CC1: Democracy, rule of law and soft modes of governance in the EU

Transcription

1 CC1: Democracy, rule of law and soft modes of governance in the EU Responsible persons: Susana Borrás, Roskilde University, Denmark Thomas Conzelmann, Darmstadt Technical University, Germany Date and place: 10 th -11 th November, 2006, Roskilde University, Denmark Detailed programme Friday, 10 November :30 Introductory Session Welcome by the Organizers 1. Susana Borrás / Thomas Conzelmann: Democracy and Soft Modes of Governance in the EU: A Research Agenda Discussant: Myrto Tsakatika 10:45 Democracy and Rule of Law: How Strong is Soft Governance in the EU? 2. Poul Kjaer: Three Forms of Governance and Three Forms of Power Discussant: Jonathan Zeitlin 3. Myrto Tsakatika: A Parliamentary Dimension for EU Soft Governance Discussants: Sonja Guttenbrunner / Aron Buzogany 14:00 Deliberation and Credible Information: Input Aspects of Democratic Legitimacy 4. Susana Borrás, Charalampos Koutalakis and Frank Wendler: Independent Agencies and Input-Output Legitimacy in Europe: Stakeholders Participation and Credible Information Discussant: Dawid Friedrich 5. Anna Horvath: Analysing deliberation as a legitimating principle of the OMC: A conceptual framework and analysis Discussant: Thomas Pfister 16:00 Stakeholder Involvement and Implementation: Throughput and Output Aspects 6. Stijn Smismans: The democratic quality of the European social dialogue: Can law get a hard grip on soft procedures? Discussant: Karin Buhmann 7. Sandra Kröger: Little input, little output: The two sides of legitimacy in European social policy coordination Discussant: Anna Horvath Saturday, 11 November :00 A More Inclusive Society? 8. Karin Buhmann: Regulating CSR in Europe: Emergent EU soft law and the role of international human rights law Discussant: Thomas Conzelmann 9. Thomas Pfister: From Activated to Active Citizenship? Reflections on Participation in New Modes of Governance in the European Union Discussants: Sandra Kröger

2 11:00 A New Governance Architecture? 10. Tanja. A. Börzel/Sonja Guttenbrunner/Aron Buzogány: New Modes of Governance in the New Member States: When Soft Modes Meet Hard Constraints Discussants: Susana Borrás / Charalampos Koutalakis / Frank Wendler 11. Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin: Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union Discussant: Stijn Smismans 13:45 Where Do We Go From Here? (summing up and publication plans) List of participants with institutional affiliation and address PAPER-GIVERS (TRAVEL + HOTEL PAID, lunch and dinner also paid) 1. Thomas Conzelmann, Darmstadt university of technology, Germany, conzelmann@pg.tudarmstadt.de 2. Myrto Tsakatika, University of Athens, mtsaka@hotmail.com 3. Charalampos Koutalakis University of Athens, koutalakis@gmail.com 4. Frank Wendler, university of Maastricht, Frank.Wendler@IR.unimaas.nl 5. Anna Horvath, Central European University, Budapest pphhoa01@phd.ceu.hu 6. Stijn Smismans, university of Trento, Italy, smismans@libero.it 7. Sandra Kröger, University of Göttingen, Germany sandra_kroeger@gmx.net 8. Thomas Pfister, Queen s university Belfast, UK t.pfister@qub.ac.uk 9. Sonja Guttenbrunner, Free university of Berlin, sguttenb@zedat.fu-berlin.de 10. Aron Buzogány, buzogany@zedat.fu-berlin.de Free university of Berlin 11. Jonathan Zeitlin, University of Madison-Wisconsin, USA jzeitlin@wisc.edu 12. Poul Kjær, European University Institute, Florence Poul.Kjaer@IUE.it 13. Karin Buhmann, Roskilde University buhmann@ruc.dk (no travel-hotel) 14. Susana Borrás, Roskilde University borras@ruc.dk (no travel-hotel) NON-PAPER GIVERS (have to pay travel and hotel themselves, but were invited to lunch and dinners) 1. Dawid Friedrich: University of Bremen dfriedrich@gsss.uni-bremen.de 2. Emilia Korkea-aho, university of Helsinki emilia.korkea-aho@helsinki.fi 3. Ian Manners, Danish institute of internacional studies, Denmark Ima@diis.dk 4. Claire O Brien, European University Institute, Florence Claire.OBrien@EUI.eu 5. Sevasti Chatzopoulou seva@ruc.dk Roskilde University, Denmark 6. Lars Josephson, Roskilde University, Denmark lars.josephsen@mail.dk STUDENT assistants Cecilie Glerup Kasper Søndergaard Short description of the activity's goals and objectives The workshop held in Roskilde as well as its predecessor held at the University of Darmstadt (in November 2005) focuses on the topic of soft modes of governance as one important facet in the current debate on modes of European governing. The issue of soft modes of governance and democracy is a very timely one. While soft modes of governance represent a set of renewed dynamics in the policy, politics and polity of the EU system, their democratic quality remains a

