In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the liberal and democratic

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1 Russia: To Be Young and Reactionary RUSSIA. 3 Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia seemed rich in young people eager to usher the country into a new age of democratic and commercial success.. But the crisis of 1998 began turning back the clock.. Russian youth started falling back on Soviet-era models to decide work and life priorities.. Since the start of the Putin era, the transformation would seem complete.. Though most Russian youth knows little or nothing about its Soviet past, it still longs for paternalism.. It desperately seeks material success while at the same time evidencing Communist-era impotence.. by Nataliya Zorkaya I In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the liberal and democratic hopes of the Russian public were tied mostly to the future of the country s young. It seemed that a young generation, particularly the more educated urban contingent composed mostly of students, young intellectuals, engineers, teachers, doctors and journalists, were ready to preside over a rapid Westernization of the country, embracing the values and ideas of Western democracy. Many analysts believed that the national process of political and economic modernization would go hand in hand with the gradual removal of an older generation whose approach to governing and management was still linked to the Soviet mentality. The new generation, by A Russian teenage couple walks past the snow-encrusted equine statue in St. Petersburg. Afp / Getty Images / K. Kudryavtsev number 33. december

2 contrast, would be composed mostly of those who had n- ever lived under the worst of totalitarianism. If some members of the younger group had in fact witnessed the stagnation the occurred under the leadership Leonid Brezhnev in the 1960s and 70s or the brief period of repression brought about by Yuri Andropov in the early 1980s, the difficulties they faced were nothing like those who had been literally overwhelmed and paralyzed during the Stalin years. The end of Soviet power structure was widely perceived by as result of its own senile decay combined with the poverty of state communism s ideology. Both politicians and scholars believed in a natural process of generational replacement in which new liberal values would be strengthened and gradually spread throughout society, helping forming the backbone of democratic institutions. But by the mid-1990s Levada Center research, based periodic surveys, suggested that young people were far from the role that had been attributed to them, namely as the promoters of modernization, the holders of a new liberal-democratic values system, and the supporters of a Western model of political and economic organization. A comparative analysis of existential attitudes and ideas from different generations and age groups demonstrated that the so-called pro-western guidelines (by nature democratic or liberal) declared by young people were predominantly superficial and transient. The identified themselves in values they didn t necessarily embody. As the post-1989 years passed, young people became increasingly involved in the structure of existing institutions, those that should in fact have been transformed. Not only that, but with the dimming of the mass unrest Russian models display underwear creations by young designers at a fashion show for emerging talent in St. Petersburg. that existed in the times of perestroika and the dissolution of the USSR, many concepts typical of Russia s recent past were restored and fortified. The crises and difficulties that emerged during the post-communist transition period combined with sharps drop in living standards and the emergence of mass unemployment (unknown in Soviet Union) to create a keen nostalgia for a Soviet past, which some are now even inclined to idealize. People were uncomfortable with the uncertainties of their new life. Pessimistic moods, which were dominant in Russian society until the early years of the presidency of Vladimir Putin made young people all the more receptive to typical Soviet-era stereotypes and prejudice, which they carried into adulthood. This thinking included the idea of a Western conspiracy directed against Russia and a desire Young women pose for snapshots with a soldier on the banks of St. Petersburg s Neva River. to return to state paternalism and re-embrace isolationism. These feelings helped manufacture a concomitant nostalgia for aggressive power and status as well as a oldschool vision of Russia s past glory as a great power. Until around 1998, the overall political climate in the country remained relatively mild and liberal. Society still maintained a semblance of interest in variety and pluralism of ideas and positions. Young people of the late 1990s period were distinguished by a marked polarization of views. Some were ready to support the liberal reformist wing of the political spectrum (represented mostly by y- outh active and successful in large urban centers). Others were inclined to back radical nationalist-populist politicians such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky (a group dominated by mostly poor and uneducated youth located in the social periphery). Youth, more supple in every respect, tended to adapt to social and political change faster than other generations. Early on, Russian youth helped counteract the Afp / Getty Images / K. Kudryavtsev Getty Images / S. Gallup 40. east. europe and asia strategies number 33. december

