INDIAN PARTY SYSTEM FROM 1947 TO 1989

Transcription

1 CHAPTER - II INDIAN PARTY SYSTEM FROM 1947 TO 1989 Political parties in India first emerged in the context of local self-governing institutions such as district boards and municipal councils in the last quarter of the 19"^ century. A political anthropologist called these earliest forms of political parties 'micro - parties'. Nomenclatures of earlier parties were Kayasth Party, Khatri Party etc. The term is not very apt. as even though these parties included elements other than the caste. They were labeled parties but were very different from modem political parties. They are better called pre-party, factions or cliques. In that sense, such organizations existed even in pre-british times. Liberal and Orthodox factions in the Maurya and Mughal courts... In any case, as the British Raj introduced partly elected councils and assemblies, such pre-party formation tended to acquire more and more the characteristics that we usually associate with the political parties (Singh & Saxena 2000, p. 184). Another, and more important, context which facilitated the emergence of parties in India was the nationalist movement. Various political organizations first emerged in British Indian provinces and princely states as pressure groups, with both secular and communal overtones, clamouring for representation in administration. Subsequently, they turned into mass-movement agitating for independence. Predominantly the Indian Nationalist Movement led by the Indian National Congress. It was only after the independence that the Parliamentary and the Assembly wings of the movement started in right earnest, the transformation of the movement into a party. Similar tendencies with some variations may be observed in the left wing and in religion based parties on the right as well as in the regional parties (Ibid. p. 185). The contemporary party system in India developed originally in the context of the struggle for freedom and since 1950 within the frame work of the Parliamentary Government. Both these environmental factors have exerted their influence on the present character and structure of the political parties (Quoted in Narang 1988, p. 263). 48

2 In first place, India has developed a multi-party system and the number of political parties is certainly much more than in other democratic countries of the world. It has been estimated that over 200 political parties, have been existing in India since independence. A large number of groups which had worked within the Congress during the freedom struggle disaligned themselves from the Congress. They could not reach an agreement with it and decided to set-up independent parties, certain individuals also set-up political parties to increase their importance in the politics. Due to the introduction of universal adult franchise some of the numerically strong communities were encouraged to establish their own parties to fight for a share in the political power. The reservation of seats for the members of scheduled castes and tribes also encouraged the members to form their independent parties. The creation of separate parties by khasis and Mizos in Assam is an example of this tendency. The disgruntled land-lords, dispossessed Zamindars and the deposed Maha Rajas also formed a number of political parties. The increasing feeling of dominance by the North over the South led to the formation of the parties like DMK, Nam Tamil Party, Cochin Party etc. Linguistic, caste and religious consideration also encouraged the formation of number of political parties in different parts of India. Finally, a number of new parties emerged due to the factional fights within the larger parties (Khanna 2001, p. 226). India's multi-party system was different from the multi-party system of countries like France or Italy. Leading writers on the Indian Party System like Myron Weiner, Rajni Kothari and Giovanni Sartori have preferred to call it 'single dominant party system'. It means that one party is so powerful that all other put together may make no match and may be thus in no position to pose a serious or meaningful challenge to its sway. This position was enjoyed by the Indian National Congress that had been in power at the states since independence (Palmer 1971, p. 184). In India, the configuration of parties since independence cannot be straight away characterized by any single label. It can be delineate atleast six different phases of party system evolution: (i) One party dominance model (OPD) until (1969); (ii) Coalition model at the state level ( ): (iii) Second one party 49

3 dominance model at the centre ( ); (iv) Coalition model at the centre ( ); (v) Third one party dominance model ( ); and (vi) Multiparty coalitional minority governments model (1989 onwards) (Singh & Saxena 2000, p. 186). Broadly the Indian party system from is known as a one-party dominant system. But the system developed after 1989 is far from the dominant pattern. Rationale behind taking-up the historical perspective is the emergence and effective system of regional parties emerged due to the one dominant party system and its policy programmes at the national and states level as ruling party at the national level. Hence by understanding the party system from 1947 to 1989 has immense importance to analyse the regional party system in India from this angle. The present chapter is structured to study the first five phases of Indian party system from : (a) First One Party Dominance Model ( ) (b) Coalition Model at State Level ( ) (c) Second One Party Dominance Model at Centre ( ) (d) Coalition Model at Centre ( ) (e) Third One Party Dominance Model ( ). First One Party Dominance Model ( ) During this period Congress controlled the Indian politics not only at nafional level but also at the states level. In the Nehru era the only opposition party that assumed office in a state was the Communist Party in Kerala. The Communist ministry was dismissed from the office in the wake of the Congress which was in power at the Centre and in the rest of the state. The formation of the Swatantra Party in 1959 represented an effort of India's most distinguished public figures to build a 'non-leftist opposition to the ruling Congress Party (Saxena 1997, p. 375). In 1962 the general elections out of 494 seats in the Lok Sabha, the Congress won 361, the Communist Party 29, the Swantantra Party 18, the Jana Sangh 14, the Praja Socialist 12, the Socialist 6, other parties 27 and Independents 27 (Tharyan 1974, p. 85). 50