3 disputed matter both among scholars and among practitioners (policymakers and stakeholders). On the one hand, the new modes might be problematic since they bypass parliamentarian procedures and lack in transparency and accountability. On the other hand, the participatory nature of many soft governance arrangement can be an important source of democratic renewal since they might constitute alternative sources of legitimacy for the EU system. Against that background, the Roskilde seminar will explore the democratic quality of soft modes of governance in Europe by scrutinizing the institutional design and practical functioning of different soft governance arrangements in Europe and also by discussing the extent to which soft modes of governance interfere with the principle of democratic self-rule. On the basis of an open call for papers, a number of hiqh-quality speakers were selected (see attached programme). The best papers from the Roskilde workshop will be invited to become part of the envisaged journal special issue on the topic of Soft Modes of Governance and Democracy at the European Level (see question 11). Short summary of the presentations and discussions, achievements Susana Borrás and Thomas Conzelmann s paper: Democracy and Soft Modes of Governance in the EU: A Research Agenda Thomas Conzelmann presents the paper, which has three main points. One is the issue that soft modes of governance SMG are in need of democratic legitimization, basically because they entail an authoritative allocation of values and norms that need to be socially anchored. The second point is that SMGs are so diversified that they are likely to have a differentiated levels of need for legitimisation. We suggest in the paper to make a distinction about two dimensions: the institutional logic (complementary or alternative to hard law) and the dominant role of public or private actors. The third main point is that the issue about the input legitimacy and democracy of SMGs is related to different understandings and normative theories of democracy. In doing this he shows table 2 of the paper, which contains four main yardsticks for assessing whether SMGs have the elements that are necessary for becoming democratic and input-legitimate. In parliamentary control the main issue is the control of the executive, societal input means the issue of responsiveness of SMGs to societal interests and demands along with well-articulated and encompassing public debate. Transparency is here an issue of publicity of decisions and the possibilities of monitoring and public scrutiny. Last but not least deliberative quality refers to the elements in place for Two main points for discussion: 1. The issue whether the 4 yardsticks are complementary or are mutually excluding each other. We go to the idea that they are complementary, i.e. transparency is of little use without parliamentarian control 2. Inductive or deductive. In the paper we are deductive, meaning we are starting from the normative theoretical points and creating an analytical framework. This is different from to what Moravcsik calls for an inductive way of dealing with democracy: EU democracy is no less democratic than the democracy of its member states. Discussant Myrto Tsakatika: The paper has some advantages and is good because: - Timely: Justify the need for input legitimacy - Provide a link with the debate about the democratic deficit in the EU - An attempt to differentiate SMGs.

