4.9. Sahel. The African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been actively involved in mediation to.

Transcription

1 4.9 Sahel In 2012 the security and humanitarian situation in the Sahel deteriorated sharply. A looming humanitarian crisis caused by a major drought, in combination with high food prices, displacement, and chronic poverty, put an estimated 18 million people at risk of a humanitarian disaster. 1 The region s long-standing socioeconomic and political problems, including food insecurity, high levels of poverty, limited access to basic social services, and weak state institutions, have been greatly exacerbated by the effects of the 2011 crisis in Libya that prompted the return of approximately 420,000 people to the Sahel. 2 In addition, an estimated 2,000 Tuareg who had served in the Libyan army or been hired as mercenaries returned, bringing with them an extensive arsenal of weapons and ammunition, including anti- aircraft artillery and explosives. 3 The region has also seen a rise in criminal activities, and a proliferation of terrorist groups. In addition to al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), active in the Sahel since 2007, this includes new armed groups, such as the Islamist group Ansar Dine and the al- Qaeda splinter group Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). In Mali, the combination of these factors was further complicated by the entry of a new Tuareg rebellion that was first supported and then hijacked by Islamist groups and a military coup in March 2012 that overthrew the democratically elected government. The twin crises in Mali demonstrate fragility of the governments in the region, and the potential wide-reaching effects of the deteriorating situation in the Sahel. The African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been actively involved in mediation to restore constitutional order in Mali. In November ECOWAS and the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed a plan for a military intervention force to address the situation in the country s north, and in December the UN Security Council authorized an African-led intervention force for an initial period of one year. Alarmed at the presence of al-qaeda in the region, the European Union set up a police mission in Niger in August 2012 aimed at strengthening the country s capacity to fight terrorism and organized crime. In December, the European Council also approved a military support mission to Mali to train Malian combat units. The UN s response to the unfolding crisis in the Sahel and the twin crises in Mali has been primarily led by Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and head of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) Said Djinnit. In October 2012 the UN also appointed a Special Envoy for the Sahel. Key Developments Conflict between Tuareg separatist groups and Mali s government has smoldered beneath the surface since the most recent rebellion ended in 2009, leaving key demands of the rebels, such as greater autonomy, greater political participation, and increased economic development, unaddressed. On 17 January 2012 the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) a new Tuareg rebel group formed in October 2011 by former rebels and fighters returning from Libya launched an armed rebellion with attacks on towns in northern Mali. Increased fighting throughout March between government troops and the MNLA, supported by AQIM and Ansar Dine, prompted calls to 122

2 SAHEL 123 postpone Mali s presidential elections scheduled for 29 April. On 22 March, following a mutiny in which soldiers accused the government of mishandling the rebel uprising in the north, army troops ousted President Amadou Tou - mani Touré and suspended the constitution. In the north, MNLA rebels and their allies took advantage of the power vacuum and made swift advances, seizing strategic northern towns, including the army s last stronghold, the ancient city of Timbuktu. On 27 March, ECOWAS named President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso as lead mediator for the crisis in Mali, with the mandate to interact with relevant stakeholders and engage them in dialogue for the restoration of peace in the country. ECOWAS received further mediation support from SRSG Djinnit, who also engaged with ECOWAS and the AU on joint efforts toward the return of constitutional order. In addition, the SRSG held consultations with countries in the region affected by the crisis, including Mauritania and Niger. On 6 April the junta agreed to a transitional framework that led to the appointment of the former head of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, as interim president and Cheick Modibo Diarra as prime minister. In a later agreement, the transitional term was extended from forty days to a twelve-month period. The security situation in the north continued to deteriorate. In May the MNLA and Ansar Dine, in an apparent compromise to achieve their respective demands for an independent Azawad (northern Mali) and the imposition of sharia law, announced their intention to merge and to create an independent Islamic state in the northern part of Mali. Soon after, however, the alliance began to show cracks and by the end of June, Ansar Dine had driven MNLA fighters out of key towns, taken full control over the northern territory, and begun enforcing sharia law. In July, MUJAO reportedly recruited hundreds of youth fighters from neighboring countries, including Côte d Ivoire, to join the fight in the north. 4 Secretary-General of a delegation of Mali's Tuareg MNLA group, Bilal Ag Acherif speaks with Burkina Faso foreign affairs minister Djibril Bassole during a meeting on 16 November 2012 in Ouagadougou. It was not until the end of August that President Traoré, who had returned from France after two months of recuperation from a mob attack backed by junta leader Amadou Sanogo, announced the formation of a national unity government. Also in August, amid growing concerns over al-qaeda s presence in the Sahel, the European Union, through its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), deployed a police mission to Niger. The CSDP Civil Mission in Sahel (EUCAP Sahel Niger) aims to improve the capacities of Nigerien security forces to fight terrorism and organized crime, with a view toward enhancing political stability, security, governance, and social cohesion in Niger and the Sahel region. Although the mission focuses primarily on Niger, its liaison officers are closely monitoring the situation in the Sahel, with a view toward further possible actions, particularly in Mali and Mauritania. ECOWAS and the AU, in response to the deteriorating security situation in northern Mali, sought authorization from the UN Security Council for a military intervention force. In June and July the Council did not back requests to this end due to a lack of detailed AFP photo/ahmed Ouoba

