Mainstream parties and their conceptions of Europe: the populist contagion

Transcription

1 National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) Challenges to Democracy in the 21 st Century Working Paper No. 60 Mainstream parties and their conceptions of Europe: the populist contagion Valeria Camia Institute of Political Science University of St. Gallen Rosenbergstrasse 52 CH-9000 St. Gallen Phone: August 2013

2 Mainstream parties and their conceptions of Europe: the populist contagion Valeria Camia Abstract: The study does a longitudinal analysis of how British, French and German mainstream parties speak of the European polity and EU economic policies. The objective of the paper is to describe conceptions of Europe voice by mainstream parties and to explore whether populist claims against immigration and pro-welfare chauvinism can be attested in their conceptions. The paper generates a number of empirical measures and new qualitative data to assess changes in party conceptions between 1990 and The analysis shows that mainstream parties are vulnerable to the populist rhetoric and favoured more restrictive immigration and integration policies since the 2000s. Nonetheless, there is variation regarding the scope of the right s abandonment of economic liberalism and the extent to which the left both abdicates from its traditional commitment to cultural liberalism and turns the back to centrist economic policies. Taking a focus on the left, the findings are to be understood in relation to the broader domestic interaction context and party internal factionalism. Keywords: party family, conceptions of Europe, manifestos 1

3 Introduction The European Union, it is claimed in a number of political analyses and public debates, is at a crossroads. European integration no longer appears to bring prosperity to the member states, but in fact it demands increasing austerity measures. For many, it threatens jobs and national traditions within member states and alienates people from decision-making processes. While for most European pundits, the current problems of the EU are temporary and pertain to the lack of European input legitimacy (Scharpf, 2009; Fuchs, 2011), the political mood points to a much different direction. The last decades have seen the electoral rise of populist parties which put forward a strong anti-european agenda, are against universalistic economic distributive policies and favour cultural authoritarianism and nationalistic preferences (Fuchs et al., 2009; Bale et al., 2010, p ). The populist anti- European agenda is set against the (yet sometime cautious) pro-europeanism of mainstream parties (Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Kriesi et al., 2008). Although the influence of populist parties on other parties of the political spectrum has not yet been proven systematically, there is empirical evidence of changes in the policy supported by mainstream parties towards cultural and economic protectionism at the domestic level (see Bale, 2003; Bale et al., 2010; Camia and Caramani, 2012). This paper looks at the European level. It aims to describe conceptions of Europe supported by mainstream parties in Germany, France and the United Kingdom and to explore whether populist claims can be attested in such conceptions. This research agenda is worth asking because of its implications for the legitimacy of the EU. While generalised anti-europeanism is growing under the blessing of populism, how do mainstream parties, which traditionally support European integration, address citizens malaise? This question is answered empirically by generating original data to understand changes over time. Left, Right and the populist challenge for Europe To date, mainstream parties of the left and the right remain, generally, amongst the supporters of European integration. For the mainstream right, the relationship with Europe dates back to the very origin of the European Communities, and indeed this party family was the engine of European integration (Dimitrakopoulos, 2011). For the mainstream left, the relationship with Europe has been more turbulent and showed little uniformity (Featherstone, 1988; Marks and Wilson, 2000). Nonetheless, in the wake of post-industrialism and denationalisation taking place in Western Europe visibly since the end of the 1970s, social democratic parties gave signs of support for European integration as a means to disguise and correct a perceived failure of social democratic policy output at the national level (Cramme, 2012, p. 161; Bonoli and Powell, 2004). 2

4 Looking at the evolution of mainstream parties preferences for European integration, initial research underlined the centrality of the left right ideology (Ladrech, 2001; Gabel and Hix, 2002). For instance, Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) argue that contention about European integration is essentially about market regulation versus market liberalisation. In this model, the space of contestation on Europe mirrors the economic domestic competition between the left and the right, the former favouring common economic regulation across Europe and the latter supporting less EU market constraints. The predominance of the traditional left right competition concerning European integration is being challenged in most recent times. There is evidence that parties contestation about European integration fits within the new meaning of the lines of conflict cutting across the domestic space. These new lines of conflict are no longer about the traditional state market divide but involve opposition between different economic distributive policies and also cultural liberalism versus cultural authoritarianism s preferences (Hooghe et al., 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Kriesi et al., 2008). Amongst second-generation studies, the model developed by Hooghe and Marks (2001) explains contestation over European integration as being about old politics, i.e. preferences for traditionalism/authoritarianism/nationalism (TAN policies), in opposition to new politics, i.e. green/alternative/libertarian preferences (GAL policies). Parties on the political right, favouring the TAN set of preferences, oppose further political integration; while parties on the centre-left favour the GAL set of preferences and hence are overall welcoming political integration (see also, Marks and Steenbergen, 2004). More recently, Kriesi et al. (2008) find evidence of the restructuring of party preferences for European integration along economic and cultural dimensions together with the emergence of a new cleavage, the winner loser cleavage. This cleavage divides those people who are supportive of liberal economic policies and cosmopolitanism (therefore supporting European integration) from those people who hold xenophobic and nationalist preferences (thereby being against European integration), and it has political implications. In the last decade, mainstream parties of the left and of the right have developed their domestic programme and supported European integration in order to speak to sections of the winners of globalisation (Kriesi et al., 2008). In contrast, populist parties have been able to appeal to the losers of globalisation (Minkenberg, 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2010; Ducan, 2010). However, by demanding restrictive immigration in the EU, exclusive collectives and job market protectionism, the populist right s agenda represents a challenge to the left because it touches upon issues which are central for those people in blue-collar occupations (Bale et al., 2010). As examples, one may think of the Austrian election in 1999, when over a third of 3

