right-wing Very rightwing Labour MPs (-25) Gordon Brown (-22) Charles Kennedy & Lib Dem MPs (-15) Voters (-2) Tony Blair (+4) Michael Howard & Tory MPs (+52) Source: YouGov, Party Conferences, poll for the Daily Telegraph, 27 Sept 2004, retrieved 1 December 2007 from < 4

6 Notes: Q. Some people talk about left, right and centre to describe parties and politicians. Where would you place [politician/party/yourself] on this scale? [Options: very left-wing, fairly left-wing, slightly left-of-centre, centre, slightly right-of-centre, fairly right-wing, very right-wing, don t know] Graph shows distribution of respondents (grey bars) and mean position of various parties and politicians. Mean scores converted to figure between -100 (very left-wing) and +100 (very right-wing). A simple spatial model of party competition appears to capture the Conservatives problem. In Figure 2, Labour (LAB) is much closer to the median voter (M) than the Tories are when they are positioned at CON 1. Those who advocate a New Labour-style modernisation for the Tories usually have this situation in mind, because Labour did indeed abandon a raft of leftwing policies in its pursuit of the centre-ground in the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 2: Centrist Versus Right-wing Conservative Policy Positions LAB M CON 2 CON 1 There is evidence, however, that voters saw the Conservatives differently from the way they saw Old Labour. There was certainly no comparison with Labour s travails in the mid-1980s when the term Loony Left entered popular parlance, in response to the activities of some 5

7 municipal Labour administrations. Indeed, there was no general feeling that the Tories were extreme. A series of MORI polls that gave respondents a list of characteristics of the parties and asked them to select those that were applicable, found that the proportion of respondents describing the Conservatives as extreme never rose above 15 percent between 1997 and 2006, and was usually about percent. These figures were about 5 percent lower than they were under Mrs Thatcher s leadership and considerably lower than Labour s ratings in the mid-1980s (37 percent in 1987). 3 For most of the period, the Conservatives were denounced by their own modernisers, as well as by many media commentators, as too right-wing and were advised to shift to the centre. However, another conventional wisdom was that the two main parties were very similar in their policy offerings (e.g. Green, 2007: 630-1). It was accepted by rightwingers in the Conservative Party, many of whom suggested (and some still do see Tebbit, 2006) that their party should open up clear blue water between itself and New Labour. A YouGov poll of ordinary Conservative members during the leadership election of 2005 found that 48 percent believed that The Conservative Party should remain firmly on the Right of politics and put clear blue water between the Conservatives and New Labour. In contrast, 45 percent thought the party should move more towards the political Centre, with more moderate one nation policies. 4 The notion of policy convergence among parties in a twoparty system is well known in political science, particularly in relation to the spatial model. In the simple two-party model, the party that is closest to the median voter in policy space wins his support and so each party has an incentive to edge closer than its rival to this voter until the parties straddle the median-voter position in equilibrium. In Figure 2, this conjuncture occurs when the Conservatives shift to point CON 2. 6

8 Before looking at the evidence for these conjunctures, it is necessary to deal briefly with one potential objection to this analysis. In the 2005 general election, the Liberal Democrats won 22.1 percent of the vote and 62 parliamentary seats. Even though they are much smaller than the Conservatives and Labour, their presence complicates the application of the two-party spatial model. Indeed, Britain is frequently said to have a two-and-a-half party system (e.g. Siaroff, 2003). The existence of a small centrist party can reduce the zero-sum nature of competition between the two major parties a lost centrist vote for one is no longer necessarily a vote gained for the other because it could go to the centrist party instead. It may thereby be possible for the major parties to adopt slightly more radical policies because the electoral damage from doing so is lessened an attractive option for parties whose members and candidates have non-centrist policy preferences (Adams and Merrill, 2006: 406). There are reasons for believing, however, that the dynamics of two-party competition still characterised British politics after Spatial models tend to assume, for reasons of simplicity, a single national constituency. In reality, the UK had 659 local constituencies in , and 646 in Very few were genuine three-way contests. A feature of this period, especially , was a high level of tactical voting, as supporters of Labour and the Liberal Democrats voted for whichever of the two parties had the best chance of defeating the Tories in a given constituency (Curtice and Steed, 1997: ; 2002: 321-2). Thus, centripetal forces were present at the local level, reinforcing those at the national level, where Labour and the Liberal Democrats enjoyed a cooperative relationship, at least during the Blair government s first term (Denver, 2002). In short, the presence of the Liberal Democrats did not provide the Conservatives with much leeway for safely adopting right-wing policies. As such, the use of a two-party spatial model, although a simplification, can still shed light on the 7

