International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies. Real Time Evaluation. IFRC Response to the Syria Crisis FINAL REPORT

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1 International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies Real Time Evaluation IFRC Response to the Syria Crisis FINAL REPORT December Real Time Evaluation Team Simon Lawry-White, Team Leader Martina Schloffer

2 The IFRC s Planning and Evaluation Department is committed to upholding the IFRC Framework for Evaluation. The framework is designed to promote reliable, useful, ethical evaluations that contribute to organizational learning, accountability, and our mission to best serve those in need. It demonstrates the IFRC s commitment to transparency, providing a publicly accessible document to all stakeholders so that they may better understand and participate in the evaluation function. Planning and Evaluation department International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Case postale Genève 19 Suisse Tel: Fax: Disclaimer The opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect those of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the author(s). Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by the IFRC of the opinions expressed. ii

3 Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VI 1 INTRODUCTION 1 2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION RTE PURPOSE RTE QUESTIONS RTE COVERAGE RTE TIMING RTE MANAGEMENT 3 3 METHODOLOGY AND REPORT STRUCTURE METHODOLOGY LIMITATIONS REPORT STRUCTURE 4 4 FINDINGS SCALE OF THE IFRC RESPONSE IFRC APPEALS USE OF IFRC STANDARD HUMANITARIAN TOOLS THE MOVEMENT ADVISORY PLATFORM (MAP) IFRC SECRETARIAT-ICRC COOPERATION PNS FUNDING AND COORDINATION PNS BILATERAL FUNDING AND SUPPORT PNS CONSORTIA PNS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY GENDER AND GBV HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE IFRC CULTURE HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY REPORTING AND INFORMATION PRODUCTS MOVEMENT WIDE INITIATIVES MOVEMENT WIDE COMMUNICATIONS THE COMMON NARRATIVE MOVEMENT WIDE REPORTING 12 5 DISCUSSION MODELS OF IFRC SUPPORT APPLYING THE LEAD AGENCY CONCEPT SECRETARIAT MANAGEMENT OF THE SYRIA CRISIS RESPONSE SECRETARIAT ROLE DEFINITION RESOURCING FOR THE ZONE OFFICES REGIONAL VERSUS COUNTRY PLANNING AND APPEALS GLOBAL DISASTER RESPONSE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPS) MAINTAINING RESOURCES FOR THE SYRIA CRISIS RESPONSE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE AND PLANNING EXTERNAL COORDINATION 20 iii

4 6 CONCLUSIONS STRATEGIC DECISIONS FOR THE IFRC THE CRISIS RESPONSE HAS BEEN STRONG BUT VARIABLE IN SCALE CONFLICTING ASSUMPTIONS HAVE WEAKENED THE IFRC APPROACH THE MAP PROCESS IS IMPORTANT AND SHOULD BE SUPPORTED STRONGLY IFRC PLANNING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT THE IFRC NEEDS A WAY TO PREDICT RESPONSE CAPACITY PARTNER NATIONAL SOCIETY BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IS SET TO INCREASE RESOURCE MOBILISATION HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS BUT NEEDS TO ADJUST INNOVATIONS COMPARISONS WITH OTHER RTES 24 7 RECOMMENDATIONS COUNTRY SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS SYRIA CRISIS REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS PROMPTED BY THE RTE 29 ANNEX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE 30 ANNEX 2 DOCUMENTS CONSULTED 40 ANNEX 3 SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS 43 ANNEX 4 COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS - SYRIA 47 ANNEX 5 COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS - LEBANON 51 ANNEX 6 COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS JORDAN 54 ANNEX 7 COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS - TURKEY 57 ANNEX 8 RESOURCE MOBILISATION HISTORY 60 ANNEX 9 COMPETING MODELS OF FEDERATION RESPONSE 63 ANNEX 10 SECRETARIAT LEADERSHIP 66 ANNEX 11 - THE MOVEMENT ADVISORY PLATFORM (MAP) 68 ANNEX 12 PNS CONSORTIA 70 ANNEX 13 RAISING STANDARDS IN IFRC PLANNING 72 ANNEX 14 - THE OBSERVER ROLE OF THE FEDERATION 73 iv

5 Abbreviations and Key words ACAPS CBHFA CTP DREF ECHO EPOA ERU FACT Federation HNS HR IASC ICRC IFRC JRC KPI LRC MAP MENA NFI NGO NS OCAC OCHA PMER PNS P&R Region RCRC RDRT RTE SARC Secretariat (S)GBV SMCC SOP TOR TRC Assessment Capacities Project Community based Health and First Aid in action Cash transfer programme/ing Disaster Relief Emergency Fund European Community Humanitarian Office Emergency Plan of Action Emergency Response Unit Field Assessment and Coordination Team The Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies Host National Societies, i.e. the NS of countries affected by the Syria crisis Human Resources Inter-Agency Steering Committee International Committee of the Red Cross International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Jordan Red Crescent Key performance indicator Lebanon Red Cross Movement Advisory Platform Middle East and North Africa Non-Food Item Non-Governmental Organisation National Society Organizational Capacity Assessment and Certification United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Planning Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting Partner National Societies Principles and Rules of Humanitarian Assistance Refers to Syria and surrounding countries affected by the crisis Red Cross Red Crescent Regional Disaster Response Team Real Time Evaluation Syrian Arab Red Crescent The Secretariat of the Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (Sexual and) Gender Based Violence Strengthening Movement Cooperation and Coordination Standard Operating Procedure Terms of Reference Turkish Red Crescent (Turk Kizilayi) v

6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Context In October 2014, there were 6.5 million IDPs and 10.8 million people in need inside Syria, plus some 3 million registered refugees outside Syria, and many more unregistered. The armed conflict and displacement in Syria, together with the situation of Syrian refugees in surrounding countries, is the largest humanitarian crisis today and the most significant for at least the past decade. The crisis is not over. On the contrary it is deepening, while world media and donor attention have been drawn away to Ebola and other crises. The International Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) faces the challenge of keeping Syria high on the international agenda and continuing to mobilise resources. The RTE This Real Time Evaluation (RTE) of the IFRC response to the Syria crisis ( ) was commissioned by the USG for Programme Services at the IFRC Secretariat. The RTE comes almost three years into the crisis, much later than normal for an IFRC RTE 1, but still valid as a one of the evaluation tools applicable for use in a long running crisis. According to the TOR, the core questions for the RTE were: 1. How well did the IFRC secretariat coordinate its response internally and with other Red Cross Red Crescent Movement actors? 2. What were the challenges and opportunities of a multi-country (multi-zone) response? 3. How has the IFRC dealt with and learnt from a long-term, chronic crisis of this nature? The main focus of the evaluation is on the IFRC Secretariat, and on Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Syria, where the RTE team made visits. The Host National Societies in region 2, and the ICRC, were informants to the evaluation, rather than objects of the evaluation. The Response The extensive operation by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) inside Syria has given both itself and the Movement strong credibility for the crisis response as a whole. The SARC is reaching more than 3 million people each month, which still leaves perhaps the same number again without the assistance they need. The Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) has responded strongly and at scale to the needs of refugees in 23 camps, including reaching 250,000 people each month with e-card food assistance. Both SARC and TRC have major partnerships with UN organisations from which they receive substantial resources. Less than 10% of SARC crisis responses resources have come via the IFRC, while the equivalent figure for the TRC is 2%. In Lebanon and Jordan, medical, relief and cash assistance to refugees and local communities is more modest in scale but growing in both countries. Models of IFRC response The IFRC s Syria crisis response has been complicated by competing assumptions about how the IFRC as a whole should respond to the crisis. Some partners consider that the IFRC should maximise the response to the crisis, using capacity from across the RCRC network where there are opportunities to reach vulnerable people beyond the capacities of the Host 1 The norm is for IFRC RTE s i to be carried out within three months of disaster 2 Throughout this report, region refers to Syria plus neighbouring countries affected by the crisis in Syria. (It is not a reference to IFRC zones) vi

7 National Society (HNS). Others favour scaling the crisis response to fit the capacity of the HNS, while working at the same time to expand its response capacity gradually, and in line with the wishes of the HNS. The second model is the dominant one in the region, which is one of the main reasons for the relatively small scale RCRC response in Jordan and Lebanon. The adoption of the second model for the Syria crisis has profoundly affected the IFRC s response, influencing every aspect of how the HNS, IFRC Secretariat and PNS have responded, and may continue to affect the IFRC response into the future. The Secretariat has not succeeded in providing a middle way that respects the role of the HNS, while also delivering significant additional response capacity in parallel to the HNS, using the Secretariat and PNS resources. Resource Mobilisation Since 2012, the CHF110 million has been raised against three separate emergency appeals for Syria, Turkey, and Iraq-Jordan-Lebanon, out of a total of CHF187 million requested. Significant additional resources have come via bilateral channels but consolidated figures are not available. All predictions are of a tight funding environment for Meeting the Movement Advisory Platform commitment to a 50% expansion of activities across the Syria crisis response will be challenging and will need high quality funding proposals targeting both humanitarian and development funding sources, going well beyond the standard emergency appeal system. IFRC Response Tools Apart from the Appeals, only moderate use has been made of standard IFRC response tools. The field hospital for Azraq camp in Jordan has been the only ERU deployment, while nonstandard use has been made of other standard IFRC tools; Heads of Emergency Operations and Field Assessment and Coordination Teams. There was two DREF releases, one each for Armenia and Bulgaria. Otherwise, there was little call for the use of the standard IFRC response tools, which are, in any case, not well suited to the long-term chronic nature of the Syria crisis. Secretariat Decentralisation Previous IFRC evaluations have highlighted how the Secretariat decentralisation to Zone offices has not been implemented in a way that readily allows for the IFRC to mobilise its global network of national society resources in a coordinated response. This has again proved a challenge in the Syria crisis. Coordination between zone offices has been limited and it is likely that an over-reliance on zone offices to coordinate the global IFRC response has not led to the optimal use of either the Secretariat or PNS resources. Movement Advisory Platform The MAP has overseen coordination and cooperation for the Movement s response. Since 2012, it has held a series of largely ineffective meetings but has created a political momentum towards increasing Movement cooperation and communication. The MAP Steering Group is leading a process for the planning of the expansion of the overall response by 50% in 2015 and for the development of Movement-wide country plans, which could be an important step forward, with the potential to create a more coherent RCRC approach to the Syria crisis, and so the process should be well supported. vii

8 Summary Recommendations The RTE report provides three sets of recommendations, largely addressed to the Secretariat: 1) for the four countries reviewed, 2) for the Syria crisis response at a regional level, and 3) general recommendations drawn from the RTE, but not specific to the Syria response. Only the regional 3 recommendations are summarised below 4. Section 7 of the main report includes the full text of the regional recommendations, plus the country specific and general recommendations. 1. With regard to the Movement Advisory Panel process: a. IFRC Secretariat (with the ICRC) should provide high-level technical support to HNS to develop 3-year movement-wide country plans, in accordance with the decisions of the mini-map meeting of October b. The plans for, and progress of, the MAP process (including the Steering Group and mini-map) should be circulated more widely. c. The MAP process should conclude movement wide country plans by March 2015 and a regional chapeau by June The Secretariat should institute a series of measures to improve internal coordination, communication and support across the Syria crisis response, as follows: a. The Secretariat should improve its internal communication and coordination for the Syria crisis by, for example, instituting biweekly teleconferences for the Secretariat across the region, including HQ b. The Secretariat should convene a teleconference, perhaps every 6 weeks, for each country, at senior working level, with the individual HNS c. The MENA Zone office, with the Europe Zone office, should issue a written communication on the respective roles and responsibilities of the Syria team and Syria crisis team, to clarify how they relate to each other d. The Secretariat in Geneva should appoint one designated focal point for the Syria crisis e. The two Directors of Zone concerned should call for additional technical support from Geneva HQ, especially for those areas where they have no specialist f. By end April 2015, the two Directors of Zone should send a short progress report on this set of recommendations (a-e) directly to the Secretary-General. 3. As far as possible, the current MENA Zone strategic planning exercise should encompass: a. The development of a 3-5 year DM development strategy for the countries of the Zone. b. Developing greater clarity on the nature of the leadership the HNS and PNS expect from the Secretariat zone and country offices. c. How to maintain sufficient human resources to support the Syria crisis operation, while at the same time providing the rest of the Zone with the support it requires. d. Engagement of Geneva HQ on how to address the general under-resourcing of the Zone Office. 3 region and regional are used throughout the report to refer to Syria and neighbouring countries affected by the crisis in Syria. Region does not refer to Secretariat zones. 4 The Management Response to the evaluation should base itself on the text in Section 7, not the summary listed here viii

9 4. The IFRC, led by the Secretariat, should develop a regional resource mobilisation strategy for the medium term, adopting a resilience approach and seeking out development funding sources, not just traditional humanitarian donors. 5. Alongside the regional resource mobilisation strategy, each country in the region should develop, with technical support, a mobilisation plan to raise resources incountry, via embassies, local donor representation, UN agencies and the private sector. 6. The Secretariat should ensure that IFRC participation in inter-agency fora is more regular and is equipped to exert greater influence, strengthen the perception of the RCRC role and relevance, and learn from the situation analysis and strategies of other actors. 7. The Secretariat should build on current good practices to reflect bilateral plans and contributions in the EPOA and the Emergency Appeal. 8. It is proposed that the ICRC Director-General and the IFRC Secretary-General send internal communications to their staff in the region, spelling out their intent for closer cooperation between the organisations, and highlighting particular areas where cooperation is to be strengthened. 9. Working with Secretariat HQ, the zone offices should invite PNS (traditional and non-traditional) to provide or fund senior technical support for the following: e. Movement wide country plans, in line with the on-going MAP process f. A Syria region resource mobilisation strategy, and country strategies g. An Humanitarian Diplomacy Strategy, building on the work already done in devising the Movement Communications Strategy. 10. The Secretariat should convene the HNS at operational level, to share practical lessons (as proposed by SARC). The Secretariat should first test the interest level of the NS concerned. ix

10 1 Introduction The conflict in Syria continues with no end in sight. The situation of armed conflict and displacement in Syria, together with the situation of Syrian refugees living in surrounding countries, is the largest humanitarian crisis today and the most significant for at least the past decade. It is estimated that more than 200,000 people have been killed. The crisis is not over; on the contrary, it is deepening and humanitarian needs are increasing in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq. The numbers of displaced, both IDPs and refugees, is growing, increasing the burden on states and on host communities. In Syria, food supplies, hospitals and medical centres, water and power supply, schools and livelihoods have been destroyed. People suffer psychological harm from bereavement and the effects of the unpredictable and volatile security situation. Humanitarian actors and donor governments for ways to maintain humanitarian assistance to the affected communities but financial resources are stretched as more recent crises take the headlines, especially Ebola, but also other crises (Libya, Iraq, Gaza, South Sudan etc.). National Societies of the countries affected have been responding from the beginning of the crisis. The IFRC Secretariat has been supporting NS in both Europe and MENA zones. The first appeal responding to the emerging crisis was for the MENA Civil Unrest operation from July Further appeals in support to SARC and the NS in neighbouring countries were launched in According to the UN, at the time of writing, there were 6.5 million IDPs and 10.8 million people in need inside Syria, plus some 3 million registered refugees outside Syria 5. As coping strategies are exhausted and resentment against the long-term stay of refugees grows in the neighbouring countries, the chances of inter-community tension grow. Domestic economies are under strain. The drivers of resentment against refuges are common across the hosting countries; increased competition for jobs, depressed wages, higher rents and shortages in housing 6. Even though, governments and the humanitarian community, including the IFRC, have mounted very large relief operations, there are gaps in provision in all four countries reviewed by the evaluation team. 2 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation 2.1 RTE Purpose According to the TOR, the purpose of RTE is as follows: This real time evaluation (RTE) will assess aspects of the IFRC s response to the Syria Crisis. It will inform the on-going support to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) operations in Syria and the support to operations in the surrounding countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. As with other RTEs, the evaluation will also inform future global emergency response operations and approaches. Particular 5 The RTE team was informed in all countries visited that the actual number of refugees is much higher, though precise figures are not available. For example, while there are just over 1 million Syrians accorded temporary protection in Turkey, the Red Crescent puts the number at nearer 1.5 million. Syrians without valid passports cannot be registered. 6 based on Dialogue and local response mechanisms to conflict between host communities and Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Search for Common Ground, May

11 emphasis will be placed on looking at the opportunities and challenges in such a complex Movement response over an extended time period, and how Movement coordination / cooperation can be best applied to provide flexible and optimal support to the National Societies involved. The RTE will also be asked to scope out future directions and opportunities for the on-going response and contingency planning. The individual Host National Societies in region affected, and the ICRC, were not the target of the RTE. They are informants to the evaluation, rather than objects of the evaluation. While this RTE is being undertaken during an on-going emergency rather than in response to a sudden onset crisis, the purpose of providing real time feedback to the on-going operation remains the same. The RTE is formative and aims to contribute to the strengthening of the response to the on-going crisis in the short to medium term, as well as providing lessons for future responses. 2.2 RTE Questions According to the TOR, the core, high-level questions for the RTE were: 1. How well did the IFRC secretariat coordinate its response internally and with other Red Cross Red Crescent Movement actors? 2. What were the challenges and opportunities of a multi-country (multi-zone) response? 3. How has the IFRC dealt with and learnt from a long-term, chronic crisis of this nature? 2.3 RTE Coverage Geographically, the evaluation has focused on the countries visited: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The TOR asked for Iraq to be covered as well (without a visit) but this has not been achieved. Given the very rapidly evolving situation in Iraq 7, the RTE might have been less relevant there, in any case. The RTE covered the period July 2012 to present day 8, taking account of the RTE of the MENA Civil Unrest operation that preceded it. A timeline of events has been included in the new emergency appeals for some countries but the RTE team has not had sufficient resources to develop a complete timeline of events from the start of the crisis for all countries. Instead, it has focused on the situation as is, on proposals for the future of the Syria crisis operations, and on lessons for IFRC crisis response for the long term RTE Timing This Real Time Evaluation was carried out between mid September and mid November The Secretariat has been trying to commission this RTE for more than a year. It has been subject to a number of delays, including difficulty in agreeing the Terms of Reference. Despite this, for a number of reasons, the timing of the RTE is opportune because: The Movement Advisory Platform process has started to address practically the development of Movement-wide country plans for the countries of the region, which the RTE may be able to inform 7 A visit to Iraq was excluded from the outset. Information gathered on Iraq is very limited. The Federation Representative for Iraq was interviewed. 8 Several interviewees have asked why the RTE has taken place more than two years into the current operations, given that according to the IFRC guidance it should take place a few months in. The guidance could usefully be modified, as there is no set timing for a RTE. As long as an RTE can provide useful feedback in real time, it can be carried out at any phase of an operation. 9 The RTE team requested support from the Secretariat to plot trends of funding and to summarise data on RCRC accomplishments in the Syria crisis but this was not available. 2

