Information Warfare New Security Challenge for Europe Tomáš Čižik (ed.)

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2 Tomáš Čižik (ed.)

3 Bratislava 2017 Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) This publication is supported by NATO Public Diplomacy Division Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) Editor: Tomáš Čižik Authors: Čižik, Tomáš Schmidt Felzmann, Anke Amb. Gvineria, Shota Pashkov, Mykhailo Šukytė, Dovilė Cover: Viktor Belan, Gradient Studio Graphic design: Zuzana Chmelová Proofreading: Marek Šťastný Printed by: Marketing and Business Group, s. r. o. Information Warfare New Security Challenge for Europe All rights reserved. Any production or copying of this work is allowed only with the permission of the publisher. Any opinions and conclusions expressed here are solely those of authors and should not be constructed as representing the opinions or policy of any organization participating in preparing the publication. ISBN

4 Content Foreword 6 RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE IN CENTRAL EUROPE Tomáš Čižik 8 MORE THAN JUST DISINFORMATION: RUSSIA S INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE NORDIC REGION Anke Schmidt Felzmann 32 INFORMATION WARFARE AS RUSSIA S HYBRID WARFARE TOOL Amb. Shota Gvineria 68 RUSSIA S INFORMATION EXPANSION: UKRAINIAN FOOTHOLD Mykhailo Pashkov 96 RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE BALTIC STATES AND POSSIBILITIES TO RESIST Dovilė Šukytė 116 About authors 138 About CENAA 140 5

5 Foreword The idea of writing this book was influenced by the fact that since March 2014 European and Eastern European countries are facing a massive onslaught of Russian information warfare, whose main goal is to undermine the trust of citizens in the political elites, European institutions, democratic system of governance, and from a long-term perspective to dissolve the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. Russian Federation has a long-standing tradition of information warfare, but the information era, globalization and the ubiquity of the Internet have brought a whole new meaning and capabilities to information warfare. There is a clear shift from the classic military or hard power confrontation to the new confrontation that is targeting our minds. This fight will be difficult to win, mainly due to the fact that Russia does not distinguish between peacetime and wartime, while the Western countries still do not fully understand such an approach. Russia is conducting the information operations continuously with massive investments into news agencies, while the western countries seem to be still waiting for the official declaration of war. In starting this project, we set out to investigate the role of the Russian information warfare on specific regions and countries. Our main aim was to create a publication that would provide a detailed analysis of how Kremlin s propaganda works and what tools it employs to reach its foreign policy goals in various countries. Therefore, in our opinion information warfare had become the most imminent and the gravest security threat for Europe. any major difficulty. It is obvious that Russia is following its own strategic interests and Putin has successfully changed the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The book provides a detailed analysis of the Russian information warfare and its tools of the trade used in various European and Eastern European countries and regions Central Europe, the Baltic states, Nordic countries, Ukraine and Georgia. Each author provides his/her own understanding of Russian propaganda and then continues with the analysis of the specific tools and tactics used by Kremlin s information warfare in their country or region. Thanks to its prognostic approach, valuable recommendations and lessons learned, the book might appeal not only to a wide range of readers interested in foreign affairs and security policy, but also to professionals and politicians. It is certain that the publication and the copious research that went into it would never be possible without the hard work of a group of leading experts from Georgia, Ukraine, Sweden, Lithuania and Slovakia, to whom I would like to express my whole-hearted gratitude. Tomáš Čižik The book has the ambition to provide answers to many questions that have arisen in connection with the Russian information warfare and propaganda unleashed in Europe. Russian disinformation campaigns are clearly present in the European and specifically Eastern European region. Moreover, Kremlin s disinformation actions are tailor-made for specific countries and specific societies. This makes Russian information warfare a very dangerous geopolitical tool, which can influence whole societies without any massive investments into military or hard power. Kremlin is using the so-called soft power, which is not constrained by borders and can be easily spread throughout Europe without 6 7

6 RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE IN CENTRAL EUROPE Tomáš Čižik Director, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) as a NATO partner country. Moreover, western states overlooked or ignored the fact that Russian defence budget had increased significantly since 2008 from 3.3% of the GDP in 2008 to 4.5% in That means an increase from 56.2 billion dollars to 84.5 billion dollars (SIPRI, n.d.). Also, investments of Russian government into media rose significantly. According to DELFI (2015) the budget for the RT agency (formerly Russia Today) over the period of was approximately 120 million USD, reaching its height over with 400 million USD. Sputnik News, in conjunction with Ria Novosti have a combined operating budget of 200 million USD per year, not to mention the local media involved in the spreading of propaganda. Russia itself considers information warfare as a powerful tool thus the main aim of this article is to describe how Russia understands information warfare and how it is using soft power to influence decision-making in Central Europe. Introduction Since March 2014, European countries are facing massive disinformation campaigns originating from the Russian Federation. Information warfare itself cannot be considered as a new phenomenon in armed conflicts, however in today s information era, the Internet and the social media have provide information warfare with a new battleground, where the main target groups are not militaries, but the minds of civilians. Russian behaviour became more and more aggressive and its origins can be traced