PART 2 OF 3 DISCUSSION PAPERS BY THE CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (CCIC)

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1 THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH IN FRAGILE STATES PART 2 OF 3 DISCUSSION PAPERS BY THE CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (CCIC) The call for greater policy coherence across areas of international policy grew louder in the last decade, from both government and non-government sources. CCIC s Point Agenda to End Global Poverty argued that that eradication of poverty required policy coherence across traditional departmental boundaries. Environmentalists echoed the same theme under the umbrella of sustainable development. Concepts such as human security challenged traditional notions of defence; and human rights advocacy expanded to address international economic and financial policies. All of these trends highlighted the need for policy coherence. Policy coherence became the centrepiece of a new International Policy Statement issued by then Prime Minister Paul Martin in April 2005, and all political parties broadly supported the focus on a whole-of-government approach to foreign policy. Policy coherence is, however, a means to achieve an objective, not an end in itself. The 2005 policy statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World was less clear about the objective of policy coherence, lending credence to the argument that coherence might easily become a fig-leaf for the use of all foreign policy tools to serve a particular set of interests or goals be they economic or security. Without clear objectives or public debate in the 2006 election campaign, the integration of aid, diplomacy and security the language of the whole-of-government approach was adopted by the new Conservative government. 1 Development of a detailed whole-of-government policy for fragile states within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the Department of National Defence (DND) has been plagued by delay, lack of clarity, and uncertain budget allocations. It has become clear that a formal whole-ofgovernment policy for fragile states is not a priority for the Conservative government, in spite of the government s focus on intervening in fragile states. Departmental officials have argued that Canadian action in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti would illustrate foreign policy directions. Policy is being developed through the specific cases, rather than a clear, transparent and accountable policy framework providing direction for application in specific circumstances. This paper is based on analysis of the current whole of government strategies for Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti, during the timeframe of April to July 2006, one year after announcement of the new whole-of-government approach. The body of the paper describes some common themes in the cases. Detailed analyses of Canada s approach to each case (as of July 2006) are included in the Appendices. PEACE AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS There is little public evidence of thorough conflict analysis under-girding Canada s strategies in Afghanistan, Sudan, or Haiti. The new Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce (START) in DFAIT plans to add significant capacity for conflict analysis, but there have been delays in implementation, resulting in poor conflict analysis. 1 Speech from the Throne. Canada s New Government: Turning a New Leaf. 39 th Parliament, April 4, (DECEMBER 2006) 1

2 Lack of precision in language is a reflection of superficiality in analysis. Sometimes Afghanistan is designated as a recovering failed state and at other times it is labelled as a weak state in government documents. Many in the Canadian NGO community argue that rather than a weak state, Afghanistan is an active conflict zone. The civil war in the country has never been resolved, and precedes the 2001 war with the United States that led to the Bonn Agreement. While the Bonn agreement did not resolve the internal civil war, serves as the basis for the current strategy). Without addressing that factor, argue many analysts, it will be difficult to achieve success in rebuilding Afghanistan. Program choices are different for countries in conflict than for countries in post-conflict reconstruction. In the case of Haiti, there is a recognition that previous analysis was inadequate and past approaches were not effective. Based on its experience, CIDA is now leading a pilot project to apply the International Principles for Engagement in Fragile States in the context of Haiti. The background report submitted to the OECD-DAC for this project includes some significant lessons learned in the area of aid policy, but it lacks depth in analysis of the root causes of the conflict and it is not clear how the relatively minor adjustments in strategy, made under these principles, will address these causes and produce better results. 2 In the case of Sudan, there is a need for deeper analysis of the driving forces of the conflict, a more thorough understanding of the current government, and greater receptivity to information and analysis from alternative sources. One expression of the lack of depth in analysis is the generality and similarity of the public information documents for each of the three situations (Haiti, Sudan, Afghanistan), in spite of differences in the contexts. These documents are used to justify or explain government decisions and allocation of significant public resources. They lack clarity in some of the basic elements for public accountability: 1. Clear and specific objectives for Canada s engagement; 2. Reasons for engagement grounded in careful analysis; and 3. A strategy that explains how Canada will achieve its objectives. The superficial analysis in government documents contributes to a low level of public understanding of the issues involved and limited public engagement in foreign policy formation. THE MEANING OF A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH The meaning of a whole-of-government approach remains unclear. The term is used to describe a wide variety of arrangements, from co-ordination between different departments to the combination of different functions under one leadership with respect for distinct roles, to fully integrated functions. Policy documents have focused on government departments working together, without clarity on the nature of the new relationships. The Haiti strategy, for example, can be described as coordination between departments, while the Sudan Taskforce combines distinct programs under one decision-making structure, and the Afghanistan strategy claims to be fully integrated. 2 Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian Cooperation with Haiti: Reflecting on a Decade of Difficult Partnership. December, Available at (DECEMBER 2006) 2