12 HNS are interested to increase their engagement with Movement partners, which was not the case for all at the beginning of the crisis The RTE can inform the new Secretary-General s decision-making concerning IFRC disaster management for major crises, including conflict situations The Strengthening Movement Cooperation and Coordination (SMCC) process due to conclude in 2015 will hopefully be informed by the RTE The new spirit of cooperation developing between the IFRC Secretariat and the ICRC can hopefully be strengthened by the RTE On the down side, the RTE comes too late to influence the first versions of the new IFRC appeals for Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, but it can still inform the revision of the Syria Complex Emergency Appeal due at the end of RTE Management The RTE was commissioned by Secretariat Under Secretary-General for Programme Services. An Evaluation Management Team, comprising members of the Geneva Secretariat and Europe and MENA Zone offices, oversaw the management of the evaluation. 3 Methodology and Report Structure 3.1 Methodology The RTE methodology has included: Inception Phase. An inception report was finalised on September , building on the Terms of Reference, setting out the process and timetable for the RTE, following the first RTE team visit to Geneva and a teleconference of the Evaluation Management Team. Document review. A comprehensive set of background documents was assembled to inform the evaluation, much of which has been studied by the RTE team. A schedule of documents consulted is included as Annex 2. Data. The RTE has included a review of financial data in particular on the appeals and with regard to levels of funding versus requests and which donors have been most prominent. Where possible, data on outputs has been triangulated against perceptions of progress made in the operations. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). In all, 120 interviews were conducted with the Secretariat HQ, zone offices, country delegations, with the four HNS in countries visited, with 12 PNS at HQ, regional and country levels, with the ICRC at HQ and country level, and with UN partners in-country and in Geneva. Government officials of the countries affected, NGOs, and other external commentators were not interviewed. Interview guides were developed for the KIIs and included in the inception report. A list of those interviewed is included in Annex 3. Field visits. The evaluation team undertook field visits of between 2-4 days each to Amman, Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus. The RTE team did not travel beyond the capital cities 10 and there was no interaction with beneficiaries. On-line survey. An online survey was developed and issued to PNS, as it was not possible to interview all those that had contributed to the Appeals. However, only 12 out of 40 responses were received, and the responses have been used in the general analysis without generating a separate analysis of the survey results. Feedback and Consultation. The RTE team provided only limited feedback on its preliminary observations in the countries visited, due to time constraints, more limited than the team would have liked. 10 which, in any event, would not have been possible in Syria and Turkey. 3

13 3.2 Limitations The RTE has been subject to certain limitations: The evaluation team was only two instead of the planned 3-4 team members The budget for the RTE was inadequate for a multi-country evaluation of this complexity and importance. Individual country situations have been analysed sufficiently to draw general lessons for the IFRC but not to the accuracy and depth that country based readers will be anticipating and the recommendations for individual countries may have missed important topics. Given the multi-country nature of the evaluation, the RTE has little hard data about the quality or success of individual programmes. Where there was a consensus about successes or failures of particular interventions, these are highlighted. From the outset, it became clear that the evaluation was politically sensitive within and beyond the Secretariat. The strong feelings and contradictory narratives have left the RTE team with few obvious points of consensus from which to form clear judgements. The report aims to be constructive and forward looking. 3.3 Report Structure In order for the main report to keep within the designated 10,000 words for the main report, important material has been included in the Annexes, including a summary analysis for each of the four countries Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (see Annexes 4-7). Section 7 of the main text includes country-specific recommendations. Other Annexes of material significance to the evaluation include: Annex 8 Resource Mobilisation Annex 9 Competing Models of IFRC Response Annex 10 Secretariat Leadership Annex 11 The Movement Advisory Platform Annex 12 PNS Consortia Annex 13 Raising standards in IFRC Planning Annex 14 The Observer role of the IFRC 4 Findings 4.1 Scale of the IFRC Response The scale of the RCRC response in Syria and Turkey has been in the same order of magnitude as the humanitarian needs generated by the crisis. At the same time, in both countries there are considerable needs not being met. In Turkey, the TRC has largely focused on large-scale assistance to refugees, in line with its designated role under national disaster law, In Jordan and Lebanon, the IFRC response has been smaller and not on the same scale as the needs, but the response is expanding gradually in both countries. The capacity of these National Societies was quite well understood by the IFRC Secretariat and by those PNS with a long-term presence in the country. That the JRC and LRC would be in a position to mount relatively small operations should have been understood from the outset. There are constraints to scaling up RCRC response in the countries of the region: Auxiliary role. As auxiliaries to government, some NS are given specific roles to play by government beyond which they cannot go, unless they advocate for an expanded role, with or without Secretariat support The evaluation team did not meet with host government departments, so no further detail is available on this point 4

14 Security. Security risks are very high in parts of Syria and front lines are shifting and multiplying. In Lebanon, the equilibrium is being disrupted by violence in some parts of the north and east of the country. Resourcing. The IFRC appeals have been underfunded, meaning that activities and human resources are below the levels planned. 4.2 IFRC Appeals (See Annex 8 for further discussion) The IFRC launched three appeals for the Syria crisis, as follows: Syria Complex Emergency; the Appeal total stands at CHF 97 million and is 75% covered Turkey Population Movement; the Appeal total stands at CHF 41 million, including bilateral contributions, and is 87% covered. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon Population Movement; the Appeal stood at CHF 49 million including bilateral contributions, and was 37% covered before it was divided into three separate country appeals. 4.3 Use of IFRC standard humanitarian tools Apart from IFRC Emergency Appeals, the standard IFRC response tools have been little used during the Syria crisis. Where they have been, it has generally been in non-standard ways. Only one Emergency Response Unit (ERU) has been deployed, the field hospital in Azraq camp in Jordan. From early on, it was clear that the hospital would not follow standard procedures and would stay for much longer than the standard 4 months. It was re-designated as a district hospital by the Consortium managing the ERU deployment. The FACT deployment to Jordan early 2013 to support JRC in the feasibility of establishing the Hallabat Camp for Syrian Refugees in Jordan was given a nonstandard and narrow remit. All three HQ based Heads of Operations (HEOps) were deployed during the crisis, some more than once, but did not have the coordination of the Federation international support to the operations, as per their standard TOR. The IFRC Emergency Appeal system has been well used during this crisis. The appeals have been somewhat underfunded, yet, by the time of the RTE, they had mobilised a total of over CHF110 million. In the evaluation period, two disbursements were made from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF). In October 2013, CHF 172,726 was allocated to the Bulgarian RC to respond to the needs of 1,500 mostly Syrian asylum seekers. In January 2014, the Armenian RC received CHF 138,746 for winterization support for 1,000 Syrian Armenian refugees. The nature and evolution of the emergency is part of the explanation for the limited and nonstandard use of standard tools. The long-term nature of the crisis does not match well with the short-term nature of the standard response tools. ERUs would not, in any case, fit well with the regional approach of the IFRC, which has been to work exclusively through the developing capacities of the HNS. The ERU hospital in Azraq, Jordan, responded to a request from the JRC and the Government for a hospital deployment. UNHCR supported the offer to ensure the secondary health facility services in the camp. Otherwise, ERUs were not requested by HNS and therefore fell outside the scope of the response planning. 4.4 The Movement Advisory Platform (MAP) (See Annex 11 for further discussion). Since December 2012, there has been a series of Movement conferences for Movement partners to discuss the Syria crisis response, under the heading of the Movement Advisory 5

15 Platform (MAP). The consensus amongst interviewees is that these meetings have been generally ineffective because they were too big and not well enough prepared. However, the MAP has created political momentum for a Movement wide approach to the Syria crisis that could yet produce results. The MAP meeting in May 2014 in Beirut agreed to an expansion of 50% in Movement activities for the Syria crisis and established a Steering Group, which in turn organised a mini-map meeting in Geneva in October The mini-map agreed that 12 : Movement wide country plans should be developed for Syria and each of the neighbouring countries 13 by early 2015, with a further mini-map meeting to be held in Q The format of the plans will be tailored to country context as needed. MENA Zone Office and ICRC Beirut are to develop Terms of Reference for resource person(s) who will be made available by IFRC/ICRC to support the National Society in the development of country plans. A further attempt will be made to advance Movement-wide reporting, taking Lebanon as a model. The need for results based planning and movement wide reporting was acknowledged by the participants. The Movement Communications Strategy was given renewed impetus. The MAP process, including the development of country plans and a regional chapeau to those plans, represents a major opportunity that should not be lost. Well managed, the MAP process could provide improved planning and strategy for the Syria crisis over a 3 year term, a cogent set of plans for response across the Movement, and a consensus on the way forward between HQ, region and country levels. The Emergency Plans of Action underpinning the new country appeals for Lebanon and Jordan show a more coordinated approach between Movement partners, which is a promising start towards the development of country plans. Reducing the size of the MAP meetings for planning purposes is sensible but the process has become rather too closed. Communications before the mini-map were kept to a tight circle, such that most stakeholders had no idea what was taking place. From here on, even if MAP participation is limited, the process itself needs much better and wider communication across Movement actors to make sure the process and outcomes envisaged are understood, and all partners are consulted and take ownership of the results. 4.5 IFRC Secretariat-ICRC Cooperation The two organisations are making genuine efforts to improve movement cooperation, and this is bearing some fruit in the Syria crisis response, even if both organisations find the engagement challenging. At working level, there is practical cooperation between the two organisations concerning the Syria crisis in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. At management level, interaction is less consistent. At the same time, some interviews showed how old prejudices persist, with typical comments being the ICRC just wants to take over, from the Secretariat and in the end we have to do it (capacity building) because the Federation won t deliver from the ICRC. If the heads of the two organisations were able to communicate more clearly their intent to cooperate more closely, and the shape this cooperation will take, this would help to strengthen cooperation at field level. 12 based on verbal feedback from the meeting. The minutes of the meeting may not be published before the RTE report is finalized. 13 National Societies of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt, plus the Palestinian Red Crescent 6

16 In Syria, according to the tripartite agreement of 2012, ICRC is the primary operational partner of the SARC. The ICRC therefore has expressed its disapproval to the IFRC of its having a large operation 14 and objected in particular to the large food component of the IFRC appeal for Syria, which has been an irritant in ICRC-IFRC relations in Syria. (See also Annex 4). 4.6 PNS Funding and Coordination PNS Bilateral funding and support In the Syria crisis, multilateral support via the IFRC Appeals has lost ground as more PNS have taken the bilateral funding route 15. Significant resources have been provided via bilateral channels but consolidated figures are not available. A cost benefit analysis of bilateral versus multilateral funding is beyond the scope of the RTE. What is evident, however, is that the many PNS perceive advantages 16 in the bilateral approach, compared with multilateral funding, including: Better attention to back-donor requirements regarding reporting, accounting, and audit Lower overhead costs than working via the Secretariat 17 Greater confidence in more timely implementation. Greater PNS visibility The IFRC Appeal still offers the preferred route for funding where the PNS has no presence 18, by choice or by the decision of the HNS, and the Secretariat can provide a measure of oversight and reporting for their funds, or support the HNS in performing its accountability functions. The Secretariat has been successful in this role in Syria, Turkey and in the Jordan Cash Transfer Programme. PNS are ready to pay the charges levied by the Secretariat where the Appeal is the best, or only, funding channel. The PNS that traditionally support the multilateral approach stated that if the Secretariat were more effective in their view, they would pass more funds through the IFRC Appeal. The Secretariat response is that if more funds went via the Appeal, it could be more effective. This circular, and old, argument can only be broken by the Secretariat generating quality products, in particular, emergency needs assessments, plans, appeals, and reports, and taking a more proactive stance in coordination, in order to win back confidence. Whatever the advantages for the PNS, bilateral support can also increase the burden on HNS as the Lebanon case illustrates par excellence, with 16 PNS present in one country. (See also Annex 5) PNS Consortia (See Annex 12 for further discussion) The concept of the PNS consortium is not new. The Syria crisis response has given rise to a number of PNS consortia, in various forms, including: 14 IFRC and ICRC appeals for Syria were broadly similar in scale in For some PNS, bilateralism is the only route, as their back-donors do not accept accountability via Federation reporting. 16 Beyond the remit of the RTE, a cost analysis of bilateral versus multilateral funding, including the role of PNS consortia, could be a valuable addition to the current SMCC process. 17 Avoiding the Secretariat 6.5% Programme and Services Support Recovery (PSSR) is an important factor in PNS preferring bilateral funding. 18 Bilateral assistance can also be provided where the PNS has no presence, eg German and Netherlands RC support to the Turkish RC 7

17 The Norwegian and German RCs formed a close partnership for their work with SARC. With a joint representative in-country and a limited number of delegates, the two NS have combined their considerable bilateral funding into one programme with SARC. The Hospital Consortium of four PNS (Finnish, German, Norwegian and Canadian RC) was assembled to provide sufficient capacity to provide a hospital for 130,000 people. The Finnish RC signed the ECHO contract and is the sole partner responsible to ECHO 19. In 2013, the Secretariat was asked to take the lead in coordinating an ECHO application for the neighbouring countries and to act as contracting partner for ECHO but this did not go forward 20 and the French RC took on the leadership of the consortium. Within Syria, the Danish RC took the lead of the Danish RC, German RC, Norwegian and Federation consortium. In other less visible PNS consortia, silent partners are adding their funds into other bilateral NS projects, such as Austrian RC adding funds to the Swiss RC CTP investment in Jordan and to the Netherlands RC programming in Lebanon. The trend towards consortia, as a modified form of bilateral funding, is significant and can be seen as the PNS re-inventing multilateral programming as an alternative to the IFRC Appeal. Some PNS would prefer to fund via a more effective, but less costly, Secretariat PNS from the Middle East For the Syria crisis, PNS from the wider region have made a substantial contribution to the RCRC response. The Iraqi RC is implementing a US$10 million programme in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in favour of Syrian Refugees and IDPs, in cooperation with the respective HNS. The Qatari RC is providing assistance in northern Syria and health and psychological services in Jordan, and is active in cross border operations from southern Turkey. The Kuwait RC is working in Lebanon and Jordan, and has contributed to the Turkey appeal. The United Arab Emirates RC runs a refugee camp in Al Halabat, Jordan, with UNHCR. The financial investment of Kuwaiti RC and UAE RC is reported to be considerable but information is not available. Some of these interventions are not fully coordinated with the respective HNS. An attempt was made to set up a Gulf Forum, supported by the IFRC Regional Representative, but this did not come about. The Secretariat has engaged a consultant to develop a strategy for engaging more fully with the NS from the Gulf. This should be a priority for the Federation given the potential for greater financial assistance and for more cooperation between the Gulf NS. 4.7 Security Security management emerged as a specific concern during the evaluation. For Syria and Lebanon, responsibilities for security management lie somewhere between the HNS, that is leading on security, with the IFRC and ICRC sharing responsibility in some way. Some countries did not appear to have written roles and responsibilities for security. The limited 19 ECHO is a key donor for support to the Syria crisis response. It wants to see one application from the RCRC per crisis, not several, which has driven to some extent to move to consortia 20 This did not work as the Secretariat was not ready to reduce its 6.5% PSSR share (which would have left 0.5% for the PNS from the 7% overhead allowed by ECHO). For ECHO funding, if the Federation is not the leader of the consortium, the PNS lose the benefit of the Federation being regarded as an International Organisation by the EU, which brings with it simpler reporting requirements. 8

18 number of delegates in Syria is in part due to Geneva HQ concerns about security, whose security advisers are not satisfied with security arrangements for Syria, in particular 21. For Lebanon, a country not in conflict but still not stable and presenting security risks, the security setup is also unclear. The MENA zone security advisor, though working in a zonal responsibility, is personally tracking the field trips of IFRC and PNS delegates within Lebanon and to and from Syria. Past and present delegates raised concerns about the lack of a more formalized security system. Even though the IFRC has written security procedures, PNS delegates have come up with work-around solutions (joining an NGO security network and/or the security umbrella provided by their own embassies). They seemed unaware of the IFRC evacuation procedures. The currently blurred roles of LRC, IFRC Secretariat and the ICRC need to be clarified and measures introduced for delegates to conform to security measures, which seem to be treated too casually at the moment. 4.8 Gender and GBV Gender issues receive limited attention in IFRC planning documents and reports. and was only mentioned occasionally in interviews conducted for the RTE. This is somewhat in contrast to the 2011 MENA Civil Unrest RTE, which was positive about the handling of gender issues, at least for Tunisia. The fact that there is no longer a gender advisor in the MENA zone office may be a contributing factor to the relative absence of gender analysis or programming. There are some positive examples however. The current IFRC appeal for Syria contains the provision of women s emergency kits in Syria, as will the revised appeal for 2015, with distribution by CBHFA volunteers, trained on GBV and reproductive health messages. PNS bilateral assistance for Turkey is includes hygiene kits. Gender is reportedly being addressed as a cross cutting issue in the Cash Transfer Programme in Jordan and in the CBHFA programme, where the Secretariat and the JRC decided to recruit a gender balance cadre of volunteers for the CBHFA programme. Gender focal points for the offices are members of a MENA Gender Network. While the MENA Zone has no gender advisor, a senior officer continues to act. Seminars/workshops conducted on gender related issues. However, attention to gender is not consistent across the various country operations. Measures to address Gender Based Violence (GBV) are hard to identify in IFRC appeals and reports, while external reports make it clear that GBV is major issue in the crisis 22. In Jordan, funding has been allocated to GBV training, under CBHFA 23. The latest EPOA for Lebanon makes reference to SGBV and intimate partner violence but includes no strategies to address it. Overall there is little action on GBV. 4.9 Human Resources and the IFRC Culture The RTE team noted that a proportion of Secretariat zone and country based international staff are on short contracts, sometimes as little as a few months. Short-term appointments, and gaps in filling posts reduce the effectiveness of the Secretariat s engagement with the long- 21 No particular observations were made concerning security arrangements in Turkey. Security risks appear to be lower than in Lebanon and Jordan but were reported to be increasing. Currently IFRC has only one delegate in country. If this presence were increase, a separate security assessment would be justified. Superficially, security arrangements at the office buildings visited in Ankara were generally more stringent than those in the other capital cities visited 22 see for example, Intimate partner violence, threat of sexual violence, early marriage and survival sex are identified by adult women and adolescent girls as the main forms of violence currently experienced by women and girls since arriving in Lebanon. 23 The IFRC defines violence as: the use of force or power, either as an action or omission in any setting, threatened, perceived or actual against oneself, another person, a group, a community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in death, physical injury, psychological or emotional harm, mal-development or deprivation. 9