5 workers voted for the populist party FPÖ; or at the rise of the far right in Denmark and in Norway, which has attracted higher portion of workers through the 1990s (Eatwell, 2000). Yet, populist parties steal voters not only from the mainstream left but also from the mainstream right, by appealing to bourgeois constituencies of middle-class entrepreneurs active in sheltered sectors. Taking a Downsian perspective, Bale (2003, p. 69) argues that mainstream right-wing parties, realising the electoral appeal of populist issues, themselves begin to address these issue and to include the populist right either as a coalition partner or as a support party. This strategy has led the mainstream right to adopt tougher domestic immigration policies and policy commitment against crime and welfare abuse, making the difference between the mainstream and the populist right more a matter of degree than of kind. These findings lead to the question which this paper aims to pass under scrutiny. By describing the issue-areas and the overall conceptions of Europe held by mainstream parties, the paper explores the contagion impact of populism claims on the kind of Europe mainstream parties support. Do mainstream parties move rightwards, endorsing populist right s core issues law and order, anti-immigration and anti-integration, as well as welfare protectionism for the losers of globalization? The purpose of this study is not to prove that where a populist party exists, the mainstream parties have changed, but it is to explore the timing of mainstream parties changes on matters of values (e.g. immigration and culture) and economic preferences (e.g. welfare chauvinism). Taking into account the linguistic capabilities of the researcher as well as the attempt to guarantee a broad spectrum of institutional structure and differences in domestic party politics, Germany, France and the United Kingdom were included in the analysis. In these countries, the mainstream right continues to support at least some degree of European integration. But what of its view on Europe, and its response to populist claims against unrestricted immigration policies and economic liberal policies? As to the mainstream left, is its view on Europe committed to tolerance and cultural liberalism, or is it also penetrated by somewhat populist claims, such as concerns for security, law and order? Data and method The paper adopts a longitudinal perspective and develops empirical measures for a systematic comparison of parties conceptions of Europe. The longitudinal analysis covers approximately fifteen years ( ). These years have seen issues such as European integration and denationalisation becoming increasingly part of party politicisation (Kriesi et al., 2008). i The sources for the study are party manifestos for national elections (presidential elections in the French case). These documents are revealing of the way in which 4

6 conceptions of Europe are expressed by parties in the context of electoral competition. Manifestos are often criticised by scholars who argue that, in order to analyse party preferences, it is more instructive to focus on the media and public debates where party confrontation on political issues is more pronounced (Koopmans, 2007). Even so, manifestos remain a most reliable source to study party preferences without the use of secondary sources (Gabel and Huber, 2000). Furthermore, while media-based analyses contribute to the study of party claims which are visible and accessible to the wider public, the analysis of manifestos allows one to reveal issues which do not surface in the media (Stoll, 2010). Finally, in comparison to analyses based on expert surveys, manifestos allow one to perform a longer longitudinal analysis (Budge and Laver, 1986). The cases for the study of this paper are mainstream parties of the left and the right in the United Kingdom (hereafter UK), Germany, and France. UK: Labour Party/ New Labour ii and the Conservative Party; Germany: the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU); France: the Socialist Party (PS) and the Rally for the Republic (RPR)/ Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). iii The study of the documents is contextual, namely it focuses on the detection of parties explicit references to Europe; it does not focus on the selection of words, silence and pauses as well as Freudian slips. Precisely, the analysis builds on the work of Ritchie and Spencer (1994), who developed a method of analysis based on a systematic process of indexing, charting and mapping of the documents according to key issue-areas, or domains. This method offers in-depth analysis of changes in references and themes and allows one to qualify the overall view on Europe of the parties. Furthermore, it is valuable because of its systematic nature and clarity, allowing the researcher to make explicit how the analysis has been performed. The analysis of the manifestos starts with a preliminary familiarisation with the data (electronic version of electoral national manifestos). This stage of the analysis allows one to gain an overview of the documents and to identify issues or themes mentioned in regard to Europe. By reading each of the manifestos an index of the whole identified issues is created. With the help of the text analysis programme ATLAS.ti it is also possible to record the number of incidences of issues in a systematic way. iv Issues can be expressed by single sentences only or, and more often, few paragraphs. The subsequent step of the analysis aims to build a picture of the data as a whole. This consists in considering the range of 5

