Call for Papers ECPR General Conference 2015, August, Montreal

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1 Giovanni Amerigo Giuliani, PhD Candidate, Scuola Normale Superiore, Istituto di Scienze Umane (SNS), XXIX cycle Call for Papers ECPR General Conference 2015, August, Montreal Radical Right Parties and Welfare Issues in Western Europe. A New Winning Formula? Empirical evidence from French Front National and Italian Lega Nord. Draft version 1 1. Introduction. The emergence and success of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) in Western Europe is both a political and academic salient issue, which has been extensively probed during the last decades. Since the 1990s, and in some cases even before, RRPs have gained growing electoral support, presenting themselves as the new challengers to the traditional parties (Kriesi, 2008), affecting the national political background and, sometimes, playing a key role in the victory of centre-right-wing coalitions. Notwithstanding that it is largely demonstrated that RRPs are not a temporary phenomenon and that they are playing a key role in altering European countries party systems, there is no complete agreement within the academic community concerning the factors explaining their electoral success. More precisely, there is not even an agreement in the exact definition of such parties. Indeed, different labels have been employed to define basically the same group of parties, further complicating the understanding of the topic examples can be Betz radical right-wing populist parties (1993), Kitschelt and McGann s new radical-right parties (1995), Ignazi s extremeright parties (1992, 2003), Van der Brug s anti-immigration parties (2000, 2005), Rydgren s movements of exclusion (2005) and Swank and Betz and right-wing populist parties (2003) 2. What is crucial to underscore is that researchers have attached different prominence to the role played by the cultural and economic dimension in explaining RRPs emergence and, in particular, electoral success. The choice of highlighting one dimension rather than the other has therefore led to different, and sometimes discordant, theoretical explanations in the study of the Radical Right.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1!This paper is just a preliminary work of what will constitute a broader and more accurate research, and thus aims only at giving a partial view of the topic analysed. Therefore, data as well as the method employed are mainly a starting point and will be successively strengthened and widened. Please do not cite without permission of the author.!! 2!Following Kitschelt line of reasoning (2007), in this work, I settled on the more general and comprehensive term Radical Right, used by Mudde (2007) and Carter (2005), rather than Extreme Right, chosen by Ignazi (2003), as extreme in everyday language tends to suggest an explicit rejection of democracy, which is, on the contrary, a political approach not shared by most parties covered by the more inclusive notion of Radical Right.!! 1!

2 Cultural Dimension Prominence in RRPs analysis From a theoretical perspective, RRPs, as all the other parties, compete in a bi-dimensional political space (Kitschelt 1995; 2004; 2007; Kriesi, 2008; 2012). As Kitschelt explained (2004), the first dimension, the Socialism vs. Capitalism dimension, concerns the allocation of resources, redistributive political allocation vs. allocation of income in accordance with the market while the second one deals with topics related to processes that bring about collective outcomes Libertarian vs. Authoritarian dimension. During the Seventies and the Eighties, competitive space was essentially one-dimensional, the Socialism-Capitalism dimension, but in the Nineties a rotation of voter distribution occurred and this led to a centripetal trend, as all parties converged to the centre of the Socialism- Capitalism dimension, while they continued on holding different positions on the Libertarian-Authoritarian dimension. For Kitschelt and McGann (1995) new RRPs have positioned themselves on both dimensions, setting up a winning formula combining an extreme and economically speaking rightists, free-marketeering as well as politically and culturally authoritarian positions. Notwithstanding that such strategy seems to fit properly for the RRPs in the Eighties and early Nineties, its explicative strength has repeatedly been questioned, most notably for the excessive emphasis it puts on neoliberal economics and also for the overestimation of the economic dimension (Betz, 1996; Jocelyn et al., 2001; Immerfall and Betz, 1998; Ivarsflaten, 2002; Mudde, 1999; Schain, 1997; Steinmetz, 1997). Indeed, Inglehart s post-materialist thesis (1990) suggests that a new political culture dominated by post-material values such as self-expression, participation, subjective well-being, trust, tolerance, and quality of life concerns has increasingly overshadowed an old political culture focusing on the distribution of scarce resources between social classes. As a reaction to this cultural revolution, politically articulated by the parties of the New Left, a silent counter- revolution occurred (Ignazi, 2003), carried on by the new Radical Right Parties. In this perspective, rather than being defined by their anti- egalitarian stance on economic issues, these new RRPs are primarily identified for supporting and promoting authoritarian attitude on cultural issues. The current trend in the literature of RRPs seems to follow mainly this approach, attributing more weight to the cultural dimension, neglecting or reshaping the relevance of the social and economic factors in explaining RRPs success. The rise and success of the Radical Right is thus analysed as a consequence of the growing salience of the new cultural dimension of conflict at the expense of the economic state-market cleavage (Bornschier, 2012). RRPs increasing popularity is to a large extent due to dissatisfaction about immigration and the multicultural society (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren, 2008, Van der Brug et al. 2005; Van der Brug et al. 2000) while the economic program is merely a secondary feature in their ideologies, employed to put into practice their core ideological positions (nativism, authoritarianism, and populism) and to expand their electorate (Mudde, 2007). An additional theoretical justification for neglecting the importance of the economic dimension in mobilizing radical right voters is that RRPs constituency share homogeneous authoritarian cultural preferences but diverges in terms of orientations regarding state intervention in the economy (Ivasflaten, 2005). The division on economic dimension could potentially hinder their electoral success as no economic realignment can occur within the constituency (Ivasflaten, 2005). Therefore, RRPs tend to adopt a position blurring strategy, i.e. they strategically avoid taking position on several divisive issues, such as economic ones, focusing on the cultural issues, in order to keep their heterogeneous constituency unified (Rovny, 2013). To sum up, for this literature stream the cultural questions of identity plays a more strategic role than economic questions. Therefore, as claimed by Oesch (2008) the formula of RRPs electoral success would seem clear: It s the identity, stupid!.! 2!

