Involuntary Resettlement in Hydroelectric Projects: A Comparison of Chinese and Canadian case studies. and implications for best practice

Transcription

1 1 Involuntary Resettlement in Hydroelectric Projects: A Comparison of Chinese and Canadian case studies and implications for best practice MPA Research Report Submitted to The Local Government Program Department of Political Science The University of Western Ontario Qian Liao July 2012

2 2 Involuntary Resettlement in Hydroelectric Projects: A Comparison of Chinese and Canadian case studies and implications for best practice Abstract This paper attempts to compare different political systems with respect to similar issues, in this case, the involuntary resettlement induced by the construction of large dams. It aims to examine real world cases from both China and Canada, namely the Three Georges Dam, and a series of dams being built in James Bay in Quebec regarding the involuntary resettlement issue. By looking at the practices of both hydroelectric projects in this regard, the role of government in this process and their impact on the affected communities and the society as a whole, this paper seeks to explore the characteristics of both cases from the perspective of political science in an attempt to analyze those practices and the problems that occurred under each system. By comparing the differences of both China s case and Canada s case, the rationales will be presented as to why there are differences or similarities found in quite different political and social contexts. Based on previous studies and analysis, several political factors stand out as the main contributing factors in shaping the resettlement process in China, namely the land ownership system, center-local governmental relationships; accountability structures and preference for urban-industrial development over ruralagricultural development. Aside from that, it s fascinating to find that even in different political systems, some similarities can still be found when dealing with similar issues. In this case, due to the nature of the issue and the similar characteristics of targeted population, similar effects are found as a result of the involuntary resettlements. At the end of the paper, some insights and recommendations will be provided and conclusions will be made as to what can be learned from each other in dealing with similar issues in the future through a political lens.

3 3 Literature Review... 4 Development Projects and Resettlement... 4 Pros and Cons of the construction of large dams... 6 Involuntary Resettlement caused by Large Dams... 8 Past Experiences Dam-induced Involuntary Resettlement in China History of Dam building and resettlement issue in China A Case Study of Involuntary Resettlement of Three Gorges Dam Project Introduction of Three Gorges Dam project Resettlement Program Political principles, Major Policies and Approaches of Resettlement Political Factors that influence the Resettlement Process Achievements and major problems Dam-induced Resettlement in Canada History of Dam building and resettlement issue in Canada A Case study of Hydroelectric Projects-induced Resettlement among James Bay Cree Introduction of James Bay Hydroelectric projects and Cree Bands Resettlement Program Political Principles, Standards and Approaches of Resettlement Political Factors that influence the Resettlement Process Achievements and major problems Conclusion Reference... 44

4 4 Literature Review Resettlement has never failed to gain great attention as well as to provoke worldwide debate both in the academic field and in real world practice in the issue of development due to its highly controversial nature and the adverse long-term social and environmental costs of large development projects (Asthana, 1996; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Cernea, 1988, etc.). The nature of development projects is economic-driven. The problem resulting from this kind of projects lies in its social impact, such as involuntary resettlement. People who are affected by development projects must move to places regardless of their willingness. In most cases, they are reluctant or even resistant to such relocation. From an ethical perspective, involuntary resettlement is the most debatable, or even unacceptable issue involved in launching this kind of project. Those who oppose those projects always consider it to be inhumane and against human rights. People displaced by dams and reservoirs are considered a consequence of development (Cernea, 1990; Scudder & Colson, 1982). Each year, 10 million people worldwide are resettled to make way for infrastructure projects such as dams, airports, highways 1 (Cernea, 1997; World Bank on Dams, 1996). Development projects causing resettlement, however, are seen to fit into the nation's ideology and the larger social good (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993). Development Projects and Resettlement Consequently, there has been a huge pool of academic studies in the field of resettlement or relocation as a result of development projects since the 1980s (Asthana, 1996; Barnett & Webber, 2010; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Croll, 1999; Escobar, 2003; Feldman, Geisler, & Silberling, 2003; Forsyth, 2003; Hirsch & Warren, 1998; 1 Of these 10 million, large dams account for 4 million displaced people. (Dwivedic, 1999)

