School of Public Policy Working Paper Series: ISSN Center for European Studies and Department of Political Science University of Florida

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1 School of Public Policy Working Paper Series: ISSN Working Paper 6 Moving in the Other Direction? The Impact of Domestic Party System Change on Italian MEPs Amie Kreppel Center for European Studies and Department of Political Science University of Florida The support of UCL Friends Programme is gratefully acknowledged. School of Public Policy University College London The Rubin Building 29/30 Tavistock Square London WC1H 9QU, UK Tel , Fax spp@ucl.ac.uk Date: January 2004

2 Moving in the Other Direction? The Impact of Domestic Party System Change on Italian MEPs Amie Kreppel Center for European Studies & Department of Political Science University of Florida An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Workshop on the Europeanization of Italy, 19 th 20 th June, 2003 Fiesole, Italy. The author thanks the participants and organizers of that workshop for their comments and Amy Cosan for excellent research assistance. All errors remain the sole responsibility of the author. Abstract This paper re-examines some of the assumptions of the Europeanization literature by suggesting that it might be possible for domestic political events to have a direct influence on supranational political organizations. This possibility is addressed through an analysis of the impact that the dramatic political reform of the Italian party system in the 1990s had on the primary home of political party action in the EU, the European Parliament. The goal is to determine the extent to which the transformation of the Italian political party system impacted the party system of the EP through an analysis of EP party group voting unity and the additional impact that these events may have had on the political roles and influence of Italian MEPs within the EP through an examination of the allocation committee chairmanships and rapporteurships across time. The results are in many ways counterintuitive and suggest that the norms and rules that structure the supranational institutions may be hardier and more resistant to shock than currently assumed. 2

3 There can be little doubt that the development of the European Union has had a tremendous impact on the national political life of its member states. The flourishing field of Europeanization literature clearly examines and demonstrates this impact in a wide range of spheres. This paper seeks to ask a different question, or rather to reverse the question to a certain extent to ask whether, or to what extent, political changes in the national sphere affect the European political arena. Although some aspects of this relationship are quite clear (for example changes in national leadership have had profound effects on EU integration broadly) others remain less studied and far less obvious. 1 This paper seeks to examine the potential effects of domestic political change on European level institutions more closely through an analysis of the behaviour of Italian Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) before and after the reforms and political upheavals that rocked Italy during the1990s. The dramatic transformation of the Italian political scene and, in particular, the political party system unquestionably reshaped the national Italian political landscape, but did these changes have any impact at the supranational level? This paper traces the shifts in the behaviour and roles of Italian MEPs within the European Parliament before and after the dramatic transformation of the national party system that took place during the 1990s. While the immediate subject of the paper is the potential changes in the behaviour and roles of Italian MEPs and the influence of domestic political reforms on supranational actors, the broader subject addressed is the extent to which Europeanization is a one-way street or a recursive relationship between Europe and the member states. This question takes on increased relevance in light of the future enlargement of the EU to at least ten (if not eventually 13 or more) 1 The most obvious recent examples being the switch from Conservative John Major to Labour s Tony Blair in the UK and the shift from the Center-right coalition led for so long by Helmut Kohl to the redgreen (center-left) coalition led by Gerhard Schroeder and Joshka Fischer in Germany. 3

4 new member states. The domestic politics of the newly democratic countries of Eastern and Central Europe are markedly different from that of the current member states. Party systems in particular are more fluid and parties themselves play a substantially reduced role in most cases. Thus, the impact of party system fluidity and large scale political reform in Italy on Italian MEPs may be understood in the broader context of EU enlargement as a possible example of potential future patterns among MEPs from the new accession countries. In this paper I first examine the question of why we might expect national political events to impact the supranational level. In other words, this section outlines why we might expect Europeanization to move in the other direction focusing, in particular, on the realm of political party competition and the potential impact on the European Parliament. In the second section I summarize (very briefly) the political upheaval experienced in Italy during from the late 1980s through the mid 1990s. This will include a more detailed look at the dramatic changes to the party system as a result of a combination of international events, changing electoral laws and the corruption scandals of the time. The third section outlines in detail the specific questions addressed by the data analysis, the data itself and the process of analysis while section four reports the results and interprets their meaning. In the final concluding section focuses on the extent to which the lessons of this specific research can be broadly applied or generalized and what this might mean in terms of EU enlargement. Moving in the Other Direction? The increasing focus in recent years on the impact of European integration on the politics, policies and institutions of the member states of the European Union is understandable 4