3 mood of the Russian masses, which felt displaced and disoriented by a new lifestyle and new habits, unable to accept the social overhaul brought by living in different times. Youth considered their position of privilege within society as a perfectly natural entitlement. Having obtained ready-made freedom and opportunities that were previously inaccessible, these values were not perceived as ones that needed either earning or constant defense. Instead, they were seen as default conditions of a lifestyle that put a premium on individualism, privacy and selfishness, at least from the point of view of social obligations. Youth identified itself with these new freedoms and opportunities, believing itself deserving of the advantages made available by a market economy, including freedom of movement, access to all kinds of information (long denied to Soviet citizens), mass culture, and new forms of entertainment. The illusion among young Russians that they were ripe for normal national life (in the context of Western democratic nations) lasted until the country hit a wall in The Russian financial crisis of that year brought people back to their senses with a thud. The country was not only forced to face unpleasant realities but also compelled to introduce self-criticism and accept the critical assessment of others, all this while Europe s attitude toward events in Russia grew increasingly intolerant. Criticism from the international community met with a particularly virulent response. The youth mood changed suddenly. Russian nationalism, representing a kind of negative, hostile adolescence, grew in strength and scope. Underneath this growth was the desire for a show of force, which in turn led to support for Putin-style authoritarianism and the aggressive rhetoric of a resurrected Russia that was no longer on its knees. Those who struggled to adapt to changes began being seen as losers unable to adjust to the new life. Those who didn t fit in or faltered were perceived as not worth understanding or even taking into account. These feelings led to the establishing an atmosphere of contempt and indifference towards the country s poorest and the weakest social groups. Young people who established success in financial, professional or entrepreneurial fields or who gained marginal commercial credibility in the service sector or the entertainment industry (even those who became members of the bureaucracy under Putin) created their own losers list. On it were members of the democratic in- telligentsia and the more educated strata who had sympathized with the early post-soviet reformers. T he current weakness and political fragmentation of that group further reinforces the negative attitude toward them. For most young Russians, thinkers and reformers accomplished little or nothing in the time of change. Instead, the Putin-era authoritarian regime acts as a benchmark for success. Young people now entering post-soviet social life have lost any interest they might have had in the history of the Soviet past. More importantly, they have also lost interest in the era of democratic transformation in that swept through Russia at the end of the Soviet Union and endured early into the 1990s. If the early 1990s witnessed a show of force among Russia s young in terms of their openness and sympathy toward the West, the new young Russians are completely post-soviet. They didn t experience the Cold War. Those who have developed anti-western tendencies have done so on their own, and the militancy of their positions often surpasses those of the previous anti-west generation. Here is some data in support of these points. Afp / Getty Images / Y. Kadobnov TABLE 1. To what extent to you associate with the statement: It would be better for Russia if foreigners stopped imposing their ideas. (In percent based on,000 interviews) Completely agree / mostly agree Mostly disagree / completely disagree 0 Does Russia today have outside enemies? (In percent based on 1,00 interviews conducted in July 08) Yes No AGES AGES AGES TABLE. AND ABOVE TABLE 3. To what extent do you agree with the statement: AIDS was introduced into Russia by foreigners to weaken the country? (In percent based on,000 interviews) Completely agree / mostly agree Mostly disagree / completely disagree Do you think Western allegations regarding abuses of democracy in Russia are based on genuine concern about Russian citizens or are they instead part of an effort to discredit the country and reap the benefits? (In percent based on 1,600 interviews conducted in 08) They re based on concern for the welfare of Russian citizens They re intended to discredit the country and reap the benefits Across generational lines, Russians have offered little resistance to the ideas and rhetoric propounded by official government policy. Anti-Western thinking and mass xenophobia, combined with a growth in Russian nationalism and the revival great power emotions, have become a swamp for social aggression and envy directed toward ostentatious Western consumerism. Domestically, there is a desire to imitate those considered as successful, rich and well-placed. The successful in turn show off superiority through standards of consumption and high living that are inaccessible