9 Tories electoral predicament. 5 The question is whether either of the conjunctures presented in Figure 2 provides an accurate portrayal of British politics from 1997 to Party Policy Positions, Two sources of data are consulted to ascertain the policy positions of the parties since 1997 the manifesto data of the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) and the panel data of the British Election Study (BES). After each election, the CMP codifies all sentences in parties general-election manifestos as either left or right before subtracting the percentage of left sentences from the percentage of right sentences (see Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006; Bara, 2006). A score of +100 indicates a completely right-wing manifesto, while a score of -100 signifies an entirely left-wing manifesto. British parties manifestos have usually fallen within a range stretching from +30 on the right to -40 on the left. One drawback of the CMP scores is that they are unrelated to voters preferences: the centre-point of the scale is rather arbitrary and cannot be taken as the position of the median voter without further evidence. Indeed, the CMP data is somewhat controversial, with some political scientists questioning whether it really does capture parties policy positions (see Volkens, 2001; Laver et al., 2003). Therefore, it is best regarded as suggestive, as one indicator of policy, although as is revealed later, it (often) tells a similar story to the BES data. 8

10 LEFT RIGHT Figure 3: Left-Right Placement of British Parties Manifestos, Conservative Alliance/Lib Dem Labour Sources: Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., Note: Scale: -100 = completely left-wing; +100 = completely right-wing Figure 3 shows the CMP s data for Britain between 1983 and It confirms the impression that the period was one of policy convergence between Labour and the Conservatives (and the Liberal Democrats) the closest they have been since the 1950s, according to the same dataset. In 1997 and 2001, Labour even fell on the right side of the political spectrum for the first time in its history, with only a slight track back to the left in Under Blair, Labour occupied traditional Tory territory on economic management, defence and crime, which effectively led the parties to compete for centre-right voters. During the same period, the Conservatives were shifting towards them and away from their more 9

11 rightist Thatcherite positions of the 1980s. This closeness was apparent in actual policies. On taxation, the distance between Labour and the Conservatives was the 4 billion of tax cuts that the Tories planned to make these amounted to 0.3 percent of national income, an almost imperceptible figure. Even on issues such as immigration, where the Tories promised strict quotas and an Australian-style points-based system, Labour replied with its own points system. The period also witnessed another major area of agreement between Labour and the Conservatives: support for the Iraq War, which only the anti-war Liberal Democrats were able to use to damage the government. If it were the case that both Labour and the Conservatives were to the right of the median voter something it is not possible to discern from the CMP data the dynamics of party competition would be somewhat different from either of the conjunctures in Figure 2. In a two-party setting, a party that were sufficiently ruthless and ideologically mobile could take advantage of any non-centrist position that its opponent might adopt by siding up next to it so that both parties were on the same side of the median-voter position. This scenario is depicted in Figure 4. The Conservative Party is positioned on the centre-right of the policy spectrum, but the Labour Party, rather than staying to the left of the median voter, has moved past it and positioned itself slightly to the left of the Conservatives on the right-hand side of the policy spectrum. 6 If we assume there is no (or little) abstention among voters on the left of the policy spectrum, Labour will win the election because it is closer to the median voter thus explaining the paradox that the two major parties can have similar policies but enjoy greatly contrasting electoral fortunes. 7 10

12 Figure 4: Policy Convergence to the Right of the Median Voter Position M LAB CON Some electoral analysts tend to assume that in spatial models, parties look to locate themselves as close as possible to the median voter in order to maximise votes (e.g. Whiteley, et al., 2005: 147). 8 In fact, the prediction of two-party spatial models is that the party closest to the median voter will win the election. Convergence at the median-voter position is an equilibrium in the two-party spatial model, but if one party, for whatever reason, remains some distance from the median voter s bliss point, its rival maximises votes by adopting a similar policy position, while remaining closer to the median voter, as in Figure 4. This Labour strategy presents the Conservatives with a strategic problem. The Tories need to be closer to the median voter if they are to be electorally competitive, but they are blocked by the presence of Labour. One possibility is to leap-frog over Labour and become slightly more leftist. Interestingly, Downs (1957: 122-3) ruled out this possibility as one of the constraints on party behaviour in his spatial model, although as subsequent writers have pointed out, there is nothing in the logic of the model to justify this move (e.g. Laver, 1997: 112). In the real world of party politics, however, there may well be such a constraint because a centreright party that tried to pass itself off as more leftist than its centre-left opponent would lack credibility and not be trusted by voters (see Downs, 1957: ). 11