5 given the rapid increase in the overall pace of integration since the late 1980s. Literature on Europeanization has emphasized, among other things, the impact of EU integration on specific national policy arenas (for example Radaelli, 1997; Agh, 1999; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002; Harcourt, 2002; Jorson 2002), institutions (for example Ladrech, 2001, 2002; Cole and Drake, 2000; Cole, 2001; Grabbe, 2001; Hanley, 2002), regions and regionalism (for example Börzel, 1999,2000, 2003; Bentz and Eberlein, 1999) and even political systems as a whole (Ladrech, 1994; Anderson, 2002). Almost universally, however, the focus has been on the impact of the development of EU level policies, institutions and overall integration on aspects of the member states political systems. The causal arrow has consistently been pointing from the supranational level down towards the member states, despite frequent recognition of the fact that national actors may look to the supranational EU level as a potential sphere of action through which they can indirectly influence domestic outcomes via EU policies (Hix and Goetz, 2000; Ladrech, 2002; Cole, 2001; Anderson, 2002 amongst others). Many definitions of Europeanization, however, suggest at least the possibility for a more recursive relationship between European (EU) and national level political developments, but this aspect of the EU-member state relationship has, thus far, been under-researched. Ladrech (2002: 391), for example, defines Europeanization by stating that it has something to do with the penetration of the European dimension into national political arenas of politics and policy making, but despite the fact that he is examining the relationship between Europeanization and political parties (which operate at the supranational level within the EP), he does not question whether this relationship might also exist in the opposite direction. The notion that domestic politics may impact European level decision-making and outcomes is not, in and of itself, new. The notion is, in fact, an integral concept within the 5

6 intergovernmentalist theoretical framework, which posits national leaders as the primary actors in the integration process (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). The intergovernmental approach highlights the possibility for changes in national leadership to have significant short and long term effects on the process and content of EU integration. 2 One need only think about such crucial actors as Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer, Margret Thatcher, Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl to realize the positive and negative effects that individual leaders can have on EU integration as a whole. But while few would dispute that national leadership matters for the future path of the EU, the potential that substantial changes in national level political structures, and in particular party systems, might have is less well understood. This is surprising given the recent deluge of literature on the growing importance of the European Parliament (EP) and the critical role of parties within it (Kreppel, 1999, 2002; Kreppel and Hix, 2003; Hix, Noury and Kreppel, 2003; Hix, Noury and Gerard, 2002, Scully, 2000; Raunio, 1997, 2002). Although some disputes remain over the particulars, there is by now broad agreement that; a) the powers of the European parliament have grown substantially and almost inexorably since the Single European Act (SEA) and b) the EP today merits the title of colegislator and acts as a functioning legislative body in most significant policy arenas within the EU (Tsebelis,1994, 1995; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1997, 2000; Garrett and Tsebelis 2001; Kreppel, 2000, 2002 ; Hix, 1999; Scully, 1997; Shackleton,1998, 2000; Corbett, Jacobs and Schackleton, 2003; etc.). If the EP is a crucial aspect of EU decision making and the political party groups are the dominant force within it, why shouldn t we be concerned about the development of those party groups and in particular the impact that national party system change might have on them? (199***). 2 See also some aspects of historical institutionalism such as that presented by Paul Pierson 6

7 To understand the direct relationship between national party systems and the party system of the European Parliament it is crucial to remember that the party groups of the EP are fundamentally conglomerations of national level parties. The supranational EP party groups do not exist at the national level. Elections to the EP are based on nationally derived electoral lists. MEPs once elected on the basis of their national party decide (generally within their delegation, although individuals may act on their own) which EP party group to join. Alternatively, national delegations may decide to remain unaffiliated or even work to create a new party group. 3 Even after they have joined a party group the national delegations may continue to exert an independent influence on the activities of the EP as a whole, and no matter what will exert at least some influence over their own EP party group (Kreppel, 2002). As a result significant changes in domestic party systems could potentially directly influence EU outcomes (policy and other) through the activities of the national party delegations within the EP. This will be especially true for those countries that have a substantial representation in the EP since many crucial activities require high vote thresholds and the general application of the proportionality rule means that size matters. 4 Italy, as one of the current big states has 87 members in the EP, a not inconsiderable 14% of the total membership (626). 5 It seems worth investigating therefore, whether the dramatic reforms and party system upheavals in the 1980s and 1990s in Italy had any impact on the European Parliament and the supranational 3 The rules concerning party group formation are found in the EP s Rules of Procedure. The most recent edition of which states that (1) Members may form themselves into groups according to their political affinities; (2) A Political Group must comprise Members from more than one Member State (Rule 29 in 2003 edition). 4 For example all votes under the assent procedure and all votes in the second and third round of the cooperation and codecision procedures (where the EP has the most power) require at least an absolute majority of the EPs component members. Given continued high rates of absenteeism this can often translate into a requirement for a 75% or more vote threshold. 5 This essentially argues that the significance of party system change will be greater in big countries and that the impact of substantial change in any one country will decrease as the size of the EU (number of member states) increases (since each country will have a proportionally smaller share of EP members). 7