3 124 MISSION NOTES Western Sahara The stalemated dispute over Western Sahara continued in 2012 between the government of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el- Hamra y de Río de Oro (POLISARIO) independence movement, as no progress was achieved on the fundamental points of contention. POLISARIO operates in exile from the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria and has proclaimed an in - dependent Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in Western Sahara, while Morocco controls the majority of the territory and advocates incorporating an autonomous Western Sahara under its sovereignty. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was founded in 1991 with a mandate centered on registering voters and conducting a self-determination referendum originally scheduled for Due to fundamental disputes between the parties, no progress has been made toward its execution in over a decade. While the two sides appear no closer to an agreement on the future of Western Sahara, MINURSO focuses on other activities, such as the monitoring of the cease-fire and the provision of support to UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) led confidence building measures. MINURSO is the only UN peacekeeping mission established since 1978 without a human rights role in its mandate, but the 2012 Security Council mandate renewal resolution was the first to explicitly call on the parties to respect human rights. In June 2012 Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber was appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara. In addition to MINURSO, the Personal Envoy to the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and an African Union liaison office deal with aspects of the dispute within their respective mandates. MINURSO monitors the cease-fire, tracks personnel movement around the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Authorization Date 29 April 1991 (UNSC Res. 690) Start Date 6 September 1991 SRSG Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber (Germany) Force Commander Major-General Abdul Hafiz (Bangladesh) Budget $61.3 million (1 July June 2013) Strength as of Troops: October 2012 Military Observers: 197 Police: 6 International Civilian Staff: 95 National Civilian Staff: 165 UN Volunteers: 15 For detailed mission information see p. 252 Authorization Date 19 March 1997 (UNSC Pres. Statement S/PRST/1997/16) PESG Christopher Ross (United States) Budget $0.7 million (1 January December 2012) Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 2 31 October 2012 For detailed mission information see p. 280 sand berm separating Moroccan- and POLISARIO-controlled territory, receives complaints from both sides, reports ceasefire violations, and acts as the means of communication between Moroccan and POLISARIO armed forces. During the reporting period, MINURSO performed 8,335 ground patrols and 530 aerial patrols, recording twenty-five violations by Moroccan forces and seven by POLISARIO forces. 1 The territory of Western Sahara is one of the most heavily mined areas in the world. 2 MINURSO continues to support removal of landmines and unexploded Personal Envoy for Western Sahara ordnance in POLISARIO-controlled territory. In 2012, MINURSO received a new de-mining system that enhanced the speed of these activities. MINURSO supports UNHCR assistance programs for displaced and separated Sahrawi families, temporarily reuniting families split between Algeria and Western Sahara. UNHCR recently chartered a larger aircraft for this purpose, greatly enhancing the program s capacity. Both Morocco and POLISARIO maintain restrictions on MINURSO operations, including limitations on its access (continues)