19 term crisis, and the long-term capacity development approach the Secretariat is pursuing with the HNS requires delegates to be in post for an extended period in order to build credibility and trust. Delegates also require fuller technical briefings and handover than they typically receive. The RTE team was struck by how much the morale of interviewees varied from being energised by particular interventions on one hand, to disempowered and disappointed that the Secretariat had not lived up to the challenge of the Syria crisis, on the other. Both the PNS and HNS observed that the quality of Secretariat staff/delegates was very variable. The HNS are only interested in receiving more delegates with high levels of technical skill and experience, with an appropriate, culturally attuned attitude. Representing the IFRC and managing the relationship with NS that allows the IFRC to support but also influence in a tactful, constructive way requires wisdom, interpersonal skills, and knowledge of the RCRC at a high level. As the crisis continues for several years to come, the IFRC will need to continue to look across its networks to ensure a continuity of quality leadership that can manage these relationships. There is also a case for better codification and training for how to manage the IFRC representative HNS senior leadership relationship, which is perhaps, the critical IFRC-HNS relationship Humanitarian Diplomacy The goals of the IFRC s Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) Policy include influencing decision makers to address the interests of vulnerable people and maintaining the public visibility of the RCRC 24. To boost its effort in HD, the MENA Zone recently appointed an HD coordinator into the Syria crisis team. According to the Job Description, the purpose of the position is to ensure greater value to membership and enhance Red Cross Red Crescent coordinated response in a complex operation. The highly sensitive environment in and around Syria places restrictions on what public statements from the RCRC can say, in order to avoid compromising the HNS, or its beneficiaries and volunteers. Even so, the IFRC and the ICRC have been active in increasing the visibility of the RCRC and, in particular, promoting the neutral role of the SARC in the Syria crisis, using press releases and other briefings, which has been seen as successful both internally and by UN partners. A number of PNS have been very active in promoting the Syria crisis at home, and have raised its public profile and funds. The SARC would like to see the IFRC play a more intensive and strategically planned role in Humanitarian Diplomacy. Overall, the IFRC has placed more emphasis on the Movement actors and less on promoting the interests of the 13 million people made vulnerable by the crisis, which should become the core of the communications strategy from here on Reporting and Information products In response to demands for up-to-date information on the progress and impact of response activities, challenges and opportunities experienced in the field, the MENA Zone have developed a number of information products in addition to the regular Operations Updates, including Facts and Figures, key messages, Who does What Where and When (4Ws), and 24 The six HD goals of the HD policy are: 1) More frequent consideration by decision makers and opinion leaders of the interests of vulnerable people; 2) Greater access to and influence with decision makers; 3) Greater humanitarian access and space for National Societies and the International Federation; 4) Strong visibility for and public understanding of Red Cross and Red Crescent activities; 5) Stronger capacity to mobilise all relevant resources; and 6) facilitation of effective partnerships when responding to the needs of the vulnerable. 10

20 infographic presentation of an overview of the Movement s response in MENA Zone, plus Turkey. MENA Zone office is unique amongst zone offices in having an information management officer and has made a significant effort to improve the presentation of information from the Syria crisis countries. For Syria, information is collected from SARC information management officers and consolidated into monthly reports by SARC. This information contains data on IFRC supported items as well as data from all other SARC partner agencies. For the other countries, the respective reporting delegates compile reports using information from the NS. Some NS and IFRC country offices expressed concern that information they provide can get stuck at zone level and may only appear in reports well after it is useful, sometimes months later. Operations Updates as a standard are only produced quarterly, and by start December 2014 the latest 4Ws infographic on the IFRC Syria-crisis site covered data from January to April. The Secretariat is aware that more needs to done to improve the timeliness and regularity of data. Users of the infographics find their presentation eye-catching and useful to a point. They also said that they need more management information on trends, developments and obstacles. One Geneva based interviewee stated that, in the absence of a technical counterpart in the MENA Zone office, technical updates had to be taken from public Operations Updates Movement Wide Initiatives Movement Wide Communications After a slow start, communicators from across the Movement have made a considerable effort to improve the RCRC communication on the Syria Crisis, resulting in a Joint Movement Communication Strategy for the Syria Crisis adopted in November Alongside the strategic and tactical objectives 25, the strategy aims to increase the joint production of written, audio-visual and other public communication materials and on joint activities. Progress has not been achieved without challenges, firstly to change perspective from focusing on RCRC positioning to the issues of the affected population. This in turn requires data on the needs of the population. In a progress report on Syria crisis communications to the MAP meeting in Beirut 2013, a series of challenges was listed, amongst them the requirement to improve communications and data gathering capacities within the NS, harmonizing and improving data collection and statistics from Movement components and improved common analyses and positions on key humanitarian issues of shared concern. The HNS in the region have not been used to generating such analysis. Much of the communications strategy remains to be implemented. The segmentation of different audiences, the messages they are to receive, how they will be reached, and by whom is not well developed. This would be a valuable addition to the IFRC s forward planning for the Syria crisis at a time when public interest and funding are at risk of flagging. A further advance in Movement wide communication has taken place with the recent launch of the website, which aims to reflect the contributions of all Movement actors to the Syria crisis response Increase public awareness of the humanitarian impact of the Syria crisis. 2. Position the Movement as the leading and most effective humanitarian responder to the crisis. 3. Enhance the Movement s influence on unimpeded and safe access to those most in need. 4. Develop the Movement s communication and advocacy around the increasing humanitarian needs of Syrians who have fled Syria and their host communities. 5. Project an external image of a strong, united and global humanitarian movement speaking with one voice. 11

21 The Common Narrative The MAP meeting of December 2012 established a small working group of IFRC Secretariat, ICRC, Netherlands and German RC representatives to work on the development of the paper for a Common Narrative. The Syria crisis common narrative was one of the first joint communications on the priorities, focus and activities of the Movement to a specific crisis 26 in recent years. The narrative aimed to capture the totality of all Movement actors in each country. The first issue of the common narrative was published in July 2013, and with some difficulty. Figures to be included had to be negotiated, and it was not possible to agree text on operations strategies or advocacy messages beyond the need for recognition of the unique role of the Movement, with consequent delays in publication 27. There have been only two updates to the common narrative since the original. RTE informants supported the idea of a common narrative but found its practical value limited because information was not kept up to date Movement wide reporting To construct an overview and improve communication of the Movement s overall response to the Syria Crisis, the MAP decided to introduce Movement wide reporting. While IFRC-wide reporting has been adopted for other contexts (Haiti), the joint effort with the ICRC, and the multi-country nature of the reporting are new elements. There has been limited success in Movement wide reporting. One of the challenges has been to give due acknowledgement to the individual parties within a document which reports achievements only at Movement wide level. The recent mini-map meeting decided to revive the concept using Lebanon as a pilot. While the concept paper behind movement-wide reporting focused on the agreement of common indicators, movement wide reporting is only likely to become consistent when it has to report on movement-wide goals and targets. The partners will only have sufficient incentive to contribute information to the corporate progress when there are jointly held objectives to work towards. These do not yet exist but should be made to emerge from the MAP-led movement wide country planning process. The MENA Zone 4Ws database provides a detailed mapping of activities of all movement partners, except ICRC, and has been used as the source for the 4Ws-infographic mentioned above. The value this vast collection of information is reduced because it is not complete, and in any case, the 4W process does not ask for financial data, which would be required for the most meaningful reporting of movement wide activity. 5 Discussion 5.1 Models of IFRC Support (See Annex 9 for further discussion) A dominating feature of the Syria crisis response, and the part played in it by the Secretariat, are competing sets of assumptions about how the IFRC as whole should respond to the crisis. There are strong differences of opinion about the approach to be taken within and between HNS, PNS, and the Secretariat. 26 The common narrative covers Syria and the surrounding countries. 27 By the time of this evaluation the latest issue of the common narrative (March 2014) was more than 6 months old (of March 2014). 12

22 In the first model, all parts of the Movement are mobilised to mount a response that comes as close as possible to meeting the humanitarian needs of the populations affected, in those sectors in which the IFRC is competent. The end goal is the maximum assistance to the maximum number of people affected, in coordination with other actors, leading to an exit when needs decline. (In conflict settings, ICRC would coordinate any PNS contributions in cooperation with the HNS). In the second model, National Society capacity and intentions determine the IFRC response. Parallel responses mounted by other actors of the IFRC are not considered and are not seen as appropriate. The IFRC response is scaled to fit within the capacity of the HNS, while, as far as possible, working to expand the response capacity of HNS, according to the wishes of HNS leadership. The end goal is gradual, sustainable growth in HNS capacity, including for the crisis response. In reality, no part of the IFRC engaged in the Syria crisis is working purely to one model or the other. However, the clear emphasis is on the second of the two models, which has profoundly affected many aspects of how the HNS, IFRC Secretariat and PNS have responded, and will affect the IFRC response into the future. The table below illustrates the key differences in the two approaches Function Required for an at scale response? Required for response based on HNS capacity? Country-wide, multi sector needs assessment Yes No Analysis of driving forces behind the conflict Yes No Overarching strategic RCRC approach Yes No Mapping of other organisation activities and resources Yes No Analysis of service gaps Yes At local level Determination of RCRC competence to close gaps Yes Limited Coordination with organisations in same sectors Yes Partial Reporting of gaps Yes No Regional strategy for RCRC response Yes No HNS lead strategy Advocacy with government Yes No Advocacy with HCT Yes No 5.2 Applying the Lead Agency Concept While the Seville Agreement of 1997 represented a major step forward in delineating the Movement Lead Agency for conflicts and major disasters, the simple delineation of roles between the IFRC and the ICRC for whole countries has been modified for a number of cases, especially where the emergency is part conflict, part disaster (eg Pakistan, Philippines). Where no Lead Agency has been designated, for example, in Lebanon, but conflict pertains in parts of the country, the ICRC and IFRC take on different tasks. The Syria crisis has tested the SA/SM 28 ; We are in uncharted waters. With regard to the conflict in Syria, the SARC is formally the Lead Agency, in part because of the government decision to give SARC responsibility for the oversight of all foreign assistance. In the neighbouring countries, the HNS have the lead by default. The ICRC carries out activities according to its mandate, and provides significant financial and technical support to the SARC, LRC and JRC to increase their response capacity, which overlaps with the IFRC s capacity building activities. 28 Seville Agreement and its Supplementary Measures 13

23 As a result, the clean delineation of roles set out in SA/SM has not been applied, and there has been considerable discussion, some of it uneasy, between Movement partners about who should be doing what. For some RTE informants, Seville is dead and it is time to pilot new creative alternatives, or interpretations of the SA/SM. However, the SA/SM remain in force until the current SMCC process determines whether and how to change them. Whatever the delineation of roles on paper, for the Syria crisis, the political reality is that the HNS are in control (or sovereign ) and act according to their preferences, within the mandates designated to them in their auxiliary role to governments, and the resources available. 5.3 Secretariat management of the Syria Crisis response The RTE received widespread positive comment about the contribution of the Secretariat, in partnership with PNS, in assisting SARC to develop its capacity, both before and during the Syria crisis response. The SARC itself sees the Secretariat as a close partner, while also acknowledging the major support of the ICRC. At the same time, many interviewees expressed concern that that the IFRC Secretariat did not move quickly enough to offer some organising framework for the various parts of the IFRC membership to work together in support of the various HNS. The capacity of the MENA Zone office to manage the Syria crisis operations has grown considerably in recent months, as it has added the so-called 'Syria Crisis team', expanded the 'Syria team'; and added a Lebanon Operations Manager position from June this year 29. (See Figure 1 below). The RTE team found some confusion within and beyond these teams on the respective roles and responsibilities of the Syria team and Syria crisis team 30. The MENA Zone office should issue a written communication on the respective roles and responsibilities of the Syria team and Syria crisis team, to clarify how they relate to each other, if it has not already done so. The need to strengthen the structure has been evident for at least the last 18 months and it is difficult to unpick the precise reasons for the delay in doing, given the varying narratives on the matter, but they lie somewhere between a lack of funding, lack of strategic planning to justify the proposed structures, and a lack of response to vacancy announcements. Europe Zone office, with its smaller part of the operation, did not scale up its structure in response to the crisis, apart from sending one delegate to Turkey. The one-person zonal Disaster Management Unit appears rather stretched but is managing and no particular concerns were brought up regarding the Europe zone office s capacity to manage its support to the Syria crisis response. For Geneva HQ, the lack of a large, scaled-up response in Jordan and Lebanon needed serious attention, while for the MENA Zone office, the goal has been to support HNS capacity to develop from its current level. Even now, there is no resolution between the two approaches. (See also Annex 9). The Geneva Secretariat HQ has tried more than once to create a hub for the management of the Syria crisis. The Secretariat HQ proposed that the hub be located at HQ, according to the draft SOPs for response to the largest disasters, and also made proposals for scaling up the crisis response, including through a master plan (a plan was drafted in 2013). Neither of these proposals found with the zone offices, however. 29 Oddly, having now strengthened the structure, the MENA Zone office is receiving some criticism for having too much resource devoted to the Syria crisis compared with the other countries in the zone. 30.For example, does the Syria crisis team have a decision making role with regard to Syria itself and what is the relationship between the Federation Representative and the head of the Syria crisis team, who have a different reporting lines. 14

24 Given the scale of the crisis, the gaps in some of the Movement s crisis response and unresolved HQ-zone positions on future direction, deserve the direct intervention and leadership of the IFRC Secretary-General, at least until strategic direction for the Secretariat s role in the crisis has been confirmed as it is, or has been reset. Some PNS are frustrated by what they see as a lack of leadership from the Secretariat in the Syria crisis, while, in the region, both the Secretariat and the PNS themselves at country level are primarily in the mode of following the requests of the HNS. (See also the Model A/Model B discussion in Annex 9 and Secretariat Leadership Annex 10). The MENA Zone office needs to regain the confidence of some of the PNS and HNS, and to gain the confidence of the non-traditional PNS, including by leading the implementation of the regional recommendations set out in Section In time, this would attract greater human and financial resources either to the IFRC Appeal or by placement of delegates with the Zone office. At the same time, the MENA zone office deserves to be allocated more core resources to make the core zone structure more stable, given the scale of the current and potential crises in the zone. The MENA Zone Office is currently undertaking a strategic planning exercise using an external consultant. Ideally, this exercise will include a 3-5 year DM development strategy for the countries of the Zone. It is essential that this exercise takes into account the findings of this evaluation, including: The nature of the leadership the HNS and PNS expect from the Secretariat (see Annex 10) How to maintain sufficient human resources to support the Syria crisis operation, while at the same time providing the rest of the Zone with the support it requires. Engaging Geneva HQ on how to address the general under-resourcing of the Zone Office compared with the current and possible future scale of crises in the zone. Several staff in the MENA Zone office felt that there was a need for more information sharing in the office. There did not appear to be regular meetings or platforms for internal information exchange and coordination for the staff concerned with Syria Crisis response 32. The MENA and Europe Zone office disaster management coordinators have kept in touch informally during the crisis but there is no formal coordination between the two zone offices. With most of the attention focused on the MENA Zone office, Europe zone office has often been left out of discussions. In particular, it is not part of the MAP steering committee. Information flow between the country - zone HQ levels needs to be improved. Staff are not sufficiently aware of what is happening at the other levels and gaps in communication risk fragmentation, both actual and perceived. Regular regional coordination meetings are required, including Turkey and the Europe Zone Office At least, those recommendations accepted by management in the Management Response 32 Some staff have themselves introduced informal coffee talk in the cafeteria to keep each other informed. 33 a simple step towards improved internal information would be to update the office structures shown in the FedNet, to help readers understand the zonal organization and the appropriate contact persons. 15

25 Figure 1 - Extract from the Organisation Chart for the Secretariat MENA Zone office, for the Syria Crisis Operation team for neighbouring countries and the Syria team 5.4 Secretariat Role Definition The roles and responsibilities of Geneva versus the zones has been debated since the Zone structure was created in The Haiti RTE highlighted the challenges to effective Secretariat disaster management presented by the decentralised structure. The Syria crisis response has been affected by continuing uncertainties over the respective roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat HQ and the Zone offices following decentralisation. Even though the issue is well known, the IFRC Secretariat leadership has not addressed the issue of how the zone and HQ work together optimally. Secretariat zone offices and country representatives are better attuned to the country context and the capacities and wishes of the HNS than is the Geneva Secretariat. Almost three years into the conflict, whether this has led to a better response overall is a moot point. In the case of the Syria crisis, many disaster management and other technical staff in Geneva HQ have felt out of touch with the response. It is likely that the technical capacity of HQ has not been made the best use of during the crisis. Greater use could be made of Geneva Secretariat HQ advisers, especially for technical sectors where there is no or limited capacity in the Zone or country offices. Behind the HQ-Zone sense of dislocation lies a more important question, namely: What job exactly, is the IFRC Secretariat in the zone and country there to perform during a major crisis? The zone office is walking a fine line, especially in this region, between the more passive role of responding to the requests of the HNS, and, as the PNS and Secretariat HQ 16

26 expect, playing both a facilitation, coordination, advisory role, as well as a challenge function, where needed, so that the crisis response can reach the most beneficiaries possible. There is no clear idea of what Secretariat leadership means in this region, at least, not one shared across the IFRC. The Secretariat management has not acted to clarify it and the HNS and PNS concerned have not requested a clarification from the IFRC Secretariat. 5.5 Resourcing for the Zone Offices The RTE team was told severally by the MENA Zone Office that there was a lack of resources, financial and human, to provide stronger support to the crisis response. There are several factors at play: Reportedly, the MENA Zone office is under-resourced with core resources, compared with other zone offices and considering the humanitarian caseload and unrest in the region 34. A number of posts in the zone office are directly supported by individual PNS. It has taken time to assemble a team (or teams) with sufficient capacity dedicated to the Syria crisis. It has taken more than a year to fill the post of Syria crisis coordinator. By the time of the RTE visits, it was too early to tell the impact of the enlargement of the Syria team and Syria crisis teams. There are still key gaps in the MENA zone office. There are Secretariat health delegates in Jordan and Syria but there is no Regional Health Delegate, an important gap that needs to be closed. The zone Disaster Management Coordinator left the post in October and the post is yet to be advertised. Responsibility for the management of the Secretariat s contribution to the Syria crisis response has lain squarely with the MENA and Europe Zone offices. Yet, in the early stages of the response, the MENA Zone office was left under-resourced, and in transition from Amman to Beirut when key decisions about the IFRC response were being made. The leadership of the IFRC crisis response was left squarely with the zone offices, probably too much so, given the huge scale of the crisis that unfolded and the need to engage resources from across the RCRC network, whatever the designated role of the Zone offices under the decentralised model. 5.6 Regional versus country planning and appeals Until recently, the IFRC Appeals for the Syria crisis were 3-fold: 1) Syria, 2) Turkey, and 3) Regional (for Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon). Revised appeals have recently been prepared on a country basis, not regional. Whether to have regional or country appeals has been the subject of debate, and not all are happy with the decision for country appeals. The country approach allows more control of resource at the country level and recognises the great variation between country contexts, the HNS, and operational needs. It is generally agreed that country level planning is required but not all agree that this should have been translated to country level appeals. It is not yet clear how back-donors will respond to country-by-country appeals. There is certainly a case for presenting an IFRC (and if possible, Movement) wide approach to crisis as a whole. Donors do not expect the same activities across all countries but, rather, that the RCRC presents a regional strategy for themes that are common across the countries (for example, the potential for civil unrest in countries with major refugee influx), and coordinated action amongst IFRC partners in response. Simply assembling country plans into one document will not achieve this. It is not a matter, therefore, of regional versus country plans but regional and country plans. 34 The two zone offices interviewed were concerned that the Secretariat in Geneva is growing in size, rather than resources going to equip the zones and countries. 17

