Rebellion against the state to obtain one's rights: discourse of rights between instrumentalisation and local concerns 1. by Ole Martin Gaasholt

Transcription

1 Rebellion against the state to obtain one's rights: discourse of rights between instrumentalisation and local concerns 1 by Ole Martin Gaasholt Introduction In Mali, rebellions led by Tuareg have taken place seen independence. They have been concerned with the allegedly marginalised position of the Tuareg s part of the country, Northern Mali, and have frequently been couched in terms of autonomy or independence. This year, the insistence on independence during one such rebellion has been more pronounced than ever before. In addition, for the first time in history, the rebels have managed to obtain territorial control, enabling them to actually declare independence. Of course, this has been met with unanimous international condemnation. At the time of writing, the situation is unclear as concerns Northern Mali, both regarding how to resolve the issue of this breakaway province, and the internal relationship between a number of rebel and Islamist groups. In an effort to disentangle the present situation while addressing the ideological underpinnings of the various actors, I shall tackle the issue of irredentism in Northern Mali from a historical perspective. Thus, I hope to bring out both the underlying dynamics and features peculiar to each rebellion. This year, the novel features are the insistence on independence and a rival Islamist programme. Approaching the issues in question in this manner, I shall address the topics of political discourse, which in this particular context must be set against the forces on the ground. In fact, motivations and workable political aims and avenues are heavily informed by the political economy. Thus, earlier rebellions typically ended by pledges of increased transfers to Northern Mali and offer of positions in the state to the rebels. In other words, the conflicts ended by making Northern Mali have greater access to the state while the issue of independence receded to the background or was reformulated into autonomy. This year, the rebel organisation insisting on independence, the MNLA (Mouvement national pour la libération de l Azawad), has nevertheless retained the theme of mismanagement by the state, allegedly 1 Part of the research for this article was made possible by a grant from the Central Research Fund of the University of London and an Additional Fieldwork Award from the School of Oriental and African Studies. 1

2 resulting in too limited economic resources and development in Northern Mali. Ultimately, however, such mismanagement is down to a colonial regime through which Mali has governed Northern Mali. Hence the quest for an independent state, Azawad. Yet, in reality, a quest for material gain has partly characterised the rebels advance. Engaged in negotiations for some time, but less receptive to promises of an improved relationship to the state than earlier rebels, the MNLA has been involved in extensive looting. Many members are also known to have been smugglers, an important part of the externally oriented economy of Northern Mali. Accusing the Malian state of collusion in such operations, the MNLA also castigate it for its failure to maintain security in Northern Mali. In fact, the MNLA even accuses it of co-operation with Islamist organisations in smuggling ventures. While I cannot dismiss links cross-cutting all actors present in Northern Mali in the realm of illicit activities, the MNLA have relied on tactical collaboration with the Islamists, including the originally Algerian AQIM (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb). It has in fact been crucial for their military success. Taking into account the discrepancies between idealised political projects and political action, they do not necessarily appear as an improvement compared to the Malian state that the rebels are wont to criticise. This leaves the question of the substance of the discourse of the rebels. Is it only a façade? Are the rebels only trying to appeal to Western audiences by invoking their rights? A more likely answer is that discourses of variegated origins converge in an attempt to formulate legitimate local grievances while expressing them in a language that might find a response from an international audience. Put differently, decades of exposure to and participation in international discourses while engaging with the predicament of Northern Mali's peripheral situation means that one cannot easily demarcate the aboriginal and the imported. Through a historical review of rebellions in Northern Mali, this mutual process of mixing will be demonstrated, as well as the contrast between earlier uprisings and the rebellion of this year. In conclusion, I shall address the issues of the long-term underlying features and how the prevailing discourse can only partly express such aspects. Rebellions in Northern Mali It was only a short time after independence that the first Tuareg-led rebellion broke out in Mali. Unlike later ones, it only involved one Tuareg group, the Ifoghas, and consequently, 2

