Taiwan s international visibility in the twenty-first century: A suggestive note

Transcription

1 Scholarly Essay Taiwan s international visibility in the twenty-first century: A suggestive note International Journal 2017, Vol. 72(1) 79 90! The Author(s) 2017 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalspermissions.nav DOI: / journals.sagepub.com/home/ijx Young Chul Cho Jimmy Carter School of International Studies, Chonbuk National University, Deokjin-gu, Jeonju-si, Jeollabuk-do, South Korea Mun Suk Ahn Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Chonbuk National University, Deokjin-gu, Jeonju-si, Jeollabuk-do, South Korea Abstract This paper provides a critical check to the ongoing, dominant blue/green debate about Taiwan s identity vis-à-vis China. The colour blue is associated with those who support closer ties with China and green with those who support Taiwanese independence. The state-centric debate over unification, independence, or the status quo in cross-strait relations is closely tied to Taiwan s national aspirations to enhance its international standing in the twenty-first century, a standing which is arguably diplomatically underrecognized. Based on a critical discussion of the blue/green debate, this paper presents two pragmatic ways of augmenting Taiwan s international visibility through global recognition without jeopardizing national security or regional stability in East Asia. Keywords Taiwan, unification, independence, international visibility, global recognition Background: Divided Taiwan Along with South Korea, Taiwan (the Republic of China; ROC) has been an excellent showcase for successful democratization with rapid socio-economic development in the non-western world after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, Corresponding author: Mun Suk Ahn, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, 567 Baekje-daero, Deokjin-gu, Jeonju-si, Jeollabuk-do, 54896, South Korea. ahnms@jbnu.ac.kr

2 80 International Journal 72(1) Taiwan s democratization profoundly changed its political identity and began an irreversible process of Taiwanization that diverges from the Chinese mainland. 1 During the period of authoritarian rule, until the early 1990s, only one exclusive, government-led narrative for Taiwan s identity was seen as legitimate. That narrative claims that Taiwan embraces not only the island but also the mainland, carrying the torch for the whole Chinese nation. In this sense, making a unified, greater Chinese nation-state is the sublime national task of people in Taiwan. 2 This unification narrative, which nurtures pan-chinese nationalism, still operates in Taiwan today. Given its history, culture, language, and geography, it is impossible for Taiwan to make a clean break from China. Indeed, the official name of Taiwan is the Republic of not Taiwan but China. In spite of Beijing s assertion that Taiwan is an indispensable segment of China (the People s Republic of China; PRC), the Taiwanese unification narrative alludes to China as a part of Taiwan (ROC). This unification narrative has traditionally provided an ideological basis for the blue faction, which is one of the two major political coalitions in Taiwan. Broadly speaking, the blue coalition contains the Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party, and the New Party, among others. The blue faction tends to favour Chinese national and cultural identity over a separate Taiwanese identity and promotes an engagement policy for greater economic and cultural ties with China, such as the Taiwan China Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in In recent years, the blue coalition has shifted its stance toward preserving the status quo relationship between Taiwan and China, recognizing its inability to realize reunification with much stronger China on its own terms and increasing Taiwanization at home. Furthermore, today few blue supporters truly seek reunification with mainland China, in spite of the many ways the blue coalition emphasizes closely connected, vibrant cross-strait relations. 3 KMT-based former President Ma Ying-jeou s Three Noes statement no independence, no reunification, and no use of force captures today s blue stance. However, that is not to suggest that the blues have totally discarded unification or integration. While being critical of reunification with the Chinese Communist Party s China, the blue coalition continues to endorse a modified form of the one China idea. 4 Presumably, in the blue understanding of Taiwan, PRC can be rejected, but not China as a civilization or culture. The deep blue faction in particular holds that, morally and culturally, Taiwan should unify with China in the long run. Thus, from the blue viewpoint, Chinese-ness is essential to understanding Taiwan s identity. On the other hand, by permitting criticism of the top-down unification narrative of the past, Taiwan s democratization has allowed its people to imagine and produce a different understanding of what it means to be Taiwanese, one that emphasizes the island itself and excludes the Chinese mainland. This green 1. Malcolm Cook, Taiwan s identity challenge, SAIS Review 25, no. 2 (2005): John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009). 3. Peter Hays Gries and Jenny Su, Taiwanese views of China and the world: Party identification, ethnicity, and cross-strait relations, Japanese Journal of Political Science 14 (2013): (1) Cass R. Sunstein, Taiwan s fragile success story, Korea Joongang Daily, December 2015.