3 Bringing Economic Dimension back into RRPs analysis Although such an approach seems convincing and is supported by solid empirical evidence, the underestimation of the importance of the economic dimension for explaining RRPs rise and success has been largely criticized. This paper inserts itself into this stream and aims at investigating the role of Welfare issues, and, more generally of economic issues closely linked to the Welfare State, in the light of new exogenous pressures on the Welfare State i.e., globalization and its multifaceted aspects. More precisely, the article follows the literature claiming that newrightist parties not only have cultural agendas, but may also distinguish themselves through a newly developed Welfare and economic agenda emphasizing the interests of the native common man. (de Koster, Achterberg and Van der Waal, 2012). Put in other words, the research question is: to what extent have the welfare issues been incorporated within RRPs electoral strategy, in the light of new exogenous pressures on the welfare state? Focusing on the case of French Front National (National Front) and Italian Lega Nord (Northern League), this study will test three interconnected hypotheses: Hp1: RRPs have increased over time their focus on Welfare and economic issues, appealing to a constituency made up of the losers of globalization, in particular those from the working class. (Proletarianization Hypothesis) Hp2: In countries where RRPs are a permanent or quasi-permanent opposition force, Kitschelt s winning formula is expected to have been replaced by a Welfare-chauvinist strategy, which strictly ties the cultural and economic dimensions together (Welfare Chauvinism Hypothesis). Hp3: In countries where RRPs take part in a right-wing coalition, and therefore are institutionally tied to the mainstream right-wing parties, the Welfare-chauvinist strategy is expected to be less feasible and RRPs are expected to realign on a free-market-oriented strategy, closer to the original Winning formula (Institutionalization Hypothesis) The paper is structured in the following way: in the first and second section, I provide a theoretical justification of our hypothesis, showing how a) external pressures on the Welfare States have represented a window of opportunity for the RRPs to gain support from the losers of globalization and b) how Welfare Chauvinism can be seen as the new winning formula in particular circumstances. In the third section I present the method employed and the cases selected; in the fourth section I show and comment the results of our case study analysis (demand side and supply side). The fifth and last section is devoted to the conclusion and suggestions for future research. 2. Economic and Social Background: Exogenous Pressure on the Welfare State and RRPs When analysing the relation between the Radical Right and the Welfare State, the core question is why RRPs would have a Welfare agenda and, as a consequence, mobilize their constituency not only on the cultural but also on the economic dimension. A possible theoretical answer to this question is that exogenous pressures on the Western Europe Welfare State i.e. globalization with its multifaceted aspects could have represented, since the Nineties, a new window of opportunity for the new Radical Right. Indeed, after the Golden Age of Welfare State expansion - characterized by the widening coverage of social insurance, an increasing generosity of transfer payments, and a greater scope and quality of services (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera 2006) - the Western Europe Welfare State entered into a period of crisis, intensified in the 1980s and in the 1990s. The mainstream political parties, both right-wing and left-wing, in all advanced industrial European democracies have had to tackle with growing demands for Welfare! 3!

4 recalibration, or even retrenchment (Pierson, 2004; Stephens and Huber, 2001). Three exogenous factors strictly linked to the general concept of globalization can be counted as the main source of pressure: economic globalization effects on the traditional economic structure, the growing immigration flow and the process of Europeanization. Economic globalization Economic globalization, i.e., an increasing internalization of Western economies, has been reported as one of the main exogenous factor pressuring the European Welfare State. As Stephens and Huber claimed (2001), it is assumed to strongly favour market solutions and therefore to be particularly unfavourable to generous social policies, supported by left-wing parties and trade unions. More generally, I can state that the process of globalization has led to the formation of a new structural conflict in Western countries, opposing those who benefit from this process i.e., the winners of globalization and those who tend to feel threatened by this drastic structural change i.e., the losers of globalization (Betz, 1993; Swank and Betz 2002, Kitschelt and McGann1995, Kriesi et al. 2008). The likely winners of globalization include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citizens. Losers of globalization, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified workers, both in exposed and sheltered sectors, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community (Kriesi et al. 2008). Indeed, Freeman and Soete (1994) have stressed that, due to the globalization process, all Western European economies are experiencing a shift from an old Fordist techno-economic paradigm - based on energy-intensive production systems and services - to a new techno-economic paradigm based on information- intensive production systems and services. In other words, we are witnessing a breakdown of traditional occupational categories and a clash between skilled versus unskilled workers, labouring in the exposed and in sheltered sectors of the economy (Ferrera, Hemerijck, and Rhodes, 2000). Massive immigration flow Furthermore, another consequence of globalization, which pressures the Welfare State from another perspective, is the massive immigration into Western Europe of ethnic groups who are rather distinct from the European population. Comprehensive European Welfare States have granted some social rights and privileges to these immigrants, and this increases the perception of a cultural competition (Kriesi, 2008) for the same scarce resources on the part of the native population. Process of Europeanization Finally, in a more specific perspective, the process of European Integration, which can be considered a particular case of globalization, has affected the Welfare State of the Member States (Liebrfied, 2010). Indeed, on the one hand, this impact has been on the expenditure side: opening borders and widening social security systems for citizens of other EU states means that social transfers are no longer restricted to their own citizens and no longer used within the state territory. On the other hand, Europeanization has affected the budgetary resources of the member states: the creation of EMU has imposed strict convergence criteria, which, in turn, limit the deficit spending of the member states (Scharpf, 2000). Summing up, globalization with its multifaceted aspects has pressured from different sides the European Welfare State. Furthermore, it has transformed the basis of politics in Western Europe! 4!