3 only one part of Northern Mali, the present-day Kidal region. Because of the brutal manner in which it was quashed, and how it would frame debates regarding the place of Tuareg, it was to have momentous consequences. Suffice to say within the context of this article that the uprising was in many regards a local affair opposing some Tuareg of the area to the Malian authorities which had recently replaced the colonial ones (Boilley 1999). The survivors of the savage repression sought refuge in Algeria and not least Libya. There they gradually developed their political plans regarding Northern Mali. Their ranks were swelled by the arrival of people leaving Mali in the wake of the droughts of the 1970s (Bellil and Dida 1995). Together, people from either category formally organised for their political project and enjoyed for a while the support of Gaddafi. It was soon withdrawn, however, while Gaddafi employed some Tuareg in his Islamic Legion, making them fight in Lebanon and above all in Chad. Without any prominent backer, they nevertheless returned to Mali, and neighbouring Niger, with extensive combat experience (Bourgeot 1995). For in 1990, Algeria decided to repatriate large number of drought refugees, including those of a second series of droughts in the 1980s, to Mali and Niger. They were predominantly Tuareg and Arabs originating in those two countries. Placed in camps in Northern Niger and on the border between Algeria and Mali, they lived in cramped and squalid conditions. The Malian rebels of the time claimed that they were already pitched to launch their rebellion, but events in neighbouring Niger hastened the decision (Boilley 1999). There still appears to have been only a limited degree of preparation, whilst unrest in the camps in Niger acted as a trigger, regardless of the state of preparedness of the Malian rebels. In Niger, then, young men demonstrated against the authorities in Tchin Tabaraden, protesting against the poor living conditions in the camps. The result was a massacre. Casualties were variously given as ranging from some sixty to more than a thousand. Some assumed instigators were arrested and imprisoned in Menaka in Mali. Iyad ag Ghali, the leader of the rebels, attacked the prison with his men, liberated the prisoners, killed many of the guards and withdrew after looting the military arsenal (Poulton & Ag Youssouf 1998). Soon after, the rebels presented their movement, which eventually tooke the name of MPA (Mouvement Populaire pour l Azawad). They carried on looting vehicles and money from NGOs and weapons from military arsenals. The army being unable to track them in the Adghagh mountains of the Kidal region, negotiations began. The emphasis was not on independence. Alleging marginalisation of Northern Mali and discrimination of the Tuareg and other inhabitants of the northern regions, the rebels claimed increased state transfers and improved access to the state apparatus. They even demanded all the most important minister 3

4 posts. A treaty was signed in early 1991 in Tamanrasset, Algeria. The rebels were offered one minister post, almost half the state s development budget for the next few years and positions in the state administration as well as the possibility to integrate the armed forces for the rebels (Diarrah 1991). But the single-party regime of Moussa Traoré was overthrown in a coup d état in March 1991 after security forces had fired at protesters. The combined pressure of the prodemocracy movement in Southern Mali and the rebels from Northern Mali had presumably made the government more inclined to negotiate with the rebels. Now, new negotiations were opened by the interim government. It was composed of both military personnel and civilians, including a Tuareg minister drawn from among the rebels. They would retain such a post until 1997, well after the handing over of power to an elected president and a government responsible to an elected parliament. At any rate, negotiations during the transition period resulted in a National Pact in 1992, still offering increased state transfers and investments, positions in the state administration for rebel leaders and integration into the armed forces for the rank and file (Poulton & Ag Youssouf 1998). Furthermore, the three northern regions should receive a special status and create their own assembly with a series of prerogatives regarding co-operation with other countries and agencies. But the special status created a stir in the rest of Mali. Meanwhile, some rebels took up arms again, not being content with the negotiated agreement. In general, there was a proliferation of movements (cf. Klute 1995) and increase regarding their demands to ensure that everyone received a portion of what was on offer, in this case, primarily positions in the armed forces (cf. Poulton & Ag Youssouf 1998; Gaasholt 2011). Quite exorbitant demands were made, while ex-rebels were promoted to high rank, creating jealousy, and there were frequent problems of indiscipline. Coupled with looting undertaken by rebels or people associated with them, other Northern Malians and army personnel expressed their discontent through the creation of a vigilante group, the Ganda Koy, issuing from among the Songhay. In reality, its leaders were deserted army officers that the army allowed to operate. And while invoking the rights of occupation of the Songhay Ganda Koy means masters of the land the group strived not just for security for its people against looting, but, with time, to obtain positions for its members. At any rate, oppositions between Black Malians and the so-called Red ones, the Tuareg and Arabs, there being many Arab rebels both in the original rebel group and in a separate Arab rebel movement, created clashes between local communities while increasingly Red people were targeted as they were identified with the rebels. In some areas, this had 4