4 Three comments: - SMGs interfere with authoritative allocation of values: need to strengthen this point by developing further the idea that SMGs advance particular interests of those involved in the process: categories of winners and loosers experts/ non-experts, but need to look at other types of winners and loosers, i.e. different member states, i.e. OMC get their ideas which become mainstream. Need to look at the literature of ideational change: how ideas got entrenched, changed. Winners and loosers in processes of ideational change. - The need for legitimacy: the closer to hard law the less need for legitimacy. She is not sure we can make this distinction: we cannot assume that methods based on hard law, i.e. The community method or variations of this is publically legitimate why are we discussing the democratic deficit in the EU? [Perhaps it is mostly an issue of ADDITIONAL legitimacy or the creation of mechanisms ensuring input legitimacy] - The 4 yardsticks: complementary?? depends on the theories you are basing the instruments. Mutually supporting, mutually dependent, are some more important than others? i.e. is parliamentary approval more important than monitoring, reporting and verification? Need to have a hierarchy in this criteria, and discriminate. General discussion: Zeitlin picks up on the second, less constructive point: the degree: not assuming that legal instruments have input legitimacy. We need to examine the extent to which mechanisms of hard law meet the theoretical and normative criteria. Relevance to Moravcsik: we want to be more radical, and not to develop an assessment on the basis of unrealistic theoretical expectations. Steen Smismans and Wendler pick up some points of Jonathan. What about public action: democracy does not apply at private markets? What about the issue of legality, any assumption that it is automatically legitimate? Reply by Susana: No, we did not assume that legality legislative procedures of hard law - is automaticlally generating input legitimacy. Reply by Thomas discusses the issue of the 4 yardsticks. Poul Kjær paper: Three forms of governance and three forms of power [He does not use ppt in his presentation, just an oral presentation] His paper is based on thee notions of power: - Liberal concept of power = regulatory agencies - Communicative power = commitology - Radical concept of power = OMC His presentation will focus on the third aspect, because it is a SMG. Foucault: power is processed and is diffused. Freedom and power go hand in hand: power is conduct of conduct: ability to define the possible field of order, the number of possible options and choices. This poststructuralist understanding of power is related to DDP: Democratic Deliverative Poliarchy normative theory: shifting the focus away from institutions to problem-solving. Just as Foucault, DDP theories does not claim that power stands in opposition to freedom, and other elements. He establishes the link between Foucault poststructuralist understanding of power and DDP: but DDP proponents put the notion of power upside down: power is positive, an ability enhancing tool. OMC based on ideal models highly inspired on the Scandinavian models. But there is a considerably distance between OMC mechanism and the DDP ideal. Discussant: Jonathan Zeitlin:

5 Suggestion to cut off the OMC part and develop it further. There are important elements to be explored there. More specific idea: You are OK in establishing a link between DDP and Foucault ideas of power (external, diffused, not contrary to freedom, etc). But he would challenge the paper s interpretation of what is going on: the model you are presenting of a consensus of the EMCO etc outputs, is not the case. General discussion: Stijn Smismans: the structure of the paper can be improved. Anna Hóvarth: the Foucault concept of power is too broad and unclear. Different institutions generate different forms of power is not well argued. Ian Manners comments on the notion of power Discussion: Poul is aware that there are several papers in his paper. His comments about the diagnosis f the OMC he holds on to that. We need an integrated model. 11:30 Myrto Tsakatika: A Parliamentary Dimension for EU Soft Governance Presentation: Her paper is a first draft trying to come to grips between the EP-democratic deficit issues and the OMC, putting both aspects together. Main two points of the paper: - Is there a democratic legitimacy problem of the OMC? - The answer is yes = allocation of values + horizontal accountability through transparency cannot be substituted, only complemented by - The second question is whether OMC shall be anchored at national and European parliament, the answer is both. She presents the paper using power point file. Deliberative theories of democracy miss the issue of public conflict, which are very present at parliamentary processes. Discussants: Sonja Guttenbrunner and Aron Buzogany General remarks about that the paper is a draft version, needs to take into consideration literature on the matter, particularly about the de-parlamentaization of EU politics as expressed by SMG, through policy learning benchmarking etc. Perhaps the major point of the paper is the link between EP and national parliaments, which then will need more treatement. But EP and National parliaments have different backgrounds, capacities when dealing with EU matters. Besides, national parliaments are very differently approaching and taking up these matters. General discussion: Thomas Conzelmann: Your interpretation of OMC (using benchmarks, etc) seems to be different to other OMC interpretations. Do we need to separate make distinction between different types of OMC? Sandra Kröger: You need to introduce a dialogue between theory and practice: your paper has strong claims, but need demonstration and examples. Jonathan Zeitlin: interesting paper problem of idealization of the work of parliaments and the real practice of the real existing parliamentary work. So the issue would be whether they do the job properly. Is it theoretically plausible to expect that EP and nat. parliaments can at all play that role in contemporary