3 Complementarity and co-ordination can maximise impact, without the risks of subordinating important dimensions that often results from full integration. Most development and relief organizations, for example, advocate for effective co-ordination between humanitarian actors and security forces. Full integration, however, creates problems because alignment with particular military forces increases risks for the people being served and the humanitarian actors, who rely on their neutrality and respect for humanitarian space for their safety. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS The complex interdependence of development and security has tended to be reduced to a security first logic in Canada s strategies in fragile states. The Afghanistan strategy, for example, treats military security as a pre-condition for development. The result is that military responses receive priority for resource allocation; too little attention is given to the contribution that development approaches could make to address the political, social, religious and economic factors that lead people to take up arms. A discussion paper for a DFAIT workshop describes three distinct phases : stabilisation; institutional renewal and development; and consolidation of political reforms, extension of governmental authority and economic development. It subscribes to the security-first school of thought on state building, which focuses on military security as the priority. 3 In fact, policy in the field of conflict resolution points to a growing awareness that simultaneous attention is needed on three or four major tracks to achieve and consolidate peace; these include inclusive political participation; security; economic development; and social cohesion. In general, current nation-building concepts are dominated by military approaches. This stands in sharp contrast to the findings of the major, international War Torn Societies Project which was a major international applied research project in the 1990 s, supported by Canada and other countries. 4 Based on programming experience and research in Eritrea, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Somalia, the concluding report found that rebuilding war-torn societies is fundamentally a development, not a humanitarian or security challenge. Furthermore, they argue that military security challenges can often be most effectively dispersed by carefully targeted development action. Key to increased stability is reducing distrust and encouraging cooperation among conflicting parties, communities, or neighbouring countries. 5 In the current case of Afghanistan, approaches that reflect the interdependence of security and development would pay earlier attention to alternative economic livelihoods to achieve community security from drug traders and warlords. Some analysts argue, in fact, that addressing the economic livelihood/drug trade question will determine the future success or failure of Afghanistan. They also advocate for allocating a greater portion of the resources to education, economic livelihoods, and building community capacity to protect the rights of women. Greater attention to the human rights dimensions in the Afghanistan strategy has been identified by Afghan women s organizations as essential for lasting peace Sedra, Mark and Naidoo, Nathan. Confronting the Threat of Failed and Fragile States, a discussion paper prepared for a dialogue on Canada s Fragile States Policy, February 15, Steifel, Matthias. Rebuilding after War: a Summary Report of the War-torn Societies Project. Wartorn Societies Project, c. 1998, Steifel, Matthias. Rebuilding after War: a Summary Report of the War-torn Societies Project. Wartorn Societies Project, c. 1998, p (DECEMBER 2006) 3

