Comparative Political Economy Fall 2009

Transcription

1 Comparative Political Economy Fall 2009 Erik Wibbels Perkins 306 Office Hours: Tuesday Web: Course Description: This class provides an overview of current developments in comparative political economy. Readings cover the developed and developing regions of the world, material written by political scientists, economists, and historians, and a broad swath of topics with robust, contemporary research programs. The course is designed less to provide a broad overview of thinking on the relationship between government and economics than to explore the areas of comparative political economy that have seen interesting developments in the last twenty or so years. The chief goal is to help you develop your own research project. As such, the main assignment is a final paper. COURSE REQUIREMENTS Participation: (25 percent). Class sessions will be conducted in a highly participatory seminar format. As the class will depend heavily on the on the quality of class participation, it is essential that members of the seminar attend all sessions, participate actively in class discussions, and complete the required readings prior to class. To ensure we re all keeping up, please send a half page or so of discussion points/questions bearing on the week s reading to me by noon the day of class. I will put the comments together and send them to the group. You can raise questions about theory, method, point out conflicts between readings, develop links with previous weeks readings, whatever. These needn t be long and detailed, but they also shouldn t be a one-line question/comment. Short Papers and Discussion Leadership (25 percent): Students will also choose two weeks for which to write a short (3 page) paper in reaction to the readings. This paper will form the basis for a more active role for the student in leading the week s discussion. For example, the paper and resulting discussion might critique some aspect of the readings, discuss extensions, critical case studies, or potential empirical applications, entertain alternative assumptions or approaches, or explore related questions that are left unaddressed by the readings. These papers will be circulated to the other students by Tuesday night. Research Paper: (50 percent total). You will write an original research paper of pages that bears on the themes of the class. I would encourage you to talk with me soon about topics, methods, etc. in advance of starting. You will present your papers in the last regular class on November 18, but the paper will be due on Monday, December 7. I encourage you to use the intervening weeks to improve your paper in line with the comments you receive from your presentation. Late papers will be penalized by a letter grade per day. Note on Readings: In most cases, the order of the readings actually matters, so I d encourage you to go in the order on which they appear on the syllabus. The Recommended lists are exceedingly extensive. Consider them as little more than helpful in your own research and a guide to the field. COURSE SCHEDULE Aug. 26: What is comparative political economy? Przeworski, Adam States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy. Chapters 1 & 5. Przeworski, Adam Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible? Available here:

2 Ostrom, E A Letter from the Chair The Political Economist Gerber, Elizabeth What is Political Economy The Political Economy Newsletter Pontusson, Jonas From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting Political Institutions in Their Place and Taking Interests Seriously, Comparative Political Studies 31: Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press. Pages 1-15.Ordeshook, Peter The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy. In Alt and Shepsle, eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Pgs Peter Hall. The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations. Hirschman, Albert The Passion and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before It s Triumph. Chapter 1. Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Oman, Charles P. and Ganesh Wignaraja The Postwar Evolution of Development Thinking. New York: St. Martin s Press. Chapters 1-4. Moser, Peter The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar. Part I, pgs Alt, James and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge UP 1990, Intro (Alt & Shepsle), Ch. 2 (Bates), Ch. 9 (Olson). Dixit, Avinash, The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective (Munich Lectures in Economics), Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997, Part I: Hall, Peter, ed. The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations. Introduction. Sept. 2: Professor Wibbels out of town no class Sept. 9: Development I: Development, the Institutions Debate and Some Growth Theory David Weil A Framework for Analysis. Chapters 2 and 3 in Economic Growth. 1 William Easterly Solow s Surprise: Investment is Not the Key to Growth. Chapter 3 in The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge: MIT Press. North, Douglas and Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, Journal of Economic History 49(4), 1989, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics Przeworski, Adam The Last Instance? Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic Development? European Journal of Sociology 15: Glaeser, E., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A Do Institutions Cause Growth? Journal of Economic Growth 9: Presentation: Where are the politics? 1 The more technically oriented instead can read Chapter 1 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin s textbook, Economic Growth.