8 party system and likewise whether these changes had any subsequent impact on the ability of Italian MEPs to wield influence within the EP. 6 Examining the relationship between the national and supranational political spheres in this way fundamentally changes the standard question of the Europeanization literature by reversing the direction of the causal arrow. Instead of focusing solely on the impact that the EU and the process of European integration may be having on domestic politics, policies and institutions, it asks what impact significant shifts in the party systems of the member states may have on EU level institutions and through them policy outcomes. Because the EP is the primary repository of partisan politics in the EU it is logical to look at the impact of national party system change on the activities and organization of the supranational party groups that govern most of the activities within it. Before moving to examine this influence directly it will be useful to briefly review some of the momentous changes that have taken in place in Italy since the late 1980s, focusing in particular on the changes that have taken place within the party system itself. 7 Once the basic transitions that occurred within the party system have been reviewed it will be possible to delineate the specific questions addressed as well as the method and the results of the analysis itself. 6 Although this study examines the impact of just one country, it might be possible to imagine other generalized systemic changes (such as the rise of the new right) across the EU that could similarly have repercussions at the EU level. 7 This requires leaving aside much of the more complex discussion of the broader effects of the scandals associated with the tangenti and mani puliti investigations. For a good basic review of these events see Bufacchi and Burgess,

9 The Italian Party System in Upheaval The political upheaval that took place in Italy between 1988 and 1995 can hardly be over stated. Many have gone so far as to speak of the new Italian 2 nd Republic suggesting that, in fact, the Italian political system of today represents a wholly new political entity (see for example D Alimonte, 1997; D Alimonte and Bartolini, 1995, 2002; Bufacchi and Burgess, 1997). While the changes wrought by the advent of the 2 nd Republic were widespread, it is largely uncontroversial to state that the most far-reaching changes occurred within the party system. These changes were not, however, solely a function of the political scandals that destabilized Italy during these years. In fact, at least one significant change took place before the major corruption scandals began, at least partially due to events in the international arena. 8 Nevertheless, the dramatic transformation of the party system was linked to the broader political upheaval of the period, which was due in large part to the dominance of the parties (and the Christian Democrats in particular) in the post-war years and their subsequent corruption and delegitimization. Unfortunately, an in-depth analysis of the corruption scandals themselves and their broader impact on the Italian political system are beyond the scope of this paper, instead, this section will focus on several key aspects of party system change that took place during this time; The voluntary dismantling of the Communist Party (Partito Communista, PCI) and creation of the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratica di Sinistra, PDS). The implosion of the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) with the subsequent birth of a number of small parties of the center formed largely around personalities. The rise of the center right Forza Italia 9 party. 8 This was the name change of the Communist party (Partito Communista Italiana-PCI) into the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratic di Sinistra-PDS) which followed from both the events in Tiananmen Square in 1988 and the fall of the wall in It is not possible to accurately translate Forza Italia into English and give the sense of the name in Italian. Prior to the creation of the political party the phrase was most commonly heard at football (soccer) matches as a rallying cry for the national team. 9

10 The wholesale restructuring of the party system in terms of inter-party relationships as a result of the reform of the electoral system. These events, although presented independently above, are clearly interconnected to a greater or lesser extent. To understand the full significance of the transformation of the Italian party system it is necessary to be aware of the omnipresent role that political parties have had in all aspects of life in Italy during the post-war era. The political system of Italy between 1949 and 1993 was commonly referred to as a partitocrazia in which political parties, and especially the Christian Democrats (DC), were able to effectively control the system as a whole (Hine, 1990; Furlong, 199***). Between 1949 and 1993 the DC were never out of power and they controlled the office of Prime Minister almost continuously (with only a few brief pauses for coalition partners to take the helm). The uninterrupted concentration of power into the hands of a tightly controlled hierarchical party system led almost inexorably to corruption. The full extent of the corruption may never be known, but by March, 1993 over 1000 politicians and businessmen, including at least two ex-prime ministers were under investigation for acts of corruption. Estimates at the time suggested that the parties had been extorting between 3.4 billion and 5 billion Lire a year (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1997). 10 The breadth and depth of the political and financial corruption that riddled Italy can hardly be overstated, and its impact on the political system was vast. The unraveling of the tangentopoli (bribecity) scandals and the subsequent mani puliti (clean hands) program brought to light the level of decay within the stagnant Italian system and forced the public to take notice of level of entrenchment of the existing parties and leaders. This led to public support (and in some cases demand) for change including electoral reform which was considered crucial to the $1 US Dollar. 10 Exchange rates fluctuated quite a bit over the period but averaged approximately 1,500 Lire per 10