back to It started at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, where Vladimir Putin said that Russia should play and increasingly active role in world affairs (The Washington Post, 2007), it continues with the suspension of the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 2007, Russian peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia, followed still followed by the Russian intervention to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, in addition to large military exercises on Russia s western borders near Georgia and Ukraine as well as multiple incursions against the air sovereignty of many NATO member states, which continues to this day at high rates (Čižik, 2016). Besides all these facts, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russian Federation took every state by surprise, mainly due to the fact that the Russian Federation was for a long time considered 8 9 Russian information warfare represents the most challenging security issue not only for the European Union, but also for NATO member states. It can be considered as a very powerful geopolitical tool, which can negatively influence any European state without using military or hard power. Russian information warfare and propaganda have a clear geopolitical context. These tools are carefully prepared by experts and tailor-made for each state, not only in the close neighborhood of Russia such as Ukraine and Georgia, but also for NATO and EU member states. The information and network struggle (more frequently, the information-psychological struggle), including its extreme forms, such as information-psychological warfare and netwars, are the means the state [Russia] uses to achieve its goals in international, regional and domestic politics and also to gain a geopolitical advantage (Darczewska, 2014). Russian understanding of information warfare For the purposes of this article, it is necessary to understand and describe how Russia or Putin understands information warfare. Antonovich (2011, cf. Giles 2016) states that in the Russian construct, information warfare is not an activity limited to wartime. It is not even limited to the initial phase of conflict

7 before hostilities begin, which includes information preparation of the battle space. As Heickerö (2010, cf. Giles 2016) further argues it is an ongoing activity regardless of the state of relations with the opponent, in contrast to other forms and methods of opposition, information confrontation is waged constantly in peacetime (Slipchenko 1998, cf. Giles 2016). Russia has a longstanding experience with propaganda and its dissemination. Firstly, it was used to spread the ideology of Marxism and Leninism, later it became the tool of choice in the competition with the United States during the Cold War (Čižik, 2016). However, the information era brought a whole new meaning and possibilities for information warfare. Nowadays, information can be found almost everywhere, on the internet, social media, in radio broadcast or TV, which makes it difficult for anybody to select a relevant source of information or to differentiate between correct and incorrect or misleading information. As Giles (2016) argues information warfare can cover a vast range of different activities and processes seeking to steal, plant, interdict, manipulate, distort or destroy information. The channels and methods available for doing this cover an equally broad range, including computers, smartphones, real or invented news media, statements by leaders or celebrities, online troll campaigns, text messages, vox pops by concerned citizens, YouTube videos, or directed approaches to individual human targets. The recent Russian campaigning provides all of the above and more. On the other hand, the western understanding of information warfare can be defined as tactical information operations carried out during hostilities to deceive adversary and indirectly influence its decision-making and the actions to follow based on this decision-making process. Based on previous definition, western understanding of information warfare is focused mainly on military use and only used in the time of war. As can be seen, western and Russian understanding of information warfare is clearly the opposite. Russian approach is much broader and more complex, focusing mainly on civilians. Russian information warfare or propaganda is exploiting history, culture, language, nationalism and more to carry out cyber-enhanced disinformation campaigns with much wider objectives (Giles, n.d.) Even more dangerous it the fact that Kremlin s information warfare is not monotonous, but it is tailor-made for particular states and particular segments of the population. Different kinds of Kremlin s propaganda are prepared for Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltic states, Nordic states and Central Europe. According to Lucas and Nimmo (2015) Russia s information warfare does not crudely promote the Kremlin s agenda. Instead it is calibrated to confuse, befuddle and distract. Perhaps the best understanding of Kremlin s information warfare can be drawn from the strategic documents of the Russian Federation National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation 2015, Military Doctrine 2014, Russian Federation s Foreign Policy Concept 2016, and Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation Russian strategic documents describe information warfare as a part of modern or so-called hybrid warfare, which consists of combination of political, military, technical, diplomatic, economic, informational and psychological tools. However, according to these documents information warfare is understood by Kremlin mostly as a soft power tool, but in the negative connotation. 1 Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy s armed forces personnel and civil population (Berzins 2014). To sum up, Kremlin gave the term soft power an entirely military meaning. National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015) does not mention terms like information warfare and soft power directly, but contains many hidden clues, where the threat description clearly points to information warfare 1 Soft power, according to Joseph Nye (2004) is the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion. In his definition it is meant as a power of attraction. European Union can serve as a best example throughout the years its policies, promotion of human rights, rule of law and common values have attracted many states to join this unique international organization.