6 governance based on recusivity? Frank Wendler: Different views of OMC need for legitimacy needs to be strengthened in the paper: your argument non-binding + authoritative allocation of values. Need to make more clear what OMCs: more health care, EES BEPG, Comparisons Borrás-Charalampos-Wendler: Independent Agencies and Input-Output Legitimacy in Europe: Stakeholders Participation and Credible Knowledge Presentation: Power point presentation by Frank and Charalampos. The initial motivation of the paper is that the classical assumptions related to regulatory independent agencies are based on effectiveness and output legitimacy because their neutrality to make decisions that are welfare efficient. We propose the argument of credible knowledge as the linking element between input and output phase of the policy making process. The input side is very important. WE are dissatisfied with the explanatory potential of the principal-agent framework: they explain why agencies emerge, but does not give us instruments to understand how do these agencies work on a day-to-day basis. Social contestation of their decisions, and the authoritative role of scientific opinions, particularly on areas where these scientific opinions are different and not homogeneous. No consensual idea about how to regulate a certain process or product. Within this conflictual environments, how do agencies operate in policy environments that are conflictual? How do they deal with the networks of the policy environment. Are these networks able to generate credible knowledge? Table comparing the three agencies: the features, the challenges and the regulatory networks. Discussant: Dawid Friedrich He starts by stating the importance of the question regarding the legitimacy of these agencies. The paper focuses on the day-to-day operation of the agencies. The idea is that the scientific knowledge has lost its legitimacy authority, and hence it needs to be based on more socially-robust scientific knowledge. 4 main points: 1. the role of credible knowledge: the paper needs to be more explicit about scientific knowledge, this is a matter of degree: scientific knowledge has always been contested and contingent. Credible knowledge might increase contingency and complexity, not less. Fundamental democratic principle. How credible knowledge will solve this problem: who or how sets the limits of what this 2. Democracy we do not base the issue of democratic input not as a normative statement. more input for compensating for lack of scientific knowledge. More input does not mean more democracy. 3. More clear references and use of democratic theory is needed in this paper. Output can be socially legitimate without being democratically legitimate. Policy results that are democratic, but how they were reached. 4. input-output: the separation of both dimensions. Who or how: if scientists cannot make this decision, then shall it be stakeholders, and what is input or output. 5. Democratization of the agencies: the constitutional act, and who is financing the agencies. Bring the agencies into the democratic control. The paper needs to be normatively more modest and empirically more ambitious.

7 General discussion: Jonathan Zeitlin: Two comments: Unclear notion of credible knowledge: Knowledge that is credible? Or a process that is credible? the paper is more procedural (second point) rather than on the first. Shall you separate so strongly the creation and the operational phase of agencies? Stjin Smismans: Credible knowledge: how are you going to measure it? Is your assessment of what is credible or not? Example of Bilbao agency about safety labour: Output legitimacy of the agency is very weak, because the stakeholders do not take into consideration. Stakeholders are more satisfied with the Dublin foundation, because it has a research function the creation of knowledge, so stakeholders are more interested on that. This means that it is the quality of the knowledge that makes it credible - not only who participates. Thomas Conzelmann: Networks are processes of consultation the link with the policy environment. More cautious when looking at those networks about who are the actors in these networks Myrto Tsakatika: Interest capture is an important element here! who is included / excluded, and also by the results. 15:00 Anna Hórvath: Analysing deliberation as a legitimating principle of the OMC: A conceptual framework and analysis. She does a power point presentation, which is in the folder. Discussant: Thomas Pfister. The paper has a double conceptual approach about deliberation : normative dimension and analytical dimension. The paper avoids a normative evaluation of deliberation but it is implicit all through the paper. He elaborates on this point in different parts of the paper. This double dimension is almost unsustainable because of the proliferation of the meanings of deliberation means that there is no operationalisation of the notion, and this has important methodological consequences, mainly lack of methodological consistency. The distinction of deliberation as an institutional feature and as a structural-systemic feature is also suffering from the same problem described above. Sometimes the paper is not clear as to what of these two levels-dimensions it refers to. Perhaps you could deconstruct what the actors mean-think about deliberation as such, particularly since your empirical analysis is dedicated to the micro-world of the committee SPC social protection committee. General discussion: Sandra Kröger: you need to focus more on the institutional dimension and see whether deliberation can or cannot take place. The identity of actors linkage to deliberation is not an obvious link. SPC is at the lower side of the hierarchy this means that there is a functional requirement for consensus. Jonathan Zeitlin: There is an imbalance between the analytical aspect and empirical aspect of the paper that needs to be redressed by strengthening the later. An ambiguity in the paper about treating the normative dimension: either as an ideal that the committee has to engage in deliberation, or as a starting points. Poul Kjær: The interviews: who were the respondents?how did they responded to your questions about deliberation? Same understanding? 16:00 Stijn Smismans: The European Social Dialogue between Constitutional and Labour Law: Can Law get a hard grip on soft procedures? [He does not have power point presentation] The social dialogue is implemented from two sides: the transposition of collective agreements in Council decisions or voluntarity by the stakeholders themselves. The democratic control is though