13 From this perspective, the main obstacle to a Conservative revival was not their right-wing policies according to the CMP data, their last two manifestos have been their most centrist since October 1974 but rather the electoral strategy of New Labour, whereby the party often occupied territory just to the right of centre. This conjuncture somewhat echoes that of the mid-late 1950s, another time of policy convergence between the parties, but this time it was the Conservatives who had shifted towards Labour and adopted some of their centre-left policies, winning three consecutive election victories. 9 Then as now, more radical voices in the opposition party sought to respond to this invasion of their political territory by adopting a more radical policy position (the Bevanites in the Labour Party in the 1950s and the taxcutting right in the Conservative Party after 1997). Then as now, the more moderate voices were initially undermined by not having a clear idea about what to do to reverse their party s fortunes. Then as now, questions were asked about what the opposition party stood for. This comparison is perhaps better than the frequently-made one between the Conservatives predicament after 1997 and Labour s travails in the 1980s, when the policy difference between the parties was huge, necessitating centrist shifts by Labour (see Figure 3). 10 The CMP data is based on policies that the parties themselves put forward in their manifestos, but it does not provide data on voters preferences. For the latter we must rely on opinion polls and large-scale surveys such as the British Election Study. Before and after each general election, the BES asks a large panel of respondents various questions on their political preferences and views of the parties. Among them are questions that ask respondents to locate themselves and the parties on 11-point scales for a number of different policy issues. Figure 5 below plots on a continuum the mean scores for the issue of taxation and spending on public services, one of the key issues in any election. 12

14 Figure 5: Mean Voter Placements of Voters, Labour and Conservatives on Taxation Versus Public Spending ( ) 1997 LAB (6.37) Voters (6.28) CON (3.07) (Lib Dems = 6.25) More taxes, higher spending Lower taxes, lower spending 2001 Voters (6.46) LAB (5.93) CON (4.61) (Lib Dems = 6.51) More taxes, higher spending Lower taxes, lower spending 2005 LAB (6.07) Voters (6.05) CON (5.00) (Lib Dems = 6.06) More taxes, higher spending Lower taxes, lower spending Source: British Election Study, post-election waves, 1997, 2001 and 2005 Note: Q. (2005) Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place yourself on this scale? (And where would you place ) Please take your answers from this card. [BES in 1997 and 2001 used very similar questions] 13

15 A number of interesting points arise from this data. First, the biggest perceived gap between Labour and the Conservatives was in 1997, though the CMP data suggests that the parties had converged since This perception may have reflected the widespread belief that public services had been neglected by the Major government. In 2001 and 2005 the gap between Labour and the Conservatives narrowed considerably, with Labour shifting slightly to the right in voters minds and the Conservatives to the left. The mean voter shifted very slightly to the right. Second, in all three elections, the average voter saw himself as closer to Labour than to the Conservatives, with an almost imperceptible difference between Labour and the mean voter in 1997 and Third, in 2001 the mean voter placed Labour somewhat to the right of himself, with the Conservatives further right. This judgment would have reflected voters views of Labour s first term in office, when it stuck to tight spending controls in its first two years. Even the significant increase in public spending in Labour s second term had little effect on perceptions of Labour on tax-and-spend. This data lends some support to the earlier argument about the Conservatives strategic dilemma (Figure 4). By 2001, Labour had positioned itself in voters minds between the Conservatives and the mean voter, presenting the Tories with the problem of how to position themselves closer to voters preferences. This problem had not been fully alleviated by 2005, when voters and Labour shared virtually the same point on the continuum, although the Tories were not regarded as being very far from the mean voter. The CMP and BES data both indicate that party competition was rather unusual during the years of the Blair government. The CMP suggests that the two main parties were both slightly to the right of centre in 1997 and 2001, while the BES found that voters placed themselves to 14