5 5 Oliver-Smith, 2006; Scudder & Colson, 1982, etc.). In particular, resettlement caused by the building of dams draws the most attention. Quite a few of them have focused on the adverse social and environmental impact relocation has imposed upon the affected communities and the society as a whole. Aside from academics, NGOs (World Bank, International Finance Corporation, World Mission on Dams, local interest groups, etc.) are also playing a big part in contributing to research in this field. The World Bank in 2004 has already published a guidance book on the planning and implementation of involuntary resettlement (World Bank, 2004). The release of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) Report (2000) more than a decade ago has also provoked much esteem, controversy, and discussion.the WCD Report provided a comprehensive overview of the impacts of large dams around the world. It recommended a new approach to decision-making based on universally agreed values and strategic priorities (equity, sustainability, efficiency, participatory decision-making, and accountability). Besides, it also presented a framework for decision-making process which includes seven strategic priorities and 26 guidelines for governments, donors, policymakers, planners, and dam builders that would involve in the dam building process. This separates relocation from other political issues that mainly draws attention within the political domain. Yet, development can be voluntary and involuntary. It s important to distinguish the two. Anthropologists use 'push' and 'pull' factors to describe involuntary and voluntary migration. Voluntary resettlement refers to attracting people to new places, whereas involuntary resettlement means forcing people out of their traditional localities. The difference between involuntary and voluntary population movements is that the former are caused by 'push' factors only. 'Pull' factors, if any, are the exception rather than the rule (Asthana, 1996; Guggenheim & Cernea, 1993). Distinguishing involuntary resettlement and voluntary resettlement helps enhancing the understanding of the

6 6 essence of involuntary resettlement. Besides, depending on geographical context, there can be resettlement that is from urban to urban, from rural to rural, and from rural to urban. In addition, resettlement can take place in democratic societies and nondemocracies, although a lot of the researchers are looking at resettlement in developing countries. All these different forms and circumstances have added dynamics and complexities to this issue. This paper attempts to compare different political systems with respect to similar issues, in this case, the involuntary resettlement induced by the construction of large dams. It aims to examine real world cases from both China and Canada, namely the Three Georges Dam, and a series of dams being built in James Bay in Quebec regarding the involuntary resettlement issue. By looking at the practices of both hydroelectric projects in this regard, the role of government in this process and their impact on the affected communities and the society as a whole, this paper seeks to explore the characteristics of both cases from the perspective of political science in an attempt to analyze those practices and the problems that occurred under each system. By comparing the differences of both China s case and Canada s case, the rationales will be presented as to why there are differences or similarities found in quite different political and social contexts. Based on previous studies and analysis, several political factors stand out as the main contributing factors in shaping the resettlement process in China, namely the land ownership system, center-local governmental relationships; accountability structures and preference for urban-industrial development over ruralagricultural development. Aside from that, it s fascinating to find that even in different political systems, some similarities can still be found when dealing with similar issues. In this case, due to the nature of the issue and the similar characteristics of targeted population, similar effects are found as a result of the involuntary resettlements. At the end of the paper, some insights and recommendations will be provided and conclusions will be made as to what can be learned from each other in dealing with similar issues in

7 7 the future through a political lens. Pros and Cons of the construction of large dams Having said that, this paper will only focus on involuntary resettlement that takes place in different political and social contexts, particularly dam-induced involuntary resettlement. Most of the existing literature about hydropower projects, especially large ones, has focused on issues around their impacts upon social, cultural and economic aspects. The justifications of building dams are usually around its economic benefits the affected communities will gain. However, the pros and cons of building development projects are both quite obvious. Over the past decades, there has been on-going debate around the issues of large-dam construction regarding the nature and magnitude of environmental and socioeconomic damage of hydro development. There is both criticism as well as support. Advocates, mostly developers and politicians of hydro development always argue that hydro power is environmentally positive compared to other sources of energy to justify their deeds. They claim that unlike coal, or other natural resources, dams don t produce greenhouse emissions, acid rain, or urban smog, or other waste that could harm our offspring, which is renewable and sustainable in the long run. They produce way fewer GHG and no other air pollutants, much lower than those generated by fossil fuel electricity- approximately 60 times less than coal-fired power plants and 20 times less than the least carbon intensive of the thermal generation options (Canadian Hydropower Association Report, 2002; Martin & Hoffman, 2008). However, that s only half the story. Those (mainly NGOs and affected groups, environmentalists and anthropologists) who strongly object to the development of hydroelectricity argue that actually reservoirs do emit greenhouse gases due to the rotting of organic matter, including submerged vegetation and soils and the detritus that