8 social partners not parliament. Different checks by the Commission and Council which aremore political than what happens at national level. The limits of the constitutional perspective is that this perspective has difficulties accepting the autonomy of the social partners, because these arre private contracts, they have a major public effects. Indirect element of democratic participation: collective agreements have a social function and hence would not need to respect competition rules the superiority of those norms? Discussant: Karin Buhmann The issue of rule of law needs to be strengthened and further developed in the paper. There is an assumption that legitimacy and input is sufficient to guarantee the quality of output. She distinguished between: Rule by law when rules are implemented following in the legality. (= legality), and Rule of law when rules are democratically the guarantees based on human rights (= legitimacy and fundamental values). What can be learnt from the different views of constitutional lawyers and labour lawyers in relation to the European collective agreements? Do consultation processes remedy legitimacy gaps, if there are any? Do deliberative and consultation processes are complementary or not, and where? Follow the tradition of labour law, which predates the creation of the EU: Can be seen as historical reality that cannot be changed. You need to examine more closely the criteria for becoming a partner in the processes: and the way in which the EU institutions do apply it in reality. General discussion: Susana Borrás: Your paper needs a clearer research question: how soft procedures can be accountable with or without law?? Or the issue of enforcement: is direct effect necessary to guarantee enforcement / widespread implementation of collective agreements?? The title of the paper, and introduction, about law getting a hard grip is ambiguous. Argumentation is based on constitutional legal scholars vs. labour law scholars. We need your own view! The issue of legitimacy comes indirectly through the EUAPME case Court decision: do you agree with the FCI ruling? Stijn: My objective with the paper is to address the issue of how do we deal with the public-private forms of norm setting? 16: 50 Sandra Kröger: Little input, little output: The two sides of legitimacy in European social policy coordination. She has a power point presentation. Her presentation focuses on the sections of the paper The empirical findings: focus on France and Germany, and secondary data for NL, Italy and UK. Discussant: Anna Horvath The link you make between input and output legitimacy seems to be tautological. (Other comments that I missed because I had to go out of the room for organisational matters) General discussion: Poul Kjær: More delegation to the Commision to solve legitimacy problems, how? Jonathan Zeitling:It is an interesting paper. The legal toolbox of delegation, precision that the paper needs to develop further.the real problem of the paper is the empirical part: the quotations and citations are used to illustrate, not to bear the weight of the argument. Problematic reading now. Sources and national cases: selectivity between national cases, and selectivity within the cases and the interviewees. Why don t you use the EAPN (powerful at EU level), or the midterm evaluation reports too? Why are social NGOs so supportive for the process? Whereas