3 Cho and Ahn 81 narrative strives for de-sinicization of Taiwan s independence at home and abroad 5 and constitutes the major opposition to the blues. Broadly speaking, the green coalition contains the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union, among others. One extreme example of the green viewpoint is the Taiwan Independence Party, inaugurated in 2015, whose political aims are to promote Taiwanese identity and to achieve the nation s independence by [not only rejecting the PRC, but also] overthrowing the Republic of China (ROC) regime. 6 It appears clear that many on the green side pursue de jure independence, although they sometimes disguise their intention for fear of Chinese military aggression toward Taiwan. President Tsai Ing-wen, from the DPP, maintains that the status quo with China, which means no mutual recognition and no unilateral change of status, is the basic foundation of her party s China policy. 7 Currently, the green coalition seems to be adopting a tactical approach. Particularly among the deep green proponents, Taiwanese-ness, which is basic to Taiwan s national identity, is most clearly defined by opposing Chinese-ness, which is what Taiwan is not and what Taiwan should fear. The logical goal following from such an identity is to make Taiwan a de jure state, a sovereign, independent state in the Westphalian world. 8 Given their ideological stances toward China unification/integration or independence the identity narratives of both the blue and green factions are very state-centric. Politically, both camps are obsessed with the state-centric questions of how to secure and shape Taiwan s statehood in the face of China s insistence that Taiwan is its renegade province. Furthermore, both sides want to enhance diplomatically unrecognized Taiwan s international standing in the twenty-first century, since the world seems to favour an evermore powerful China. Although both camps currently maintain the status quo position vis-a` -vis China for different tactical reasons, they seem incompatible in their national identity construction of Taiwan Chinese-ness and unification (blue viewpoint) and Taiwanese-ness and independence (green viewpoint). In reality, the two camps coexist in Taiwan in many conflicting ways on a daily basis. 9 It is against this backdrop that Taiwanese public discussion of Taiwan s identity has been dominated by the state-centric blue/green debate vis-a` -vis China. Individuals often feel compelled to choose either Taiwanese-ness or Chinese-ness as their national identity, and independence is considered the antithesis of unification. In recent years, the blue/green debate about Taiwan s identity has dominated 5. Barthéle my Courmont, Sovereignty, democracy and identity: Domestic debates over the definition of the nation in Taiwan, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 23, no. 4 (2011): , (accessed 23 August 2016). 6. Jason Pan, Taiwan Independence Party is inaugurated, Taipei Times, 9 May Jenny W. Hsu, Taiwan opposition s presidential nominee Tsai Ing-wen says won t change China ties, Wall Street Journal, (15 April 2015, accessed 23 August 2016). 8. Although a variety of political identity constructions currently exist in Taiwan, the blue and green discourses on Taiwan s identity remain dominant, heavily informing its people and state policy. Other discourses about Taiwan s identity remain relatively marginalized. 9. Dafydd Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan (London: Routledge, 2012).

