NBC Proliferation. Biological ~ Challenges in containment. Chemical Weapons

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "NBC Proliferation. Biological ~ Challenges in containment. Chemical Weapons"

Kelley Thornton
6 years ago
Views:

1 NBC Proliferation Nuclear ~ Nuclear proliferation and probability of war. ~ Why do states build nuclear weapons? ~ Latest thinking on nuclear strategy. Biological ~ Challenges in containment. Chemical Weapons ~ Challenges in containment.

2 Tracking Nuclear Proliferation Timeline of Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Thermonuclear State Britain China France Russia United States Suspected Atomic State Atomic State India Pakistan N Korea? Israel N Korea 9 Oct 2006 Confirmed?

3 Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Thermonuclear State Britain China France Russia United States Suspected Atomic State Atomic State India Pakistan N Korea? Israel N Korea 9 Oct 2006 Confirmed? Suspected Wpns Prog Algeria Brazil Egypt Iran S Korea Syria Ended Wpn Reasearch Argentina Australia Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Yugoslavia Program Dismantled Iraq Libya Disarm Belarus Canada Kazakstan South Africa Ukraine Source:

Recent Headlines: Blair Unveils Plans To Keep Nuclear Arsenal, Cut Warheads London (AFP) Dec 04, 2006 Prime Minister Tony Blair unveiled plans Monday to modernise Britain's nuclear deterrent, cutting

4 Recent Headlines: Blair Unveils Plans To Keep Nuclear Arsenal, Cut Warheads London (AFP) Dec 04, 2006 Prime Minister Tony Blair unveiled plans Monday to modernise Britain's nuclear deterrent, cutting the number of warheads but warning that disarming would be dangerous as new terrorist threats emerge. While the Cold War is over, he said states like North Korea and Iran both had "highly dubious" reasons to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, and other rogue states were a distinct reason for Britain to keep its deterrent. Iranian and Nukes IAEA Chief Warns Against Isolation Of Iran, North Korea Kyoto (AFP) Dec 03, 2006 UN atomic watchdog chief Mohamed ElBaradei on Sunday warned against the diplomatic isolation of North Korea and Iran, saying confrontation would only lead them to accelerate their nuclear programs. Diplomacy was key to dealing with both countries, he said, although Iran's case was different since, unlike North Korea, there was no evidence that it had yet acquired the capacity to develop nuclear arms.

5 Recent Headlines: Russia Must Stay Nuclear Moscow (UPI) Nov 29, 2006 An all-out war or armed conflict between the great powers no longer seems possible. However, the five official nuclear powers are in no hurry to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their policy, a fact attested to by the United States' new nuclear doctrine, loose rules of engagement for using nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis and greater regional tensions. Nuclear-Armed Japan Would Be "Terrible Mistake" Kyoto (AFP) Dec 03, 2006 Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the UN nuclear watchdog, warned Sunday that it would be a "terrible mistake" for Japan to develop nuclear weapons in the wake of North Korea's atomic test. "I think it would be a terrible mistake for any country now to move to nuclear arms because there is a domino effect," the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency told a seminar at Kyoto University in western Japan.

Recent Headlines: World Powers To Meet In Paris On Iran Nuclear Sanctions Paris (AFP) Dec 04, 2006 Six world powers are to meet Tuesday in Paris in their latest bid to secure agreement on a package

6 Recent Headlines: World Powers To Meet In Paris On Iran Nuclear Sanctions Paris (AFP) Dec 04, 2006 Six world powers are to meet Tuesday in Paris in their latest bid to secure agreement on a package of sanctions against Iran for its refusal to suspend sensitive nuclear activities. Highranking diplomats from the five veto-wielding UN Security Council members - Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States -- plus Germany will attend the talks Tuesday evening at the French foreign ministry.