16 the left of both parties on tax-and-spend in In terms of policy, it may have been the case that there was little more the Conservatives could have done to make themselves more competitive in 2001 (Green, 2005: 125). By 2005, Labour had shifted slightly to the left according to the CMP, while the BES found that voters positioned themselves at almost the same point as Labour. Labour s tentative vacating of centre-right territory largely because of the need to raise taxes and pour money into the public services at least offered the Conservatives the hope of winning the votes of some voters who found themselves positioned between the two main parties. Party Competition and Security Issues Although policy on taxation and public spending is vitally important, it is not the only issue that voters consider at election time. During Labour s second term, security issues such as crime, terrorism and immigration rose up the list of salient issues, largely as a direct and indirect consequence of the 9/11 terror attacks (Quinn, 2006: 18-24). These issues roughly relate to the second major ideological dimension traditionally used by political scientists, that of authoritarianism-liberalism (see Heath, et al., 1994). The BES collects data on respondents views of where the parties are positioned on the trade-off between reducing crime and protecting the rights of suspects. (Immigration is categorised by the BES as a valence (i.e. competence) issue and so no data is collected on where respondents position the parties, although they are asked which party would best handle the issue see below.) 15

17 Figure 6: Mean Voter Placements of Voters, Labour and Conservatives on Crime Reduction Versus Protection of Rights ( ) 2001 LAB (4.93) CON (3.96) Voters (3.56) (Lib Dems = 4.84) Protect rights > reduce crime Reduce crime > protect rights 2005 LAB CON Voters (5.14) (4.10) (3.65) (Lib Dems = 4.98) Protect rights > reduce crime Reduce crime > protect rights Source: British Election Study, post-election waves, 2001 and 2005 Note: Q. Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale below, where would you place yourself? (And where would you place...) Please take your answers from this card. Figure 6 shows the mean voter positions and mean party positions, as perceived by BES respondents, for law-and-order in 2001 and 2005 (this question was not asked in the 1997 BES). In each case, Labour was in the centre of the continuum, with the Conservatives to the right and voters even further to the right. However, the distances between the parties and with voters were not particularly great. Labour was largely able to nullify much of the positional advantage the Conservatives enjoyed on the issue; certainly, Labour was not seen as soft on 16

18 crime by voters as a whole (probably because David Blunkett had been a blunt and vocal critic of liberals in the criminal justice system when he was home secretary). The charge that the Conservatives have been too right-wing faces two problems in relation to the law-and-order issue. First, the Conservatives were seen as slightly to the left of public opinion on the issue. Second, Labour itself, although seen as to the left of the Conservatives on crime, was not especially so. Its own policies in this area included flagship measures such as anti-social behaviour orders, as well as numerous legislative measures to tackle crime. In summary, the BES data on tax-and-spend and law-and-order suggests that there was a considerable degree of policy convergence between the two (indeed, the three) main parties. Sometimes, this convergence was to the right of the mean voter (tax-and-spend in 2001), sometimes to the left of the mean voter (law-and-order in 2001 and 2005), and sometimes towards the mean voter, with the parties on different sides (tax-and-spend in 2005). But voters perceived the policy gap between the Conservatives and Labour to be narrowing, particularly on tax-and-spend. This story is hard to square with the conventional wisdom that the Conservatives have been too right-wing and need to move to the centre, if only because this process has been happening continuously for the last ten years. The Conservative Party s Image Problem The previous section showed that voters perceived policy convergence between the Conservatives and Labour. However, Figure 1 showed that voters also saw the Tories and their then-leader, Michael Howard, as fairly right-wing. 11 Clearly, this judgment must have been based on something other than policies. A clue was provided by an ICM poll for the BBC s Newsnight programme in February It showed that support for strict controls on 17

