Images of Border Conflicts within EU Policy-Making Circles and Their Impact on Policy

Transcription

1 Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies Images of Border Conflicts within EU Policy-Making Circles and Their Impact on Policy Michelle Pace, Ph.D. Research Fellow University of Birmingham No. 16 June 2005

2 Introduction As the world looks to Europe to take on more responsibility in international relations and security in the devastating aftermath of Bosnia and Kosovo, this article aims at a systematic evaluation of the images of border conflicts in EU policy circles. It proposes that there is a strong link between the belief system shared by EU actors and their perceptions of border conflicts. In turn, this link impacts upon EU actions, processes and outputs of decision making on the transformation of conflicts. The article combines a synthesis of the literature on conflict studies with primary interviews and EU documentation analysis that document the perceptions of EU policy circles on conflicts and the likely effects of such images. This article will proceed as follows. The first section will briefly summarize the literature on conflict studies and trace out the various definitions and understandings of conflict here. This is followed by the explication of the significance of perceptions for the debates within this literature and the role perceptions play in conflict situations. A third section presents the images of conflicts in EU policy-making circles. It is argued that the EU s belief system impacts on these images. This finding and how it influences the EU s policy-making process are explored in more depth in the following section. The conclusion sums up the main ideas put forward in this article and includes some implications for policy-makers. What is conflict? Types of conflict 1 According to the Conflict Barometer, conflict is defined as the clashing of positional differences or interests, for example on national values and other issues of some duration and magnitude between two parties that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cause. 2 From a traditional, International Relations, realist perspective, a conflict is recognised if there is a clash between opposing interests of states regarding core concepts such as security, sovereignty or power. These dynamics continue to define conflicts even after the end of the Cold War when new conflicts emerged as a result of states claiming neighbouring border areas, often for economic purposes or where such conflicts emerged within states. Hence, in a traditional, statecentred manner, conflict studies often view conflict as being defined by the interests of conflict parties. In the case of a boundary conflict, a line is defined by the conflictual parties respective interests whether through implicit or explicit agreement or consent. Such a perspective has made way to a wider, dynamic understanding of international and national conflicts. As Richmond points out, newer approaches tend to uncover sources of conflict and potentials for conflict resolution that have been shielded by decades or more of state-interest-based practice and sovereign assumptions. 3 This change becomes visible in the paradigm shift from state-centred 1 For a thorough analysis, see Pace, Michelle and Stephan Stetter, A Literature Review on the Study of Border Conflicts and their Transformation in the Social Sciences. Available at: 2 Conflict Barometer, Richmond, O.P., A Genealogy of Peacemaking: The Creation and Re-Creation of Order, Alternatives 26,

3 to a wider human-needs / world society framework as well as multilevel analyses of conflict. 4 The disappearance of the bipolar system after 1989 also triggered this new stage in the development of conflict theory as the radar-screens of conflict studies increasingly captured the predominance of internal, asymmetric conflicts ethnic or others as opposed to classical international conflicts. A thorough survey of the conflict studies literature reveals that conflict usually emerges because the dominant ethnic community in a country monopolizes all of the economic opportunities, leaving those in the other groups disadvantaged. This is the central assumption in the cultural studies, anthropology and sociology literature. In a similar vein, there is a related body of literature labelled as feminist reconstructive politics, which emerged in particular after the conflict in Kosovo, and which moves beyond traditional top-down approaches to conflict studies. The understanding of conflict here is one that focuses in particular on violence against women in war, especially cases of rape as well as violence against domestic peace. This literature emphasises bottom-up approaches to conflict transformation through community networks and membership groups organised across ethnic divides and aimed at achieving everyday human security and reconciliation. This view echoes the ideas on conflict found in the human geography literature. Along similar lines, the literature in critical geography relates conflict to identities rather than the interests of conflict parties. How people identify themselves in conflict situations and how they perceive other conflict parties in such contexts is the focus of social psychologists who try to understand perceptions about competitive struggles in conflict situations. This leads us to the role of perceptions in conflicts. Why focus on perceptions? What is the role of perceptions in conflicts? Within the general definition of a conflict as a disagreement between at least two parties who perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns, an important aspect emerges as to the role of perceptions in conflict situations. If there is some level of difference in the positions of the two (or more) parties involved in a conflict, the true disagreement may be quite different from the perceived disagreement between the parties. In fact, many observers argue that there are often significant levels of misunderstanding where conflict parties exaggerate the perceived disagreement. Typically, although perceptions do not necessarily become reality per se, conflict parties re-act to perceived threats facing them: thus, people s behaviours, feelings and ongoing responses are modified by an evolving sense of the threats they feel they are confronted with. The role of third parties or mediators thus normally involves understanding the true areas of disagreement between conflict parties (issues) as a way of helping them manage the true needs of the parties (agreement) and to solve the conflict by focusing on the right problems (solutions). However, third parties frequently end up taking sides on the basis of their own perceptions of the issues involved in a conflict, past issues and relationships with one (or more) of the conflict parties, roles within an organization and other factors. This leads to the very obvious conclusion of why perceptions matter and why third party perceptions in particular are 4 Ibid.,

