INQUIRY ON PAN-ISLAMIST FEATURE OF THE RECENT TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY WITH CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

Transcription

1 June, 2015 INQUIRY ON PAN-ISLAMIST FEATURE OF THE RECENT TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY WITH CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE OSMAN GÜLTEKİN Bahçeşehir University, İstanbul ABSTRACT There are criticisms about recent Turkish foreign policy that Turkey has been moving from an activist zero problem approach to a precious loneliness. This article aims to find the most relevant foreign policy or international relations theory to analyze the paradigm of recent Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East region specifically during the Justice and Development Party (herein it will be used as AKP). A constructivist ummah identity approach serving for realist purposes is found to be the most accurate explaining theory for the transformation of the Turkish foreign policy. It will be examined if AKP followed a continuation of the 1990s liberal activist foreign policies in its first two terms, however a new constructed ummah image in a pan-islamist contextual framework in foreign relations has been in effect after It will be argued that how this constructivist approach is aligned with the strategic depth doctrine of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is assumed to be the main character in directing the Turkish foreign policy in the AKP governments. It will be inquired how the new agent-structure relation takes place, how new constructed ummah identity, its interests and norms are related to and came into the surface during the Arab uprisings. After Arab Spring, the new constructed positioning and its elements are shifted to realize more pragmatist realist purposes in the region. Key words: Turkish foreign policy, ummah, pan-islamism, constructivism, Ahmet Davutoğlu, AKP, Justice and Development Party

2 Introduction and Historical Background on Turkish Foreign Policy Although Turkey declared a bold policy of zero problem open publicly years ago, Turkey faced challenges in maintaining its close relationships with some previously allied countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region recently. Especially after Arab Spring movements, Turkey seemed to have diplomatic conflicts with a number of countries that some ambassadors were called back to Turkey and some bilateral cooperation agreements were cancelled. Turkey used to benefit from the use of cultural and religious proximity with the countries in the region to increase trade and influence but with Turkey bordering this region, however, its geographic proximity pulls Turkey to deal with number of unstable regional developments such as civil war in Syria and the emergence of ISIS as a violent terrorist group. Between the years of 1923 and 1991, Turkey never took an active role in Middle Eastern politics and always followed a low profile and neutral policies. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk argued for a realistic-rational foreign policy and denounced both pan- Islamism (unity of all Muslims) and pan-turkism (unity of all Turkic origin peoples) as inappropriate goals. 1 During the World War II, Turkey pursued an active neutrality policy by being in close communication with the both warring sides. A small power s diplomacy of a realist balance of power strategy could hope to achieve no greater success. 2 After the war, the security conditions reinforced Turkey to make alliance with the USA and become a member of NATO. 3 Also, Turkey was bound to seek a place in Western alliances with insufficient economic, technical and military sources to protect itself. 4 Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in the early postwar years made clear to the Turks that the US support would be beneficial and their foreign policy had been determined by the relations with that country in the Cold War. 5 With the help of the USA, Turkey gained membership to the North Atlantic Treaty 1 Andrew Mango, Reflections on the Atatürkist Origin of Turkish Foreign Policy and Domestic Linkages in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 2 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An active neutrality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 3 Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 4 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy , (London: Frank Cass, 2000) 5 Bruce Kuniholm, Turkey and the West Since World War II in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), Turkey Between the East and West (Boulder, CO; Westview, 1996)

3 Organization (NATO) in 1952 and in 1963 established an association agreement with the then-european Economic Community (EEC). 6 In the Middle East, Turkey was neutral to any conflicts in the region and never took sides in Cold War years. As a NATO member, Turkey deliberately didn't develop its relations with the Arab world due to significant Soviet influence in the Middle East. Arab countries had only approached Turkey in the Cyprus crisis when they thought Turkey couldn t get along well with the Western powers. 7 After the disintegration of the USSR, the transformation of the political and strategic landscape in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the new conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus changed Turkey s foreign policy environment. 8 After the Cold War, with the emergence of eight newly independent states, there was a new structure in Central Asia and Caucasus. With its strong, historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic bonds with new independent states, Turkey wanted to employ some pan- Turkist ideas over the new Turkic states as a reflexive action. Turkey s unfulfilling promises, newly independent countries trying to build their own nation and selfidentity caused resentment in the Central Asia and also a disappointment in the Turkish side. 9 Ultimately, it helped Turkey to realize that they needed to develop a realistic and pragmatic policy for this region and focus more on economic cooperation such as the transportation of Caspian energy project. In the post-cold War period, the instability in Balkans, Russia s uncertain future direction, Iranian fundamentalism, Iraqi aggression and durability of Middle East peace process reinforced the interest of US policy makers in Turkey again. In those matters, for the USA, Turkey was one of the few countries in the world that was not a major player, but had strategic importance. 10 In the 1990s, Turkey and the USA had convergent approaches in the cooperation in the Middle East; with USA s help Turkey and Israel made an agreement for cooperation and that they acted together on 6 Paul Kubicek, Turkey s Inclusion in the Atlantic Community: Looking Back, Looking Forward. Turkish Studies (March 2008) 7 Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi, (İstanbul:Alkım Yayınevi, Onsekizinci Baskı, 2012) 8 Sabri Sayarı, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi- Regionalism, Journal of International Affairs (Fall 2000) 9 Mustafa Aydın, Foucault s Pendelum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkish Studies, (Summer 2004) 10 Morton Abramovitz, The complexities of American Policymaking on Turkey in Abramovitz (ed.) Turkey s Trabsformation and American Policy (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000)