19 immigration decreased from 82 percent to 65 percent once voters were told that this policy was a Conservative policy, while opposition rose from 18 percent to 35 percent. Net support thus fell from 64 percent to 30 percent. 12 In short, the party s image was damaged: as King (2006: 166) observes, [i]t was not Tory policies that were disliked, it was the Tories. Image, or brand as it is sometimes described, is important because it represents what Francis Maude, a former Conservative chairman, called a party s personality (Philp, 2006: 34). It is the perception that voters have of a party, perceptions that may be only partly related to policy. Party image subsumes a number of things. It reflects voters views of the public face of the party, in the form of its leading personnel, as well as perceptions of which social groups the party represents. It also reflects a party s language, tone of voice, and general attitude towards the wider world: it could be optimistic, caring, modern and forward-looking, or the opposite pessimistic, selfish, old-fashioned and backward-looking. The same set of policies could, in principle, co-exist with either of these personalities, but a party is likely to improve its electoral prospects with a given set of policies if it enjoys a positive public image. The Conservatives suffered immense image problems in the post-1997 period. Some of these dated from the Major government (see Norton, 1998). The events of Black Wednesday in September 1992, when the pound was chaotically ejected from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, robbed the Conservatives of their long-standing reputation for sound economic management. It compounded dismay over the recession of , in which many people struggled with mortgage payments. Despite an economic recovery in the mid-1990s, voters never forgave the Major government, and once New Labour had demonstrated its own economic credentials, voters were disinclined to trust the Conservative Party on the management of the economy. A YouGov poll for the Daily Telegraph days before the

20 general election found that 52 percent of respondents agreed with the statement, I still hold against the Conservatives the chaos and hardship of the early 1990s when interest rates went through the roof and John Major and Norman Lamont couldn t prevent Britain being forced out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (just 36 percent disagreed). 13 Economic incompetence can have drastic consequences for the well-being and livelihoods of ordinary people, and if a party acquires such a reputation, it can poison its overall image in the eyes of voters. A further problem inherited from the Major years was the Conservatives internal divisions. MORI polls found that when respondents were presented with a list of attributes to describe the Conservative Party, one of the most frequently chosen was divided, with 50 percent using this description in 1997 and 42 percent using it in The divisions in the Conservative Party were principally over European integration, with long-running factional disputes between Eurosceptics and Europhiles (see Turner, 2000). The Conservatives internal battles over Europe were different from the factional conflicts in the Labour Party a decade earlier. Unlike in the Labour Party, the radical faction in the Tories case, the Eurosceptics was not unpopular among voters. On the contrary, the British public had itself become increasingly Eurosceptic. The BES found that voters positioned themselves closer to the Conservatives than to Labour on the issue of Europe. On an 11-point scale, where 0 was the most anti-european position and 10 the most pro-european point, voters on average positioned themselves at 5.2, the Conservatives at 4.3, the Liberal Democrats at 6.9 and Labour at 7.6 (Whiteley et al., 2005: 150). However, despite the Tories often intense focus on Europe, especially in 2001, voters did not consider it especially important. The main problem that Europe caused the party was not that it made voters consider them extreme, but that it advertised their divisions (Evans, 1998). 19

21 Important as these perceived problems of incompetence and division were for the Conservatives, they do not explain why the party was viewed as fairly right-wing. Explaining the latter will reveal what the party must do to shift to the centre-ground. In fact, the Conservatives major problem was that they did not look particularly mainstream in important ways. Too often, the party appeared to embody selfishness and a socially exclusive appeal. It was also seen by many people as nasty and angry about the modern world. This sense was reinforced by the party s sometimes old-fashioned image. Each of these image problems is examined in turn. Selfish and Socially Exclusive? Figure 7 shows the results of a YouGov poll for the Daily Telegraph in October 2005 in which respondents were asked to say whether or not the Conservatives were close to various social groups. 15 Large majorities saw the party as close to the rich, big business and rural dwellers, whereas almost equally big majorities saw them as not being close to the poor, the working classes and trade unionists, among others. If the latter negative findings were not particularly surprising, the problem was that the first three groups were the only ones that respondents associated with the Tories. Being seen as a party of the well-off limited the Conservatives electoral appeal. It fed into voters fears about how the party would manage the public services that most people relied on, with suspicions that they might privatise them. People will usually be disinclined to support a party if they believe it does not understand their economic circumstances because it speaks mainly for the wealthy, or it simply wants the well-off to have the right to get richer while everyone else must fend for themselves. In this context, shifting to the centre would entail being more representative of all socio-economic groups and banishing the perception that the party represented only the haves. 20