7 issues and in rearranging single issue according to appropriate domains. In other words, the specific issues identified across all manifestos are grouped according to broader issueareas, they share. The attribution of themes to domains entails a degree of subjectivity, meaning that it is not automatic but it involves making judgments about the meaning of the references to Europe in the manifestos. In the work of Ritchie and Spencer (1994) this step of the analysis is called charting of the data. In the analysis of party s manifestos, charts are drawn up for each domain and entries made for several documents on each chart. Eight domains, which are about the nature of Europe as a polity and which policies the EU has to promote, are identified inductively: (1) empowerment of nation-states; (2) empowerment of the EU; (3) inclusive society, (4) assimilationist society; (5) free enterprise; (6) economic planning; (7) winners; (8) losers. Domain 1 to 4 pertains to the nature of Europe and precisely the scope of governance of European institutions (domain 1-2) and the type of society to be promoted by the EU (domain 3-4). Scope of governance. The empirical analysis, conducted preliminary on a sample of the document, suggests differentiating two domains, or issue-areas, pertaining to the relationship between the EU institutions and the nation-states. v Empowerment of nation-states. When a party refers to national interest; commitment to defend national sovereignty; and opposition to European centralisation, this is interpreted as a preference for Europe empowering the nation-states. It is taken as revealing of passive or antagonist engagement with European institutional deepening and a preference for the maintenance of traditional sovereignty boundaries. vi Empowerment of the EU. When a party shows generic support and desirability of expanding the competences of European institutions and the European Parliament; support for the concept of European political citizenship and for improving a supranational mode of decision making at the European level, this is interpreted as a preference for a form of European supranational governance. Societal inclusion. The analysis allows one to identify two domains about the polity s openness or exclusivity towards others, such as immigrants, as well as different social groups in Europe. Assimilationist society. When a party refers positively to traditional moral values; maintenance and stability of traditions, national culture in Europe; is concerned with international crime and terrorism in Europe; and is sceptic of open boundary policies, this 6

8 is interpreted as a preference for an assimilationist Europe. It indicates a preference for a Europe which is inimical to new values but is supportive of cultural authoritarianism and acceptance of others provided they assimilate into the European way of life. Inclusive society. When a party supports cultural diversity, communalism, and cultural plurality in Europe; emphasises the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within European countries; and favours intercultural dialogue, this is interpreted as a preference for a Europe driven by an inclusive attitude towards new and different values and others, e.g. social groups. Domain 5 to 8 is about economic distribution policies to be implemented by the EU (domain 5-6) and the social groups to be targeted by the EU policies (domain 7-8). Economic distribution. Two domains pertaining to alternative sets of policy s preference concerning the kind of involvement of Europe on economic matters and welfare are identifiable from the analysis of the manifestos. Free enterprise. When a party is in favour of free economic enterprise in Europe; refers positively to personal and individual economic initiative; and supports policies to induce enterprise, this is interpreted as a preference for minimal European policies in economic matters. Economic planning. When a party supports long-standing European economic planning and harmonisation, as well as European social policies providing income support; special protection for underprivileged; need for fair distribution of resources; and support for social market economy, this is interpreted as a preference for Europe actively engaged in economic regulations and redistribution policies. Social groups. Two domains about statements concerning the social groups which European economic policies need to target are identifiable. vii Winners. When a party refers positively to professional groups and small medium entrepreneurs as the focus of European economic policies, this is interpreted as a preference for minimal European policies in economic matters favouring sections of the new middle class with an entrepreneurial spirit. viii Losers. When a party refers to policies for the unemployed (e.g. youth unemployed), the labour groups in general, this is interpreted as a preference for Europe actively engaged in policies favouring those people mostly exposed to economic denationalisation. The final step of the analysis is about the pulling together of domains in order to map and interpret the data as a whole. The aim of this part of the process, which is the most difficult to 7