4 so important to understand if third parties are to act constructively to manage a conflict. In fact, there is a tendency, by conflict parties as well as external actors, to narrowly define the problem in a conflict as an economic one in terms of substance, task and near-term viability, (measured in terms) of costs or price to be paid for a solution. But as the tragic events in the Middle East conflict show, the first step towards peace is for both parties to acknowledge that they have been aggressors as well as victims. In the words of the internationally acclaimed Israeli author David Grossman, What is really hard is for each side to give up its perception of itself as the sole victim of the conflict. Each side s view of itself as victim gives it strength, motivation, a sense of the justice of its cause, and internal cohesion. It links both Israelis and Palestinians to their historical identities. Both sides have, in different ways, conceived their history around a sense that they are fated to be victims A people that is prepared to give up its monopoly on being the injured party has freed itself from the defeatism and paralysis inherent in the role of sole eternal victim The other points of dispute will become less charged, less symbolic and mythological. They will become more human and so easier to resolve. 5 It can thus be anticipated that with conflict parties having differing perceptions of a situation, this in turn impacts on third parties perceptions of a conflict. The effect of this is that perceptual filters are created that shape third party responses to a conflict situation. In the case of the EU s involvement in the transformation of conflicts, these filters are influenced by its belief system. Before moving on to the latter, the next section will examine the images of conflicts within EU policy circles. Images of Conflicts in EU policy-making circles There are broadly three different modes of how conflicts are conceptualised in EU policy circles: a) conflict as inherently violent, that is, destructive. This conception is linked to what some analysts have termed power conflict. 6 A clear case is the image of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict among EU actors. For Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the Middle East conflict is overshadowed by violence; it is not perceived as a racial/religious conflict. (In general, the view of this conflict in the EP is one of a violent dispute with historical origins). It is perceived as a broad conflict involving not only Israel and Palestine but also Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan. For MEPs, a solution (based on this perception) requires regional cooperation, and the Middle East peace process is therefore a CFSP issue (where the Council is more active), where the EU s efforts are aimed at a recognition of two independent, sovereign states which can co-exist in a situation of mutual security. 5 Grossman, David, 2005 (translated by Haim Watzman). The Guardian G2, February 8, pg Diez, Thomas; Stetter, Stephan; Albert, Mathias (2004), The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts: Theorising the Impact of Integration and Association, paper presented at the ISA Conference, Montreal, March 2004; at the UACES conference, Birmingham, 6-8 September 2004; and at the Pan-European IR Conference in The Hague, 9-11 September

5 This conceptualisation of conflicts links with traditional IR literature on conflict but also takes us back to the writings of Darwin who emphasized the competitive struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest and on whose reading conflict equates to competition and destruction. He also claimed that all nature is at war, one organism with another, or with external nature. Seeing the contented face of nature, this may at first be well doubted; but reflection will inevitably prove it is too true. This reflection is echoed in the work of Machiavelli, familiar to IR audiences, who wrote a short analysis of how to rule an Italian city state successfully in the late middle ages. Machiavelli wrote of power, balance of power, formation of alliances and counteralliances and the causes of conflict between different city-states. 7 He believed that a single ruler was necessary to found or reform states and presents a tough and practical view of politics, in which questions of how to use power to achieve desired ends, by the use of any and every technique and resources available, are seen as vastly more important than moral or philosophical questions about the desirability of such strategies. Being devoid of general principles, Machiavellianism is seen as contradicting the European spirit but at the same time it emphasizes the nature of power conflicts. This does not, however, equate with the EU s belief system, whose moral foundation is based on peace, welfare and stability. This helps us explain and understand why the EU s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is (at face value at least, perceived as) minimal and why the EU is not always seen as a credible international player and influence. It echoes a wider belief that the EU s foreign policy is still a work in progress as EU policy circles struggle with situations where another international actor, in this case the US, puts aside moral issues and focuses on strategies aimed at achieving desired ends (often through measures incompatible with EU pathways). b) A second lens through which conflicts are perceived in EU policy circles is one in which conflicts are taken as a set of technical issues and where co-operative relations between conflict parties are possible. Commission perceptions in particular tend to highlight conflicts as issue conflicts. 8 In this way, conflicts become manageable through economic means: the EU can thus offer package deals to conflict parties to improve the situation on the ground and in the region as a whole. The Commission s technocratic discourse on the Kaliningrad oblast and its perceptions of the Greek/Turkish and the Cyprus issue, for example, emphasise the flexibility of the acquis in order to accommodate special concerns arising in these cases. In this manner, disputes perceived as a series of issue conflicts, are translated into possible solutions through pragmatic approaches. This is evident in the Commission s 1998 Regular Report where it states that: There are a number of contentious issues in the Aegean area between Turkey and an EU Member State, Greece, including disputes about the demarcation of the continental self. Turkey also challenges sovereignty over various islets and rocks. The boundaries of the two territorial waters and airspace are also problematic. 9 7 Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince. 8 Diez et al, Commission reports have been analysed for 5 conflict cases including the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Greece/Turkey and Europe s North conflicts. 9 Regular Report 1998: 51. It is important to note here that the Cyprus issue is not perceived to be part of the Greek-Turkish conflict! Moreover, there is no mention of the issue of the Turkish-speaking Muslim minority of Western Thrace. Issues related to the Greek minority in Turkey (for example the 5