Recent Headlines: Nuclear Blackmarket Moscow Dismisses Rumors On Uranium Deal With Pyongyang Moscow (AFP) Dec 04, 2006 Moscow dismissed as "rumors" Monday a report that North Korea had offered Russia

7 Recent Headlines: Nuclear Blackmarket Moscow Dismisses Rumors On Uranium Deal With Pyongyang Moscow (AFP) Dec 04, 2006 Moscow dismissed as "rumors" Monday a report that North Korea had offered Russia exclusive access to its uranium deposits in exchange for Russian support in multilateral talks aimed at ending Pyongyang's nuclear program. Japanese daily Tokyo Shimbun on Sunday cited unnamed Russian officials as saying Pyongyang had offered Russia exclusive rights to import North Korean uranium, which Russia would then enrich and export as nuclear fuel to China and Vietnam. Senate Passes U.S.India Nuclear Deal Nov 17, 2006 The Senate on Thursday approved a controversial bill allowing the United States to trade civil nuclear material with its one-time foe India, a victory for President Bush who hailed the plan as a major boost for trade with a key Asian ally. Direct US, North Korea Talks Give New Glimmer Of Hope Washington (AFP) Dec 03, 2006 One month after North Korea agreed to return to multilateral nuclear talks following its defiant atomic weapons test, the six-nation dialogue remains stalled. But few are complaining. This is because the United States and North Korea, the key parties of the four-year nuclear standoff, are engaged in face-to-face talks on crunch issues that some believe are more productive that the six-party process including China, South Korea, Russia and Japan.

8 Recent Headlines: Bombs That Won't Go Off [World s nuclear material more secure now] By Anthony Wier and Matthew Bunn Washington Post Nov 19, 2006 With North Korea testing a nuclear bomb and Iran suspected of heading in that direction, one might be forgiven for thinking there's nothing but bad news these days about the spread of nuclear weapons. But behind the scenes, one piece of good news has been unfolding: While there's a great deal more to do, much of the world's potential nuclear bomb material, scattered in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries around the world, is notably more secure than it was before Sept. 11, 2001, which means that it's harder for terrorists to steal. And the critical effort to remove such material entirely from the world's most vulnerable sites is picking up steam. So in 2004 the Bush administration launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, an integrated effort to convert these reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels that cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb; to ship the HEU back to secure sites; and to beef up security at vulnerable sites in the meantime.... The successes of the past two years represent bombs that will never go off. But these successes, though real, are only the beginning. The world needs to move as quickly as possible to ensure that security upgrades and material removals get to all of these nuclear stockpiles before thieves and terrorists do. The writers, who have served in government positions dealing with nuclear security and nonproliferation, are with the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. They are co-authors of "Securing the Bomb 2006."

9 Are we moving away from or a step closer to a nuclear Armageddon?

10 Are we moving away from or a step closer to a nuclear Armageddon? Doomsday Clock

11 Proliferation What is the problem? Not a problem : Thoroughly proliferated among great powers. (5 permanent members of UN Security Council) A problem : Proliferation among middle powers and less developed countries. Technical question : How difficult it is to build a nuclear weapon? Key question Does proliferation increase or decrease the likelihood of nuclear war, or does proliferation per se have little direct effect on the likelihood of nuclear war?

12 Proliferation and the Probablity of Nuclear War The Cardinality Theorem (Brito-Intriligator 1996) The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 40. No.1 (Mar 1996) pp

13 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Arguments Argument#1 - Pro-proliferation : Believes that, at least in the long run, proliferation makes nuclear war less likely. Argument#2 - Anti-proliferation : Believes that the spread of nuclear weapons always (or at least almost always) increases the probability of nuclear war.

14 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Pro-Proliferation Arguments Although proliferation will increase probability of nuclear war in the short run, in the long run, proliferation will decrease and eventually eliminate the probability of nuclear war! Best of worlds : No nuclear weapons. But : Nuclear technology already discovered and widely promulgated > Disarmament is impossible. Best feasible goal : proliferate selectively and steadily.