9 national level this is not the case? Conclude with the question: you describe the problem at national level as resistance to europeanisation, so, if this is the problem why would more delegation to the EU level increase input legitimacy? Your argument seems to be problematic here. Dawid Friederich: why do you need the input legitimacy? You could focus only on the output legitimacy,? Sonja: The link between EU and national level. Susana Borrás: The criteria for input and output legitimacy is very superficially presented, needs more substantial development, specially for indicating their theoretical anchorage and in terms of indicating clear guiding discrimination of when is taking place or not. Your reading of Scharpf of interdependency of input and output legitimacy is it correct? Data: how and what data is been used? The comparability of primary data and secondary data- the same questions and approach? Saturday 11 th November Problems with the train, we start 1 hour later than planned Karin Buhmann: Regulating CSR in Europe: Emergent soft law and the role of international human rights [She makes a rich power point presentation] The EU commission has engineered the CSR framework and human rights framework. Rule of law what is it? And its importance. The nature of soft law: in general sense, and in the specific area of CSR. Legitimacy and societal influence important to link it to legality but also based on Human rights connexion. Discussant: Thomas Conzelmann The paper looks at many aspects that need to be integrated. Two main points: human rights and soft law: but it is not enough to discuss the ontological dimension whether it is soft law or not, the paper needs to look at the effects: expectations, setting up standards of behaviour, etc. Looking at the the notions of human rights in international law. CSR functional issue: more interesting to look at why the EU has entered the field of CSR there is a code fatigue at global international level, why should the EU be entering? To give a European twist to the contents. General discussion: Poul Kjær: The influence of EU to global? Or just global to EU?Frank Wendler: If CSR is explained by constrains so firms comply in order to avoid that there is no hard law. Reflexive nature of law and soft law: norms evolution. Constrains-driven or something different? Claire O Brian: I find soft law more useful because it is more persuasive than the compulsory nature of law. The risks that you mention are not distinctive to soft law, they also apply to hard law. 10:40 Thomas Pfister: From Activated to Active Citizenship? Reflections on Participation in New Modes of Governance in the European Union. No power point presentation. He mentions that this paper is part of a larger project. The paper focuses on the OMC. The contents of the EES have become empty shell with time. Does not examine the consequences or causes of this, but looks into the possibilities whether more participation can remedy this situation. To do that the paper delves into different theoretical perspectives regarding participation, like

10 Young, Philips, Bades, but they are too rigid for different reasons. Therefore he looks at James Tully work, who presents a much wider framework about participation and philosophy related to that: three general trends that collide with the principle of democracy. Against these trends, there are three possible responses: and I concentrate on the first and third: acceptance of EES-OMC about the need to adapt and reform our societies due to globalisation but this compromises the principle of democracy. Social science cannot prescribe procedures for deliberation without engaging actively. Three examples of these practices of participatory practices of EES. The contestation of EU guidelines shall be done on the basis of these practices. Discussant: Sandra Kröger The introduction is not linked to the rest of the paper. You are taking too many issues in the paper that are not at the centre of the paper need to focus more. Sometimes the paper has some strong claims / comments/ remarks that deserve more argument- explanation. Points about participation: the link between theoretical discussion- the examples and the EU-level of governance. It is unclear what you mean by participatory practices, it lacks a definition! General discussion: Jonathan Zeitlin: This paper is problematic because lack of empirical content. And lack of knowledge of what is really going on in the EU regarding gender equality. The theoretical side is too abstract to be linked to the real processes. Myrto Tsakatika: we shall be careful with notions of participation because the main aspects of democracy are representative. Susana Borrás: The examples are not empirical findings, but just examples presented in an indirect way. Unclear role: normal examples or exceptional examples. But most problematic of all is what is the role of these examples in the overall argument of the paper in the sense of being extremely micro-level Tanja Börzel, Aron Buzogany and Sonja Guttenbrunner: New Modes of Governance in the New Member States: When Soft Modes meet Hard Constraints Sonja Guttenbrunner makes a power point presentation The paper brings some results of a large research project financed by Newgov, which involves partners in southern Europe and central eastern Europe. The main objective of the paper is to examine the role of SMG in relation to implementation of EU law in new member states. The empirical part examines 4 directives, 2 of which are shaped in a way that they are probably going to enhance use of soft modes; and 2 of which are command-control classical forms not enhancing that. They examine these expectations in three different countries, namely, Poland, Hungary and Romania. Are the preconditions for input legitimacy to the processes in EU? Discussant: Frank Wendler: The empirical findings are still relatively general between directives not so much between countries. Therefore, use more the theoretical basis of NMG and to be more specific results of comparative nature. Use your own typology: the findings are not clear about what tipe of NMG your conclusions refer to, following your own typology. Make more use of the empirical material. Are you putting assumptions to the wrong context? The pressure of EU to new member states in the process of enlargement not applicable in the context of enlargement process.

