POLS S3608 The Power of Persuasion: Coercion in International Politics

Transcription

1 POLS S3608 The Power of Persuasion: Coercion in International Politics Columbia University Instructor: Dianne R. Pfundstein Office Hours: Wed 2-4 PM, 1338 IAB Summer Session D 2010 May 24 July 2 MTWR 11:00 12:35, 902 IAB Website: Course Description: Despite the decline in interstate war in recent decades, the use of coercive instruments short of war is an increasingly important means of exerting power in the international system. The behavior of states such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran have consumed American foreign policy for the past decade, and they are likely to continue to challenge policy makers in the coming years. Yet both the academic and policy communities disagree about whether instruments such as economic sanctions, aerial bombing, and aid packages are effective tools of statecraft. The goals of this course are to develop a broad understanding of political science theories of coercion, to use these theories to evaluate the historical record of coercion, and to apply the tools of political science to contemporary policy dilemmas. At the outset of this course, we will address the following important questions: what is coercion and how does it work? Why is credibility so important, and how can states achieve it? With these frameworks in mind, we will focus our attention on strategies by which strong states coerce weaker states in the international system, including economic sanctions, aerial bombing and positive incentives, and we will consider the challenges of both multilateral coercion and the coercion of one s allies. We will complement our study of aerial bombing with a visit to the USS Intrepid. Next, we will turn our attention to the question of how weak actors coerce strong states. Strategies such as terrorism, WMD proliferation and issue linkage are not always studied in this context, but constitute important means by which less powerful actors are able to exert leverage over the most powerful states in the system. We will then employ political science theories of coercion to evaluate recent policy challenges, including US and UN strategies toward Libya, Serbia and North Korea. We will also examine the methodological challenges of evaluating claims about the effectiveness of coercive instruments, and consider the ethical implications of interstate coercion. Finally, we will consider new and future instruments of coercion, including smart sanctions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cyber warfare. Although some consider war to be the ultimate form of coercion, in this course we will generally restrict our study to coercive instruments that stop short of the actual use of war. There is an excellent, 4000-level lecture course on the causes and conduct of war and peace (POLS W4895x), taught by Professor Richard Betts. Prerequisites: Completion of the undergraduate, introductory course in international relations (POLS V1601 x or y) or equivalent strongly recommended, but not required. A basic knowledge of current events will also be helpful for our discussions. POLS S3608 1

2 Textbooks and Required Readings: Three books are available for purchase at the Columbia University bookstore (Art and Cronin s The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, Pape s Bombing to Win, and Schelling s Arms and Influence). The purchase of these books is strongly recommended, because we will be reading significant portions of each. These books and all other readings are available through the library reserves in Butler Library. Many of the readings are available in electronic format, and you can access the full list of readings through the library reserves tab in Courseworks. Requirements: This class is a seminar, and thus students are expected to read assigned materials in advance and to attend class prepared to discuss them critically. Each student is permitted two unexcused absences during the semester; more than two unexcused absences will lower the student s participation grade for the course (excused absences are permitted for reasons of documented medical illness, family emergency, or religious observance). Class attendance and participation will constitute 15% of the final grade. Laptops are permitted for note taking only. Multitasking will not be permitted in class: students found to be checking Facebook or sending text messages during class will be asked to leave, at the penalty of one unexcused absence. Each student will write 5 response papers (length: 1 double-spaced page maximum) on the readings for the course, one in weeks 1-4 and the fifth in week 6 (there will be no response papers due during the week of the policy debate). These will be graded on a three-point scale, and the five papers will count for 15% of the final grade. Response papers must be turned in at the beginning of the class for which the readings are assigned, i.e., students are not permitted to write response papers about readings that we have already discussed in class. Late response papers will not be accepted, and it is not possible to write two papers in one week to make up for a missed paper in an earlier week. Students should not use these papers to simply restate the main ideas of the readings, but to raise questions about the readings, challenge underlying assumptions, examine tensions among the authors that we read, etc. There will be an in-class, closed-book midterm on Monday, June 14, in which students will be asked to explore the themes of the first half of the course. The exam will include several short-answer/identification questions and one longer essay. This exam will count for 20% of the final grade. Students will also write a 5-page paper (doublespaced), which will be due at the beginning of class on Wednesday, June 23. This paper will employ the theories studied early in the course to develop a proposal for how the international community should approach Iran s alleged nuclear weapons program, and will serve as the foundation for an in-class policy debate. There will be a handout with more specific guidelines for the paper during the second week of the course. This paper will count for 20% of the final grade. There will also be an open-book, take-home final exam, worth 30% of the final grade. I will hand out the questions for the final exam on Thursday, June 24 and the exam will be due at the beginning of the last class period on Thursday, July 1. Papers and exams will be penalized one third of a letter grade for every day late. POLS S3608 2