5 by giving rise to a new integration demarcation cleavage, opposing globalization winners and losers.within this last group, production workers (blue collars) have been strongly hit by the erosion of industrial mass production, the Keynesian compromise, and full employment (Oesch, 2006). Their market position has gradually worsen and unlike qualified workers who exploit to their advantage technological progress and the opening of borders, production workers often lack convertible skills required to adjust to these new conditions (Oesch, 2006). These workers, which represented the core traditional constituency of the Left, no longer trust that Social Democrats (SD) can guarantee their social security channels. Indeed, SD are increasingly pressured by the economic and political commitment imposed both by the economic change due to globalization and by the EMU. Therefore, the SD s room for manoeuvre in supporting typical left- redistributive policies has been strongly limited (Lefkofridi and Michel, 2014; Mair 2007). Social Democrats in government could hardly reverse the neoliberal trend promoted by former centre-right government and, furthermore, they themselves have implemented retrenchment measures in social policy (Kitschelt, 1994; 2004). Economically speaking, traditional right-wing and left-wing parties tend to converge to the centre of the political spectrum, or even, the SD tend to experience a shift to the right. With no clear economic alternatives from traditional parties, the losers of globalization express their disappointment by voting for the only political alternative that openly opposes to economic modernization, the RRPs (Oesch, 2006; Swank and Betz, 2002; Kitschelt 2008). These parties thus succeed in attracting working class voters that hold left-authoritarian views, that is, left-wing positions on socioeconomic issues (pro-welfare) and authoritarian positions on sociocultural issues (immigration.) (Lefkofridi and Michel, 2014). The so-called authoritarian worker (Lipset, 1966) has thus finally found a political representation within the RRPs, which have undertaken a protectionist stance toward international competition, advocating trade barriers and opposing further integration in the European common market. Toning down the previous neoliberal position typical of the Eighties and Nineties, the RRPs have combined cultural authoritarianism and pro-native approach as to employment and social security. Contrary to Kitschelt s original winning formula, the new strategy for Radical right in the new century seems to be Welfare Chauvinism. 3. Welfare Chauvinism as the new Winning Formula? As previously explained, Kitschelt s winning formula (1995) has been strongly criticized, and in particular the fact of labelling Welfare Chauvinism a losing strategy, belonging to the old Radical Right parties, has been harshly questioned. Welfare Chauvinism can be considered as a combination of strong support for economic redistribution with resistance toward distributing Welfare services to immigrants (Van der Waal et al., 2010). More simple way, Welfare Chauvinism reflects the idea that Welfare services should be restricted to our own (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990). The theoretical strength of Welfare Chauvinism strategy lies in the fact that it successfully links the cultural question of immigration with the social and economic question of the Welfare State, connecting cultural and economic dimensions and exploiting both for mobilizing voters. Radical Right parties undertaking a Welfare Chauvinist programme do not clash with economic redistribution in itself, but aim at restricting this redistribution to the native population (de Koster, Achterberg and Van der Waal, 2012). To be more precise, the critique promoted by the Radical Right is not against the Welfare State in itself, but rather against its intrinsic universalistic nature, i.e. against the fact that entitlements to Welfare services are for the most part irrespective of one s origins (de Koster, Achterberg and Van der Waal, 2012). Therefore, today s Radical Right more than criticizing the European Welfare State, aims at conferring it an exclusionary definition, raising a well-defined wall separating the natives from the non-indigenous people (Grabow and Hartleb, 2013)! 5!

6 In this nativist interpretation of the Welfare State, fairly generous social benefits are to be guaranteed for the native needy (mainly pensioners and the sick), while aliens have to be excluded (Mudde, 2007). Furthermore, this exclusionary interpretation of the Welfare State is supported also on common sense financial grounds. The argumentation is that a generous and comprehensive Welfare State can only be sustained if limited to a country s own people (Mudde, 2007). Therefore, aiming at capturing disillusioned industrial low-skill workers - threatened by globalization, the challenges of post-industrial society and the arrival of competitive immigrant workers (Derks, 2006) - Welfare Chauvinism seems to be a more appropriate winning strategy compared to the original winning formula. (De Lange, 2007). Kitschelt (2007) himself has recently remodulated his original winning formula, claiming that it does no longer imply a consistent neoliberalism, but rather a compromise that is sufficiently free-market to appeal to petty bourgeois voters, but does not alienate working- class support by attacking the Welfare State too vigorously, while at the same time promising protectionism favourable to both. Notwithstanding that Isupport Welfare Chauvinism as the new RRPs winning formula, Iclaim that this strategy can be easily implemented only when the RRPs is a permanent or quasipermanent opposition party. This happens when established centre-right-wing parties adopt a cordon sanitaire strategy (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006; De Witte 1996, 1998), excluding the possibilities of embedding the RRPs within an electoral as well as governmental coalition, relegating it to the margins of the party system. This allows RRPs to avoid institutional constraints and offers them broader room of manoeuvre in choosing a strategy that, from an economic perspective, strongly diverges from that of established conservative parties. On the other hand, when RRPs join government coalitions with free-market centre-right parties, which aim at undertaking policies of accelerated economic liberalization and Welfare State retrenchment, support of Welfare State expansion is more likely to be reshaped, though not eliminated, and, in the end, RRPs are forced to realign on more free-market-oriented strategies, close to the original Winning formula. In the next paragraphs I will test empirically these theories, focusing on the case of the French Front National and Italian Lega Nord. 3. Selection of cases, Data and Method. In order to assess our hypothesis I will focus on two specific cases: French Front National (FN) and Italian Lega Nord (LN). The Front National, under the leadership of Jean Marie Le Pen, has been considered as the ideal-type of Radical Right Party, strongly corroborating Kitschelt s winning formula thesis in the Eighties and in the early Nineties. Nevertheless, several study have demonstrated a change of strategy in the late Nineties, and in particular during the first decade of the new century with the new leadership of Marine Le Pen, with a softening of its neoliberal economic rhetoric (Ivaldi, 2012; Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, 2011; 2013; Mayer, 2002; 2013). The choice of including the Lega Nord in this study could be exposed to criticism, as there is no agreement in considering it as a radical right party. Indeed, the Lega Nord has often been labelled as a regionalist populist party, emphasising the issue of separatism as a sub-form of exclusionary mobilisation (Grabow and Hartleb, 2013). Nevertheless, several researchers have included LN within the Radical Right party family (Betz, 1993; Hale Williams, 2006; Norris, 2005, Rydgren, 2005), in particular because of its authoritarian positions on the cultural dimension, which are close to those of the main European RRPs. Furthermore, in the last years the party is experiencing a new national vocation, still promoting the federalism issue but with an increased accent on such issues as immigration, employment, and European Union, which can mobilize a broader constituency, geographically speaking. For these reasons, LN seems to be a proper case of RRP.! 6!