4 To understand India's parties and party system from Independence to 1967, the best model was given by Kothari and Morris-Jones. They described it as a 'dominant party system', that is, a multi party system, in which the Indian National Congress enjoyed a dominant position, both in terms of the number of seats that it held in Parliament in New Delhi and the state legislative assemblies, and in terms of its immense organizational strength outside the legislatures. Hence, the Congress was dominant in both spheres (Manaor 2002, p. 433). In this first phase, India had a party system characterized by 'dominance coexisting with competition but without a trace of alternation', because opposition parties had little hope of preventing the Congress from obtaining sizable majorities in the legislatures despite the ruling party's failure on the most occasions to gain a majority of the valid votes cast. Neither, by and large, did opposition parties share the power in coalitions with the Congress at the states level. So here was a competitive party system in which the competing parties played rather dissimilar roles'. The ruling Congress party was a 'party of consensus' and the opposition parties were 'parties of pressure'. That is to say, the opposition parties played a role that was quite distinctive. Instead of providing an alternative to the Congress party, they function by influencing sections within the Congress. They opposed by making Congress-men oppose. Groups within the ruling party assumed the role of opposition parties, often quite openly, reflecting the ideologies and interests of other parties. The later influence political decision making at the margin (Ibid., pp ). In 1950 regional parties were present in the states of Madras and Punjab which have developed a self-identity of their own during the colonial period, though they had not yet come to power during this period. In both these regions the regional movement had not been fully assimilated into the Congress-led national movement though it was not antagonistic to it. There was a parallel movement seeking self identity. Other states which had experienced strong regional movements in the colonial period such as Maharashtra, Andhra and Gujrat did not develop regional party, though they had a fairly well developed regional language and literature through which this regional consciousness could be expressed. In these states-except in the case of Kerala and West Bengal- 51

5 regional forces existed, but were not 'visible' as they were expressed through the units of the Congress party. The leadership of the Congress party in the states was drawn from the regional castes dominant at that time for example, the Marathas in Maharashtra, Patels in Gujrat, Reddis in Andhra etc. In the Hindi heartland states of UP, Bihar, Rajasthan and MP, despite linguistic homogeneity no separate regional identity had grown. These states became the bastions of the Congress Party; here sub-regional movements emerged much later, after a time-lag. In the case of West Bengal and to a lesser extent, Kerala, the left parties, seem to express the original aspirations of these states. The north eastern region, consisting then of the larger state of Assam, had yet to be integrated into the national mainstream (Pai 1997, pp ). The linguistic reorganization of the states in 1956 and later redrawing of some state boundaries brought territorial boundaries in a closer alignment with their socio-cultural coordinates. The consequence of this has been an "indigenization and democratization of provincial politics which gave a strong impetus to the development of political cultures, enhancing the political significance of caste and educated regional elites". These regionalizing trends accelerated after the 1967 elections when the Congress party failed to gain a majority in a large number of states (Ibid., p. 160). Congress was able to maintain its position as a party occupying most of the space in the political system because 'there [was] plurality within the dominant party which [made] it more representative, [provided] flexibility and [sustained] internal competition. At the same time, it [was] prepared to absorb groups and movements from outside the party and thus prevent other parties from gaining strength'. The task of creating and sustaining the immensely broad Congress coalition in that phase was, facilitated by the complexities and ambiguities of Indian society, which prevented polarization (in class terms or any other terms) and formation of contradictions that might fracture such an all-embracing alliance of interests. This insight differs from but complements Myron Weiner's argument that the task of building the Congress coalition was eased by traditional values and roles of conciliation that Congressmen astutely took up, (Manor 2002, p. 435), and the Rudolphs' contention that traditional elements of the caste system assisted the development of modem, representative politics in India (Ibid., p. 435). 52

6 Thus the main features of the party system from were intrapaity competition within the Congress party, based on a historical consensus, and opposition remained in the position of the pressure groups. The Congress party was successful in evolving a national consensus. The party system was oriented to conflict avoidance and group accommodation even at the cost of ideological coherence and effectiveness of performance (Saxena 1997, p. 376). The deficiencies of the one party dominant system were: firstly, compared to the inter-party competition was less stable, less programme oriented and weaker in representational function; secondly, the omnibus character of the party made clear-cut enunciation of ideology or programme very difficult; thirdly, consensus was over-emphasised without adequate attention to the contents of such, 'consensus'; fourthly the model led to large scale frustration on the part of the opposition parties and non-congress voters (Patagundi 1987, p. 43). Coalition Model at State Level ( ) The year 1967 proved a set-back to the pattern of Congress dominance in India greater competitiveness and decreasing institutionalization was the general trend after Political fragmentation, defection and dissidence were the feature of the party system both at the national and state level (Jones 1974, p. 213) elections were the only one in which the opposition's performance was somewhat good: out of 520 seats in the Lok Sabha, the Congress won only 282 seats compared to 361 out of 494 seats in The Swantra Party raised its strength from 18 to 44, the Jana Sangh from 14 to 35, the DMK from 7 to 25, Samyukta Socialist from 6 to 23, the PSP (Praja Socialist party) from 12 to 13. The CPI won 23 seats and CPI (M) 19, and independents and others had 54 seats (Tharyan 1974, p. 85). [In 1967 Lok Sabha the DMK captured all the 25 seats contested (Fadia 1984, p. 226)]. The fourth general election had been qualitatively different from the previous elections for the following reasons. It was the first general election in India without Nehru, whose presence in the three general elections was a formidable asset for the ruling Congress party. Nehru was a great mobliser of votes for the Congress, while other political parties lacked such a mobliser. On 53