11 overall reform process. However, tangentopoli was not the only motivation for change. Even before the full extent of the corruption of the political class came to light international events were instigating reform and changing the public mood. The first signs of the change to come came in 1988 when Achille Occhetto was selected to lead the Italian Communist Party (PCI). A reformer who was unsatisfied with the role of outsider historically played by the PCI (despite its status as the second largest party in the country) Occhetto pushed for wholesale reform of the party. Despite some initial attempts in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square tragedy, it was not until the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc that formal progress was made. The process began with a series of reforms passed by the PCI central committee in late November of These included a new name - the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), a new symbol - the oak tree, and a significant political realignment towards the center-left. 11 The reforms caused the hard-core Communist members to break away and form a new splinter party, the aptly named Rifondazione Communista (Communist Refoundation). The implementation of the proposed reforms was not completed until 1991 and failed to lead to much support among voters due to the rise of factionalism within the party, the slow implementation of reforms, and an unclear party agenda. In fact, in the following general elections in April 1992 the PDS received just 16.1% of the vote, down considerably from 1987 s elections in which the PCI received 26.6%. The transformation of the DC can also be linked, at least in part, to end of the cold war. Support for the DC began to erode after 1989 as its anti-communist stances, a key aspect of its platform, became increasingly obsolete. It is impossible to know what the long term effect of the end of the cold war would have been on the DC because by early 1992 allegations of corruption, 11 There was something of a rapprochement with the Socialist party which was then in Government. 11

12 the failure to reform the political and public systems, and the inability to counteract Italy s economic crisis and organized crime has all begun to weigh heavily on the party. The beginning of the end can be traced back to February 17 th, 1992 when Mario Chiesa, a middle-ranking Socialist party member, was arrested for taking a bribe of Eventually many other Milan officials were implicated. This marked the beginning of the Tangentopoli scandal which would eventually come to implicate a large number of the DC s past and current leadership. The general elections of April, 1992 gave a clear indication of the trouble the government parties, and especially the DC, were in. The outgoing 4-party coalition led by the DC barely retained a majority of Senate and Chamber seats, but its combined share of the vote fell below the 50% threshold. For the first time in its history, the DC did not get at least 30% of the vote. Following the wide-spread delegitimization of the DC due to the continued growth of the corruption scandals and allegations against its members and leaders the new head of the party announced in July 1993, at the DC Assembly in Rome, that he would rehabilitate the DC by renaming it the Italian Popular Party (PPI) and redefining its goals and internal organization. The attempt to save the DC as a united entity by giving it a new name failed, and by early 1994, the DC had split into four groups: (1) The PPI, as had been promised in July, (2) The Christian Democratic Center (CCD), a more conservative party, (3) The Pact for Italy (PI), based on liberal democratic reform, and (4) The Social Christians (C-S), a more clearly center-left oriented group. 12 The fractionalization of the DC continued in early 1995 when the new PPI split in two, 12 At the same time the Socialist PSI, also suffering from intense involvement in the corruption scandals, likewise split into three parties. Given the small size of the PSI to begin with (averaging around 8%) this effectively marked the end of the Socialists as a significant independent political force in Italy. 12

13 followed less than a year later by the creation of the Rinovamento Italiano (a centrist party) and the creation in early 1998 of the Unione Democratica per la Repubblica (UDR) led by expresident Cossiga (a former member of the DC). After over 45 years of uninterrupted power the DC effectively internally combusted between 1993 and 1998 leaving in its wake a flotilla of small, often unstable and poorly organized parties with little or no hope of reacquiring the previous glory of the DC. The very public disintegration of the DC left a huge vacuum in the Italian political system, one that would be filled through the creation of a wholly new party both in form and content. The history of the development of the Forza Italia party, led by media magnate Silvio Berlusconi is relatively short. In the wake of the corruption scandals and the electoral reforms that were being proposed Berlusconi began to create his own politically oriented network in In early 1994, during the run up to the general elections Berlusconi challenged the moderate forces to join together to combat the parties from the left stating that if they failed to do so he would enter the election at the head of the new Forza Italia. Immediately following this was the effective dissolution of the DC. Not surprisingly Berlusconi took this as a sign that the center and moderate parties were incapable of joining together to fight the left, so he officially entered the political fray at the head of the new Forza Italia party. 13 The initial creation of the Forza Italia was initiated as an advertising campaign in which billboards and promotional paraphernalia such as stickers and pens were distributed across most of Italy, but without specifying what exactly the Forza Italia was. Since this is also the rallying cry of the national football/soccer squad it was in no way immediately clear that this was to become a political party. 13