8 and its tools. For example paragraph 21: [t]he intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries aspirations to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation. Such description greatly resembles Kremlin s activities in Georgia, Ukraine and EU and NATO members, where public awareness is manipulated via TV channels, radio broadcasts, financial support of pro-russian oriented alternative media, promotion of Russian culture and efforts to falsify history. Another example can be found in paragraph 43, which is dedicated to threats to the state and public security. Among others, it mentions activities connected with the use of information and communication technologies to disseminate and promote the ideology of fascism, extremism, terrorism and separatism and to endanger the civil peace and political and social stability in the society. Based on the preceding statement, Kremlin is definitely aware of the effectiveness and power of the disinformation campaigns and propaganda. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014) is more specific with respect to the definition of the term information warfare. Paragraph 11 is pointing out that there is a tendency towards shifting the military risks and military threats to the information space and the internal sphere of the Russian Federation. Paragraph 12, mentioning the external military risks for the Russian Federation also contains the following statement: the use of information and communication technologies for the military-political purposes to take actions which run counter to international law, being aimed against sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity of states pose a threat to the international peace, security and global stability. Even more focus is given to the information warfare in paragraph 13, which addresses internal military risks for the Russian Federation. Internal military risks refer to: subversive information activities against the population, especially young citizens of the State, aimed at undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions related to the defense of the Motherland Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2016) considers that soft power has become an integral part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives. This primarily includes the tools offered by civil society, as well as various methods and technologies from information and communication, to humanitarian and other types. According to the Concept (paragraph 47) Russia seeks to ensure that the world has an objective image of the country, develops its own effective ways to influence foreign audiences, promotes Russian and Russian-language media in the global information space, providing them with necessary government support, is proactive in international information cooperation, and takes necessary steps to counter threats to its information security. New information and communication technology is used to this end. Russia is intent on promoting a set of legal and ethical norms regarding the safe use of such technology. Russia asserts the right of every person to access unbiased information about global developments and various points of view. Based on previous statements, it is obvious that Russia is actively using soft power tools for its own purposes and for achieving its own foreign policy goals. In further paragraphs of the Concept, it is possible to find statements that are very similar to statements or arguments, which are frequently used by Russian disinformation campaigns and propaganda. As an example, we can cite paragraph 61: [s]ystemic problems in the Euro-Atlantic region that have accumulated over the last quarter century are manifested in the geopolitical expansion pursued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) along with their refusal to begin implementation of political statements regarding the creation of a common European security and cooperation framework, have resulted in a serious crisis in the relations between Russia and the Western States. The containment policy adopted by the United States and its allies against Russia, and political, economic, information and other pressure Russia is facing from them undermine regional and global stability, are detrimental to the long-term interests of all sides and run counter to the growing need for cooperation and addressing of the transnational challenges and threats in today s world. It portrays Russia as a victim of western aggressive policies and expansion of NATO, describes EU and NATO as originators of the crisis between Russia and Western states. Furthermore, Paragraph 62 states that Russia s long-term Euro-Atlantic policy is aimed at building a common space of peace, security and stability based on the principles of

9 indivisible security, equal cooperation and mutual trust. Same as in the previous case, very similar statements are used by alternative media, when informing about Russia s actions. The most relevant strategic document dealing with Russian understanding of information warfare is the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, approved by Vladimir Putin in December The whole document focuses solely on the information security of the Russian Federation, defines notions like information security, information area, information threats or information infrastructure. The Doctrine also identifies national interests of the Russian Federation in the information area, major information threats, strategic objectives and key areas for ensuring information security; and institutional framework of information security. 