5 taken place in 1991 and 1992 already, creating mass movements of refugees to neighbouring countries. As oppositions intensified in 1994, so did the flight of refugees of Tuareg and Arab origin (Gaasholt 2011). Significantly, the MPA remained on the side of the government ever since 1992, while much of the opposition existed between the Tuareg and Arab rebel movements themselves. Once those conflicts were sorted out, sometimes by force of arms, a rapprochement gradually took place between Songhay and Tuareg leaders in a specific area. That allowed for a rapprochement between the Ganda Koy and one intransigent Tuareg rebel group. Following the meeting between local leaders, peace meetings were organised throughout Mali to discuss grievances and attempt reconciliation. Perhaps as importantly, the last rebel movement, the Arab one, was now isolated, and soon reached an agreement with the government (Gaasholt 2011). In the end, all the rebel movements, including the Ganda Koy, were placed on an equal footing vis-à-vis the government, as they were officially resolved and surrendered their weapons to be incinerated in a ceremony known as the Flame of Peace (Poulton & Ag Youssouf 1998). Ex-rebels were integrated into the armed forces, although the Ganda Koy only received a modest number, and others were offered projects for re-integration into society. Thus one attempted to counter-act looting by unemployed and destitute young men, while giving everyone access to state resources. During the fighting, the rebels had mobilised their international networks. Drawing on alleged discrimination against Tuareg in Mali and Niger (cf. Dayak 1992), arguments were put forward in terms of people s rights to self-determination. Studies by Tuareg specialists echoed these concerns (cf. Claudot-Hawad 1990, 1993), and invoked the partitioning of Tuareg lands by the colonial powers (cf. Hawad 1990, Dupraz & Decoudras 1993). Other observers developed these notions further regarding the legal bases for self-determination (cf. Rosenberg 1992). Such efforts on the part of a Tuareg intelligentsia, often based in Europe, resulted in the passing of a motion in favour of the Tuareg and castigating Mali for its human rights abuses vis-à-vis Northern Malian populations (Prasse 1995). As shown, however, in Mali, these notions were not the primary ones. In fact, notions of self-determination were overshadowed by an emphasis on the marginalisation of all of Northern Mali, including all ethnic groups, and thus a demand for increased state intervention. In Niger, negotiations eventually followed a similar pattern (Decoudras & Abba 1995). It should also be noted that despite the initial connection between the uprisings in Mali and Niger, the conflicts then developed separately, the rebels targeting their respective governments. In spite of a forming a community in exile (cf. Bourgeot 1995), the rebels of 5