22 Figure 7: Conservative Party s Perceived Closeness to Social Groups The rich Professional and business people People who live in the country Women Old people People who live in large towns and cities People like myself Gay people Members of ethnic minorities Working-class people Trade union members Young people The poor Source: YouGov, Iraq, Conservative Party, poll for the Daily Telegraph, 4 October 2005, retrieved 1 December 2007 from < Notes: Q. People often see political parties as being close, or not close, to various sections of society. How close do you see the Conservative Party as being to each of these kinds of people? Graph shows proportion of people saying the Conservative Party is very or fairly close minus the proportion saying they are not very or not at all close to various groups. 21

23 The Nasty Party? It was shown earlier that the Conservatives were in tune with public opinion on law-andorder, a key issue on the authoritarianism-liberalism dimension. The BES also found that the Tories were seen as the best party to deal with the issue of immigration and asylum (Table 1). According to the BES, immigration/asylum was the most salient issue in the 2005 election. It would seem unsurprising, therefore, that the Conservatives chose to put immigration at the forefront of their election campaign in The party s manifesto focused on five key policy areas, of which one was immigration. The relevant section was headed, It s not racist to impose limits on immigration, a slogan that also adorned a large campaign poster (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005: 76). Research commissioned by the Conservative donor, Michael Ashcroft, found that the Tories stance on immigration was the theme that voters most remembered from their campaign (Ashcroft, 2005: 34-43). Table 1: Most Important Issue and Party Best Able to Handle It (2005) Best Party Labour Conservative Liberal Democrats Asylum/immigration (20.7) NHS (15.3) Law and order (11.9) Economy/unemployment (7.7) Education (6.4) EU/EMU (5.7) Source: British Election Study 2005 (post-election wave) Note: Figures in brackets in first column show percentage of all respondents thinking this issue is most important one. Figures in columns 2-4 show percentage believing each party best able to handle issue, among those who cited issue as most important. 22

24 The danger of this focus was that the Conservatives risked being seen as unsympathetic and even nasty the latter being the description offered of the party by its own chairman, Theresa May, in Although Labour was also keen to emphasise its tough credentials on security issues, it nevertheless retained a more caring image because of its association with public services and social justice. The Conservatives did not have this image to fall back on, so they risked appearing merely angry. The Tories tone of language on crime and immigration, as well as their perceived antipathy to other social groups such as the poor, single mothers, ethnic minorities and gays (see below), crystallised their nasty party image (see Cowley and Green, 2005: 51-2; Lynch and Garnett, 2003: 260-1; Norton, 2006: 46). It is what most critics probably meant when they said the party was too right-wing. William Hague and Michael Howard regularly succumbed to the temptation of using authoritarian rhetoric when talking about crime and immigration. Hague gave a notorious speech in 2001, referring to Britain becoming a foreign land ; even if he did not explicitly relate this image to immigration, his spin doctors briefed journalists that he was indeed referring to this issue (Lynch, 2003: 191). He also expressed sympathy with a farmer who had been jailed for shooting an intruder in his home (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005: 255). During the 2005 election campaign, there was much talk in the media of the Conservatives dog-whistle politics : couching speeches and slogans in language that appeared benign but which contained coded words whose hard-line intent would be understood by right-wing voters (including the party s election slogan, Are you thinking what we re thinking? ). Even when Howard s Conservatives spoke about public services, they tended to play on people s fears: the manifesto section on health emphasised anxieties about contracting superbugs in hospitals, while the section on education focused on bringing discipline back to unruly classrooms (Conservative Party, 2005). 23

25 This language and issue focus might have helped the Tories had their target voters found it attractive, but the evidence is that they did not. The BES survey for 2005 confirmed the findings of polling reported by Ashcroft: the most anti-immigrant segments of the population were the working classes, i.e. the social group least likely to support the Conservatives. In contrast, the electorally crucial salariat (professional middle classes) tended to be more liberal on immigration. In 1992, the Conservatives led Labour by 56 percent to 20 percent among the salariat, but by 2005, the gap had shrunk to 2 percent, with the Tories winning 36 percent to Labour s 34 percent; the Liberal Democrats support among the salariat rose slightly, from 21 percent to 23 percent during this period (Sanders, 1993: 189; Bartle and Laycock, 2006: 82). It seems likely that the Tories image as the nasty party cost it dear among a group whose support is indispensable if the party is to win an election (see Portillo, 2007b). In this sense, shifting to the centre-ground would entail softening the party s tone and rhetoric on immigration, even if the policies themselves were modified only marginally. Some political scientists argue that issues such as immigration and race relations should be separated from the old authoritarian-liberal ideological dimension because they entail attitudes towards something else, namely, the tolerance of difference (Sanders, 2006). Hardline views on crime can co-exist with liberal views on immigration. Shifting to the centreground thereby involves becoming more tolerant of difference, partly in relation to race and immigration, but also in relation to other aspects of modern life, as shown in the next section. Old-fashioned and Stuck in the Past? One of the major problems facing the Conservative Party after 1997 was the perception that it was old-fashioned and ill at ease with the modern world, a feeling compounded by the 24