2 Without any doubt, Russia is investing too much on information security, information warfare and its tools and its research. Russia s long-standing experience with propaganda in combination with massive investments into media makes information warfare the most dangerous security threat that EU and NATO members states are currently facing. Russian hybrid soft power in Central Europe Key Russian interests and objectives This chapter will focus on Central Europe and the way information warfare financed by Russia operates, in addition to Russian main objectives and key interests in this region. As was mentioned above, Russian propaganda is tailormade for specific countries and the V4 countries are no exception. Therefore, the main goal of this chapter is to describe the tools Russia is using in the V4 2 For detailed information: publisher/cptickb6bz29/content/id/ countries (Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) to influence the decision making of political elites and to manipulate the minds of citizens of these countries to reach its own foreign policy goals. Russian logic is very clear the weaker the European Union, the stronger Russia will become. Visegrad countries share common history, they are located in the common geopolitical space that has been ruled by the western, eastern or southern empires, they were part of the Soviet bloc, have very good mutual bilateral and multilateral relations, and last but not least, they are part of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As such, they share common values and democratic principles. All these characteristics explain why Russia is using to some extent some of the same tools in each of these states. In addition to all the arguments mentioned above, it is necessary to note that there is no united perspective of Russia among Visegrad countries. Poland was always very critical and suspicious towards Russian actions, same as the Baltic states. The main reason behind Poland s heightened suspicions towards Russia lies in their mutual historical clashes and relations. Poland has always considered Russia as a vital threat for its security. On the other hand, there are Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary, whose policy towards Russia was always ambiguous. For all of these countries Russia represents or has represented the main source of energy supplies. Even better explanation is that all of these countries were almost 100% dependent on Russian oil supplies. What s more, all of these states were also exporting to Russia many of their products, not to mention business ties of many a businessmen from V4 countries with Russia. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russian Federation clearly showed Russian aggressiveness and it has influenced the whole region, because it became obvious that Kremlin cannot be considered as partner but rather an adversary. Key Russian objectives in Central Europe do not differ for its general strategic foreign policy objectives, which are the dissolution of European Union and possibly NATO (from a long-term perspective) through manipulation of the minds of the general population and changing their perception and attitudes towards the democratic system. According to the research by Globsec Policy Institute (2016), the ultimate goal of Russian propaganda in Central Europe is

10 undermining citizens trust in the European integration project, contesting the importance of NATO as a viable military defence pact, and the membership of the Central European countries in it. when support for NATO membership was 85% in Hungary, 57% in Czech Republic (both in 1998) and 51% in Slovakia in 2004 (IVO 2005, EU Commission Archives 2004, Dvorský 2007 cf. Čižik, 2016a). Central Europe is definitely more vulnerable to Russian disinformation campaigns than other Western European states. It is mainly due to the ineffective educational system, which is curriculum based on memorization of facts, while the development of critical thinking, so necessary for the processing of information is less of a priority. Another shortcoming of the educational system is the insufficient coverage of key historical developments in international relations. Illustrative is the fact that majority of history textbooks entirely leave out the Cold War era, or only refer to it marginally. The result is that young people are missing information on international developments spanning the past 65 years, which is why they are more likely to succumb to propaganda s effects (Čižik, 2016). Central Europe also became the region, which can be considered as a paradise of alternative media and so-called Russian trolls. In Visegrad countries, there are many groups and individuals, who are disseminating Russian propaganda on a daily basis. The main goal of these disinformation campaigns is to describe and depict western countries and the European project as incapable and the United States as aggressor supporting terrorism. According to the Globsec Policy Institute (2016), there are significant differences in perceptions of Euro-Atlantic integration among the V4 countries, but on the other hand, according to polls, Hungary is the strongest supporter of NATO and the most euro-optimistic country in the region 3. In Hungary 54% of citizens support EU membership and 47% support NATO membership. Slovakia is the second most euro-optimistic country with the support of 52% for EU membership and only 30% for NATO membership. On the other hand, Slovakia is the most pro-russian leaning and anti-american country in the region, while Czech Republic is the most euro-sceptic country with the support of only 32% citizens for EU membership and 44% for NATO membership. There can be seen significant drop in support for NATO since the pre-accession period, 3 Research of Globsec Policy Institute does not include information about Poland Tools of Russian information warfare in Central Europe Russian state actors use various tools of information warfare to achieve their strategic goals. In Central Europe it is mainly alternative media, pro-russia oriented trolls; ambiguity of high-level politicians; financial support for extremist right-wing parties, whose policies include anti-eu and anti-nato rhetoric; and allegations of fascism, Nazism or anti-state and illiberal activism. The main role of Russia s information warfare tools and actors involved in dissemination of disinformation campaigns, conspiracy theories and hoaxes is to spread information that is precisely crafted by professionals in Kremlin to target as many people as possible, in their native tongues and through as many information channels as possible. The following section will focus on detailed analysis of information warfare tools, which are used in Central Europe to manipulate the minds of general public. Russian information warfare uses a wide range of tools to maximize the effect. Those tools are interconnected and depend on each other. Alternative media In Central Europe, the most common tool of Russian propaganda is alternative media, representing also the most active tool. By alternative media we understand TV and radio channels, on-line magazines and social media disseminating disinformation, conspiracy theories and hoaxes among general public. Among the alternative media that operate in Central Europe is the nowfamous Russian news agency Sputnik (operating in the Czech Republic and Poland) and Russian TV channel RT (formerly Russia Today), which is not directly broadcasted in any of Central European countries, but it can be found in