6 In this case, Commission discourses also include references to the continuous improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey, especially since The improvement is sometimes linked with adjectives such as significantly 10 or dramatically. 11 In this context, the Regular Reports refer to the signing of bilateral agreements which aim to deepen the co-operation between the two countries, 12 the agreement on a number of confidence building measures, 13 the exploratory talks in the Aegean that started in March 2002, 14 as well as symbolic movements such as the official visit of the Turkish PM to Greece and his private visit to Western Thrace where he called on the Turkish-speaking Muslim minority to contribute to Greece s prosperity 15 and the public commitments at the highest level to continued rapprochement. 16 In some documents, there are also references to the Greek/Turkish rapprochement at the level of civil society: A number of other initiatives were taken at the grass-root level, such as the Third Turkish-Greek tourism Forum in Marmaris in May These perceptions echo the EU s belief system and Europe s own experience which should serve as a model for conflict parties to emulate. The devastation of World War I, the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the intense competition among businesses and among nations, the rise of Nazism and other totalitarian systems reinforced the social psychological perspective which contributed to viewing conflict from the perspective of competitive struggle. The psychological mode however, offers some room for viewing co-operative aspects of conflict. In attempting to explain conflict in terms of what goes on in the minds of men, or tensions that cause war we can rethink conflict in terms of the perceptions, beliefs, values, ideology, motivations, and other psychological characteristics that individual men and women acquire as a result of their experiences. Following the EU s own experience after the devastation of World War II, we can understand how the EU s belief system is activated in particular conflict situations and according to which, conflict parties find themselves located and playing a role. Many analysts argue that the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan s stature as a westerniser is a direct result of the EU s enabling impact in the Turkish-Greek and Cyprus disputes. Another example is the EU s role vis-à-vis its immediate neighbours (such as Russia or those included in the relatively new European Neighbourhood Policy, the ENP) where it is believed to have a crucial role in promoting reforms. Through the ENP, the EU can be a successful driver for democratisation in the neighbouring or accession countries. The EU is offering incentives such as increased access to the single market and improved visa regimes in exchange for measurable progress in democratic reforms such as judicial independence and free media. Rather than politicise or securitize a conflict a closing of the Greek Orthodox Halki seminary since 1971) are perceived as a domestic affair that relate to human rights and not as a bilateral dispute involving Greece and Turkey (see Regular Report 1998: 19-20; Regular Report, 2004: 44). 10 Regular Report, 2001: Regular Report, 2004: : 41; 2002: 18 and : 2003: 41;2002: 44; 2001: ; 2002: 18 and Regular Report, Regular Report, 2003: Regular Report, 2001: 89. 6