to the vast majority of young people. But even downtrodden youth are sensitive to the change in their environment, and thus aspire to be rich, independent and free. These kinds of reactions manifest a kind of deprivation that inevitably produces a sharp rise in generalized aggression. Not having what you most want, you hate it instead. Young people are not only oriented toward achieving Western consumer standards, but also aspire to high wages and say they are willing to work very hard to obtain them. The embrace of new consumer standards is costly, and new lifestyles and practices in leisure-time behavior require substantial resources. The majority of y- outh believes that higher education is necessary to pursue a successful and highly profitable career. But the attitude of young people polled also includes strong dose pragmatism. For example, many consider it important to receive just one kind of education that by itself ensures future high income. Receiving specialized training or adequate preparation for a future occupation is seen as less important than simply obtaining a high school diploma. The ideas students have about their future careers are vague at best. Only 39 percent of secondary school students and about half the college population say they intending to look for future work based on a specialization. AGES AGES AGES TABLE 4. AND ABOVE east. europe and asia strategies number 33. december

4 A s previously noted, living large is an expensive undertaking and requires an investment of time and energy. One in 10 students work. College s- tudents are particularly good at reconciling academics and a job (44 percent), while vocational technical students are able to combine the two in only 14-to-1 percent of cases. Since the vast majority of students both s- tudy and work in the course of a day, the learning process is diluted and the educational quality lowered. Moscow has the highest proportion of working students ( percent), while in smaller cities the number drops to 10 percent. Work and school are combined only five percent of the time in the countryside. The need to work is related in part to paying for school fees, but also stems from a desire to not unduly burden the family budget. But school fees exist in all cities. The fact the Moscow students tend to combine work and school to the extent they do reflects the need to partake in an environment that s rich in goods and cultural diversions. It also suggests a more developed sense of the importance of consumerism as well as a desire among students to have their own money to spend as they place, Russian teenager painting graffiti on wall in Moscow. here and now, not dictated by family needs and wants. This attitude toward padding personal gain suggests the extent of the gap between the everyday life of young people and the adult world, which is fraught problems, tensions, conflicts, and tends to demand compromise. Big city life, leisure and entertainment are mostly the property of the young and the wealthy. The majority of the adult population is content with more sedate home pastimes, such as watching television and videos, participating in domestic activities, and forging relations with neighbors and relatives. Those youths who go back home after time spent in the city tend to take solace in family life, particularly among the poorer strata. Though domestic life has been transformed over the past years (greater prosperity and increased domestics comforts, including appliances such as vacuum cleaners, dishwashers, and home video systems) it is nonetheless organized differently that the way most youths would want. It s poorer; there are more day-to-day dilemmas, with tension Afp / Getty Images / N. Kolesnikova and depression commonplace. These factors lead to the estrangement of some of the young who go home. If the adult majority continues to prefer guaranteed work (even if it s poorly paid), young people are more willing to work harder, even lacking assurance of future employment stability, so long as their immediate pay is higher. The attitude of Russia s youth toward work, success, career and the nature of their profession can t be fully understood outside the context of a specific social and institutional framework. For example, in Soviet and post-soviet era, the feeling that work is underestimated and undervalued is a fundamental one. This belief sustains a common feeling that an individual is constantly penalized when it comes to salary, which is seen as never commensurate with the service rendered. This powerful notion is present both in the adult population and among youth. Of youths interviewed, 4 percent said they believed in this disparity, compared to 6 percent of adult workers. Only 3 percent of youths interviewed said they were putting maximum effort into work. The vast majority (73 percent) instead openly stated that they could do more. This contradiction between a fundamental belief that all work is undervalued and the modest assessment of their own productivity in the context of work itself demonstrates a lack of respect for individual professionalism as well a firm belief that hard work will yield neither institutional reward nor the appreciation of others, both ethically and financially. This thinking is very much a vestige of the Soviet model. In Communist times, the undervaluation of work was used to justify the passivity, approximate effort, and the