I famericanneoconservativesareliberalsmuggedbyreality,chinese

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1 Introduction DanielA.Bell I famericanneoconservativesareliberalsmuggedbyreality,chinese realistsareidealistsmuggedbythesurrealeventsoftheculturalrevolution.inthecaseofyanxuetong,hegrewupinafamilyofmorallyuprightintellectualsand,attheageofsixteen,wassenttoaconstruction corpsinchina sfarnorth,wherehestayedfornineyears.here showhe describeshisexperienceofhardship: Atthattime,theLeftistideology wasinfullswing.inmay,waterinheilongjiangstillturnstoice. When wepulledthesowingmachine,wewerenotallowedtowearboots. We walkedbarefootovertheice.ourlegswerecoveredincuts.wecarried sacksofseedthatcouldweighuptoeightykilograms[about176pounds]. Wecarriedthemalongtheraisedpathwaysaroundthepaddyfields.These werenotlevel;makeaslightmisstepandyoufellintothewater.youjust thoughtofclimbingoutandgoingon.whenyouatlaststruggledtothe endandlaydown,youreyescouldonlyseeblackandyoujustcouldnot getup...[w]esawpeoplebeingbeatentodeath,soyoubecamesomewhatimmunetoit. In1969,theVoiceofAmericapredictedthatwar could break out on the Sino Soviet border: When we young people learnedthis,wewereparticularlyhappy.wehopedthatamassivewar wouldimprovethecountry,oratleastchangeourownlives.todaypeoplefearwar,butatthetimewehopedforimmediateaction,evento wageaworldwar.thatwaywecouldhavehope.inthatframeofmind, therewasnodifferencebetweenlifeanddeath.therewasnopointin living. Fourdecadeslater,YanXuetonghasemergedasChina smostinfluentialforeignpolicyanalystandtheoristofinternationalrelations(in2008, Foreign Policy named him one of the world s hundred most influential

2 2 DANIELA.BELL publicintellectuals).heopenlyrecognizesthathisexperienceofhardshipinthecountrysidehasshapedhisoutlook: [It]gavepeopletheconfidencetoovercomeallobstacles.Andthisconfidenceisbuiltprecisely onthebasisofanestimationofthediffcultiesfaced,onthebasisofalways preparingfortheworstcase.hence,manypeoplewhowentdowntothe countrysidearerealistswithregardtolife.peoplewhohavenotexperienced hardship are more liable to adopt an optimistic attitude toward internationalpolitics. 1 Totheoutsideworld,YanmayappearasChina s PrinceofDarkness, thehawkishpolicyadviserwhoistheenemyofliberalinternationalists. MarkLeonard,theauthoroftheinfluentialbookWhatDoesChinaThink?, labelsyanaschina s leading neo comm, anassertivenationalistwho hascalledforamoreforthrightapproachtotaiwan,japan,andtheunited States. A neo comm is China s equivalent of theamerican neocon: The neo comm labelwillstickbecausetherearesomanyparallelsbetweenyanxuetongandhisanalogues[theneocons]intheusa.yanxuetongisalmostthemirrorimageofwilliamkristol...wherekristolis obsessedwithachinathreatandconvincedthatussupremacyistheonly solutiontoapeacefulworldorder,yanxuetongisfixatedwiththeusa and sure that China s military s modernization is the key to world stability. 2 ButLeonard saccount basedonenglish languagesources misrepresentsyan sviews.yanisneitheracommunist(ormarxist)whobelieves thateconomicmightisthekeytonationalpowernoraneoconwhobelievesthatchinashouldrelyonmilitarymightratherthanmultilateral organizationstogetitsway.yan sargumentisthatpoliticalleadershipis thekeytonationalpowerandthatmoralityisanessentialpartofpolitical leadership. Economic and military might matter as components of nationalpower,buttheyaresecondarytopoliticalleaderswhoact(atleast partly)inaccordancewithmoralnorms.ifchina sleadersabsorbandact onthatinsight,theycanplayagreaterroleinshapingapeacefulandharmoniousworldorder. Yanisstillapoliticalrealist,becausehebelieves politicalleadershipshapesinternationalrelations;it sthewaythepoliticalworldactuallyworks,notjustanideal.moreover,yanbelievesthatthe globalorderisboundtobehierarchical,withsomestatesbeingdominant

