State of Civil Society in the MENA Region

Transcription

1 State of Civil Society in the MENA Region Page 1 State of Civil Society in the MENA Region Origins of weak civil society by Cenap ÇAKMAK The MENA region does not have a strong civil society tradition whatsoever. It is, however, possible to point to some vibrancy in terms of civil society activism in the region, despite there being weaknesses of civil society and organized political opposition, as evidenced by freedom deficit, women s empowerment deficit and human capabilities/ knowledge deficit in the Arab World. 1 Low degree of freedom, as the Arab Human Development Report of 2002 recalls, is confirmed by a number of objective indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, political rights and independence of the media. 2 Similarly, in terms of gender empowerment, the Arab region performs worse than any other region in the World, with the exception of sub-saharan Africa. The poor performance of the Arab world is due to the limited participation of women in political organizations. 3 Notwithstanding some slight and minor improvements in the field of fundamental rights and freedoms in the early 2000s, civil society 1 Arab Human Development Report 2002: Building a p.27 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p.28 has never been allowed to flourish in the MENA region. According to the 2003 Arab Human Development Report, civil society organizations in many an Arab country suffered more legal and practical constraints. 4 The very same report confirmed the critical persistence of the three deficits identified in the previous reports and further concluded that challenges to human development in the region were even graver than before, especially with respect to freedom. 5 Ironically, poor performance in the field of political freedom is both the outcome of a weak civil society tradition and the underlying cause for the growing popular activism during the Arab awakening. Scholarly studies and academic reports concur that civil society remains weak in the region because of the deliberate repression of the political opposition groups by the authoritarian 4 Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a p.31 5 Ibid., p.32 Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) Mecidiyeköy Yolu Caddesi, No:10, Şişli -İSTANBUL bilgesam@bilgesam.org Phone: Fax: All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied, transmitted without the written permission of BILGESAM.

2 State of Civil Society in the MENA Region Page 2 regimes. It is also ironic to observe that these regimes often rely on repressive measures while also showing some intent to introduce reforms. It appears that they have oppressed political opposition because they have rightly feared the spread of Islamist ideas and further popularity of Islamist movements which were the agents of stronger opposition: The Islamic currents constitute a wide spectrum, with wide internal variation. The great majority of Islamic currents in Arab countries represent widespread societal forces and have deep popular roots as a result of their practice over many years of social and political action among ordinary people. The mainstream currents have experienced important developments over the past five decades with regard to their stance on certain societal issues, such as respect for human rights and good governance or democracy, that will be crucial for the future Similarly, most of these mainstream currents are witnessing a noticeable growth, among their relatively younger generations, of an enlightened leadership, at the moment that these younger generations are increasingly appearing at the top of their organizational hierarchy. In addition, there is growing activity from the grass-roots demanding greater internal democracy. 6 Political administrations have never trusted Islamist groups; but pro-freedom groups, women rights advocacy organizations or other similar grassroots movements have also held certain doubts as to whether Islamists would actually contribute to an agenda of democratization: 6 Arab Human Development Report 2006: Building a p.2 The chief concern is that these movements would rescind the very freedoms they need in order to come to power once they have gained it. Freedom of belief, opinion and expression and a range of personal freedoms have, at different times, been singled out by some Islamic opposition leaders as inconsistent with what they conceive of as true Islam. The manifestos of some of these movements, such as the programme of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have not dispelled such doubts. 7 Additionally, the presence and activism of Islamist groups and movements on the political stage rarely has anything to do with promotion of democracy and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. In other words, transition to democracy is not their strategic demand. It is, rather, their path to power, which will then enable them to implement their strategic goal of building Arab society on their vision of Islam. 8 The authoritarian governments in the Arab world, which depict these movements as threats to the state and the nation, have justified their repressive measures to keep them under control. Despite the oppressive measures implemented by national governments which justified them by reference to the alleged threat that Islamist movements had posed, civil society sector was still able to flourish, at least to some extent. Civil society groups in different parts of the Arab world have promoted press freedom, freedom of expression and other fundamental rights issues by reliance on the extensive use of technology, 7 Arab Human Development Report 2009: Building a p.71 8 Ibid.