9 describe, is to outline the conceptions of Europe which emerge from the domains association. Mapping the overall picture one encounters the risk of doing a simple and subjective aggregation of domains. To counter this problem, the identification of conceptions of Europe voiced by the parties is theoretically driven. Sources for the identification of conceptions about the nature of the European polity are studies on the relation between the European institutions and the member states (e.g. Maier and Risse 2003; Dimitrapopoulos 2011), and academic works on the values and purposes of Europe as a collective (e.g. Leontidou 2004; Leca 2010). The identification of conceptions pertaining to the policies to be implemented by the EU draws on the literature on the role of the EU in promoting economic and social policies (Dyson, 2002; Dimitrakopoulos, 2011, Camia and Caramani, 2012). Europe in election manifestos ( ) The first part of the analysis is concerned with the domain salience. Table 1 presents the salience of issues in the areas of various polity and policy domains in the manifestos of the British Conservative Party and the Labour Party. Since the 1990s one of the most salient domains for both parties concerns the empowerment of nation-state. Furthermore, despite different initial positions, over time both the right and the left party s manifestos reveal increasing engagement with cultural-assimilationist terms. Finally, by the mid-2000s, there is a return of attention for the losers of globalisation in the manifesto of the Labour Party. Table 1 about here The increasing salience of references to protect the interests of nation-states in the EU is visible when comparing its importance in the early 1990s and in the early 2000s: from 13 percent to 71 percent in the manifestos of the Conservative Party; and from 24 percent to about 58 percent in the manifestos of the Labour Party. At the time of the elections in 1997 and 2001, the Conservative Party campaigns for a leading role of the UK in Europe and, more than once, evokes its vision for a Europe of nation-states in opposition to a federal Europe. Similarly, in the manifestos of the Labour Party the most salient issue-area pertains to retaining power at the level of British institutions and government. Yet the mainstream leftwing party is more explicitly supportive of the UK membership to the EU and the accreditation of some power to Brussels as a means to promote British (economic) interests. With the turn into the new millennium, the relation between the UK and the EU acquires further centrality in the manifestos of both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. The documents discuss more extensively the nature of the European polity, but it is in the 8

10 manifesto of the Conservative Party where this concern is most central. While reducing the emphasis attributed to the economic policies to be implemented by the EU, more than three quarters of references to Europe in the manifesto of the Conservative Party in 2001 are about empowerment of nation-states and the maintenance of the UK s veto power in the EU. In contrast, the salience of references to free enterprise and open market (21 percent) decreases visibly when compared with the previous years (it was over 50 percent in 1992). ix Besides concerns for the empowerment of nation states, another important issue-area which becomes more important over time is assimilationist society. Topics included in this domain concern the security and defence of Britain, including the need for stricter border controls and the introduction of finger prints for asylum seekers. While holding diverse conceptions in the early 1990s, by the mid-2000s both parties preferences concerning societal inclusion are defined in rather rightist terms. In the early 1990s, about 35 percent of the references to Europe in the manifesto of the Conservative Party claims for harsher checks of the external frontiers of EU. In contrast, in 1992 the manifesto of the Labour Party includes a much different vision of European societal inclusion. The party refers to equal and fair immigration laws to be applied throughout the European Community. The domain inclusive society is the most mentioned issue-area in the 1992 manifesto (37 percent). By the late 1990s, however, the mainstream left-wing party changes the way it refers to societal assimilation. Even though restrictive immigration policies are not (yet) supported and the development of inclusive policies promoting anti-discrimination and equality in the EU is evoked by Labour Party, the salience of this domain reduces (from about 37 percent in 1992 manifesto to 11 percent in the 1997 manifesto). Boundary maintenance, control and security are yet openly mentioned in the Labour Party s manifestos for the elections in the 2000s. Not only in the manifesto following the aftermath of September 11 do references to international threats as well as the need for more clear-cut immigration policies play a salient role, but also at the time of the election in 2005 the salience of these issues does not decline. References in favour to an assimilationist Europe, not present in the manifestos in the 1990s, account for 21 percent of all the references to Europe in The growing concern for boundary maintenance and security in the European Union features in the manifestos of the Conservative Party as well. In 2001, the Conservative Party s manifesto emphasises global threats, such as terrorism, and foresees an active role of the EU in the international arena yet under the control of the NATO. In the 2005 manifesto, the focus is not only on international security but also on anti-immigration policies. As Table 1 shows, the salience of the domain assimilation society increases more than double (from 3 percent in 2001 to 7 percent in 2005), yet without reaching the importance it has in the 1992 manifesto (34 percent of all the references to Europe). 9