refusal to pursue more ambitious professional goals ( Why work hard for so little money? ). But compared to their parents, young people have greater on-the-job mobility and are far less attached to work. Though Russian youth can earn money, pursue a career and settle down (satisfaction levels in this regard have increased significantly over the past decade) the y- ounger generation persists in embracing a low level of onthe-job professionalism, evidently preferring quick money options. Among the young, the limited relevance of specialized knowledge, the overall depreciation of professionalism, and the role played by income in the choice of employment produces only marginal willingness when it comes to defending their rights as employees. In the context of an already passive population, young people are proving more inclined than their elder to give up worker rights and guarantees, including long-entrenched social benefits, opting instead for employment in the sprawling offthe-book sector. In the case of a serious violation of worker rights, 44 percent of youths interviewed said they d simply change jobs, one in 10 said they d do nothing, while 14 percent had no definite answer to the question. Only 30 percent of youth said they d be willing to take action to defend their rights, a number that dropped to 3 percent specifically among employed young workers (according to 06 survey data). Levada Center data suggests that youthful willingness to act in defense of their rights may be more of abstract and generic, a rebellious position expressed by those just entering into adulthood. Not surprisingly, it is strongest among middle school and university students. Over the years, the attitude tends to weaken significantly. The only difference between young and old as time passes is that the latter are more likely to adopt a passive position toward injustice (the Russian version of patience ), while young people tend to act more impulsively or seek a private solution to the problem at hand. These private solutions are usually unconnected to law, reinforcing what amount to widespread legal nihilism. A relative majority of young people surveyed (4 percent based on 06 data) would be willing to work without a formal employment contract, provided they liked the pay and the working conditions. In general, the promise of higher incomes cancels out worries about violations in worker rights. For example, 7 percent of those interviewed would accept overt violations if they were unable to find a satisfactory regular job (the whim of an employer presupposes the willingness of an employee to become a victim of it). Only 4 percent said they d refuse to agree to work without a contract under any condition. In the 1-to-19 year old age group, the number was 6 percent, dropping to percent in the -to-9 group (16 percent among me, percent among women, a difference attributable less gender but the understanding of their respective workplace roles). A significant number of the young would work abroad, at least in principle (3 percent said definitely ; 33 per- 44. east. europe and asia strategies number 33. december 10. 4

5 Afp / Getty Images / V. Rodionov Russian President Dmitri Medvedev arrives at a youth forum at Lake Seliger northwest of Moscow in July 10. TABLE. How many years in advance can you plan your future? (In percent based on different occupations) 07 survey among,000 youths in 1 large Russian cities Average Businessmen Managers Working professionals Office workers Unskilled workers Students Housewives Unemployed -6 YEARS/ WELL AHEAD OF TIME 1 OR YEARS AHEAD OF TIME I DON T EVEN KNOW WHAT S GOING TO HAPPEN IN A MONTH I DON T KNOW cent said probably ). But only percent of respondents would choose working outside Russia to follow their area of specialty. For the majority (7 percent), a very rewarding job came ahead of following their personal inclination. As in the case of getting an education outside Russia, the motive wasn t linked to the prospect of increased professionalism or a higher quality work environment, but to a desire to achieve a higher standard of living. These ideas are in many ways illusory and naïve, like the idea of being able make up another life. In fact, only tiny minority of youth would really be willing to work abroad. This carefree attitude that youth has toward its future (together with satisfaction with its lives and successes ) can be considered a new version of an old Soviet-style dependence on a system, one that is associated, once a- 46. east. europe and asia strategies gain in Soviet terms, with a broader sense of hopelessness and the inability to associate life with a larger context. It s no coincidence that Russia s young, affluent and successful classes are convinced they are unable (and unwilling) to have an effect on the country s political realities. Unable to defend their own rights, they are similarly helpless when it comes to knowing how to stand in the way of the will of the powerful. This shows the extent to which anti-modernism prevails among the young. Their values and guidelines unrelated to concepts of self-actualization. They evidence the enduring negative-passive response to change. They tend to copy the survival experience of previous generations, but with different means and materials. But passive adaptation, both at an individually and a collective level, promises nothing new for the society of the future..