27 The MAP process should deliver, latest by May/June , a regional presentation and chapeau that brings all the country plans into a cogent whole, and with resources for regional coordination and communications activities also specified. 5.7 Global Disaster Response Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) The Secretariat has developed draft SOPs for the categorisation of disasters (yellow, orange, red), and for the decision-making structures and the procedures to be followed at various stages of the response according to severity. The SOPs have been in late draft stage for more than a year. The RTE team understands that it has not been possible to agree the SOPs because of the question of who is in charge of Secretariat management of the response Geneva HQ or the Zone for the most severe disasters. The zone directors do not accept that Geneva HQ should take the lead role in the management of the Syria crisis response, which would certainly be classified as Red under the SOPs, ie an organisation-wide priority. Some RTE informants consider that if the SOPs had been in place for the Syria crisis, the IFRC response would have been more effective. It might be true that via the specific actions and timelines set out in the draft SOPs, a faster and more systematically managed IFRC response would have resulted but on the question of who leads, the SOPs, as drafted, would probably not have helped. The cumbersome mechanism proposed in the draft SOPs 36 for making this decision would probably mean delay and internal debate, as per the Syria crisis, instead of a rapid and clear decision being reached on the locus of Secretariat leadership. The RTE team proposes instead that the Secretary-General should make the decision on leadership based on the advice of senior manages from the zone and HQ, and issue a written instruction valid for a set period. 5.8 Maintaining resources for the Syria crisis response The Secretariat is concerned that funding for the Syria crisis may decline. Most humanitarian agencies report funding shortfalls for Syria and surrounding countries, with predications of further shortfalls in WFP, in particular, signalled likely significant shortfalls for The recent Ebola crisis has drawn off attention and funding and there are other major emergencies to be addressed. However, there are still donor groups trying to keep Syria on the agenda and as one informant put it, there is still money out there for Syria for organisations that know how to get it 37. From now on, the IFRC may need to split its fundraising strategies for Syria and the neighbouring countries. Syria itself continues as the world s largest humanitarian crisis and as such should continue to be funded from humanitarian budgets. For the neighbouring countries, however, the IFRC should look more widely to both humanitarian and development funding. The donor focus in these countries will be on resilience, and perhaps on conflict reduction. Humanitarian funding for these countries may decline. The HNS need help to access new funding sources, which could be reflected in a IFRC resource mobilisation strategy for the region. 35 This seems a long way off but given that country plans are not due to be completed before March 2015 under the MAP process, it is not realistic to expect a high quality regional presentation before May/June. 36 If the Zone determines the level of the disaster, as the SOPs propose, it is likely that the Zone will find reasons to classify the emergency in a way that Geneva should not lead. The current proposal includes convening a Senior Management Adjudication Body (p8) if the USG Programme Services disagrees with the Zone decision. This overcomplicates the matter. 37 For example, on October , 40 countries and international bodies adopted a declaration saying donors would mobilize for years to come increased development support (ie from development budgets) to help Lebanon and Jordan shoulder the impact of millions of Syrian refugees, with Germany announcing 500 million euros for

28 The IFRC s resource mobilisation networks should research the potential for accessing development funds. Typically, development funders (that is the development departments of the normal back-donors) require higher standards in terms of assessments, plans, funding proposals and reports. The advantage is that funds can be secured for 2-3 years at a time, instead of short-term humanitarian financing. In theory, there should be considerable potential for more funding via the Gulf National Societies to the Syria crisis response, if not for Syria itself, then for the neighbouring countries. However, at the moment, most financial resources from the Gulf States go from government-government, or to the UN. The IFRC Secretary General has recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Saudi Red Crescent, which may pave the way for specific investments. The Secretariat at MENA Zone and Geneva levels should continue to work, in support of the IFRC Regional Representative, to create more meaningful partnerships with Gulf NS. (see also 4.6.3) The HNS would appreciate and benefit from Secretariat support to develop their fundraising strategies for continuing humanitarian services for this crisis, going well beyond the IFRC appeals. The resource mobilisation map is complicated with many different donors, with varying interests and conditions, a world that the HNS in the region have limited exposure to. There is potential for the IFRC to play a high value added bridging/liaison role between HNS and donors (not just PNS). As one example, the TRC would welcome assistance with how to engage with the World Bank. Given the scale of the funding that will be needed, this investment is certainly justified. 5.9 Capacity Development The Secretariat has been providing various forms of training for the HNS of the region, in particular Regional and National Disaster Response Training. The HNS appreciate these events, although there does not seem to be an assessment of the effectiveness of these resource intensive training events. In Syria reporting, information management and communications have all been a prominent part of NS capacity building, Monthly country-wide reports for all SARC partners beyond IFRC (including INGOs and UN) as well as in information management and communications products (available on SARC website/facebook). PNS capacity building efforts have targeted other areas. The documents for the three Federation appeals did not distinguish between capacity building and adding extra capacity. For example, provision of fuel for vehicles, or paying salaries for staff is listed as capacity building. While such actions add temporary capacity, they do not strengthen the organisation. In interviews, all parts of the Movement stated that they were engaged in capacity building. Capacity building 38 equips the organisation to improve its financial or technical capacity and to strengthen the structures, decision-making or governance. For the Syria crisis, the Secretariat could usefully strengthen the links between disaster management capacity building for HNS and the regular NS development processes. In particular, Step 1 self-assessment stage of the Organisational Capacity Assessment and Certification (OCAC) has been undertaken by JRC and LRC in recent years, with, reportedly, good facilitation from the MENA Zone office and Geneva Secretariat. It is remarkable that the OCAC process does not include an assessment of the disaster management capacity of the 38 Some other organisations find capacity development a less patronising term 19

29 National Society, even though this is a fundamental role of every NS. The OCAC should cover disaster management 39. As part of achieving Movement wide country planning for the region, it would be helpful for the IFRC to have a common understanding of what capacity building means (ideally also with ICRC). The RTE team was not able to locate a concise IFRC definition of capacity building United Nations response and planning There has been some heart-searching during the Syria crisis that, especially in Lebanon and Jordan, the IFRC has been upstaged by the UN and has lost ground and room to operate as a result. Certainly, the UN response is larger in all countries than the RCRC response, and in some the UN and RCRC response are closely connected, especially in food assistance. By the end of 2014, the UN will release two 2015 plans for the Syria crisis: An All-of-Syria plan including assistance provided from within in Syria and crossborder operations 40 A Regional Refugee Response and Resilience Plan ( 3RP 41 ), covering Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt. This plan will be close to final by the time this RTE is complete and should prove a reference document for the MAP planning process. The TOR raises the question of why, if the UN is following a whole-of-region approach, why is the IFRC pursuing a country approach. The 3RP will have separate country chapters, but also a regional overview, so, the difference between the UN and the IFRC planning approaches may not be as great as might first appear, if the MAP planning process includes both country plans and a regional overview. Following the UN Security Council Resolution 2165 in July 2014, the UN is gearing up for cross border operations at four crossing points from neighbouring countries into Syria. There seemed little enthusiasm from informants for the RCRC to participate in these operations and the Federation does not seem to have taken a position on the issue External Coordination (See Annex 14 for further discussion) Beyond the Movement, the most important partners for the IFRC to coordinate with are the UN agencies and INGOs. The IFRC has observer status in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 42, and hence also in the Humanitarian Country Team. The HNS/Secretariat attendance at the HCT and the sector working groups or clusters under the HCT was not consistent in any of the four countries reviewed. The IFRC could play a much fuller role in such groups: Explaining RCRC activities and advocating for its role Influencing the approach and focus of the HCT, especially from a community perspective Contributing to needs assessment, analysis and strategy of the HCT, plus spotting openings for new activities or partnerships. 39 Another Federation standard tool, the Cooperation Agreement Strategy, captures NS development needs and partner inputs to capacity development 39. There was no mention of CAS in any interviews for the RTE. If such strategies exist, any elements relating to increasing the NS disaster and crisis management capacity should inform the coming the MAP-led Country Plans. 40 as authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 2165 July for the 3RP, UNHCR and UNDP have signed an MOU concerning complementary humanitarian and resilience based development interventions. A preview of the 3RP document was released on November See =13 42 As does the ICRC 20

30 In the offices visited, IFRC participants were not being briefed on how to prepare for and exploit the humanitarian diplomacy opportunities these meetings provide. There did not seem to be a vision for doing so. The Secretariat needs to clarify for its staff and the PNS what the observer role means and how to be more effective in inter-agency forums, which some see as low priority when faced with other pressures of work. This is an important missed opportunity for influence, and for learning. The evaluation found specific examples of IFRC contributions to sector working groups 43. In Jordan, the health delegate contributes actively to the health sector working group, and chairs the Community Based Health Task Group. In Lebanon, various PNS take part in working groups, in particular those designated by the LRC as lead for a particular sector. (Even so, a number of PNS may attend the same working group without having first coordinated their inputs.) 6 Conclusions 6.1 Strategic decisions for the IFRC Regarding the Syria crisis, the IFRC faces a number of strategic decisions for the immediate future. These are 1. How to scale up the IFRC crisis response in affected countries 2. How to maintain the profile of the Syria crisis as the world s worst (and deteriorating) crisis today, including highlighting the plight of the more than the 13 million affected. 3. How to bring the important MAP planning process to a successful, practical conclusion by March The crisis response has been strong but variable in scale The SARC operation inside Syria, supported by the IFRC and the ICRC, has given itself and the Movement strong credibility for the regional response as a whole. SARC has risen to the challenge of expanding its services, reaching perhaps 3 million people each month, its increased strength based in part on pre-crisis investments in capacity development by IFRC Secretariat and a few PNS. In Turkey, the TRC has responded strongly and at scale to the needs of refugees in camps, although a very small proportion of its resources have come through the RCRC network. In Lebanon, the LRC emergency medical services are highly respected and have provided the bulk of the ambulance services during the crisis. In both Lebanon and Jordan other service areas, especially cash and non-cash relief, appear to be at a scale well below that of the needs, although the IFRC has limited documentation of existing gaps. There has been discussion during the RTE about how different the IFRC response would have been if the crisis had been disaster related rather than conflict related. Challenges related to security, access and obtaining visas have all been worse than would be typical for a disaster situation but the capacity and ambition of the HNS has been much more influential over the shape of the IFRC response than whether the crisis is conflict or disaster-related. 6.3 Conflicting assumptions have weakened the IFRC approach Various parts of the IFRC have found themselves conflicted over the Syria crisis response. The Zone offices and delegations have taken as their starting point the tailoring of the scale of the response to the capacity of the HNS, while supporting, and sometimes urging the HNS, towards a greater response capacity. The option of maximising the response by adding parallel but coordinated IFRC capacity alongside the HNS has yet to be fully explored. The 43 Sector working groups are more informal than the HCT. The observer role is not as relevant and to intents and purpose the HNS, PNS and Federation participants can consider themselves on a par with other participants. 21

31 Secretariat has not succeeded in providing a middle way that respects the role of the HNS, while delivering significant additional response capacity in parallel to the HNS, using the Secretariat and the PNS. This is where the Secretariat could and should be exercising leadership. 6.4 The MAP process is important and should be supported strongly The MAP has provided political momentum for the Movement partners to improve movement wide cooperation and coordination for the Syria crisis response, even if some of the past MAP meetings have been ineffective. With the establishment of the MAP Steering Group and the first mini-map meeting, some progress is being made towards Movement-wide country planning, communication and reporting and there is a new determination of the IFRC Secretariat and the ICRC to improve cooperation between the two organisations. The MAP process needs wider communication of the intended process and outcomes. The MAP has considerable potential to improve RCRC strategy, planning, coordination, communication, external presentation of the response, and resource mobilisation, and should therefore be well supported. The next six months is crucial. If the process fails, it may be hard to revive. At first sight, the new IFRC appeal totals for Lebanon and Jordan reflect the MAP Steering group decision for a 50% increase in activity, with, taking an average monthly budget compared between new and previous appeals, a 152% increase for Lebanon and 147% for Jordan. To be somewhat comparable, and able to add up to a regional presentation of the Movement response, country plans need a basic, agreed common structure with a common core, even if plans differ in detail in other respects. The MAP process will need to both support the development of the movement wide country plans and continue to support and track their implementation. 6.5 IFRC planning needs improvement (See also Annex 13) IFRC planning tools need updating given that they have evolved relatively little since In terms of the understanding of what makes for quality humanitarian response, the IFRC may have lost ground relative to other actors. RCRC assessments and plans need to reflect a more thorough analysis below the headline numbers. Appeals and EPOAs need better analysis of needs by age, gender, disability, rural versus urban needs etc, and better developed strategies for addressing these needs, especially now that the crisis has moved beyond emergency response, at least in the neighbouring countries. Investing in quality improvements in these areas could pay significant dividends in terms of donor support. The MAP movement wide country planning process has the potential to provide improved strategy for the Syria crisis over a 3-year term, increased financial resources, better alignment of Movement actors, consensus on the way forward between HQ, region and country levels and greater trust and cooperation between the Secretariat and ICRC. Given this potential, every effort should be taken to ensure the MAP process succeeds. 6.6 The IFRC needs a way to predict response capacity The IFRC should have known the likely scale of the response to the Syria crisis by the relevant HNS but, it appears, did not. For the IFRC to have a predictable response in any country, it needs a system to match likely National Society response with the likely crisis impact, and then plan how other Movement partners, including the ICRC for conflict-related crises, can provide additional response capacity. Without such a process, the IFRC will find itself mounting responses of unknown speed, scale and sector focus. It cannot afford to start a debate over how Movement partners should respond when the crisis has already begun. 22

32 6.7 Partner National Society bilateral assistance is set to increase PNS pressure and persuasion has been a factor in the HNS gradually opening up to more bilateral assistance. The PNS themselves acknowledge that they have mixed motives, in part to see more assistance to going to affected people, but also wishing to increase their presence, influence and visibility in responding to the Syria crisis (even if it is the HNS that are responding, not the PNS). The PNS preferences for bilateral and consortium style PNS activities are likely to continue or increase, relative to multilateral funding. 6.8 Resource Mobilisation has had some success but needs to adjust The three current appeals for the Syria crisis have been somewhat underfunded but have similar percentage coverage levels to the UN appeals, in some cases better. Many informants stated that resources will be tighter from here on, and all actors will need to be creative in maintaining support and creating new openings. The IFRC may need to split its fundraising strategies for Syria and the neighbouring countries. Syria itself continues as the world s largest humanitarian crisis and as such should continue to be funded from humanitarian budgets. Emergency relief, health and other forms of support will be required in the medium term. For the neighbouring countries, however, the IFRC should look more widely to development funding, for which IFRC emergency appeal documents will not be suited. The IFRC will need to shift towards a resilience approach, to ensure that the most vulnerable avoid destitution and host communities are not unfairly disadvantaged by the refugee influx. This may mean the adoption of livelihoods and income generation approaches. Cash based programmes have already shown their potential. The HNS would appreciate and benefit from Secretariat support to develop their fundraising strategies for the crisis going well beyond the IFRC appeals. Monitoring and reporting systems, which have shown some recent improvements in HNS and the Secretariat, will need to go on improving to maintain donor support in a competitive environment. 6.9 Innovations The Syria crisis response has thrown up a number of new innovations. While these are mentioned elsewhere in the report, a selection is assembled here: The Movement wide initiatives on communications, reporting, and country planning are all important, ambitious but common sense initiatives to present a more joined-up view of RCRC action. These all have teething troubles and will require special effort and leadership to become standard practice for major crisis. The Emergency Plans of Action underpinning the new country appeals for Lebanon and Jordan show a much more coordinated approach between Movement partners than previous appeal documents, and themselves will contribute to the development of movement wide country plans. Europe and MENA zone offices have made efforts to include information on bilateral activities into the Federation appeals, using different approaches: For Turkey, bilateral budgets are included into the budget page of the appeal; for Lebanon, the PNS plans are included into the narrative of the new appeal and are an integrated part of the overall plan; for the regional appeal and for Syria, PNS contributions are shown in the respective donors response pages. A combination of all these approaches points the way forward for providing a more integrated HNS plan and overview of IFRC-wide contributions. Both SARC and TRC are operating successfully as major partners of WFP in food assistance, a new departure for NS in the region. It would be worth at some stage organizing a joint reflection with WFP on how well this arrangement has worked and what lessons can be drawn from these partnerships. 23

33 MENA zone office has invested in its capacity to produce graphical presentations of information regarding the Syria crisis response, including Turkey, which was generally welcomed. This approach could be used to good effect by other zones, bearing in mind that these infographics are not a substitute for management information reports. For Turkey, the Secretariat has taken the initiative before any other organization to commission a translation of the Sphere Handbook into Turkish. In Jordan, the IFRC health delegate chairs the inter-agency community health task force, with the French RC acting as co-chair, a good example of the RCRC offering inter-agency leadership. Also in Jordan, the JRC has recruited equal numbers of male and female volunteers for its CBHFA programme, one of few explicit attempts to ensure gender balance in the regional crisis response. Various European NS have shown themselves adept at forming consortia, sometimes with Secretariat involvement, to obtain funds from ECHO, one of the most important funding sources for this crisis. In most cases, this has improved collaboration between these NS, drawing on the strengths of the consortium partners, and has been undertaken in coordination with the HNS concerned. (This is not an endorsement of consortia, rather a recognition of the initiative and cooperation shown). In Lebanon, the LRC has initiated a system of lead PNS for specific sectors, helping to coordinate the activities of other PNS. While certainly innovative, this is only a half-way house towards a rationalization of PNS activity and presence in Lebanon with regard to the Syria crisis Comparisons with other RTEs The RTE reports for Pakistan, Haiti and the MENA Civil Unrest Operation have been reviewed with a view to identifying common themes from those evaluations that also resonate with this RTE. It appears that the issues are persistent and still need attention: Haiti The need for more flexible design for ERU deployments Strategic planning should come before delegate (i.e. HR) planning PNS should harmonise salaries for the same country/location The need to strengthen induction for delegates HQ and Zone should agree strategic directions Increasing interaction with non RC actors PNS to work in a concerted approach, not individually Increase expertise on livelihoods and cash grants Systematic inclusion of GBV in response plans Pakistan Resolve communications issues between Zone and Geneva offices Assess (and, by implication, improve) the needs assessment capacity of HNS and the Secretariat Collect and analyse information in a timely way MENA population movement Ensuring adequate MENA Zone office capacity Ensure assessments lead to common situation analysis Agree a strategic framework that underpins the response actions of the Movement Zones/Geneva HQ/PNS to develop a resource mobilisation strategy for the operation 24

34 7 Recommendations 7.1 Country specific recommendations The IFRC Secretariat in Syria should: 11. Work with Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and other partners to improve programme monitoring, in particular to resolve the SARC-WFP arrangements over third party monitoring of food parcel distributions. 12. Support the SARC in its management of coordination meetings with INGOs active in Syria to make sure that the constraints on the SARC are well understood and that INGOs perspectives are taken into account, to help make these important relationships work as well as possible. 13. Work with the SARC and the ICRC to agree a robust security protocol for foreign delegates to replace the current unstructured security arrangements, including seeking advice from the Zone security adviser and Geneva security section. 14. Support SARC in defining its capacity development needs for improved response, for example strengthening through strategic planning, resource mobilisation or international relations and, working with ICRC, identify high quality technical support, which may mean looking beyond the RCRC network. 15. The MENA Zone office, in consultation with the Europe Zone office, should issue an internal written communication to clarify the responsibilities of the respective Syria crisis team and the Syria team, and how the two coordinate, to avoid any confusion or overlap between Secretariat teams in the countries of the region. 16. The IFRC Secretariat Secretary-General should visit Damascus in the near future to show support to the SARC and help cement Movement cooperation, as there has been no S-G visit there since the start of the crisis 44. (The RTE team understands that a visit is planned.) The IFRC Secretariat in Lebanon should: 17. Support the Lebanon RC in developing a strategy for a significant expansion of the Syria crisis response, harnessing additional PNS operational capacity alongside LRC implementation, with full LRC endorsement. The underlying principle is to continue the progressive, long-term development of the LRC response capabilities, while other National Societies mount short and medium term responses to acute needs not covered by the LRC. The Secretariat should provide additional specialist coordination and technical support over a period of months to make the scale-up possible, according to the priorities for growth identified in the Lebanon Country Plan being developed under the MAP process. Once agreed, this will require an upward revision of the Lebanon Population Movement Emergency Appeal. (Shared recommendation for Jordan and Lebanon). 18. Take a stronger lead in PNS coordination in Lebanon, as several of the PNS have been requesting, and negotiate, in discussion with PNS and the LRC, a reduction in the number of PNS present in Lebanon, to improve efficiency in the use of resources, and reduce the coordination and hosting burden on the LRC. As a guide, the end 44 both the President and Director General of ICRC have visited Damascus. 25