14 In perhaps the most astonishing political success story in post war Europe, Berlusconi was able to lead the center-right to victory in the 1994 elections through a clever electoral coalition strategy. The 1994 elections were the first with the new electoral system (below) which meant that 75% of the seats were allocated in single member districts. Given the fractionalization of the Italian party system this effectively required like-minded parties to join forces and create electoral coalitions. Berlusconi s Forza Italia formed coalitions with the regionalist Northern League in the north and with the far right National Alliance (AN) in the south. 14 This was a daring strategy, which proved successful only in the short term. The rightist alliance won 42.9% of the national vote, but there was friction between the Northern League and the AN, due to the difference in their philosophies and the AN s still questionable historical ties. In the end the new Government was short lived and new elections had to be called in But the change wrought was fundamental. The 1994 elections marked the complete transformation of the Italian party system. The old key parties of the past, the DC, PCI and even the PSI were gone or mere shells of what they had been. Instead new parties (such as the Northern League and the Forza Italia) or significantly reformed parties (such as the PDS and the AN) were the primary parties. The largest party in the country was wholly new and had been created just months before the election. Unlike the DC and PCI the new parties had almost no social penetration, weak 14 The National Alliance (Allianza Nationale) was the new name of the Italian Socialist Movement (MSI) which was the historical descendent of the old fascist party. The name change (as with the PCI previously) was an attempt by the party s leadership to gain legitimacy and cut ties with the past. Because of its extremist heritage the MSI (like the PCI) had never served in Government and as a result was largely free of the taint if the tangentopoli scandals. 14

15 historical ties and in many cases were based more on personalities that party ideology (Newell, 2000; Bufacchi and Burgess, 1997). The large scale reform of the electoral system itself was also a key facet of this transition. The existing electoral system has been one of the most proportional in existence. With relatively large electoral districts and a national college of the remainders even small geographically dispersed parties were able to win seats in the legislature. At times as many as twenty-two parties held seats in the lower chamber. No party ever won a clear majority and the largest parties (the DC and PCI) while ideologically distinct, did not effectively represent two possible poles around which coalitions could form. Although the PCI had formally shed it ties to the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin it was still generally considered to be anti-systemic and therefore illegitimate. Fear of PCI participation in government was so great that in the 1970s even the unofficial support of the PCI for the government (during the Historic Compromise ) led directly to an increase in domestic terrorism. The result was that the DC was left as the sole focus of Government formation and in fact was the largest party in every coalition during the pre-war period until its demise. Many viewed the electoral system as the root of Italy s political problems. Broad coalitions were incapable of effective decision-making, there was little real alternative to the DC based Governments (despite the ineffectiveness) and the system served to re-elect the same people repeatedly leading to entrenched interests (and eventually corruption). 15 The first attempts 15 One of the more extreme cases is Guilio Andreotti, an ex-leader of the DC and 8-time prime minister who served in every Government from and was later indicted (though acquitted) of accomplice to murder in conjunction with several mafia organized homicides. 15

16 at reform took place in 1988 when a referendum was overwhelming passed to reduce the number of voter preferences that could be expressed from four to just one. 16 The broad support for the reform (despite the opposition of several Government parties) was perhaps the first indication of the readiness of the public for change. Following the discovery of the corruption scandals, many of which were linked to campaign finance, there was a movement to move towards more radical electoral system reform, including the introduction of a majoritarian system with single member districts. In July 1992 a bicameral commission on electoral reform was created, however progress was slow and compromise difficult to achieve. Small parties risked extinction under a purely majoritarian system and were unlikely to vote in favor, while the larger parties wanted to create a bonus system that would further benefit the larger parties and ensure an absolute majority victory. Because of the inability of the legislative commission to act it was decided to present the voters with the decision and a referendum on the issue was scheduled for April The proposed electoral reform stipulated that 75% of the Senate s (and later, also the Chamber s) seats would be allocated through the single member districts and the remaining 25% through proportional representation. The referendum was overwhelmingly passed with an average turnout of 77%. 17 In June, 1993 the results of the referendum were officially adopted by the legislature with the addition of a 4% threshold for the proportional seats. 16 It had come to light that in many cases preference votes were being bought by candidates to insure their own election, especially in the mafia controlled areas of the south. 17 In reality there were eight separate referenda on the ballot including party finance reform, the abolition of several cabinet ministries and several other less critical topics On the whole, however, electoral reform was the most critical. 16