7 discourse which the EU cannot follow up with effective measures, a conflict is made manageable through a technocratic image/discourse. The importance given in EU documents to economic development of the poorest side as in the case of bridging economic disparities between north and south Cyprus, the Occupied Territories and Israel highlight this perception. This is also a clear finding in the analysis of documents relating to Kaliningrad which reveal EU actors perceptions that can be interpreted as EU discourses on economic, social development and technical issues; these issues, in EU policy circles eyes, can be resolved to bring about stability, justice and peace in and around an enlarged EU. 18 The Commission perceptions of this conflict derive from the combination of three sub-discourses: the first sees the Kaliningrad issue as a series of issue conflicts of a technical nature that emanate from enlargment. Kaliningrad is a special case with respect to the movement of people but not with respect to the movement of goods. In this respect, the EU can have an enabling and connective impact, that is flexible through its acquis which offers practical solutions as well as financial assistance for the creation of infrastructures that facilitate cross-border crossings. A second perception relates the Kaliningrad issue to a wider EU concern over the socioeconomic disparities across the border of the EU with Russia. Thus, the permanent resolution of the issue will be possible only if these socio-economic disparities are addressed. A third perception relates Kaliningrad to the EU s security concerns emanating from the northern region and Russia illegal immigrants, cross border crime, environment, etc. The permanent resolution of this issue would therefore be in the EU s efforts at linking these concerns in the framework of its relations with Russia. In this context the EU adopts conditions for Russia to accept and which legitimse its actions through financial instruments. There is also a fourth perception which sees EU-Russian relations in terms of common values. These perceptions are closely observed by neighbouring countries who look to the EU as a model for stability: for example, in countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, where the new leaders have made their European aspirations clear, the EU s carrot and stick approach to building a closer relationship to the EU and a more stable and peaceful neighbourhood, is very important. European integration and the EU become a reference point for political and civil society actors in particular. The EU becomes the model for democratic values, justice and peace. This marks the important effectiveness of the connective EU impact on the transformation of conflicts where the EU is able to give a voice to the silent ones and underlines its neo-functionalist premises. 19 c) A third set of perceptual lenses of conflicts is linked to identity: conflict between parties is perceived by EU policy circles as ultimately based on identity matters, or 18 See for example, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 17 January 2002 (21.01) 5413/02 on the subject of Commission Staff Working Paper on EU and Kaliningrad: Movement of persons over land borders after enlargement and Commission document SEC(2002) 49 and IP/02/1331, MEMO/02/169; Commission of the European Communities. Communication From the Commission to the Council. The EU and Kaliningrad. Brussels COM(2001) 26 final and Kaliningrad: Transit. COM (2002) 510 final, Brussels ; 19 Diez et al, 2004 and Rumelili, Bahar, The Talkers and the Silent Ones. The EU and Change in Greek-Turkish Relations. Wokring paper number 10. EUBorderConf working paper series. Available at: 7

8 what analysts have termed identity conflict. 20 A case in point is the Northern Ireland conflict in which cultural phenomena are controlled by political and economic matters. The Commission appears to subscribe to the EP s perception in this case (Northern Ireland conflict as an identity conflict). The conflict is also seen to impose constraints on Northern Ireland s economic and social development: The conflict also had the malignant effect of polarising the Communities in Northern Ireland, which in turn has led to increased physical segregation of the population along religious lines, hampering efforts to promote cross-community contact and reconciliation, impeding the functioning of the labour market and making it more difficult to secure equality of employment opportunities. 21 The EU thus perceives its role in this conflict as engaging the populations on both sides of the border: The Commission operated on the belief that stability and prosperity are mutually reinforcing, but understood that creating this virtuous circle would require the widest consensus and participation of the local population. This is why, from the very beginning, we encouraged widening the scope of partnership beyond what was the norm for other European programmes. This approach was in fact adopted on the ground to great success, leading to an unprecedented grass-root involvement 22 and An extended PEACE programme is expected to move towards an ever increased role of NGOs and local partnerships in its delivery which s considered as essential element for trust-building in Northern Ireland. 23 Thus, the Commission s belief in peaceful resolution of conflicts resulted in its initiative of the PEACE Programme for Northern Ireland, in close co-operation with the governments of Ireland and the UK as well as representatives of the local communities. 24 Therefore, how EU policy circles perceive the essential nature of conflicts helps explain their attitude to how conflicts should be resolved. Behind these conceptions, lies a profound belief system, which is explored in the following section of this article. 20 Ibid., Conclusion of EU Task Force created in Autumn 1994 shortly after the ceasefires; in PEACE I: p. 13, own emphasis. This perception was echoed during interviews carried out in Brussels amongst policy actors during January Monika Wulf-Mathies, Member of the European Commission: Preface to European commission Peace and Reconciliation. 23 Ibid. 24 See PEACE I: pp