4 In the case of Sudan, aid was limited to humanitarian assistance and local peace building activities prior to the signing of the North-South peace agreement, although many civil society advocates pushed for development programming in safer areas. Education was as essential as food and water, given the length of the conflict and the need to build capacity for managing affairs after the conflict. The current challenge in governing capacity in the south reflects the many years of relying on external humanitarian aid with no development. In Haiti, the focus on policing without accompanying judicial reform and respect for human rights was found to be ineffective and has now lead to more comprehensive approaches. Much greater attention is needed to the complex linkages between development, human rights, and security in order to find the most effective programming options. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY Strengthening state institutions has become the top priority for donor agency investment in fragile states, as now explicitly stated in the OECD-DAC Principles for International Engagement in Fragile States. 6 This is consistent with a similar trend in general aid policy, as highlighted in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 7 Canada s strategies in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti, all conflict countries, illustrate this trend. A closer look at other analyses done by peace and conflict specialists would suggest, however, that a state-centric approach risks missing key strategic elements for effective outcomes. What is fragile in conflict-affected societies is the covenant or trust relationship between the governed and the governing. Mending this relationship and restoring trust requires a balanced focus on strengthening institutions and civil society organizations. This is the major lesson learned from the War-torn Societies Project. Based on experience in Mozambique, Eritrea, Guatemala, and Somalia, this research concluded that the central, primary challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies has to do with mending relations and with restoring dignity, trust, and faith. Consistent with that analysis, the research recommends that relationship-building and the restoration of dignity and trust must become explicit and overriding policy objectives in rebuilding strategies. 8 In Afghanistan, for example, Canada s strategy in the first phase focused almost exclusively on extending the central government s military control. Components of the national development strategy that focused on reconciliation and local capacity building were delayed and poorly resourced. The people in Afghanistan outside of Kabul have seen limited practical results in their communities from more than $12 billion in aid since This contributes to their growing lack of confidence in the new government and in the methods being employed by foreign forces. Add to this the growing number of civilians killed as a result of military clashes, and it is not surprising that growing numbers of Afghans are disillusioned with the international military presence Article 3 states: Focus on state-building as the central objective. OECD-DAC, Principles for International Engagement in Fragile States. DCD (2005) 8. April 7, Available at Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Statement by High Level Forum of Ministers on Joint Progress toward Aid Effectiveness, February 28 to March 2, Available at War-torn Societies Project, Rebuilding after War: a Summary Report of the War-torn Societies Project, c. 1999, pp 12 and 28. (DECEMBER 2006) 4

5 In the case of Sudan, the major point of debate in Canada has been the role of the current government in Sudan and how Canada should relate to it. After evidence of egregious violations of human rights were documented in Darfur, Canada s policy finally put more emphasis on measures to hold the government accountable for serious violations of human rights. Meanwhile civil society advocates continue to press for a stronger focus on building local capacity in the south, as well as working with the government in the national capital of Khartoum in the north, because the fragile peace agreement is not being implemented in the south and is at risk of unravelling. Haiti presents a particularly interesting example in this regard. Canada has provided assistance to Haiti since From 1996 to 1999 the focus was on strengthening the government; this approach produced poor results because of political factors and Canada withdrew support from the government and shifted to almost exclusive support for NGOs. While the results were better, this approach created parallel systems of service delivery, leading to a situation where 80% of basic services are delivered by non-state agencies and the state remains very weak. In 2004, CIDA analyzed its past engagement in Haiti and adjusted its strategy again to support the interim government. This time the strategy does recognize the need to focus on strengthening relationships between communities and the government. It is too early to evaluate the methods used or the results. Some analysts have identified as a central focus those who can resolve conflicts peacefully and those who cannot, with priority then going to national dialogue processes and the infrastructure for peace and conflict resolution. In the case of Sudan, for example, support for initiatives such as people-to-people peace processes played an important role in creating conditions to end the conflict. Such a focus requires early attention to civil society channels and the interface between government and population groups, which is a broader approach than the current focus on state institution building. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS At the policy level Canada is a strong supporter of multilateral and regional solutions to international issues, including fragile states. The implementation strategies for specific countries, however, vary in their consideration of regional factors. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, many analysts point to regional factors as an essential component for success, but Canada s early strategy paid little attention to that, assuming success was possible by focusing on military control within Afghanistan. This may be an indication that a key driver of the Afghanistan strategy was Canada s alliance with the US rather than a careful analysis of what was likely to work in Afghanistan. Recently more attention is being paid to Pakistan, but there is still not a clear regional strategy. In Sudan, on the other hand, Canada has largely limited its approach to support for regional and international initiatives, rejecting some policy choices along the way because of lack of international support. In Haiti, Canada has a leadership role among donors in support of a coordinated development strategy, participates in the UN mission in Haiti, and works regionally through the Organization of American States. In this case, there is not an international consensus about the political component of strategies for Haiti, and a lack of clarity about Canada s political role during recent tensions fostered criticism from different directions. (DECEMBER 2006) 5