26 resolutely modern New Labour government of Tony Blair. A YouGov poll shortly before the 2005 general election offered respondents a series of statements and asked whether they applied more to the Conservatives or Labour. The Tories had large leads on negative statements such as, It seems to appeal to one section of society rather than to the whole country (48 percent cited the Tories, while 20 percent cited Labour); It seems stuck in the past (45 percent to Labour s 11 percent); and It seems rather old and tired (44 percent to Labour s 18 percent). In contrast, the Conservative Party lagged behind Labour on positive statements such as, It seems to have succeeded in moving on and left its past behind it (17 percent to Labour s 42 percent) and Even if I don t agree with them, at least its heart is in the right place (22 percent to Labour s 40 percent). 16 Part of the problem for the Conservatives was that British society had changed, becoming socially more plural, but many people saw the Tories as a party that did not welcome this development. Figure 7 presented earlier showed that the Conservatives were not seen as close to gays, ethnic minorities, women or young people. Centre-right parties can sometimes look old-fashioned, especially to the young. They tend to emphasise family values and garner disproportionate support among the elderly, both of which were and are true of the British Conservatives. However, the Tories had a deeper problem. They suffered from residual memories of John Major s infamous back to basics campaign in the mid-1990s, when the Conservative government appeared to be lecturing people on their lifestyles especially single mothers while a succession of Tory MPs became embroiled in sexual scandals. In addition, a fissure had opened up within the Thatcherite coalition between economic and social liberals on the one hand and social conservatives on the other (Norton, 2002: 86-7; 2006: 35). The former would become the new modernisers associated first with Michael 25

27 Portillo and later Cameron and the Notting Hill set. However, socially conservative traditionalists sought to impose their will at crucial points during the Tories first two terms in opposition. That was most evident with Iain Duncan Smith s decision to impose a three-line whip on what came to be called gay adoption, with high-profile social liberals defying the leadership (Cowley and Green, 2005: 52-3). It was also seen earlier in relation to drugs, when Ann Widdecombe, then shadow home secretary in Hague s shadow cabinet, attempted to impose a hard-line policy on cannabis. In addition, party spokesmen continued to express their strong preference for marriage and traditional two-parent families. Even if the party did not return to the hectoring tone of the Major years, its divisions over social policy reinforced the image of a party still living in the past. Whereas US conservatives have been able to appeal to religious values voters, the potential for the Tories to replicate such a strategy is limited because Britain is largely a secular, socially liberal country. A Populus poll commissioned by Ashcroft (2005: 26) found large majorities expressing support for Britain s multi-ethnic society, gay rights, the acceptability of cohabitation among unmarried couples, the acceptability of lone-parent families, and the unacceptability of governmental interference in people s private behaviour (see Table 2). 26

28 Table 2: Social Liberalism in Britain Indicators of Social Liberalism % Agreeing The single change that would most improve life in Britain today is people being more tolerant of different ethnic groups and cultures 77 It is not a matter for political parties to express a preference between marriage and couples living together outside marriage 70 The diverse mix of races, cultures and religions now found in our society has been good for Britain 69 It is not a matter for political parties to express a preference between two-parent families and one-parent families 66 Gay couples should have exactly the same rights as heterosexual couples 65 Governments should not use the law to try and change people s private behaviour 65 Source: Ashcroft, 2005: 26 Public opinion has also become more liberal on the issue of drugs, especially soft drugs, such as cannabis. A YouGov poll for the Daily Telegraph in January 2004 found that 57 percent of respondents believed that hard drugs should be distinguished from soft drugs (41 percent said they were much the same). Although 47 percent thought soft drugs caused harm to all or most users, the same proportion thought they caused harm to few users or to none at all. Moreover, while 43 percent thought the sale and possession of soft drugs should remain criminal offences, fully 51 percent said they should be either legalised (23 percent) or decriminalised, i.e. seen as minor offences on a par with parking in the wrong place (28 percent)