4 the conflicts in Balkans, Bosnia and Kosovo. However, they had divergent approaches on the issues of Iraq s territorial integrity and Cyprus issues. 11 The regional security problems, the decline of American power in a multipolar world, and the transformation of Turkish domestic policies and new foreign policy were important factors in the relationship between Turkey and the USA. 12 During the 1990s, Turkish governments realized the importance of the economy. In foreign policy, this meant that the Turkish governments had to try to prevent political conflicts with important trading partners and avoid isolationist policies, which could have cut them off from international financial markets or potential investors. It was believed that, increasing regional economic links and dependencies would help secure greater regional political stability. 13 Powered by a growing private business sector, the Turkish economy experienced a dynamic growth during Turgut Özal s tenure. Turkey s volume of trade increased due to increased imports and exports. The percentage of the trade volume in GNP jumped from 15.6% in 1980 to 36.6% in Turkey s GNP growth rate saw 8% in 1995, 7.1% in 1996, 8.3% in 1997 and 3.8% in Kemal Kirişçi claims the trading state approach has been very influential in Turkish foreign policy and it has increasingly been shaped by economic considerations. Turkish financial markets became sensitive to foreign policy issues, ranging from relations with the EU to expanding relations with Northern Iraq. Similarly, he argues that, the Turkish government s efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria and to initiate a rapprochement with Armenia are driven as much by economic considerations as by other reasons. 15 Turkey adopted its trading state approach mostly in the period after the collapse of the USSR in AKP continued and prioritized this approach in the foreign policy of their first and second term. It was very useful to implement this readily approach, as AKP was a newly established party. 11 Sabri Sayarı, Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.) Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future (London: Routledge, 2004) 12 Sabri Sayarı, New Directions in Turkey-Us Relations, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, (June 2013) 13 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy , (London: Frank Cass, 2000) 14 William Hale, Economic Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 15 Kemal Kirişçi, The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New Perspectives in Turkey, (Spring 2009)

5 Turkey s energy needs, particularly the need for natural gas and increased electricity use became an issue that could have consequences in the direction of foreign policy in 1990s. Between , Turkey s total energy demand rose by an average of almost 10% a year. 16 For natural gas, demand was rising fast. Big cities were connected to national distribution of natural gas and Turkey started to depend heavily on Russia and Iran for natural gas. Turkey s energy dependence has been a matter for national security, which makes the Turkish economy vulnerable to regional developments and creates unbalanced trade situations. 17 Turkey s increased cooperation with Russia and Iran is based primarily on Turkey s dependence on the energy. It is argued that the trading state approach lasted until the second half of the 2000s as the economic considerations are the most constant dominant element. However, when Turkey s disappointment was observed in EU accession talks, the increase in Turkey s involvement with the Eastern countries coincided a change or emerging multi-dimensional feature of the foreign policy after It will be examined whether Turkey has moved away from its pragmatist liberal trading state and mediator policy to a norm maker and a new constructed identity one in the Middle East region after mid-2000s. It will be discussed whether a constructed image of an Islamic religion-ideological ummah or pan-islamist image is in effect over the region due to Turkey s historical, geo-cultural and geo-strategical affinity. As the reasons for the increased tension with the countries Syria, Egypt, Libya and Israel will be analyzed in their exclusiveness of each cases with those countries, in the meantime, it will be tried to find the most defining common characteristics of the new Turkish foreign policy paradigm with the help of international relation theories and Ahmet Davutoğlu s ideas in his strategic depth doctrine. It will be answered how the constructed identity approach employed for realist purposes before the Arab Spring. It will be claimed, after Arab Spring, Turkey adopted a pragmatist realist perspective with the mixed sentiments of fear motivations and opportunity seeking behavior. 16 William Hale, Economic Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 17 Kemal Kirişçi Turkey and the Muslim Middle East in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000)

