Gast: Vali Nasr Dean of Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Intern Studies of Johns Hopkins University

Transcription

1 Middle East Challenges after the Arab Spring Conversation Gast: Vali Nasr Dean of Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Intern Studies of Johns Hopkins University Penalisten: Heinz Gärtner, Universität Wien, wissenschaftlicher Direktor des oiip Cengiz Günay, Senior Fellow oiip Gudrun Harrer, senior editor and Middle East editor at Der Standard and lecturer Moderation: Florian Schwarz Adresse: Wiener Rathaus, Felderstraße, Feststiege 1, 1010 Wien Teilnehmer: 100 Zusammenfassung: Irina Iancu Organized in coperation with Wiener Vorlesung

2 Abstract The hopeful Arab Spring has since 2011 produced unexpected outcomes: return of Al Qaeda to the Middle East, civil war in Syria, return of dictatorship to Egypt. These developments pose challenges to regional security and mean that the Arab world will remain a cauldron of conflict and instability in the near term. Addressing these issues will have to take place in the context of reduced American and European engagement with the Middle East, a decline in Turkey s regional influence, growth of sectarian tensions in the region, and heightened Arab Iran rivalry at a time when the international community is seeking a resolution to Iran s nuclear program. This talk will discuss the emerging strategic dynamic in the Middle East and the nature of challenges facing the West in managing regional affairs. Der erwartungsvolle Arabische Frühling hat seit 2011 unerwartete Folgen mit sich gebracht: die Rückkehr der Al Kaida in den Mittleren Osten, Bürgerkrieg in Syrien und die Rückkehr einer Diktatur in Ägypten. Diese Entwicklungen stellen Herausforderungen an die regionale Sicherheit und bedeuten, dass die arabische Welt in naher Zukunft ein Kessel von Konflikten und Instabilität bleiben wird. Diese Themen werden in Kontext gesetzt mit einer reduzierten Einbringung von Amerika und Europa in den Mittleren Osten, ein Rückgang an Einfluss aus der Türkei, eine Zunahme an gespannten Verhältnissen innerhalb der Glaubensrichtungen und eine erhöhte arabisch iranische Rivalität zu einer Zeit in der die internationale Gemeinschaft nach einer Einigung zu dem Iranischen Nuklearprogramm sucht. In diesem Gespräch geht es um die entstehende strategische Dynamik im Mittleren Osten und die Art der Herausforderungen mit denen der Westen im führen dieser regionalen Angelegenheiten nun konfrontiert ist. 2

3 Summary The talk held at the historical Viennese City Hall discussed the emerging strategic dynamic in the Middle East and the nature of challenges facing the West in managing regional affairs in the wake of the Arab Spring. The renowned American academic and author specializing in the Middle East and the Islamic world Vali Nasr began his talk by briefly presenting some of the major developments in the Middle East as a result of the Arab Spring. The past two years have witnessed enormous political development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), something which has had implications until this day for the West, the US and the European Sphere. The fall of authoritarianism in the region had been compared at the time to the Berlin Wall paradigm and has led since then to many unanswered questions. According to Nasr, it is always hard to draw conclusions when a historical and political process is incomplete. Popular opposition was concentrated towards a set of factors that ultimately led to a process of democratization in the region. The first factor was of course authoritarianism and its outworn instruments which ultimately led to a pool of awareness among people. Certainly the MENA region has no history of democracy or its institutions. The second issue was the regional economy with its high unemployment rate among the younger generation as well as the overall lack of liberal economic values. The third aspect was the certain modernity that the revolution brought with itself by means of the proliferation of technology, for this was indeed not a revolution of the poor, but rather one of the rich with solely the context per se being provided by the former. While in Tunisia awareness was spread by means of technology and in Egypt the middle class affluent students took the streets, the revolution in Turkey blossomed thanks to the overemployed and overeducated people. Even though the focus may have shifted in some way to other aspects such as wars and regional military takeovers, with the fate of regional authoritarianism remaining rather unclear, many of the other factors are still unresolved today. When the uprisings first took shape in 2011, the West failed to intervene on the economic front and limited its action solely on the political front. Ongoing weak economies in the region were unable to produce jobs and therefore meet the expectations of the younger population. Furthermore, the 3

