24th World Congress of Political Science (IPSA)

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1 24th World Congress of Political Science (IPSA) 23-28/07/2016 Poznan, Polônia Panel: Are We Discussing Democracy Properly? Theories about the quality of democracy: Origins, perspectives and fundamentals Author: Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga Institutional affiliation: Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar) Academic qualification: Pós-Doutora em Ciência Política pela USP-Brasil Address: Rua Aibi, 42 ap.603 Vila Ipojuca, SP, Brasil, June

2 Theories about the quality of democracy: Origins, perspectives and fundamentals Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga (UFSCar) Abstract: Since the late 90's there s a vast bibliography evaluating the quality of democracies in Latin America. Following theoretical perspectives and different parameters these studies have fueled a robust debate on the living conditions of these democracies after the economic and political crisis natives from neoliberal policies implemented by the various governments in the region since the mid 80 s. The objective of this study is to evaluate the theoretical basis from these recent contributions that seeks to discuss its origins, foundations and assumptions responsible for guiding the analisys, diagnoses and evaluations of directions made by democracies in various contexts of the region. This work is related to the research Left wing governments and the quality of democracy in Latin America, financed with funds from FAPESP, and its main question is: Do different types of left governments in the region have exercised different impacts on the quality of democracy in their countries? Methodologically, we are going to develop case studies and in order to check the hypotheses, indicators that combine forms of theoretical, documentary and empirical research will be elaborated. keywords: Theories, quality of democracy, Latin America, democracy Introduction In the last 16 years advances and failures of the left wing in Latin America has motivated robust research agenda to explain both the reasons for the rise of the left in the region after two decades of dominance of neoliberal ideology and of the "Quiet Revolution" (Reid, 2007 ), which caused profound changes in the economy and society of the region, as assess their successes and problems. The analysis material is truly immense, given the different construction processes of democracy that marked the region and the diversity of experiences of the left and actors who headed in countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. As stated by Levitsky and Roberts, "in 2009, about twothirds of Latin Americans lived under leftist governments. The extent of this 'turn left' is unprecedented; never so many countries in the region had their administrations entrusted to leaders associated with the political left "(2011b: 1). Given this diversity, works such as Panizza s (2005; 2008), Lanzaro s (2008), Roberts s (2008), 2

3 Natanson s (2008) Weyland s (2009) Weyland s, Madrid and Hunter s (2010a), Cameron and Hershberg s (2010) Silva s (2011) and Levitsky and Roberts s (2011a) presented explanations for the "turn left" in Latin America and proposed typologies concerning the progressive governments and comparative assessment of their administrative experiences. Given this research framework, the aim of this paper is to present, organize and discuss how the literature on recent left experiences in the region evaluates the impact of these administrations on the quality of democracy. For such, we must focus on jobs that take a comparative perspective and studies of cases about governments from four specific countries: the Lula da Silva administration in Brazil ( ); Ricardo Lagos and Michele Bachelet s regime in Chile ( ); Evo Morales s administration in Bolivia ( ); and the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela ( ). From this perspective, our work ends up joining two literatures that largely have been developing separately, although they have many points in common. The first one relates to 'pink tide' in Latin America. The second point concernes the quality of democracy in the region. By doing so through the analysis of other works, we believe to make a first step towards understanding a little better the impacts of recent experiences of leftist governments on the development and evolution of democratic regimes in the region. (TOO MANY REGION ) In order to achieve our goals, this paper is structured as follows: In the first section, we will present some of the conceptual assumptions that guides this work, apart from some of the existing typologies of leftist governments in the region and will also explain the reason why we have chosen each one of these cases. Secondly, the dimensions used to evaluate the impacts of leftist governments in Latin America and the evidence found in each of them in the literature will be introduced; Finally, in the third section, we will weave the final considerations along with a few questions still to be answered on the subject. Democracy and the left (s) We start by presenting what this literature has defined as (a) Left governments, (b) Democratic Regimes and (c) Quality of Democracy. These 3