4 82 International Journal 72(1) almost all elections, severely polarizing Taiwan s society. 10 This can reasonably be called a Taiwan Taiwan conflict, and today s Taiwan can be seen as a divided nation, politically and emotionally. 11 Moreover, this is not simply a domestic Taiwanese identity problem; it is a critical security matter informing both crossstrait relations and East Asian international politics. 12 The blue/green debate keeps repeating itself, dividing Taiwan and generating regional insecurity in East Asia while apparently going nowhere, with no practical compromise or solution being suggested by either side. At this juncture, it is necessary and worthwhile to call the state-centric blue/green debate into question. What benefits accrue to preoccupation (or obsession) with the blue/green debate? Does the ongoing, fierce blue/green debate continue to reproduce divided Taiwan, unnecessarily squandering Taiwan s resources and destabilizing East Asia s international relations? As an alternative to the persistent reproduction of the state-centric blue/green debate, which is bound up with Taiwanese national aspirations for international standing in the twenty-first century, this paper considers pragmatic ways to augment Taiwan s international visibility and global recognition, which the blue and green coalitions and Taiwan s public all crave, without jeopardizing Taiwan s national security or regional stability in the world of the twenty-first century. Practical impossibility of the blue/green visions of Taiwan s identity Arguably, the current goals of both camps the deep blue wish for unification/ integration and the deep green wish for independence are both unattainable and conflict-prone in the real world. Largely due to Taiwan s strong connection to Chinese culture and history, along with economic interests, the blue viewpoint tends to mould a framework for eventual national unification, although recently blue voices have become increasingly moderate in support of peaceful coexistence over de jure unification with stronger China. For instance, former premier Hau Pei-tsun said in 2013 that it is self-depreciation to argue that Taiwan is already an independent country named the Republic of China (ROC) and The ROC is Taiwan. It is still assumed that unification between Taiwan and China will eventually happen. 13 In addition, the current ROC constitution claims sovereignty over both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, which reveals the one China principle. 10. Courmont, Sovereignty, democracy and identity ; Katherine Hui-yi Tseng and Min-hua Chiang, Taiwan politics: Cross-strait relations continue to dominate, East Asia Policy 4 (2012): (1) John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, Taiwan in 2013: Stalemate at home, some headway abroad, Asian Survey 54 (2014): (1) Richard Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2011). 13. Shih Hsiu-chuan, Taiwan is not a sovereign nation: Former premier, Taipei Times, 30 June 2013, (accessed 23 August 2016).

5 Cho and Ahn 83 This constitution has been the central reference point of the blue force in defining Taiwan s identity. Despite these ideological claims, Taiwanese society is moving in the opposite direction. According to a survey conducted by cable news channel TVBS in October 2013, 66 percent of respondents were in favour of the status quo of cross-strait relations, 24 percent supported independence, and 7 percent wanted unification with China. Strikingly, when asked to select between only independence and unification, 71 percent of respondents backed independence, and only 18 percent backed unification. 14 Quoting a National Chengchi University Election Study Center poll, the Taipei Times in 2015 reported that 60.6 percent of respondents see themselves as Taiwanese, a dramatic increase over 17.6 percent in 1992, although 23.9 percent back Taiwanese independence. Also, 32.5 percent of respondents regarded themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, down from 47.7 percent in 2004, and 3.5 percent said they see themselves as Chinese, down from 26.2 percent in Another survey found that 70 to 80 percent of the people in Taiwan are unwilling to accept a Hong Kong-style one country, two systems status. 16 Therefore, considering the velocity and scale of Taiwanization on the island, it is simply not feasible to realize cross-strait unification as sought by the deep blue faction. It is also worth considering what the blue faction means by unification, specifically whose terms should be a foundation for that sublime national goal, Taipei s or Beijing s. There is currently a sense in Taiwan that the peace-loving island is being swallowed by massive, authoritarian China and pushed to give up its treasured democracy, human rights, local history, and traditions. 17 It thus seems evident even within the deep blue faction that successful and peaceful unification requires democratic, political change in China and popular acceptance by Taiwan s population, suggesting that today s Taiwanese way of life, which includes democracy, human rights, freedom, openness, and civil society, should be the underpinning of a unified China in the future. In relation to this, regarding Hong Kong s Umbrella Movement for democracy in 2014, former President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan, often accused by the green faction of being too China-friendly, said, If mainland China can practice democracy in Hong Kong, or if mainland China itself can become more democratic, then we can shorten the psychological distance between people from the two sides [of the Taiwan Straits]. 18 It is self-evident from the 14. Chris Wang, Taiwanese prefer independence over unification: Survey, Taipei Times, 31 October 2013, (accessed 23 August 2016) Tseng Wei-chen and Chen Wei-han, Taiwanese identity hits record level, Taipei Times, 26 January 2015, (accessed 23 August 2016). 16. Courmont, Sovereignty, democracy and identity, Hung-mao Tien and Chen-yuan Tung, Taiwan in 2010: Mapping for a new political landscape and economic outlook, Asian Survey 51 (1) (2011): Keith Bradsher and Austin Ramzy, For leader of Taiwan, a delicate balancing act, International New York Times, 1 2 November 2014,