3 Pablo Pinto and Jeff Timmons The Political Determinants of Economic Performance: Political Competition and the Sources of Growth. Comparative Political Studies, 38: William Easterly "National policies and economic growth" in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, editors, Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier. Available at: Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: the Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." American Economic Review 95: Available at: Engerman and Sokoloff Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World. Journal of Economic Perspectives XIV: William Easterly "National policies and economic growth" in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, editors, Handbook of Economic Growth. Crafts, N.F.R "Endogenous growth: lessons for and from economic history." In David M. Kreps and Kenneth F. Wallis (eds.), Advances in economics and econometrics: theory and applications. Seventh World Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Volume II: pages Temple, Jonathan The New Growth Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature 37: Dani Rodrik Why We Learn Nothing from Regressing Economic Growth on Policies. Manuscript, Harvard: Aghion, Caroli and García-Penalosa Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories. Journal of Economic Literature. Vol XXXVII: Barro, Robert. J "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth." Journal of Political Economy 98: S103-S126. Krugman, Paul History Versus Expectations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105: Salai-I-Martin, Xavier I Just Ran Two Million Regressions. American Economic Review 87: Krueger, Ann O "Government Failures in Development." Journal of Economic Perspectives 4: Rodrik and Rodriguez Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence. In Bernanke and Rogoff, eds. Macroeconomics Annual Rodrik, Dani Institutions, Integration, and Geography: In Search of the Deep Determinants of Economic Growth, in In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth, Dani Rodrik, ed. Princeton University Press. Jon Elster. "The Impact of Constitutions on Economic Performance." Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics Washington, World Bank, pp Hammond, Peter J., and Andrés Rodriguez-Clare "On Endogenizing Long-Run Growth." In Torben M. Andersen and Karl O. Moene (eds.), Endogenous Growth. Oxford: Blackwell. Pages Dani Rodrik Growth Strategies. Handbook of Economic Growth. Cheibub, Jos Antonio, and Adam Przeworski "Government spending and economic growth under democracy and dictatorship." In Albert Breton et al. (eds.), Understanding Democracy: Economic and Political Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages Rodrik. "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich," Economic Policy 20, 1995.

4 September 16: Development II: Non-Institutional Accounts Paul Krugman Geography and Trade. Selections. Roemer, Paul M The Origins of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (1):3-22. Evans, Peter Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil. Princeton: Princeton UP. Pgs Wade, Robert Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 11. Kenneth Pomeranz The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. Princeton: PUP. Introduction and Chapters 5 and 6. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny Income Distribution, Market Size and Industrialization. Quarterly Journal of Economics 3: Galor, O. (2005). From stagnation to growth: unified growth theory, in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, eds. Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 1A, Amsterdam: North Holland. Gerschenkron Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard UP. Alexander Field The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: A Critique with Special Reference to the North/Thomas model of pre-1500 Europe. Explorations in Economic History 18: Haggard, Stephan. Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries. Cornell UP 1990, esp. chpts. 1, 2, and conclusion. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, 2001, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review, 91, Easterly, William Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17: Gabriella R. Montinola When does Aid Conditionality Work? Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press: pgs Amartya Sen, "The Concept of Development," in Hollis Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan, eds., Handbook of Development Economics, Volume I, pps Elsevier Science Publishers. Olson, Mancur, Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor, Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 2 (1996): Weingast, Barry, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets, Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 1993, pp Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States. Guillermo O'Donnell Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California. Remmer, Karen Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: The Resurgence of Institutional Analysis. World Politics 50: [A critique of Huntington]. Hirschman, Albert, Rise and Decline of Development Economics, in Essays in Trespassing, CUP 1-24 Valenzuela, J. Samuel and Arturo Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment, Comp Politics 10: Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Sen, Amartya, Nicholar Stern and Joseph Stiglitz Development Strategies: The Roles of the State and the Private Sector. Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics

5 Murphy, Kevin, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny Industrialization and the Big Push. Journal of Political Economy 97: Easterly William and Ross Levine Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development, Journal of Monetary Economics, Janaury pp Easterly, William What did Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies and Growth with Repeated IMF and World Bank Adjustment Loans. Journal of Development Economics. Sachs, Jeffrey D Tropical Underdevelopment. NBER Working Paper Sept. 23: Education, Human Capital and Development Lindert, Peter Growing Public: Volume 1: The Story, Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge University Press. Chapters 5 and 6. Wolf, Alison Education and Economic Performance: Simplistic Theories and Their Policy Consequences. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 20(2): Bourguignon, François and Thierry Verdier (2000) Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality, and Growth, Journal of Development Economics, vol.62, pp Ansell, Ben Traders, Teachers, and Tyrants: Democracy, Globalization, and Public Investment in Education, IO Iversen and Stephens Partisan politics, the welfare state, and three worlds of human capital formation. Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies. Filipe Campante & Edward Glaeser Yet Another Tale of Two Cities: Buenos Aires and Chicago. NBER Working Paper, June 2009 Carles Boix Political Parties and the Supply Side of the Economy: The Provision of Physical and Human Capital in Advanced Economies. American Journal of Political Science, 41(3): David Stasavage "Democracy and Education Spending in Africa" American Journal of Political Science 49(2), pp Brown, David (1999) Reading Writing, and Regime Type: Democracy s Impact on School Enrollment, Political Research Quarterly, vol.52, no.4, pp Card, David (1995): The causal effect of education on earnings, Chapter 30 in Ashenfelter, Orley and David Card, eds. Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3A, Amsterdam: Elsevier. [ERC] Duflo, Esther. (2000): Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment, American Economic Review, 91(4), Krueger, Alan and Mikael Lindahl (2001): Education and growth: Why and for whom? Journal of Economic Literature, 39(4), Glewwe, Paul. (2002). Schools and Skills in Developing Countries: Education Policies and Socioeconomic Outcomes, Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2), Angrist, Joshua and Victor Lavy (1999): Using Maimonides Rule to Estimate the Effectof Class Size on Scholastic Achievement, Quarterly Journal of Economics,114(2), Angrist, Joshua, Eric Bettinger, and Michael Kremer. (2006). Long-Term Consequences of Secondary School Vouchers: Evidence from Administrative Records in Colombia, American Economic Review, 96(3).

6 Part II: Regime Type and the (Dis)Organization of the State Sept. 30: The PE of Regime Type Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi Modernization: Theory and Facts. World Politics 49: Boix, Carles and Susan Stokes Endogenous Democratization. World Politics 55: Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (November 2000): Ansell and Samuels Inequality and Democratization. Working Paper, University of Minnesota. I ll . Glaeser, Edward, Giacomo Ponzetto and Andrei Shleifer Why does Democracy Need Education? Journal of Economic Growth 12: Michael Ross Is Democracy Good for the Poor? American Journal of Political Science. Available at: -%20final%20draft.pdf John Ahlquist and Erik Wibbels. Trade, Factor Prices and Political Regimes. Working paper. Adam Przeworski. Forthcoming. The Poor and the Viability of Democracy. Available here: Gerring, Thacker and Moreno "Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry," American Political Science Review 99: David Lake and Matthew Baum The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services. Comparative Political Studies 34: 587- Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski Dictatorial Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. Comparative Political Studies. 40: Gerring, John, Philip Bond, William Barndt, Carola Moreno Democracy and Growth: A Historical Perspective. World Politics 57:3 (April) Ordeshook, Peter C Are Western Constitutions relevant to Anything Other than the Countries they Serve? Constitutional Political Economy 13:1 (March) Huber, Rueschemeyer, Stephens. The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:3, Robert Barro, "Determinants of Democracy", Journal of Political Economy, December1999 Adserà, Alicia and Carles Boix, 2002, Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness, International Organization 56 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy. Chapters 3-6 Evelyne Hueber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John D. Stephens. "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy." Journal of Economic Perspectives 7(3):71-85, Przeworski et al. Democracy and Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. Alberto Alesina, Sule Özler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel "Political Instability and Economic Growth." Journal of Economic Growth 1: Buchanan, James M. and Richard E. Wagner Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes. New York: Academic Press. Stephen Elkin. "Pluralism in Its Place: State and Regime in Liberal Democracy". In R. Benjamin and S. Elkin (eds.), The Democratic State, Joseph A. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Oct. 7: The Horizontal Organization of the State