17 The general elections of March 1994 were the first with the new electoral system. The right-wing alliance (above) was the winner, obtaining a majority of seats in the lower chamber and falling just three short of one in the Senate. The center-left Progressive Alliance did not fair so well, due primarily to the internal squabbling and the inability to appeal to voters both on the left and right. The new laws had a significant impact on the overall results of the election. There was, as was to be expected with the introduction of an even partially majoritarian system, a high level of distortion between the percentage of votes won and the percentage of seats gained. For example, the Right coalition won 42.9% of the votes, but 58.1% of the seats. However, the new system failed to live up to expectations by providing an overall reduction in the number of parties and a clear governing majority. The number overall number of parliamentary parties did not change significantly and the large parties were somewhat less large than in the past. In effect this was the opposite of the desired outcome. In the five years between 1989 and 1994 the entire Italian political system was transformed. The elite that had governed Italy for nearly half a century were thoroughly delegitimized and many were under investigation for corruption or worse. The main political parties of the post-war era had disappeared, either by fragmenting into numerous splinter groups or through internal reform and reinvention. In their place were a new kind of party based more on personality than ideology and with weak ties to society as a whole. The system of extreme electoral proportionality had been replaced by one based primarily on majoritarian principals. By 1994 a coalition of new and reformed parties of the far right was in power and the old DC and PCI were no where to be found. The changes wrought in these five years endured bringing in a center-left coalition in 1996 and a return of the Berlusconi coalition in the late 1990s (finally achieving the log sought after alternation in power). The question is what significance, if any, did 17

18 these profound changes in the party system of Italy have on European Parliament, the focal point of partisan activity in the EU? Did the transformation of the Italian party system have any impact of the supranational party system of the EP or the role of the Italian representatives within it? What Kind of Change? The impact of the transformation of the domestic political party system might be expected to manifest itself in two arenas and in two directions as graphically demonstrated in Figure 1. The first direction reflects the influence that Italian MEPS can exert at the supranational level. In this direction the first arena is the EP as a whole, and in particular the EP party system (quadrant A). Here we might expect that changes in the relative balance of power between parties in the domestic arena would affect the EP party system since elections to the EP are organized around national parties. Thus, shifts in electoral fortunes and the creation or dissolution of political parties at the national level potentially impacts the relative size of the supranational groups in the EP, which consist of national party delegations. In this context the changes in the Italian party system might have influenced the balance of power between party groups depending on which groups the new parties joined (if any) and which party groups lost members as a result of old Italian parties effectively disappearing. Because EP elections are independent from national elections these changes can only occur following the former which occur every five years and are therefore less able to directly mirror national change on an annual basis. Thus only membership shifts in 1994 and 1999 can be analyzed. 18

19 Figure 1: Arenas of Potential Change The second arena in which the changes in the domestic sphere may have a significant impact is within the party groups themselves (quadrant B). Since each EP party group is made up of a number of national party delegations there is always some level of internal ideological variation. As the EP has grown and the party groups have assumed members from a broader spectrum of national parties this internal variation has tended to increase. However, it is not necessary for the EU to expand for internal party group diversity to increase. Changes within existing member states can also lead to increased internal party group diversity if new parties are created that differ from the existing EP party groups and yet seek membership within them. 18 The clearest evidence of increased internal party group diversity would be a reduction in voting unity within the EP party groups. Given the frequent requirement for absolute majority threshold a reduction in the cohesion of either of the two largest parties could hinder the ability of the EP to act effectively and reduce its ability to bargain with the other EU institutions. In fact, some evidence suggests that the EP as a whole is significantly less influential within the legislative process when it suffers from internal divisions (Kreppel, 2002). 18 It might be expected that new parties that differed substantially from existing groups would simply prefer to form their own group or remain independent, however resources in the EP are allocated on the basis of group membership and more benefits accrue to larger party groups, often leading to the effective marginalization of small groups (Kreppel, 2000, 2002, 2003). In addition, the Rules of Procedure require that all groups consist of members from at least two member states and require a higher number of members if only two states are represented making it more difficult to simply form a new group independently (Rule 29, Rules of Procedure, 2003). 19

20 The impact of changes in the internal unity of party groups with substantial Italian membership will be examined here through an analysis of roll-call votes. Of particular interest will be a comparison between the internal unity of the European Peoples Party (EPP) and the Party of European Socialists (PES) before and after Italian party system changes as these two groups were the most directly impacted by the changes in the Italian domestic sphere described above and are also arguably the most significant groups in the EP. The EPP initially was the group of the DC and later (after initially being refused) became the group of the Forza Europa delegation. Likewise, the PES was influenced by the transformation of the PCI into the PDS, which eventually opted to join the PES where its predecessor had not (remaining in small variously named coalitions of the far left). In both of these cases the addition of the new national Italian party delegation led to an expansion of the ideological spectrum included within the group and potentially to a decrease in party group unity as a result. 19 Both of the above questions reflect the potential impact that the transformation of the Italian party system might have had on the EP party system and the party groups themselves. There is also the possibility that the influence and role of Italian MEPs also underwent a change. In particular, it is possible that the instability of the new national parties, the resulting high rate of turnover among Italian MEPs (especially in the 1994 EP elections), and the unclear status of the Forza Italia members led to the marginalization of Italian MEPs within the organizational structure of the EP leading to a decrease in the ability of Italian MEPs to effect decision-making in the EP as a whole (quadrant C). 20 The extent to which this occurred can be measured by 19 It is true that prior to 1995 the EPP had a large Italian component with the participation of the DC. However, the DC was much more centrally located ideologically within the EPP than the new Forza Europa members, which tend to be more right wing and have no historical link with the church. Traditionally the EPP had been a largely Christian Democratic group and in fact this was its original name prior to direct elections. 20 It is important to note that this would effectively mean that the new structure of opportunities for national actors to affect domestic policies via participation in EU institutions and influence over EU level policy-making as described by Hix and Goetz would be limited within the EP. 20