7 Concerning the time span of this research, our goal is to cover years from 2000 up to now, making however reference to both parties positions in the Nineties. Therefore, the study will focus on a lapse of time ranging from ca.1996 to From a methodological perspective, employing a mixed method research design (Morgan, 2014) - combining therefore quantitative and qualitative research techniques I will follow the approach suggested by Kriesi (2008; 2012) and therefore in order to assess our three hypotheses I will distinguish between the two sides of party competition: the demand side, covering the political preferences of RRPs electorate, and the supply side, summarizing the issue-positions of the Radical Right in the national elections. For the exploration of the demand side, I will rely on secondary analyses of existing surveys, using the 1996 International Social Surveys Program (ISSP/ Role of Government) and the 2002, 2004 and 2012 European Social Surveys. Two basic questions will guide our exploration of the demand side of FN and LN: on the one hand, I will aim at analysing their attitude towards the Welfare State and towards Immigration; on the other hand, I am interested in providing an informative description of the voters social and political characteristics: social class, level of education, self-positioning on the left-right scale. In order to operationalize the Welfare attitudes in the ESS, I will follow Krisi s strategy (2012) and use the item The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (variable gincdif, 5-point scale). In answering, respondents have specific policies in mind, so this item might reflect attitudes towards certain aspects of economic liberalism as well. I will use the same strategy to operationalize Welfare attitude in the 1996 ISSP (variable v.42). Anti-immigration sentiment is operationalized only for the 2002, 2004 and 2012 ESS, as the 1996 ISSP unfortunately does not provide data. I will employ two different indicators: immigration bad for country s economy (variable imbgeco) and country s cultural life undermined by immigrants (variable imueclt). The first indicator allows us to link the immigration issue to the economic dimension, therefore it could provide, combined with the Welfare attitude indicator, a quite comprehensive, though not perfect, idea of voters inclination towards Welfare Chauvinism. The second immigration indicator helps us to frame immigration within a cultural perspective. The operationalization of social class indicator deserves a final remark. I chose to employ the scheme set up by Daniel Oesch 3 (2006) and therefore I will distinguish the following eight categories: (1) large employers and self-employed professionals, (2) small-business owners, (3) managers, (4) technical specialists, (5) sociocultural specialists, (6) clerks, (7) service workers, and (8) production workers. In analysing the data, managers and technical and sociocultural specialists are combined into a large group, the salaried middle class, while service and production workers are grouped together as a unique working class. As far as the demand side is concerned, in order to assess the position of RRPs on economic and Welfare State issues, I analysed National Election Manifestos for the Front National and Lega Nord, employing Comparative Party Manifesto Database (CMP) (Volkens, Lehmann, Matthieß, Merz, Regel, Sven, Werner, 2015). In order to operationalize the general property Welfare State issues, I chose two main indicators Welfare State Expansion and Welfare State Limitation and other strictly linked indicators listed in Handbook of the CMP 4.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 3!I will rely on information from three variables: a) the employment status, separating employers and the self- employed from the much larger group of employees;!b) the number of employees, distinguishing between large and small employers on the one hand and the self-employed without employees on the other; and!3) the occupational title, assigning individuals to different work logics and different hierarchical levels on the basis of their occupation (using the International Standard Classification of Occupations Isco88 and the new Isco-08).! 4!The indicators are the following: Free Market Economy, Incentives: Positive, Market Regulation: Positive, Protectionism: Positive, Protection: Negative, Keynesian Demand Management: Positive, Controlled Economy: Positive, Nationalism: Positive, Economic Orthodoxy: Positive, Labour Group: Positive, Labour Group: Negative; Equality: Positive. I also include the indicator National Way of Life: Positive and National Way of Life: negative as well as Multiculturalism: Positive and Multiculturalism: Negative in order to show RRP s attitude towards immigration.!!! 7!

8 Following Lefkofridi and Michel s strategy (2014), in a mixed method perspective, I combine quantitative and qualitative methods. As far as the quantitative analysis is concerned, first I analysed the salience of the issues. The score associated to each issue represents the percentage of manifesto length devoted to such issue. Therefore, as Lefkofridi and Michel(2014) have highlighted, the higher the score, the more salient an issue is to a party. Such data allow to assess the evolution of Welfare and related economic issues salience during RRPs electoral campaigns. They also allow to compare them with the cultural issues, in particular the immigration issue. Second, as codes in CMP s classification scheme have a quasi-positional character, I re-elaborated the data in order to provide a spatial positioning of the RRPs along Kitschelt s Socialism- Capitalism dimension 5. In table 1, I show the Left-Right partition of the issues analysed in building up the Socialism-Capitalism scale. Table 1. Kitschelt s Socialism-Capitalism Dimension Right emphases: sum of % for Left Emphases: sum of %s for Free Enterprise Market regulation Economic Incentives Protectionism: positive, Protectionism: Negative Keynesian Demand Management: Positive, Economic Orthodoxy Controlled Economy Welfare State Limitation Welfare State Expansion Labour Groups: Negative Labour Group: Positive Nationalisation Controlled Economy Equality Source: Ian Budge, Data realaborated by the author.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 5!The Socialism-Capitalism scale is built up using the Ratio scaling of Right-Left positions!: (R - L) / (R + L)!, where R represents Right categories, and L the Left categories. Clearly, I re-calculated the total number of the sentences, taking into consideration only those linked to the indicators chosen. The scale varies from -100 to +100, with -100 meaning extreme Left and +100 meaning Extreme Right. As the scale measures the ideological positions regarding Economic dimension, the Immigration indicators are not included.!! 8!