3 INTRODUCTION 3 andotherslessinfluential.butdominanceisachievedmainlybymorally informedpoliticalleadershipratherthaneconomicormilitarypower. Yan stheorywasshapedbyhisgroundbreakingacademicresearchon ancientchinesethinkerswhowroteaboutgovernanceandinterstaterelationsduringaperiodofincessantwarfarebetweenfragmentedstates, beforechinawasunifiedbythefirstemperorofqinin221bce.inthis way,too,yanisdifferentfromtheneocons:heisascholaraswellapoliticalcommentator.thisbookisatranslationofyan sworkontheinternationalpoliticalphilosophyofancientchinesethinkers.thethreeessays byyanarefollowedbycriticalcommentariesbythreechinesescholars. Inthelastchapter,Yanrepliestohiscriticsanddrawsimplicationsofpre QinphilosophyforChina srisetoday.thebookincludesthreeappendixes:ashortaccountofthehistoricalcontextandthekeythinkersofthe pre Qinperiodthatmaybehelpfulfornonexperts,arevealinginterview withyanxuetonghimself,andyanxuetong sdiscussionofwhythereis nochineseschoolofinternationalrelationstheory.readersofthisbook maynotagreewithallofyan sarguments,butthe neo comm label,we hope,willnotstick. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF PRE-QIN THINKERS TheSpringandAutumnPeriod(ca bce)andtheWarringStates Period(ca bce)wereatimeofruthlesscompetitionforterritorial advantage among small states.the various princely states still gavefeudalhomagetothezhoukingastheircommonlordbut,asyang Qianru notes in chapter 4, it was rather like the relationship of the membersoftoday scommonwealthtogreatbritain.theyacceptthe QueenastheheadoftheCommonwealthbutenjoyequalandindependentstatusalongwithGreatBritain. Thehistoricalrealityisthat several largeprincelystatesalreadyhadtwobasicfeaturesofthemodern state : sovereigntyandterritory.notonlydidthestateshaveindependentand autonomoussovereignty,theyalsohadveryclearborders. Arguably,the SpringandAutumnandWarringStatesperiodshavemoreincommon

4 4 DANIELA.BELL withthecurrentglobalsystemthanwithimperialchina,thenheldtobe the empire (Middle Kingdom) at the center of the world. Hence, it shouldnotbesurprisingthatthereemergedarichdiscourseofstatecraft thatmaystillberelevantforthepresent daycontext. AsYangputsit, onthegroundsofprotectingtheirownsecurity,[thepre Qinstates] soughttodevelopandresolvetherelationshipsamongthemselves andthecentralroyalhouseandthustheyaccumulatedarichand prolificexperienceinpoliticsanddiplomacy.thiscomplicatedand complexpoliticalconfigurationcreatedthespaceforscholarshipto lookattheinternationalsystem,staterelations,andinterstatepoliticalphilosophy. Thepre Qinmasterswrotebooksandadvanced theoriestryingtoselltotherulerstheirideasonhowtorunastate and conduct diplomacy and military strategy while they played majorrolesinadvocatingstrategiesofbecomingeitherahumane authorityorahegemon,makingeithervertical(north South)or horizontal(east West)alliances,oreithercreatingalliancesorgoing towar.scholarswhohaveresearchedthehistoryofthoughthave lookedonlyatonesideandemphasizedthevalueofthepre Qin masters thought as theory (philosophical, historical, or political), whereasmostoftheseideaswereusedtoservepracticalpolitical anddiplomaticpurposesamongthestates.theireffectivenessboth thenandnowisproven.therefore,thereisnodoubtaboutthepositive and practical role of researching the foreign relations, state politics,andmilitarystrategiesofthepre Qinclassicsorofapplyingtheinsightsgleanedfromstudyingthesemasterstointernational politicalthought. 3 Chapter1isacomprehensivecomparisonofthetheoriesofinterstate politics of seven pre Qin masters: Guanzi, Laozi, Confucius, Mencius, Mozi,Xunzi,andHanfeizi.Yandeploysthetoolsofinternationalrelations theorytoanalyzetheirwaysofthinkingandwhattheysayaboutinterstate order,interstateleadership,andtransferofhegemonicpower.yan sanalysisshowsthatthereisawidediversityofperspectivesinpre Qininternationalpoliticalphilosophy.Buttherearealsocommonalities: thepre Qin thinkersholdthatmoralityandtheinterstateorderaredirectlyrelated,