4 definitions are the key to the development of this work and to make the chosen cases clearer, in order to present a more detailed analysis and the dimensions that make up the quality assessment regime. Most of this literature of classical works, such as Bobbio (1995), analysis of the left in Latin America contained in Weyland (2009; 2010) and Levitsky and Roberts (2011b). Based on this literature defined in ideological terms, as leftist governments who point out, as a programmatic priority, the search for greater equality in both socio- economic aspect, by reducing the disparity between social classes, and in the status of different groups, defending for example, more equity between genders and ethnicities. In terms of political action, leftist governments favor the state as a tool to reshape society and the economy, adopting a critical stance regarding the possibility of the market getting equate all social demands alone. As to the definition of democratic systems, Morlino and Diamond (2005) stablish certain requirements derived from Dahl s classic work (1971). According to the authors, a democracy requires: a) universal suffrage; b) free, frequent, fair and competitive elections; c) More than a serious political party; and d) Alternative sources of information. Complementing the four requirements above, the authors also state that democratic regimes should not be subject to restrictions by groups and institutions - internal or external - which do not provide directly or indirectly accounts from their actions to the public and to be free and just elections it is necessary that the regime count on civil and political liberties that enable citizens to organize around their interests and political positions (pp. x-xi). According to Diamond and Morlino (2005), it is possible to define the quality of democracy from three elements: (a) freedom, (b) political equality and (c) popular control over public and political policies of institutionalized form. For the authors, a democracy quality is the one in which the regime has broad legitimacy and which citizens, individually or in combination, are extensive political freedom and equality and have the power to assess and monitor whether the government fulfills its functions according to the law (p. xii). As we will see below, the quality of democracy is evaluated by these authors from different dimensions that include the elements mentioned. 4

5 If there is not exactly an agreement on the interpretation of the different types of leftist governments that came to power in 1998 in the region, there is almost a consensus on the elements that made possible the election victory of these progressive forces. Here we follow two good summaries made by Luna (2010) and Levitsky and Roberts (2011b). There is no single cause for the 'pink tide'. Conjunctural elements combined with more structural aspects in different ways between 1998 and 2010 to produce the left wins. The persistence of poverty and profound social inequalities created a potentially favorable electoral base to the left of speech returned to redistributive policies. In the 1980s and 1990s, as argued by Levitsky and Roberts (2011b), the left had failed to capitalize on this structural aspect of the region, as the combination of inflationary pressure, fiscal crisis, weakened sidicates and ideological confusion after the fall of the Berlin Wall left the progressive forces clearly on the defensive. However, since the late 1990s, the failure of the neoliberal model to respond to growing social demands opened a major gap for repoliticization theme of social inequality from an enlargement of the left perspective of state action and rights expansion. Another important structural matrix element was the institutionalization of electoral competition that took place from the Third Wave of Democratization. In a less polarized international context ideologically from the 1980s and the increased acceptance of liberal democracy by the left forces, the polls have become the preferred way for progressive forces to advance politically. In addition, the new political environment reduced the animosity by conservative elites with respect to the left forces and raised the costs of the organization and outbreak of military coups. Within this new competitive environment, the left parties initially obtained important electoral victories at the subnational level, which accelerated its organizational- party development. Later, it also grew electorally at the national level from the articulation of interests of different social groups dissatisfied with the pro- market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. However, these structural elements are not able to explain the left wins from the turn of the century by themselves. The severe economic crisis that hit the region between 1998 and 2002 played a key role in this process, to assist in erosion of the popularity of central and right governments that dominated the Latin American scene and pro- market reforms in the previous period. The crisis of 5

6 'lost half decade' made a double movement benefit the left in the region. On the one hand, it has hit the ruling parties. Between 1998 and 2004, 14 of the 18 Latin American governments changed hands. Despite this change of events, it strengthened the political forces that managed to articulate an anti- neoliberal discourse, albeit vague. Already in power in many countries of the subcontinent, the left was helped by the significant increase in the global economic environment in commodity prices, especially between 2002 and This favored the Latin American economy, that between 2004 and 2007 grew at a rate 5.5% per year. Obviously, the shift governments politically benefited from this growth. In addition, the expansion of exports also allowed more room for fiscal maneuver to the left governments develop redistributive policies and new social programs. For the first time since the return to democracy, leftist governments counted on a favorable scenario for the deployment of traditionally associated with progressive government policies. Between 2002 and 2008, the percentage of people below the poverty line in the region increased from 44% to 33%. This favorable environment articulated to the success of some redistributive measures have caused parties / leftist groups to succeed, between 2006 and 2009, the re- election in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela and Uruguay. The success of these administrations also eventually strengthen leftist parties and candidates countries traditionally led by conservative governments, such as Paraguay and El Salvador, demonstrating to these constituencies the viability of alternative progressive politicies. If, the literature does not differ much on the factors that caused the rise of the left in the region as a whole, it is not true about the types and characteristics of progressive Latin American governments. However, there seems to be at least one consensus: there is only one kind of left in the region (Panizza 2005; 2008; Castañeda, 2006; Lanzaro, 2008; Weyland, 2009; 2010; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011b). Considering this fact, many have sought to carry out a typology and provide explanations for the different types that were found. Do not let this article conduct a thorough discussion of all of them, but only to point out some of the most influential awards in literature. We begin by established by Castañeda (2006) - more for its 6