35 result should be the operational presence in Lebanon 45 of not more than 6 PNS working on the Syria crisis response. 19. Clarify responsibilities and procedures for security (for example for evacuation). If the LRC is established as having responsibility security for PNS and Secretariat delegates, the Secretariat should make use of its international experience and standard procedures to assist the LRC in adapting its systems to include expatriate requirements. The IFRC Secretariat in Jordan should: 20. Support the Jordan RC in developing a strategy for a significant expansion of the Syria crisis response, harnessing additional PNS operational capacity alongside JRC implementation, with full JRC endorsement. The underlying principle is to continue the progressive, long-term development of the JRC response capabilities, while other National Societies mount short and medium term responses to acute needs not covered by the JRC. The Secretariat should provide additional specialist coordination and technical support over a period of months to make the scale-up possible, according to the priorities for growth identified in the Jordan Country Plan being developed under the MAP process. Once agreed, this will require an upward revision of the Jordan Population Movement Emergency Appeal. (Shared recommendation for Jordan and Lebanon). 21. Work with the JRC to devise measures that will improve the confidence of partners in the JRC as a partner. A programme of measures is required to improve financial systems, and clearer and more formalised management structures and systems. Donors will likely also require stronger monitoring processes as part of any confidence building measures. 22. Develop a handover strategy for the Azraq camp hospital to be ready at latest 12 months before the PNS Hospital Consortium funding comes to an end. 23. Assist in the Movement s country-level coordination meetings decision-making and definition of specific action points through improved preparation and management of meetings. JRC decision makers should be encouraged to attend. Attempts to bring in to these meetings those Movement partners who attend on a less regular basis have already born some fruit and should be continued. The IFRC Secretariat in Turkey should: 24. The TRC receives very considerable funds from the Government of Turkey but these do not allow the TRC to address the substantial unmet humanitarian needs of Syrians across Turkey. The TRC aspires to raise funds from external donors and the World Bank, just as other well-established NS do. Therefore, the Europe Zone Office, with Geneva HQ support, should consider how it can provide high quality support to the Turkish RC in the development of its resource mobilisation strategies (not just for the Emergency Appeal), to increase its understanding of funding sources and donors, as it seeks to diversify funding sources and partnerships. 25. Consider how to revive its dormant status agreement with the Government of Turkey to provide the IFRC with the tax and other benefits the agreement confers Some PNS will continue to have a presence in Beirut to fulfill a regional function rather than a country function. 46 The TRC has decided to turn its tent manufacturing into a private business. In future all purchases will be subject to tax. 26

36 26. Explore whether the TRC might welcome a small increase in IFRC presence in Turkey, and perhaps the opening of a small delegation, if support services the TRC considers high priority are made available. 7.2 Syria crisis regional recommendations 27. Movement Advisory Platform a. IFRC Secretariat (with the ICRC) should provide high-level technical support to HNS to develop 3-year movement-wide country plans, in accordance with the decisions of the mini-map meeting of October These plans should be focused on responding the Syria crisis, not comprehensive NS development strategies. Given the many potential options for a country plan, the minimum expected content and basic structure should be agreed in advance with the HNS, so that a regional narrative and presentation can be added to attract donor interest. b. The plans for, and progress of, the MAP process (including the Steering Group and mini-map) should be circulated more widely to ensure that interested stakeholder are more fully engaged. c. The MAP process should conclude movement wide country plans by March 2015 and a regional chapeau by June 2015 that brings all the plans together into a cogent whole, with resources specified for regional coordination and communications activities required. 28. The Secretariat should institute a series of measures to improve internal coordination, communication and support across the Syria crisis response, as follows: a. The Secretariat should improve its internal communication and coordination for the Syria crisis by, for example, convening on an biweekly working level operational progress teleconference/meeting at regional level for the Syria crisis, including Europe and MENA zones, HQ, and country delegations, possibly chaired by the Head of Syria Crisis Operation based in Beirut. b. To improve regular information flow with the PNS and Geneva Secretariat, the Secretariat should convene a teleconference, perhaps every 6 weeks, for each country, again at senior working level, with the individual HNS. (Demand will probably be highest for Syria itself). c. The MENA Zone office, with the Europe Zone office, should issue a written communication on the respective roles and responsibilities of the Syria team and Syria crisis team, to clarify how they relate to each other. d. The Secretariat in Geneva should appoint one designated focal point for the Syria crisis, dedicated to the task of linking the operations coordination to the regional coordination level, with a widely advertised and phone number. e. The Directors of Zone concerned should call for additional technical support from Geneva HQ, especially, but not limited to, those areas where the zone office has no technical specialist. Geneva HQ should, in turn, propose to zone and country offices, through the designated HQ focal point, where technical support could usefully be provided. 27

37 f. By end April 2015, the two Directors of Zone should send a short progress report on the implementation of recommendations 18a-18e to the Secretary- General for his review. 29. As far as possible, the current MENA Zone strategic planning exercise should encompass: a. The development of a 3-5 year DM development strategy for the countries of the Zone. b. Developing greater clarity on the nature of the leadership the HNS and PNS expect from the Secretariat zone and country offices. c. How to maintain sufficient human resources to support the Syria crisis operation, while at the same time providing the rest of the Zone with the support it requires. d. Engagement of Geneva HQ on how to address the general under-resourcing of the Zone Office compared with the current and possible future scale of crises in the zone. 30. The IFRC, led by the Secretariat, should develop a regional resource mobilisation strategy for the medium term. To gain longer-term financial support to maintain RCRC activities for Syrians and affected local communities in neighbouring countries, the IFRC will need to adopt a resilience approach and seek out development funding sources, not just traditional humanitarian donors. To be successful in this approach, it will require high quality, detailed proposals covering a 2-3 year time frame. 31. Alongside the regional resource mobilisation strategy, each country in the region should develop, with technical support, a mobilisation plan to raise resources incountry, via embassies, local donor representation, UN agencies and the private sector. 32. The Secretariat should ensure that IFRC participation in inter-agency fora is more regular and is equipped to exert greater influence, strengthen the perception of the RCRC role and relevance, and learn from the situation analysis and strategies of other actors. To do so, representatives need to be well prepared with information and shared messages. It is legitimate for the IFRC or designated PNS to represent an IFRC position, in addition to the HNS, as long as all parties coordinate in advance. 33. The Secretariat should build on current good practices regarding the presentation IFRC-wide planning and reporting, as observed from Lebanon, Turkey and the MENA Zone office, by working with PNS to; 1) reflect bilateral plans and contributions in the EPOA and the Emergency Appeal, in both the narrative and budget columns designed for the purpose, and 2) listing bilateral contributions in the Donor Response document. The combination of 1) and 2) will provide a better overview of the IFRC-wide contribution to the Syria Crisis response. (This recommendation could also have global application). 34. To help ensure that all Secretariat and ICRC staff in the region understand the intention to increase cooperation between the organisations, it is proposed that the ICRC Director-General and the IFRC Secretary-General send internal communications to their staff in the region, spelling out their intent for closer cooperation between the organisations, and highlighting particular areas where cooperation is to be strengthened. 28

38 35. Working with Secretariat HQ, the zone offices should invite PNS (traditional and non-traditional) to provide or fund senior technical support for the following: a. Movement wide country plans, in line with the on-going MAP process b. A Syria region resource mobilisation strategy, and country strategies c. An Humanitarian Diplomacy Strategy, building on the work already done in devising the Movement Communications Strategy. 36. The Secretariat should convene the HNS at operational level, to share practical lessons (as proposed by SARC). The Secretariat should first test the interest level of the NS concerned. 7.3 General recommendations prompted by the RTE 37. The Secretariat should complete and publish the Global Disaster Response Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), with a modification for how the decision is made on the location and organisation of the Secretariat leadership of the response to a major crisis. It is proposed that the standard procedure should be for the Secretary-General to make the decision based on the advice of senior management from the zone(s) concerned and HQ, with a written instruction, valid for a set duration. 38. The Secretariat should consider how to revise its incentive systems for its managers of offices and delegations to measure and reward performance against clearly defined tasks and products, in line with the SOPs, rather than using resources raised for the Secretariat as a key performance indicator. 39. The IFRC should ensure a more predictable response to major emergencies by 1) analysing disaster and crisis risks in the countries most at risk of crisis or disaster (say the top ), 2) map the likely response capacity of the National Societies in those countries, based on the NS own self assessment, 3) create a dialogue and plan for how an emergency response would be scaled up, building on any OCAC and CAS results available, in consultation with the HNS and Movement partners active in the country. 40. The Organisational Capacity and Certification (OCAC) process should be amended to include NS capacity for disaster management within its scope. 41. The IFRC Secretariat should work to improve the quality of its own, and NS, response planning and preparedness, in particular, needs assessment, vulnerability analysis, and gap analysis, including assessment of non-rcrc actors, and beneficiary consultation, as part of a general standards improvement initiative, which is amongst the new Secretary-General s priorities. 47 using the Federation s existing risk assessment methodology or, for example, the Index Risk Management Initiative, see 29

39 Annex 1 Terms of Reference 1. Summary 1.1. Purpose: This real time evaluation (RTE) will assess aspects of the IFRC s response to the Syria Crisis. It will inform the on-going support to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) operations in Syria and the support to operations in the surrounding countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. As with other RTEs, the evaluation will also inform future global emergency response operations and approaches. Particular emphasis will be placed on looking at the opportunities and challenges in such a complex Movement response over an extended time period, and how Movement coordination / cooperation can be best applied to provide flexible and optimal support to the National Societies involved. The RTE will also be asked to scope out future directions and opportunities for the on-going response and contingency planning Commissioner: This RTE has been commissioned by the USG of the Programme Services Division at the IFRC secretariat in Geneva Audience: This RTE will be used by the IFRC Secretariat in Syria, in the neighbouring countries, in the MENA Zone, Europe Zone and in Geneva to improve delivery in the various Syria crisis-related operations and to help plan future strategies and interventions. It will also inform all RC/RC actors contributing to the operations, to help improve RCRC Movement coordination and integration around this crisis. And finally, it will inform future global emergency response operations and the improvement of IFRC approaches and coordination mechanisms in the changing operating environment Duration of consultancy: Approximately 30 days (with approx. 15 days in the field) 1.5. Estimated dates of consultancy: August to September Location of consultancy: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Budapest / Turkey and Geneva 2. Background The conflict in Syria persists with no end in sight. The impact on the humanitarian crisis in the region is worsening and becoming increasingly complex, with increasing number of refugees in need of assistance, increased burden sharing by host communities, and the spread of political tensions and violence in the region. Humanitarian actors and donor governments are looking at ways to find alternative solutions and to maintain humanitarian assistance to the affected communities. This includes scalingup and sustaining response activities. The revised UN appeal - Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) 2014 for USD 2.28bn (26% covered) and the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) for USD 3.74bn (36% covered) 48 according to UNOCHA. Attempts are being made to raise further funds and find negotiated solutions through the Geneva peace talks process. The IFRC has been involved in this crisis since the beginning, starting with the MENA Civil Unrest operation from July 2011 and then specifically in support to SARC and the neighbouring countries since Although not directly operational in Syria, has provided funding, technical and material assistance to SARC since the outset of the crisis, to enable them to respond to the growing and challenging needs in an increasingly tense and fragmented situation. The IFRC has also provided targeted support as required to those countries neighbouring Syria, who are hosting an increasing number of refugees either in

40 camps or in host families and through DREF to more distant countries hosting Syrian refugees, such as Bulgaria. At this point, the refugee numbers for people of concern show nearly three million people have crossed into neighbouring countries ( 49 over 1,122,221 in Lebanon, 605,719 in Jordan, 799,291 in Turkey, 220,210 in Iraq, 138,290 in Egypt and several thousands in Bulgaria, plus in Greece, Italy and other countries). Unofficially, the estimated figures are higher and are likely to rise above the current 2.2 million. Given the current context, the IFRC will continue to assist SARC within the framework followed up until now, and will increase that support as requested by the National Society. The IFRC continues to provide its humanitarian support working integrally with the National Societies in different ways according to the specific context. It will provide all support to SARC and will have a particular focus on providing capacitybuilding support to the National Society, in accordance with the IFRC s mandate and the National Society s needs. The IFRC will also provide targeted assistance to the National Societies of the neighbouring countries as required, and will also focus on ensuring that there is capacity to maintain current or scaled-up response levels. The IFRC will continue to coordinate and communicate with Movement partners to enhance the complementarities of Movement s work, and improve coordinated Movement action in support of the response and the capacity building of the National Societies. To date, the IFRC has launched three Emergency Appeals (two managed by the MENA Zone and one by the Europe Zone), plus a DREF for Bulgaria for CHF 172,746 given in October 2013 to assist their response in support of refugees from the crisis: 1. Syria - The MENA Zone launched the Emergency Appeal for Syria on 6 July 2012, and revised it in December 2012, July 2013, and again on 18 November 2013 to scale-up support for the SARC. The current Appeal aims to assist up to 5.4 million beneficiaries until December The total budget of the Appeal now stands at CHF 106,323,513 and focuses on: a. Food and Non-Food distributions: IFRC supports SARC s relief efforts in areas not covered by other partners. The objective is to provide assistance to 2.3 million people, through supplementary food (food parcels) and non-food items (hygiene parcels, women s kits, and winterization items etc.). The Appeal will also provide contingency stocks for 5,000 families (50,000 people). b. Health: The IFRC Appeal will continue to assist SARC emergency and basic health facilities in areas where it has been providing this support over an established period. It will also support psychosocial assistance to the affected population through this established network of clinics, health points, mobile health units and ambulance services c. Capacity building: The IFRC is placing a strong emphasis on building and maintaining the capacity of SARC, in both technical and management areas, as well as supporting SARC s branches and volunteers to be able to continue the response in support of affected populations. 2. Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq On 9 August 2012, the IFRC launched a Preliminary Emergency Appeal for Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq to address population movement resulting from the Syria Crisis. The Appeal sought CHF 3.7 Million for six months to strengthen the capacities of the Jordanian Red Crescent, Lebanese Red Cross and Iraqi Red Crescent to respond to the needs of some 11,000 families in relief, cash transfer, hygiene promotion and disaster preparedness, and on the capacity building of the three National Societies. This Appeal was revised in January 2013, in May 2013, in November 49 All refugee are taken from UNHCR snapshot for 7 July

41 2013 and again on 4 July 2014, to cope with the needs of the growing numbers of Syrian refugees and to support the National Societies of the region who are trying to assist them. The revised appeal is now at CHF 49.2 million to assist 479,350 people. The revised Appeal will provide support for: a. Relief distributions and cash transfer: The Appeal will support the distribution of non-food items in all three countries as well as food kits and supplementary food in Lebanon and Iraq, while at the same time supporting the scale-up of cash transfer programming to 5,000 families in Jordan and the start up of a similar programme in Lebanon b. Health: The IFRC will continue its support to the Emergency Medical Services, clinics and other services of the Lebanese Red Cross, will support the health and PSP activities of the Jordanian and Iraqi Red Crescent and is coordinating the support of a consortia-led ERU Hospital in Azraq camp in Jordan. The Appeal also supports the Palestine Red Crescent Branch in Lebanon to provide health care for the increasing numbers of Palestinian refugees fleeing Syria. c. Water supply and hygiene promotion: The appeal will support Lebanese Red Cross to provide water and hygiene supplies / promotion to 24,000 Syrian refugees and the Iraqi Red Crescent to provide safe water to 20,000 refugees. d. Capacity building: In all three countries there is strong element of support for headquarters and branch capacity, through the provision of material, technical and financial support, as well as support for staff and volunteers. 3. Turkey On 9 November 2012, the Europe Zone launched an Emergency Appeal for Population Movement seeking CHF 32 million in cash to support Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) to assist up to 170,000 people displaced by the Crisis. This Appeal was revised in May 2013, on 18 November 2013 and again on 30 June 2014, and now seeks CHF 42 million to assist 250,000 people in camps and in urban areas in Southern Turkey. The Appeal is focused on: a. Relief distributions and winterization support: This Appeal will cover the distribution of vital non-food to 250,000 temporary protected people living in camps, This includes the provision of shelter support to 40,000 families with shelter materials and contingency stocks for a further 5,000 families. The Appeal will also support the provision of contingency stocks for an additional 5,000 families (50,000 people). b. Sanitation and hygiene promotion: The Appeal will provide sanitation and hygiene promotion/ hygiene kits to 45,000 people living in the camps, and will set up temporary shower and toilet facilities for 2,400 people. c. Health and Psycho-social support: The Appeal will provide First Aid training and support to up to 80,000 people in the camps and Psycho-social support to 20,000 adults and children in the neighbouring urban communities. The National Society will also set up information and call centres to improve communications with beneficiaries. d. Capacity building: IFRC will support TRCS in areas where it requires or requests capacity building support, such as in reporting, beneficiary communications, finance and logistics and will support the translation of key DM tools and trainings into Turkish. 32

42 The IFRC has also provided DREF and technical support to other countries receiving an influx of Syrian refugees. For example, on 3 October 2013, the IFRC allocated a DREF of CHF 172,726 to assist Bulgarian RC to respond to the needs of 1,500 asylum seekers mostly coming from Syria. While these countries will not be the focus of this RTE, the reviewers will consider any implications of that wider support. The situation faced by the affected populations, both inside Syria and in the surrounding countries, continues to worsen and the needs will increase and continue for the foreseeable future. The future needs of the affected populations will be significant, and National Societies must be prepared for a protracted situation and long-term humanitarian consequences. It is therefore necessary for the RCRC Movement to work with the National Societies to look at how to scale-up and also sustain a high level of response in this difficult context, for some time to come. It is also necessary for the Movement to consider the subsequent recovery needs over the coming years. The IFRC will be required to maintain the continuity of its support in key areas over this longer-term period and to help the National Societies to have the capacity to deliver services and maintain credibility for the longer-term and to work with them to build community resilience. 3. Evaluation Purpose & Scope The IFRC secretariat is committed to ensuring quality assurance, standards and a strong culture of lesson learning in its disaster response. It is committed to carrying out RTEs during all major disasters requiring an international response and meeting certain criteria of scale, scope, complexity or risk. These RTEs aim to improve service delivery and accountability to beneficiaries, donors and other stakeholders; and to capture lessons for the improvement of IFRC s disaster response system. The response to the Syria Crisis, both within Syria and in the neighbouring countries, falls within these criteria. Normally RTEs are carried out in the early stages of a response, which was not possible for this particular operation, for operational and security restrictions (the RTE was originally scheduled to take place in May 2013, but had to be postponed). This RTE is therefore quite different in timescale from those normally conducted by IFRC and others 50, which has had consequences on its purpose and scope. The purpose of an early-stage RTE is to influence key decisions early in the development of an operation and demands a quick turn-around time for the evaluation report and management response. However, the timing of this RTE means that this exercise will focus more on lesson learning from operational decisions already made, but it will still aim to inform operational decisions for the remainder of the operation, as well as for future operations. The humanitarian context in relation to the Syria Crisis is particularly complex for the humanitarian system and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. The operating environment for both the National Societies and the IFRC secretariat is changing rapidly and creating new challenges. This RTE will also extend its focus beyond the specifics of operational management and delivery systems and will take this opportunity to examine the challenges of this on-going, multi-country crisis. It will look at how the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement can best sustain a prolonged response through its multiple stakeholders and the coordinate of such efforts between these Movement actors. 50 See 33