6 Mali and Niger did not co-operate during the rebellions, nor was emphasis on artificial colonial boundaries and the creation of a Tuareg polity transcending them. Instead, their engaging with their respective states reflects the importance of the political economy within the already existing framework. Autonomy through decentralisation and a renewed quest for the state The special status of Northern Mali having created problems, autonomy was eventually granted through the country s process of decentralisation, which extended democratisation by creating locally elected councils to replace centrally appointed administrators. The decentralisation should allow for rule in tune with local and regional practices. The rights claimed by both promoters of greater autonomy and by democracy activists advocating a break with centralisation should thus be met. Once more, however, the political economy of peripheral constituencies showed its importance. The newly created municipalities were poorly equipped for their new tasks, for which they received very limited funding. These were often expensive tasks, for example schooling and healthcare, making the decentralisation resemble a way of saving money for the central state. In a strongly externally oriented economy, contributions from outside, whether from the state and development agencies or labour migration and smuggling, were necessary to make the economy go around. Previously, during the single-party regime, but also in the colonial state, the limited capacity of the state had made it rely on local collaborators, typically chiefs or local leaders. In an ambiguous intermediary position between local people and the external state, they derived some benefits and even prestige while passing on decisions, although they risked becoming tainted by association. A circle of chiefs formed around the state administration in post-independence Mali to capture state and development funds. With the decentralisation, more people could enter into the political game and also solicit funds from external development partners. A particular synergy between men of influence re-created the circle of chiefs, only in an enlarged version, gathering all those entertaining a wide range of external connections through trade, smuggling, political activity and relations to NGOs. Such an arrangement primarily benefited those with the densest web of connections and their immediate associates. Likewise, with a high degree of insecurity after the rebellion, a plethora of weapons on civilian hands making for numerous thefts of cars and livestock, only people in agglomerations profited from the armed forces presence, which was permanent 6

7 only in towns and villages which served as a set of nodes. People in the bush and unconnected townspeople were the victims of crime and might even suffer the exploitation of the armed forces themselves. Only local leaders and their associates were protected from such abuses. The new state, in continuity with the old one, thus suffered from a series of flaws. Inadequate and unequal security provision and differential access to services were addressed by local people and held to constitute the main failings of what could be regarded as a system of association between local representatives and the still somewhat external state. In a similar vein, rebels who had integrated the armed forces and the state administration were castigated for having only followed their own interest and having been on a quest for positions. Considering the limited degree of representation of Northern Malians or Tuareg and Arabs in the Malian state before the 1990s rebellion, however, improved representation was nevertheless regarded as an improvement with greater access to the state. Yet, misgivings about this state of affairs did not go away, as the lack of social and economic development was pointed out alongside the mismanagement and self-serving practices of both old and new elites. Various aspects of this situation were addressed by ordinary citizens, and with increasing emphasis during the next two rebellions. New rebellions, smuggling, insecurity and Islamism In 2006, a new rebellion broke out in Kidal. Rebels took control of the army s stockpile of arms while others deserted with their service weapons. Complaining that pledges of increased transfers and investments to Northern Mali had not been fulfilled, they demanded improved access to the state. But this was with reference to the National Pact of The decentralisation should be made fully workable, as was agreed shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion. Hard-liners continued the struggle, however, desiring a diminished state presence in the area. Independence or autonomy was thus still not foremost among the remaining rebels demands. Yet, a rebellion broke out in Niger a year later. The rebels there voiced some of the same concerns, but also emphasised the unequal distribution of income from uranium mines concentrated in their areas. During this period, a republic was declared that united the northern parts of Mali and Niger, thus removing at least part of the borders inherited from colonialism. It only took place on the internet, as Tuareg officials in Mali disdainfully pointed 7