7 the plane of leadership, competition among various political parties was on an unequal basis. The death of Nehru created a situation in which at the level of leadership, all national political parties (Ibid., p. 376) stood, by and large, on an equal footing in their respective zones of influence. In first three general elections the Congress dominated the political scene came to typify more are newel of confidence in the Congress rule than a real competition among the political parties for capturing power. The fourth general election, on the other hand, tliurew up formidable claimants for power. The Congress party faced the fourth general election with certain liabilities, while the opposition parties had certain assists with them. The public image of the Congress had been tarnished owing to the charges of corruption, against it, and on account of growing economic crises in the country (agrarian capitalism). Intra-party conflicts, and the role of bosses, weakened the party, dissidents and splinter groups made away from the Congress in the form of Jana Congress in Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Jana Kranti Dal in Bihar, Jana Pakha in Mysore and the Jana Party in Rajasthan (Saxena 1997, pp ). Thirdly, during the first three general elections, the Congress victory was partly explained by the splinting of the opposition vote. At the time of fourth general election, therefore, the opposition parties used the strategy of forming united front's to avoid conflicts among themselves. Another important factor which influenced the voters at the time of the fourth general election was the growing economic crisis, the socialist path of development followed by the Congress, sharpening of social conflicts, devaluation of the Indian rupee, failure of government's economic and political policies, famine in Bihar, stunted growth, growing discontentment among large sections of the people, rising prices and inflation, prospering of the rich as a result of the benefits of the three year plans and coupled with these, was the issue of 'cow slaughter'. In this atmosphere, the opposition parties were preparing themselves for "opposing, exposing and deposing" the Congress party from power (Bhambhri 1992, pp ). Kothari pointed out that the 1967 elections did represent "a major step in the direction of an increasing competition" but, the Congress retained even after 1967, its central role in "maintaining and restructuring political consensus", and continuity and change in the Indian party system. It still formed the "centre of 54

8 Indian politics". Tiiis he pointed out was true on two grounds: most of the other parties developed out of the Congress and secondly, it still occupied the centre of the ideological spectrum in Indian politics, other parties occupying the opposite ends. Kothari also stressed on the entry of new groups into politics and the emergence of a "political market place" as citizens developed the ability to evaluate the party in power and make choices, an aspect also emphasized by Morris-Jones. In the mid 1960s the increasing emphasis on ideology, issues and demands, and sharing of political power in coalitions made this system impossible to maintain in the states (Pai 1997, pp ). In 1967, it was first time when Congress was unable to form ministries in half of the states, and it was a setback to the Congress. For the first time the non- Congress parties got an opportunity to assume office in some of the states, and a new political trend emerged in Indian politics (Tharyan 1974, pp ). In this period, the state party systems were different from the national party system and distinct from each other. One category of states consisted of those in which the Congress Party maintained its dominant position in 1967 and was able to form the government, such as Andhra Pradesh (AP), Maharashtra, Gujrat, Assam and Karnataka. Though in all of them the Congress vote share declined in 1967 election, indicates an erosion of its strength. Here factional groupings played the role of opposition parties particularly following the Congress split in 1969 (Pai 1997, p. 162). In the second category, a clear trend towards bi-polarity was those elections accelerated In Gujarat, the Swantra Party steadly emerged as the opposition party getting 26 seats with 16.9% votes in 1962, and 66 seats with 39% in In 1967, the Congress and Swatntra Party together obtained 83% of the votes and 95% of the seats in MP... The Jana Sangh also had begun to build-up its base in the state. A two-party system emerged in Orissa, Kerala and West Bengal, where a region-based party competed for power with the Congress. In Orissa, following the 1967 elections-unlike many other states-the non-congress coalition formed. It was stable and lasted until 1971 when fresh elections were held together with the Lok Sabha elections. The main opposition party, Swatantra, had local roots being 55