9 Finally, I will move from a quantitative descriptive statistical analysis to an in-depth qualitative content analysis of two specific Manifestos, the 2012 French Front National manifesto and the 2013 Lega Nord manifesto. This strategy has been chosen to provide a link between immigration and Welfare issues without employing regression analysis. Party Manifesto provides precious data regarding the issue-salience and also the Right-Left positioning of the parties, but they lack information about the specific content over the issue. A qualitative analysis of the manifestos can overcome these shortcomings, allowing to obtain a more comprehensive perspective. 5. France: Front National Established in 1972, the Front National (FN) has been considered the prototype of the successful Radical Right Party. Under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen and, more recently, her daughter, Marine Le Pen, the party - thanks to its professional organization and the strategic modelhas gained a considerable electoral support in the French national elections. As table 2 shows, in the legislative election of 1997 the party obtained impressive results in terms of number of votes gained, though it could elect only one candidate. But it is in the 2002 presidential election that the party shocked the French party system, as well as the French and European society, by defeating the Socialist party candidate, Lionel Jospin, allowing Le Pen to compete in the second-round runoff visa-vis Jacques Chirac. Though Chirac won with a wide margin, the fact that FN was at the centre of the second-round national-level politics was a clear indication of its progress in French society. Nevertheless, in the 2002 legislative election the party gained no seats in the National Assembly and in the following 2007 presidential and, in particular, legislative election the party lost support (from 11.12% in the 2002 legislative election to 4.29% in the 2007). Table 2: Percentage of vote in legislative election and absolute number of seats. (Election: 1997,2002, 2007, 2012) 1 % of votes (Presidential) 3 % of votes (Legislative 4 ) Absolute number of Seats 1997 n/a % % % % 4.29 % % % 2 Source: Comparative Manifesto Project 1 I analysed only legislative elections as Comparative Party Manifesto database provides data only on legislative elections. It is important to underline that in France with the 2000 major constitutional amendment and since 2002, presidential and legislative elections have been synchronized, reducing the presidential term to five years, the same as the maximum term for the National Assembly. This new arrangement was designed specifically to diminish the possibility that presidency and parliament be controlled by different parties, a form of divided government known in France as cohabitation (Laver et al., 2005). 2 The presidential election took place in First round; 4 First round. But in 2012, under the renewed charismatic leadership of Marine Le Pen, FN seems renew its political momentum, with 17.90% of votes gained in the presidential election and 13.60% in the legislative ones, obtaining two seats in the French Assembly. As in these elections FN run alone, it seems fair to state that the political strategy of the FN was, and still is, the isolation, i.e. to strictly refuse to make alliance with the mainstream right party - at the same time, the mainstream right refuses to ally with FN. In other words, the FN has preferred to be a spoiler rather than to allow another party prone to introducing policies akin to its own to come into power (Hale Williams, 2006). FN is thus determined to win support alone without alliances with the mainstream right, despite the risk that a left-wing party might come to power.! 9!

10 I can now proceed with an in-depth analysis of FN, taking into consideration both the demand and supply side of party competition. 5.1 Findings from the Demand Side analysis of Front National 6 The quantitative descriptive analysis of the demand side is crucial in order to assess the core part of our first hypothesis, the Proletarianization Hypothesis, i.e. understanding whether FN has attracted the losers of globalization, in particular that part of the working class hit by globalization, which strongly supports Welfare State expansion and at the same time opposes growing migration flows. In the effort to assess our hypothesis, I shall first provide a dynamic description of the political and social characteristics of the FN electors, probing their self-placement on the Left-Right scale, their educational background and, most important, their social class. Concerning their positioning on the L-R scale, we can observe in table 3 that a remarkable percentage of voters place themselves at the centre of the scale, showing that FN succeeds in gaining support not only from an extreme constituency but also from a more moderate one. Nevertheless, the cumulative percentages of those who position themselves at the right or extreme right of the L-R continuum have increased over the years, with a peak in the 2012, where almost 60% of the voters placed themselves to the Right (graphic 1). On the other hand, in the 2002 only a considerable percentage of voters of FN (29.7%) answered to feel more left-wing, while in the following years this percentage decreased drastically (19.3% in 2007 and 11.2% in 2012). In conclusion, it seems fair to say that FN electors have stabilized to the right or even extreme right of the L-R scale, acting as a typical constituency of a Radical Right party, though a high percentage of centrist voters continues to be represented. Graphic 1. Percentage of FN voters positioning on the Right and Left of L-R scale. Source: ESS (2002; 2004; 2012). Data realaborated by the author. Concerning the educational background, I insert this social indicator because, as countries modernize, cognitive skills and cultural resources become more important for an individual s place in society and to adapt to the globalization challenges to the labour market (Kriesi, 2012). As table!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6!All the data shown are weighted. For the ISSP I used the general weight (V325) provided directly by the database. For the ESS we used the Design weights (DWEIGHT), which adjust for different selection probabilities. Due to a different graphic layout, all the main tables of the demand side of FN are shown in Appendix A.! 10!

11 4 and 5 show, with the exception of 1996 where 48.6% of FN electors had not completed the secondary education, a high percentage of the voters completed upper secondary education (48,2% in 2002, 41.5 in 2004 and 58.5% in 2012), indicating that FN constituency may fairly be considered as having an average education. Nevertheless, as graphic 2 shows, the cumulative percentages of FN low-educated voters (the group of electors having not completed lower secondary education or with only secondary education) is quite high, though a sizeable change of trend, especially in 2012, can be noted. Finally, it must be underlined that the group of voters who own a university degree is highly underrepresented. This leads us to conclude that, though a high percentage of FN voters have an average level of education, over the years the number of low-educated supporters of FN remains high, while the party has never succeed in winning the support of a highly-educated constituency. Graphic 2. Percentage of low-educated FN voters Source: ISSP (1996) and ESS (2002; 2004; 2012). Data realaborated by the author. The final and most important social indicator I wish not to point out is the social class of FN electors. As already explained, a stream of literature states that RRPs receive support from two different constituencies, the petite-bourgeoisie in particular small shop-owners or self-employed workers- and the working class. The two constituencies have a different conception of the role of the government in the economy and for this reason RRPs tend to mobilize their heterogeneous electorate on the cultural dimension, not taking a clear position on the economic dimension. Table 6 shows how this theory, for the Front National, does not fit in the Nineties nor in the last years. Though I have only data from the 1996 ISSP and 2012 ESS, it is clear that the FN is supported mostly by a working class (production workers and service workers), while the salaried middle class (managers, technical, sociocultural specialists and clerks combined together) is underepresented as well as the large employers and self-employed professionals and the petitebourgeoisie class (graphic 3). In particular the latter, though its percentage of supporters has increased in 2012, continues to be relatively low. The FN constituency, though not completely homogenous, appears to be predominately represented by that working class that traditionally has represented the core social-democrats electorate.! 11!