43 Geographically, the evaluation will include the affected countries, with a focus on the response in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The team will refer to the operation in Iraq, but as there has been limited support for this operation to date, this will not be a main focus for the RTE. The evaluation should consider the challenges in the Iraq operation related to the lack of funding and any general findings or recommendations that are considered relevant to the operation. The reviewers should also be aware of the wider IFRC support (through DREF) to countries such as Bulgaria and Armenia to respond to the needs of Syrian refugees, although, likewise, these countries are not the focus of the RTE. The timeframe of the RTE will focus on the period of the current emergency appeals (from July 2012 to the present day), but should also be aware of the assistance provided to Syria and the region under the MENA Civil Unrest operation from May The evaluation team should be aware of the RTE carried out for that operation and any key findings and follow-up actions agreed. The evaluation will look at the following areas:- i) How well did the IFRC secretariat coordinate its response internally and with other Red Cross Red Crescent Movement actors. ii) What were the challenges and opportunities of a multi-country (multi-zone) response? iii) How has the IFRC dealt with and learnt from a long-term, chronic crisis of this nature? In relation to all of these areas above, the RTE should help the IFRC secretariat and relevant National Societies refine their strategy to sustain the longer-term response and plan for recovery operations in each country and regionally. The data collection, conclusions and recommendations should include a focus on National Society capacity building as well as support to operational delivery. 4. Evaluation Objectives and Key Questions The specific objectives and possible key questions to be addressed in this RTE are listed below, under the three areas outlined above. In addressing these issues, particular emphasis should be placed on considering the performance and delivery of the IFRC Secretariat support to the National Societies in the four countries, in relation to the specific environment and context and in relation to the wider RCRC Movement engagement and considering possible future scenarios, options and directions. Please note that these are guiding questions and the RTE team are not limited to those below. 1. How did the IFRC secretariat coordinate its response internally and with Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and non-movement actors a. Has there been clarity around the division of roles and responsibilities between the National Societies, the IFRC and the ICRC in each context and across the Syria Crisis response in its entirety? b. Did the secretariat optimize available Movement-wide resources? What has been done to coordinate Movement messaging around Syria and the region, and how could challenges in this area be addressed in future? 34

44 c. How effectively did the IFRC secretariat coordinate the international operation and has the secretariat been able to adhere to and support agreed joint working modalities? i. within the secretariat (country/regional/zonal/hq (Geneva) levels), ii. within the wider IFRC membership and iii. with ICRC 51? What recommendations would the evaluators give to help the secretariat adapt its coordination approaches and tools in future? d. What coordination has there been with non-movement actors at national and at regional levels? How has this been balanced with engagement with Movement actors? And how has this worked in relation to the National Societies auxiliary role with their governments? e. What systems for communications and information management/reporting have been set up and used in the different countries and what has been done to adapt these systems to improve IFRC and Movement coordination? How has this worked where the IFRC secretariat has had no or limited presence in country? f. What challenges have been faced by the secretariat regarding the mobilization of resources (funds, HR and logistics) in this politically sensitive environment? Has this been optimized across the RCRC Movement? What opportunities and challenges have there been in engaging with the Gulf States National Societies and how could the secretariat enhance that cooperation? g. Make recommendations for future coordination and working together, both in the response and recovery operations. 2. What are the challenges and opportunities of a multi-country (multi-zone) response a. How effectively have the secretariat and partner National Societies tailored and delivered support to the National Society response in each country - including capacity building? b. To what extent has the secretariat established coherence between the different operations? The evaluators should also examine opportunities for resource sharing and joint lesson-learning related to the overall response to the Crisis, including the development of future DM approaches and tools. c. Given the increasing regional approach of the UN and the humanitarian system, what recommendations would the RTE make to improve NS to NS and IFRC coordination around a regional strategy for this Crisis? i. What options have already been considered to establish a regional approach? What factors have influenced this and what possibilities could be considered to address this in future? 51 It should be noted the RTE will look at links to ICRC s activities but will not include them within the scope of the actual evaluation. The ICRC will be fully briefed on this RTE and will be encouraged to input into its findings. 35

45 ii. What opportunities are there for engagement with other humanitarian actors or other partners to strengthen our future approach at a regional level? d. What role has humanitarian diplomacy taken in presenting the Syria Crisis as a coherent regional response and what key messages have been identified / advocated? How could this role be strengthened in future? 3. How has the IFRC dealt with a long-term, chronic crisis of this nature? a. How effectively did the secretariat and partner National Societies reinforce and adapt their operational support and capacity building as the crisis continued? b. How have the secretariat and member National Societies adapted their tools and systems to better plan for, resource and respond to a multi-year response and longer-term recovery operation including sustaining capacity building of National Societies? c. What contingency planning has taken place to date at country and regional level? How could this be strengthened? Has contingency and scenario planning taken place with other Movement and non-movement actors? What recommendations would the RTE make regarding this, given the complexity and rapidly changing dynamic of the context? d. What recovery actions have or are being considered? How can the secretariat best support member National Societies in their planning for recovery? e. Given an assessment of the evolving situation on the ground, the rapidly changing and increasing needs and the engagement of other actors, what key directions would the RTE recommend that the IFRC secretariat and the National Societies consider for future strategies? How would this inform extension or revision of existing plans and emergency appeals? 52 f. What challenges has the IFRC secretariat faced in resourcing its support to National Societies over the longer-term? How would the RTE recommend addressing these issues and what options would it suggest the IFRC secretariat and wider IFRC to consider in future to access and sustain funding for a longer-term response to a chronic crisis? 5. Evaluation Methodology & Process The methodology will adhere to the IFRC Framework for Evaluations 53, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized. An IFRC evaluation management team will oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators, ensure that it upholds the IFRC Framework for Evaluations. The evaluation management team will consist of three people not directly involved with the MENA operation; one of which is from the IFRC secretariat Planning and Evaluation Department, the other two who have direct experience in emergency operations and assessments one from either the MENA 52 This question would have to be discussed with the other members of the RCRC Movement to be viable in this context

46 or Europe Zone and one from the Programme Services Division. The evaluation management team will provide the interface with the Secretariat offices in each country, and will help to support the functioning of the team prior to and during the evaluation. The evaluation team will consist of three to four people: an external evaluator who will be the team leader, and 3 representatives from PNS, including one from a Society in the region or from a non-traditional partner National Society). Ideally the team leader or one of the PNS representatives should have regional knowledge / experience. Ideally all candidates should have some experience of the IFRC disaster response systems and operations. The external evaluator / team leader will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations, and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he should not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity. The PNS evaluators will assist the external evaluator in the evaluation process, and will be able to provide perspectives on the RCRC actors and interactions in the operation. It is expected that this team will be able to conduct a reliable and informed evaluation of the operation that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders. The specific evaluation methodology will be detailed in close consultation between the RTE team and IFRC, but will draw upon the following primary methods: 1. Desktop review of operational background documents, relevant organizational background and history, including prior IFRC RTE evaluation reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data, such as existing surveys from IFRC participants in the operation. 2. Field visits/observations to selected sites and to the Country/Zonal offices. 3. Key informant interviews (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate). 4. Focus group discussions, (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate) as time and capacity allow. The RTE team will mainly look at the response in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey and will visit each the National Society and IFRC office in each location if feasible. If access is not possible, the team will carry out the review by phone/skype and other means. It is possible that the team will split to allow coverage of all locations. The team will not visit Iraq, but will aim to speak with the Iraq office by phone/skype or to meet the IFRC Representative as feasible, to reflect input from that National Society and response. They will also not visit Bulgaria or Armenia, but will seek information from the Europe Zone to complement their research. The team will be briefed by the teams in Geneva and Beirut and in Budapest (by phone) and will receive a full security briefing for the countries to be visited (this will include completing the IFRC online security course if not already done). The draft IFRC Real-time Evaluation Management Guide will guide this RTE, including the report review process and the management response. 6. Evaluation Deliverables Inception Report The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the RTE and will include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the 37

47 team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the team. Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels The team will report its preliminary findings to the IFRC MENA Zone in Beirut, Europe Zone in Budapest, and the team or team leader will debrief in Geneva, in a timely manner and will adhere to the above mentioned review process. Draft report A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader within two weeks of the evaluation team s return from the field. Final report The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000 words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant materials. The final RTE report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated feedback from IFRC. Budget and time should be made available to translate the final report and management response into Arabic and Turkish, so that it is accessible for use by the National Societies. All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The evaluators will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as his / her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes. 7. Consultancy Timeframe Consultants Activities Due dates Deliverables Develop inception report August Inception plan Review background documents and data collection Aug-Sept Debriefing/feedback of preliminary findings to management at all levels September Preliminary findings Submit draft report with annexes, September Draft report IFRC submits any requests for clarifications, corrections, changes September Submit final report with annexes September Final report 8. Evaluation Quality & Ethical Standards The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Framework for Evaluations. The IFRC evaluation standards are: 1. Utility: Evaluations must be useful and used. 2. Feasibility: Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner. 3. Ethics & Legality: Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation. 38

48 4. Impartiality & Independence; Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders. 5. Transparency: Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency. 6. Accuracy: Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined. 7. Participation: Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate. 8. Collaboration: Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation. It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these Principles at: 39

49 Annex 2 Documents Consulted IFRC Appeals and Appeal related documents 1. MDR Revised Emergency appeal Lebanon, Jordan & Iraq: Population Movement (4 Jul 2014) 2. MDR Donor response, Emergency Appeal Lebanon, Jordan & Iraq - Population Movement. Donor response (as per 6 Nov 2014) 3. MDR Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) -Lebanon, Jordan & Iraq: Population Movement 4. MDRJO001 - Emergency Appeal Jordan: Population Movement (29 Oct 2014) 5. MDRJO001 - Donor response, Emergency Appeal Jordan - Population Movement (as per 6 Nov 2014) 6. MDRJO001 - Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Jordan: Population Movement (29 Oct 2014) 7. MDRLB004 - Emergency appeal - Lebanon: Population Movement (30 Oct 2014) 8. MDRLB004 - Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) - Lebanon: Population Movement (30 Oct 2014) 9. MDRSY003 - Revised Emergency Appeal Syria - Syria Complex Emergency, (18 Nov 2013) 10. MDRSY003 - Emergency Appeal Syria - Syria Complex Emergency, Operation Update #7 (11 Oct 2014) 11. MDRSY003 - Donor Response, Emergency Appeal Syria - Syria Complex Emergency (as per 6 Nov 2014) 12. MDRTR003 - Revised Emergency Appeal Turkey: Population Movement (30 Jun 2014) 13. MDRTR003 - Donor Response REA Turkey - Population Movement (as per 6 Nov 2014) 14. MDRTR003 - Revised Emergency Appeal Turkey - ops update 6 (1 Oct 2014) 15. MDRBG001 - Bulgaria: Population Movement; DREF final report 16. MDRAM002 Armenia: Extreme Winter; DREF Operation Final Report Information Products 17. IFRC Syria crisis IFRC wide support IFRC Syria crisis map: areas reached through IFRC support IFRC Syria Facts&Figures May-July IFRC Regional Jordan REA Summary of Needs nov IFRC Regional Lebanon REA Summary of Needs nov IFRC Turkey REA Summary Of Needs 23. IFRC Who does what, where and when; MENA Zone and Turkey map Jan RCRC Syria Crisis Common Narrative, March IFRC Project Proposal Food assistance to families affected by ongoing conflict inside Syria 26. Press releases SARC, IFRC, combined Movement IFRC Plan and Budget 2014 IFRC Secretariat documents, Syria Crisis 28. IFRC MENA Strategic framework IFRC MENA Logistics Supply Chain strategy 30. Organigram MENA - Sept Organigram Syria Operation Sept Draft Concept - Syria Crisis, Scaling Up Humanitarian and Development Response, Dec Masterplan for Syria Crisis, Draft Sep The DM Brief #53, Jun List of PNS delegates Lebanon, Jun IFRC 4Ws v3 0 May April ERU Jordan &JRCS Partnership A discussion paper 38. Movement-wide reporting for the operation responding to the Syria crisis concept paper May MENA RTE Civil Unrest

50 40. MENA RTE Civil Unrest 2011, Management Feedback Pakistan RTE Report Final 42. Haiti RTE Management Response IFRC Federation-wide Master Plan for Syria crisis covering Syria and neighbouring countries, draft September Syria Crisis Scenarios, August HEOps Jordan EoM Report 46. HEOps Syria Crisis EoM Report, Sept HEOps MENA EoM, Apr-Oct End of Mission report (EoM) IFRC Gender Advisor MENA Zone, May EoM Financial Controller, MENA Zone, March EoM Regional Psychosocial Coordinator, MENA Zone, Dec EoM DR delegate, MENA Zone, Apr EoM Quality Assurance & Resource Mobilisation Delegate for Syria, Dec EoM Disaster Response Delegate, MENA Zone Mission, Dec EoM Human Resource Coordinator, MENA Zone, June EoM Reporting Delegate, Syria Crisis Operation, Aug 2012 IFRC Documents 56. IFRC Constitution 57. IFRC Principles and Rules of Humanitarian Assistance 58. Recovery programming guidance, Emergency Plan of Action guidance for NS 60. Handbook for coordination: Working together in international disaster response (draft) 61. OCAC introduction to pilots 62. Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy 63. Gender Policy 64. Handbook for Coordination: Working together in international disaster response, Country Assistance Strategy Planning tool, The Way We Finance, Roles and Responsibilities in Disaster Response, draft Global Disaster Response Standard Operating Procedures, draft Sept The Road to Resilience discussion paper June Review of Movement Coordination and Cooperation: Syria crisis: , Wolfgroup consultants 71. Review of the Decentralisation of the IFRC Secretariat, Accenture, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, Jean Pictet, Real Time Evaluations Haiti, Pakistan, MENA Civil Unrest Movement documents 74. Movement Communication Strategy on the Syria crisis, Nov Movement Common Narrative 76. Movement Advisory Panel, conference papers and MAP Steering Group minutes 77. Syria Crisis Special Notes to National Societies 1 to Summary report of the Movement Advisory Platform Conference on the Syria conflict and its regional consequences May Minutes of Meeting - MAP Steering Group, 18 June DMWG Stockholm meeting, June Draft minutes 81. Presentation to ICG Paris, June 2014: Scaling Up the Movement Response to the Syria Crisis in the neighboring countries - Lessons Learned and thoughts about the ECHO Consortium 82. IFRC PNS Lebanon Assessment report Dec 2014 Non RCRC documents 83. Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis, May 2014, IASC Humanitarian Evaluations Steering Group 41

51 84. SHARP: 2014 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan, Dec Key Emerging Issues: Overarching principles, from Syria UNCT, Regional Response Plan 2014 and mid year update 87. HPG ODI Syria Crisis - notes of a roundtable, June ALNAP Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis, June UNHCR From slow boil to breaking point: A real-time evaluation of UNHCR s response to the Syrian refugee emergency 90. Lebanon Interagency assessment 13 June RRP6 Mid Term Review, Lebanon Overview 92. WFP Syria Monitoring Report May Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, Syrian Refugees Inter-Agency Regional Update, September 2014 Methodological Guidance 95. IFRC Framework for Evaluation 96. IFRC RTE guide DRAFT 42

52 Annex 3 Schedule of Interviews IFRC Geneva Elise Baudot Roger Bracke William Carter Walter Cotte Legal Counsel, Legal Department Head, Organisational Development Department Senior Officer, WatSan, Water, Sanitation and Emergency Health Unit, Health Department Under Secretary General, Programme Services Division Pieter De Rijke Senior Officer, ERU, Disaster and Crisis Management Department Simon Eccleshall Cristina Estrada Hakan Karay Pierre Kremer Benoit Carpentier Josse Gillijns Pankaj Mishra Ivana Mrdja Head, Disaster and Crisis Management Department Senior Officer, Operations Quality Assurance, Disaster and Crisis Management Department Senior Disaster Response Officer, Disaster Crisis Management Department Head, Communications Department Team Leader, Public communication and Outreach Head, Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Senior Officer, Preparedness, Disaster and Crisis Department Senior Officer, Relationship, Management, Strategic Partnerships Unit Panu Saaristo Senior Officer, Emergency Health Coordinator, Water, Sanitation and Emergency Health Unit, Health Department Valpuri Saarlerma Programming Senior Policy Advisor, Resilience, Programme Services Division Matthias Schmale Under Secretary General, National Society and Knowledge Development Isabelle Séchaud Ela Serdaroglu Pedro Simoes Christine South Lars Karl Julisson Joelle Tanguy Miki Tsukamoto Tangen, Unit Manager, Field Logistics, Global Logistics Service Senior Officer, Shelter and Settlements Department Senior Auditor, Risk Management & Audit Department Senior Officer, Operations Quality Assurance Head, Security Unit, Senior Officer, Security Unit Under Secretary General, Humanitarian Values and Diplomacy Division Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer IFRC MENA Zone, Beirut Tamreez Amirzada Marina Bassil Melkar El Khoury Hossam Faysal Elias Ghanem Nadine Haddad DM Information Delegate HR Manager Gender & Diversity Officer DM coordinator Director of Zone Senior PMER officer 43

53 Tenna Mengistu Zamira Muca Jean Salloum Shail Shrestha Azmat Ulla Head of NSKD and support services, Policy, Strategy& Planning Senior Advisor Financial Controller Security Advisor Lebanon Operations Manager Head of Operations Syria Crisis Cell and Syria Office Staff in MENA Zone office, Beirut Tommaso Della Longa Communications Coordinator Syria Crisis Mohamed El Amin Ibrahim Khaled Erksousi Mike Higginson Ezster Matyeka Sophie Sutrich Logistics Syria Crisis HD coordinator Syria Crisis Head of Syria Crisis Operations Reporting Delegate Syria Quality Assurance & RM Delegate Syria IFRC Syria, Damascus Asa Erika Jannsson Gyula Kadar Jeyathesan Kulasingam Jyri Rantanen IFRC Iraq Farid Aiwyar IFRC Jordan, Amman Khaled Abu Assaf Mohamed Babiker Karsten Dahl Jacinta Hurst Francisco Maldonado Rose Munene Doa a Okour Federation Representative Syria - outgoing Operations Manager Health Delegate Federation Representative Syria - incoming Federation Representative Iraq Finance Manager Regional Representative, Gulf & HoD CTP & Livelihood Delegate Health Coordinator Head of Operation Regional Reporting Delegate Syrian Crisis Senior Admin Officer IFRC Europe Zone office, Budapest Andrea Anca Senior Communication Officer Sophia Keri Timea Kramcsak Alberto Monguzzi Imre Nagy Evgeni Parfenov Anitta Underlin Grant Administration and Programme Reporting Officer Zone Finance Controller Zone DM coordinator PMER Manager Head of Operations Director of Zone IFRC Turkey, Ankara Javier Ormeno Reporting Delegate 44