11 In the UK, while cultural differences between the mainstream left and the mainstream right have reduced in the last decade, economic divergences remains. Indeed, there is a return of Labour Party s references to European economic policies to promote employment and improved living conditions for those people most exposed to international competition. The mainstream left s manifesto for the 2005 election contains positive references to government-lead policies as well as EU effective regulations to support social welfare (7 percent). In this manifesto the Labour Party criticizes the weakness of the EU institutions in promoting socio-economic policies. Therefore, one may see a growing salience of stances which stand for those people mostly exposed to the opening of international economic competition, that is, for the losers of globalisation, such as labour groups (these references account for about 15 percent of all references to Europe in 2005). Such types of references are not part of the manifestos of the Conservative Party. Looking now at the salience of issue-areas in the manifestos of the French mainstream right (RPR/UPM) and mainstream left (PS), data shows that these parties maintain alternative stances with respect to the delegation of power to European institutions and economic policies throughout (Table 1). The PS attributes much more salience to the empowerment of European institutions than the RPR/UMP. Furthermore, it makes explicit the support an active role of the EU in the promotion of social policies and the coordination of the work of nation-states to cope with the effects of globalization. However, a similar discourse is endorsed by the parties in the late 2000s: against rising popular debates on the issue of immigration and integration in the EU, both parties respond by diffusing the issue, namely by decreasing its salience. Support for an assimilationist Europe and empowerment of nation-states have been among the most salient political issues on the RPR/UMP electoral agenda since the early 1990s. The party emphasises the idea of a European culture, where France and its enlightenment s tradition are set as a model for the whole EU. Additionally, in the 1993 the party spells out clearly its preference for a Europe of nation-states, respectful of national traditions, where national parliaments have a central role in shaping European decisions. In the manifesto of the RPR the issue-areas assimilationist society and empowerment of nation-states are about 80 percent of all references to Europe. In the early 1990s, also the manifestos of the PS emphasises repetitively the concept of a European civilisation modelled on the French civilisation and favours further international measures to contrast illegal immigration. Nonetheless, these types of references are few (between 7 and 8 percent of references to Europe) and clearly not as central as in the RPR manifesto. Even in the late 1990s, when the manifesto of the PS mentions more often the importance of the protection of national sovereignty in Europe (12 percent), references to the empowerment of European institutions 10

12 (23 percent of references to Europe in the manifesto in 1993 and 16 percent in 1995) continue to outdo references to national-interest. The cultural distance between the RPR and the PS is particularly clear when one compares the parties manifesto for the election in the early 2000s and looks at the salience attributed to references concerning law and order and acceptance of immigrants in the EU (e.g. about 7 percent in PS manifesto and more than 60 percent in the RPR manifesto for the election in 2002). The RPR s rhetoric focusses on anti-immigration policies both at the domestic level and at the European level, but this preoccupation is not shared by the PS. The manifesto of the mainstream left-wing party concentrates on cultural diversity and cultural plurality (this issue-area is about 14 percent of all references to Europe). In contrast, differences between the mainstream right-wing and left-wing parties are less pronounced at the time of the election in 2007 and with respect to their propensity to speak of immigration and integration issues. The manifesto of the mainstream right-wing party is less concerned with the kind of society to be fostered in the EU. The salience of the domain assimilationist society in the manifesto for the election in 2007 is more than halved, as it drops down from about 65 pencent in 2002 to about 22 percent in The weakening of cultural references to Europe is found also in the manifesto of the PS. Neither references to restrictive immigration policies nor references embracing cultural liberalism are included in the manifesto. Thus, at the time of the election in 2007 there is a reshaping of mainstream party priorities. The UMP and the PS put aside ideological contestation on immigration/integration and emphasise more pragmatic issues, such as who has the power in the EU and which kinds of economic policies to be promoted by European institutions (e.g. employment, health, pension, taxation). With regard to the economic policies to be promoted by the EU, the RPR/UMP s preferences are overall very different from the preferences of the left-wing social democratic party, PS, which at no point endorses rightist policies. As Table 1 shows, the PS speaks mostly in favour of an active role of the EU in economic policies and of a Europe which is closed to those people (i.e. workers) who feel threatened by the opening of markets and international competition. The issue-area economic planning constitutes almost half of the references to Europe in each of the analysed manifestos of the PS. In contrast, the mainstream right-wing party is visibly less sensitive to European policies in the area of social issues, amelioration of social standards of live, promotion of socio-economic progress and against market liberalism. x Table 1 also includes data pertaining to the analysis of the manifestos of the German mainstream right party, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), and mainstream left party, the 11