9 largely a party of the ex-princely rulers because the erstwhile Gantantra Parishad had merged with it in Together JS wis able to form a broad coalition of leaders from both the eastern and the western regions for the first time, effectively keeping the Congress out of power. In Kerala since 1967, power has alternated between the Congress and the Communist coalitions, while in West Bengal after a period of instability in the mid 1960s, the left Front coalition led by the CPM has remained in power. The Communist Parties in both the states have effectively functioned as regional parties (Pai 1997, p. 163). Regional parties were able to capture power in two states-the Akali Dal in Punjab and the DMK in Madras upto 1967 a strategy of "Tamilsation under Kamraj had allowed the Congress to gain a majority in Tamil Nadu... The states of Hindi heartland, UP, Bihar and Rajasthan, fall into separate category because here the Congress-except in Rajasthan-failed to form a government but no strong opposition party existed leading to a period of coalition governments (SVDs) and instability. Lacking any regional identity these states did not throw-up any regional formations (Ibid., p. 164). The outcome or results of 1967's elections is clear evidence that the people wanted the change... For twenty years the Congress had been the ruling party after independence except for a short period in Kerala. During those two decades, there had been no substantial improvement in the standard of living of the people, the prices of essential articles, particular food items shoot-up. Problems like unemployment and housing became acute. What was the point, the people thought, in allowing a party to remain in office, if it could not provide. The people with basic amenities, freedom and democracy signified nothing to people who had not enough to eat. The two years preceding the election were, fi-om the economic point of view, critical for the nation. Food production decreased because of drought and the ineffective agricultural policy of the Government. Hoarding of grain by traders raised food prices. In Bihar, U.P. and Rajasthan, several districts were affected by drought and famine conditions prevailed (Tharyan 1974, p. 87). The factor that affected the Congress most adversely was in-fighting within it. The Congress became a house divided, and groupism sapped the unity and strength of the party. Instead of trying to solve the problems of the people, the 56

10 Congressmen dissipated their energy by fighting amongst themselves. Even those Congressmen who were once known for ideahsm and selfless work hankered after power, influence and wealth. The moral decline of angles was pathetic (Ibid., p. 88). At the time of elections the non-congress parties joined together, forgetting their differences, to defeat the Congress. The common factor which brought diverse organizations like the Jana Sangh and the SSP (Samyukta Socialist Party) together in Uttar Pradesh, or the Communists and Muslim league together in Kerala or the DMK and Swatantra party together in Madras was their aim to dislodge the Congress from office. The Congress was their common enemy. For that even friendship with the devil, if helpful, had to be sought. That was the attitude of the opposition parties (Ibid., p. 88). Obviously the Congress was shaken badly by the electorate. The closing years of sixties were even more eventful for the Congress as well as for the party system in India. As the growing, schism within the Congress leadership led to the vertical splits in the party in Thus, at the close of the 1960s the Congress was under severe strain and neither any single political party, not any cohesive coalition of parties, was insight to fill this political space. As the two factions of the Congress battled for the party's legacy and popular support base. Mrs. Gandhi's Congress claiming a definite edge, the emerging contour of the party system in the country was still hazy (Kothari 1970, pp ). The 1967 elections were clearly a break with the past, in the sense that several regional parties realized the importance of a coalition of likeminded political organizations for pursuing ideological goals. Those had remained peripheral in the Congress agenda (Mehra 2003, p. 65). The decline of the Congress party (at the time of coalition model, ) led not only to the change in its numerical position but also had tremendous impact on the institutional set-up of the whole political system. Firstly, anti- Congress wave swept the 1967 election for the first time in post-independence period. Secondly, there was a shift away fi"om the process of crystalisation of internal democracy in the Congress party. Thirdly, the dominance of party in the 57

11 Parliament was reduced. Fourthly, the formation of non- Congress coalition governments in some South Indian states had considerable impact on the nature of federalism. Fifthly, the Congress party had to face a leadership problem from During this time there was no leader commanding total loyalty. These developments show that India has been moving from a dominant party system to a system of competitive dominance in this period (Kothari 1970, p. 200). The victory of non-congress parties in some states marked by an enhancement of regional identities and the formation of unstable, unworkable and patch work coalitions. The goal of this coalition model was power sharing. The decline of the Congress encouraged the opposition parties to believe that they could come together to get into power. During this period the parties diluted their ideology in order to attain their goal of power-sharing (Patagundi 1987, p. 46) election also made Centre-State relations an important feature of the inter-party competition. Bargaining had long been an important element of relations between New Delhi and the states, even in the Nehru era when Congressmen held sway at both the levels. After Nehru's death, the power of the state-level Congress leaders had become both greater and more apparent (Manor 2002, p. 438). Period from 1967 to 1971 proved very crucial for the Congress, first due to split and secondly during this period the Congress lost power in many states. Regional parties posed challenge to the Congress dominance. Regional parties like DMK, Akali Dal posed serious challenges to the Congress. The various coalitions formed by the opposition parties in the states demanding more powers to state. During relations between certain states (Kerala, Tamil Nadu etc.) ruled by non-congress governments) and centre were strained. Second One Party Dominance Model at Centre ( ) 1971 elections re-established one-party dominance, under-lining the importance of grand alliance. It showed that a shift from dominance to competitiveness was indeed brought. Although yet it was only a situation and not a stable party system (Patagundi 1987, p. 47). In 1971 Parliamentary elections the Syndicate Congress, which claimed to be the Indian National Congress, won only 16 seats, the Congress (Indira Gandhi's 58