21 examining the representation of Italian MEPs in significant positions within the EP both before and after the shift at the national level including specifically the allocation of rapporteurships and committee chairmanships which are the key prizes that can be broadly distributed among MEPs. A similar situation may have occurred within the party groups themselves and this can also be measured by examining the leadership role of Italian members within the largest groups (EPP and PES) across time (quadrant D). Each of these analyses measures the extent to which changes to the Italian party system at the national level directly or indirectly impacted the party system and organization of the European Parliament. Also included is an analysis of how these changes affected the role of Italian MEPs within the EP and, thus, their potential to effectively influence outcomes (policy or other). The fundamental point of the analyses is to determine the extent to which significant changes at the national level in the domestic political realm have an effect on supranational politics. For the purposes of space conservation only quadrants B and C will be fully analyzed here with quadrants A and D remaining for future research. 21 Changes in MEP Behaviour and Group Unity To measure the extent to which the changes at the national level among Italy s parties influenced the internal unity of the EP party groups I analyzed voting patterns (during roll call votes) across the period. 22 In particular I traced the similarity of voting patterns between Italian 21 Overall B and C seem to be the most significant aspects of possible change and include an example of both arenas and both directions suggested by the general theoretical framework. Future revisions will incorporate quadrants A and D. 22 The basic roll call vote data used for this paper was generously made available by Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland. A full analysis of the entire dataset of over 10,000 votes can be found in Hix, Noury, Gerard,

22 MEPs and those of their respective party groups as well as the general agreement between all Italians and the EP as a whole. 23 The focus of the analysis is on those part groups which experienced the greatest changes. This includes the EPP and PES throughout the period and the Communist and Left Coalition groups during the period through 1992 and the small party groups of the right including the Forza Europa (FE) group during the post 1994 period. 24 The primary goal is to determine the extent to which the voting behaviour of Italian MEPs changed as a result of the party system changes happening at the national level. To this end I selected six different years to chart the evolution of voting behaviour among Italian MEPs. Using 1984 as a base year since this predated any of the changes discussed above. The second year selected in 1988 which marked the beginning of the political earthquake in Italy. The very first electoral system reform (the abolition of preferences) was being voted on by referendum. The third year is 1990 which immediately follows the initial decision by the PCI to change its name to PDS and undergo thorough internal reforms (which eventually lead to the split and the creation of the splinter Communist reformation party (Rifondazione Communista). The fourth year selected, 1992, follows on the actual creation of the PDS and its active attempts to join the ranks of European Socialists (rather than Communists). The last two years selected (1995 and 1999) focus instead on the dissolution of the DC and the rise of the Forza Italia after the corruption scandals and electoral reform of the early to mid 1990s. The year 1999 is divided in to two groups one just before the elections and one just after. 23 In general the overall cohesion of the EP is quite high leading to very high overall levels of voting unity. See Hix, Noury and Roland, The base roll call vote data groups a number of the smaller right-wing/conservative parties together including the Progressive European Democrats (DEP), European Democratic Alliance (RDE), Union for Europe (UPE) Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN) and the Forza Europe (FE). The Italian members used in this analysis are all Forza Italia members. 22

23 Tables 1-6 below report the correlation coefficients for the various years. 25 In each case 100 votes were analyzed (for a total of 700 roll call votes) and the correlation coefficients were determined on the basis of yes and no votes. 26 Since the goal was to compare the behaviour of the Italian members to the other members of their EP party groups and the EP as a whole I divided the party groups into the Italian members and the rest of the group minus the Italian members. The same was done for the EP as a whole. The main aspects to focus on are the correlation coefficients between the Italian Members and their EP party groups as well those with their future party group (i.e. the correspondence between PCI MEPs and those of the PES Group or the Forza Italia Members and the EPP group). It is also possible to get a sense of the overall influence of national identity on voting behaviour via the correlation coefficients between Italian members of different party groups. In 1984 (Table 1) the DC and PCI were the undisputed leaders at the national level. The Italian socialists, although still a small party, were increasing in importance within the governing coalition. The Italians were a large component within both the EPP and the Communist groups and a much smaller delegation within the PES. Overall the DC members tended to vote overwhelmingly with the other members of the EPP group (correlation coefficient of.911) while the PSI and PCI members voted substantially less often with their groups (.665 and a striking.367 for the Communists). Interestingly even at this stage the Italian Communists voted more frequently with the PES than they did with other Communists (correlation coefficient of.578) There were a total of 200 votes used for 1999, 100 during the first six months before the EP elections and 100 in the second six months after the elections. 26 There were a statistically insignificant number of formal votes of abstention which were not included in this analysis. Absent members were counted as missing data points and not included. 27 This is most likely due to the relatively moderate stance of the Italian Communists who since the 1960 had been Euro-Communist while the other members of the EP Communist group such as the French Communists tended to be much more extremist. 23