6 After observing the Arab Spring, some Turkish foreign policy makers would like to take the opportunity to exert influence in the region and help designing the domestic politics of the countries similar to Turkish model, however, at the same time some Turkish policy makers observed the potential negative spillover effect of the uprisings in Turkey in the short aftermath of the Arab Spring. Turkey s fear about this issue was most prevalent during the Gezi Movement in Istanbul in May Turkey inclined to follow a pragmatist realist approach, that this new paradigm would like to be the continuation of the recent constructivist approach for realist purposes with constructed identity and values supporting the ummah approach. Furthermore, new paradigm tries to modify the identity policy by exerting more emphasis on national interests and asserting power in the region and the global arena. Recent Middle Eastern Policy Turkey pursued a non-interference and non-involvement policy toward the Middle East for many years by distancing itself from ongoing regional conflicts and by considering its Middle Eastern policies as an extension of Western allies policies shaped by the US foreign and security policy approach toward the region. 18 However, after the Cold War, Turkey s pursuit of active and assertive politics had been most pronounced in the Middle East. The removal of Soviet influence from the Arab s world has given more flexibility to Turkish foreign policies in the Middle East, Turkey s traditional Middle East policy underwent a significant change, specifically, with its decision to participate in the Gulf War in Turkey s national interests have become intimately related to the security and stability in all of its surrounding regions. Turkey is also a Middle Eastern country and its security, stability and prosperity are closely tied to the developments in the Middle East. The expansion of Turkey s role in the Middle East continued after the end of the Gulf War. The Kurdish issue and the PKK also contributed to Turkey s decision to forge a new security cooperation arrangement with Israel. Syria saw the pressures from the North and South; they didn't host PKK leader Öcalan any longer. His expulsion from that 18 Emel Parlar Dal, The transformation of Turkey s relations with the Middle East: Illusion of Awakening?, Turkish Studies, (June 2012)

7 country was a notable example of the transition from the reactive foreign policy to a more pro-active policy of Turkey. 19 In 1980s, Turgut Özal started to follow an increasingly activist and international approach to the relations in the Middle East. During his period, Turkey s economic relations with the Middle East grew significantly. Normalization of relations between Turkey and Arab/Muslim world was observed. However, in the post-cold War, some Middle Eastern countries still used to see Turkey as a Western agent, as Turkey was an ally with the USA and in NATO. 20 Arab countries had reservations to Turkish involvement in the region for several reasons: Turkey s activism and the rise of pan- Turkist tendencies in Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia, military operations in Northern Iraq, Turkey s water problem with Syria and its cooperation with Israel. 21 In the late 2000s, Turkish Middle Eastern policies revealed a noteworthy shift in the orientation of Turkish foreign policy from a liberal trading state approach to a realist one with constructive identity. Especially, after 2005, with Ankara s growing disappointment in EU candidacy, Turkey wanted to develop its relations with the Middle East region. That was described as a shift of axis by the media and some academics in Turkish foreign policy. It is believed that it was the result of Turkey s self-redefinition of its identity and its desire to exert its influence beyond the country s border, over the Middle Eastern. Some scholars claim that it happened naturally as democracies would have their own demonstrative effects. 22 Egypt and Turkey, historically, supported peace processes and maintained close strategic relations with the USA. They perceive similar threats to their national security from radical Islamic groups. 23 A free trade agreement made between the 19 Sabri Sayarı, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi- Regionalism, Journal of International Affairs, (Fall 2000) 20 Kemal Kirişçi Turkey and the Muslim Middle East in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 21 Emel Parlar Dal, The transformation of Turkey s relations with the Middle East: Illusion of Awakening?, Turkish Studies, (June 2012) 22 Kemal Kirişçi, Turkey s Demonstrative Effect and the Transformation of the Middle East, Insight Turkey, Vol.13 (2011) 23 Kemal Kirişçi Turkey and the Muslim Middle East in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000)