54 National Societies Marwan Alawar Georges Kattaneh Samer Husein Chehade Mash'al AL Hadid & Ra ed Al Hadid Marwan Abdullah Abdul Raman Attar Hazem Bakleh Sami Fakhoury Hussam Saeid Raya Ramadant Samir Rami Sattouf Tarek Tannira Yasemin Aktaş Kamil Erden Guler Mehmet Güllüoğlu Mintez Şimşek Deniz Solen Katy Attfield Julia Brothwell David Peppiat Hosam Elsharkawi Breanne England Tina Agerbak Mads Brinch Charlotte Kjoerrup Alfredo Melgarejo Florent del Pinto Kirsi Pohjola David Kenealy Franziska Kellerhaus Annette Kohlmeier Frido Hendrickx Gerard Jonkman Cristhian Cortez Cardoza Ola Ulmo Torgeir Vasaasen Ana Roldan Malena Rembe Thomas Söderman Lebanese Red Cross, DM Coordinator Lebanese Rec Cross, Secretary General Palestine Red Crescent Society, Lebanon Director of Projects Unit Jordan Red Crescent Society, Admin Advisor, Projects Coordinator Jordan Red Crescent Society, DM Manager Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Director General Syrian Arab Red Crescent, President Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Head of Medical Services Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Deputy Director General Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Information Management Coordinator Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Deputy Director General Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Project Finance Manager Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Health Coordinator Turkish Red Crescent, Head, International Programs Systems Management Department Turkish Red Crescent, Executive, Middle East Desk Turkish Red Crescent, Director General Turkish Red Crescent, Deputy Director General Turkish Red Crescent, Coordinator International Relations, Programmes and Operations British Red Cross, Head of Disaster Management British Red Cross, Syria Crisis Programme Manager British Red Cross, Head of International Canadian Red Cross, Director, Emergencies and Recovery Canadian Red Cross, Manager, Emergency Relief and funds Danish Red Cross, Organisational Development Delegate, MENA Region Danish Red Cross, Head of Region, MENA Danish Red Cross, Country Coordinator, Lebanon Danish Red Cross, Country Coordinator, Syria French Red Cross, Regional Representative, Middle East Logistics Delegate, Finnish RC German Red Cross, Programme Coordinator Syria Crisis (Lebanon/Turkey) German Red Cross, Desk officer Syria Crisis German Red Cross, Syria Country Delegate Netherlands Red Cross, Head of Disaster Response Unit Netherlands Red Cross, Lebanon Country Representative Norwegian Red Cross, MENA Regional Representative Norwegian Red Cross, Syria Consortium Delegate Norwegian Red Cross, Lebanon Country Manager Spanish RC, Regional Representative MENA Swedish Red Cross, Regional Representative MENA Swedish Red Cross, Senior Advisor, Disaster Management 45

55 Atef Dalgamouni Pepe Juhanni Hamsa Assi ICRC Robert Mardini Jane Clarke Dorothea Krimitsas Celine Leonet Boris Michel Brigitta Kunz Fabrizio Carboni Rocio Fischer Finn Ruda Salmela Mietola Qatar Red Crescent, Jordan, Chief of Mission Azraq Hospital Consortium Manager, Finnish RC Hospital Manager, Finnish RC HR Manager, Canadian RC ICRC Geneva, Head of Region, Near and Middle East ICRC Geneva, Head of Sector, Cooperation and Coordination in the Movement ICRC Geneva, Head of Public Relations a.i. ICRC Geneva, Head of Movement Operations Unit ICRC Damascus, Head of Delegation ICRC Amman, Cooperation Delegate ICRC Beirut, Head of Delegation ICRC Beirut, Cooperation Delegate ICRC Beirut, Cooperation Delegate (Regional) Non-Movement Partners Carlos Afonso Gallegos Max Hadom Carlos Geha Maria Rosaria Bruno Severine Jacomy-Vité Ann Burton Volker Schimmel Paul Stromberg Lynne Miller Karim Atassi Alev Orsel-Karaca Norimasa Yoshida Adeyinka Badejo Helene Greiche ECHO Amman Regional Support Office, Technical Assistant OCHA Geneva, Senior Humanitarian Advisor OCHA Jordan Office, Head of Office OCHA Syria, Humanitarian Affairs Officer UNICEF Turkey, Chief of Child Protection UNHCR Jordan, Health Working Group UNHCR Jordan, Cash Working Group UNHCR Jordan Deputy Representative UNHCR Lebanon, Deputy Representative (Operations) UNHCR Turkey, Deputy Representative UNHCR Turkey, Liaison Officer Japanese Embassy, Amman, First Secretary and Head of the Economic Division WFP Syria, Deputy Country Director WFP Turkey, Programme Officer 46

56 Annex 4 Country Observations - Syria The achievements of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent are generally acknowledged to be remarkable. The SARC itself recognises that, at the outset of the crisis, it did not have sufficient capacity to respond, and acknowledges the help of Movement partners in helping the organisation to develop. Through its own efforts, and with the support of the IFRC and the ICRC, and as a partner of UN agencies, SARC has increased its institutional and operational capacity to the point where it is meeting perhaps 50% of the total relief needs of the affected population. The commitment and bravery of the 3,000 active SARC volunteers is frequently cited in Movement communications. Sadly, 40 SARC volunteers have so far lost their lives while responding to those in need. However, humanitarian needs in Syria are huge and increasing, and humanitarian agencies struggle with response gaps in all sectors. For example, there are an estimated three million people in need who would qualify for food assistance but who are not receiving it. SARC has worked hard to establish its credibility as a neutral actor, working in both Government and opposition controlled areas to alleviate the suffering of civilians. With its network across the country and its capacity to negotiate access it is able to reach most areas affected, apart from the north of the country. From early in the conflict, humanitarian work inside Syria has faced severe constraints, especially from the high risk working environment, restricted access, and bureaucratic obstacles. SARC was put in the delicate and difficult role of official Government interface and operational partner for all humanitarian agencies. SARC has risen to the challenge presented by this role, despite initial concerns from outside the Movement that it would not be effective or impartial. SARC has proven the doubters wrong on both counts. SARC is a key partner for the United Nations, in particular WFP, but also UNICEF and UNFPA, and other humanitarian organizations in Syria. In practice, the SARC does not coordinate the UN agencies, which work directly with government, but retains the task of coordinating international NGOs. In the Letter of Understanding, signed in June 2012, SARC, IFRC and ICRC agreed on SARC as the Lead Agency for the RCRC movement in Syria. The IFRC has no separate office in Syria. IFRC representation and PNS delegates are accommodated in the SARC offices in Damascus. Until late 2013, the IFRC had only a Representative and one logistics delegate present. The last Representative served for more than 5 years in Syria up to September 2014, and was very much appreciated by the SARC leadership. The Secretariat made proposals for increasing its support to the SARC, as far back as June 2012, in the following areas: IT/Telecommunication, Financial management and reporting, logistics, disaster management capacity, and emergency health. Several of these offers were taken up by SARC. The Secretariat produced a report on propositions for a Strategic Plan for SARC, but SARC decided not to undertake a new strategic plan at the height of the crisis. The IFRC human resources dedicated to Syria in Damascus and in Beirut have been strengthened only recently. The reasons for this delay include: SARC not welcoming extra foreigners in the beginning, difficulty in getting visas, slow IFRC recruitment procedures, and security limitations. Currently, the IFRC Syria team is split into 5 staff permanently based in Damascus and 2 based within the MENA Zone office in Beirut, travelling back and forth (as per Figure 1 above). 47

57 A small number of PNS is present with bilateral support to SARC and with delegates. Some were already working with SARC before the current crisis: Danish RC Long term focus on PSP; with the Syria crisis, it added support to relief activities and EMS, branch and sub-branch structures. The programme is linked up with British RC who add livelihood support (micro projects for economic restart - in kind; 2 delegates: PSP technical staff and Representative German RC/ The 2 PNS combine different qualities (timeline, earmarking) of their funding into Norwegian one joint programme with SARC; focus lies on logistics support (GerRC) and RC WatSan (Norwegian RC); 2 Del: Logistics (German RC) and WatSan/OD (NorRC) Iraqi RC 4.5 million medical supply units. 2 medical centres for Iraqi residents. Distribution of blankets and food parcels. The Qatari RC operates independently of the SARC in the north of the country. Several other PNS have given bilateral support without deploying staff to Syria. Figure 2 below shows the cumulative donor response to the Syria Appeal Figure 2 Donor response to the Syria Appeal What works well: The IFRC Secretariat presence and role in supporting the NS is broadly appreciated because of its long-term supportive approach to the SARC. It is working in the same offices as SARC and is seen as a real partner. Where well-qualified technical IFRC staff provide support, it is highly appreciated. Via the Emergency Appeal, the IFRC has added a substantially to the SARC crisis response operation in food and health. The food parcels supplied by the IFRC are seen to be very high quality, according to beneficiary feedback, and the sourcing and logistics for the food component of the Syria Appeal is seen to be effectively managed. (The British and German RCs also provide logistics support to SARC). The Secretariat has supported SARC to increase its capacity in communications and reporting, improving SARC s external image and its information flow to partners and donors. The relatively small group of IFRC and PNS delegates in Damascus have worked well together, and with the SARC, and with the ICRC. The PNS present are following mid/long-term agendas in partnership with SARC. Some of their funding support is already secured for 2015 and Their physical integration in SARC offices supports a frequent dialogue and coordination. With the SARC working in full response mode and with no spare time for non-urgent activities, the successful IFRC and PNS approach is one of tightly knitting capacity building onto operational support. 48

58 Movement Cooperation: The 2012 agreement between SARC, ICRC and IFRC created greater clarity on their respective roles and responsibilities. The movement wide publication of this agreement also made this transparent to the other RCRC partners. Challenges: The overall response is not keeping up with the increasing humanitarian needs in the country and the funding environment is becoming tighter. The highly sensitive working environment restricts public communication and humanitarian diplomacy. Stakeholders in and outside the Movement consider that the Secretariat is putting too much emphasis on its own visibility and on the funding of its operational support, compared with its coordination and capacity building roles. SARC, as an implementing partner of most of the humanitarian UN agencies operating in Syria is also affected by funding shortfalls that are likely to affect the UN. WFP is facing funding shortages, with funds varying from month to month. To manage this, WFP reduces the volume of the food parcel but not the number of food parcels. This can make the WFP food parcel still less attractive than the IFRC supplied parcels. The substantial food component 54 of the Syria Emergency Appeal 55 has proven contentious with ICRC because, in its view, with the IFRC having agreed to lead on capacity development, a large food component is not appropriate for the IFRC. From the SARC viewpoint, if having more sources of food means there is a greater volume overall, this helps to meet the unmet needs for beneficiaries. The disagreement is affecting the tone of ICRC/IFRC cooperation in Syria. The IFRC food parcels offer the greatest flexibility because, as they come directly to the SARC warehouses, they can be used for immediate deployments when short-term access is granted to contested areas. IFRC and PNS delegates are frequently absent from Damascus because of official travel, R&R, and holidays, reducing their perceived effectiveness to SARC. SARC now organises regular coordination meetings with the nine INGOs authorised to work in Syria. Relationships with these INGOs can be complicated by having to impose restrictions on their movement or activities that originate with government but the INGOs may not be aware that this is the case. The Secretariat could usefully support SARC in building strong partnerships with these organisations, including by playing a liaison role. The security situation makes the independent monitoring of relief distributions difficult. SARC is not yet working with the WFP third party monitors, and the Secretariat should work with SARC to find a solution for independent monitoring to avoid a risk of reputational damage. The Tripartite SARC/ICRC/IFRC agreement was an early achievement but formal meetings that include the Federation Representative are not being held, and should be revived. At working level SARC/ICRC/IFRC meetings continue well. Opportunities SARC can certainly absorb more funding if it can be obtained, for its proposed future focus on disaster management, health, relief (food and non-food) and life-saving services, and for SARC capacity building. 54 The Federation Appeal has provided about 5% of the total food provision so far, with ICRC a further 15% and the remainder coming from WFP. 55 According to the expenditure table accompanying the Operations Update No 7 of 11 Oct 2014 ( Two years on update ) the food component was CHF 15.2m out of a total raised against the Syria appeal of CHF 51.2m, ie 30%. 49

59 SARC has been through a steep and long learning curve to arrive at its current increased capacity. Given that expatriate delegates are relatively costly, the SARC is open to receiving technical assistance, as long as it high calibre. If the ICRC can match both the quality and flexibility of the IFRC food parcels, and if it can provide the extra food to cover that coming through IFRC channels, this should be a feasible option. This would make the logistics chain more cost effective and bring the IFRC more in line with its commitments in the tripartite agreement of Given that the RTE has not made an in-depth assessment of this matter, the RTE cannot make a firm recommendation on this point. As other funding resources are at risk of declining, the IFRC s multilateral and bilateral contributions, while small compared with UN resources, become increasingly important. ICRC is also increasing its budget for 2015 for Syria significantly to help close the resource gap. From CH139m to CHF 163m (provisional). SARC is open to receiving high quality facilitation and technical support with strategic planning in general, and the Country Plan to be developed under the MAP process, in particular. SARC is becoming more open to further PNS involvement and, in a limited way, additional PNS presence. The entry barrier will, and should be, high to ensure that the PNS contribution is of material significance either financially or in terms of technical support, or both. PNS may consider the provision of short/medium terms specialist technical inputs over longer term posting of delegates with only generalist operations management skills that the SARC already has. The visa situation for foreigners has improved to an extent. There is room for more advocacy/raising public awareness for the plight of people affected by the conflict (past communications have emphasised the Movement and the SARC volunteers). As part of the MAP process, the new Syria country plan should be mapped against all financial sources of support, including UN, INGO, and all RCRC sources. As a first, simpler step, both multilateral and bilateral support could be shown in the IFRC Emergency Appeal to provide a more complete picture of IFRC support and activity to Syria. 50

60 Annex 5 Country Observations - Lebanon Since 2012, Lebanon has received a steady influx of Syrian refugees, with a major surge in early By end of September 2014, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon was estimated at 1.2 million, although the actual number of Syrians in Lebanon could easily exceed 1.5 million, against a Lebanese population of only 4.5 million. The rate of entry of new refugees has reduced significantly. The presence of so many refugees will place a heavy burden on Lebanon's infrastructure and social stability for some years to come. With the crisis protracting, the needs for short-term assistance and for long-term support for refugees in Lebanon and host communities are both increasing and changing in nature (for example, there is an increased demand for schooling). In Lebanon, refugees are staying with relatives, or renting in urban areas. It has been government policy not to provide shelter, although it is now considering opening two camps for the first time, in part because informal settlements have grown significantly and over 1000 such settlements hold an estimated 15% of all registered Syrian refugees. The LRC enjoys a good reputation in the country for its Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and for its impartiality and neutrality, to which it is highly committed to safeguarding. Its reputation allows it to access areas that no other national or international organization can reach. The Lebanon Branch of the Palestinian RC Society is active in Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, supporting Syrian as well as resident Palestinians in need of health care. In recent years, the LRC has undergone considerable change in its governance and management structures, with the first appointment of a Secretary-General only in LRC management adheres to a strategy of sustainable growth in services. The LRC has taken a responsible and carefully chosen path to gradually expand its services, while maintaining service quality and the respect of its service users. The LRC s main concern is that it should not start something it cannot sustain. At the same time, beyond the EMS, the LRC response is growing but modest and the bulk of the humanitarian response for Syrian refugees and local communities has been left to other actors. Other humanitarian actors (UN, Danish Refugee Council, etc.) have responded strongly and at scale, and the RTE team heard a number of times from RCRC actors that there are no serious gaps in provision left in Lebanon, although they could not give a proper analysis of the needs and no RCRC analysis could be found. External reports tell of growing impoverishment, poor shelter conditions, inadequate access to the health system, foreseeable long-term effects of a lack of schooling and preventive health measures, and the negative impact on the social and socio-economic stability of the country. Some of these themes now appear in the new EPOA for Lebanon. The IFRC Secretariat moved its MENA Zone office from Jordan to Lebanon in There has been no Lebanon Delegation or Country Representation for several years, nor has there been a dedicated staff to support Lebanese RC in the Syria Crisis Response. In June 2014, an IFRC Country Operations Manager was appointed for Lebanon. There are 16 PNS with either a country or regional presence in Lebanon, supporting the LRC and the PRCS in their long-term development, standard operations and response to the effects of the Syria crisis. Most of the PNS with a presence are providing bilateral assistance. The LRC is concerned that if Syria opens up to more PNS, some will discontinue their support to LRC and move to Syria. In 2014, the ICRC increased its operations in Lebanon, especially for water and sanitation sector, so enlarging the total RCRC Movement s response in the country. 51

61 Figure 3. Sector participation of the PNS in the RCRC Syria crisis operation in Lebanon 56. What works well: Given the relatively low levels of target beneficiaries compared with the needs in past IFRC appeals, the recently released Lebanon Emergency Appeal increase in targeted population from 200,000 to 415,000 is a positive step. (Part of this increase may relate to the inclusion of PNS-funded activities related to the Syria crisis. LRC considers that the new appeal is based more clearly on LRC plans than previous versions. The improvement in the EPOA and Emergency Appeal appears to have been helped by the appointment of an IFRC Lebanon Operations Coordinator 57. ICRC has also been giving active support to a coordinated Movement response in Lebanon. The LRC has expanded cautiously but effectively into new areas. Just over a year ago, there was no disaster management function in LRC but this has now been established and oversees the provision of relief goods to 4,000 families per month. A cash transfer programme is being tested. Logistics and other capacity have been strengthened with PNS support during the current crisis. There is a high interest of PNS to work with LRC for the Syria Crisis response and some are committed to long-term partnership. Most PNS present have their offices in the LRC HQ, which has a positive impact on cooperation and communication, and provides rental income for LRC. Good practice examples of NS effort to improve efficiency include: 1) The French RC has fully embedded a delegate into the LRC management and reporting structures, 2) Netherlands RC is implementing funding of Austrian RC, 3) The joint ECHO application of several PNS and the Secretariat, under the lead of French RC, projected a more coordinated RC approach to ECHO. The ICRC has increased its presence and response in Lebanon and appears to be committed to a further increase from 2014 to 2015 from CHF 38 million to CHF 45 million (provisional). The LRC has set up a system of sector coordination whereby close partner PNS provide a measure of coordination of other PNS working in that sector. The protocols for this coordination are still to be completed. A Disaster Management strategy for the LRC has been drafted with the relevant partners. 56 Taken from the draft Federation Emergency Appeal for Lebanon, October The position currently depends on the funding of a PNS, and has just been extended from 6 months initially to April