3 Academic honesty: Students are not permitted to collaborate with each other or with anyone else on the exams or on the policy paper, although they may consult with the instructor on the policy paper. Students are expected to employ appropriate citation (including page numbers) whenever they incorporate into their own writing direct quotations AND/OR ideas, paraphrases of ideas, etc., from other work. Any standard academic citation style is acceptable. If you have questions about appropriate citation formats, please consult with the instructor. Students found to be cheating on any course component (exams, policy papers, response papers, etc.), will receive a grade of zero for that component, which may result in an overall failing grade for the course. Cheating in this context includes, but is not limited to: inappropriate collaboration on assignments; the use of notes or other aides during the closed-book midterm; and plagiarism in written work. The instructor may also forward cases of suspected and/or confirmed cheating to the dean of the Columbia summer program. If you have any questions about appropriate practices for this course, please contact the instructor. Instructor Dianne Pfundstein: I am readily available by (drp2109@columbia.edu). Please keep in mind the fact that I do not check my after 8 PM, and may not get back to you right away over the weekend. I will hold office hours on Wednesdays from 2-4 PM in 1338 IAB and by appointment. Schedule of Assignments Readings should be completed by the date indicated. Please refer to the questions listed after each subject heading to guide your reading and to prepare for discussion. Part I: Theories of Coercion Monday, May 24: Introduction: Why study coercion? What isn t coercion? 1. Read selections from Melian Dialogue in class Tuesday, May 25: What is Coercion? What are the goals of coercion? Why is it used? How does coercion differ from the direct application of military force? 1. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2d. Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994): Introduction, Ch Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp Wednesday, May 26: Credibility and Threats: Why does credibility matter? Why is credibility so difficult to achieve? How can states maintain their credibility? What is the difference between deterrence and compellence? What is brinkmanship? What is the concept of face, and why is it so important? 1. Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp , POLS S3608 3

4 Thursday, May 27: Strategies of Coercion: How does coercion work? What are the mechanisms by which threats and coercive pressure achieve change in the target state? Why are some strategies more likely to be effective than others? How is Pape s work a critique of Schelling s theories? 1. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter Pape, Bombing to Win, pp Monday, May 31: University Holiday NO CLASS Part II: The Strong Coercing the Weak Tuesday, June 1: Economic Sanctions I: What is an economic sanction? How do sanctions work? Why are they employed? Are sanctions effective in coercing target states? 1. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot and Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3d. Ed. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), Chapter Case study: US sanctions against Japan before WWII Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, pp Wednesday, June 2: Economic Sanctions II: What is the appropriate standard of evidence for determining whether sanctions work? Should states use them? Are they a useful substitute for military force? 1. Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn 1997): Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty? International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998): David A. Baldwin and Robert A. Pape, Evaluating Economic Sanctions, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn 1998): Thursday, June 3: Air Power I: What are the strategies by which aerial bombing may coerce target states? Are these strategies effective? Did bombing work against the North Vietnamese? 1. Pape, Bombing to Win, Chapter Case Study: US Bombing of Vietnam Pape, Bombing to Win, Chapter 6. POLS S3608 4

5 Friday, June 4: Make Up Class for Memorial Day Holiday: Air Power II: Can air power work as an independent means of coercion? Why or why not? In the debate between Pape and Warden, who s right? What evidence would we need to support or refute their claims? 1. Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter, When Does Aerial Bombing Work?: Quantitative Empirical Tests, , Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr. 2001): Robert A. Pape, The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power, Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/98): John A. Warden III, Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape s Bombing to Win, Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter ): Monday, June 7: Multilateralism and Enforcement: What are the unique challenges and benefits of a multilateral approach to coercion? Why is it so difficult for one state to enforce economic sanctions on its own? How can coalition dynamics affect the course and success of coercive campaigns? 1. Robert L. Paarlberg, Food, Oil, and Coercive Resource Power, International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn 1978): Jo Becker and Ron Nixon, US Enriches Companies Defying its Policy on Iran, New York Times, 6 March 2010, middleeast/07sanctions.html?scp=6&sq=&st=nyt. 3. David E. Sanger and Mark Landler, China Pledges to Work With U. S. on Iran Sanctions, New York Times, 12 April 2010, 13/world/13summit.html?scp=1&sq=china%20AND%20iran%20&st=cse 4. Case study: NATO allies and targeting debates in the conflict over Kosovo Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002), Chapter 9. Tuesday, June 8: Persuading Allies: What are the unique challenges and/or advantages of coercing friendly states? Is it easier to coerce an ally or an opponent? During the Suez Crisis, who was coercing whom? 1. T. Y. Wang, U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar. 1999): Scott Wilson, Obama Shifts From a Populist to a Personal Approach, Washington Post, 29 March 2010, 3. Case study: The Western Allies and the Suez Crisis of 1956 William Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), chapters Wednesday, June 9: Carrots vs. Sticks: How do positive incentives differ from negative sanctions? What are the unique challenges and benefits of employing positive sanctions? How can positive incentives be combined with negative sanctions to effect change in target state behavior? 1. David A. Baldwin, The Power of Positive Sanctions, World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Oct. 1971): POLS S3608 5