7 influence on public debate rather than for its analytical merits. In an article published in the Foreing Affairs, the Mexican author divides the Latin American left in two types: the reformist and populist. In the author's words: the rest of the world began to pay attention to the resurgence of the left, usually with concern and even with a certain hysteria. But to understand the reasons behind these developments requires recognizing that there is not only one left in Latin America today: there are two. One is modern, open, reformist and internationalist (...). The other, born of the great tradition of Latin American populism, it is nationalist, aggressive and closed (2006, p.1). It does not take much to guess which one the author qualifies as "good" and which one is seen as "bad". Chile would be an example of a country ruled by a reformist left as the Chavez government embodies at its best the populist version. Although full of normativity, the Castañeda s distinction (2006), at least with regard to the countries cited, was accompanied by other authors. In more refined analysis, Panizza qualifies Latin American leftists as "populist" and "social democratic" (2008). There lies, in the first category, the governments of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela for exemple. In the second one, the Lula government in Brazil and Tabaré Vazquez ( ), Uruguay. For the author, the explanations for the emergence of two types are in the democratic institutions and the different impacts of economic neoliberal reforms in the1980s and 1990s. To Panizza, Uruguay and Brazil have more complex political institutions that are able to build brakes and balances that limit the concentration of power in the executive and prevent the social polarization between "excluded" and "powerful" typical of populist political processes. Moreover, the economic situation in these two countries was relatively stable when the left parties took the power, which eventually reduced the incentives for more radical actions by these governments in economic management. The same conditions are not reproduced in Bolivia and Venezuela, whose political systems proved to be unable to handle the demands and social conflicts that have deepened with the neoliberal reforms. In these countries, according to the author, it created a political vacuum that was quickly filled by a repolarization with boundaries defined from the antagonism between the "excluded" and the "powerful and construction of new identities from socioeconomic, ethnic or cultural bases (2008). 7

8 Although also working with a rating based on two poles, Weyland has advanced in the characterization of the different leftist governments in the region (2010). For the author, you can sort the progressive governments in a continuous whose poles are composed of two types of left, "moderate" and "anti-establishment". Closer to the first pole there are, for example, Lagos-Bachelet s administrations ( ) and Lula s ( ). On the other pole, we can locate the Hugo Chavez s government (1998-) and Evo Morales s (2006-). According to Weyland, moderate governments pursue their goals prudently and through negotiation, respecting the macroeconomic constraints and political opposition. The contestatory ones challenges macroeconomic constraints - identified as neoliberal - and attacks the political opposition. According to the author, to maintain and strengthen the loyalty of their supporters, these administrations engage frequently in disputes against political opponents, business groups and the US government (2010, p. 3). To Weyland, the joint action of four variables can explain the existence of different types of the left in Latin America. They are: a) organizational characteristics of the ruling parties. The Workers Party (PT) in Brazil and the Chilean Socialist Party (the SP) have a higher level of institutionalization of the Bolivian Movement to Socialism (MAS) and the Bolivarian movement in Venezuela. The different levels of institutionalization provoke different pressures on governments. In Bolivia and Venezuela, governments are subject to incentives to avoid the fluctuation of his supporters, forcing them to deploy more short-term policies. Moreover, the party structures have little ability to oppose government decisions. In Brazil and Chile, Lula and Lagos double-bachelet had more incentive to focus on long-term goals and came under pressure within their own parties. b) the party system performance. The PT and the SP operated in more institutionalized party systems than the one existing in Venezuela and Bolivia. Thus, Lula and Lagos-Bachelet s, compared to Chavez s and Morales s administrations acted in a context of greater political restriction caused by the existence of institutional controls and consolidated electoral rules, as well as a dynamic opposition with real chances of victory and able to monitor the government's actions. c) Impact of pro-market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. The pro-market reforms in Brazil and Chile were more successful than in Venezuela and Bolivia. In the first two 8