6 84 International Journal 72(1) blue viewpoint that a unified country must be based on democratic governance, universal and free suffrage, liberties, human rights, and a vibrant civil society. However, those terms appear unacceptable to the overwhelmingly stronger China led by the Communist Party. Creating a democratic China via peaceful unification with/by Taiwan remains a pipe dream, a truth even the deep blue faction understands. What remains is to maintain the status quo until a better option comes up as cross-strait relations evolve. Meanwhile, the green coalition fervently strives for Taiwanese independence in earnest. Frank Chiang, president of the Taiwan Public Policy Council, argues that the ROC government is a mere governing authority in Taiwan, to be more exact, a government of China in exile. 19 In his article Taiwan has already declared its independence, Lin Cho-shui, a former member of Taiwan s Legislative Yuan and chief executive of the Party Policy Committee of the DPP, argues that Taiwan cannot help but take on the behavior of a sovereign nation...the question, in other words, is no longer whether or not to declare independence, but whether it is feasible not to declare independence. 20 Chris Huang, a law professor at National Tsing Hua University (NTHU) in Taiwan, maintains that Taiwanese must seek self-determination and independence as soon as possible and free Taiwan from occupation by a foreign power [KMT]. 21 In 2014, the Sunflower Student Movement, which occupied the Legislative Yuan, demonstrated that younger Taiwanese generations have a deep-rooted distrust of China and worry about Taiwan s unbalanced dependence on China, which, as they see it, hurts the island s economic autonomy and national security. 22 It is widely accepted that, as a political goal, unification is now a nonstarter, and independence is the desired goal in Taiwan. 23 Nonetheless, the green faction s quest for independence could be not only impossible but also dangerous if it were to be implemented in practice. First, as articulated in Beijing s Anti-Secession Law passed in 2005, under no circumstance does PRC accept any Taiwanese initiative to consolidate its external sovereignty that might lead to Taiwan s independence. Beijing is explicit that it will resort to force should Taiwan declare its independence. In addition, a nationalistic Chinese public will not accept Taiwan s independence, which means that Taiwanese independence would pose a critical threat to regime security in Beijing. Taiwan has been an integral part of Beijing legitimacy. 24 Second, worsening of cross-strait relations president-ma-ying-jeou-backs-hong-kong-protesters-while-courting-beijing.html?_r=0 (accessed 23 August 2016) Frank Chiang, Sadly, Taiwan is still not a state, Taipei Times, 12 March 2005, taipeitimes.com/news/editorials/archives/2005/03/12/ (accessed 23 August 2016). 20. Lin Cho-shui, Taiwan has already declared its independence, Global Asia 3 (2008): Chris Huang, Defeat likely without independence, Taipei Times, 15 July 2015, taipeitimes.com/news/editorials/archives/2015/07/15/ John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, Taiwan in 2014: A besieged president amid political turmoil, Asian Survey 55 (2015): (1) Hays and Su, Taiwanese views of China and the world. 24. Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society (London: Routledge, 1997).

7 Cho and Ahn 85 caused by Taiwan s quest for independence is likely to result in deteriorating security and peace in East Asia. No other East Asian power is willing to support Taiwan s official independence at the cost of sacrificing its interests with China. At the moment, all East Asian powers appear to prefer the status quo neither Taiwan s independence nor unification between ROC and PRC for the sake of regional peace and stability. Third, the green faction s independence fever is based on the premise that Taiwan s current status as a de facto state is abnormal, which could have negative psychological effects on the Taiwanese public and should thus be corrected so it becomes a de jure state. In this sense, the green viewpoint defines Taiwan by what it lacks rather than by who the Taiwanese people are and what they do and achieve. Because official independence appears out of the question in practice, the Taiwanese people tend to become stranded in the logic of an abnormal Taiwan that stands in contrast to its successful narrative of political, economic, and social development in the post-cold War era of globalization. If Taiwan is truly abnormal, how many countries are really normal in the way of providing their own people with basic needs and decent living conditions for self-realization? In brief, neither the deep blue faction s dream of unification nor the deep green faction s dream of independence is feasible or desirable in practice. Rather, both are conflict-prone; seeking unification in the process of rapid Taiwanization could deepen an existing Taiwan Taiwan conflict at home, whereas declaring official independence could well lead to military action against Taiwan from Beijing. The state-centric blue/green debate has become an unhealthy debate that squanders Taiwanese resources and energy, deterring diverse understandings of complex Taiwan today and narrowing down Taiwanese thinking space for imagining a better, global Taiwan. The statecentric blue/green debate is of great interest to a handful of factionalismbased politicians in pursuit of re-election, rather than to the general public in Taiwan. Pragmatic suggestions for Taiwan s visibility in the international world Both the blue and green coalitions know that neither unification nor independence is viable, and thus they have no choice but to opt for the status quo as the best bet in domestic and international politics. Indeed, the state-centric blue/green debate itself is not a solution but a problem causing insecurity inside and outside Taiwan. Therefore, it is high time to ask a novel question regarding Taiwan s identity and place in global politics: how can Taiwan augment its diplomatically under-recognized visibility in the international world? The Taiwanese people are painfully aware of Taiwan s diplomatic isolation, such as nonparticipation in the United Nations; only 21 small countries diplomatically recognize Taiwan. Taiwan s lack of diplomatic recognition forms a large part of the Taiwanese psyche. The island appears to be hungry for international recognition of its existence as a modern state on a par with Japan and

