Multi-domain Counter-terrorism Modeling

Transcription

1 Multi-domain Counter-terrorism Modeling Roger Smith Vice President and Group CTO Titan Systems Corporation MORS WG16 & WG29 The Goal Capture the complex dynamics of a global network of people, organizations, and resources Al Quaeda is one challenge Timothy McVeigh is another Equip our government with tools to enhance thinking, planning, and training Explore consistent, logical, and rigorous relationships through the construction of models 1

2 The Target The command nucleus is not the only target in counter-terrorism activities Field Cells, Communications, Weapons, Assets, Sympathizers, and National Hosts are all part of the target set Each of these is made up of assets that reside in different domains Operational Domains Information 2

3 Domain Models Information Domain Relationships Objects, Interactions, and Relationships must be grouped into functional domains Each domain requires a different modeling abstraction Missiles, Bank Transactions, Cases, Intelligence Analysis, and Medical relief will not fit into one simulation system Cross-domain data exchanges will carry very unique information Not valuable to every federated domain model 3

4 Trade Modification Sample Domain Relationships Information Asset Allocation United Nations Support Trade Sanctions Foreign Aid Terror Funds Host Nation Supporters People & Orgs Host Nation Supporters Protection Communications Intelligence Human Intelligence Communications Operational Assets Recruiting Military Forces Police Protection Security Controls Terrorist Networks International Trade Access to Assets Bank Regulation Source of Funds (Information Domain) Tactical Intel Captured Money Sympathizers Captured People Psychological, Family Influence Behavior Influence Counter-terrorism Laws International Prosecution Immigration Monitoring Target Identification (Information Domain) Medical Aid Refugee Support Media Images Convictions Dynamics Model of Relationships <transfer> <Immigration> <Training Camps> Bank Analysis Immigration Analysis Human Agents Intelligence US Policy Neighbor Country Intl Policy Host Country Information Military Police Command Nodes Radio Web Cellphone Security Target Facilities Weapons Stores Attacks capture Prisoners Field Cells capture2 Education Media Medical Support Potential Recruits <US Policy> Food Mind <Host Country> Training Camps pass recruits International Trade Terrorist Bank Acct Banks transfer Sympathizers Bank Accts immigrate Immigration fail Terror Laws Trial Conviction 4

5 Objects and Interactions of Interest Information Objects Terror Command Terror Field Cells Military Forces Special Forces Law Enforcement Customs Sensor Platforms Sensors Analysts Distribution Cells National Govt United Nations Tribal Govt Aid Workers Food Medicine Media Education Finance Institutions Finance Networks Account Holders Money Justice System Military Tribunals Modifiers Fear Loyalty Duty Org Visibility Coop Position Power Attention Enviro Mind Self-interest Asset Access Positions Info Mental State NOTE: This is not a FOM, further abstraction is required Classrooms Applications of CT Models Teach new concepts through exploration Training Exercises Rehearse actions in cross-functional teams Analysis Identify effective tactics & countermeasures Prediction Identify clues to future attacks 5

6 Conclusion Traditional physical combat simulations can not be modified to capture the entire domain of interest. Explorations with these tools will lead to known answers and brick walls We don t currently understand the problem well enough to create a simulation or a federation that can usefully represent it. It will require a combination of combat, information, political, cultural, financial, and legal sims to capture important details New objects, interactions, and object modifiers will have to be selected, discovered, and invented Counter-terrorism is this generation s Fulda Gap. It will be our primary focus for at least one decade. We should begin addressing the problem now 6