12 Graphic 3. FN Voters Social Class Source: Data elaborated by the author. Having provided an informative diachronic description of the main social characteristics of FN electors, the second step is to show whether they support Welfare State and how they consider the immigration issue, from economic and cultural perspectives. Table 7 shows FN electors attitude towards the Welfare State, and the data clearly highlight that FN voters strongly support the Welfare State. As indicated in graphic 4 the cumulative percentages of the supporters of the Welfare State (those who strongly agree and those who agree) is beyond 70%. Therefore only a limited number of voters display opposition to welfare policies. At the same time, as shown in table 8, FN electors are strongly against immigration, as it is perceived as a serious threat to the national economy. Graphic 4. FN voters supporting Welfare State (%) Source: ISSP (1996) and ESS (2002; 2004; 2012). Data realaborated by the author. Indeed, the cumulative percentages of anti-immigration attitude from an economic perspective (graphic 5) 61.5% in 2002, 72.5% in 2004 and 73.1% in 2012 provide an indicator of the welfare chauvinism approach of FN electors: though they support the Welfare State, they want to limit it only to their own, excluding immigrants who represent a burden and a risk for the national economy.! 12!

13 Graphic 5. FN Voters Anti-Immigration Attitude Source: ESS (2002; 2004; 2012). Data realaborated by the author. Furthermore, FN voters strongly oppose immigration also from a on cultural ground 76.7% in 2002, 69.5% in 2004 and 75% in 2012 but as indicated in graphic 5, the percentages are almost equal to those previously shown. This means that the immigration issue cannot be considered strictly within the cultural dimension but has a strong connection with the economic dimension. Therefore, the FN constituency mobilizes both on the economic as well as cultural dimension. In conclusion, FN is supported mainly by a medium/low-educated working class, which, by and large, positions on the right or extreme-right of the L-R continuum. The FN electors strongly support Welfare State while they harshly oppose immigration from both a cultural and economic reasons. A core part of our Proletarianization Hypothesis is thus confirmed, thus FN succeeds in attracting the losers of globalization, in particular that kind of authoritarian worker, which does not feel represented by traditional Left-wing parties. 5.2 Findings from the Supply Side analysis of Front National 7 Here I present the findings concerning the FN s salience of the welfare issues - and of those economic issues strictly interconnected with the Welfare State as well as the resulting spatial positioning of the party on the Kitschelt s Socialism- Capitalism dimension. The first thing to underline is that the total salience of Welfare and economic issues, regardless of the ideological direction, increased over the years (despite a small decline of 1.08 percentage points in 2007), with a peak in the 2012 election, while around 30% of the electoral manifesto was devoted to issues related to the economic dimension (graphic 6).!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 7!Due to a different graphic layout, all the main tables of the supply side of FN are shown in Appendix A!! 13!

14 Graphic 6. Total salience of welfare and economic issues Source: Comparative Manifesto Project By contrast, in table 3, I present the salience of those indicators which operationalize immigration issues, and which consequently belong to the cultural dimension. As graphic 7 shows, immigration total salience decreased in the new century compared to the Nineties and this indicates that immigration, though remaining crucial, is far from being considered as the single core element in FN s programme. Put in other words, data show that Front National cannot be conceived as a single-issue party (Mudde, 1999). Graphic 7. Total immigration issue salience Source: Comparative Manifesto Project Returning to the economic dimension, a more in-depth analysis of the top welfare and economic issues in FN manifestos over the years shows that protectionism positive and incentives gained the higher percentage scores in 1996 and 2002 respectively 5.33% and 4% in 1996 and 7.5% and 3.21% in 2002 but lost relevance in the following elections. Indeed, the top issues within the economic dimension in 2007 were free enterprise (5.22%) and Welfare State expansion (3.84%), while in the last legislative election in 2012 they were market regulation positive (8.08%) and Welfare State expansion (11.45%).! 14!

15 Within the economic dimension, two elements deserve our attention, free enterprise and economic orthodoxy, which are negatively associated to a pro-welfare State approach. The first which is strictly linked to a neo-liberal approach in the economic sector - has always been moderately presented (2.67% in 1997; 2.56% in 2002), with a relatively high score in 2007 (5.22%), as already underlined. Nevertheless, it totally disappeared in the 2012 election. Economic orthodoxy indeed has played a minor role (1.33% in 1997; 0.32% in 2002; and 1.31% in 2007), until a peak in 2012 (4.04%). From this preliminary analysis, it seems clear that the 2012 election represents a turning point as FN has toned down its liberal rhetoric, even though some economic-rightist elements still persist. Nonetheless, in order to have a comprehensive view of FN welfare and economic agenda, I need to analyse those indicators related directly to the Welfare State (expansion or limitation). Data clearly show an increasing trend in supporting Welfare State, with a peak in 2012 where Welfare State expansion reaches a score of 11.45%, higher than of the sum of the two anti-immigration indicators (National Way of Life negative and Multiculturalism negative). On the contrary, opposition to the Welfare State (Welfare State Limitation), though it did not completely disappear, has decreased since the 1997 election (1.33%), obtaining a 0.16% salience in 2007 and 0.67% in Furthermore, I compared FN welfare salience with that of the two French mainstream rightwing and left-wing parties (PS and Rally for the Republic/UMP). As table 13 shows, the mainstream parties not only tend to give high salience to Welfare in general, but, by and large, they support Welfare State expansion. Therefore, as both the Socialist Party and the Gaullist Party give approximately the same salience percentages to the Welfare State, Ican affirm that in French politics, Welfare State expansion goes beyond ideological cleavage, and can be conceived as a shared inter-party issue. Put in other words, from an issue salience theory perspective (Budge et al., 2001), no French mainstream party owns exclusively the welfare issue. Table 12: Welfare Expansion and Limitation Salience for the mainstream Left and Right-wing Parties (PS and Rally for the Republic/UMP RPR/UMP PS Welfare State + Welfare State - Welfare State + Welfare State % 1,64 % 4.20 % 0.70 % % 0 % % 0 % % 0.53 % % 0 % % 3.60 % % 0 % Source: Comparative Manifesto Project Nonetheless, as shown in graphic 8, the welfare expansion salience of the two mainstream French parties decreased over time, contrasting with the trend observed in FN. Therefore, FN has been able to exploit to its advantage the decrease of salience from the Socialist Party, attracting those traditional Left voters with cultural authoritarian stances.! 15!