9 countries the economic stability gained secured an important electoral support base and resulted, in an institutionalized context of political competition, the moderation of the PT and the SP. In Venezuela and Bolivia, the reforms have had dramatic impacts on populations, which caused the alternatives of the left to emerge in the context of great dissatisfaction with the economic management of neoliberal cut. d) Plenty of natural resources, particularly oil and gas. In Venezuela and Bolivia, leftist governments have benefited from energy commodity price growth, which reduced the tax burden and made possible the expansion of spending in a relatively short period. This gave greater scope for these governments deepen social programs and challenging economic groups and international financial institutions. In Brazil and Chile, the government continued dealing with fiscal constraints and limitations of expenses that encouraged the adoption of more gradual political strategies. The combination of institutional and macroeconomic variables served in a clear direction, as interpreted by Weyland,: the left governments in Brazil and Chile were encouraged to act gradually and adopt more moderate positions than progressive administrations in Venezuela and Bolivia. Finally, it is noteworthy to mention the contribution of Levitsky and Roberts (2011b). The authors warn that the typologies based on two poles can be useful in extreme cases, such as the leftist governments in Chile and Venezuela, but are not able to capture the diversity of cases of progressive governments in the region. The authors then propose a new classification based on organizational characteristics of the ruling parties. From two dimensions, there are four categories of leftist governments. The first dimension is the party institutionalization level. This dimension makes a distinction between established parties and new parties and movements. In the first case, the associations have bureaucratic structures, identities and consolidated support networks and compete long elections. In the second, the parties are recent creations and were formed as political vehicles for leaders and / or popular movements that emerged in times of economic and political crisis in the 1990s and 2000s. The second dimension concerns the level of concentration of power. This dimension separates the parties among those where there is a concentration of power in the hands of a personality and that there is a power of dispersion among the party structures and networks of social movements. The combination of these two dimensions derive, according to Levitsky and Roberts, four categories: 9

10 Institutionalized Left Partisan (with two subtypes: Professional Left-Election and Organic Mass); Left Movimentista; Populist Machine; and Populist Left (2011b, pp ) (Table 1). Table 1 Authority dispersed Authority concentrated Established Party Institutionalized party Left Professional- electoral Left (PSCh; PT) Left organic mass (FA) Populist machine (Peronismo under the Kirchner) New party / movement Left movimentista (MAS) Populist left (Chávez and Correa governments) Fonte: Levistky e Roberts, 2011, p. 13 For Levitsky and Roberts, the different types of leftist governments have impact on the different policies and programs adopted by each of them. The Institutionalized Left Partisan, for instance, adopted a path in the economic and social areas that the authors qualify as social- liberal. It kept relatively orthodox macroeconomic policies combined with increasing investments in social policies. Moreover, the political aspect followed a democratic- liberal orientation, respecting the rules of the electoral game and the existing constitutional framework. The Left Movimentista adopted a heterodox macroeconomic policy, increasing state intervention without, however, radically alter property rights. Politically, it followed a direction that the authors qualify as plebiscitary, mobilizing broad social segments to make constitutional changes and expand executive power (2011b, pp ). As you can observe, typologies based on two poles come to very similar results regardless of their level of refinement and degree of normativity (Silva, 2011). Levitsky and Roberts s proposition (2011b), although overlap at various times to the analysis of Weyland (2010), presents more nuances. For this article, the discussion of the different types of the left in Latin America has a dual significance. First, we analyze the different types of left and if their governments exercised different impacts on the quality of democracy in the cases studied. Secondly, from our analysis we 10