11 almost every hotel room TV offering. On regional level, there are various local news agencies (such as MTI news agency in Hungary) and on-line magazines such as Zem & Vek, Hlavné správy, Slobodný vysielač, Slovensko-ruská spoločnosť and many others in Slovakia. In Czech Republic, there is Aeronet.cz, Parlamentní listy, Protiproud and many others. Poland is generally more resistant towards Russian disinformation campaigns, and therefore there are not so many alternative media as in others countries. According to Stop Fake (2017) there are around one hundred webpages in Czech Republic and Slovakia 4, which are using and disseminating propaganda that was designed by Kremlin, however none openly admitting Russian organizational or financial support. Nevertheless, according to the latest leaked information from communication of Alexander Usovski (leaked by Ukrainian Cyber Alliance), Russian disinformation campaigns in Central Europe was financed by Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofejev, who sent to Usovski to develop the network of pro-russian oriented organizations in Central Europe (Soukup, 2017). Alexander Usovski then approached a Czech pro-russian activist and member of Czech communist party (Communist Party of Czech Republic and Moravia) Ladislav Kašuk, with organizing protest rallies in Prague against fascists in Kyiv. According to Aktuality.sk (2017), Kašuk received 250 for banners and flags of Donetsk and Lugansk separatist republics and 500 for a Canon camera to document their activities. In 2014, Kašuk has organized two demonstrations in Košice and Banská Bystrica in Slovakia, but was also responsible for a demonstration in Budapest and in eastern Poland, where Ukrainian Insurgent Army memorial was destroyed. However, such revelations of direct Russian support are very rare. Besides the fact that it is difficult to uncover who exactly is financially supporting these webpages and organizations, the narrative they are using is much more revealing. All these webpages are using very similar language aimed at criticizing the West, the establishment, democratic system and political elites. 4 Slovak webpage Konšpirátori.sk has created the list of webpages with questionable content. Full list can be found here: They are using very simply sounding stories and articles without any citations or sources of information. The key role here is played by the main idea or main message that contains strict anti-nato, anti-eu and anti-us narratives. Those narratives could be summed up as follows: The United States is trying to take over the world, the United States supports terrorists (ISIS, Taliban, Al-Qaeda and others), NATO is the aggressor expanding eastward, NATO, presided over by the United States represents a threat for Russia and its interests (Treisman, 2015). According to the Globsec Policy Institute (2016) research, this anti-system and anti-us narrative seems to be very effective 59% of Slovaks and 51% of Czechs find the US s role in Europe and the world negative. The trust of general public to alternative media is also very disturbing 16% of Hungarians, 17% of Slovaks and 24% of Czechs believe more the alternative media. On the other hand, 71% of Hungarians, 72% of Slovaks and only 59% of Czechs believe the traditional media. One of the major aims of pro-russian propaganda is to undermine the confidence of general public in the independent (public or privately owned) media in CEE. The goal of Russian propaganda is not necessarily to convince people that the Russian worldview is the right one or that their interpretation of events is better, but rather to destroy and undermine confidence in the western media (including Central European ones) so that the people would not believe anyone). The most visible distrust of traditional media can be found among young people. In Slovakia 29% of young Slovaks between the age of 19 and 24 believe the alternative media more, which from a long-term perspective makes of a very unfavourable situation in Slovakia. This is mainly caused by their inability to think critically and verify sources of information. They are also missing crucial knowledge about international relation over the past 70 years. Uneducated young people, who do not think critically are fertile ground and a very easy target for Russian propaganda. While in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary alternative media are enjoying huge popularity, in Poland the situation is quite opposite. That does not mean that alternative media and Russian propaganda in Poland are not present or are inactive. Russian propaganda in Poland differs from that in the other V4 countries mainly in the narrative it uses. In Poland activities at destroying the

12 relations between Poland and Ukraine, and Poland and Lithuania prevail (such as the above-mentioned destruction of Ukrainian Insurgent Army memorial in eastern Poland) (Stop Fake, 2017). Superior resilience of the citizens of Poland towards Russian disinformation is the outcome of the historical tensions between these two countries. Twisting the truth history and events one of the most popular Slovak alternative sources of information Hlavné správy (2015), first Egyptian pharaohs were Slavs. Archaeologists discovered the graves, which belonged to mummies of white tall people with flat noses, pale skin and ginger hair, blue eyes, alpine type and European DNA. Targeted questioning of the officially-endorsed history should bring only more confusion to the world, where the recipients are flooded with information from various sources. In combination with limited education in history of the general public, such actions are potentially very dangerous for the future of any nation. Another very popular tool of Russian information warfare in Central Europe is the twisting of historical events. The main goal of this history twisting is to show important events from country s history differently to create chaos in the minds of the population. Key argument here often used by alternative media, is that history of many nations was falsified, classified, manipulated by