4 increasing proliferation of technology in the region led to the establishment of a network environment, ideal for discussing and tackling pressing matters. According to Nasr, due to the lack of economic engagement by the West, these problems are bound to return at some point. The legacy of the 2011 uprisings is not democracy but rather a hybrid of other factors. Firstly, there is a clear production of failed and failing states to be seen in the region, which directly implies that the region itself will become more and more important in the future. The Arab Spring led to a strong weakening of political institutions (such as in Egypt), while others collapsed entirely (such as in Tunisia, Libya or Syria). This was the overall case in the region, since political institutions were severely affected, thus making authoritarianism not less present, but rather different in shape and form. This means of course that it has also become increasingly difficult to tackle terrorism or extremism in the region as well as handling other economic and political needs that brought the uprisings about in the first place. According to Nasr, the US has learned from Afghanistan that there is a direct correlation between failed states and the organizational, developing and recruiting capabilities of terrorist and extremist organizations. Therefore, a second important factor caused by the Arab Spring was the return of the Islam to the mainstream of Arab politics, such as in Libya, Tunisia or within the Syrian Opposition. Moreover, the Arab Spring has seen a very strong proliferation of Al Qaeda, which has now spread from the periphery states of the Middle East up to its core (Syria, Iraq and Egypt), making this one of the most pressing matters today in the region. According to Nasr one could see this phenomenon as the birth of a so called Al Qaeda State', with boundaries crossing the Turkish borders up to southern Iraq, whereby this is a direct consequence of the collapse of authority in the region. The third problem would be the increase of sectarian conflict. Nasr believes that sectarianism has always been present in the region, even before the arrival of the Americans in Iraq, especially within the states, and not in society. The Arab Spring is important with regards to this, because it ironically brought sectarianism back into attention in a different way, especially within the relatively homogenous populations of North Africa, where the uprising first took shape. However, with the shift of the Arab Spring eastwards, everything came to a region that had sectarian and ethnic differences as well as a strong colonial legacy, this making it more difficult for the unsettled distribution of power to dissipate. Nasr drew a rather interesting comparison between the past US Iraq/Afghanistan conflicts with those brought about by the Arab Spring. According to him, what the American military did in Iraq, the Arab Spring did in the rest of the region, ultimately leading to a strong imbalance in the distribution of power. Therefore, people began to openly identify along 4

5 sectarian lines, as opposed to Iraq, where there had been a strong denial of sectarianism among the population. The legacy of colonial power was calcified through authoritarian regimes that then protected with time the imbalance of distribution of powers between communities. This phenomenon is now beginning to fall apart, so Nasr. The Arab Spring, (particularly with regards to Syria) is now really portending to renegotiate international post WWI agreements. There is a clear threat to the post WWI power structure (especially in the Levant) that was established between Britain and France at the moment of departure. Nasr continued by stressing out the crucial role of Syria in the Middle East equation, as almost all of these issues are being encapsulated within Syrian borders. Thus, Syria doesn t represent a sole isolated humanitarian area anymore, but a security one, for its fate is now decisive for the entire region as it entails the most important matters facing the whole region. Therefore, depending on how the War in Syria ends, this may lead up to a domino effect in the neighbor countries, thus touching a pool of sectarian conflicts. According to Nasr, the main reason why the Arab Spring failed was the disengagement of the West. The absence of the West is what makes the Arab Spring so different compared to any other democratic movement in the world. One month of the US financial investment in Iraq would have been transformative in the region, so Nasr. There were naturally many other mistakes made by the West, such as overestimating the power of the opposition in the region, especially in Syria, as well as underestimating the power of the Assad Regime and the importance of crucial actors such as Iran or Russia for Assad s survival. On the other part, the region itself overestimated the commitment of the West in tackling crucial issues such as the overthrown of the Assad Regime, which ultimately led to the opposition s failure. All in all, the strategic outcomes of the Arab Spring could be summarized in three main points. Firstly, the Russian Iranian Alliances were facilitated by Syria (compared to the American Arab Alliances). Secondly, Syria worked as a further catalyzer for the Iranian Saudi Arabian Rivalry, which goes back to Both of these countries regard the West as disengaging in the region, leading to a larger open Plainfield, with them competing for hegemony and assigning themselves particular spheres of influences that contribute to the whole dynamic of the region. The second point naturally leads to the question of Iran and how Iran positioned itself as the savior of Syria. The Arab Spring was perceived back in 2011 as an overall revival of the Arab World with Iran 5