5 INTRODUCTION 5 especiallyatthelevelofthepersonalmoralityoftheleaderanditsrolein determiningthestabilityofinterstateorder. Rulersconcernedwithsuccessfulgovernanceinaworldofshiftingallegiancesandpowerimbalances alsoneedtoemploytalentedadvisors: Confucius,Mencius,Xunzi,Mozi, andguanziallexplainshiftsinhegemonicpowerthroughtheonemediatingvariableoftheneedtoemployworthypeople,thatis,allofthemthink thatemployingworthyandcapablepersonsisanecessary,eventhecrucial,conditionforsuccessfulgovernance. Andiftherulerswanttostrive forthemorallyhighestformofpoliticalrule,thepre Qinthinkers(with theexceptionofhanfeizi)allagreethatthebasisofhumaneauthorityis themorallevelofthestate.yandoesnotsaysoexplicitly,butthereisa strongpresumptionthatareasofagreementamongsuchdiversethinkers mustapproximatehowinternationalpoliticsworksinreality. Inhercommentary(chapter4),YangQianruobjectstoYan ssocial scientificmethodonthegroundsthatitabstractsfromconcretehistorical contexts and is driven by the aim of constructing an explanatory modelthatallowstheresearchertodrawnormativeconclusionsofuniversalsignificanceandtoanalyzechina srise.yangdoesnotobjecttothe methodsofinternationalpoliticaltheoryperse,butshearguesthat we needtocorrectlygrasptherealityofhistoricaltextsandthethoughtof pre Qinmasters,andthendeepenandexpandtheareasandperspectives ofcurrentresearch. ButperhapsYanandYangarenotsofarapart;it s moreamatteroftwomethodologieswithdifferentemphasesthatcan enricheachother.yandoesaimto graspthetruepicture[myemphasis]of pre Qinthoughtsoastomakenewdiscoveriesintheory. Inprinciple,he coulddistorttheideasofpre Qinthinkersforthepurposeofcreating newtheoriesordrawingimplicationsforchina srise,buthedoesn tdo that:atsomelevel,heisconcernedwithhistoricaltruth.sothemore historicallymindedinterpreterscanhelpyan sprojectbycorrectingand improvinghisaccountofpre Qinthinkers;iftheythinkhisaccountis wrong,letthemdrawondetailedaccountsofthehistoricalcontextto explaintheproblem.asforthehistoricallymindedinterpreters,theycan learnfromyan sresearchsothatinvestigationsofthepre Qinhistorical contextwillbeguidedbyquestionsthatareofgreatertheoreticaland politicalrelevancetoday.

6 6 DANIELA.BELL Inchapter2,YanfocusesmorespecificallyonXunzi sinterstatepoliticalphilosophy.xunzi(ca bce)isthegreatsynthesizerofinternationalpoliticalphilosophyoftheSpringandAutumnandWarringStates periods.althoughhegenerallyupholdsconfucianmoralprinciples,he beginswithdarkassumptionsabouthumannatureandisexplicitlyconcernedwithappropriatestrategiesfornonidealpoliticalcontexts.incontrasttomodernideasofequalityofsovereignty,xunziarguesforhierarchies among states, with powerful states having extra responsibility to secureinternationalorder.xunzidistinguishesamongthreekindsofinternational power, in decreasing order of goodness: humane authority, hegemony, and tyranny.tyranny, which is based on military force and stratagems,inevitablycreatesenemiesandshouldbeavoidedatallcosts. Inananarchicworldofself interestedstates,thehegemonicstatemay haveadegreeofmoralitybecauseitisreliableinitsstrategies:domesticallyitdoesnotcheatthepeople,andexternallyitdoesnotcheatitsallies.butstrategicreliabilitymustalsohaveabasisinhardpowersothat thehegemongainsthetrustofitsallies.forxunzi,humaneauthority, meaningastatethatwinstheheartsofthepeopleathomeandabroad,is theultimateaim.humaneauthorityisfoundedonthesuperiormoral poweroftherulerhimself.yancomments: WewouldhavediffcultyfindingapoliticalleaderwhomeetsXunzi s standard,butifonecomparesf.d.rooseveltaspresidentofthe UnitedStatesduringWorldWarIIandtherecentGeorgeW.Bush, wecanseewhatxunzimeansaboutthemoralpoweroftheleader playingaroleinestablishinginternationalnormsandchangingthe internationalsystem.roosevelt sbeliefinworldpeacewastheimpetusforthefoundationoftheunitednationsafterworldwarii, whereasbush schristianfundamentalistbeliefsledtotheunited Statescontinuallyfloutinginternationalnorms,whichresultedina declineoftheinternationalnonproliferationregime. Yanagreesthathumaneauthorityshouldbetheaimofthestate,though hecriticizesxunziforoverlookingthefactthathumaneauthoritymust alsohaveabasisinhardpower: Lackingstrongpowerorfailingtoplaya

7 INTRODUCTION 7 fullpartininternationalaffairsandhavingonlymoralauthorityisnot suffcienttoenableastatetoattainworldleadership. In his commentary(chapter 5), Xu Jin argues that it is diffcult for Xunzitoarguethathierarchicalnormscanbe implementedormaintained when there are evil persons(or evil states) that seek their own ends by flouting norms, especially when these people (or states) have considerableforce. XusuggeststhatitiseasiertosupportXunzi spolitical conclusions with Mencius s view that human beings have a natural inclinationtowardthegood.moreover,menciuscancontributetothe debateabouthowtoimplementhumaneauthority:inadditiontoemphasizingthemoralityoftheruler,heputsforwarddetailedproposalssuch aslighttaxationandaland distributionsystemmeanttosecurethebasic requirementsforlifeforthecommonpeople. Yan sthirdchapter(cowrittenwithhuangyuxing)providesadetailed pictureofthehegemonicphilosophyofthestratagemsofthewarringstates. Thisbookhasnotbeenregardedasamajorphilosophicaltreatisebutitis avaluablehistoricalresourcefortheorizingaboutthefoundationsofhegemonicpower,theroleofnormsinahegemony,andthebasicstrategies forattaininghegemony.yanandhuangcomparetheirfindingswithcontemporarywesternhegemonictheoryandproposethatancientchinese thinkerssawpoliticalpowerasthecoreofhegemony,withgovernment byworthyandcompetentpersonsasitsguarantee.evenatextthatrecountsthestrategiesofannexationandallianceofhard nosedpoliticians stresses the importance of respect for interstate norms in attaining or maintaininghegemony: Withoutthesupportofnormsandrelyingonly onpower,thestrategistsofthewarringstatesperiodcouldnothaveattainedhegemony;hence,theiremphasisoninterstatenormsisgenuine andnotprimarilyintendedasacloakforaprofitmotive. YanandHuang drawonarecentcasetoillustratethepointthatfailingtorespectinterstatenormswillhaveanegativeinfluenceonastate shegemonicstatus: TheunilateralistforeignpolicyofPresidentGeorgeW.Bushweakened theinternationalpoliticalmobilizingcapacityoftheunitedstates. Inhiscommentary(chapter6),WangRihuaexpandsonstrategiesfor achievinghegemonybydrawingonothertextsfromthepre Qinperiod.