8 countries in 2005, military agreement memorandum was signed in 2008 and highlevel strategic cooperation meetings were to be held in Turkey was openly supporting one political party in Egypt after Husnu Mubarek s regime: Mursi s Muslim Brotherhood. When Mursi was toppled by a military coup in July 2013, AKP sided against the military intervention and condemned anti-democratic rule of the interim government in Egypt although the USA, United Nations and number of Arabic Gulf countries welcomed the new government. The Egyptian government reacted directly to AKP. AKP was criticized about intervening domestic politics in a country. The level of its diplomatic relations with Egypt downgraded reciprocally. As another important country in the Middle East, Turkey signed an intelligence and military cooperation agreement with Israel in the mid-1990s. Turkish-Israeli alignment created shock waves in the region, and Turkey became the focus of criticism from several regional states, especially from Syria and Iran. With the signs of normalization and free trade agreement, the trade volume went up dramatically. Israel accepted Turkey s intermediary role between Syria and Israel. Economic cooperation increased and more touristic visits were exchanged between the countries. 24 The countries reached a high level of cooperation in the late 1990s; their relations declined after 2000 and resulted in a serious crisis in recent years. After the Israel s Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, Turkey reacted sharply to Israel and declared that they will no longer see Israel as a partner for peace. In January 2010, in Davos Summit, the Turkish prime minister had a verbal spat with the Israeli president. Anti- Semitist TV series on Turkish national channels, low-couch diplomatic crisis at the Israeli foreign ministry and finally Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis took the conflict at a very higher level. On May 31 st, 2010, Israeli commandos killed nine activists en route to Gaza for humanitarian help. The Mavi Marmara crisis overlapped with Turkey s veto on the sanctions of Iranian nuclear program. This raised a red flag about Turkey s new foreign policy orientation. It caused souring in Turkey USA relations. Turkey s role as an impartial mediator in countries peace talks was finished Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkish Policy toward Israel in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 25 İlker Aytürk, The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish Israeli Relations since 2002, Turkish Studies (December 2011)

9 With Syria, Turkey started to develop normalized relations after the expulsion of PKK s leader from Damascus occurred and Turkey s parliamentary rejection on the motion of US troops in the Iraq War in In 2004, two countries signed free trade agreements, military cooperation was planned and visas between two countries were waived. The countries were planning to hold mutual ministerial meetings regularly. Turkey was supporting clearly Assad regime s intentions for the social and economical development in Syria. The countries relations were closer than ever before in their history. In 2011, the civil war in Syria started. Turkey condemned the Syrian government. The diplomatic ties between the countries deteriorated immediately. Turkey opened its borders to all refugees. Two million refugees moved to Turkey. Turkey has spent more than five billion Euros in facilitating the refugees. Turkey called the Syrian government doing savagery and asked them to stop the civil war. Turkish Prime Minister claimed to oust the Assad regime in Syria in a short time. Turkish authorities had over-confidence in the matter and they believed the problem would be fixed in a couple of months with a regime change. For this purpose, Turkey started to support the opposition groups in Syria and helped them build an armed organization. As a strategy, Turkey only aligned itself with the Sunni political and armed opposition forces. Sunnification of Turkish foreign policy and Sunni power ascendance was a matter of concern in USA s considerations who would like to guarantee religious and ethnic pluralism in the possible new regime in Syria. 26 In the Syrian case, Turkey is criticized to make a miscalculation. The intelligence information Turkey received had predicted the situation in Syria as an opportunity that would help Turkey to design the domestic politics in align with the Muslim Brotherhood elements in the country in a similar way happened in Mursi s Egypt before military coup. Turkey assumed the Syrian public would support an outsider intervention and the West, mainly by the USA, would back them. However, when the Turkish prime minister, foreign minister and head of Turkish National Intelligence Service (MIT) met their counterparts in Washington DC in May 2013, the USA showed no strong signs of support for Turkey s initiative for Syria. Moreover, although there was a civil war in Syria, Assad was holding the legitimacy of his rule in the country as the majority of the people around the capital were supporting him. 26 Halil Karaveli, The Obama-Erdoğan Partnership Over Syria: Advancing Western Values?, Turkish Policy Quarterly (Spring 2013)

10 This majority perceived this war against the Western manipulation and they were fighting for the independence of their country. The other world powers such as Russia, China and Iran also made their positioning in support of the Assad regime. Turkey was left in a position where he solely stood up for the change in the Syrian regime. The social and economic burden of accommodating millions of refugees, bloody terrorist attacks inside the Turkish territory, the emergence of uncontrolled violent groups in the region, the economic loss in trade and the opposition with the countries over Syria were the negative effects Turkey faced. The Extent of Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Holsti claims there can be many causes of the change. Trends, great events, great achievements, significant social/technological innovations can result in changes. Though, as a concept, change can mean replacement, addition, dialectics, and transformation after some turning points or discontinuations. 27 In Charles Hermann s work, he asserts foreign policy changes can vary indicating the magnitude of the shift from minor to major: adjustment changes, program changes, goal changes and international orientation changes. 28 Charles Hermann s four categories of foreign policy changes are analyzed in Meliha Altunışık s academic works. She concludes that for adjustment changes, Turkey engaged in Northern Iraq, Syria and Iran in 1990s for security purposes and aligned with Israel. Turgut Özal and Ismail Cem tried to develop economic relations with the region. This liberal approach also continued in the first two terms of AKP governments. As program changes, Turkey s involvement with the region became more comprehensive, multi-faceted and deeper. Diplomatic negotiations rather than military strategies started to be used. There was more focus on soft power assets, engagement, economic interdependence and promoting mediator roles. As examples of problem/goal change, she claims AKP wanted Turkey to be the regional leader, continued to support on the Iraq s territorial integration, competed with Iran over regional influence and supported a resolution of the Palestinian issue. Definition of problems and set of strategies are changed. Also, AKP used Turkey s relations with the Middle East in domestic politics to consolidate the support from 27 K. J. Holsti, The Problem of Change in International Relations Theory, Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 26 (December 1998) 28 Charles F. Hermann, Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34 (1990)