62 Challenges: Needs versus RCRC response: To date, the RCRC response to the needs of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has been modest compared with both the scale of the needs and with the response of some other organizations. There is room for improvement of the IFRC s analysis of current and future humanitarian needs in country. The latest Emergency Appeal (30 Oct 2014) refers to 'identified humanitarian needs, gaps and constraints' without any closer analysis. Coordination: There appears not to have been a clarifying discussion on roles and responsibilities of the Movement components based on the Seville Agreement (or if there has, the result has not been shared). Lebanon RC is in the lead by right and by default, but there is no clarity on the extent to which the Secretariat should support Movement coordination. All Movement actors would like the Secretariat to play a stronger coordination role. The Lebanon operations coordinator has already made some progress in this direction but the Secretariat has work to do to avoid being seen as another PNS. Participation of the IFRC in external coordination is patchy. The LRC does not participate systematically. Some PNS attend sector coordination forums based on their own decision, while the Secretariat accompanies the LRC. The result is uncoordinated representation of the IFRC and a lack of common messages to be delivered to these forums. The Secretariat is yet to provide the LRC with a proposal for how RCRC activity can be significantly scaled up to provide a response that is provided alongside the LRC and is both short-term (2-3 years) and explicitly non-sustainable. Fragmentation and Inefficiency: As almost all RCRC actors in Lebanon acknowledge, the relatively small number and small scale of programmes being supported by a large number of PNS and the Secretariat has led to an inefficient use of resources. The numbers of delegates and their considerable associated costs cannot be justified 58. The crowding of PNS is not ideal for the RCRC image. Some combination of the following steps is required to improve the situation: o The Secretariat takes a stronger hand in PNS coordination in Lebanon, as several of the PNS have been requesting o Assuming that role is fulfilled successfully, some bilateral funding could revert to the multilateral support the Appeal o PNS consortia are expanded to allow some PNS to invest through others, creating joint programmes with one PNS lead o Each PNS consortium lead manages a programme that supports the LRC in each major sector, building on the current system of sectoral support. Whichever combination of measures is adopted, the end result should be a more streamlined IFRC programme of activities with the LRC, with lower overheads, and a significantly reduced number of PNS for the LRC to relate to. 58 The RTE team did not receive exact numbers but based on the MENA Zone office contact list and its own investigations, the team counted 32 PNS delegates based in Beirut during the time of the RTE visits, out of which 15 were performing in a regional function (MENA or Syria Crisis). 53

63 Annex 6 Country Observations Jordan At the end of October 2014, more than 618,000 Syrian refugees were registered in Jordan, of which 20% are residing in refugee camps, where government and aid organizations provide humanitarian support. The total number of Syrians in Jordan almost certainly exceeds 1 million. For the majority of refugees outside the camps, not all needs can be adequately addressed. The greatest challenge for Syrian refugees is to find jobs and income, especially for food and rent. The dependency of the refugees on assistance is said to be increasing. An estimated 1 million Jordanians are themselves considered to be affected by the crisis. The Jordanian Red Crescent (JRC), supported by RCRC movement partners has responded to the needs of a reported 30,000 households (approximately 150,000 individuals) since the beginning of the crisis, with immediate relief distribution, shelter, cash transfer programming, medical services, restoring household links among others. The delegation in Amman comprises the IFRC Representative 59, plus a Head of Operations and a Health Coordinator and Cash Delegate dedicated to the Syria crisis response. The Delegation also houses the Hospital consortium team. The delegation, as it was formerly the regional delegation, still includes the finance manager for the Syria operation, although consideration is being given as to whether to move this function to Beirut. The delegation also houses the regional reporting delegate. A country based IFRC Jordan Population Movement Emergency Appeal has been developed during the period of the RTE, and was published on 29 Oct 2014 with an implementation period to 31 Dec For Jordan, this appeal has replaced the Regional Population Movement EA covering Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. It asks for 12 Million CHF to provide support to 126,400 Syrian Refugees and Jordanians. According to the Appeal, 13 Movement partners are active in Jordan (but not all are present). They include, Canadian RC, Danish RC, Finish RC, German RC, French RC, Iraqi RC, Norwegian RC, as well as IFRC and ICRC. The Qatari UAE, Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian RCs operate on a loosely bilateral or unilateral basis. In Jordan, the ICRC and the Secretariat actively coordinate their capacity building support to the JRC. The ICRC, IFRC and the bilateral PNS are all funding staff within the JRC. Some PNS have integration agreements with the Secretariat, while the four PNS within the hospital consortium have a modified service agreement. What works well: The Cash Transfer Project (CTP) (JRC/IFRC, ICRC and Swiss RC) had reached 6,649 households with unconditional cash assistance by 31 August The RTE has not evaluated the project technically but the project is said by all parties to be highly relevant. It is well integrated as part of a UNHCR coordinated effort with other agencies. In Jordan, UNHCR reports very good technical engagement with the IFRC on the Cash Transfer Programme. (This was the only example reported to the RTE team where the IFRC was implementing directly with UNHCR.) In 2014, the IFRC Amman office has taken a more active role in controlling the implementation of the JRC/IFRC part of the programme. A temporary IFRC Cash Transfer Delegate has been focusing on the set up and improvement of the system over four months. 59 The current acting head of delegation is also the Regional IFRC Representative for the Gulf States 54

64 The Emergency Appeal foresees an increase of the IFRC/JRC part of the programme to target 4,000 instead of 2,500 households per month, which shows progress even if beneficiary numbers are still modest compared to the needs in the country. The Secretariat is supporting the JRC in organizing Movement coordination in Jordan. Meetings take place every fortnight, chaired by JRC and supported by IFRC delegates. Coordination is said to work well with those who participate. Trilateral meetings are also taking place between IFRC, ICRC and JRC, as well as bilateral coordination. Programme discussions were described as pragmatic. The Secretariat organised for a Japanese Government grant to be transferred partly to the Danish RC/JRC bilateral psychosocial programme to reinforce the existing programme rather than using the funds to start a new one. The Head of Delegation regularly attends the HCT, while the Health delegate chairs an interagency Community Health task group, with the French RC as co-chair. In Jordan, a process has started to develop one plan for the JRC, with every Movement partner identifying areas to support. This will in turn feed into the Country Plan anticipated by early 2015 under the MAP process. Challenges The RCRC has been increasing and adapting its response according to the needs identified but the limited organizational and response capacity of the JRC remains a limitation on the scale of the response. PNS do not have confidence in JRC accountability systems. The JRC does recognise the need for improvements but, as yet, there is no roadmap (at least, none written) for strengthening JRC management structures and accountability systems. In common with other offices, short-term contracts for some IFRC delegates are a weakness, and are accompanied by gaps in staffing and insufficient handovers. The ERU Field (now District) Hospital The RCRC hospital in Azraq is now open after a one-year delay. In 2013, a consortium formed of the Canadian RC, Finnish RC, German RC and Norwegian RC accepted a prefabricated ERU hospital from the Italian Government via the IFRC, valued at 1.1 million. Approval and authorisation for the hospital to open finally came from the Jordanian Cabinet, through Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation on 25 th Sept 2014 and the hospital was officially opened on October 12 th. Since then the Consortium has been scaling up the medical services comprising the OTP, internal medicine, paediatrics, X-Ray and Laboratory Services, maternity and surgery services. (The laboratory services and dispensary had been active for some time before the official opening). The long delay in opening the hospital has been problematic for the Consortium and all other partners, including the main funder, ECHO. For UNHCR, the lack of secondary care in the camp increased costs and, in its view, slowed down the growth of the population in Azraq camp. UNHCR assumes that the camp population will rise to 30,000, while the IFRC planning figure for 2015 is 60, On 9 October 2014, Azraq held 14,493 refugees. The border with Syria was closed on October 31, adding to further uncertainty over the final Azraq camp population. The RTE Team heard a wide variety of views with regards to the project, which dominated discussion of the crisis response in Jordan. A combination of factors led to the delayed opening: The authorities delayed the opening of the Azraq camp, and it has since been filling up slowly. 60 judging by the draft revised Federation appeal for Jordan 55

65 Lack of awareness of, and changing, administrational procedures to achieve permission to run the hospital. The Secretariat was seen not to move hard or fast enough to gain the permission required. At the same time, the fact that the JRC was not involved in the negotiations, plus new requirements introduced by sections of government apart from the Ministry of Health, all led to the decision on approving the opening of the hospital ending up before the Jordanian Cabinet. The benchmark for opening of the hospital was set for a minimum camp population of 30,000 (based on the average needs of a population for secondary treatment) may have reduced the pressure to open (the population has still not reached that figure). The JRC was not involved in the set up or management of the hospital, a decision the JRC has disputed, and it maintains that the decision to open would have been far smoother if it had been involved. The JRC is still looking to participate on a small scale in the hospital. A high need for secondary treatment amongst refugees leaving Syria only when treatment was already urgently needed, or, labour was already underway, has made the need for hospital care even more evident. (UNHCR had to refer people to a hospital 70km away) The management of the hospital consortium does not seem to have run smoothly and it was sometimes slow to make decisions. It took the Secretariat and the consortium more than 7 months to agree a relatively simple modified service agreement. The Canadian and Norwegian RCs will continue to support the hospital but have withdrawn from the consortium arrangement. The concept of the consortium and the hospital was reasonable, although there were concerns for some months about whether the Azraq camp, let alone the hospital, would open. The delayed start has been negative for the reputation of the RCRC in Jordan but hopefully this can be recovered once the fully-functional hospital proves its value. Excluding the funds for the hospital structure itself, ECHO and Canadian funding together came to 8.7 million. Some 2 million has been spent on the tents for the original ERU hospital, on medical equipment and on additional buildings to complement the main structure. Some of the medication purchased for the hospital expired before it could be used and was disposed of (value not known). By mid-september 2014, some 2 million of the original budget remained. The ECHO funding ends at the end of 2014, with a possible extension to March Future resourcing will need to be negotiated soon. How long the consortium intends to run the hospital is not clear. However, a handover strategy will need to be developed before long, unless international support is to continue into the medium term. A handover strategy should be in place at least 12 months before the RC funding ends. 56

66 Annex 7 Country Observations - Turkey By 2 October 2014, UNHCR had registered some 896,702 Syrian refugees 61 in Turkey, plus about 170,000 awaiting registration. The Turkish Government estimates the total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey to be around 1.6 million. 75% of registered refugees live outside camps. The Turkish Government, with its national Disaster Management Agency AFAD, is leading a huge effort to support Syrian refugees. The Turkish RC (also known as Kizilay) is part of a very large-scale government effort and works closely with AFAD. The TRC has been given specific responsibilities by government for nutrition, shelter, and non-food items. Turkish RC has distributed kitchen utensils, cooking stoves, mini-fridges, fans and other essential household items. In 23 camps, the TRC is providing e-cards food aid programme reaching some 250,000 people each month, with supported from WFP since the beginning of the The resources devoted by government outweigh many times any international assistance provided. Government spending so far exceeds US$3 billion, while TRC spend since the start of the crisis in 2011 is estimated by TRC at US$1 billion, making the total funding via the IFRC Appeal some 2% of TRC expenditure, or 3% if bilateral contributions are included. The TRC is aware of the need to also provide assistance outside camps, where the bulk of the Syrian refugees are living. The authorities have recognised that there is a risk of social instability if refugees become destitute or local community resentment against refugees grows. Syrian refugees will soon have the right to work in Turkey. In 2015, the TRC will open a Community Centre in the same border region as the camps for Syrians living outside camps, as a pilot project funded from the IFRC Emergency Appeal, to provide information and psychological support to Syrian citizens living in an town. The possibility of including Child Friendly Spaces in partnership with UNICEF is under discussion. Should the pilot prove successful, more community centres will be opened. In addition to camp operations, since 2013, the so-called zero-point operations 62 from Turkey have been providing substantial relief into northern Syria, though with little or no chance of monitoring the results by SARC or other Movement actors. The TRC provides all the customs clearance and transport for zero-point operations on behalf of INGOs. The engagement of RCRC and non-rcrc with the TRC element of the Turkish government Syria Crisis operation is summarised as follows: Place Activity Group Non-Turkish Government Partners Shelter UNHCR, IFRC, IOM Food WFP NFI IFRC, UNHCR, IOM, GermanRC, BritRC, NethRC, etc. Camps Sanitation (Showers and WC) and Hygiene Promotion (Hygiene Kits) IFRC, UNHCR, IOM, GermanRC, Psychosocial Support and Remedial Education (Children Friendly Spaces and UNICEF Youth activities) Off Community Centre pilot IFRC, UNICEF Camp Mobile Kitchen in Suruch IFRC, WFP 61 Use of the term refugee is technically incorrect in this context. Turkey has accorded temporary protection to Syrians on their territory, which precludes forced repatriation, however legally they are not refugees in Turkey but guests. 62 zero-point operation refers to delivery of relief goods across Turkey up to the border with Syria and collection by other parties taking the relief goods into Syria. This is in contrast to the UN s more recent cross border operations, in which the RCRC does not take part. 57

67 Zero Point Operation (Transfer of food and non food items at border) Other relief activities by branches UNICEF, Save the Children, Mercy Corps and many other organizations Local NGOs The TRC is the sole partner for WFP in the distribution and follow up of e-cards for food assistance. According to WFP it is facing a serious financial shortfall in 2015 (across the region, not just for Turkey), for which no solution is yet evident. As of late October, WFP only had funds for the e-card programme to end November While the financial contribution of the RCRC partners is tiny compared with the resources flowing to TRC from government agencies and the UN, as funding becomes tighter, the TRC is keen to explore new avenues for funding partnerships within the Movement and beyond. The IFRC Appeal is currently used primarily to fund hygiene kits for use in the camps, for food support to the refugee influx to Kobane, and for off camp activities. The appeal funds have also been used to fund 4 three-monthly Impact trainings in disaster management and induction, including elements of the Sphere Standards, for TRC staff joining the operation. The appeal is also funding the translation of the Sphere handbook into Turkish. The IFRC Turkey Population Movement Emergency Appeal was first published in its 3 rd revision on 30 June 2014, with a timeframe until 31 December It is seeking for 41 million CHF in total, of which 15 million are already covered by bilateral contributions and 22 million by multilateral means. The PNS have supported the TRC with contributions in kind and cash. There is no possibility of individual PNS opening representations in Turkey, which the TRC does not need and would not welcome. This is one reason why the IFRC Appeal is relatively well supported, because PNS have no presence. Bilateral contributions to the TRC operations have come from the Norwegian, British, Finnish, Swedish, German, and Netherlands RCs. What works well: The TRC is responding at scale, handling a significant portion of national and international assistance to Syrian refugees. The TRC enjoys strong partnerships with UN partners, especially UNHCR, and UNICEF and WFP. These working relationships began because initially the UN had no choice but to partner with TRC. However these partnerships are now close and TRC is valued for its can-do problem-solving attitude. The IFRC Europe Zone Office has provided specific technical support to the TRC in disaster management and finance, which has been appreciated. One reporting delegate, reporting to the zone office, sits in the TRC team office. The Turkey operation is seen as successful thanks to the high capacity of Kizilay and its close working relations with the government disaster response agency. The Reporting Delegate (in reality performing also a liaison role with TRC and RC partners) has built a good rapport with the TRC and his role seems to be valued. This is especially important given the good will lost by the IFRC when it closed its delegation in Turkey some years ago. The Secretariat has been successful in negotiating two ECHO contributions to the Turkey appeal The TRC has followed a clear programmatic approach and plan in its Syria crisis response. The IFRC Appeal for Turkey is the only one that lists the bilateral contributions to the response operation in the standard column foreseen for exactly this purpose in the Revised Appeal Budget Overview 63. The Appeal document allows 63 Out of the CHF41m planned to the end of 2015, CHF15m are to be covered by bilateral contributions and CHF26m by multilateral means 58

68 an overview on the IFRCs contribution instead of an IFRC Secretariats contribution only, and, thanks to the cooperation of the PNS involved adds a level of transparency that the RTE team did not find elsewhere. Challenges: With no end in sight of the Syria crisis, the need to support the Syrian refugees will continue in the medium term in Turkey, as per other neighbouring countries. The resources available to the TRC are well below those needed to address outstanding needs of Syrian visitors to Turkey. The PNS providing funds via the multilateral appeal or bilaterally have had a long wait to be able to visit camps where their financial support has been utilised. In October, PNS representatives were able to visit one camp and there were positive reports of the visit, even though only 7 out of 20 NS took up the opportunity. The TRC, like other organisations in Turkey, depends on the government for the analysis of the conditions of refugees. Organisations cannot make their own assessments. The government assessments can be slow in coming but in the meantime, the TRC needs to understand the situation and vulnerabilities of refugees out of camps. 59

69 Annex 8 Resource Mobilisation History (See also relevant country observation annexes 4-7 above) Syria Complex Emergency Appeal The MENA Zone launched the Emergency Appeal for Syria on 6 July 2012, and revised it in December 2012, July 2013, and again on 18 November 2013 to scale-up support for the SARC. The current Appeal aims to assist up to 5.4 million beneficiaries until December The total budget of the Appeal stood at CHF 106 million, primarily to fund interventions in 1) Food and Non-Food distributions, 2) Health and 3) Capacity building, but in its recent revision, has been reduced to CHF97 million 64. Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq Population Movement Appeal On 9 August 2012, the IFRC launched a Preliminary Emergency Appeal for Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq to address population movement resulting from the Syria Crisis. The Appeal sought CHF 3.7 Million for six months to strengthen the capacities of the Jordanian Red Crescent (JRC), Iraqi Red Crescent, Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) and the Palestinian Red Crescent (Lebanon branch) to respond to the needs of some 11,000 families in relief, cash transfer, hygiene promotion and disaster preparedness, and on the capacity building of these National Societies. This Appeal was revised in January 2013, in May 2013, in November 2013 and again on 4 July 2014, to cope with the needs of the growing numbers of Syrian refugees and to support the National Societies of the region who are trying to assist them. The revised appeal was for CHF 49.2 million to assist 479,350 people with 1) Relief distributions and cash transfer, 2) Health, 3) Water supply and hygiene promotion, and 4) Capacity building. The 3-country sub-regional appeal has been discontinued and replaced by separate country appeals for the three countries, which have been in preparation during the course of the RTE. Turkey Population Movement Appeal On 9 November 2012, the Europe Zone launched an Emergency Appeal for Population Movement seeking CHF 32 million in cash to support Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) to assist up to 170,000 people displaced by the Crisis. This Appeal was revised in May 2013, on 18 November 2013 and again on 30 June 2014, seeking CHF 42 million to assist 250,000 people in camps and in urban areas in Southern Turkey. The Appeal is focused on 1) Relief distributions and winterization support, 2) Sanitation and hygiene promotion, 3) Health and Psycho-social support, and 4) Capacity building. In future, the Appeal will also support one pilot community centre. The Appeal budget now stands at CHF 41 million. Figure 4 shows the IFRC Emergency Appeal coverage for the region, including how the budgets for the new country level appeals have evolved from the regional appeal. 64 This is a technical correction due to a change in commodity prices, there is no intended change in activity levels 60

70 Figure 4 The major PNS multilateral contributors to the appeals were: Swedish Red Cross, British Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross Society, Netherlands Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, British Red Cross, Danish Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, American Red Cross, Australian Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, German Red Cross, Austrian Red Cross, Kuwait Red Crescent Society, Spanish Red Cross. The major PNS bilateral contributors were (only those reported to the Secretariat) German Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross Society, Danish Red Cross, Red Crescent Society of Islamic Republic of Iran, Netherlands Red Cross, Austrian Red Cross, The Republic of Korea National Red Cross, Swiss Red Cross, Italian Red Cross. Other contributions are not recorded and may be substantial, eg those from the Iraqi RC, Qatar RC, Kuwait RC and UAE RC. These national societies should be asked again for their contribution data. ICRC Appeals For reference, data provided by ICRC shows ICRC Appeals for 2014 as follows: 61

71 ICRC provisional appeal totals for 2015, not yet approved by the ICRC Assembly, are: Syria, CHF163.4m, Lebanon CHF45.1m, Jordan, CHF31.8m. (The ICRC has no operations in Turkey). Comparison with UN coverage As of October 30, the UN s Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP), with a budget of $2.28 billion, was 39% funded and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP), with a budget of US$3.74 billion, was 53% funded. The funding ratios are therefore slightly worse than for the IFRC s Emergency Appeals. 62