12 Party) won 350 of the 515 constituencies where elections were held. The CPI (M) won 25 seats, the CPI 23, the DMR 23 and the JanaSangh 22 and Swatantra party 8. The Jana Sangh had 35 seats and Swatantra party 44 seats in previous Lok Sabha. The Praja Socialist Party's strength dropped from 13 to 2 and the Samyukta Socialist party's from 23 to 3. It was almost a clean sweep for the Congress, and the only person who could take credit for that was Indira Gandhi (Tharyan 1974, p. 91). The manifesto of the Congress appealed to the electorate to give the Congress a clear mandate to: (i) continue the advance to socialism through democratic processes; (ii) put down the forces of violence and disorder; (iii) defend secularism and safeguard the interests of the minorities and the weaker sections of the community, particularly the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and the other backward sections; (iv) end anachronistic privilege such as privy purses, and reduce glaring disparities of income and opportunity to the elite; (v) accelerate effort to provide basic requirements of the' people by undertaking a dynamic programme of agricultural development by the application of science and technology, and thereby usher in a new phase of rural prosperity; (vi) provide fresh avenues of employment; (vii) enlarge the role of the public sector and improve its performance, (viii) give scope to the private sector to play its proper role in the economy, while curling the concentration of economic power and wealth; (ix) control prices and ensure to the people the supply of essential commodities at reasonable rates; (x) launch a programme of child welfare to provide nutritious diet to pre-school children; (xi) provide elementary education to all children and reshape secondary and higher education to suit the needs of the country; (xii) for these purposes to effect such amendments of the constitution as may be necessary (Ibid., p. 90). The opposition parties became weak after the election. After the split Congress's image brightened, it acquired ideological zeal, the like of which it had never had before. Indira Gandhi emerged almost as a future leader from savior of the masses and from one end of the country to the other (Ibid., p. 89). Thus, the 1971 general election marked revival of personality cult in India. The election was fought on the name of Mrs. Gandhi. There was public reaction to instability, inefficiency and corrupt coalition governments those were formed in 59

13 1967. The credit, however, went to viability and credibility of Mrs. Gandhi's leadership and her populist appeals. The Congress party under leadership of Mrs. Gandhi's asserted its overwhelming dominance overall other parties (Markandan 1990, pp ). Populism plus military and political success over Pakistan, resulting in the emergence of Bangladesh, enabled Indira Gandhi's Congress to reemerge as the dominant political party in 1971 elections (Wallace 2003, p. 3). The party system of India remained a one party dominance. From 1972 to 1974 was a period of opportunity for the Congress. The people were expecting a glorious revolution from the party. The Congress government at that time enjoyed comfortable majority at centre and government could have done best out of it. But the leaders misused the power that was regained by them. The people began to notice the beginning of the decay of the rejuvenated Congress. Meanwhile the opposition parties gradually recovered from their electoral defeats (Thayan 1974, p. 92). They knew that all was not lost and they should fight. Curiously enough, the failure of the Congress to fulfill its promises and growing economic hardships of the people strengthened their confidence in themselves. They put up a brave front in the Assembly elections in February Indira Gandhi began to loose her popularity and credibility 1973 onwards, due to a nationwide spread of the drought in 1971, 1972 and 1973, international inflation, the strike of the railway workers and the Jaya Parkash Narayan movement in 1972, and finally the decision of the Allahabad High Court in June Ulfimately Indira Gandhi had to impose emergency on 26"^ June 1975 (Patagundi 1987, p. 47). Congress lost main features of one-party dominant system i.e. legitimacy and consensus. The Congress completely banned the opposition parties, the people were sent to jails without any legal provision for opposing the government. Though people had lost their faith in ruling party even then it tended to work at centre and periphery states had no say in administration and were reduced to glorify district boards. The India was posed towards as 'One- Party Authoritative Rule' (Markandan 1990, p. 752). 60

14 Emergency was imposed to scuttle political opposition against Indira Gandhi's government. Threatened by a massive political mobilization by the opposition parties, the Congress government suspended the constitutional machinery in the name of protecting the security, safety and integrity of the nation (Chakrabarty 2006, p. 100). Despite being ideologically fractured, the unity of the opposition parties against this authoritarian rule was remarkable (Ibid., p. 102). The opposition parties launched a campaign accusing Indira Gandhi of 'clinging to an office corruptly gained'. In a rally in New Delhi on 25"^ June 1975 JP announced a nationwide, week-long programme of civil disobedience to force the Congress government to stepdown. In his address to the rally, JP urged the participants to make it impossible for the government to function, and exhorted the armed forces, the police, and the bureaucracy not to obey the government dictates as they were illegal and 'unconstitutional'. Opposition to Indira Gandhi was interpreted as anti-national, and those who indulged in opposition politics were dubbed as 'traitor'. In pursuance of this logic, 'opposition parties attempted to mobilize and express local grievances', valid or not, was perceived as law and order problems. Indira Gandhi introduced a system of rule that undermined the coalitional basis of Indian Society and politics. Those the Congress under Nehru had as assiduously nurtured. It was not surprising that during her term in power there also grew, alongside a centralized developmental ideology, 'a hugely expanded central machinery of the police and the paramilitary forces against the political movements'... The detention of opposition leaders was based on the 'slightest suspicion' or for 'criticizing the emergency in the meetings'. The overall purpose of the detentions was 'to silence all the opposition' (Ibid., pp ). But opposite to this emergency gave a chance to opposition to mobilize people against the ruling party. The major characteristics of new model were: firstly, the collapse of competitive mechanism; secondly, the decline of institutionalized politics and the growth of populist style; and thirdly a clearer articulation of the goals of the system (Patagandi 1987, pp ). Coalition Model at Centre ( ) 61