3 State of Civil Society in the MENA Region Page 3 particularly the Internet. Growing interest by civil society groups in the use of the Internet was evident even well before the Arab Spring. As 2005 Arab Human Development Report notes, civic action in the region was distinguished by a growing pluralism and enlarged Internet presence, testifying to a new assertiveness and sense of public mission in civil society. 9 Civil society institutions were able to accommodate the demands of the people and convey them to the public sphere. However, due to the challenges they have encountered, particularly in connection with the oppression and brutality of the governments, these institutions were unable to perform the roles they were expected to play firmly in the MENA region. According to the 2004 Arab Human Development Report, undemocratic regimes and the tradition of tribalism have been two main sources of threats to freedom and to the proper performance of services and roles by the civil society institutions. 10 It is not fair and realistic to expect a vibrant and influential civil society in the Arab world due to the domination of the authoritarian state tradition in the region: The emergence of the modern authoritarian system played a large role in curtailing the growth of civil institutions. Though European capitalism brought with it new values relating to the state, politics and society, these did not originate in local conditions. Hence the cycle through which the foundations of a law-based state and 9 Arab Human Development Report 2005: Building a p.2 10 Arab Human Development Report 2004: Building a p.83 an independent civil society resistant to oppression might have been established was never completed. 11 Governments in Arab countries often portray civil society organizations as agents of external forces and enemies, and put in efforts to undermine the public image of these institutions. Coupled with the heavy and intense restrictions and legal obstructions, the unfair campaign of the governments contributes to the deterioration of their image among the general public. For this reason, civil society groups often have limited membership. This is also why political parties are reluctant to work in tandem with these institutions. 12 Identity Crisis in the Middle East The Middle East region suffers from an identity crisis, 13 and the legacy of the colonial period could be cited as the most important reason for lack of strong national identity in the region. It is arguable that settlement in the aftermath of World War I created one key issue in the region that has remained unresolved ever since: partition, or taqsim, the division of the Arab world into separate states where nationalism has posited a single people. 14 This has been the main motive behind Arab nationalism and the emergence of efforts seeking Arab unity. These efforts have failed, however, because the 11 Arab Human Development Report 2009: Building a p Ibid., p P.R. Kumaraswamy, (2006). Who am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East. Middle East Review of International Affairs 10(1), Fred Halliday, (2005). The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p.91

4 State of Civil Society in the MENA Region Page 4 individual regimes were never able to agree on what type of unity they should strive for and on what type of institutional structures it should be based. 15 Additionally, the changes introduced to create a national identity were mainly responses to specific external pressures. 16 Over time, it has also become apparent that despite efforts and impositions by central state apparatuses upon their people for national unity, opponents have found ways to mobilize a counter-power based on such alternatives as an appeal to regional or communitarian loyalties or to a rival interpretation of the proper role of religion. 17 With the exception of Iran, Turkey and, to a certain extent, Egypt, the countries in the MENA region are highly exposed to potential danger arising from incomplete nation building because people rarely associate themselves with a national identity. Instead, ethnic, sectarian and religious affiliation appears to be stronger among ordinary people. For instance, studies found that Arab and Islamic identity was stronger than Libyan national identity. In a public survey of 600 Libyans, it was concluded that 56% of the respondents defined themselves as Muslim, 25% as Arab and only 18% as Libyan. 18 This poses a serious threat to creating a sense of national unity, and it is argued that the presence of rival ethnic and religious groups seeking to expand their spheres of influence and autonomy in these countries is undermining the viability of the different regimes. 19 Without a robust national identity, powerful society and enhanced civic participation, democracy cannot fulfil its ordinary functions in the region. Holding fair and free elections in such an environment is not the proper solution. As shown through previous experience, absence of a developed civic life may result in the ascendancy of extremists and their checkmate by military power. 20 Most MENA countries have strong state apparatuses but weak societies, which poses another major obstacle to the introduction of a smoothly functioning democracy: not only is there no strong political group or entity to limit the state s power, but also the majority of people, due to uneven and rapid modernization, remain poor and uneducated. 21 It could therefore be argued that sectarian and ethnic divisions run too deep to permit democracy in the region. 22 These divisions are not limited to ethnic or sectarian differences: tribal identity is also strong in some parts of the Middle East. For example, in Yemen, tribes have permanent offices of leadership, and rituals and procedures for installing 15 Roger Owen, (2003). State, Power and Politics in the Making of Modern Middle East. New York, NY: Routledge., p Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations, p Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of Modern Middle East, p Doğan, Gürkan and Durgun, Bülent (2012). Arap Baharı ve Libya: Tarihsel Süreç ve Demokratikleşme Kavramı Çerçevesinde Bir Değerlendirme. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 5(15), p Sati Yılmaz, (2010). Orta Doğu ya Demokrasiyi Getirmek. International Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences 3(5), Richard N. Haass, (2003). Toward Greater Democracy in the Muslim World. The Washington Quarterly 26(3), p Ali R. Abootalebi, (1988). Civil Society, Democracy, and the Middle East, Middle East Review of International Affairs 2(3), September, 1988, p Larry Diamond, (2010) Why are There No Arab Democracies, Journal of Democracy 21(1), p.95