11 intend to contribute to this debate to look deep into the unfolding of democratic regimes in countries that relied on the left of governments and to check whether the proposed typologies can capture the differences and classify cases satisfactorily. For that matter, the choice of the analyzed governments is essential. Lula s government in Brazil, and Lagos-Bachelet s in Chile, are always part of the same field in both types based on two poles and based on four categories. But the Morales s government in Bolivia and Chavez s in Venezuela, appear as examples of contestationary left (Weyland, 2010) and as cases of Left and Populist Movimentista respectively (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011b). Thus, the analysis of these four cases allows us to both assess the impacts caused by different types of left and the accuracy of some types of proposals. Assessing the quality of democracy The literature on the quality of democracy recognizes the multidimensional nature of the subject. Moreover, the work highlights the need to build indicators that are effectively able to assess the quality of the system in different countries and times (Altman and Pérez-Liñan, 2002; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Levine and Molina, 2007; 2011). Altman and Pérez-Liñan, in an analysis with more a quantitative approach, worked with three dimensions (Civil Rights, Participation and Competition) (2002, pp ). Diamond and Morlino reached eight dimensions, five procedural (Rule of Law, Participation, Competition, Vertical Accountability and Horizontal Accountability), two substantive (Freedom and Equality Policy) and the last one that combines elements of both previous types (Responsiveness) (2005, pp. xiv-xxxi). Levine and Molina chose to work exclusively with five procedural dimensions (Electoral Decision, Participation, Accountability, Responsiveness and Sovereignty) (2011, pp. 7-12). As reported Diamond and Morlino (2005) and Levine and Molina (2011) many dimensions can relate to and overlap in the cases s analysis. Hagopian, for example, converted the previous eight dimensions proposed by Diamond and Morlino in just two to realize its comparative analysis of the Brazilian and Chilean cases (2005, p. 125). We use a similar approach here. To ensure the depth and details of the analysis and at the same time avoid excessive overlapping of the dimensions, we chose to reduce eight dimensions indicated by Diamond and Morlino (2005) to five. 11

12 Are they: 1) Rule of Law: This dimension includes the degree to which all citizens are equal before the law and the degree to which it is universal, public and applied by an independent judiciary. In addition, laws should work in strengthening the democratic system itself, arguing, for example, civil and political rights of citizens. 2) Participation: This dimension assesses the extent to which all citizens have the right to political participation and the extent to which the system is able to foster the effective political participation not only by voting, but to take part in political parties and civil society organizations. Thus, this dimension also covers the vertical accountability and the degree of political equality, assuming that the effective political participation of citizens requires a minimum of social conditions, as well as dissemination of education and information. 3) Competition: A democracy requires a political system in which groups compete for power by performing frequent, free and fair elections. Thus, in this dimension, we assess the degree to which the system is able to guarantee the existence of electoral competition. In addition, we analyzed the ability of electoral and party systems to sue the different demands in society, covering another important aspect of vertical accountability. 4) Horizontal Accountability: This dimension includes the degree of the authorities s accountability by other institutional actors with power to review the actions and punishment of those who govern, as constitutional courts, agencies, tribunals and committees. 5) Responsiveness: Here, we analyze the degree of regime's ability to meet the needs, interests and demands of citizens. In the words of Powell, responsiveness is what happens when the democratic process induces the government to formulate and implement policies that citizens desire. When the process induces these policies consistently, we can consider a high quality democracy (2005, p. 91). 12

13 As we can see, it contemplates both procedural as substantive aspects in our five dimensions. To evaluate them, it is possible to mobilize different empirical indicators and quantitative and qualitative research strategies. In this article, however, we follow the analysis and the data obtained by other researchers and, therefore, focus on the dimensions (2), (3), (4) and (5). We begin our analysis by the Venezuelan case. Although there is no consensus among analysts about the brands of participatory practices introduced from 1999 by the government of Hugo Chavez, there seems to be no doubt about the expansion of the mechanisms of participation in Venezuela. As said by Goldfrank, participatory principles, cronyism and Leninist ideas appear to overlap the numerous mechanisms created (2011, p. 177). Among them stood out, at first, the Local Councils of Public Planning (CLPPs), bodies composed by members of local administrations and civil society representatives to discuss the planning and budgeting at the local level. From 2005, the central government has chosen to empty the CLPPs and strengthen the communal councils (CCs). Directly subordinate to the national government, these boards are designed to function as microgovernments, creating and implementing community projects. The decision for the strengthening of CCs is subject to different analyzes. For some authors, the central government, through the allocation of resources, can keep their local mobilized bases and weaken any opposition at the local level. In this sense, the advice would be effective clientelist tools. Others, however, argue that the CCs were a solution concerning the lack of CLPPs, who now have their powers limited by both mayors aligned with the government and with the opposition (Goldfrank 2011, p. 179). The level of participation in the CCs is high. Surveys show that more than a third of adults have participated in meetings of those bodies. Participation, although higher among government supporters, is also high among opposition supporters. Some studies also indicate that the view of the public concerning the council is, in general, form a positive perspective, and that most of the proposed projects come from the community itself and not the government (Goldfrank, 2011; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011c). In this sense, many authors emphasize the positive effects of inclusion policy advice played and their ability to channel social demands dammed, especially in poor communities in large urban centers. This expansion of participatory possibilities seems to have helped to resize the satisfaction of Venezuelans with the democratic regime: in the Chávez period the satisfaction with democracy, as 13