7 Erik Wibbels Madison in Baghdad? Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative Perspective. Annual Review of Political Science. Available on my webpage. Pablo Beramendi. Inequality, Economic Specialization, and Fiscal Decentralization. IO. Ades, Alberto and Edward Glaeser, Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, Catherine Boone Political Topographies of the African State. Cambridge: CUP. Pgs Jonathan Rodden Political Geography and Electoral Rules: Why Single-Member Districts are Bad for the Left. Working paper, Stanford. Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 11, No. 1. (1995), pp Cai H, Treisman D Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy. American Economic Review. Kasara, Kimuli Tax Me if You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa. American Political Science Review 101: Beramendi, Pablo and Alberto Diaz-Cayeros Distributive Tensions in Developing Federations. Working paper, Duke and Stanford. Bates, Robert Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pgs. 1-8 & Edward Glaeser and Bryce Ward. Myths and Realities of American Political Geography. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Paper available here: 4f8fe2fe c/$FILE/rwp_06_007_glaeser_SSRN.pdf Herbst, Jeffery I States and Power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and control, Princeton; Princeton University Press. Chapter 1. Erik Wibbels Decentralized Governance, Constitution Formation, and Redistribution in Argentina, India, and the U.S. Constitutional Political Economy. Wendy Tam Cho, James Gimpel, and Joshua Dyck. Residential Concentration, Political Socialization, and Voter Turnout. The Journal of Politics 68, 1: Chhibber P, Kollman K The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. Chapter 1 (skim) and 3. Edward Gibson Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries. Word Politics October: Alfred Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, Journal of Democracy 10: 4 (October 1999), p Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolare Economic Integration and Political Disintegration. American Economic Review 90: Bolton P, Roland G The breakup of nations: a political economy analysis. Q. J. Econ. 112: John Donahue "Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America's Devolution Debate." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11: Erik Wibbels Bailouts, Budget Constraints, and Leviathans: Comparative Federalism and Lessons from the Early U.S. Comparative Political Studies: Charles Tiebout "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64: Inman and Rubinfeld "Rethinking Federalism. Journal of Economic Perspectives Fall:

8 Larson, John Lauritz Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Edward Gibson and Ernesto Calvo, Federalism and Low-Maintenance Constituencies: Territorial Dimensions of Economic Reform in Argentina, Studies in Comparative International Development, 35, 3 (Fall 2000): Susan Rose-Ackerman and Jonathon Rodden, Does Federalism Preserve Markets? Virginia Law Review 83 (1997): Qian, Yinghi and Gerard Roland Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint, American Economic Review 88, 5: Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multi-Tiered Systems." World Politics July: Oct. 14: The Choice of Electoral Systems Boix, Carles Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. American Political Science Review 93, 3: Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. American Political Science Review 101, 3: Rodden, Jonathan Why did Western Europe adopt Proportional Representation? Working Paper, Stanford. Andrews, Josephine and Robert Jackman Strategic Fools: Electoral Rule Choice under Extreme Uncertainty. Electoral Studies 24: Karen Remmer The Politics of Institutional Change: Electoral Reform in Latin America, Party Politics 14: 5-30 Ticchi, Davide and Andrea Vindigni Endogenous Constitutions. Unpublished paper, Princeton University. Oct. 21: Political Disorder and State Breakdown Fearon, James and David Laitin Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review 97 (1): Fearon and Laitin Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. American Political Science Review 90: Alesina and Spolaore Economic Integration and Political Disintegration. American Economic Review. Spolaore, Enrico and Romain Wacziarg. War and Relatedness. Working Paper, Tufts and UCLA I will . Dube, Oendrill and Juan Vargas Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict. Working Paper, NYU. Kalyvas, Stathis N. Kocher, Matthew Adam How "Free" Is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem. World Politics. Bakke and Wibbels Regional Inequality, Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Federal States. World Politics October: Sambanis, Nicholas Globalization, Decentralization and Secession: A Review of the Literature and Some Conjectures. n Gustav Ranis, David Cameron, and Annalisa Zinn, eds., Globalization and Self-Determination: Is the Nation-State under Siege? (New York: Routledge, 2006). Available here: Jason Lyall. No date. Landscapes of Violence: A Comparative Study of Insurgency in the Northern Caucasus. Working paper, Princeton University.