5 State of Civil Society in the MENA Region Page 5 and rejecting leaders. 23 Regimes often exploit these differences and weak national identities in order to remain in power, cultivating tribal or sectarian loyalties and pitting groups against one another. 24 For many years, Lebanon has suffered from the repercussions of the influence of Syria and Iran, which have taken full advantage of Lebanon s fragmented society and the presence of groups ready to align with them to interfere in its domestic politics. In Lebanon, where 17 communities, whose cultures and sociopolitical conditions and particularities did not neatly overlap, were patched together into a unitary state identity is also expressed in religious terms religion refers not only to canonical and theological beliefs but also to social beliefs, practices, and values associated with the various religious communities. 25 The divided nature of the society and absence of a genuine national identity led to the pursuit of a consensus or arrangement between the different groups. Although this arrangement could not create a real democracy, the Lebanese consociational democracy (See Lijphart 1969) at least should propose a solution. In Iraq and possibly in some other countries on their way to transitioning to a democratic order which suffer from weak national identities simultaneously, political parties seem to be be- 23 Shelagh Weir, (2007) A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, p Abdelwahab El-Affendi, (2010). Political culture and the crisis of democracy in the Arab World. In Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi (Eds.), Democracy in the Arab World Explaining the Deficit. New York, NY: Routledge, p Robert G. Rabil, (2011). Religion, National Identity, and Confessional Politics in Lebanon: The Challenge of Islamism. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p.141 lieve that to be part of a political process, one must somehow be part of the government. Otherwise, one has no role in the political process, and one s only options are submission or resistance, the latter in the form of boycott, sabotage, terror, or armed insurrection. 26 This eventually reduces the likelihood of the survival and sustainability of a democratic order, even if free elections where rival parties compete for office are held on a regular basis. As in the Iraqi case, people align themselves with sectarian or ethnic lines in elections, almost completely ignoring the political programs and promises of the competing parties. 27 Currently, even the countries that made a smooth transition to a democratic order at the initial stage of the Arab Spring now face serious challenges concerning lack of a democratic culture; a problem that can be associated with an identity crisis. This identity crisis is also pertinent to a failed nation-building in most Middle East countries. Because of the need to recognize the ethnic, sectarian and religious identities (in the absence of a strong national identity), a pluralist democracy that is built upon ethnic or religious identities 28 appears to be a widely accepted solution in the region. However, this model failed in Lebanon; and the recent developments in the aftermath of the Arab Spring changes also revealed that tribal, sectarian and ethnic allegiances proved to be stronger, making an introduction of a cit- 26 Bernard Lewis, (2010). Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p Andreas Wimmer, ( ). Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq. Survival 45(4), Cenap Çakmak and Murat Ustaoğlu (2015). Post-Conflict Syrian State and Nation Building: Economic and Political Development. New York, NY: Palgrave, p.26

6 State of Civil Society in the MENA Region Page 6 izenship-based identity almost impossible to achieve. Thus, the failure to sustain the initial success and achievements in the popular uprisings may, at least partially, be associated with an abysmal lack of a strong national identity which would represent the accommodation and convergence of societal demands. Findings of recent studies reveal that national allegiance is weak in the Arab world because, according to the Arab Human Development Report, 29 Arab states took shape, in most cases, under the pressure of historical events on which the will of Arabs themselves had very little effect. The same report further argues that the people were not the source of state sovereignty and that the will of the people was not incorporated into the political system because the social contract was arbitrary and devoid of legitimacy. 30 The modern Arab states, as summarized in the report, did not emerge from the collective agency of the people, unlike nation-states in the West, which developed their own political and constitutional way of life Most emerged either as a consequence of the individual ruler s wishes, inscribed in a document bestowed on the people, or through a popular yes-no referendum drafted in such a way as to preclude any discussion. 31 In other words, a flawed and poor construction of the state and nation is almost an inherent deficiency of the nation-building process in most Arab countries: The consolidation of the Arab state did not take into consideration the extent of kinship and ethnic ties among the human groups that formed the administrative units of countries which subsequently went on to become states. Their borders often appear contrived, enclosing diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic groups that were incorporated as minorities in the postcolonial era. The homogenising project of the Arab state has never been a smooth transition towards inclusion. Rather, a strong nationalistic trend developed with the objective of masking the diversity of the population and subduing its cultural, linguistic and religious heterogeneity under command structures. 32 Most Arab states did not introduce democratic governance and institutions of representation that ensure inclusion, the equal distribution of wealth among various groups, or respect for cultural diversity, leading identity-based groups in some Arab countries to try to free themselves from the captivity of the nation-state in whose shadow they live. 33 In the absence of political legitimacy, diverse ethnic, religious, sectarian and linguistic groups have developed a culture of distrust, resulting in emergence of militant political and religious groups some of which have strong track records in providing social services. 34 Wimmer, Andreas ( ). Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq. Survival 45(4), Arab Human Development Report 2005: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries. New York, NY: United Nations Publications, p Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries. New York, NY: United Nations Publications, p Ibid. 34 Ibid.

7 State of Civil Society in the MENA Region Page 7 About BILGESAM Established in 2008, the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) is one of the leading think tanks in Turkey. As a non-profit, non-partisan organization BILGESAM operates under the guidance of a group of well-respected academics from different disciplines, retired military generals and diplomats; and aims to contribute regional and global peace and prosperity. Closely following the domestic and international developments, BILGESAM conducts research on Turkey s domestic problems, foreign policy and security strategies, and the developments in the neighbouring regions to provide the Turkish decision-makers with practical policy recommendations and policy options. About Author Cenap Çakmak is professor of international law and head of international relations Department at Osmangazi University. He is a visiting researcher at T.M.C. Asser Institute: Center for Int l and European Law and international law fellow at the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGE- SAM). He has published numerous articles and books on international law and international relations at home and abroad.