15 As soon as the 1977 elections were announced, four opposition parties - the Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Bhaitiya Lok Dal and Socialist party - merged to form Janata Party, which decided to have common candidates and a common symbol... The Janata Party's election manifesto had three charters: political, economic and social. The political charter sought to release people 'from the bandage of fear' by lifting emergency, thirteen-point economic charter pledged to delete the right to property from constitution, to affirm the right to work, and ftill employment in ten years. The fifteen point social charter called for reform of education and the eradication of illiteracy (Chakrabarty 2006, pp ). The combined manifesto proved success full to mobilize the people. The sixth Lok Sabha Elections held in 1977 gave a final blow to one-party dominance of the Congress. The Congress routed in 1977 Lok Sabha polls in the North and the Central India. Loss of Congress hegemony heralded a new era in the Indian politics. The Janata Party secured a photo finish victory over the Congress in The Congress lost and the Janata Party captured power in 8 out of 10 states those went to polls. In two union territories also the Congress was badly defeated. In most of the states the Janata Party disowned of assemblies of the states governed by the Congress (Markandan 1990, pp ). In view of the alleged and publicized atrocities committed during the emergency the Congress had lost its popularity to a large extent. Out of 542 Parliamentary seats, the Janata Party obtained 330, while the Congress had a meager share of 154, with 7 seats going to the CPI and 21 to the AIADMK. In North Congress won only 2 out of 234 seats it contested. The collapse was so ignominious that even Indira Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi lost (Chakrabarty 2006, p. 94). The year 1977 represented a distinct benchmark in the evolution of Indian polity. The Parliamentary Election (1977) brought to an end thirty years of the Congress party rule, 11 years of the government under Prime Ministership of Mrs. Gandhi and twenty one months of emergency rule that had set the nation on an authoritarian course, and drastically changed the basic structure of the party system (Wiener 1978, p. 1). 62

16 The electoral changes of 1977 had affected both the pattern of vote's choice as well as institutional framework of the party system. It brought about an end of the 'Congress system' and in its place ushered in a two-party system. Then the shape of this two-party system was not clear because both the Congress and the Janata were experiencing stresses and strains and there roused skepticism about their long term viability (Markandan 1990, p. 757). The merger of the opposition parties into the Janata Party. Alliance with the Akali Dal, DMK and Marxist Communist created a highly competitive two-party system. After June 1977 election, there was a rift between factions led by Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Sanjiva Reddy and there was second split in the party. And the split of January 2"^*, 1978 gave birth to a new breakaway. Officially it was named Congress (Indira) and Mrs. Gandhi's personality was its mainstay (Ibid., p. 757). The Janata Party that held power between March 1977 and July 1979 was 'a hastily assembled coalition of quite different opposition parties and groups united mainly by their opposition to 'Indira Gandhi and the Emergency'. The unity among the opposition groups was politically expedient, and the natural dichotomy among them began to emerge once the common enemy was defeated. The Janata Party was a coalition, dominated by the conservative, but secularist, faction of the Congress Party. It also had the Jana Sangh, a party of the 'Hindu Rightist', representing mainly the high caste middle class in the urban areas of the North and the Central India. As a constituent, the Bhartiya Lok Dal (BLD) sought to articulate the interest of 'the prosperous, small peasant proprietors' primarily in the Hindi belt. Its primary ideological goal was to reallocate resources away from the urban, industrial sector towards agriculture rural society. The fourth constituent was the Socialist Party (SP), with a well-entrenched support base among the workers in urban areas and also the rural poor in some areas of North India. Finally, the Congress for Democracy was a splinter group from the Congress with the support among the poor, particularly in rural India (Chakrabarty 2006, p. 106). The euphoria over the Janata Party coalition was short-lived. Once the government was formed, holding the party together was a major preoccupation of 63