13 Social Democratic Party (SPD). One of the most notable findings is that starting from different cultural and economic preferences, by the 2000s the parties differences reduce. On the one hand, the CDU acknowledges more active (leftist) European economic policies; and the other hand, the SPD endorses rightist claims on restrictive immigration. The absence of explicit references to social groups of losers and a more clear-cut focus on the pragmatic relations between the EU and the nation-states distinguishes however the CDU from the SPD in the new Millennium. In the 1990s, the manifestos of the CDU are mainly about societal integration, cultural assimilation and identity issues. During these years, about 30 percent or more of the references to Europe focus on the domain assimilation society, although references open to inclusive society (e.g. protection of minority rights) are also included in the manifestos. For the party, the EU should not only guarantee the respect of a number of civic values but should also allow people cultures to co-exist and ethnic groups to maintain their identity and traditions without discrimination. The issue-area assimilationist society, including the need to develop EU policies to regulate asylum, immigration and, generally, security, is very salient in the late 1990s (more than 40 percent of references to Europe). When turning to the analysis of the SPD, the manifestos of this party in the 1990s reveal an ambivalent set of references which ultimately results in a rightist cultural turn in the 2000s. For the election in 1994, for instance, the party shows conflicting conceptions concerning integration and assimilation. On the one hand, almost 10 percent of references to Europe in the manifestos are about the party s concerns for local collectives and their preservation in the European polity. On the other hand, there are also about 10 percent of references to Europe which favour the development of inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue, especially with those people of Islamic tradition. In the 2000s the SPD manifestos reveal however a change on the matter of law and order, issues which becomes more salient. Indeed, taking a longitudinal view of the manifestos of the SPD, it is observable a reduction of references to the issue-area societal inclusion, and an increasing number of statements about security not only at the domestic level but also in Europe (from below 10 percent in the 1990s to about 15 percent in the new Millennium). The party approves tighter and more efficient controls on the external borders of the EU to fight illegal immigration and criminality, as well as more police efforts against terrorism, illegal immigration, crime and trafficking. Hence, the mainstream left moves closer to the right on matter of integration and societal assimilation. This change is even more remarkable because it is not matched by a similar change in manifestos of the CDU the domain assimilationist society loses importance in the document of the mainstream right-wing party in the mid-2000s. The salience of the 12

14 domain drops from 30 percent in 2002 to just above 6 percent in 2005, whereas it holds steady in the manifestos of the SPD for the same period (see Table 1). As the SPD turns somewhat toward the right with regard to issues pertain to immigration and security, the CDU shows a shift away from economic liberalism in the 2000s. Although concerns for economic coordination and harmonization on fiscal and social matters are included in the manifestos for the election in the 1990s, positive references to the domain economic planning increase most throughout the 2000s. This issue-area accounts to more than 30 percent of references to Europe in the manifesto for the 2005 election (the domain free enterprise is mentioned in only 6 percent of the references). The mainstream right-wing party speaks positively of a more central role of the EU in facing the problems of illegal work and market competition and supports European coordination of economic and monetary policies. These types of references are similar to the economic claims voiced by the SPD. In its manifesto for the election in 2002, the mainstream left-wing party favours economic policy coordination between the European Central Bank (ECB), parties and the governments of the Member States to make the EU economy competitive by investing in research and social programmes. In the 2005 manifesto, references concerning the role of the EU in taxes regulation and in the area of jobs market are central (the domain economic planning accounts for 57 percent of references to Europe and the domain losers to 14 percent). Therefore, by the mid-2000s traditional left-right divergences on EU economic policies are surprisingly reduced. Differences remains with respect to explicit references to the winners/losers divide, because the CDU does not explicitly speak of the workers. In contrast, the unemployed and the young are openly mentioned in the manifesto of the SPD (e.g. about 14 percent of references to Europe in the 2005 manifesto). xi Another difference between the mainstream parties concerns the relationship between the EU and the member states. In the case of the mainstream right-wing party, there is increasing salience of references which put an emphasis on pragmatic issues, such as the subsidiary principle and redefinition of roles between the EU and the nation-states. On average, the domain empowerment of nation-states includes about one quarter of all references to Europe, and there is a visible increase by the late 1990s with a pick in the manifesto for the election in 2005 (31 percent). In general, these issues are not central in the manifestos of the SPD. The salience of the domain empowerment of nation-states remains on average much below 20 percent throughout the whole analysed period, Rather, the mainstream left-wing party engages with more theoretical matters, above all, the notion of citizens empowerment in the EU institutions. This is particularly the case of the manifesto for the election in 1994, in which the party is critical of the excessive bureaucracy 13

15 and unnecessary centralization in the EU and enthusiast of the idea of an EU of citizens as a means against the resurgence of nationalism. Parties conceptions of Europe The analysis shows that party s references to Europe are about two aspects: polity and policy. The former concerns the nature of the European polity and its values, while the latter is about both economic preferences to be promoted by the EU. Building on the empirical analysis, it is plausible to distinguish between two polity conceptions and two policy conceptions. They can be best regarded as the poles of a polity continuum and a policy continuum. xii The two polity conceptions draw on the divergence concerning diversity and solidarity, between cultural liberalism and community boundaries (see Schmidt, 2010); and they can be ranked top-down following a decreasing level: from a polity emphasising individual rights, cultural openness, people s participation to governance (open Europe) to a polity which places greater emphasis on traditional community membership, mostly uncomfortable with mass immigration and post-national forms of governance (closed Europe). The view open Europe can be found for instance in the understanding of Europe as concerned with social rights as well as solidarity (Dimitrakopoulos, 2011, p.16); supportive of a supranational form of governance, which involves delegation of political decision-making beyond the memberstates (Camia, 2012, p. 234; see also Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998, pp ), and favours unrestricted inclusion of immigrants (Helbling et al., 2010). The view closed Europe entails a view of a polity which fall within the realm of traditional nationhood (Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998, pp ); it is not comfortable with new values and therefore is largely protectionist in cultural terms. The two policy conceptions draw on the divergence between favouring welfare policies and regulated capitalism and combining social equality with growth and competitiveness (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Camia and Caramani, 2012) and can be ranked top-down following a decreasing level of support for an active role of Europe in welfare and economic policies. More precisely, they are about the divergence between concerns for welfare freeriding of the left s working-class voters (social Europe) and support for largely unregulated economic growth in the age of globalisation endorsed by voters who are less sceptical of liberalism and economic globalisation (liberal Europe). Table 2 about here 14