11 Anatolia. Hence, the foreign policy was used as an important element for the domestic policies. For the international orientation change, there are various examples that Turkey implements more independent and Eastern-looking policies. The incidents of the rapid deterioration with Israel relations after the Gaza War, Turkey s improving relations with Iran and vetoing the sanctions on Iranian nuclear program, close energy relations with Russia and ordering missiles from China all demonstrated Turkey was moving away from its traditional Western orientation to a global one or Islamic/Eastern. 29 There is absolutely a change in the direction of foreign policy starting with the AKP governments in Turkey. Some scholars argue that a shift of axis in policy occurred. This shift may not constitute a total reorientation but it tells us that Turkey is constructing a new position for itself in the Middle East. The details of the orientation change are now more visible. The new orientation has a deep civilizational discourse and it is very realist as it can be seen in Ahmet Davutoğlu s strategic depth doctrine. Levels of Analysis and Theoretical Framework The levels of analysis constitute a framework designed to organize and assist in systematic thinking about international relations. 30 The levels are individual or group, state and society, the international system as a whole. The foreign policy analysts disaggregate or break down each case into different parts in order to study and understand different aspects. It is for the purpose of selecting the most right entrance point to analysis. The levels of analysis are tools, heuristic devices that help studying subjects. 31 At the individual level, scholars focus on individual decision makers; how they make decisions, what perceptions and misperceptions they hold, and the ways key decision makers interact. At the state level, societal and governmental factors are examined on the making of foreign policy in a particular state. At the system level analysis, bilateral relations, regional issues, global issues and multilateral interactions are explored. At each level of analysis, there is a particular understanding of the subjects. Our understanding may be quite thorough for one level but will exclude 29 Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkish Policy toward Israel in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 30 Mark Kauppi and Paul Viotti, International Relations Theory, (Longman, 5 th Edition, 2012) 31 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21 st Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003)

12 information that can only be attained by using one of the other levels of analysis. J. David Singer, describes two broad levels: system and sub-system. This scheme collapses the individual and state levels into the subsystem category. He says in some sub-systemic level of analysis, it is likely to produce a richer description and more satisfactory explanation of international relations, though its predictive power appears no greater than the systemic orientation. In terms of description, we find that the systemic level produces a more comprehensive and total picture of international relations than the national or sub-systemic level. 32 There are four worldviews or grand theories that dominate the study of international relations: realism, liberalism, Marxism and constructivism. Those theories and their variants have different but fairly straightforward explanations of how things work in the world. Realism has a pessimistic view of human nature and makes key assumptions about the nature of states and state behaviors. States are self-interested actors like humans but existing in an international system characterized by the constant struggle to maintain autonomy from other states. For realists, international politics is conflictual, by nature. The realist perspective is state-centered. Only states are the international actors. In liberalism, international politics is characterized by harmony among international actors. Liberals are pluralists. They conceptualize politics as the interaction of multiple actors pursuing multiple interests and using different types of resources and methods of interaction such as bargaining, coalition building and arm-twisting. Liberals focus on the formation of international law, organizations, and cooperative arrangements. Liberalism proposes that free and open trade between countries can decrease the possibility of conflict between them. Marxism constitutes a response to realism and liberalism. An international system based on capitalism class system divided is into rich and poor. International institutions are used to maintain the capitalist system in favor of the wealthy class/states J. David Singer, The level of Analysis Problem in International Relations in G. John Ikenberry (ed.) American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (Glenview, IL, 2008) 33 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21 st Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003)