29 Internal divisions over social policy reinforced the impression that many Conservatives wanted to return to a mythical Golden Age, somewhere in the 1950s. Voters probably did not regard such ideas as a threat, if only because few people in Britain seriously believe that the government has much influence over people s lifestyle choices. But old-fashioned views did make the party appear out of touch, irrelevant, and somewhat right-wing on the pluralism and tolerance dimension. A shift to the centre-ground would, in this respect, require a greater acceptance of modern social mores. Each of these image problems for the Conservatives their association with the rich, their harsh tone on security issues, and their perceived intolerance was exacerbated by the leaders they chose during their first two terms in opposition. Here is not the place to undertake a comprehensive analysis of leadership effects on party support, something on which political scientists disagree (for contrasting views, see Bartle and Crewe, 2002; Evans and Anderson, 2005). However, not only did Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard all lag behind Blair in satisfaction ratings, 18 they all personified the right-wing image the party needed to soften. It was the Conservatives misfortune that their most appealing electoral figure during these years was Kenneth Clarke, whose pro-european views made him unacceptable to most of his party. Consequently, when Tory leaders sought to broaden the party s appeal by discussing issues such as public services or criticising Blair s conduct in the run-up to the Iraq War, they tended to be seen as opportunistic. Hague and Howard were also accused of abandoning earlier efforts to reposition the party and returning to the core-vote strategy of appealing to the Tories committed supporters a move that was invariably accompanied by a return to the strident tone that other voters found off-putting (Denham and O Hara, 2007: ). 28

30 Conclusion Despite frequent injunctions by media commentators that the Conservatives must shift to the centre-ground, this article has found that Conservative policies have not been particularly right-wing over the last decade. Their policies have often been only marginally different from New Labour s. Indeed, one of the biggest obstacles in the Tories way was Tony Blair, who was seen by voters as a centrist. His aggressive electoral strategy saw Labour competing with the Tories not only for centrist but also centre-right voters. Gordon Brown, by contrast, is seen as slightly left-of-centre and thereby offers a clearer target for the Conservatives: clear blue water might well help the Tories, but only if it opens up by Labour shifting to the left. The major problem for the Conservatives, however, has been their negative public image. In addition to a lingering perception of economic incompetence, they came across as uncaring, strident and intolerant. These impressions helped foster the popular image of the Tories as right-wing. Consequently, David Cameron has spent his first two years as leader rebranding his party and trying to convince voters that it was modernising. It is not the task of this paper to examine Cameron s strategy in detail (see Denham and O Hara, 2007: 185-8; Denham and Dorey, 2006; Dorey, 2007; Kerr, 2007), but a few observations are in order. Thus far, Cameron has made few substantive policy pronouncements. Instead, he has sought to decontaminate his party s brand, softening its tone, appearing more inclusive and focusing on issues that enable the party to project a more caring image. Talk of tax cuts has given way to an emphasis on public services, and Cameron sought to win over public-sector workers by calling for fewer performance targets and more trust in professionals (see Sanders, 2006: 171-9). A new emphasis on the environment was partly intended to distance the party from materialism and individual self-interest, and was symbolised by a change in the party s 29

31 logo to an oak tree. Harsh rhetoric on security issues has been replaced by a stronger defence of civil liberties. Meanwhile, Cameron has also tried to make his party look socially more representative, by encouraging local Conservative associations to look beyond white, professional married men when choosing parliamentary candidates (Dorey, 2007: 153-5). Cameron s efforts thus far have brought some success. A YouGov poll for Channel 4 News in June 2007, similar to the one reported in Figure 1, found that respondents saw Cameron as more centrist than the previous Conservative leader. His rating was +33 ( slightly right-ofcentre ), although Gordon Brown, the man who was then waiting to take over as prime minister, was closer to the centre (-26). Cameron s bigger problem was that his party was still seen as fairly right-wing (+52). Furthermore, 44 percent agreed that The Conservative Party will prevent David Cameron s policies from being as moderate as he would like them to be, with 17 percent disagreeing and 39 percent not knowing. 19 It would seem that before the Conservatives can make an electoral breakthrough, Cameron must convince voters not only that he is modern and centrist, but that his party is too. 30