8 8 DANIELA.BELL Hepointstothefrequencyofcovenantmeetingsintheperiodthatperformedthepoliticalfunctionsofaffrminghegemony,controllingallies andpreventingthemfromfallingawayfromthealliance,anddetermininginternationalnormssothatthewillofthehegemonicstatebecame theinternationalconsensus,thusinstitutionalizingthehegemony.moreover,politicalhegemonictheoryoftheperiod,likejust wartheorytoday, preferredthemilitarystrategyofactinginresponsetoaggressionrather thanlaunchingwarsofaggression.italsostressedthathegemonicstates hadthedutyofprovidingsecurityguaranteestosmallandmedium size states,andeconomicassistanceintimesofdanger,suchasfamine.but Wangremindsusthat theancientchineseclassics,includingthestratagems of thewarring States, all acknowledge that the main distinction in power is between humane authority and hegemony. Pre Qin thinkers heldthattheexerciseofhegemonicpoweroverotherstateswithinafragmentedworld,evenifthepowerisinformedbymorality,isinferiorto theexerciseofhumaneauthorityinaworldwherethereisasingleruler overeverythingunderheaven. RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES Yanmakesuseoftheanalyticaltoolsofmoderninternationalrelations theorytosharpenunderstandingoftheinternationalpoliticalphilosophy ofpre Qinthinkers.Butthepre Qinthinkerscanalsohelptoimprove moderntheories.internationalrelationstheoryhasbeenshapedprimarilybythehistoryandconceptuallanguageofwesterncountries,andyan aimstoenrichitwiththediscourseofancientchinesethought.thepre Qineraisarichresourcenotjustinthesensethatthehistoricalcontext approximatesthecontemporaryworldofsovereignstatesinananarchic world,butalsobecausetheywerewritingforpoliticalactors,nottheir academiccolleagues: Whatpre Qinthinkershavetosayaboutinternationalrelationsisallgroundedinpolicy;theirthoughtisorientedtoward practicalpoliticalpolicies. Yanisexplicit,however,thattheaimshould notbetoproduceadistinctivelychineseschoolofinternationalrelations

9 INTRODUCTION 9 theory. Rather, scholars should aim to improve international relations theorywiththeinsightsofpre Qinthinkerssothatitcanbetterunderstand and predict our interstate world. So what lessons can be drawn frompre Qininternationalpoliticalphilosophy? Yanstressesthatthepre Qinthinkersdiscussedinthebook,withthe exceptionofhanfeizi,wereconceptualratherthanmaterialdeterminists:theybelievedthatshiftsininternationalpowerrelationsareexplained morebyideasthanbymaterialwealthandmilitarymight.intoday sinternationalrelationstheory,incontrast, thetwowell developedtheoriesarerealismandliberalism,andbothoftheseschoolslookatinternationalrelationsfromthepointofviewofmaterialbenefitandmaterial force. Yanbelievesthatsuchtheorieswouldbecomemorerealisticand havegreaterpolicyrelevanceandpredictivepoweriftheytookmoreseriouslytheroleofconceptsandmoralityinshapinginternationalaffairs. Constructivism and international political psychology have recently emergedinresponsetoconcernsaboutthematerialdeterminismofinternationalrelationstheory,but thesetwotheoriesarenotyetmature...andtheyarestuckattheacademiclevel. EvenHanfeizi,notoriousforhisextremecynicism,allowsforthepossibility that morality matters in certain contexts when humans face nonhumanthreats andyanarguesthathan sviewmaybecomeincreasinglyrelevantinthecontemporaryworld,withimplicationsfortheorizingaboutsecurityinnewways: Itshowsthatwith,today sriseofnontraditionalthreatstosecurity andthedeclineoftraditionalthreatstosecurity,moralitymayplay agreaterroleininternationalsecuritycooperationthaninthecold war period of security attained between two opposing military blocs. Apartfromterrorism,nontraditionalsecuritythreatsarebasicallynonhumanthreatstosecurity,suchasthefinancialcrisis,the energycrisis,environmentalpollution,andclimatechange.climate changeespeciallyisseenasanincreasinglygravethreattointernational security. Reducing carbon dioxide emissions has become a moralissue.researchonsecuritytheorymayhavetotakeamoral angletoanalyzeconflict,cooperation,successorfailure,andpositionshiftsintheareaofnontraditionalsecurity.