historians or purposefully neglected and forgotten for specific purpose, mainly to obfuscate their real origin (Hlavné správy, 2016) 5. As one of the best examples serves a document that was prepared and broadcast by Russian state TV Rossija 1 Warsaw Pact declassified documents. In this document, there are statements such as that Warsaw Pact served as a main safeguard against aggressive NATO, which was prepared to invade Czechoslovakia. The same rationale was used in the explanation of why Soviet military had to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968; they simply came here to protect us against aggressive NATO (O médiách.com, 2015). Likewise, the Russian propaganda often tries to prove that history of Slavs was different from that officially presented by historians. The logic behind these actions is to put greater and rather exaggerated emphasis on the uniqueness of the Slavic culture to evoke the impression that Slavic culture is much older than presented in history textbooks. Alternative media often work with the information that footprints of Slavic culture can be traced back to the era of Jesus and even further back in history. According to 5 Hlavné správy is one of the most popular alternative media in Slovakia, which combines the correct and misleading information (60:40) to even more confuse its readers Russian trolls as new soft power soldiers Alternative media are closely interconnected with another tool of Russian information warfare so called Russian trolls. The main role of these trolls is to systematically manipulate the public debate in Central Europe across a wide range of different online forums. There are three distinct categories of trolls. To the first category includes individuals, who are paid for their activities comments in discussions in online forums, where their main goal is to promote Russian foreign and security policy interests; to undermine the credibility of the authors of expert articles; to manufacture as many comments as possible on the Internet to create the impression that many people are supporting the same argument; or to simply disseminate more lies and conspiracies and create even greater chaos. Of course their work is well organized, they are working in shifts, which enables them to work continuously. Companies that gather trolls are called troll factories. The most famous troll factory is operating in St. Petersburg. The nondescript building had been identified as the headquarters of Russia s troll army, where hundreds of paid bloggers work round the clock to flood Russian internet forums, social networks and the comments section of western publications with remarks praising president, Vladimir Putin, and raging at the depravity and injustice of the West (The Guardian, 2015). Latest information from The Moscow Times (2017) said that the above-mentioned troll factory rebranded itself as an emerging media conglomerate. According to Moscow Times, they employ over 200 full-time journalists and editors

13 whose content attracts more than 30 million pageviews every month. There is no evidence that the same factory operates in any of the V4 countries, however, the above-mentioned tactics of the St. Petersburg s troll factory are clearly present in Central Europe. Paid trolls often attend public debates on foreign and security policy, where they are very loudly and actively expressing their opinion about certain issues. They are never alone, most of the time they are accompanied by other like-minded individuals, who are trying to undermine the credibility of speakers or arguments they are using. The arguments they use often compare the annexation of Crimea by Russian Federation to the Kosovo case, accusing NATO and the United States of aggressive policy towards Russia, accusing Ukrainian government of fascism, and many other claims. The second category of trolls encompasses individuals who blindly and uncritically believe any information that praises Russia as a country, Putin as a president and criticizes the west, the United States, NATO, EU and the democratic system of governance. These individuals are sharing all the disinformation campaigns, conspiracy theories and hoaxes they found on the Internet and social media. Together with paid trolls, they represent the second most dangerous tool of Russian propaganda operating in Central Europe, because their joint activity is influencing great many people. The third category of pro-russian trolls represents the mix of the first and second category. To this category belong former and active top politicians, academics and individuals who were or still are politically or professionally active and openly support Russian foreign policy. They are not necessarily directly paid by Russia, but many of them have active relations and business interests with Russian politicians and all of them are active in public life. Many of them were and still are members of the Communist Party. Among these individuals are Miloš Zeman (President of the Czech Republic); Andrej Babiš (Minister of Finance, Czech Republic); Ján Čarnogurský (former Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic), presently Chairman of Slovensko-Ruská Spoločnosť (Slovak-Russian Association), which openly supports Russian foreign policy and contributes to the dissemination of Russian propaganda in Slovakia; Jalal Suleiman (Deputy Chairman of the Communist Party, Slovakia), Victor Orbán (Prime Minister of Hungary) and others Ambiguity of high-level politicians in V4 countries towards Russian Federation The overall impact of the Russian information warfare on Central Europe is multiplied also by the ambiguity of high-level politicians towards Russia. Ambiguity in this case means the incompatibility of domestic and international politics of Central European countries or the unwillingness to label Russian Federation as an aggressor responsible for violations of international law and a threat to European security architecture. Inconsistent statements of top politicians only contribute to the further division of the population with respect to the official policy of the country. To be specific, open criticism by Róbert Fico, Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic of the sanctions imposed on Russian Federation by the European Union, for the domestic audiences just hours after they were unanimously approved by all EU member states in Brussels does not exactly present Slovakia as a reliable partner. Another example is the official visit to the Russian Federation by Slovak Prime Minister Fico where he criticized sanctions, when he literally said that sanctions are not right and unreasonable (Jancová, 2015). Yet another example is the participation of Czech President Miloš Zeman and Slovak Prime Minister Róbert Fico at the celebrations of the end of the World War II. in Moscow in May Both Zeman and Fico were important guests for Vladimir Putin, who had used their visit as a proof of European disunity (Fendrych, 2015). 