9 The Belief System of the European Union and impact on policy In this section, it will be argued that there is a vital relationship between the EU s belief system, images or perceptions of border conflicts in EU policy circles and decision-making in the area of conflict resolution. The EU has come to symbolize prosperity, (national or personal) security, ideals of tolerance and intellectual freedom, and thereby attracts peoples and politicians all over the East and South who want to associate with these ideals and therefore want to become part of the EU. We have witnessed this very recently in the case of Ukraine. For many people, the EU represents a special area of human hope, the originator of the idea of human rights. In 1948, in a speech, Churchill spoke about a movement for European Unity : In the centre of our movement stands the idea of a Charter of Human Rights, guarded by freedom and sustained by law. 25 The EU s belief system is embedded in Enlightenment values stressing the possibility of man s own intellect planning a society on rational grounds (reason, people s emancipation to take rationale choices), the growth of democracy, a liberal society (with increased individual freedom, especially of thought), and co-operative human behaviour. One of the high points of this belief system is the rejection of received authority. These liberalist ideals underlying the EU s belief system are expressed in its internal market (laissez-faire, free market system), its basic support for civil liberties or human rights, a commitment to equality, and the belief in talents, capacities and needs of individuals. By focusing on enlightenment values, the EU develops policies and programmes for conflict parties, building on dialogue and respect for its values. Some see the EU as a radical, albeit idealistic, system aiming for change in societies. One can argue that a rationale behind the EU s policy on border conflicts is the mission to civilise areas around the EU through its belief system. This top-down approach is useful in establishing the EU as a global actor through the export of its ideas, images and values which are embedded in Enlightenment ideas and the historical memory of its policy circles. Critics may argue that the attempt by the EU to export its belief system is a way of creating a political platform and a legitimacy for its political power. In this project of exporting its belief system to conflict parties, the receivers (that is the conflict parties) are regarded as empty vessels that should be filled with values, with little respect for the values of the receivers. The reality of divergent values was illustrated recently during the EU s final assessment of Turkey s membership application. The Justice and Development party, the AKP, had to withdraw a proposal to criminalize adultery because the measure was against EU principles and values. At this point, Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister nevertheless made it clear that Turkey had no intention of trading its social and cultural values for EU membership. 26 From the EU s perspective, democracy is the universally valid system of governance as long as it is backed up by constitutionally guaranteed rights: Democracy is 25 Quoted in The Guardian, What is Europe?, 17 December Woollacott, Martin, Turkey s bid for European membership is full of contradictions. Despite this deal, the road ahead remains rocky indeed, The Guardian, December 18, pg

10 perceived by EU policy circles as a universal trait of all people, a longing to control their own destiny. Thus, the EU s promotion of the principles of genuine democratisation, universality and respect for human rights is a moral imperative as well as the determining factor in building sustainable human development and lasting peace. For EU actors, any actions in support of democratisation and respect for human rights, including the right to participate in the establishment of governments through free and fair elections, can make a major contribution to peace, security and the transformation or prevention of conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has thus sought to shift from the definition of international human rights norms and standards to a more active implementation of these standards and democratic principles. In fact, since 2000, EU election missions have been sent to Zimbabwe (2000), Peru, Zambia, East Timor, Guyana, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nicaragua (2001), Kenya, Madagascar, Pakistan, Ecuador, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Congo Brazzaville, Cambodia (2002), Mozambique, Guatemala, Cambodia, Rwanda, Nigeria and West Bank and Gaza Strip (2003), West Bank and Gaza Strip, Mozambique, Malawi, Sri Lanka, Indonesia (2004-5). Election missions are taken as part of the mandate of the EU whose Treaty considers the protection and promotion of human rights as well as support for democratisation as corner stones of EU foreign policy and EU development co-operation. The European Union promotes and respects the universal principles as laid down in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and its complementary International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Guided by the European Convention on Human Rights, the EU s activities are thus based on the main international and regional instruments for the protection of these rights. These instruments protect common values with regards to fundamental freedoms and democratic principles, which are universal, indivisible and interdependent. What does this have to do with the EU in its pursuit of international peace and security? The underlying issue has to do with the manner in which societies respect these values as a condition for their efficient development. The concepts of human rights and democratic principles are explicitly found in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1 November 1993 which considers as one of the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU s activities directed at development cooperation as a way forward in the transformation of conflict situations are therefore enshrined in the belief in human rights and democratisation. This is made clear in the new title on development cooperation within the TEU which includes a second direct reference to these principles: Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. 10