10 10 DANIELA.BELL Thepre Qinunderstandingthatthebasisofinternationalauthorityis the moral level of the leading state can also enrich modern theories: Thetheoryofhegemonicstabilityincontemporaryinternationalrelationstheoryhasoverlookedtherelationshipbetweenthenatureofhegemonicpowerandthestabilityoftheinternationalorder...According to[thepre Qinthinkers ]wayofthinking,wecansupposethatthelevel ofmoralityofthehegemonisrelatedtothedegreeofstabilityoftheinternationalsystemandthelengthoftimeofitsendurance. Yansupports thishypothesiswithexamplesfromtheimperialhistoryofwesterngreat powers: Throughouthistory,GreatBritainandFrance,respectively,adopted policies of indirect and direct administration of their colonies. GreatBritain scolonialpolicywasgentlerthanfrance s,withtheresult thatviolentoppositionmovementswerelessfrequentinbritishthanin Frenchcolonies. Accordingtopre Qinthought,themorallevelofastateisdetermined primarilybythequalityofthestate sleaders.yanspellsouttheimplicationsforcontemporaryinternationalrelationstheory: Thetheoryofimperialoverstretchandthecoalitionpoliticstheorybothexplainthefall ofhegemonicpowerintermsofexcessiveconsumptionofthehegemon s materialstrengthandoverlookthefactthatunderdifferentleadersthe samestateevincesadifferenceintheriseandfallofitspower. Pre Qin thinkershadspecificviewsaboutwhataspectsofpoliticalleadershipinfluenceshiftsininternationalpower: forthemostparttheythinkthatit hastodowithwhetherworthypeopleareemployed. Thecompetition fortalentisafeatureoftheknowledgeeconomy,suggestingthatthepre Qinthinkersmayhavehituponamoreuniversalrulethathelpstoexplaintheriseandfallofgreatpowers: Ifcompetitivenessamonglarge states more than two thousand years ago and competitiveness among largestatesinthecontemporaryglobalizedworldbothinvolvecompetitionfortalent,thisimpliesthatcompetitionfortalentisnotaphenomenonpeculiartotheeraoftheknowledgeeconomybutratheristhe essenceofcompetitionamonggreatpowers. Yanisclearlypersuadedby thepre Qinviewthatthemovementoftalentedpersonsamongnations isthekeyindicatortoassessnationalpoliticalpower,andheaddsthatitis

11 INTRODUCTION 11 anadvanceonthecurrentlackofanystandardtoassessnationalpolitical powerincontemporaryinternationalrelationstheory. Givenvariationsinthemorallevelsofstatesandthequalityofleaders andadvisors,therewillalsobevariationsinthenationalpowerofstates. Hence,pre Qinthinkingassumesthatpowerintheinternationalsystem hasahierarchicalstructure,incontrasttotheprincipleincontemporary relationstheorythatdemandsrespectfortheequalityofstatesovereignty. Unexpectedly, perhaps, the accounts of pre Qin thinkers may better modelcontemporaryrealitythantheoriesofmoremodernorigin: Ifwe lookcarefullyattoday sinternationalsystem,...wewilldiscoverthat the power relationships among members of the United Nations, the WorldBank,andtheInternationalMonetaryFundareallstructuredhierarchicallyandarenotequal.TheUnitedNationsdistinguishesamong permanentmembersofthesecuritycouncil,nonpermanentmembers ofthesecuritycouncil,andordinarymemberstates.theworldbank andtheinternationalmonetaryfundhavevotingstructuresdependent onthecontributionsofthemembers. Yandoesnotdenythatnormsof equalitydirectstatebehaviorintheinternationalsystem,andheopposes practices like the traditional EastAsian tribute system with China that makenoroom,howeversymbolic,fortheprincipleofsovereignequality amongnations.buthearguesthattheprincipleofhierarchyamongstates shouldplayakeyroleininternationalrelationstheory,bothbecauseitfits the reality of our interstate world and because it helps theorists think abouthowbesttodealwithpracticalpoliticalproblems,suchasminimizingviolentinternationalconflict: Pre Qinthinkersgenerallybelievethat hierarchicalnormscanrestrainstatebehaviorandthusmaintainorder among states, whereas contemporary international relations theorists thinkthat,torestrainstates behavior,normsofequalityalonecanuphold theorderoftheinternationalsystem. Moreover,thecaseforequalityon thegroundthatithelpstoprotecttheinterestsofweakerstatesisnot compellingbecausehierarchicalnormscanalsoperformthatfunction: Hierarchicalnormscarrywiththemthedemandthatthestrongshould undertakegreaterinternationalresponsibilitieswhiletheweakrespect theimplementationofdiscriminatoryinternationalrules.forinstance,