8 out. Behind it was presumably a movement attempting to unite Malian and Nigerien Tuareg. But apart from some contacts for the exchange of weapons, there was no co-operation on an operative level, each rebellion once more being directed against its respective government. Tuareg intellectuals and ex-rebels from the 1990s brought out the decentralisation laws, pointing out the close connection between this process and the initial pledges of autonomy in the National Pact. But they adhered both to the Pact and to the Malian state. Only misgivings about the Malian state s management of affairs remained, insofar people invoked rights to criticise it. Education remained a primary concern, various associations insisting on it as a right, while pointing out the short-comings of the Malian state. The remaining rebels in Northern Mali addressed the security situation. For some years, the Algerian Islamists known from 2007 as the AQIM were losing terrain in Algeria and increasingly employed Mali as a refuge. They were involved in hostage taking for ransom and cannabis smuggling from Morocco. Clashing with the AQIM and at times managing to drive them into remote desert areas, the rebels made a point of having fought the Islamists, something the Malian state had failed to do. They thus laid claim to being Malian patriots who should be awarded what accrued to them as Malian citizens. Yet, these rebels were in all likelihood heavily involved in smuggling through Northern Mali, which would explain their persistent demand for a diminished armed forces presence. Smuggling remained a mainstay of the externally oriented economy of Northern Mali. In the region of Kidal in particular, its importance was enhanced by the lack of other economic opportunities in a one-sided, poorly diversified economy. Rumours had begun circulating regarding the trafficking of cocaine through the Sahara, including Mali. Only a few seizures took place. A plane was crashed next to Gao, seemingly deliberately, and it was widely assumed to have been carrying a large cargo of drugs. During this period of rebellion, smuggling and Islamist presence, speculations began regarding connections between Tuareg rebels and the AQIM, although their clashes did not exactly support that theory. Even the scale of the cocaine trade is difficult to ascertain, smugglers exercising far more discretion in this realm than in the almost completely accepted smuggling of cigarettes, tea and sugar. As the latter is a highly lucrative activity, it is fair to assume AQIM involvement in it, as in the case of many of the recalcitrant rebels of Moreover, these rebels eventually suffered defeat by the Malian army, who was led by integrated Tuareg and Arab soldiers. Those unwilling to enter into an agreement withdrew to Libya, where they leader, Ibrahim ag Bahanga, found his death under unclear circumstances in

9 Meanwhile, the regime of the time, the one of the president Amadou Toumani Touré, continued its emphasis on national consensus, gathering all political parties, but thus eroding any opposition. Misgivings about its inefficiency and mismanagement were growing, especially regarding misappropriation of funds and problems in the education sector. In terms of security, the presence of the AQIM was increasingly listed among the alleged failures. For a while, this organisation developed links with families around Timbuktu and set up bases quite far south 2. Problems within the realm of co-operation with neighbouring countries, particularly Algeria, were blamed on the Malian president by among others the Algerian press, although the AQIM originally hailed from Algeria. Even so, a joint attack with Mauritania in 2011, managed to push the AQIM back further north into the desert. After the fall of Gaddafi, Tuareg who had fought for him returned from Libya with numerous weapons, bolstering the hard-liners from the 2006 rebellion. Forming into the MNLA, these people could not reach a satisfactory arrangement with the government and launched yet another rebellion. Iyad ag Ghali, the historical leader of the 1990s rebellion first attempted to negotiate between parties. When it failed, he formed his own movement, the Ansar Dine, which would soon come to be known for its desire to introduce sharia to all of Mali rather than seek independence for Northern Mali. The latter formed the programme of the MNLA, and it was justified on the following bases. Returning to notions sometimes invoked by earlier rebels or intellectuals associated with them, the MNLA drew up a historical narrative presenting their projected state, Azawad, as an alternative to Mali with all its failings. Regarding the present and recent times, criticism of Mali went along the lines mentioned above. But such corruption and abuse of power had characterised the Malian state since its inception. In fact, it represented a colonial occupation of Azawad, undermining the free enterprise of its people and replacing its institutions with inadequate and corrupt ones. For Azawad had a history of its own. Its inhabitants had stood up to the French colonisers. Later, they had petitioned de Gaulle to remain associated with France within a planned structure known as the OCRS (Organisation commune des régions sahariennes) 3. Then were listed the different uprisings against the Malian state, beginning with the rebellion of The existence of a political entity pre-dating the Malian state was thus held to have been demonstrated, just as the will of its people to remain independent from 2 The presence of an American observation post and military co-operation with the USA and other Western powers brought remarkably few results (cf. Lecocq & Schrijver 2007). 3 A temporary attempt at retaining control of Saharan parts of West and North African colonies, the OCRS was abandoned at the approach of independence (cf. Boilley 1993), and although Tuareg leaders were approached within the framework of preparations for this projected entity, many refused it and preferred continued allegiance to the French Soudan. 9