11 The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force on 1 May 1999, inserts a new article 6 in the Treaty of European Union, which reaffirms that the European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. Since the early 1990s, the EC has systematically included a human-rights clause in its bilateral trade and co-operation agreements with third countries, including association agreements such as the Europe agreements and Mediterranean agreements. In order to present a framework for all EU activities in the area of human rights, the Commission has issued, since 1995, a series of communications to the Council and the Parliament. These communications set out strategies aimed at enhancing the consistency and effectiveness of the human rights and democratisation approach of the EU. The latest communication on the EU s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries (May 2001) concentrates mainly on developing a coherent strategy in this field for EU external assistance. The aim here is to set this policy in the context of the Commission s overall strategic approach in external relations for the forthcoming years, and a better coherence between the EU s internal and external approaches to human rights. The EU has always favoured an approach based on partnership and cooperation, rather than sanctions and other negative measures and consistently aims to work both with governments and the wider civil society to achieve sustainable change. The legal basis for all EU human rights and democratisation activities may be found under Chapter B7-70, where the Council adopted two Regulations on April 29, 1999 (975/1999 and 976/1999) on the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms under Articles 179 and 308 TEEC. The chapter B7-70, entitled European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, was created through an EP initiative in 1994, which brought together a series of budget headings specifically dealing with the promotion of human rights. This budget heading is aimed specifically at NGOs. In implementing its human rights policy, the EU recognises the important contributions made by international, regional and non-governmental organisations to the wider civil society and to the development of a democracy that upholds political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights. The EU values NGOs expertise (which many organisations working to implement human rights possess), as well as their visibly high impact in this field. This bottom-up approach in EU policy is reflected in EP debates on conflict cases, where this institution emerges as a force for good, peace and reconciliation. Members of the EP associate themselves with wider civil societies in conflict areas. 27 MEPs hold a strong sense of Europe s identity (what Europe stands for), and the strength of this as a reference point for MEPs to think and act upon in the context of conflict situations and for conflict parties to emulate. Hence, the discourse of European values (democracy, peace and respect for others) emerges as an important model which MEPs flag for all conflict parties to replicate. They feel it is the right thing to become involved in conflict situations and see their role as addressing the root cause of conflicts rather than the symptoms. MEPs thus emerge as important entrepreneurs in the EU s policy-making on conflict situations, guided by the EU s norms and 27 EP debates on the following conflicts were analysed: Israel-Palestine (from ), Northern Ireland (from 1973 to date), Cyprus ( ), Turkey/Greece ( ) and Europe s North ( ). 11

12 acting upon their perceptions that the EU has a valid contribution to make towards peaceful outcomes of conflicts. They emphasize in particular the symbolic impact of the EU s contribution in such contexts. EP debates show that the EU has in fact had the most positive role when it managed to change the material and social structures in which political and wider civil society actors act: When the EU managed to empower those political and wider civil society actors interested and willing to promote cooperation across conflict parties. This may explain why EU approaches to the transformation of conflicts directed at wider societal levels have been the most effective in many conflict cases, including Northern Ireland, Greek/Turkish disputes, Cyprus as well as the Middle East, to mention a few. Thus, the impact of the EU has been strongest when it supported local and grassroots organizations, successfully combined the objectives of conflict parties cooperation efforts and civil society development and when it facilitated the formation of new partnerships between organizations on both sides of the border. Thus, the symbolic presence of the EU has been the reason why conflicts, on many occasions, did not blow off into full scale violent conflicts. This finding goes well in line with the views of analysts who argue for the case of the EU as a civilian power as well as the normative power of the EU. 28 What is interesting in this context is how EU norms are diffused into conflict situations and impact on conflict parties. Values are at the core of this belief system Consequently, like conflict parties, EU decision-makers often act upon their images of the situation on the ground in conflict areas rather than upon objective reality. The structure as well as the contents of the EU s belief system play an integral role in the cognitive process of policy-making on border conflicts. The relationship of images to international conflict is clear: decision makers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of the conflict parties as well as their own image of the EU s role as a third party to a conflict. These images are in turn dependent upon the decision-makers belief system [and, it may be argued, these may or may not necessarily be accurate representations of reality. Thus, it can be suggested that international conflict is frequently perceived through distorted images]. 28 Manners, Ian, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 40, No 2, pp The image of the Community as a civilian power is not new in the literature. It was originally introduced by Duchêne, F., Europe s Role in World Peace. In Mayne, R., (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen European Look Ahead. London: Fontana, pp and Duchêne, F., The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence. In Kohnstamm, M and W. Hager, (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community. Basingstoke: Macmillan. This was followed by Bull s criticism (Bull, H., Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp ) and Hill s questioning of whether the EC is a civilian or a political power (Hill, C., The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe s International Role. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp ). See also Whitman, R., From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan. The debate has recently been reinvigorated: See Youngs, Richard, Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU s External Identity, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2., pp and at a Millennium Annual Conference. See Diez, Thomas, 2004, Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Problematising the Concept of Normative Power Europe, London, October. 12