16 Table 2 shows the commitment to polity and policy conceptions of the analysed parties. The symbols represent how strongly the parties support the identified conceptions. To disentangle between policy and polity allows studying whether features of the populist rightwing have penetrated the references to Europe of mainstream parties. A general indicator of the impact of populist parties on mainstream parties conceptions is attested by the growing salience of references pertaining to the protection of the interests of the nation-states and supportive of restrictive immigration policies (closed Europe). Another indicator is the abandonment of references to market liberalism (liberal Europe), but the enthusiasm for welfare chauvinism as a means to protect those left behind by denationalisation and globalization (see Bale, 2003, p. 86). In other words, as mainstream parties refer to issues such as law-and-order and cultural assimilation as well as welfare protectionism, it is fair to say that they undergone an effort to concede to the populist challenge in order to limit its appeal. From the analysis it is observable that the view closed Europe gains more relevance in the manifestos of most of the analysed parties over time. Particularly by the 2000s, the manifestos take a clearer stance against further delegation of power to Europe and in favour to restrictive measures against immigration and crime in the EU. However there remain differences regarding the degree of commitment to such a polity view. The mainstream left wing parties fail to establish a steady ownership of open Europe, i.e. Europe as a multicultural and tolerant collective. At the same time, there is not a consensual approach among the left to favouring law and order, and more restrictive immigration policies in Europe. The pace of the changes and the commitment to closed Europe vary among the parties and without homogeneity. Over the last two decades social democratic parties in Germany and in the United Kingdom take more decisive steps towards a somewhat rightist preference for European values (polity) and the differences between the British and German left and the right-wing parties on the cultural dimension appear a matter of degree. The described change is not undergone by the mainstream left-wing party in France. In the UK and in Germany, in the late 1990s, the left-right divide appears fuzzy also with respect to the socio-economic dimension. In the years preceding the new millennium, the Labour Party even abandons the support for an active role of Europe in economic redistribution and supports the view liberal Europe, as it is done by the Conservative Party. In the same years, the SPD s view of European policies as a means to disguise and correct the failure of domestic policies is challenged by increasing references to liberal Europe. Taking a longitudinal perspective, however, it is visible that neither the left party-family makes the running on welfare protectionism, nor does the right party-family hold ownership of market liberalism. Indeed only in the late 1990s does the manifesto of the German Christian Democratic Party include references to liberal Europe. 15

17 Overall, the analysis shows that there is growing salience of cultural issues (e.g. immigration and cultural protectionism) which depart from the traditional left-right economic lines of conflicts, especially in Germany and in the UK. With respect to these cultural issues, the leftright divide seems to have lost much relevance especially because of the move towards restrictive immigration and integration policies of the mainstream left-wing parties. Additionally there is also increasing concern and emphasis on European economic policies which are less open to the logics of free market not only amongst the left-wing parties but also amongst the right-wing parties (here the Conservative Party is the main exception). There is therefore some sign of the populist contagion which is bi-dimensional, and concerns the adoption of restrictive positions on immigration and societal exclusion, as well as welfare chauvinism. It is fair to say that the pressure of populist claims challenges the left in the economic and cultural area, leading this party family to abandon somewhat centrist economic policies and depriving it of its commitment to cultural liberalism to focus instead on more pragmatic issues. The right moves further to the extreme in cultural terms but is overall less challenged in economic terms. These different types of pressure are exemplified by the substantial difference between the French mainstream parties with regard to the kind of European polity and policy conceptions they support. What is discernible in the analysis is a different response given by the RPR and the PS to the electoral ascent of the right-wing populist party, Front National (FN), favouring not only drastic border controls against immigration but also economic policies across Europe against liberal market economy. On the one hand, the manifestos of the RPR are filled with references in favour of closed Europe (e.g. against delegation of power to European institutions and multiculturalism), although references to liberal European economic policies are also found. While support for economic liberalism comes in sharp contrast with the claims for welfare chauvinism endorsed by the agenda of the far right populism, references to politics of domestic control over Europe might be endorsed to send a message of firmness to voters, against the appealing populist rhetoric of the FN. On the other hand, even the manifestos of the PS, a party which remains largely committed to an open European polity, show a reduction of references to societal inclusion over time and an increase of references to the losers of globalisation. This result can be fairly interpreted as the attempt of the French left to respond to the challenge of the FN and the desertion of its former work-class support. At the same time, there are nuances in the salience of cultural and economic issues, on the left and on the right, and variation exists also where the political and electoral weight of rightwing parties at the domestic level is minimal, for instance in the UK. Overall, the findings do not close but open up the door to further explanatory research to explain the heterogeneous 16