10 Mali. This people was not only the Tuareg of this area, but all its ethnic groups, Songhay, Fulani and Arabs. Yet, to this day, only very few Songhay have joined the MNLA. The degeneration of the Malian state, particularly in Northern Mali, was considered to be such that there was a high degree of collusion between Malian officials, including those from Northern Mali integrated following the latest rebellions, and the AQIM in smuggling ventures, particularly the cocaine trade. As mentioned, not much can be proved about the drugs trade. Meanwhile, individual connections between Malian officials, smugglers, exrebels and Islamists, some of whom may have at various times belonged to more than one of these categories, are very likely, contrary to the notion of co-operation between entire groups and agencies. The MNLA, however, thus not only blamed the Malian government for failing to provide security against the AQIM, but even to collaborate with it. By contrast, they presented themselves as a safeguard against Islamists, an idea that their spokespersons in Europe tried hard to promote. But increasingly, a different image emerged of the relations on the ground between the actors present in Northern Mali. In an early battle against the Malian army, rumours emerged of the participation of Islamists. Because of heavy losses, soldiers and civilians demonstrated in Bamako and neighbouring cities. Attacks on Red people made the majority of Tuareg and Arabs leave Southern Mali, fearing persecution as in the 1990s. A drawn-out battle for a camp on the Algerian border ended with victory to rebels. But an eyewitness report that I received from a soldier in the Malian army told of the presence of AQIM members, who were by far the strongest party, subjecting the army to a barrage of fire. But the MNLA continued to deny any connection to the AQIM. Soon after, junior officers revolted and carried out a coup d état on the basis of discontent with the campaign against the rebels. As military command structures evaporated, the rebels advanced very rapidly, taking control of the three regional capitals of Northern Mali in as many days. Until then, they had only captured peripheral towns that the garrisons had abandoned. During earlier rebellions, territorial control of agglomerations was almost unheard of. But this time, the army simply fled, only a few shots being fired in Gao, for example, according to an Arab soldier who escaped to Algeria. Some Tuareg and Arab soldiers temporarily joined the rebels to avoid having to fight to them, but fled shortly after. Most officials also left the country, alongside a great number of refugees, although the latter did this in part to avoid being identified with the rebels in case of a counter-attack by the Malian army. Still, few officials joined the ranks of the rebels. Having reached their military goals, the 10

11 MNLA stated that the campaign was finished, and then proclaimed the independence of the state of Azawad. Inside Azawad, however, they had to contend for control with the Tuareg Islamist group, the Ansar Dine, the AQIM, and a splinter group, the MUJAO (Mouvement pour l unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l Ouest). The Azawad flag that was hoisted on abandoned government buildings was at times replaced with a black Salafist one. More importantly, crucial support was forthcoming from the AQIM during the conquest of the regional capitals. The MNLA s influence there was since said to be limited, the AQIM in alliance with the Ansar Dine exercising the main control, although the MNLA had a presence in Gao and Timbuktu. Otherwise, they were relegated to southern and peripheral parts of the Azawad. Ideological differences or discourse for foreign consumption? Despite the MNLA having distanced itself from the Islamists, there was thus evidence of at least a tactical alliance with the AQIM. The various Islamist groups were powerful enough to attempt to impose their interpretation of sharia. The implications of this are beyond the scope of this paper. The MNLA tried to organise an interim government, partly in co-operation with the Ansar Dine, despite debates over the place of Islam in the new state. The two movements also signed an agreement, which later fell through. Most recently, the MNLA were chased from Gao by the MUJAO. Considering the discrepancies between the stated project of the MNLA and particularly their alleged opposition to the Islamists on the one hand and the various complex interrelations entertained to the Ansar Dine and the tactical alliance with the AQIM on the other, one is entitled to ask whether the ideological differences truly matter. Are the MNLA putting forward a discourse aimed at a Western audience? Keeping in mind previous references to self-determination, are we hearing a discourse combining the rights of the oppressed or indigenous peoples coupled with one of opposition to radical Islamism? As concerns the latter, the MNLA have clearly tried to exploit Western fears to cast themselves as the best defence against such forces. More significantly, they have kept up an activity that could be observed in the 1990s of promoting their rights to self-determination and to present that message to a Western audience, the MNLA having several spokespersons in Europe, particularly in France. Furthermore, while the Islamists programme has been met with violent demonstrations, the MNLA does not appear to enjoy any substantive support. 11