15 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Pro-Proliferation Arguments Any nuclear power can attack a non-nuclear power because there is no retaliation. Nuclear power cannot attack nuclear power (with nuclear wpns). Retaliation in kind. Early stage: Raise probability of nuclear war. Nuclear states attack large number of non-nuclear states. Later stage: Lower probability because most states would have capability for nuclear retaliation. Theory : All states have nuclear wpns> zero prob. of nuclear war.

16 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Pro-Proliferation Arguments More May Be Better ~ Kenneth N. Waltz Chapter 1. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Debate Renewed ~ Rational Deterrence Theory ~ Small likelihood of accidental trigger.

17 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Pro-Proliferation Arguments Main danger of anti-proliferation: Obstacles to proliferation may stop spread of nuclear weapons halfway. Significant number of nuclear powers would be presented with a larger number of nonnuclear powers. Situation most likely to breed nuclear war!

18 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Anti-Proliferation Arguments Any increase in the number of nuclear powers will increase the likelihood of nuclear war. The nth country problem danger of many hands being able to reach for the nuclear trigger. (3) Nuclear weapons in hands of less developed countries more apt to use nuclear wpns because they have very little to lose. (4) Later nuclear powers led by less responsible leaders. (5) Likelihood of accidental war miscalculation Miscommunication Instigation of agent provocateur, etc

19 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Anti-Proliferation Arguments Any increase in the number of nuclear powers will increase the likelihood of nuclear war. More Will Be Worse - Scott D. Sagan Chapter 2. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Debate Renewed ~ Debunked rational deterrence assumption. ~ Organisational Theory - Military mindset and civil-control over military. - Accidents and miscalculations.

20 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Anti-Proliferation Already nuclear power. Strong alliance with a nuclear power. Little hope of developing. Reject on moral grounds. Pro-Proliferation Real prospects of developing in near future. Face nuclear or large unfriendly neighbours non-nuclear defence risky. If India builds the bomb,then we will eat grass or leaves,even go hungry. But we will get one of our own. We have no alternative. - Pakistani Leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto mid-1960s

21 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Anti-Proliferation Already nuclear power. Strong alliance with a nuclear power. Little hope of developing. Reject on moral grounds. Pro-Proliferation Real prospects of developing in near future. Face nuclear or large unfriendly neighbours non-nuclear defence risky. What is your stand? How do we evaluate the two arguments?

22 Anti-Proliferation vs Pro-Proliferation Different assumption in ability of nuclear power to deter a nuclear attack by another nuclear power. Pro-proliferation: deterrence is very robust. No nuclear power will attack another nuclear power. Anti-proliferation: deterrence is very fragile. No state can deter a nuclear attack by another state. Only way to evaluate the two arguments : Determine whether or not deterrence would hold between a new nuclear power and its potential targets.

23 Anti-Proliferation vs Pro-Proliferation Deterrence Argument Deterrence depends on systemic influences e.g. types of weapons state deploys, strategies adopted, degree to which calculation is clouded by uncertainty, credibility of retaliation, etc.

24 Anti-Proliferation vs Pro-Proliferation Six conditions a state must meet to in order to be assured of being able to retaliate against a nuclear attack (Wohlstetter:1959) (1) Maintenance of a standing, reliable deterrence force in peacetime. (2) Ability of this force to survive a pre-emptive attack. (3) Reliable C3I Command, Control and Communication Information system. (4) Ability of retaliatory force to reach distant enemy territory. (5) Ability to penetrate enemy active defence (e.g. anti-aircraft, interceptors, etc) (6) Ability to overcome enemy passive defence (e.g.bomb shelters, civil defence) Deterrence = credibility of second strike capability.

25 Anti-Proliferation vs Pro-Proliferation Interactive effect between state that deters and state that is to be deterred - state can undermine deterrence and provoke another to strike first (Daniel Ellsberg 1960) A state can undermine deterrence by deploying forces that were especially well-suited to strike first but ill-suited to strike second. Such forces might encourage an opponent to calculate that its best option is to strike first.