7 In 2015, Russia planned to invest 10.8 billion dollars in the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant, the only atomic power station in Hungary, which supplies approximately 40% of the country s electricity. According to critics there is another motive for Russia s investing in Hungary Russia is buying 6 Miloš Zeman was one of the two European Presidents (besides the President of Cyprus), who accepted invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Other Presidents had ignored this event as a protest of Russian annexation of Crimean Peninsula. In addition, Róbert Fico was one of the two Prime Ministers to visit Moscow (besides Alexis Tspiras, Prime Minister of Greece). 7 In Central Europe, there are also top-politicians and state representatives, who strongly support membership of all V4 countries in EU and NATO, and who are able to openly say that Russia represents a vital threat for Europe.

14 favor with a European Union (EU) government. Zoltan Illes, former lawmaker for the ruling Fidesz party who was a state secretary for the environment until 2014 said that this Paks deal is a camouflage, [ ] this is a financial transaction, and for the Russians this is buying influence (Than, 2015). In Poland, according to Tamkin (2017) disinformation doesn t have to come from Kremlin in to undermine cohesion within Europe. The Polish government, for instance, repeatedly lies about the number of Ukrainian refugees Poland has supposedly accepted [ ] they do so to have an excuse not to accept refugees from the Middle East, but these statements are just blatant lies. Such actions just contribute to the furthering of the disunity of the European Union and provide Russia with a wider range of possibilities for its own actions. Yet another act of ambiguous policy towards Russia is the unwillingness of politicians to call things by their real name. Politicians from V4 countries (except Poland) are not willing to say that Russia and its aggressive actions represent a clear and imminent threat for their states. The abovementioned fact has an impact on states foreign and security policy, the preparation of the strategic documents, and on the general public. Politicians often use only very general statements, which will not harm their own interest, weaken their electorate base or provoke or disturb any Russian officials. This category includes also statements of highranking politicians, which are similar to those used by Russian propaganda and trolls in their narratives. In November 2016, Slovak Prime Minister, Róbert Fico, calls journalists dirty anti Slovak prostitutes, who do not inform, but fight with the government (The Guardian, 2016). In another statement he said Islam has no place in Slovakia before he had later deigned to criticize fascism. His rhetoric is the same as that used by the Russian propaganda, but also his statements are reminiscent of the rhetoric used by far-right political parties. Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary behaves in a similar manner. He is accusing migrants of terrorism, who came to Europe to destroy our culture and enforce Islam over Christianity. The very same rhetoric is used by right-wing extremists, who support the same ideas promoted by Russian propaganda. In all of the Central European countries, we can identify some sort of illiberal and ambiguous policies or political statements, which threaten the cohesion of the European Union and NATO and simultaneously support Russian intentions in this region Russian financial support of right-wing extremist political parties in Central Europe As mentioned above, right-wing extremist parties are often using the same narrative that is used by Russian propaganda. Members of extremist parties are promoting panslavism the idea or advocacy of a political union of all Slavic peoples led by Russia; anti-eu, anti-nato and anti-us policies or protests against Slovakia s membership in NATO and EU; strong anti-migrant policies; and strong promotion of Nazism and fascism. Those parties, too, get a boost from Russian disinformation. Russian influence is stronger on the far right where it is stronger on the mainstream, most notably in Slovakia and Hungary. The second rule that we found the more extreme you go, the stronger the Russian influence is (Kreko, 2017 cf. Tamkin, 2017). Among these right-wing extremist parties, there is the fascist People s Party -Our Slovakia and Jobbik in Hungary. People s Party Our Slovakia is anti-eu, anti-nato and pro-nazi, which in March 2016 parliamentary elections won eight percent of the popular vote. Its members are openly promoting the first Slovak Republic (Slovak State and President Jozef Tiso, who was responsible for deportations of Jews from Slovakia, denying the holocaust and popular for using fascist symbols. Some of them are even trying to infiltrate, or already have infiltrated, the Slovak Armed Forces, where they gain weapons training, and then train other mostly young people in their use. These trained individuals are often part of paramilitary groups, training in forests and preparing to fight alongside with the Russian Army or against their own country in case of armed conflict. Infiltration of members of extremist parties to Armed Forces represents one of the most imminent domestic threats for the V4 countries. Hungarian political party Jobbik is even further right oriented. This party is openly pro-kremlin and few weeks ago introduced Hungarian version of Russia s law requiring NGOs that take foreign funding to declare themselves as foreign agents (Tamkin, 2017). It is neither secret nor even a surprise that right-wing extremist political parties are supported by Russian Federation. Financial support of these parties is just another tool of Russian information warfare unleashed in Central Europe, which allows Russia to manipulate even more minds.