16 Graphic 8. Welfare State Expansion salience. Comparing FN with RPR/UMP and PS. Welfare State Expansion Salience ,92 4, ,8 10,92 1, ,67 14,92 3, ,32 11,21 11, % 1.60% 3.84% 11.45% RPR/UMP PS FN Electoral Years 10 Source: Comparative Manifesto Project RPR/UMP Proceeding with the supply side analysis, I have to stress that issue salience, though crucial in order to understand the importance of welfare issues for FN, needs to be associated with an examination of position of FN on the Kitschelt s Socialism-Capitalism dimension the economic dimension, thus on the Left-Right scale. Tables 13 shows the re-elaborated data and the L-R scores, and graphic 9 provides the FN spatial positioning on the L-R scale. Graphic 9: Space positioning of the FN on the Socialism-Capitalism Dimension (Extreme Left) (Extreme Right) Source: Comparative Manifesto Project. Data realaborated by the author.! 16!

17 The figure shows clearly that over the years FN has toned down its neo-liberal economic rhetoric. Indeed, while in the 1997 legislative election the party stands on the right (L-R score: +23.2) - though not in an extreme position in the new century, it shifts towards the left pole of the Left- Right continuum, in particular in 2002 (L-R score: -21.8) and 2012 (-55.2). In conclusion, our Proletarianization Hypothesis, already confirmed in the demand side analysis, is corroborated by our analysis, as FN has deeply increased its focus on welfare and economic issues, undertaking a welfare agenda. Furthermore, it appears clear that Kitschelt s winning formula, as far as the economic issues are concerned, has lost its explicative strength, as FN positions itself on the left-side of the economic dimension, setting aside its previous extreme neo-liberal approach. The Welfare Chauvinism Hypothesis could therefore be confirmed, in particular in 2012, as FN shows an authoritarian stance concerning immigration, as previously explained, and, at the same time, promotes Welfare State expansion. Indeed, going beyond the statistical descriptive analysis and employing a qualitativeoriented content analysis, the 2012 party manifesto reveals that FN has clearly undertaken a nativist strategy, where social entitlements are expected to be guaranteed firstly or exclusively to French people. For example, in term of social security, the so-called minimum vieillesse, i.e. allocation de solidarité aux personnes âgées, should be given firstly to the French elderly. At the same time, concerning social housing, housing will be offered to people with French citizenship. Furthermore, family benefits will be granted only to those families with at least one French or European component. The same nativist strategy can be observed when taking into consideration pension policy. Indeed, FN states that in order to support the PAYG pension system and guarantee inter-generation solidarity a policy supporting a rising birth rate will be preferred to a costly and destabilizing immigration. Furthermore, on the one hand, FN aims at restoring full retirement after 40 years of work and at reducing the legal age of retirement to 60 years old ignoring the fact that pension sustainability is one of the most important problem that France and in general the Bismarckian Welfare State has to face presently -; on the other it wants to delete the right to the minimum pension (ASPA, a monthly amount of 750) for foreigners who have not worked or paid contributions in France for at least ten years. Finally, concerning employment policy, national priority must be applied to all French people, whatever their origin. Companies will be encouraged to hire firstly people with French nationality. The government too should respect this principle, and the list of jobs called de souverainité, i.e. public sector regarding law and order in particular, will be broadened. In conclusion, from our quantitative and qualitative analysis, I can affirm that, from being a perfect empirical evidence of Kitschelt s winning formula, FN, in particular under the new leadership of Marine Le Pen, can be conceived as the new clear example of RRP employing a Welfare Chauvinist strategy. Given the electoral success obtained in the last years, it seems fair to label such a new strategy a winning one.!! 17!

18 6. Italy: Lega Nord Since its establishment in 1991 as a federation of several regional parties of northern and central Italy, Lega Nord, under the charismatic leadership of Umberto Bossi, has represented a crucial actor in the Italian party system. The party's political programme has a strong regionalist component, advocating the transformation of Italy into a federal state, supporting fiscal federalism and greater regional autonomy, especially for the northern regions. In its first years, a crucial feature of the party was its advocacy for the secession of the North, the so-called Padania, though in the last decade the party has mitigated this more subversive aspect. Though LN shares some common features with other regionalist movements such as myths concerning the distinctiveness of language, culture and territory - it also possesses specific characteristics that go beyond a traditional regionalist protest. Its strong anti-southern and antiimmigrant identity reminds a type of enemy-politics more frequently associated with radical rightwing parties (Ruzza and Schmidtke, 1996). Indeed, LN, in consistence with western Europe Radical Right, is characterized by a strong rhetoric of exclusion of outsiders - both Southern Italians who immigrate into Northern Italy, and Third World immigrants - presenting these people as carriers of a foreign - i.e. dishonest, corrupt - way of life, by contrast to the honest, civic values of the North (Tambini, 2001). Opposition to the outsiders is not declined only in cultural terms, but also from an economic perspective. Indeed, southern and immigrant workers, in collaboration with the parasitic bureaucrats of Rome, are accused of living as free-riders of the Welfare State, at the expense of the productive northern citizens (Spektorowski, 2003). Table 14 shows electoral results of the Lega since 1996, the only electoral round where it run by itself not supporting Berlusconi s centre-right-wing coalition and obtained its higher result in terms of percentage of vote (10.07%). In the following elections, LN always run within Berlusconi s coalition, signing a patto di coalizione (coalition pact) and sharing with its coalition partners a common programme. The party s success declined in 2002 and 2006, while it found a new momentum in the 2008 election when it gained 8.07% of votes and obtained its higher score in terms of absolute number of seats (60). Table 14.Percentage of vote in legislative election and absolute number of seats. (Election: 1996, 2001, 2006, 2013) Percentage of votes Absolute number of Seats (Camera) % % % % % 17 Source: Comparative Manifesto Project. Nonetheless, in 201, LN lost 4.21 percentage points, obtaining its worst electoral result ever (3.86% of total votes and only 17 seats gained). In conclusion, LN electoral history, at the national level, is made up of ups and downs with no continuative trend to be symptomatic. Undoubtedly, the fact that LN had its exploit when not bound to mainstream right-wing parties is remarkable. LN therefore seems to be a proper case study for testing our Institutionalization Hypothesis, assessing therefore to what extent being institutionalized in the mainstream right-wing coalition can limit the room of manoeuvre of a RRP in undertaking pro welfare-oriented stances.! 18!