13 Other than these three main theories, which use their own assumptions and perspectives in explaining the reality, constructivism offers an alternative tool for analysis. A constructivist argument is interpretative and it is more related to the explanation and understanding of social realities. Constructivism does not offer any alternative vision of the world. Constructivists argue that reality is socially constructed from the society s perceptions of it. Society projects a certain understanding of reality onto the world from the identities, which results to appropriate behaviors. Constructivist theory claims that agents and structures continually influence each other inter-subjectively. Constructivists are interested in the key concepts of norms, rules, identities and how they affect the conceptions and interpretations of the world. Constructivists view international structure in terms of a social structure and ideational factors such as norms, rules and law are embedded. The structure can influence the identities and interests of the agents. Constructivism sees the world as under construction with continuous interactions of agent-structure, which leads to the reshaping of identities and interests. People, throughout their interactions with the structure and other agents, they develop different behaviors, attitudes, speeches and other social form of actions in line with their giving meanings and framings to the social structure and the issues. Debates and discussions cannot be objective as they are bound to the subjectivity of the human beings. 34 In contrast to realist and neoliberal structure concept, constructivists argue for the possibility of the agency s perceptions and its interaction with the structure. Onuf argues international politics is a world of our making. The actors make choices in the process of interacting with others and with structure and they bring historically, culturally and politically distinct realities into being. 35 In constructivist theory, structures and norms not only constrain behaviors; they also constitute the identities of actors. Wendt claims the norms and shared understandings, as well as agent and structure relations, can result in constructed realities. In international relations, constructivism asks how states construct their interest through their interactions with one another. The forms, identities and social 34 Mark Kauppi and Paul Viotti, International Relations Theory, (Longman, 5 th Edition, 2012) 35 K. M. Fierke, Constructivism in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)

14 interactions provide powerful insights in the international relations discipline. Constructivist explanations depend heavily on the identity principle to describe international behavior. Identities, that are complex and changing, arise from interactions with other states often through a process of socialization. Constructivism is interested in how actors define their national interests, threats to those national interests, and their interests relationships to one another. States decide what they want based not only on material needs, but also on social interaction. 36 Constructivists focus on the actions of the individuals/groups and their relations with the system structure. The state s policy makers are individuals and as the structure is given, how the individuals construct their foreign policy ideas is a matter of concern. Personality analysis of decision makers becomes important. 37 Different worldviews focus on different levels of analysis. Realists are focused on the state, thus they study foreign policy at the Singer s system level. Realists are not likely to examine the personal beliefs of leaders. All leaders would pursue the national interests of their states. Liberals, being pluralists, focus on all the levels of analysis, depending on the subject of the study. Liberals look at the persons, groups, structures, and cultures within a state, the international organizations interacting with each other in the world, and the supranational institutions over all countries controlling the international regimes. Marxists look at foreign policy from the system and state levels. At the system level, the asymmetrical relations between states are important. At the state level, Marxists study the common interests of economic elites in one state with the elites in another. 38 It is believed that Turkish foreign policy is leader-driven and is theoretically formulated by an ideologue individual Ahmet Davutoğlu. Hence, in this research, a more individual level approach is preferred and we will focus on Ahmet Davutoğlu s ideas and ideology. 36 Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse, International Relations, (Pearson, International 10 th Edition, 2013) 37 Mark Kauppi and Paul Viotti, International Relations Theory, (Longman, 5 th Edition, 2012) 38 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21 st Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003)

15 What Identity Turkey Used? The constructivist theory has great emphasize on identity. Identity describes the country s national interests and shapes international behavior. Almost all scholars agree that the substantial change in Turkish foreign policy is based on re-defining Turkish identity over regional and global politics. What they don't agree on is the most defining essential character or the main substance of this new constructed identity. What identity did Turkey want to construct about itself? What are the features of that identity? Some signify the appearance of Ottoman-Turkish characters on the ideas of Ahmet Davutoğlu and called the new identity as Neo-Ottoman, some denote the predominant character of Islam in the ideas and approaches and call it Pan- Islamist. In the contextual framework of the pan-islamism, some say Turkey follows an Islamic-Sunni character and the new identity is a sectarian one. That also was related to ummah approach that Turkey wanted to lead a Muslim Brotherhood axis in the Middle East and could show the compability of Islam with democracy. This paper welcomes the new identity with ummah approach in a pan-islamist context over the sectarian and Neo-Ottoman figures. For a long while Davutoğlu s vision was called as neo-ottomanism because the most of the foreign policy activism was occurring in former Ottoman territories. However, it was an approach that neither ignoring Turkey s Ottoman past nor seeking to merely recapitulate its legacy. According to Bülent Aras, it would be misleading to consider neo-ottomanism as the primary motive behind the Davutoğlu s vision. 39 As neo- Ottoman idea was ethnic-centric, it was doomed to failure if ever tried. The best alteration to pan-turkist ideas would be like-abdulhamit s pan-islamist ideas that aimed to unify the all Islamic elements around Ottoman Sultan who is the caliphate of the Islamic world. Leadership of Islamic world would address wider scope of people in a vast geography. For a country like Turkey, who would like to recover its potential and be a major player in the world again, Turkey would recognize the fact that the ummah ideas would be more appealing than any Ottomanist ideas. 39 Bülent Aras, The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009)