17 the leaders. The government received frequent Jatts by the constant bickering and infighting in the party, both at the centre and in the states. The Janata Party remained a coalition of different parties and groups' and was 'a victim of factionalism, manipulation and the personal ambitions of its leaders'. Bound by anti-indira Gandhi sentiments, the coalition was too disparate historically, ideologically, and even programmatically to get together (Ibid., pp ). Although ephemeral in its existence, the Janata coalition is a remarkable experiment of governance of ideologically different but programmatically less incompatible parties. Since the major issue of the 1977 elections was concerned with how to reverse the authoritarian usurpation of democratic power, the mandate of restoration of the constitution regime 'served as the strongest foundation of support for the Janata coalition' (Ibid., p. 109). The party system went through three significant developments in India during the decade of the 1970s. First, a new look Congress, led by Mrs. Gandhi described as 'Young Turks', appeared strong and rebust enough to warrant a review that end of the dominant party had been too readily proclaimed in However, the implications of Mrs. Gandhi's new 'political process' with a 'pyramidal decision-making structure' which emphasized her own image, undermining and dismantling established structure of the party, making direct plebiscitary appeals to the voters for the Congress and the party system in India began to appear in less than half-a-decade, but was fully on at the close of the 1980s, as it 'proved unable to manage the tensions and cleavages of a heterogeneous party operating in a heterogeneous society, federally governed' (Mehra2003, p. 31). Second, the space for the opposition still appeared limited, for Mrs. Gandhi's approach towards the opposition parties, which were mauled badly in the 1971 general elections, and the state governments run by them, was confrontationist. However, a determined opposition effectively used the contradictions within a centralized but weakened the Congress government to put it on the mat taking advantage of rising corruption and mounting popular discontent. And, following an 18-month (June 1975 to January 1977) internal 64

18 emergency, just a decade after the Congress was challenged in several states, a 'quick-fix' coalition of several non-left parties ascended to power in New Delhi under the banner of the Janata Party (JP). By voting for old political 'wines' rebottled hurriedly with new label, the voters demonstrated political discretion and their option for polarization of parties, bringing in a new competitive element into the party system. The power struggle within the Congress, which had witnessed yet another vertical split, dearly reflected that 'the influence of people at the apex of national and regional political systems penetrates down through the systems most effectively by means of compromise. Attempts to rule by diktat paradoxically weaken the centeralizaters, as happened to Mrs. Gandhi (Ibid., pp ). The collapse of the Janata experiment within two years meant that despite a visible change in the texture of the party system a final social and political realignment to give a definite shape to the Indian party system was still far away of course. A remarkable awakening among the voters regarding power of the ballot was clearly visible. The resulting expectations and pressures had thrown political calculations of the parties and leaders awry, who were either deinstitutionalizing the established organizational firamework (Congress), or were unable to create one (Janata Party). The only exception was parties on the left and the right edges of the political spectrum. A related development, which has become a trend since then, was that parties and governments increasingly became unable to meet the social expectations (Ibid., p. 32). Thus in 1977 Congress party lost the power at centre. The Janata Party gained power and the regional parties like Akali Dal, DMK etc. suppor,ted it. Third One party Dominance Model at Centre ( ) The disintegration of the Janata Party in 1979 brought the Congress back to the power at the centre in Voters-once again cutting across religion and region as in 1971 and gave a massive mandate to the Congress (I). It obtained 353 out of 529 Lok Sabha seats. The erstwhile Janata coalition constituents-the Lok Dal with 41 and the Janata Party with 31 seats - lagged behind. The Communists - the CPI (M) with 36 and CPI with 11 seats - found 65

19 their numerical representation more or less intact. The Janata Party suffered another serious blow with the Jana Sangh's secession in the aftermath of the elections. It was irreparable damage for the organizational support that Jana Sangh provided crucial support for stability of coalition. The coalition, which ruled the country for almost two years ( ), hardly remained a force (Chakrabarty 2006, pp ). In this election Congress did not only secured two-third of the majority but also reduced opposition to the shambles. At the state level it emerged victorious in most of the states. Thus the seventh mid-tenn poll of 1980 re-established one party dominance (Markandan 1990, p. 754). The major goal of this model (third OPD model) was to restore law and order and improve performance (Patagundi 1987, p. 50). In 1980 when Indira Gandhi again came back to power, she dismissed the Janata party government in nine states by imposing state emergency under Article 356. Though Congress came to power in some of the states yet in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Jammu & Kashmir, Kamataka and West Bengal non- Congress governments formed. The governments in these states were basically formed regional parties. They started clamouring for less intervention by the centre and more participation by the states in the policy formation of the country (Nand 2010, p. 421). After 1967, the issue of centre-state relationship, once again came into limelight in When 'on 20*^ March 1983 the meeting of the non-congress (I) Chief Ministers of three Southern State - Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kamataka and one Union Territory - Pondicherry, was held at Bangalore (Das & Choudhary 1990, p. 13). In this meeting the Chief Ministers of these states demanded a more equitable division of financial resources between the centre and the state (Naidu 2007, p. 260). The leaders of the four Southern States who attended the Bangalore meeting, all the states with the exception of Kamataka, were mled by regional parties and even in Kamataka many of the members were elected on the tickets of Kranti Ranga - a regional party. Even the Janata Party - the major coalition partner in Kamataka was more vociferous in putting the demand of review of Centre-state relations with a view to give more autonomy to 66