11 General discussion: Susana Borrás: The main question seems to be whether the directives are so that they are hindering or enhancing new forms of governance?smg are they the product of a political process or are they a specific instrument of governance? This is important because your notion of SMG seems very close to be governance networks. Jonathan Zeitlin: The findings are not convincing because the theoretical framework is problematic, and because the research design. NMG is not just in a relation to law: twining and policy learning are processes that are not linked to the shadow of hierarchy. Poul Kjær: There is a normative assumptions all through the paper: that participation is good that command-control is bad: you will need to specify this. Central- European countries have difficulties in technical-complex areas like these. Involving private partners becomes a matter to get extra economic resources, and not much a matter to get participatory legitimacy. This means that this second issue is additional and perhaps secondary this is somehow inconsistent with the initial assumptions. 12:15 Jonathan Zeitlin: Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union He makes a presentation in a power point: The EU is creating a single market and at the same time create a political framework. The regulatory successes of the EU is resting in a new architecture of decision-making based on a recursive processes and deliberation. There are 4 elements of the new architecture: 1. Framework goals and matrices for assessing progress 2. The lower-level units 3. more autonomy of lower units in exchange for report and participation 4. The framework goals are periodically revised. EU governance: Directly Deliberative Poliarchy. DDP is a machine for learning from diversity This architecture is a sense of experimentalist and pragmatic governance. Multiple routes, 3 illustrative examples, not exhaustive (2 more examples: cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs area): Federated regulation (other people calls regulatory networks): for a and councils of regulators in telecoms and energy. Networked administrative agencies: drug authorisation, environmental. Open methods of coordination in employment, social protection, etc. A second claim of the paper: There is an extension of the new architecture because: - responses to catastrophe (i.e. food safety) - prudential regulation in advance of failure - revision of existing centralised regulation - from rules to rights: anti-discrimation fundamental DDP is networked and experimentalist, but not democratic per se. The dynamic accountability + penalty defaults has a potential for democratisation What would be required to become so?? Participation as procedural requirements. The EU is increasingly becoming increasingly transparent and participatory Discussant: Stjin Smismans The paper normative background and empirical findings are not clarely distinguished from each other. How is peer review as a democratisation links to the issue of citizens. How many examples of penalty default can we give?

12 General discussions: Susana Borrás: Is the new architecture superseding / complementing /radically changing the traditional architecture of the Community method? New architecture not soft governance need to be clearer about the position of law in the new architecture. Penalty defaults and shadow of hierarchy look too close to each other the argument of lack of capacity of hierarchical solutions is more convincing: opposite. Myrto Tsakatika:Is your paper based on the assumption of accepting technocratic rule? Where are the citizens in all this? Thomas Conzelmann: Is it possible to resort to rule-binding regulation to solve complex problems of complex society? 9) Name of PhD students participating and description of their involvement Anna Horvath, Central European University, Budapest pphhoa01@phd.ceu.hu Wrote and presented a paper, acted as discussant, and participated actively in the discussions. Sonja Guttenbrunner, Free university of Berlin, sguttenb@zedat.fu-berlin.de Wrote and presented a paper, acted as discussant, and participated actively in the discussions. Aron Buzogány, buzogany@zedat.fu-berlin.de Free university of Berlin Wrote and presented a paper, acted as discussant, and participated actively in the discussions. Poul Kjær, European University Institute, Florence Poul.Kjaer@IUE.it Wrote and presented a paper, acted as discussant, and participated actively in the discussions. Claire O Brien, European University Institute, Florence Claire.OBrien@EUI.eu Attended the seminar and participated in some of the discussions. Sevasti Chatzopoulou seva@ruc.dk Roskilde University, Denmark Attended the seminar and participated in some of the discussions. 10) Name of users (if any) participating and description of their involvement No users participated in the seminar. 11) Planned outcome (publication, further meeting, etc.) The organisers (above) intend to edit a special issue in a major international peer-reviewed academic journal, or alternatively an edited book, most probably in ) What communication with the broad public, what press coverage There was no communication with the broad public, or press coverage. Once the publication is available, we will send a press release to some major newspapers in Denmark and Germany, and EU-oriented mass media.