18 conceptions of Europe of the mainstream parties. Since some of the most surprising and radical changes are found with respect to the mainstream left, it is justifiable to end this section with an exploration of additional factors to make sense of the left s turn towards restrictive and assimilationist stances. xiii One of the plausible factors affecting the variation of conceptions of Europe of mainstream parties is the domestic interaction context. xiv The analysis of the German mainstream parties, for instance, suggests that the conceptions of the SPD are conditioned by preferences of the CDU. By the end of the 20th century, the SPD refers more openly to the promotion of the country s national interests in the EU as well as more critical of Europe and of its economic and political future. This can be best understood as an attempt to address broader constituencies of German electorate, also on the right of the political spectrum, dissatisfied with process of denationalisation, economically and culturally (see also Hough and Sloam, 2007). In the UK the conceptions of Europe of the Labour Party can be understood by looking at the preferences for Europe of the Conservative Party. Despite the absence of a populist party able to challenge mainstream parties, both the Labour and the Conservative Party politicizes the European issue in cultural terms, particularly touching upon immigration and the issue of European integration as a threat to British sovereignty and security. By linking Europe and cultural threats, such as immigration, the Conservative Party s rhetoric was potentially appealing to the less educated working-class, traditionally Labour supporters. Consequently, the left s emphasis on the losers of globalisation and the attention given to cultural denationalisation and security concerns in Europe can be understood as an answer to the rhetoric of the Conservative Party (Kriesi and Frey, 2008). Not only competition with the mainstream right-wing parties but also the presence of a competitor on the left affects the choice of the mainstream left to adopt the populist rhetoric. Neither the German SPD nor the French PS ever stops to advocate social justice in Europe, solidarity and long-term employment policies. These sets of preferences are best understood in the light of the competition with a radical left-wing party. As Wimmel and Edwards (2011) show, the radical left-wing party in Germany was gaining electoral success by promoting an anti-european rhetoric, touching upon social and economic inequalities raised by the furthering of integration. Therefore, it is in opposition to the discourse of the radical left-wing party that one may interpret the SPD s support for social policies in Europe as a potential instrument to cope with the logics of the market. Competition from the radical left also helps interpreting the firm commitment of the PS in favour of an active role of Europe in economic regulations throughout the analysed period. Such a preference for economic relations in the 17

19 EU mirrors the domestic economic policies promoted by the party in order to gain potential allies on the left, namely the French Communist Party and the Greens (Clift, 2000, p. 135). An additional factor to understand variation in the substance of mainstream parties conceptions of Europe is internal factionalism. xv In Germany, for instance, the preference for European policy conceptions supported by the SPD varies in scope and indeed conflicting preferences are often found in the same manifesto (e.g. in the document for the election in 1998). This variation can be related to divisions internal to the party (Sloam 2005): one faction which was focused on social inequalities, unemployment and public sector cuts, and supportive of further regulation to cope with such issues; and other faction supportive of less economic intervention to regulate the market. The Labour Party is also considered a divided party, especially in the 1990s, by a number of studies (e.g. Daniels, 1998; Clarke et al., 2004). The difficulties faced by a section of the party in giving up the left s traditional focus on working-class rights is revealed by the manifesto for the election in This document contains both references favouring economic incentives and market competition and a more sceptical attitude toward the European open market. Finally, a sign of factionalism is attested by analysis of the PS s polity conceptions included in manifesto for the election in the early 1990s. This document contains a full range of positions on Europe, from support for supranational institutions to support for national sovereignty. These preferences mirror the two positions dividing the parties since the late 1980s. On the one hand, the PS included committed federalists in the tradition of Monnet; on the other hand, there were party members who refused any further delegation of sovereignty to Europe, in the tradition of Chevenement. Conclusion In the last decades, the new populist radical parties in Europe attracted significant interest among growing sections of people who feel most uncomfortable with the opening up of national boundaries favoured by the process of European integration. The populist success is problematic for mainstream parties of the left and of the right. On the one hand, populist parties challenge the mainstream left by campaigning on economic issues appealing to the working-class, such welfare policies and economic protectionism in the EU. On the other hand, populist parties take ownership of concerns that have traditionally belonged to the mainstream right, such security and restrictive immigration policies both nationally and in the EU. Against the emergence of the populist anti-european wave, how do mainstream parties respond? This question is worth asking because of its implications for the legitimacy of the EU. It puts some light on whether mainstream parties conceptions of Europe stand up 18