19 6.1 Findings from the Demand Side analysis of Lega Nord 8 As I previously did when probing the demand side of Front National, I will employ the quantitative descriptive analysis in order to assess the core part of our Proletarianization Hypothesis. I here provide a dynamic description of the LN electors, showing their main social features through an analysis of mass surveys 9. Concerning their self-positioning on the L-R scale, I can observe in table 14 that in 2002 and 2012 a remarkable percentage of electors (respectively 44. 3% and 42.4%) positioned themselves at the centre of the scale, the same trend observed when analysing FN voters. This demonstrates that LN electorate is made up not only of an extremist fringe, but also has a moderate electoral base. Nevertheless, the cumulative percentages of electors who position themselves to the right or extreme right of the L-R scale is markedly high, in particular in 2004, when 86% of the voters declared to be right or extreme right wing (graphic 10). On the other hand, the percentage of LN voters who state to be more left-wing is extremely low and has decreased over the years. Graphic 10. Percentage of LN voters positioning on the Right and Left of the L-R scale.! Source: ESS (2002, 2004, 2012). Data realaborated by the author.! In conclusion, it seems fair to say that LN electors mainly position themselves at the right or extreme right pole of the L-R scale, as a typical Radical Right party constituency, though a high percentage of centrist voters, as in the FN case, are represented. As far as the educational background is concerned, table 15 and 16 clearly stress that in 1996 and 2002, most LN electors had no more than a secondary level of education or had not complete it.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 8 Due to a different graphic layout, all the main tables of the demand side of LN are shown in Appendix B!! 9!For the LN, the sample size provided by the ESS is very low. For this reason, results should be used consciously as they are not intended to be generalizable. Nonetheless, they provide an interesting starting point. Further research will employ different sources in order to show more accurate data.! 19!

20 Nonetheless, low-educated group keeps on being highly represented in the 2012 (25%). Finally, let us underline that the party did not succeed in winning support from an high-educated electorate, as the percentages of voters with a university degree is nil or very low (0% in 1996 and 2002 and 12.5% in 2012) Graphic 11. Percentage of low-educated LN voters! Source: ISSP (1996) and ESS (2002, 2004, 2012). Data realaborated by the author.!! The final, and most important, social indicator I present is the social class background of LN electors. In a preliminary view, Table 17 does not entirely corroborate our Proletarianization hypothesis, as it appears clear that, in particular in the last years, LN received support from a heterogeneous electorate, at least in terms of social class. Indeed, in 2002, both the working class and the petite-bourgeoisie are equally overrepresented (respectively, 49.5% and 47.5%), while the salaried middle class is underrepresented. In 2004 the working class group was predominant, though the petite-bourgeoisie group continued to be highly represented (24.3%), though they diminished by half. In 2012 the constituency of LN is highly heterogeneous with all the social classes - except of large employers and self-employed professionals- apparently equally distributed (Graphic 12) 10. The Working class and petite-bourgeoisie are no longer overrepresented, as clerks have increased remarkably. To sum up, it seems that in the first years of the century LN electors belonged mainly to a working and petite-bourgeoisie class. More recently, in 2012, the heterogeneity of such a constituency has broadened and this could mean that economic preferences could result to be a divisive issue within the LN electorate.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 10!As!already!noted,!the!sample!used!in!this!survey!was!quite!low,!so!results!should!be!used!consciously!! 20!

21 Graphic 12. LN Voters Social Class Source: Data realaborated by the author. Having provided an informative diachronic description of the main social characteristic of the LN electors, the second step is to show whether they support the Welfare State and how they consider the immigration issue, on an economic and cultural ground. Table 18 shows LN electors attitude towards the Welfare State, and the data clearly highlight that LN voters, though belonging to different social classes, mainly support over the years the Welfare State. As indicated in graphic 13, the cumulative percentage of the supporters of the Welfare State (who strongly agree and who agree) is beyond 60%in all the survey rounds, with the exception of 2002 when the percentage of those with a positive attitude towards Welfare State was 45% and the percentages of those who hold a neutral attitude or are opposed to the Welfare State were respectively 37.2% and 17%. Indeed, this is coherent with the data on social classes previously provided. In 2002 the working class and petite-bourgeoisie were equally overrepresented, and in consequence alignment on economic issue is less likely to occur. Graphic 13. LN voters supporting Welfare State (%) Source: ISSP (1996) and ESS (2002, 2004, 2012). Data realaborated by the author.! 21!

22 At the same time, as shown in table 17, the LN electors strongly oppose immigration with a provisory reshaping in as it is seen as a serious threat to the national economy. Graphic 14. LN voters Anti-Immigration attitude Source: ESS (2002, 2004, 2012). Data realaborated by the author. Indeed, the cumulative percentages of anti-immigration attitude from an economic perspective (graphic 5) 73.3 % in 2002, 44% in 2004 and 75.1% in 2012 provide an indicator, tough not perfect, of the Welfare Chauvinism approach of the LN electors: they support the Welfare State, but they assign to it an exclusionary meaning, excluding immigrants from welfare entitlements. Furthermore, LN voters oppose immigration also on a cultural ground, but the cumulative percentages, though continuing to be high, 52.2% in 2002, 57.7% in 2004 and 50% in 2012 are more moderate compared to with those previously shown. This means that opposition to immigration is declined mostly on the economic dimension rather than on the cultural dimension. In conclusion, the LN is supported by a heterogeneous low/medium-educated, mainly rightist constituency, made up of the losers of globalization, i.e. the petite-bourgeoisie and the working class. These two social classes are both overrepresented until 2012, when LN electorate become further more heterogeneous, with the clerk social class representing the highest percentage of LN voters. Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the LN constituency, it largely supports the Welfare State and opposes immigration mainly on an economic ground. The core part of our Proletarianization Hypothesis is confirmed only partially, as the working class, though largely mobilized, does not represent the only overrepresented group in LN constituency. Nevertheless, LN succeeds in mobilizing a broad constituency made up of the losers of globalization.! 6.2 Findings from the Supply Side analysis of Lega Nord 11 In the supply side analysis of Lega Nord, I present our findings concerning the salience of the welfare issues - and of those economic issues strictly interconnected with the Welfare State as well as the resulting spatial positioning of the party on the Kitschelt s Socialism- Capitalism dimension.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 11 Due to a different graphic layout, all the main tables of the supply side of LN are shown in Appendix B!!! 22!