6 being the marginalized unsalvageable theocracy. The outcome has turned out to be quite different, since Iran is fairly bullish and, despite its sanctions, has retained its position within the region. More importantly, the American position towards Iran shifted to engaging a mutual deal, this being by far one of the most interesting developments in the region. According the Nasr, the nuclear deal has never been about stopping nuclear proliferation but rather about the reintegration of Iran in the region. Thus, for many of the neighboring countries, the fear had never been about the Iranian Nuclear Plan, but rather about this exact reintegration of a greater Iran in the region with the West as a silent bystander. Some significant milestones towards signing this Nuclear Deal have already been attained, while some things ought to be refined even further. For instance, the new Iranian government seems more willing to cooperate as opposed to the previous one, something which has led to an overall smoother diplomatic process. If these negotiations with Iran go the same way as they have lately, the West might experience in two years time a shift towards a more open and diverse relationship with Iran. This openness might be regarded as a positive development by the US or Europe, while other neighboring countries might perceive it as a long lasting threat, a disruptive effect in the regional balance of the last thirty years. The fact remains that the entire process currently taking place in Syria still revolves around Iran s nuclear program, so Nasr. Another thing to be considered in this context is the Arab Israeli Issue. The Arab Spring basically pushed the Palestine issue aside, since the fundamental concern in the region shifted towards democratization, with different Regimes focusing on particular internal issues. Even though this problem still exists, it is not at the core of the regional problems anymore, with Iran s faith being perhaps the most pressing issue at the moment. All in all, the region confronts itself at the moment with two clear dynamics. Firstly, there is the overall concern regarding the Syrian conflict, which might end up infecting the whole region. Secondly, there is the future role of Iran to be considered, whose reintegration in the region might lead to an overall balance of power. Therefore, the fate of the region lies within a balance of these two different, yet equally important dynamics that might finally lead to overall balance in the Middle East. 6

7 The first panelist to take the stand was Madame Gudrun Harrer, the senior editor and Middle East Editor at the Austrian newspaper the Standard. She briefly praised one of Nasr s books The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, which was written before its time, back in 2006 and most definitely represented at that time a prophetic prediction of current affairs in the Middle East with regard to sectarianism. Syria has indeed been a game changer in the region with questions arising related to the visions of Saudi Arabia and Iran. With regard to the Israeli Palestine conflict, Madame Harrer commented on the apparent unwillingness of President Barack Obama to even discuss this issue, let alone take any further actions. Moreover, she expressed her concern regarding the maintenance of the Status Quo of Palestine in the future as well as on the end of Palestinian authority and the possible emergence of a Palestinian nation state. Dr. Cengiz Günay, Senior Fellow at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs also pointed out at the lack of enthusiasm in the West for the developments in the Middle East. There was a clear momentum at the time for moderate Islamic groups to be integrated in the region (i.e. Egypt), an opportunity which soon turned out to be futile, for these groups missed their pace within the uprisings, some even shortly after their elections in their countries. The Islamists have failed to win the traditional intellectuals (i.e. in Turkey, the AKP government lost the support of the Liberals). On the other hand there are also more violent groups emerging on the ground in Syria. Radical Islamist groups have emerged in response to sectarianism. They are representing an imagined unified Islamic community. Günay further agreed with the statement of Nasr according to which the West had been rather absent from the region and overall lacking strategic planning. The West missed the chance to develop any position towards moderate Islamists Following Günay s question on whether there is a valid US strategy regarding these Islamist groups in Syria, Nasr answered that the US has never had a 7

8 coherent strategy in this matter, but rather delegated its management of the opposition to Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Qatar, which eventually led to deep fractures both within the opposition and between different other factions. Another critical problem was that there was an overall disconnect between armed groups on the ground, and the political opposition, something which was also discussed at the latest convention on Syria held in Geneva in January With regard to Turkey's role in the region and a possible rapprochement towards Iran, Vali Nasr stated that this liaison between the two countries has never eroded. Nevertheless, there has been a miscalculation from Turkey in believing the US actions towards Syria, which eventually led to a shift in Turkey's position, whereby Egypt has caused a rupture between Turkey and the other Arab countries. Following Nasr's intervention, Günay further stated that there is no more Turkish strategy towards Syria in the region, something which indeed might have been affected by the US policy in the region. Even though Turkey and Iran might seem as two countries with totally different interests, a new rapprochement towards Iran would bring about a set of common positive economic effects for Turkey and vice versa. However, there are also certain limits to this cooperation as these two countries are also natural rivals over influence in their neighborhood. The Academic Director of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Professor Heinz Gärtner expressed his disagreement with regard to the disengagement of the West in the Middle East. He argued that there was nothing more that the West could have done better in Syria, for this was a clear case of internal force that cannot be tackled from the outside. Of course military intervention would not have been the best solution, since that would have been a direct act of war, something which was also demonstrated by the past military interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the West was and continues to be intensively engaged in the Middle East, something which has been continuously proved by things such as the protection of civilians throughout the MENA region or the International Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria 8