4 SAHEL 125 Western Sahara (continued) to military positions and units. This has been detrimental to the mission s ability to achieve its mandated tasks and in some instances such as the display of Moroccan license plates on its vehicles or the presence of Moroccan flags around its compound have negatively affected perceptions of its neutrality. MINURSO believes that its communication with New York may have been monitored by Morocco on at least one occasion. Christopher Ross has served as the Personal Envoy for Western Sahara since He conducts meetings between the parties, but neither side has made any substantive concessions and neither, in Ross s view, has entered into a genuine negotiating process. 3 The parties still disagree on the very purpose of negotiations. In May 2012, Morocco withdrew confidence in Ross, citing a perceived Authorization Date August 1994 Head of Office Ambassador Yilma Tadesse (Ethiopia) anti-morocco bias and blaming him for the lack of progress toward a resolution. The Secretary-General rejected these demands and maintained Ross at his post. The AU Liaison Office in Western Sahara holds weekly meetings with representatives of MINURSO, Morocco, and POLISARIO, and provides humanitarian assistance for refugees in Al geria. The AU fully recognizes the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, limiting its role as a mediator in the conflict. AU Liaison Office in Western Sahara In April 2012 the UN Secretary- General stated that the environment surrounding the conflict is changing on many levels and could eventually alter the positions of the two parties. 4 While MINURSO serves a valuable role in monitoring the cease-fire and providing independent information on conditions on the ground, its ultimate goal of conducting a referendum on the future of the territory does not seem likely in the near future. Notes: 1. Reporting period covers 16 March 2011 to 15 March See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2102/197, 5 April African Press Organization, MINURSO Marked the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, 10 April United Nations, Department of Political Affairs, Interview with Christopher Ross, February 2012, site/undpa/main/enewsletter/news0212_ross. 4. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2102/197. operation plans, but did not rule out a future endorsement. After receiving a three-phased operation plan from ECOWAS and a direct request from Mali s interim president, Traoré, the Security Council in October passed Resolution 2071, declaring its readiness to endorse a military force to intervene in northern Mali. The Security Council also tasked the Secretary- General to assist joint ECOWAS and AU planning efforts and to submit within fortyfive days detailed and actionable recommendations for a military force. The resolution called on Mali s unity government and Malian rebel groups to engage in a credible negotiation process to seek a sustainable solution and called on the international community to support the Malian political process. CSDP Civil Mission in Sahel (EUCAP SAHEL Niger) Authorization and Start Date Head of Mission 16 July 2012 (EU Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP) Colonel Francisco Espinosa Navas (Spain) Budget $2.35 million (1 October September 2012) Strength as of Civilian Police: September 2012 International Civilian Staff: 6 SRSG Djinnit met with Tuareg rebels and in a separate meeting for the first time with representatives from Ansar Dine on 13 November, in which both groups assured their

5 126 MISSION NOTES Authorization and Start Date SRSG readiness to engage in dialogue. The meetings followed on the heels of the agreement by ECOWAS to send 3,300 troops to Mali to support the approximately 5,000 strong Malian forces 5 and the AU s endorsement of the plan that was developed in consultation with UN and EU military advisers. The AU s Peace and Security Council also called on the UN to authorize the deployment of the force that the plan identified as the African-led International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA). On 19 November, EU ministers agreed to the deployment of an EU military support mission to assist in the training of Malian combat units. Approved by the European Council on 10 December, the EU training mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) is comprised of approximately 250 officers and is expected to begin its operations in January The ministers also agreed to provide financial support to African-led military operations in Mali through the African Peace Facility, which provides funds for peace operations and capacity-building efforts and urged the European Commission to prepare for a mobilization of funds. The highly anticipated report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on 28 November did not provide the en dorse - ment ECOWAS and the AU requested. Instead, the Secretary-General cautiously recommended the approval of a military intervention in Mali with a one-year mandate, but only as a last resort and with conditions, saying that if a military intervention in the north is not well conceived and executed, it would worsen an already extremely fragile humanitarian situation. 6 The report strongly underlined the primacy that a broad-based political dialogue must take over military actions as well as the Special Envoy for the Sahel 26 September 2012 (SG Statement; High-level Meeting on the Sahel), 5 October 2012 (SG Letter S/2012/750) Romano Prodi (Italy) need to address the long-standing grievances of the Tuareg. It also cautioned that fundamental questions on how the military intervention force would be led, trained, equipped and financed remain unanswered and that military plans need to be developed further. 7 The report further recommended that specific benchmarks should be met before the start of the operation, including the demonstrated operational readiness of both the Mal ian and AFISMA forces and effective training of military and police in their obligations under international human rights law. The Secretary- General recommended a logistical support package for the operation but clarified that the UN would not provide funding, which instead should come from voluntary or bilateral contributions. On 20 December, the UN Security Council authorized AFISMA for an initial one-year period and requested the Secretary- General to establish, in consultation with national authorities, a multidisciplinary UN presence in Mali to provide support to the political and security processes, including support to the planning, deployment, and operations of AFISMA. In response to concerns by member states about the readiness of ECOWAS forces and the continuing political instability in Bamako illustrated most recently by the 10 December ouster of interim prime minister Diarra by soldiers loyal to Sanogo Resolution 2085 requested the AU to report every sixty days on the deployment and activities of the mission, including before the start of military operations in the north. Benchmarks to be met include progress in the political pro - cess in Mali, including a roadmap for the resto ration of constitutional order, effective training of AFISMA and Malian defense and security forces, and the operational readiness of AFISMA. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to confirm in advance the Council s satisfaction with the planned offensive operation. Resolution 2085 was vague on the contentious issue of funding of the force. The resolution called on member states and international organizations to provide voluntary