26 Anti-Proliferation vs Pro-Proliferation Nudging towards Nuclear Armageddon? Anti-proliferation argument valid if new nuclear state does not meet Wholstetter-Ellsberg conditions i.e. deterrence undermined. Pro-proliferation argument valid if new nuclear state meet conditions of deterrence. Validity of both arguments depend on deterrence argument (differ from case-by-case!)

27 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Argument#3: Proliferation can increase or decrease likelihood of nuclear war. Actual relationship between proliferation and likelihood of nuclear war depends heavily on the assumptions one makes about durability of deterrence. (Wholstetter-Ellsberg conditions) When spread of nuclear weapons reaches extremely high levels, extent of proliferation itself has relatively little to do with likelihood of nuclear war and deterrence becomes everything.

28 Proliferation <> Probability of Nuclear War? Argument#3 Association between nuclear proliferation and likelihood of nuclear war depends highly on durability of deterrence between a new nuclear power and its potential opponents. Not every case in which a state has acquired nuclear weapons has had an identical effect on overall likelihood of nuclear war. Possible outcomes: (1) New member simply added to the danger of nuclear war. (2) Additional risk offset at least in part by the ability of the new state to deter nuclear war against itself. Which outcome? Depends on stability of deterrence.

29 Likelihood of = Proliferation (+/-) Deterrence Nuclear War

30 Returning to the Cardinality Theorem. US-India Nuclear pact? Working on understanding and influencing intent. Sagan s concerns

31 Nuclear weapons make wars hard to start. the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared. K. Waltz A world with more nuclear-armed states may be our fate; it should not be our goal. - Sagan

32 Why do states build nuclear weapons? States will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means; if they do not face such threats, they will willingly remain non-nuclear states. Clear and simple answer to the proliferation puzzle? India? Pakistan? North Korea? Iran? Japan? South Korea? What are their reasons for going nuclear or staying non-nuclear?

33 Common view, focusing on national security considerations as cause of proliferation, is dangerously inadequate. Nuclear weapons programs also serve other, more parochial and less obvious objectives. Nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of national security, they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and bureaucratic struggles. Can serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity.

34 Three Models Security Model States build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats. Domestic Model Nuclear weapons as political tools used to parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests. Norms Model Nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state s modernity and identity. Historical data shows that each model explains some cases well while others poorly.

35 Three Models Security Model States build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats. Neorealist Theory : States exist in an anarchical international system and must therefore rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security. Example : USSR s decision to develop own nuclear weapon. - Josef Stalin s request to Igor Kurchartov London August Paris China > India > Pakistan

36 Domestic Model Nuclear weapons as political tools used to parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests. No developed theory difficult to ascertain evidence. Possible examples : India, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina India

37 Norms Model Nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state s modernity and identity. From a sociological perspective, military organizations and their weapons can therefore be envisioned as serving functions similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams: they are part of what modern states believe they have to possess to be legitimate, modern states. Why and how actions are granted symbolic meaning: Why are some nuclear weapons acts considered prestiguous, while others produce opprobrium? How do such beliefs change over time? Why nuclear testing deemed prestigious and legitimate in the 1960s is today considered illegitimate and irresponsible? Shifting norms? NPT?

38 Norms Model Nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state s modernity and identity. Example? FRANCE.

39 Norms Model Nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state s modernity and identity. More evidence - De Gaulle s confession to Eisenhower in 1959

40 North Korea - Security Model? - Domestic Model? - Norms model?

41 New Thinking on Nuclear Strategy? Cold War : Deterence was achieved through ~ Predictability of Nuclear Deterrence ~ Balance of Power Balance of Terror ~ Rational Decision-making ~ Nuclear War = MAD Post Cold War?: Are the assumptions still valid? What should be the new assumptions? New nuclear strategy? Nuclear warfighting?