8 86 International Journal 72(1) South Korea, 25 but as already explained, any attempt to achieve external sovereignty through traditional state diplomacy inevitably invites military hostility from Beijing, a foregone course that threatens both Taiwan s security and regional stability. 26 Furthermore, Taiwanese frustration is not just about the lack of diplomatic recognition per se. In a broader sense, in the opinion of many Taiwanese, Taiwan has not been accorded the visibility and recognition in international relations that its recent political and economic achievements deserve. Taiwan is thus undervalued or even forgotten by global citizens. 27 Despite the long-running feud between the blue and green factions, both agree that Taiwan s international standing should be improved. Given Taiwan s unique international standing as a de facto state, a distinction between diplomatic and global recognition in international relations is necessary. Diplomatic recognition is an exclusively state practice by which states recognize one another s equal sovereign status abroad. It requires formal written agreement among states. Although Taiwan has solid internal sovereignty (territory, people, and central authority), it has weak external sovereignty (diplomatic recognition) because Beijing includes Taiwan in its one China stance. On the other hand, in terms of actors and processes in global politics today, global recognition is more inclusive than diplomatic recognition. It is a favourable endorsement as a global political entity from various actors, such as states, subnational/local jurisdictions, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, epistemic communities, transnational networks of actors, and even individuals, through various channels of politics, economy, society, culture, and the environment, among others. Global recognition can be formal and/or informal. It can be the key to global respect that serves as a basis of soft power. Note that diplomatic and global recognition are not entirely discrete, because the latter embraces the former and, more importantly in the context of Taiwan, global recognition and respect could eventually translate into international support for (de facto) diplomatic recognition. Given its international and domestic politics, working out ways to lift its international standing and visibility via global recognition/respect, without jeopardizing its national security vis-a` -vis China, is an issue of great importance to Taiwan. Both the blue and green factions, not to mention the Taiwanese public, crave such standing and visibility. Therefore, this paper makes two pragmatic suggestions. In terms of public discussion, the current divisive blue/green debate about Taiwan s identity should be significantly toned down. In other words, it is necessary to be less state-centric and more diverse in making sense of Taiwan s place in global politics today. 25. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?; Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters. 26. Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China s Territorial Integrity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 27. Fang-long Shih, The geopolitics of religious performance in twenty-first century Taiwan, in Luke M. Herrington, Alasdair Mckay, and Jeffrey Haynes, eds., Nations under God: The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing), 2015,