9 Carles Boix Political Violence Around the World. Prepared for the Conference on Order, Conflict, and Violence at Yale University, Department of Political Science, April 30th May 1st, March. Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4): Sambanis, Nicholas Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War. Perspectives on Politics 2: Robert Bates Political insecurity and state failure in contemporary Africa. CID Working Paper (115). Available at: Bolton, Patrick, Gerard Roland, and Enrico Spolaore Economic Theories of the Break-Up and Integration of Nations. European Economic Review 40: Collier, Paul. On the Economic Consequences of Civil War. Available at Leonard Wantchekon The Paradox of Warlord Democracy. American Political Science Review. James Fearon Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence. In Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds. Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Hechter, Michael Containing Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Spolaore, Enrico, 2007, Civil Conflict and Secessions, Unpublished paper. Part III: The PE of Redistribution Oct. 28: Redistribution I: Inequality, Redistribution and Insurance Torben Iversen and David Soskice "An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences." American Political Science Review 95: Moene, Karl Ove and Michael Wallerstein Earnings Inequality and Welfare Spending. World Politics 55: Korpi and Palme APSR Lind, Jo Thori Why is there so little redistribution? Nordic Journal of Political Economy 31: Adserà, Alicia and Carles Boix, 2002, Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness, International Organization 56 Wibbels and Ahlquist. Trade and Social Insurance. Working Paper. David Stasavage and Kenneth Scheve Institutions, partisanship, and inequality in the long run. NYU, Mimeo. Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen and Philipp Rehm "Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of Government Redistribution." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22: Moene, Karl O., and Michael Wallerstein Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution. American Political Science Review 95 (4): Lindert, Peter H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson (2001). Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal? NBER Working Paper No. 8228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA Ronald Rogowski and Duncan MacRae. Inequality and Institutions: What Theory, History, and (Some) Data Tell Us. Forthcoming in Beramendi and Anderson, eds. Isabela Mares The Sources of Business Interest in Social Insurance. 55:

10 Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." Journal of Political Economy 89: Kitschelt et al Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. New York: CUP. Weingast, Barry, Kenneth Shepsle, and C. Johnson, The Political Economy of Costs and Benefits: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, Journal of Political Economy 89, August, 1981, pp P. Lindert, Three Centuries of Inequality in Britain and America in Atkinson and Bourguignon, eds. Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol. 1. Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say? Ms. Dept of Economics, MIT. Robert Barro Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of Economic Growth 5: Torben Iversen and David Soskice, "Electoral Systems and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others." APSR. Torben Iversen and Anne Wren, "Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the Service Economy" World Politics (1998). Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti, 1995 Taxation and Redistribution in an Open Economy, European Economic Review, 39(May): Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment." European Economic Review 40: , Alesina, Alberto and Dani Rodrik Distributive Politics and Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: Perotti, Roberto, 1996, Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say, Journal of Economic Growth, 1: Alesina, Alberto Distributive Politics and Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics May: Paul, Gilles Saint and Thierry Verdier Inequality, Redistribution and Growth: A Challenge to the Conventional Political Economy Approach. European Economic Review 40: Avinash Dixit and John Londregan, Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency, American Political Science Review 89 (December 1995): Kuznets, S., 1955, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, American Economic Review 45(1): Nov. 4: Political Identity, Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution Moses Shayo A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution. American Political Science Review 103: Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner and Jeremy Weinstein Why does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? American Political Science Review 101: Edward Glaeser The Political Economy of Hatred. Quarterly Journal of Economics. Stasavage and Scheve "Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance", Quarterly Journal of Political Science, vol.1, no.3, pp Roemer and Lee Race and Redistribution: A Solution to the Problem of American Exceptionalism Journal of Public Economics 90, Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, etc In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies. American Economic Review 91: Pesendorfer, Wolfgang Behavioral Economics Comes of Age. Journal of Economic Literature XLIV:

11 De la O, Ana and Jonathan Rodden "Does Religion Distract the Poor?: Income and Issue Voting Around the World." Comparative Political Studies 41: Why the Poor do not Expropriate the Rich: An Old Argument in New Garb, 1998, Journal of Public Economics, 70, Austen-Smith, David and Michael Wallerstein "Redistribution and Affirmative Action." Journal of Public Economics 90: Benabou and Tirole "Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics", Quarterly Journal of Economics 121: Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton "Identity and the Economics of Organizations." Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(1): Huber, J. a. P. S. (2007). "Why do the Poor Support Right-Wing Parties? A Cross-National Analysis." Working Paper, Columbia University Political Science Department. Lind, J. T. (2007). "Fractionalization and the Size of Government." Journal of Public Economics 91: Roemer, John "Why the Poor do not Expropriate the Rich: An Old Argument in New Garb." Journal of Public Economics 70: Francesc Amat and Erik Wibbels Electoral Incentives, Group Identity and Preferences for Redistribution. Working Paper. NOTE: LAST WEEK CAN BE ON SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS, PARTIES AND PORK OR TRADE, GLOBALIZATION, ETC. SUCH WEEKS WOULD INVOLVE SOMETHING LIKE THIS: Special Interests, Parties and Pork: Gary Cox Swing Voters, Core Voters and Distributive Politics. Working Paper, UCSD. Dixit Avinash and John Londegran ``The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics.'' Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, pp Susan Stokes Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review 99(3): Larcinese, Valentino, James Snyder, and Cecilia Testa Testing Models of Distributive Politics Using Exit Polls to Measure Voter Preferences and Partisanship. Working paper, LSE. Stiglitz, Edward and Barry Weingast Distributive and Ideological Policies in the U.S. House. Working Paper, Stanford. Pasotti, Eleonora Political Branding in Cities: The Decline of Machine Politics in Bogota, Naples, and Chicago. CUP. Chapters 1-2. Primo and Snyder Public Goods and the Law of 1/n. Manuscript, MIT Political Science. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. NY: CUP. Hirano et al Distributive Politics with Primaries. Manusript, MIT. Przeworski, Adam Governments and Private Agents: Regulation. Chapter 6 in States and Markets. Ames, Barry, Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress, The Journal of Politics 57 (1995) p Alston, Lee and Bernardo Mueller. Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 22, 1: p McGillivray, Fiona Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs. American Journal of Political Science 41, 2 (April), p

12 Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics. Working paper, Princeton/Harvard. Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game. Journal of Politics 48, p Dahlberg, Matz and Eva Johansson On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments, American Political Science Review 96, 1. Levitt, Steven and James Snyder Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays. American Journal of Political Science 39, 4: Levitt, Steven and James Snyder The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes. Journal of Political Economy 105, 1: Stiglitz, Edward and Barry Weingast Distributive and Ideological Policies in the U.S. House. Working Paper, Stanford. Rose-Ackerman, Susan Trust, Honesty and Corruption: Reflections on the State-Building Process. European Journal of Sociology Vol. 42: Treisman, Daniel What Have we Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? Annual Review of Political Science. Tornell, Aaron and Philip Lane The Voracity Effect. American Economic Review 89: Primo and Snyder Public Goods and the Law of 1/n. Manuscript, MIT Political Science. William Mitchell and Michael Munger Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, American Journal of Political Science 35: Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman Electoral Rules as Constraints on Corruption. BJPS 35(4): Golden, Miriam A., and Eric C. Chang "Competitive Corruption: Factional Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy." World Politics 53 (4): Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (1985): Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman Protection for Sale. American Economic Review 84, Adsera, A., Boix Carles, and Payne Michael "Are you being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government." Journal of Law and Economic Organization 19 (2): Rose-Ackerman, Susan Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform. New York: Cambridge University Press. Abhijit Banerjee A Theory of Misgovernance Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, Kevin Murphy, Andrei Sheilfer and Robert Vishny, Why Is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?" American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 83, Przeworski, Adam, and Michael Wallerstein The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies, American Political Science Review 76: Przeworski, Adam and Michael Wallerstein Structural Dependence of the State on Capital. American Political Science Review 83: Frieden, Jeffrey Classes, Sectors, and Foreign Debt in Latin America, Comparative Politics Oct: Murillo, M. Victoria From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Latin America. World Politics 52 ~2!: Esping-Andersen, Gösta. "Politics without Class: Postindustrial Cleavages in Europe and America," in Kitschelt et al., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, ch. 10. Ronald Rogowski "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade," American Political Science Review, 81:

13 Cameron, David Distributional Coalitions and Other Sources of Economic Stagnation, International Organization 42: [A response to Olson]. Gordon Tullock The Costs of Special Privelege. In Alt and Sheple Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: CUP. Ames, Barry, Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress, The Journal of Politics 57 (1995) p Schamis, Hector Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. World Politics 51 (2): Stigler, George, The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell J of Econ 2, Spring 1971, pp Krueger, Anne The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, American Economic Review 64: Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions. Journal of Political Philosophy 2(2): Alesina, Alberto and Allan Drazen Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? The American Economic Review 81: Tullock, Gordon The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. In Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock, Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. Globalization and Domestic Politics Rogowski Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. American Political Science Review 81: Kono, Daniel. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. American Political Science Review 100: Kevin O Rourke and Alan M. Taylor. Democracy and Protectionism. Michael Hiscox Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation. American Political Science Review 96: Carles Boix 2006: Between Redistribution and Trade: The Political Economy of Protectionism and Domestic Compensation in Pranab Bardhan (ed.) Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution, Princeton University Press. Scheve and Slaughter Public Opinion, International Economic Integration and the Welfare State. In Bardhan, Bowles and Wallerstein. Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution. Available here: Iversen, Torben and Thomas Cusack The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization? World Politics. Wibbels, Erik Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World. International Organization. James Alt and Michael Gilligan, The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions, Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (1994): Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade. International Organization 60: Kenneth Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences? Journal of International Economics 54(2): Rudra, Nita Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries. International Organization. 56: Richard B. Freeman Are Your Wages Set in Beijing? Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: Michael Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry Weingast, The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy, World Politics (April 1997):

14 Kaufman, Robert, and Alex Segura-Ubiergo Globalization, Domestic Politics and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, World Politics 53: Finance: Jeffrey Frieden "Invested interests: The politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance," International Organization 45 Obstfeld, Maurice The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace? Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Autumn, 1998), pp Beth Simmons and Zachary Elkins The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. American Political Science Review 98: Mosley, Layna Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States. International Organization 54: James Vreeland Institutional determinants of IMF agreements. Manuscript, Yale University. Cao, Xun Convergence, Divergence, and Networks in the Age of Globalization: A Social Network Analysis Approach. Manuscript, UW and Princeton University. Philip Keefer Elections, Special Interests and Financial Crisis, International Organization. 62: Kaminsky, Rheinhart and Vegh The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Fall. Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler Managers, Investors, and Crises: Mutual Fund Strategies in Emerging Markets. Garrett, Geoffrey Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Garrett, Geoffrey. Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy. International Organization 49: Geoffrey Garrett The Causes of Globalization. Comparative Political Studies 33 : Kaminsky, Graciela International Capital Flows: A Blessing or a Curse? Working Paper, Department of Economics, George Washington University. Wibbels and Arce Globalization, Taxation, and Burden-Shifting in Latin America. International Organization 57: Andrew MacIntyre "Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia." 55: Armijo, Leslie Elliott Financial Globalization and Democracy in Emerging Markets. New York: St. Martin s Press. Genschel, Philipp Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Viability of the Welfare State. MPIfG Working Paper. Hallerberg, Mark, and Scott Basinger Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players. Comparative Political Studies 31: Swank, Duane Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States. New York: Cambridge University Press. Quinn, Dennis The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation. American Political Science Review 91: Daniel Verdier, Domestic Responses to Capital Market Internationalization Under the Gold Standard, , International Organization 52, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pages Beth Simmons "The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation," International Organization 53: Nov. 18: Discussion of Papers and Course Conclusion