13 The analytical framework for this argument can be presented briefly. The EU s belief system, composed of all the accumulated, organized knowledge that it has about itself and the world, may be thought of as a set of conceptual lenses through which images concerning border conflicts are received and interpreted. This belief system orients the EU to its global environment, defining conflict situations for EU actors, and identifying for EU policy circles the salient characteristics of conflicts. This process creates images of what the conflict has been about, is about and what it will be about as well as creating images of what the solution to a conflict ought to be. Internally, EU policy actors organize perceptions into a meaningful guide for behaviour, guided by the EU s belief system which functions for the establishment of goals and the ordering of policy preferences. Thus, the EU s belief system has a connection with the EU s policy/decision-making on border conflicts. The direct relationship is found in that aspect of the EU s belief system which tells policy actors what ought to be, acting as a direct guide in the establishment of goals. Indirectly, the EU s belief system also plays a role in the ordering, filtering and organizing of new perceptions and assimilating these to familiar ones in such a way as to minimize the clash with previous expectations. This does not, however, mean that there are always common EU images of a conflict: in fact, different EU actors may describe the same conflict situation in terms of their interests. In the case of Northern Ireland, the influence of different actors, particularly the influence of the member states directly involved in this conflict can be clearly determined. During May 2004, the Commission received letters from the UK and Irish Prime Ministers requesting the continuation of Community contribution to the IFI and of the PEACE programmes. These requests received a positive reply from the President of the Commission and were followed by proposals from the Commission for the continuation of Community contribution to IFI and PEACE Programme (October 2004). The influence of the Commission in the co-ordination of IFI and PEACE programmes and Structural Funds is also very evident in the documentation analysed. Regular assessments of the Union s financial contributions to the IFI have been carried out by the Commission and confirm its perception about the need to reinforce synergies between EU objectives and institutional co-ordination vis-à-vis Community Structural Funds interventions, in particular with the PEACE Programme. These recommendations were taken into account by the Council: The contribution shall be used in such a way as to complement the activities financed by the Community Structural Funds, and especially the activities of the PEACE Programme. 29 The Council and Commission perceptions of the Northern Ireland conflict, however, underestimate the potential enabling impact of the EU on parties to the conflict. 30 Throughout the EU documentation analysed, there is no mention of the EU as a forum of socialisation for the political leaders of the two parties. There is also no mention of the EU as a model in terms of power sharing and cooperation. In the documentation, one can however trace the EU s enabling effect in bringing about the Good Friday Agreement. The EU is also noted for its connective influence in the conflict which has 29 European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 17 and 18 June Diez et al,

14 led to some constructive impact in the Northern Ireland case. 31 It appears that in Council and Commission images, the EU is perceived as a catalyst for positive developments in the conflict: The EU had a clear interest and a vital role to play in maintaining the momentum for peace and reconciliation by means of a special support programme for NI and the border counties. 32 It follows that, how a conflict is perceived determines what policy solutions actors devise for EU involvement. The main argument here is that the EU s decision-making processes vis-à-vis conflicts are constructed around a set of practices and techniques with a predisposition to act towards a peaceful world society. The EU as a whole has, for some time, been attempting to improve its institutional coherence and to promote an integrated approach on conflict prevention. This was encouraged by the Commission and first applied to Africa. Following the conclusions of the Council for General Affairs on December 4, 1995, the Commission adopted a communication stressing the concept of structural stability. This communication of March 6, 1996, covers a situation which combines sustainable development, democracy and human rights with viable political structures, strong social conditions and healthy environmental conditions that can manage change without triggering violent conflict. 33 The EU s belief system and its perceptions of conflicts were once again reiterated in 1998 when the Commission issued another communication to the Council and Parliament as part of a series of communications on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries. 34 During the European Council in Goteborg between June 2001, the EU adopted a programme for the prevention of violent conflicts. 35 This followed a communication by the Commission on Conflict prevention 36 and a common position by the Council. 37 The EU logic guiding these communications and programme is clearly one of support for democracy, the rule of law and civil society. In these documents, the EU calls for the strengthening of means and instruments for short-term action through diplomatic and humanitarian instruments as well as long-term action including development co-operation, trade relations, arms control, human rights, political dialogue, trafficking issues and environmental policies. Thus, the EU s norm-guided policy in conflict situation covers a wide range of instruments political, economic as well as social, which are deemed as crucial to its effective role in the transformation of conflicts. 31 Ibid. 32 Conclusion of EU Task Force created in Autumn 1994 shortly after the ceasefires; in PEACE I: p. 13, own emphasis. 33 The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyon, SEC (96) 332 final, 6 March See also the communication of May 1995 on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries and that of November 1995 on The European Union and the external dimension of human rights policy: from Rome to Maastricht and beyond. 34 European Commission, Democratisation, the rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance: the challenges of the partnership between the European Union and the ACP States. Commission Communication To the Council and Parliament, 12 March 1998, COM(98) Document 9537/1/01 REV 1, 7 June, COM(2001) 211 final, Brussels, /374/PESC, 14 May 2001, J.O.C.E. no. L 132/3, 15 May