6 SAHEL 127 funding to AFISMA and requested the Secretary-General to set up a trust fund. The Security Council expressed its intention to consider the provision of UN-funded logistics support packages to AFISMA, in addition to voluntary contributions, including equipment and services. The Council requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the AU, ECOWAS, and Malian authorities, to further develop and refine options for a support package within thirty days. Efforts underway notwithstanding, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous already cautioned that a military operation could not likely be launched before September 2013, due to the time needed to ready the force. 8 Integrated Strategy for the Sahel Region Amid the continuing fighting in the north and the political instability in the south, the security and humanitarian situation in Mali continuously worsened, with reported acts of sexual violence against women and girls and over 200,000 people internally displaced. 9 Cultural heritage sites also came under attack, some of which were completely destroyed. The fighting in northern Mali also further aggravated the humanitarian crisis in the Sahel, with an estimated 260,000 refugees fleeing Mali for neighboring countries. 10 At the request of the Security Council, 11 UNOWA, along with other UN agencies in the region, is developing a UN integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing security, gov ernance, development, human rights, and humanitarian issues. The strategy seeks to build greater resilience in the region and aims to strengthen cooperation within the UN system as well as increase coordination with other partners, including the AU, ECOWAS, and the EU. In October the UN appointed former president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, as Special Envoy for the Sahel, tasking him with coordinating systemwide efforts to finalize and implement the UN s integrated regional strategy. In addition, the Special Envoy undertakes good offices regarding the crisis in Mali and the crossborder and transnational issues affecting Sahelian countries. Conclusion While the Security Council s December authorization of AFISMA meant that preparations for the force can begin, lingering questions about funding and logistical support to the military operation and the operational readiness of AFISMA and Malian forces remain. The Secretary-General s strong stance in his November report, in which he distanced himself from a military intervention in Mali and ruled out UN funding for an intervention force, further compromises the operation, even before the commencement of offensive operations. Meanwhile, the political process came to a halt and the security situation in Mali deteriorated further as Ansar Dine withdrew its cease-fire pledge and Islamist groups advanced toward government-held territory in the south in early January. Notes 1. Briefing of Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman to the Security Council, S.PV6836, 17 September Threats to Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel Region, Security Council Report, February 2012, 3. Malian Touaregs Return from Libya with Arms Prompts Coup, Bloomberg News, 23 March 2012, 4. Scores of Africans Recruited by Mali Qaeda offshoot, Agence France-Presse, 18 July 2012, CNG c0938d94b29c2f60a8741b81b5.c61.

7 128 MISSION NOTES 5. West African Bloc Agrees on Northern Mali Troops, Associated Press, 11 November 2012, 6. See, UN Chief Calls to Reunify Mali, Associated Press, 29 November 2012, 7. Ibid. 8. No military intervention in Mali Before September: U.N. Peacekeeping Chief, Reuters, 5 December 2012, 9. Political, Military Insecurity Deepen Mali Humanitarian Crisis, Voice of America, 8 November 2012, humanitariancrisis/ html. 10. UN: Mali Crisis Impacting Sahel Hunger, News24, 2 August 2012, See UN Security Council Resolution 2056 (2012).