12 Beyond issues of legitimacy, one must try to identify the local recipients of their discourse. While they are concerned with more than appealing to an international audience, its local manifestations are largely developments of arguments having been put forward for decades regarding the predicament of Northern Mali and the Tuareg. It is a discourse, however, that has acquired its own reality, making it partly impervious to comparison with the situation on the ground. Yet, not only to the acute outside observer, but also to many Northern Malians, the underlying dynamics of the political economy re-appears. Looting has been rife, most movements present in Northern Mali are known to contain smugglers while the two Tuareg movements are involved in negotiations with the ECOWAS. It would be hard to imagine that part of those negotiations would not be concerned with material issues. In fact, despite claiming that the independence of Azawad was non-negotiable, the MNLA have been involved in informal negotiations since shortly after their declaration of independence. These were formalised during the last month, when the Ansar Dine also joined in. One thus ultimately returns to the issue of the relationship to the state. But this relationship is open to expression in many ways, by invoking rights, by emphasising the access to resources or by stressing people s desire for an enabling state which provides services and security without imposing itself on the inhabitants. Conclusion Given the situation in Northern Mali, examining the more tangible content of political Islam might seem an equally appropriate task. I chose to retain my focus on the discourse of selfproclaimed promoters of autonomy or independence, given its much longer history in Northern Mali. Through repeated historical occurrences, the discourse related to the quest for self-determination takes on a life of its own. To be sure, it does draw upon extraneous sources for inspiration and concepts, but these are given their peculiar content and flavour through their use in a narrative about Northern Mali and the Tuareg. The end result is aimed both at an international and a local audience, as it becomes sufficiently ambiguous to resonate with many experiences of perceived oppression and marginalisation and of agendas connected to them. The origin of a given discourse is thus of less importance than the uses to which it can be put. And in any case, in Africa, with its history of alien domination and international 12

13 connections, discursive resources will be drawn from wherever possible to be employed both for the purpose of addressing the wider world and to express more closely felt local concerns. As I have tried to show, moreover, a given situation or relationship may be expressed in a numbers of ways drawing upon the most appropriate or simply available discourses. The relationship between Northern Mali and the rest of the country, frequently couched in terms of autonomy and regional specificity, does not exclude one s talking about it in terms of access to the resources of the state. That in turn is not incompatible with considerations in terms of one s due or one s rights. Nevertheless, as I have shown throughout, Northern Mali remains dependent upon resources of external origin. This is perhaps particularly the case of the region of origin of the recurring rebellions, the region of Kidal. Its one-sided, poorly diversified economy makes for the importance of outside resources, whether those obtained from the state or from involvement in smuggling. Whatever the state s failings in addressing this situation, the prevailing discourse in terms of autonomy falls short of addressing the underlying dynamics responsible for the persistently skewed relationship to the state. Even so, the ability of the inhabitants to express the eminently political aspects of their predicament by using creatively all discursive resources at their disposal is beyond dispute. 13

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