16 Pan-Islamism covers the ideas about the unity of Muslims and in some cases the expansion of Islamic values. The countries who practice some levels of democracy and hold elections, there is a chance that the pro-islamic political parties come to power and execute Islamic agenda in peace with democracy. They could take Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood movement as their inspiring example. These pan- Islamist tendencies of the countries would constitute a bloc to the Western and to the global political arena also. The solidaristic character of pan-islamism can be referred to the concept of ummah. Ummah is a concept that is used to emphasize the sociological unity of the Islamic people and gives a supra-national definition of Islamic communities beyond nation-states. In general, throughout the article, ummah implying a pan-islamist identity will be referred as the identity that Turkey tried to build with AKP governments in the region rather than neo-ottoman or sectarian identities. It is also worth to note here that there is no strong and clear evidence that Turkey favored a sectarian politics in the region, but Turkey found itself in a sectarian conflict as a consequence of the foreign policy followed in Syria. Change in Turkish Foreign Policy in early AKP terms: From Trading State to Constructivist Identity Policy According to Kemal Kirişçi, the impact of economic considerations in the 2000s is the major element of Turkish foreign policy. His findings can be extended to the previous decade. It can be claimed that the 1990s carried the same liberal economic motivations. Other than the dominant trading state theory, Kemal Kirişçi lists five alternative explaining theories of the transformation in Turkish foreign policy in his trading state article in First, Europeanization is the impact that the engagement of Turkey with the EU has had on both domestic politics as well as on Turkey s foreign policy. EU s conditionality principle and the need to meet certain criteria for starting accession talks and gaining membership has been an important transformative force. Second, the impact of domestic political developments such as the rise of AKP to power, together with a new elite and political agenda, is seen as an important force reshaping Turkish foreign policy. Third, the geopolitical factors resulting from institutional changes and the altered balance of power after the end of 40 Kemal Kirişçi, The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New Perspectives in Turkey, (Spring 2009)

17 the Cold War played a role in shaping Turkish foreign policy. Fourth, the concept of soft power is frequently employed by a wide range of politicians, columnists and academics inside and outside Turkey. The advocates of this approach attribute the transformation of Turkish foreign policy to Turkey becoming a soft power. Kemal Kirişçi lists constructivism in international relations as one of the five theories other than trading state theory. Constructivism attributes the changes in Turkish policy to a reformulation of how the Turkish state defines its own identity internally and externally. Some scholars put emphasis on the change of foreign policy culture, while others point out the transformation of the way in which national security is redefined and perceived. 41 All of the approaches in the academic works do enhance our understanding of Turkey s changing foreign policy and each approach does capture an aspect of the phenomenon. But, we find one theory does a better job than others and it is more inclusive: Constructivist explanation, more precisely, constructivist approach for realist purposes. The constructivist theory is superior to the others because it has a stronger presence in the recent foreign policy arena. As the Europeanization influence faded away by the non-frequent negotiation talks with EU, due to unresolved issues in the chapters, this theory lost its relevancy. Domestic political developments have been in the same formation with the ruling party in power for many years and that can t be explaining the new recent transformation. The geopolitical factors are the external factor that Turkey had no direct influence but structure has effect always and pushes for realist attention. Constructivist explanation is more inclusive and captures the domestic ruling elite s perceptions and their views on constructing new identities and interests. It also explains the geopolitical external structure with agent-structure relation. The soft power idea can be classified as part of constructivism and also be classified as the façade of the diffusion of the current constructed Turkish identity image in the region. The role of economic factors and the rise of the trading state explain how the decision was made in the early 1980s to open up and liberalize the Turkish economy which led to the growth of a new business elite and Turkey s trade relations with the external world. The zero-problem policy with the neighbors of AKP governments could be 41 Kemal Kirişçi, The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New Perspectives in Turkey, (Spring 2009)

18 considered a blueprint manifestation of the foreign policy of a trading state. However, it is ironic that the primary author of this policy and the architect of Turkish foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu made a scant reference to economics and interdependence as the main factors, which shaped foreign policy. In his substantive book, economics receives attention very briefly and only in the context of the composition of a country s power capabilities. This makes us believe that the main motivation of the Turkish foreign policy makers in the recent decade is not based on economics but ideology. We observe that the influence of economic considerations in the 1990s and 2000s is diminished but Turkey now has a different foreign policy orientation putting the identity and interests in the central place. In Kemal Kirişci s article in 2011, he develops the concept of a demonstrative effect and argues that this effect makes the Turkish model look more attractive to the Middle East. He also claims that this effect is a function of three developments: the rise of the trading state, the diffusion of Turkey s democratization experience as a work in progress and the positive image of Turkey s new foreign policy. The demonstrative effect of a democracy can be quoted as the soft power of a superior country over other countries in a region that are not good as in the compared area. 42 Kemal Kirişçi s trading state article was written in 2009 and demonstrative effect article was written in As a trading state country, Turkey should have been focusing on liberal and pragmatic cooperation with countries for economic benefits, but recently, there have been other elements that needed to be addressed as well. There are areas that economic motivations fail to explain. With the demonstrative effect concept, Kirişçi finds ways to add other social facts and compromise new developments in his analysis. This is where we see that the trading state and its dominant effect in foreign policy is being replaced by some other new identity and interests arguments of constructivist theory. In the recent works of scholars in 2010s, Turkey is discussed not with economic motivations but with the concepts of ideologies, identities, norms, ethics, agent-structure relationships and Islamic character. All those concepts are related to how the new construction of Turkish identity in the foreign policy is made. 42 Kemal Kirişçi, Turkey s Demonstrative Effect and the Transformation of the Middle East, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13 (2011)