42 New Thinking on Nuclear Strategy? US Nuclear Posture Review (2002)

43 New Thinking on Nuclear Strategy? US Nuclear Posture Review (2002) Cold War Triad: ~ strategic bombers ~ intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ~ ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The possession of a nuclear triad reduces the chances an enemy could destroy all a country's nuclear forces in a first strike attack, ensuring that a devastating response could be carried out. New Triad: ~ nuclear and precision non-nuclear strike forces. ~ passive and active defenses ~ revitalized defense infrastructure.

44 New Thinking on Nuclear Strategy? US Nuclear Posture Review (2002) The continuities of the past U.S.-S oviet relationship have been replaced by the unpredictability of potential opponents who are motivated by goals and values we often do not share nor well understand, and who move in directions we may not anticipate brutal leaders who have few institutional or moral constraints and are motivated by an extreme hatred of the United S tates and the personal freedoms and liberties we hold dear. These post C old W ar conditions do not permit confidence that opponents will be deterred in predictable ways. Feith US Unders ecretary for Defens e 2002

45 New Thinking on Nuclear Strategy US Nuclear Posture Review (2002) Emphasis : (2) Post Cold W ar security environment : balance of nuclear terror is not an adequate basis for strategic policy. (3) Uncertainties surrounding deterrence undermine its predictable functioning. ~ Flexible response (mix of nuclear and conventional arsenal) ~ Strategic Defence System ~ Low-yield nuclear bombs to target deep underground command complexes?

46 Biological Weapons ~ Challenges in Containment Production Delivery Biological Warfare Agents

47 Biological Weapons ~ Challenges in Containment Current Mechanism: (1) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) - Legal basis against production and stockpiling. (2) Australia Group of Impedes transfer of Biological agents and technology through national export controls. Challenges: (1) BWC lacks verification capabilities e.g. IP protection concerns. (2) AG limited members/limited effectiveness against rogue states. (3) Widespread distribution of material, technology and knowledge. (4) Difficulties of attribution - Long incubation periods. (5) Biological terrorism by non-state actors. Motivation has changed e.g. suicide bombers. (6) WHO - Underfunded

48 Biological Weapons ~ Challenges in Containment Biological security > different mix of nonproliferation, deterrence and defence than nuclear or chemical weapons. Deterrence by Denial Biological Defence? ~ Improving domestic public health. - US Biological Preparedness and Response Program (BPRP) - National Pharmaceutical Stockpile ~ Improving international response and collaboration. - International disease surveillance and reference lab capacity. ~ International financial assistance - Expensive equipment and stockpiles of antidotes.

Chemical Weapons ~ Challenges in containment. "Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons.

(2) Australia Group of 33 www.australiagroup.net - consensual national guidelines restricting the export of chemicals and technology for CW.

49 Chemical Weapons ~ Challenges in containment. "Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons..." Current Mechanism: (2) Org for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - declaration, international verification, destruction or conversion. (2) Australia Group of consensual national guidelines restricting the export of chemicals and technology for CW. Challenges: (1) Difficulties in maintaining the international verification regime -Large number of relevant facilities > Dual-use materials. (2) Non-State actors. Motivation changed. E.g. suicide bombers.

50 Conclusion Nuclear proliferation can increase or decrease the probability of nuclear war. New strategic thinking nascent stage Biological Best Defence = improvement in domestic and international health system. Chemical Export control and CD capability.

51 INTENT & MOTIVATION ~ understanding ~ influencing ~ shaping

55 SDI Star Wars - Strategic Defence Strategy Undermine deterrence?

STRATEGIC LOGIC OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

STRATEGIC LOGIC OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION Nuno P. Monteiro, Alexandre Debs Sam Bleifer INTRODUCTION Security-based theory of proliferation This interaction is shaped by the potential proliferator s ability