15 The last tool in the Russian information warfare arsenal in Central Europe includes allegations of fascism, Nazism, anti-state and illiberal activism or Russophopia of pro-western politicians, state representatives, journalists, academics and experts done on any occasion. This tool is used by all actors involved in spreading Russian propaganda in Central Europe alternative media, Russian trolls, pro-russian politicians and members of right-wing extremist political parties. Whenever Russia, Putin or extremists are criticized in the media, articles or public debates appear containing personal attacks directed at individuals and independent researchers, who were the authors of such statements. The allegation of Russophobia is a common tool employed in Russian information operations; it is designed to intimidate and deter critics of the Kremlin from voicing their views in public (Darczewska and Zochowski, 2015). Targeted individuals are accused of being anti-russian or Russophobic and the insinuation is made that these are bad human beings, treating Russians unfairly by spreading lies about Russia. Measures adopted by Central European countries against Russian information warfare Russian information warfare and propaganda clearly pose a security threat for Central Europe. Russia is using a wide range of tools and methods to influence the minds and perception of the general public. Kremlin s intentions and actions pose a serious security challenge not only for each of the Central European states, but also for their media, academics, experts and public. Putin is determined to pursue his foreign policy goals by all means. Visegrad countries always had, and still have their own domestic problems to address populism, corruption, extremism, education, health-care and others; and Putin is eager to exploit them. Russian propaganda works well in societies, which are not satisfied with their own governments and which have a low level of education and are unable to think critically. Central European states represent one of the best environments for Putin s disinformation project. Therefore it is of utmost importance for national governments, but also for the expert community and individuals to take measures and develop own capabilities to counter Russian systematic dissemination of disinformation, conspiracy theories and hoaxes. On the state level, almost nothing had been done. In October 2016, Czech Ministry of Interior had set up a special government unit, which will act to disperse misinformation in the public domain but also train public officials to be prepared to deal with disinformation (The Reuters, 2016). According to Czech intelligence agency (BIS) Russia [is] using puppet organizations and propaganda in the Czech Republic to stoke extremism and fuel anger toward the West. BIS also concluded that these activities pose a threat to the Czech Republic, EU and NATO and that infrastructure created for achieving these goals can be used to destabilize or manipulate Czech society or the political environment at any time, if Russia wishes to do so (McLaughlin, 2017). In Slovakia, the Ministry of Interior in March 2017 announced the strengthening the Computer Crime by twelve policemen. A special unit will monitor alternative media and their work in Slovakia. However, experts claim that 12 policemen will not have any real impact on thwarting Russian disinformation campaigns in Slovakia. Slovak intelligence agency (SIS) in its annual report stated that in the context of ongoing tensions in relations between the Russian Federation and the West, [SIS] paid attention to the intentions of the Russian Federation to manipulate public opinion in Slovakia and to subjects, which actively participate in these actions (SIS, 2016). In contrast to Czech Republic, the statement by Slovak intelligence agency contains a very broad and very general definition of a threat posed by Russia. In Poland and Hungary, there are similar special units aimed at combatting the Russian disinformation campaigns. In the fight against Russian information warfare and propaganda in Central Europe independent think-tanks, NGOs and individuals play the most active role, literally engaging in activities that should be the domain of national governments. These activities include educating the young generation (in the form of lectures for high-school and university students), preparing expert analysis of information warfare, organizing expert workshops and roundtables focused on Russian soft power, debunking disinformation disseminated by Kremlin s propaganda and various tools of information warfare. Other activities include organizing public discussions, where general public has the chance to discuss