14 measured by surveys such as the Latinobarómetro, has shown higher than the regional average and than mid-1990s in the country itself (Goldfrank, 2011; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011c; Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, 2010b). With regard to political competition and horizontal accountability, the literature analyzed here goes - despite the tone difference in the texts - for the interpretation that in the Chavez period, there was a concentration of power in the hands of the executive, weekness in control mechanisms of government action, as the Supreme Court, and greater difficulty of action for the political opposition. According to Corrales, the Venezuelan constitution of 1999 was that, through the Constituent Assembly, more powers conferred to the Executive throughout Latin America. Moreover, according to the author in the following years, Hugo Chavez has taken a series of measures that strengthened the presidency and decreased the strength of other institutions. The Supreme Court had its expanded number of judges from 20 to 36 - and the new members more aligned with the government - and the president was granted the right, via referendum, to be re-elected indefinitely. The government also expanded state control over the media by restricting the activities of private groups of media. In 2007, the state had control of 85% (six channels) of the television signal in the country (2011, pp ). Combined with an ongoing popular mobilization encouraged by the government, they further weakened the role of political parties, hindering the opposition activities within the institutions (Lopez Maya, 2011). This weakening has been expanded with the opposition's decision to boycott the general elections in 2005, leaving the National Assembly even more subordinate to the executive branch. In Bolivia, Evo Morales administration also strengthened participatory mechanisms. The government used recalls and referendums, established regular consultations with the social movements through assemblies and conventions and created the National Coordination for Change (CONALCAM), a body that brings together leaders of social movements, members of the executive and Congress to discuss public policy (Anria, 2010; Madrid, 2011). Unlike the Venezuelan case, however, the social movements in Bolivia have more freedom from the government, being able to organize and mobilize autonomously (Anria, 2010; Madrid, 2011). The Morales government also seems to have managed to scale the level of satisfaction of Bolivians with democracy. The literature indicates that his rise to power and the greater participation of historically marginalized sectors in decision-making were 14

15 critical to the growth of support for democracy and democratic institutions in Bolivia. According to Latinobarómetro, the proportion of Bolivians satisfied with the democratic regime jumped from 24% in 2005 to 50% in Data from Latin American Public Opinion Project (Lapop) shows that satisfaction with democracy grew among those who classified themselves as indigenous than among whites and mestizos (Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, 2010b; Madrid, 2011; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011c). The Evo Morales administration has also served to strengthen the executive power and to reduce the horizontal accountability (Anria, 2010; Madrid, 2011). The government pressured the resignation of members of the National Electoral Court, appointed supporters to the traditionally independent Attorney General, lowered the salaries of the judiciary, leading to a series of layoffs and changed the composition of the main collegiate courts of the country, including the Supreme Court. After a bitter dispute with the opposition, the government pushed through a new constitution that gave more powers to the presidency and paved the way for approval of important measures in the legislature. Bolivia's new Magna Carta, approved in a referendum in 2009, established the direct election of Supreme Court justices, reduced to a simple majority to procentagem votes in Congress for the appointment of members of the National Electoral Court and the Attorney General and increased the number of Senate seats, allowing the Morales government to gain ground in these institutions. Moreover, it has also been possible to re-election for another five-year term (Weyland, Madrid and Hunter; 2010b; Molina, 2010; Madrid, 2011). According to Madrid, the government's relationship with Morales political competition and, more directly, with the opposition, put some ambiguity. On the one hand, the MAS government acted to reduce the capacity of action of the opposition as soon as it assumed power, reforming the tax system at the expense of collection of the departments controlled by opposition governors and sponsoring conducting recalls that led to the withdrawal of the governors of Cochabamba and La Paz. On the other hand, the elections held in the country have been recognized as free and fair and there is freedom of press and association (2011, pp ). Due to similarities with that literature is the PT s administration in Brazil and the socialist one in Chile, we analyze the two cases together. According to the reviews of Levitsky and Roberts (2011c) and Weyland, Madrid and Hunter 15