15 This logic was consolidated in the European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003 by the European Council. This document not only provided a frame of reference for long-term strategies by also led to concrete follow-up possibilities in specific areas identified by the European Council, not least, the Middle East region. 38 The European Council meeting in June 2004 endorsed the Report of the Presidency, the High Representative and the Commission on the EU s Strategic Partnership with the region of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, establishing a consistent basis for the EU s policies towards conflict areas (like the Middle East) by setting out its guiding principles, norms and objectives. Thus, the different conditions parties to a conflict must comply with to achieve structural stability and economic development are in line with Union policies and norm-guided behaviour. Decision-making on conflict situations by Union institutions has thus led to affirming the EU s norms as a necessary part of strengthening and consolidating cooperation between conflict parties which should be emulated in all activities parties engage in. This strategy was important in highlighting the convergence of the Member States policies, an important step away from the persistent and profound differences between national policies. It may then be argued that, behind the EU policy circles conceptualisations of conflict, lies the enduring belief in EU action-orientations based on norms and principles, thus rendering these fitted for conflict societies to emulate. We can visualise this link between the EU s belief system, images of conflict within EU policy circles and its decision making process on border conflict transformation in the form of figure 1 below: Enlightenment, EU s historical experience, memories e.g., of holocaust, etc EU Belief System Images of conflicts in EU policy circles EU Decision-making Figure 1. Enlightenment ideas, historical experiences/memories, EU s belief system, perceptions/images of conflicts, EU decision making on conflicts While the EU s belief system is rather static, based primarily on norms, images of conflicts in EU policy circles can be dynamic as they are in continual interaction with and reflect new situations on the ground in conflict areas. The impact of new situations on the ground depends upon the degree to which images of conflict in EU circles are open or closed. For example, following the death of Yasser Arafat on November 11, 2004, there was a turning point in the perceptions of EU policy circles 38 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December Available at: 15

16 on the Middle East conflict: Mahmoud Abbas took over as head of the PLO and as the new leader of the Palestinians. 39 Abbas is perceived as a moderate and as a leader who speaks the language more familiar around EU policy circles. Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief, expressed "deep satisfaction" over the ceasefire deal between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas in the Egyptian resort Sharm el Sheik on Tuesday, January 8, In the eyes of EU observers this deal signifies an end to a four-year conflict (violence) between the two sides. The EU s belief in the peaceful resolution of conflicts was reiterated during the processes leading up to its May 2004 enlargement, when the EU s objective of promoting peace and stability in and around its space, and of thus avoiding conflicts, was reinstated. Underlying this image among EU actors are historical memories of the former Soviet Union as a former superpower in international relations: EU-Russia relations are thus often marked by face-to-face encounters where parties bargain with regards to their spheres of influence over continental affairs. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, the EC/EU has sought to secure and deepen its peace project through engagement with Russia more as a means of softening the insecurity that Russia poses on the Eastern periphery. Thus far, this relationship has resulted in a series of experimental cooperative efforts, including some disputes. The image of the Kaliningrad, Karelia and Pskov cases among EU policy circles is built on the belief that as technical issues, these could be resolved together with Russia through cooperative rather than confrontational efforts. While Russia s objective is to retain its dominance and control over the oblasts, the EU s purpose is to establish a lasting peace on the European continent. 40 So, while the Russian logic is based on a control/dominance-confrontation nexus, the EU s is based on peace, stability and cooperation. Based on its belief system, the EU secures its peace project (post-cold War) by expanding eastwards, thus tying East Europeans into a system of concentric circles through the carrot and attractiveness of EU membership. In this manner, the EU also delimits the extent to which Russia can express its own subjectivity and actorness in the space of Europe s North. Through membership, new Eastern European member states become subject to the policy priorities and embedded into the belief system of the EU while Russia is obliged to co-operate with the EU in its own interests. This relation between the EU s belief system, its images of the conflicts in the North and its decision-making processes was clearly expressed by Chris Patten when he stated that: The Baltic Sea area [is] a region where two of our top priorities meet: EU enlargement and EU-Russia co-operation. 41 The logic here is that through the enlargement process, the EU can ensure peace around its periphery and enhance its relations with a crucial partner Russia. This can be interpreted as one path through which the EU attempts to Europeanize Russia. This is a perception shared in Council policy circles, as these quotes show: 39 The Palestinian Central Elections Committee (CEC) announced on Monday January 10, 2005 that PLO chief Mahmoud Abbas won Sunday's presidential elections with percent of the votes. 40 Chirac, Jacques. 41 Patten, Chris, 2001, then EU Commissioner for External Relations, 1. CBSS 10 th Ministerial Meeting, Hamburg, 7 June Available at: 16