24 Table 1: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity Ital EPP-Ital Ital PES PES-Ital Ital COM- Ital All All-Ital EPP COM Ital Ital EPP 1 EPP-Ital Ital PES PES-Ital Ital COM COM-Ital Ital All All-Ital Although change is being discussed nothing formal has occurred by early 1988 (Table 2) and as a result is not surprising that the patterns of voting unity are largely the same. There is a reduction in the level of agreement between the Italian members of the EPP and the rest, but the overall level of agreement remains quite high (.858). The Italian Socialists and Communists also vote more frequently with their EP party groups but still not at the same level as the DC (.705 and. 669 respectively). 28 Similarities in voting between the Italian Communists and the PES increase slightly to.623 (previously.578). It is notable that this is much higher than the correlation coefficient of.436 between the PES and the non-italian Communists. Table 2: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity Ital EPP-Ital Ital PES PES-Ital Ital COM- Ital All All-Ital EPP COM Ital Ital EPP 1 EPP-Ital Ital PES PES-Ital Ital COM COM-Ital Ital All All-Ital Part of the reason for the increase for the PCI maybe the decline of the French Communists at the polls and the inclusion of members from the new member states of Greece, Spain and Portugal. 24

25 Despite the significant changes taking place in the PCI during 1989 and 1990 within the EP very little changed (Table 3). The DC members of the EPP still voted largely with the group as a whole (correlation coefficient of.877). The tendency of the PCI/PDS to vote with their new party group increased but this is most likely due to their preponderance within the new group (18/24 members or 75%). The overall tendency to also vote with the PES continued at about the same level (.630 versus.623 previously) while the tendency of the Italian Socialists to vote with the PES as a whole continued to increase (from.705 to.782). Table 3: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity Ital EPP-Ital Ital PES PES-Ital Ital LC LC-Ital Ital All All-Ital EPP Ital EPP 1 EPP-Ital Ital PES PES-Ital Ital LC LC-Ital Ital All All-Ital By 1992 (Table 4) the transformation of the PCI into the PDS was complete and the corruption scandals were quickly destabilizing the government and the DC and PSI as cohesive parties. However, despite these events, the composition of the EP remained unchanged since the 1989 elections (since the two are distinct). As a result there was no immediate impact on the relative strength of the various Italian delegations or the parties they joined. However there is a notable increase in the tendency of the Italian PDS members to vote with the PES group (.712) rather than their own Left Coalition (.551). By and large the both the DC and PSI delegations 25

26 maintain their previous behaviour with a small increase in voting similarity between the Italian PSI and the PES as a whole (from.782 to.808). Table 4: Correlation Coefficients Measuring Unity Ital EPP-Ital Ital PES PES-Ital Ital LC LC-Ital Ital All All-Ital EPP Ital EPP 1 EPP-Ital Ital PES PES-Ital Ital LC LC-Ital Ital All All-Ital The changes at the national level in 1994 (Table 5) were quite radical. The birth of the socalled Second Republic witnessed the dissolution of the DC and the rise of the Forza Italia, and even though the 1994 EP election closely followed the transitional national elections the changes in the behaviour of Italian MEPs were less dramatic. On the left the PDS had now officially joined the PES. The result was a significant increase in the tendency of the PDS members to vote with the PES (from.712 in 1992 when they were in the LC to.899). This suggests that despite the potential increase to the ideological diversity that the members of the PDS might have represented the tendency was for them to conform to the group as a whole. 29 The EPP members managed to maintain their previously high levels of voting unity with the group, despite the fact that the 16 Italian members now came from six different national parties. The biggest change of course is the addition of the strong right-wing Italian contingent and in particular the 26 representatives of the new Forza Italia. This group had a very low voting correlation both with other MEPs of the far right and the EPP, which it had aspirations to join (just.401 and It is possible that the PDS members were able to convince the other members of the PES to vote as they wished but given their small number (just 19 out of 198 total members or less than 10%) this seems unlikely to be true generally. 26