12 12 DANIELA.BELL developedcountriesshouldeachprovide0.7percentoftheirgdptoassistdevelopingcountries,andnonnuclearstatesmustnotseektopossess nuclearweapons. Pre Qin international political philosophy also offers insights about hownormsaredisseminatedintheinternationalsystem.accordingto contemporaryinternationalrelationstheory,newnormsareputforward bymajorpowers,gainsupportfromotherstates,andareinternalizedby moststatesafteranextendedperiodofimplementation.but contemporarytheorystilldoesnotunderstandtheprocesswherebyinternational normsareinternalized.accordingtotheviewsofthenatureofhumane authorityandhegemonyexpressedbypre Qinphilosophers,weknow thathumaneauthorityhastheroleoftakingtheleadinimplementingand upholdinginternationalnorms,whereashegemonylacksthis.basedon thisrealization,wecanstudythepathbywhichthenatureoftheleading state affects the internalization of international norms after they have beenestablished. Yan shypothesisisthathumaneauthorityismorelikely thanhegemonicpowertosucceedininfluencingthenormsoftheinternationalsystem. Inshort,thekeytointernationalpowerispoliticalpower,andthekey topoliticalpowerismorallyinformedpoliticalleadership.yanisarealist, buthebelievesthatstateswhichactinaccordancewithmoralityaremore likely to achieve long lasting success in the international realm. States thatrelyontyrannytogettheirwaywillenduponthebottomofthe pile;statesthatrelyonhegemonycanendupasgreatpowers;buthumaneauthorityistherealkeytobecomingtheworld sleadingpower. As Yanputsit, Ahumaneauthorityunderheavenreliesonitsultrapowerful moralforcetomaintainitscomprehensivestatepowerinfirstplaceinthe system. ButYanalsorejectstheidealisticviewheldbypre Qinthinkers (withtheexceptionofhanfeizi)thatmoralityalonecandetermineinternationalleadership: [Aleadingstate s]hardpowermaynotbethestrongestatthetime,butthelevelofitshardpowercannotbetoolow...it is unthinkable that a state could attain humane authority under heaven relyingpurelyonmoralityandhardpowerofthelowestclass.intheinternationalpoliticsofthetwenty firstcentury,theimportanceoftheareaof territoryruledhasalreadydeclinedasafactoringainingworldleadership,

13 INTRODUCTION 13 butapopulationofmorethantwohundredmilliondoesplayanimportantrole. Withouttherequisitepopulation,theUnitedKingdom,France, Germany,Japan,andRussia havenopossibilityofbecomingtheleading statesofthesystem. Forthemoment,IndiaandIndonesiamaylackthe hardeconomicandmilitarypower.thatleavestwostatesincontention forgloballeadership:chinaandtheunitedstates.theunitedstatesis clearlytheleadingpowernow.sowhatshouldchinadoifitwantstotake over firstplaceinthesystem? IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA S RISE Giventheimportanceofpoliticalpowerforinternationalleadership,the Chinesegovernmentshouldnotassumethatmoreeconomicpowernecessarily translates into the power to shape international norms.asyan putsit, anincreaseinwealthcanraisechina spowerstatusbutitdoesnot necessarily enable China to become a country respected by others, becauseapoliticalsuperpowerthatputswealthasitshighestnationalinterest maybringdisasterratherthanblessingstoothercountries. SinceChina undertookitspolicyofreformandopeningin1978,however, thechinesegovernmenthasmadeeconomicgrowththecoreofitsstrategy. In 2005,itproposedapolicyofaharmoniousworldandsetthegoalofbuildingfriendshipswithothercountries, butinaugust2008,thereportofthe ForeignAffairsMeetingofthePartyCentralCommitteeagainsaidthat theworkofforeignaffairsshouldupholdeconomicconstructionatits core. Yanconcludeshisanalysisofthestatusquoonacriticalnote: The Chinesegovernmenthasnotyetbeenableconsciouslytomakebuildinga humaneauthoritythegoalofitsstrategyforascent. Likecontemporary internationalrelationstheorists,thechinesegovernmentseemstooverestimatethepoliticalimportanceofeconomicpower.inthiscase,thegovernmentmaystillbeundertheswayofmarxisteconomicdeterminism. Sowhatshouldbedoneinstead?YanproposesthatChinashouldlearn from Xunzi s recommendation of strategy for a rising power, which stresseshumantalent,thatis,itfocusesoncompetitionfortalent. Again, thereisacritiqueofthestatusquo: Atpresent,China sstrategyofseeking