20 the states (Das & Chaudhury 1990, p. 13). The year proved very crucial for the federalism. In the light of growing demand for more powers to the states, Indira Gandhi established a federal governmental commission, called the Sarkaria Commission to study the state of federal relations in India, on 24"^ March 1983, (Saez 2002, p. 72), hardly after three days, AIADMK leader and Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran, TDP leader and Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh N.T. Rama Rao and West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu, Kamataka Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde all appreciated to Indira Gandhi for her decision to appoint commission to review the centre state relations (Ibid., p. 75). After the success for Bangalore meeting, another meeting of non-congress parties held at Vijayawada on 28"' May, 1983, just after two months of the first meeting. The conclave of opposition parties at Vijayawada was attended by 24 leaders of 14 different political parties including 4 Chief Ministers. The Vijayawada conclave reiterated the same demand for greater state autonomy, review of centre-state relations, the institution of a fiscal resources to the states (Das & Chaudhury 1990, p. 75). The Vijayawada conclave proved the possibility of the opposition parties forging a common platform for discussion on national issues, despite their acute ideological diversities. For the first time in the history of independent India, 14 non-congress political parties assembled together at one place and were able to issue a joint statement. The Vijayawada conclave's significance does not lie merely in the fact that all the non-congress (I) parties discussed centre-state relations. What is more important is that for the first time in the history of Indian parties, political initiative passed into the hands of the regional parties and barring the Congress (I) all the national parties started leaning on regional parties becoming more powerful. The Vijayawada conclave was a beginning of a significant move to forge together a unique type of national alternative to the Congress (I). It would be neither the rival of the "Janata Spirit" of 1977 nor would be a grand alliance of 1971, but an arrangement in which the regional parties would be the dominating factor in the anti-congress (I) combination (Ibid., p. 16). The success of the Vijayawada conclave spurred NTR 67

21 to continue his efforts and many conclaves held in 1983 p 1984 to review centrestate relations. There was a lull for about two years in the activity which aimed at opposition unity because NTR who in Andhra Pradesh (AP), was sacked from power in August 1984, had to be called back to power by the government in September. Smt. Indira Gandhi was assassinated on 31^' October 1984, parties in opposition to Congress (I) except the TDP, fared badly in the eighth Lok Sabha elections (Naidu 2007, p. 263). In 1984, the Congress again emerged victorious with 515 seats and got 63.93% of total votes polled. In this election, it was for the first time Congress (I) got largest seats than the previous elections and also reduced opposition. This was the result of sympathy vote for Rajiv Gandhi. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her security guard on 31^' October Only Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Sikkim, Tripura are the states ruled by the non-congress parties. In the elections of December 1984, the Congress has thus succeeded once again for establishing one-dominant party system in India. In this election many national parties failed so badly. The new regional party Telgu Dessam got the place of pride as a main opposition party. The seats share was 30 (Markandan 1990, p. 754). The victory of the Congress party in 1980 and 1984 elections proved that the Congress would remain as a dominant party in Indian politics but the elections in 1989 disapproved the statement, in 1989 Congress lost power and National Front, alliance of Janata Party, Congress (S), Telugu Dessam, DMK and Asom Gana Parishad, got power. In this election the opposition parties came together to discharge a historical responsibility to rid this country of the misrule of the Congress (I) led by a weak and blundering Prime Minister. Interestingly, what brought them together were once again the anti-congress sentiments. It acted decisively in cementing the bond among the erstwhile Janata party constituents. As on the past experiment, a common minimum programme was devised to sustain the coalition that drew, inter alia, on an anti-congress platform. Crucial to this political formation was a programme that avoided the contentious issues as 68

22 far as possible. As a result, the ideological incongruity among the parties constituting the coalition was hardly mentioned at least at the outset and opposition to the Congress Party provided them with a platform for unity (Chakrabarty 2006, p. 136). In 1989 election Congress was ousted from power for the second time since the 1952 elections because of corruption issues, rising prices and in effective leadership of Rajiv Gandhi. Thus 1980s too proved crucial for political parties and the party system in India in several respects. First, despite apparently maintaining its dominance from 1980 to 1989, Congress (I)'s organizational base and structure were corroded from within due to factionalism rampant in most of its units. It is a matter of conjecture how the Congress (I) would have done in the 1984 elections had Mrs. Gandhi not been assassinated that year. Though Rajiv Gandhi promised to free the Congress (1) of 'powerbrokers' and made a blistering critique of his own party during the party's centenary celebration in Bombay on 28"^ December He did little to improve the state of affairs during the seven years that he was at the helm in the party. In fact, bizarre though it was, weaknesses in the party structure made him think of establishing direct communion and formal links with the local self-government and the direct administration. The same was true of most national political parties, except BJP's rout in the 1984 elections (it won only 2 seats in Lok Sabha) was also caused because (RSS) grassroots workers worked for the Congress (1) (Mehra 2003, pp ). The second, and related, to the development was that Mrs. Gandhi was virtually on a confrontational course with the opposition throughout her tenure, which included the national parties as well as regional parties; particularly those who dared to oppose her. In a way this was an extension of her pre-emergency and Emergency period politics. Here confrontational politics in Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, Assam and West Bengal (on the Darjeeling Hill Council issue) and the attempts to dismiss the opposition-controlled governments in Kamataka, Jammu & Kashmir, Sikkim, and Andhra Pradesh, were heavily criticized. She did not hesitate to brand the opposition parties as anti-national for criticizing her. In fact. 69