9 Cho and Ahn 87 The blue/green debate has stagnated into repetitive discourses on reunification, independence, and the status quo vis-a` -vis China. It is clear that this state-centric debate has not provided a peaceful solution to Taiwan s divided domestic politics and often tense cross-strait relations. Rather, it continues to produce and reproduce cultures of insecurity inside and outside Taiwan. Disrupting the endless statecentric blue/green debate will promote sharper, brighter thinking about ways of making Taiwan less divisive and more peaceful in the region. For example, in today s complex international relations, are there ways of perceiving Taiwan that go beyond a de facto state seeking de jure independence? One possible answer is that Taiwan s identity or place in the world does not require legal, sovereign independence from China in the Westphalian sense. Instead, Taiwan could be regarded as an autonomous, international living space that is recognized and respected by global citizens. Diplomatic Taiwan based on Westphalian state-system thinking, albeit still important, is just one of several ways of understanding today s Taiwan. Thus, diverse aspects of Taiwan should be welcomed and discussed in everyday talk at home and abroad: such as normative Taiwan, economic Taiwan, cultural Taiwan, historical Taiwan, educational Taiwan, environmental Taiwan, and so on. These plural understandings can open new conceptual spaces for both Taiwanese and non-taiwanese in the international world. The Taiwanese people must use their creativity and energy to produce and promote diverse Taiwans that can be respected globally. Rather than being a passive norm-follower as a small country in international relations, Taiwan can be a norm-maker or norm-organizer by offering its shared values such as openness, respect, compassion, willingness to work hard, and international development cooperation to protect humans and the environment and to search for equality and justice, by way of less-state-centric actors and methods in international relations. Toward this end, the current statecentric blue/green debate should be toned down. Of course, many Taiwanese politicians, faced with the pressure of re-election, will probably continue to reproduce the state-centric blue/green debate in domestic politics. However, in the sphere of thinking and conversation, the Taiwanese people should not be drawn into that debate as they ponder what kinds of values and public goods Taiwan can offer for Taiwanese and non-taiwanese alike. Considering the current political landscape inside and outside Taiwan, although the suggestion of toning down the contentious blue/green debate is unlikely to be widely accepted overnight, it is worth public exposition and more discussion. In addition, it is desirable not to see China as the single, dominant reference point defining what and who Taiwan is, as in the state-centric blue/green debate. Needless to say, China is critical to Taiwan in many ways, but there is no need to be in thrall to China in producing and defining Taiwan s identity at home and abroad. Other factors cherished by the Taiwanese people such as respect for human rights and freedom, a vibrant civil society, local popular culture, and information technology and its contribution to international development and environmental protection can play a vital role in defining Taiwan in the twenty-first century and raising its international standing. Moreover, those Taiwanese qualities could

10 88 International Journal 72(1) socialize China, nudging the Chinese people into asking a critical question: Which way is better, safer, and more humane in everyday life, Chinese or Taiwanese? As Mitter claims, Taiwan provides an alternative, lively and democratic vision of what Chinese culture is. 28 Thus both Taiwan and China would benefit from provincializing China as the single dominant reference point of Taiwan s identity. Regarding the state-centric blue/green debate, doing less and less could help create the conditions for achieving more global recognition, reducing Taiwan s severely polarized strife at home, and creating positive images of Taiwan globally. In terms of policy-relevant practice associated with the above less-state-centric thinking, there is some evidence that the practice of low politics can be a key tool for augmenting Taiwan s visibility and recognition in global politics. High politics traditionally includes the issues of national security, the military, diplomacy, and the survival of a state, and low politics comprises human rights, the environment, education, foreign aid, and just about everything else. High politics is often led by the highest state officials, and low politics is usually in the purview of lower-career officials and non-state actors. High and low politics are not entirely discrete, however, but are interactive in practice. 29 Suggesting that low politics be stressed is not to say that the high politics of diplomatic Taiwan are unimportant. Taiwan s participation as an observer in the World Health Assembly in 2009, Taiwan s participation in the meeting of the United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization in 2013, Taiwan s respective free trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore in 2013, Taiwan s entry into the US Visa Waivers Program in 2012, Taiwan s visa-free status from Britain, Japan, New Zealand, Canada, and the Schengen countries in the European Union during are important, successful cases of Taiwanese high politics at the state level. While high politics activities should continue, plural actors using multiple channels should undertake and proactively implement various low politics activities. Global citizens could then see, touch, and experience Taiwan as represented through low politics, which are more accessible and amicable in practice than high politics and thus give global recognition to the identity of Taiwan in the world. 30 Accordingly, the international visibility craved by most Taiwanese could be consolidated and made more explicit. Furthermore, increasing international visibility by means of low politics could influence the conventional matrix of interpretations in which high politics operate. In other words, low politics could provide favourable conditions for high politics and diplomatic Taiwan. 28. Rana Mitter, Modern China: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp Brigid Starkey, Mark A. Boyer, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, International Negotiation in a Complex World, 3 rd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010). 30. Shih Hsiu-chuan, Taiwan is not a sovereign nation.

