United Nations Security Council. Topic B: Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict. Chair: Matt Felz. Moderator: Paloma Rivera. Vice Chair: Brian Yost

Transcription

1 United Nations Security Council Topic B: Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict Chair: Matt Felz Moderator: Paloma Rivera Vice Chair: Brian Yost April 10 13, 2014 Felz 1

2 Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict Introduction: The little-known separatist conflict between the Polisario Front and the kingdom of Morocco over the disputed Western Saharan remains an international security issue central to the mandate of the UNSC to maintain international peace and security. Regional negotiations and limited international involvement have failed to provide a lasting political settlement in the region, as the competing interests of the Polisario Front, Morocco, Algeria, and Islamist radicals have derailed any potential autonomy or independence deals. Given the region s instability following the Islamist insurgency in Mali and the emergence of Al Qaeda operations in Polisario-run refugee camps, the responsibility to mediate this conflict falls within the mandate of the UNSC. The Council must be aware of the delicate ethnic sensitivities of the decades long conflict and the possibility of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb capitalizing on any further inaction to turn the Western Sahara into a training ground for terrorists and militants. Though the state sovereignty of Morocco and Algeria must be respected, the failure of the parties involved to negotiate a lasting settlement necessitates the involvement of the Council to ensure the peace and stability of the region. Felz 2

3 Background and Current Situation: The dispute between the Sahrawi and the Kingdom of Morocco originated during the decolonization of Morocco and the Western Sahara territory; Morocco, in raising a historical claim to the territory inhabited by the Sahrawi ethno-linguistic group, induced a popular backlash against external rule by the Moroccan government. This widespread resentment of Moroccan occupation by local Sahrawis catalyzed the formation of the Polisario Front, a terrorist organization devoted to the self-determination of the Sahrawi people and the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). i Though, at its formation, the Polisario Front promulgated a nominally Marxist ideology, the dissolution of the Soviet Union created an ideological vacuum within the Polisario. In the absence of a unifying philosophy, the group has gravitated towards narcotics trafficking and radical Islam, with Sahrawi refugee camps administered by the Polisario acting as major recruiting bases for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. ii The high saturation of organized crime and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in these lawless regions negatively impacts regional security and negates some of the gains of recent military intervention against AQIM in Mali. The narcotics trafficking that the group now engages in has provided a new source of demand for cocaine producers in South America; this new distribution channel provides new funding to AQIM and undermines US and Colombian counternarcotics operations in South America. In dominating narcotics trafficking and providing a safe haven for (if not allying with) Al Qaeda, one can draw a disturbing parallel between the Polisario Front in contemporary Western Sahara and the Taliban in circa 2001 Afghanistan. The safe havens and military aid provided to the Polisario by the Algerian government could translate to increased operational strength of AQIM. Felz 3

4 The involvement of the Council in the Western Sahara dispute has been limited to the presence of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) from 1991 until the present. MINURSO was originally mandated to: Monitor the ceasefire; Verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory; Monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations; Take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees; Oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross ); Implement the repatriation programme (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees); Identify and register qualified voters; Organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results. iii In 1996, the Council expressed concern about the political stalemate in the region and supported the assertion of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that the absence of meaningful progress towards completion of the settlement plan would necessitate the immediate action of the Council and a phased withdrawal of the (MINURSO). iv In 2007, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1754, reaffirming the need for a solution to the conflict that would provide self-determination to the Sahrawi people while respecting the interests of all actors involved. In doing so, the Council extended MINURSO until 31 Felz 4

5 October 2007 and called upon both the Polisario Front and the Kingdom of Morocco to enter into negotiations without preconditions and in good faith. v Most recently in 2013, the Council passed Resolution 2099 to urge regional actors to cooperate more fully with MINURSO and UN negotiators. The resolution also noted the deteriorating human rights situation in the Polisario-run Tindouf refugee camps and recent violations of existing agreements. The Council further extended MINURSO and called for greater expediency in Morocco and the Polisario in moving towards a mutually acceptable political outcome. vi From the sampling of resolutions above, it remains apparent that though MINURSO and the efforts of all parties involved have maintained a ceasefire between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, the transition period has yet to begin and the region is no closer to a lasting political settlement, less some negotiations in 2007 that failed to bring the parties closer on substantive issues concerning autonomy and self-determination. vii The Council should be mindful of the conflicts relationship between the competing international norms of self-determination and state sovereignty and geographic integrity. Since decolonization, the Organization of African Unity has espoused the principle of border stability (related to uti possidetis), with African states agreeing to perpetuate the pre-existing borders as demarcated by the colonial powers. viii Challenges to the current order would be received frigidly by most African states, especially those with a history of violent ethnic secessionism or possessing separatist elements. Additionally, international actors battling secessionist groups domestically may resist any resolution that affirms the right of self-determination through secessionism and violence. Felz 5

6 The only unifying force between most member states is the desire to prevent AQIM from gaining any operational capacity in the Western Sahara. The United States, secular governments in the region, and the European Union have the most to lose with the rise of Islamic radicalism in the region. Lawless areas of the Polisario controlled Western Sahara could become launching grounds for terrorist attacks on European, Central African, and North African states. The endgame of Western Saharan self-determination is the recognition of the current non-sovereign Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The Polisario Front founded the SADR and established a government in Though the official government maintains very little authority over the territory it maintains it governs, many countries have recognized it as a legitimate state. The Polisario still maintains control of the major refugee camps in the area. The current SADR president, Mohamed Abdelaziz, acted as the Polisario secretary-general in the 1970s; the two groups have an intertwined membership and operate in close cooperation. ix Felz 6