16 (2010b), the leftist governments in Brazil and Chile contributed to the consolidation of democracy in its liberal form. In both cases, the progressive administrations respected political competition by not changing the constitution with the aim of undermining the capacity of opposition parties. In this sense, both in the parliamentary arena as the election, opposition groups were able to operate freely without institutional constraints. This helped consolidate the party system and the electoral preferences, reflected in a growing stability in political competition. In addition, both respected the existing horizontal accountability mechanisms, such as an independent judiciary, and did not make reforms to extend the powers of the Executive, which, combined with the existence of a strong and active opposition and the need to build coalitions in the legislature, has forced governments to adopt a much more grounded strategy in negotiating the Chavez and Morales administrations. According to the literature examined here, in spite of the advances described in the consolidation of democracy, both left-wing governments were not able to deepen its democratic experiences and expand the participation of citizens in the political process (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011c; Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, 2010b; Handlin and Collier, 2011). It should be remembered, however, that the works that deal with the Brazilian case (Hunter, 2011; Goldfrank 2011, Kingstone and Ponce, 2010) do not address the experience of the National Conference of Public Policy, responsible for drawing up guidelines for public policy at the federal level. Lula's government, compared to previous governments, substantially increased the number of conferences and some of them came to have more than 600,000 participants in all its stages (local, state and national). As suggested by recent work, the decisions taken by the conference were incorporated by Congress in several bills, which suggests a link between an institutionalized participatory practice and the more traditional legislating process (Pogrebinschi and Santos, 2011; Pogrebinschi and Samuels, 2012). Final considerations What tells the literature on the 'turn left' in Latin America about the quality of democracy in the region? Different types of left in the region also exerted different effects on the quality of the system? In a way, these were the questions we seek to answer in a preliminary way in this text. 16

17 Before we proceed, it is necessary to emphasize that although the studies analyzed here touch on many points related to the evaluation of the quality of democracy neither systematically looked into this aspect. In this sense, there are still systematic empirical evidence in order to perform an analysis to reveal accurately both progress / setbacks in the quality of democratic systems for cases alone as in comparative perspective, assessing the different types of leftist governments. Therefore, we propose a research agenda that seeks to fill this gap taking advantage of the construction of specific indicators for the analysis of each of the dimensions indicated (Rule of Law, Participation, Competition, Horizontal Accountability, and Responsiveness). The analysis here points to the fact that different types of leftist governments had different impacts on the quality of democracy in their countries. Lagos, Bachelet administrations in Chile and Lula in Brazil acted in strengthening horizontal and vertical accountabilities, indicating limits on the actions of rulers and claiming the party system as the main social demands plumbing locus with the state. However, they were not able to increase the participation and resize the satisfaction of its citizens with the regime. On the other hand, the Chavez government in Venezuela and Morales in Bolivia, reduced political competition space and horizontal control over the executive branch, but increased political participation and were able to reinvigorate support for the democratic regime. This finding based on literature requires both the assumption that it must be properly tested and as a starting point for further investigations. The first one concerns the very consolidation of democracy, in a context in which you need to assess what type of scrolling has shown to be more able to build a reinforcing dynamic of the democratic regime. The second one deals with the proposed typologies here. Certainly, when we look at the relationship of left-wing governments in the region to democracy, do we talk about two or four types of progressive administrations? Perhaps we would not be facing a multidimensional phenomenon in which there would necessarily overlap between political aspects (understood in relation to democratic regimes) and economic (types of macroeconomic policy)? Regardless of the answers, it is possible to say at that we are facing an exciting universe of research still unexplored. References 17

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