19 In Ziya Öniş article in 2011, he argues that considerations relating to the culture and identity became the important elements of Turkey s new policy orientation moving beyond the sphere of economics. AKP, with its Islamist roots, was already naturally receptive to developing strong cultural, diplomatic and economic links with the Arab Middle East and the Islamic world in general. Also AKP s foreign policy activism has proven to be a major economic asset in domestic politics that the foreign policy outweighed the negative effects of the global financial crisis in The assertive and independent style of foreign policy making has had an appeal to nationalistic sentiments in the nation. 43 In the constructivist theory, there is an emphasis on the agents- that they are the actors and they act according to their identities. The leaders perceptions of the role that their states should have in the international system depend on the cultural backgrounds of those leaders. In AKP s newly multi-dimensional foreign policy, the relations with the West have been viewed as more complementary to, rather than a substitute for, relations with the Islamic world. At the center of this new orientation is a new foreign policy discourse where Turkey can be a center in the regional subsystem and subsequently a global actor in the international system. At the core of this policy lies a new, sophisticated foreign policy theory called strategic depth. Turkey can emerge as a regional power only if it establishes good ties with all the countries in its proximity. Turkey expressed affinity toward Islamic countries in the region and showed solidarity with their causes. 44 The first significant signs of the new Turkish foreign policy was the close relations that the government had developed with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood plus the bitter criticism it has directed towards Israel in the late 2000s. These developments not only triggered a major debate in the West but also made Erdoğan particularly popular among the socalled Arab street where Turkey had chance to diffuse its identity and its soft power over the region easily. 43 Ziya Öniş, Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13 (2011) 44 Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, Modernity, Identity and Turkey s Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10 (2008)

20 There are changing parameters that define the new Turkish Middle East foreign policy under AKP government that is based on a new civilizational discourse and a differentiated geopolitical approach. There are new dynamics and ideological and doctrinal background in Turkey s new Middle Eastern policy. In Davutoğlu s discourse, some concepts started to be used frequently such as a common awareness in the region that is outside the nation-states, people s power, democracy, and promoting alliance of civilizations. Davutoğlu claims that Turkey can act as a security provider and peace-broker in the region with its civilizational and historical links with the region and order-instituting poster can help for a stable, peaceful, regional and international order. Turkey s newly constructed self-perception of Turkish and Islamic identity was emphasized most often in the Middle Eastern politics. 45 İlker Aktürk conducted research on the recent Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and with Israel and he concludes three major dynamics can be discussed in the Turkish decision-making in the recent years. First, ideology and actors are important. The AKP leadership has deep roots in Turkey s Islamist movement and it is anti- Israel. We know that two main distinct figures shaped Turkish policy: Erdoğan, a pragmatist and for Ahmet Davutoğlu ideologue. However, the common thing is they both are realist and act for the maximization of national interest. Second, power vacuum in the Middle East is an important structural condition. After Israel s operation in Gaza in 2009, there were some protests that developed in the Arab world. In this power vacuum Turkey saw this as an opportunity to return to the Middle East. Erdoğan was a folk hero in the Arab society with his tense anti-israel rhetoric. Third, Turkey started to use a discourse of grandeur. Turkish pro-government think-tanks and journalists were emphasizing the growing Turkish power in the Middle East. It was criticized as an exaggeration of Turkey s image in the region. 46 In line with Aktürk s findings; we can say in constructivist terms, Turkey, with a new self-perception of Turkish and ummah identity, was setting up new interests of being the regional leader and promotion of its interests in the Middle East. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, prime minister Recep Erdoğan and foreign minister Ahmet 45 Emel Parlar Dal, The transformation of Turkey s relations with the Middle East: Illusion of Awakening?, Turkish Studies, (June 2012) 46 İlker Aytürk, The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish Israeli Relations since 2002, Turkish Studies (December 2011)