7 Bloc Positions: As stated above, member states individual experiences with secessionism, challenges to territorial integrity, self-determination, and Islamist terrorism will play a critical role in the formulation of their positions on how intensely, and in what manner the Council intervenes in the crafting of a permanent political agreement. After unconditionally supporting Morocco for decades, in 2004 the United States publically supported a deal for autonomy but not independence for the Western Sahara. The United States and United Kingdom, in continuing the War on Terror, have an outsized interest in eliminating bases of support for AQIM within the Western Sahara territory. Morocco, a Cold War ally of the US, has become an even closer ally of the US in the War on Terror, and all considerations of the territorial dispute by the US policy community must take into account US national security concerns. The UK does not recognize any Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. x France, Morocco s primary trading partner, creditor, and foreign investor, has ardently supported Morocco, to the extent that France has stood alone against the entirety of the Security Council to support Moroccan interests. The other members of the P-5 also support the War on Terror, specifically aggressively engaging Al Qaeda and Islamist extremism throughout the world. Russia and China however have more nuanced views of the issue of self-determination. Russia has a very mixed record of supporting self-determination (e.g. Abkazia and South Ossentia from Georgia) and vehemently protesting it (e.g. Kosovo from Serbia) and currently supports the Sahrawi right to selfdetermination but has not recognized the Sahrawi Republic. China, while a self-proclaimed supporter of the developing, has refused to take a firm stance on self-determination, most likely because of the ongoing dispute over the self-determination of Tibet. xi Argentina, the Republic of Korea, Jordan, and Australia, while not officially recognizing the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, support Sahrawi claims on the Western Sahara (the Felz 7

8 Australian Senate have called upon its government to recognize SADR). These countries relationships with the US will nuance their views and temper their public actions. Chad, Nigeria, and Rwanda all officially recognize the Sahrawi Republic. Chile has recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, but its Congress has called for the recognition of the Sahrawi Republic. xii Felz 8

9 Questions to Consider: The following is not to be considered a comprehensive list of questions when conducting your research. They are merely being provided as encouragement to think about certain issues pertinent to the discussion. Each county will have its own agenda with regard to this topic and may also want to draw from the domestic regulatory framework it is currently operating under. 1. How will any political solution (or lack thereof) affect the security and stability of the region? 2. How does the War on Terror affect the incentives of the member states? 3. How does each member state s history with secessionist groups affect its policy on the Western Sahara? 4. How has the international community responded to other issues of self-determination and secession? 5. What types of transitions have been implemented in autonomy and independence agreements? 6. What authority does the UN have over the self-determination issue and the terrorism issue? 7. Will any UN solution create a precedent for other self-determination issues? How will this affect future UN resolutions? 8. What is your member state s individual political, military, and economic history and relationship with Morocco, Algeria, and the Polisario Front/SADR? Felz 9

10 Recommended Sources: United Nations Security Council Homepage For enacted resolutions on the issue United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights For information on human rights abuses in the Western Sahara MINURSO homepage- For information provided by the UN mission in the Western Sahara and official UN facts and figures Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook For country-specific data The New York Times For coverage of the conflict and official positions of key member states JSTOR and Academic One File (if available, may be accessible at public libraries) Reuters and BBC News Africa For in-depth timelines of the Western Sahara Conflict The European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center and the Carnegie Endowment are Think Tanks that both have done extensive writing on the topic. Felz 10

11 Bibliography: Countries that Recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. PBS Wide Angle. MINURSO Background. United Nations Peacekeeping. Accessed on February 18, 2014 at MINURSO Mandate. United Nations Peacekeeping accessed on February 18, 2014 at Moniquet, Claude. The Polisario Front and the Development of Terrorism in the Sahel, European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, (2010). Security Council Resolution 2099 (2013) S/RES/2099 (25 April 2013) available at Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007). Security Council extends United Nations Mission in Western Sahara until October 31. S/RES/1754 (30 April 2007) available at Security Council Extends Western Sahara Mission until 31 May United Nations Press Release (1996) accessed on February 18, 2014 at Theophilopoulou, Anna. Western Sahara. The Global Dispatches. January 31, Accessed on February 18, 2014 at TIMELINE: Western Sahara, a 50-year-old dispute, Reuters, January 4, 2008, accessed on November 14, Felz 11

12 Touval, Saadia. The Organization of African Unity and African Borders. International Organization. vol 21. No 1, 1967: ( ). Western Sahara Profile. BBC News Africa. 7 January Accessed on February 18, 2014 at Western Sahara Weekly News. Arso. March 31, Accessed on February 18, 2014 at i TIMELINE: Western Sahara, a 50-year-old dispute, Reuters, January 4, 2008, accessed on November 14, ii Claude Moniquet, The Polisario Front and the Development of Terrorism in the Sahel, European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, (2010): iii MINURSO Mandate. United Nations Peacekeeping. Accessed on February 18, 2014 at iv Security Council Extends Western Sahara Mission until 31 May United Nations Press Release (1996) accessed on February 18, 2014 at v Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007). Security Council extends United Nations Mission in Western Sahara until October 31. S/RES/1754 (30 April 2007) available at vi Security Council Resolution 2099 (2013) S/RES/2099 (25 April 2013) available at viivii MINURSO Background. United Nations Peacekeeping. Accessed on February 18, 2014 at viii Touval, Saadia. The Organization of African Unity and African Borders. International Organization. vol 21. No 1, 1967: ( ). ix Western Sahara Profile. BBC News Africa. 7 January Accessed on February 18, 2014 at x Western Sahara Weekly News. Arso. March 31, Accessed on February 18, 2014 at e01-13.htm xixixi Theophilopoulou, Anna. Western Sahara. The Global Dispatches. January 31, Accessed on February 18, 2014 at xii Countries that Recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. PBS Wide Angle. Felz 12