14 14 DANIELA.BELL talentisstillmainlyusedfordevelopingenterprisesandhasnotyetbeen appliedtoraisingthenationasawhole.talentisstillunderstoodashaving todowithtechniciansratherthanpoliticiansorhigh rankingoffcials... The personnel requirements for the rise of a great power are not for techniciansbutforpoliticiansandoffcialswhohavetheabilitytoinvent systemsorregulations,becauseapronouncedabilitytoinventsystems andregulationsisthekeytoensuringtheriseofagreatpower. Talented peopleareavailablebuttheyarenotalwayschosen: Xunzithinksthat therearemanytalentedpeoplewithbothmoralityandability,andthe keyiswhethertherulerwillchoosethem. Drawingonhistoricalexamples,Yanputsforwardsomestrategiesfor findingtalentthatensuretheriseofagreatpower.first, thedegreeof opennessishigh:choosingoffcialsfromthewholeworldwhomeetthe requisitestandardsofmoralityandability,soastoimprovethecapability ofthegovernmenttoformulatecorrectpolicies.forexample,inancient times,thetangdynastyinchinaandtheumayyadempireinnorthafrica,spain,andthemiddleeast,inthecourseoftheirrise,employeda greatnumberofforeignersasoffcials.itissaidthatatitspeakmorethan 70 percent of offcials in the Umayyad Empire were foreigners.the UnitedStateshasattaineditspresenthegemonicstatusalsobyitspolicy ofattractingtalentedandoutstandingforeigners. Yanisanationalist he caresaboutthegoodofhiscountrymorethanthatofothercountries buthebelievesthebestwaytopromotethegoodofhiscountryisto employmoreforeigners.oncechinapassesacertainbaselineofhard power,themaincompetitionwiththeunitedstateswillbecompetition forhumantalentratherthanforeconomicormilitarysuperiority. Second,Yanarguesthatoffcialsshouldbeheldresponsiblefortheir mistakes.heopposeslifetimejobsecuritythatincreasestheriskofoffcials becoming corrupt, lazy, and prone to repeating mistakes. In the more meritocratic societies, unsuitable government offcials could be speedilyremoved,reducingtheprobabilityoferroneousdecisions.this appliedtoallpoliticiansandoffcialsiftheylosttheirabilitytomakecorrectdecisionsforanyreason,suchasbeingcorruptedbypower,being out of dateinknowledge,decayinginthought,sufferingadeclineintheir abilitytoreflect,orexperiencingdeteriorationinhealth.establishinga

15 INTRODUCTION 15 systembywhichoffcialscanberemovedinatimelyfashionprovidesopportunitiesfortalentedpeopleandcanreduceerrorsofpolicyandultimatelyincreasepoliticalpower. Yanalsoarguesfortheestablishmentofindependentthinktanksthat would provide professional advice on policy.at the moment, the research institutions attached to our government agencies are not think tanksinthestrictsense.theirmaintaskistocarryoutpolicies,notto furnishideas.toundertaketheworkofathinktankistoexercisesocial responsibility. Suchthinktanksexistedinthepast,but sincethefoundingofthenewchinain1949,thestatehasnotallowedhighoffcialsto havetheirownpersonaladvisorsortorelyonnongovernmentaladvisory organizations. Ifthethinktanksystemofindependentandpublic spiritedadvisorsisrevived,yanopenlysaysthathewouldbewillingtoserve: Iwouldtakepart. In short, China can increase its political power by adopting a more meritocraticsystemofselectionofpoliticaloffcialsandadvisors.butthis leadstothequestionofwhatexactlythesetalentedandpublic spirited politiciansandadvisorsshouldaimfor.inthewest,politicaldiscourseis usuallyconfinedtotwooptions: good democracyand bad authoritarianism.pro democracycommentators,whetherhawkishorliberal,put forward proposals for a community or concert of democracies that wouldacttogethertopromotedemocraticdevelopmentintheworld. Thesocialscientificthesisthatdemocraciesdonotgotowarwithone anotherhasbeenthesubjectofmuchdebate.inyan sview,however,the tworelevantoptionsarehegemonyandhumaneauthority.theformeris lessgoodbutitsecuresstrategicreliability:countriesthatpursuehegemonyinthepre Qinsensearereliableinternationalactors,evenifthey arenotalwaysstrivingformorallyadmirablegoals.humaneauthorityis thebestoption countriesthatleadwithhumaneauthorityinspirethe restoftheworldwiththeirmorallysuperiorways butitismorediffculttoachieve. So,shouldChinastriveforhegemonyorhumaneauthority?Yanallows forbothpossibilities.heregardstheunitedstatesasahegemonicpower andarguesthatchinashouldstriveforahighermoralstanding: IfChina wants to become a state of humane authority, this would be different