9 acceded only recently. However, there was indeed a lack of continuation in the actions underwent by the West, which might explain its failure in the region. The biggest success so far has clearly been the nuclear agreement with Iran, a scenario that might lead to a disastrous outcome if it isn't dealt with carefully. The imposed restrictions have given the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) thus far the opportunity for strict monitoring and stringent inspections. The Additional Protocol would grant the IAEA inspectors access to information about both declared and possible undeclared activities, whereby this would include on site inspections at anytime and anywhere. Professor Gärtner also stated that, if the US Congress chose to impose even further restrictions or if sudden provocations from inside hardliners arose, Iran would dismiss the IAEA inspectors, look up excuses to retreat from the negotiations and consequently enrich its uranium aggressively. Furthermore, in the wake of a negative outcome of the negotiations, there might be a change of war, something that should be avoided at all costs. According to Gärtner, Iran now has two possibilities: either it maintains its good economic relations with the West and becomes a Persian South Korea or it chooses to engage in a full nuclear program and become an unstoppable nuclear power, a Great North Korea. Following Professor Gärtner's statement, Vali Nasr agreed that military intervention would indeed have been a disastrous decision. The Assad regime needs to realize the actual cost of war and its implications. Moreover, the actual military calculus in the region might shift in a sense that Assad could soon realize that he might actually lose. Lessons from the past have shown that there is a need for good diplomatic engagement with the countries that support Assad and the opposition as well as a need to include other actors that also drive this conflict. The current fighting tempo should be reduced to something more manageable for the international community. With regard to economic aid, Nasr believes that the major issue today is the urgent need for economic restructuring, since this represents the foundation for any democratization process. Economic aid would indeed help, but what the Middle East now needs is a good economic growth model that would help boost severed private sectors by means of privatization (i.e. in Egypt). The fact is that there is no valid strategy today between the IMF, international developing banks and donor countries with regard to economic aid for the Middle East. Economic aid could have made a difference but the truth is that this issue still remains open to discussion, since there is no stability in the region for economic restructuring. Moreover, the pressing problem continues to be terrorism with its cellular structure, something that continuously reminds the international community of past events of Iraq or Afghanistan. 9

10 With regard to the interest of the European Union today, Nasr added that this should not be considered as a strict humanitarian action from the EU, but rather as its general reaction towards the general threat of Middle East conflict to EU policy. In this context, Günay further added that one should think of the rather normative perception of democracy, something that can't be really applied to such a religious and overall different region such as MENA. The US has a more open perception to religious groups and is equipped with better tools on the long run in dealing with the MENA region and its problems. Conclusion All in all, the region confronts itself at the moment with two clear dynamics. Firstly, there is the overall concern regarding the Syrian conflict, which might end up infecting the whole region. Secondly, there is the future role of Iran to be considered, whose reintegration in the region might lead to an overall balance of power. Therefore, the fate of the region lies within a balance of these two different, yet equally important dynamics that might finally lead to overall balance in the Middle East. 10

11 Name of participants: Vali NASR Dean of The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University (since 2012); Member of Foreign Affairs Policy Board, U.S. Department of State (since 2011); Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution (since 2011); Professor of International Politics and Associate Director of the Fares Center of Eastern Mediterranean Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University ( ); Contributing Opinion Writer to New York Times and International New York Times (since 2013). Books: The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat. Doubleday Publishers, 2013 (Scribe Publishers in U.K.); Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World. Free Press; editions 1 and 2, 2009 (Nominated for the Pulitzer Prize). Heinz GÄRTNER University Professor since 2001; since 2013 academic director of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip); since 2011 senior scientist at the Department for Political Science, University of Vienna. Studies of Political Science and Communication Theory at the University of Salzburg, 1990 Habilitation (Univ. Doz.) for Political Science at the University of Innsbruck; editor of the book series International Security ; regular visiting fellowships at the universities of Stanford, New York, Johns Hopkins, Vancouver, Oxford, New Haven, Erlangen and guest lectures at many other American, European and Asian universities and research institutions. Heinz Gärtner published widely on European, international security, and arms control. Cengiz GÜNAY since 2006 Senior Fellow Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip); Field of Expertise: Middle East and Turkey. Political Systems, Islamist Movements, Socio Economic and Political Transformation Processes, Democratization, Foreign Policy, EU MENA Relations; since 2008 Lecturer at the University of Vienna; since 2012 Head of the Austrian Network of the Anna Lindh Euro Mediterranean Founda on for the Dialogue between Cultures; Austria Correspondent for CNN Turk. 11

12 Gudrun HARRER senior editor and Middle East editor at the Austrian newspaper Der Standard and lecturer on modern history and politics of the Middle East at the University of Vienna and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. After taking a MA in Islamic and Arabic Studies, she received her PhD in Political Science for a dissertation on the Iraqi nuclear program and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Gudrun Harrer is board member of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip) and the Austrian Orient Society Hammer Purgstall (ÖOG). She served as the Special Envoy of the Austrian Presidency of the European Union to Iraq in 2006, and as Austria s Chargé d Affaires (Head of Mission) of the Austrian Embassy in Baghdad. 12