6 2. Han Dorussen, Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Mar. 2001): Case study: Positive incentives for North Korea in the 1990s William M. Drennan, Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who s Coercing Whom? in Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, Chapter 5. Thursday, June 10: No class rescheduled for Friday s field trip Friday, June 11: Confronting Latent Coercive Power: Field Trip to USS Intrepid Meet at 9 AM at 116 th and Broadway gate. 1. Case Study: The use of U. S. naval power in the Taiwan Strait Confrontation Robert S. Ross, The Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and Use of Force, in Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, Chapter 6. Monday, June 14: In-Class Midterm Exam Part III: The Weak Coercing the Strong Tuesday, June 15: Terrorism: How does terrorism work to coerce? Who uses terrorism and why? Is it an effective coercive strategy? 1. Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Jul. 1981): Richard K. Betts, The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 1 (Spring 2002): Robert A. Pape, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Aug. 2003): Robert A. Pape, Lindsey O Rourke and Jenna McDermit, What Makes Chechen Women So Dangerous? New York Times, 31 March 2010, Wednesday, June 16: Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation: Why do groups or states seek WMD? Can WMD be used to coerce other states? To what extent is proliferation an act of coercion? Are nuclear weapons the ultimate equalizers in international politics? What are some of the challenges that the international community faces in limiting the spread of these weapons? 1. Thomas C. Schelling, Thinking About Nuclear Terrorism, International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982): Murhaf Jouejati, Syrian Motives for Its WMD Programs and What to Do About Them, Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Winter 2005): Case study: Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs Robert S. Litwak, Living with Ambiguity: Nuclear Deals with Iran and North Korea, Survival, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Feb-Mar 2008): POLS S3608 6

7 Thursday, June 17: Issue Linkage, Agenda Setting, and Balancing: How can small states employ issue linkage and agenda setting strategies to coerce more powerful states? What is soft balancing, and is it being employed effectively against the United States? How are smaller states attempting to influence the course of climate change negotiations? Are these strategies (linkage, agenda setting, soft balancing) available to all states, or only to smaller states? 1. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), Chapter T. V. Paul, Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005): James Kanter, Smaller Nations Weigh Power of the Walkout, New York Times, 9 December 2009, Part IV: From Theory to Practice: Evaluating Policies of Coercion *No Response Papers due this week* Monday, June 21: Libya: A Rogue State Comes in from the Cold: Was aerial bombing an effective tool of coercion in the case of Libya? Why or why not? How would we know? How do we separate the relative impacts of different coercive instruments (bombing, sanctions, etc.)? What made Libya decide to abandon its rogue status? How do we evaluate the impact of slow-moving coercive instruments? 1. Tim Zimmermann, Coercive Diplomacy and Libya, in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2d. Ed., Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp Stephen T. Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp Ronald Bruce St John, Libya Is Not Iraq : Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy, Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Summer 2004): Tuesday, June 22: Kosovo A Victory for Airpower?: What was the goal of the NATO operation? What was the proposed strategy for inducing compliance? Why did Milosevic back down when he did? Was aerial bombing the decisive factor? What evidence would we need in order to answer these questions? 1. Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000): Andrew L. Stigler, A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO s Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter ): Wednesday, June 23: Theory in Practice: Policy Debate on Iran 1. Policy papers due at the beginning of class. No additional reading. Thursday, June 24: Debate Continues in Class 1. No additional reading. Final exam distributed at the end of class. POLS S3608 7

8 *Final Response Papers due this week* Monday, June 28: Iraq in the 1990s: Did the bombing campaign succeed in coercing Saddam Hussein? Was the sanctions regime effective? How do we know? Were there any alternative strategies available? 1. Jon B. Alterman, Coercive Diplomacy Against Iraq, in Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, Chapter George A. Lopez and David Cortright, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2004): Tuesday, June 29: Ethics of Coercion: What is the theory behind smart sanctions? Are they likely to work? Who suffers when one state imposes stringent economic sanctions on another? Is it appropriate to think of sanctions as alternatives to the destruction caused by military force? Does the effectiveness of an instrument influence our perception of whether it is ethical? 1. Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, Review: Are Smart Sanctions Feasible? World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Apr. 2002): John Mueller and Karl Mueller, Sanctions of Mass Destruction, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (May-Jun. 1999): Phillip S. Meilinger, A Matter of Precision: Why Air Power May be More Humane Than Sanctions, Foreign Policy, No. 123 (Mar-Apr 2001): Wednesday, June 30: The Future of Coercion: What is the future of coercion? Are there any developments in world politics that might give rise to new types of coercion? What opportunities are available for weak states in the realm of cyber warfare or cyber coercion? How would an increased reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as bombers affect the dynamics of coercion? What are the implications of allowing private contractors to carry out the functions of interstate coercion? 1. James Adams, Virtual Defense, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3 (May-Jun. 2001): John Markoff, David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, In Digital Combat, U. S. Finds No Easy Deterrent, New York Times, 26 January 2010, rld. 3. Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks of the CIA s Covert Drone Program? The New Yorker, 26 October 2009, reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer. 4. James Risen and Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Said to Use Outsiders to Put Bombs on Drones, New York Times, 21 August 2009, 21/us/ 21intel.html?_r=1&ref=global-home. Thursday, July 1: Conclusion and Review: How successful is interstate coercion? 1. Final exams due at the beginning of class POLS S3608 8