11 Cho and Ahn 89 One example of global Taiwan represented through low politics illustrates this point. O.P. Jindal Global University (JGU) in India has hosted India s first Taiwan Education Center (TEC). 31 National Tsing Hua University (NTHU) in Taiwan, with the support of the Ministry of Education of Taiwan, began this program in The NTHU dispatched two native Mandarin speakers to India and contributed monthly financial support to JGU to set up and run the TEC. As a joint program for Taiwan and India, the centre promotes learning the Mandarin language and an awareness of Taiwanese society and Chinese culture among Indian students in higher education, and facilitates greater understanding and cooperation between the Indian and Taiwanese people. Compared with knowledge of other Asian countries such as China and Japan, almost nothing is known about Taiwan at the local level in India. Before the inception of the TEC at JGU, most JGU students did not even know of the existence of Taiwan. Students who had heard about Taiwan tended to confuse Taiwan with Thailand or thought that Taiwan was just like Hong Kong in China s one country, two systems approach. 33 The TEC is a university-level collaboration between Taiwan and India that provides Indian youth with educational programs as public goods. Note that although the TEC has been possible due to funding from Taiwan s Ministry of Education, the most visible actor organizing the TEC is a Taiwanese university rather than the government. In this way, the state can be of great service to activities in low politics, but it should be behind the scenes. The TEC at JGU has been instrumental in promoting a cultural and linguistic understanding of Taiwan among Indian students who come to recognize Taiwan as a distinct political community (in fact, country) in the world, learn Mandarin, and travel to Taiwan for further education. Through TECs in India, NTHU has also organized multiple conferences on Taiwan India relations in both Taiwan and India, given Indian students scholarships for study in Taiwan, and connected Taiwanese of diverse backgrounds with Indian students and elites. 34 In many ways, the TEC has given ordinary young Indians a window onto Taiwan s uniqueness and the alternative to China it represents. This has initiated a growing demand for TECs from Indian universities; four TECs now operate in Delhi alone, and a TEC in Chennai is also in operation. Thus, by offering academic programs as public goods through TECs run by a non-state actor, educational Taiwan has raised Taiwan s visibility among Indian youth who have come to see Taiwan as an international site of learning and interacting. Indeed, as this TEC case shows, some low politics activities have already been implemented, but they should be diversified, expanded, and sustained by initiatives of Taiwanese civil society and individuals. 31. See Jindal School of International Relations, (accessed 30 December 2015). 32. The first author of this paper was a faculty member of the Jindal School of International Affairs at JGU from 2011 to As a key JGU liaison, he was involved in helping to build the TEC between JGU and NTHU in This is based on the first author of this paper s interviews with many JGU students. 34. See Taiwan Education Center in India, (accessed 30 December 2015).

12 90 International Journal 72(1) In conclusion, the current blue/green debate, which is producing a divided Taiwan and often tense cross-strait relations, is far too state-centric. Taiwanese thinking should treat China as just one of many reference points that define Taiwan s identity in the international world. In line with such thinking, Taiwan s low politics can be a critical tool in augmenting its visibility in an era of global politics. Paradoxically, taking less-state-centric perspectives and non-state centric methods in international relations could improve global recognition among various global actors in ways that might translate into international support for Taiwan s external subjectivity (if not statehood) in the long run. Perhaps Taiwan can be the first post-westphalian state in the twenty-first century by trying not to try to be a perfect modern, traditional nation-state in international relations. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea funded by Korean Government under grant (NRF-2013S1A3A ). Author Biographies Young Chul Cho is assistant professor in the Jimmy Carter School of International Studies at Chonbuk National University, South Korea. His research and teaching interests are international relations theory, geopolitics, and East Asian international relations. His articles have been published in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Japanese Journal of Political Science, among others. Mun Suk Ahn is associate professor in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Chonbuk National University, South Korea. His research and teaching interests are foreign policy analysis, security studies, and inter-korean relations. His articles have been published in International Journal, Korean Political Science Review, The Korean Journal of International Studies, among others.