15 Nov. 25 NO CLASS: THANKSGIVING BREAK

16 OLD STUFF William Keech Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. Cambridge: CUP. Chpts 1-2. José Antonio Cheibub and Adam Przeworski Democracy, Elections, and Accountability for Economic Outcomes. In Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press: John Ferejohn Accountability and Authority. In Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press: Joel S. Hellman "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions." World Politics 50: Presentation: How does globalization impact elections? Mark Kayser. Forthcoming. Trade and the Timing of Elections. British Journal of Political Science. Available at: df David Samuel and Timothy Hellwig Voting in Open Economies: The Electoral Consequences of Globalization. Comparative Political Studies 40(7): Political Business Cycles Franzese Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science 5: Alt, Jim and David Lassen The Electoral Cycle in Debt is Where You Can t See It: Fiscal Transparency and Electoral Policy Cycles in Advanced Industrialized Democracies. Working Paper, Harvard: Nordhaus, William The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies April: Tufte, Edward Political Control of the Economy. Princeton UP. Rogoff, Kenneth, Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, AER 1990, pp (17) Alesina, Alberto, Gerald D. Cohen, Nouriel Roubini, Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies, NBER Working Paper no (pp. 1-36). (Later, truncated, appears in Economics and Politics 4, Hibbs, Douglas Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy, American Political Science Review 71: Hibbs, Douglas A The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics. Harvard UP. Ames, Barry Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America. Berkeley: UC Press.. Alesina, Alberto and Nouriel Roubini with Gerald Cohen Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy William Keech Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. Cambridge: CUP. Chpts 1-3. Economic Impacts on Elections John D. Huber and G. Bingham Powell, Jr "Congruence Between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy." World Politics 46: Remmer, Karen The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America, American Political Science Review 87: Morris Fiorina Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. Chapter 1 & 4. New Haven: Yale University Press. Michael Lewis-Beck Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Other:

17 Kitschelt, Herbert Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities. CPS 33, No. 6-7, Powell and Whitten A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of Political Context. American Journal of Political Science 37: 391- Sam Peltzman Voters as Fiscal Conservatives, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: Comparative Electoral Data: Ronald Rogowski and Mark Kayser Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries, American Journal of Political Science 46: Franzese and Noorundin. The Effective Constituency in (Re)Distributive Politics: Alternative Bases of Democratic Representation, Geographic versus Partisan parts joint with Irfan Nooruddin. Juan March Institute Working Paper Series, As presented to 2004 MPSA (April). Jensen, Nathan Rational Citizens Against Reform: Economic Reform in Transition Economies. Comparative Political Studies 36: [A response to Hellman] Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4 and 7 in Schepsle and Bonchek. Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. First of all, the class was great and I learned a lot. I especially liked the idea of having someone include additional literature. I am not sure though whether the presentation always integrated well with the rest of the discussion (time constraints etc.). Maybe a short written summary/discussion would have been better. I also think it was a good idea to have papers written so early, but maybe having the presentation one week before the due date would be even better so that we could actually use some of the criticism to improve the paper (or also have a short session in the middle of the semester where each of us has to present the research idea / design). I also liked the way you always tried to give the big picture, link the various strands of thought in the literature and give suggestions for research ideas. Sometimes I would have liked a stronger focus on the empirical part of various papers. We concentrated a lot on the theoretical arguments, but spent less time on discussing research design or specific empirical strategies. I think that would have been helpful for the papers too. On the other hand, it is very hard to combine a thorough discussion of ideas with a detailed discussion of the empirical implementation. I also liked the collection of topics and while you obviously have to cover traditional research areas like regime change, redistribution etc., I had the most fun in the sessions on political geography, violence, human capital and also the look at growth. If you wanted to give the class an even more odd spin I would focus on these topics and maybe also touch on the political economy of health care/ disease, gender relations or government revenue.