16 16 DANIELA.BELL fromthecontemporaryunitedstates. Thegoalofourstrategymustbe notonlytoreducethepowergapwiththeunitedstatesbutalsotoprovide a better model for society than that given by the United States. Nonetheless,healsowritesinfavorofthepursuitofhegemony: China canreflectonthealliance buildingstrategiesofthestratagemsofthewarringstatesandadoptastrategybeneficialtoexpandingitsinternational politicalsupport. Thealliance buildingstrategiesofthestratagemsofthe WarringStatesandtheCommunistParty sunitedfrontprinciplearevery similar.thiskindofprinciplewasabletobringaboutvictoryinthewar againstjapaneseaggression[i.e., WorldWarII],anditmayalsobesuccessfulinguidingChina srise. WecaninferthatChina saimswoulddependontheinternationalcontext.intimeofwar,itshouldstrivetobuild reliablealliancestomaintainorincreaseitshegemonicstatus.intimeof peace,itshouldstrivetoactlikeahumaneauthority. ButhowcanChinaactlikeahumaneauthority?Inthepre Qinera,the politicalidealofhumaneauthoritywaspremisedontheassumptionthat there would be one single ruling authority with sovereignty over the wholeworld. AccordingtoYan,however,theidealofworldgovernment isneitherfeasiblenordesirabletoday.sohowcouldchinaactlikeahumaneauthorityinahierarchicalworlddividedintostatesthatoftenhave competing interests? In international relations, it should do as it says: ChinashouldnotadopttheUnitedStates currentwayofacting,saying thatallstatesareequalwhileinpracticealwaysseekingtohaveadominantinternationalstatus. TheChinesegovernmentalsohasresortedto somehypocrisy: China sproposalfordemocratizationofinternational relations has not been easily accepted by the international community becausechinacouldnotabandonitsspecialvetopowerintheunited NationsSecurityCouncil. Instead,Chinashouldopenlyrecognizethatit isadominantpowerinahierarchicalworld,butthissenseofdominance meansthatithasextraresponsibilities,includingtheprovisionofeconomicassistancetopoorcountriesandsecurityguaranteestononnuclear states. Rather than insisting on reciprocity with weaker states, China shouldtrytogaintheirsupportbyallowingfordifferentialinternational normstoworkintheirfavor.inthecooperationofthe10+1 theassociationofsoutheastasiannations(asean)andchina forexample,

17 INTRODUCTION 17 Chinaisrequiredtoimplementthenormofzerotariffsinagricultural tradebeforetheaseanstatesdo.thisunequalnormenabledtheeconomiccooperationofthe10+1todevelopmorerapidlythanthatbetweenjapanandasean.japan sdemandforequaltariffswithasean slowedtheprogressofitseconomiccooperationwiththeaseanstates, whichlagsfarbehindthatofchinaandasean. Butit snotjustaquestionofforeignpolicy: ForChinatobecomea superpowermodeledonhumaneauthority,itmustfirstbecomeamodel fromwhichotherstatesarewillingtolearn. Inotherwords,Chinamust actlikeahumaneauthorityathome.yanarguesthatthemodernequivalentofhumaneauthorityisdemocracy: Ithinkthatintheirrespectfor norms,themodernconceptofdemocracyandtheancientchineseconceptofhumaneauthorityarealike...theelectoralsystemhasbecome theuniversalpoliticalnormtoday. Humaneauthoritywouldalsotranslateintoasocietythatismoreopentotherestoftheworld: Stricter bordercontrolsleadtogreatersuspicionbetweennationsandmorepronouncedconfrontation.chinashouldpromotetheprincipleoffreedom to travel, to live, and to work anywhere in the world. People tend to movetothebetterplace,andthusnationswithbetterconditionswillbe attractivetotalentedpeople.hence,chinashouldexpanditspolicyof openingtointernationalsociety. Inappendix2,Yanportrayshimselfasahard nosedscientificrealist: Iammoreconcernedwithhowreallifeandrealpoliticalbehaviorcan verifyexplanatorytheory.idonotlikewhatcannotbeverified,because thereisnowayofknowingifitsconclusionsarevalid.forinstance,in makingpredictionsiliketosetatimeframe:withinfiveyears,orwithin threeyears. 4 Yethisdiscussionofthe ultrapowerfulmoralforce ofhumaneauthoritydoesseemtoveerintonormativethinkingaboutadistant future.it shardtodisagreewithhisinspiringpoliticalvisionforchina:it wouldtakeonextrainternationalresponsibilitiesandhelpmarginalized countries;itsrulerswouldbechosenbysomesortofelectoralsystem; theirpoliticaladvisorswouldbechosenaccordingtoameritocraticsystem that ensured promotion and demotion according to performance ratherthanpoliticalloyalty;andchina sborderswouldbeopenforpeoplesofallnationalitiestojointhecompetitiontoattracttalent.thisvision

18 18 DANIELA.BELL does, however, seem quite far removed from the current reality. But maybewecanforgiveabitofmethodologicalinconsistency.ifamerica s mostinfluentialrealistscandreamofaworldwithoutnuclearweapons, 5 thenyan Xuetong can dream of a country that inspires the rest of the worldwithitshumanevalues.