8 8 flows into the reservoir from upstream (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). Not only does hydro electricity cause a different type of global climate change crisis by changing the existing ecology but what s worse, it has put our environment in danger by contaminating water and killing trees and animals. Lost forest land and serious harm to the aquatic environment (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). According to Martin and Hoffman (2008), hydro construction throughout Manitoba has resulted in the flooding of some 600,000 acres. Aside from that, advocates fail to recognize the devastating social and environmental consequences felt by affected population brought in by hydro projects, as addressed by people who are against hydro projects. These projects are ecologically, socially and morally catastrophic for affected population and the whole society, one of which is involuntary resettlement and its interaction with its social effects. For countries lacking electricity and power, hydropower projects are absolutely lifesavers. That s one of the reasons for most developing countries, like China to build Three Georges Dam since it generates huge amounts of electricity to relieve the pressure caused by shortages. Groundbreaking achievements have also been made in related areas like electronics, metallurgy, engineering, and myriad other scientific fields, as well as the development of complex organizational and managerial systems, which revolutionized the electrical system, required by the generation, transmission and distribution of electrical system. As a result, hydro companies made great strides in expanding their markets (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). Their incentive for the construction of dams is to export their product. In this revolution, there are benefits as well as costs. The winners are the consumers of some of the cheapest power. For example, In Canada, the case of Manitoba, as the North America, namely the residents of southern Manitoba and the American upper Midwest. The losers or the victims have been Manitoba s Aboriginal communities (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). However, to fully assess hydro development,

9 9 both its economic and social effects should be taken into account. Involuntary Resettlement caused by Large Dams Large dams have been an important component of infrastructure development in both developing and developed countries alike. Consequently, it is estimated that the construction of large dams has displaced 40 to 80 million of the world s people, mostly in developing countries like China, India and Brazil (World Commission on Dams, 2000). In particular, since 1949, between 18.5 and 20 million people were displaced by development projects in India and about 45.1 million in China (Brook, Michael & Duan, 2008; Fruggle, Smith, Hydrosult, & Agrodev, 2000). The 1980s has been called by some as the "decade of displacement" (Asthana, 1996). Involuntary resettlement Resettlement is involuntary when it occurs without the informed consent of the displaced persons or if they give their consent without having the power to refuse resettlement. (International Finance Corporation, 2012). It refers to the permanent forced relocation of entire households (Croll, 1999; Feldman, Geisler, & Silberling, 2003). Barnett and Webber (2010) argue that it s a special form of migration yet it bears the same characteristic that like many migrations, it is both cause and consequence of socially engineered environmental change. The involuntary nature of the migration and resettlement process involves an almost total loss of control over both choices and resources (Oliver-Smith, 1991). Involuntary resettlement consists of two closely related yet distinct processes: displacing people and rebuilding their livelihoods (Asthana, 1996), which are both significant in minimizing and avoiding the adverse impact the process would impose on relocatees. The characteristics of involuntary relocations are (Li, Waley & Rees, 2001): they are forced to move against their wills. Since they have no other realistic choice but to move; they are usually planned and carried out by governments; and they will be leaving their original living places permanently since their home will be

10 10 inundated. Thus, involuntary resettlement has devastating effects upon affected population. At first, one might have a little doubt as to the existence of involuntary resettlement in democracies. By this definition, involuntary resettlement can take place anywhere regardless of political systems and social contexts. In democratic societies most issues are dealt through negotiation. However, due to specific contexts and information asymmetry between two sides, some of the negotiation process is somewhat symbolic, which can hardly make the process just and fair. Existing literature mainly focused on the relocation policies and measures, effects of involuntary resettlement and ways to ameliorate the negative consequences of forcible relocation (Asthana, 1996; Cernea, 1988, 1997; Cernea & Kanbur, 2002; Croll, 1999; Oliver-Smith, 1991; Wilmsen, Webber, & Duan, 2011; etc). Cernea (1988) has concluded that involuntary resettlement would lead to the impoverishment of affected communities. He (1997) also argued that the documented relocation outcomes have been overwhelmingly negative. Main Theories on involuntary resettlement include Scudder-Colson relocation theory (1982) and risk model developed by Cernea (1990), which has great influence on the theories and practices in this field. According to Scudder and Colson (1982), there are four stages involved in the process of involuntary resettlement from the perspective of affected people. It begins with relocation, which means the physical replacement. The second stage involves adjustment to new environment, during which relocated people suffer from both emotional and economic stress of readjustment. A lot of them end up with lower incomes and worse standards of living due to replacement. Besides, because most people usually stop making investment once they know they have to move somewhere else, by the time of relocation, their income and the value of their assets get lower than before. Resettlement enters the third stage if economic development and community formation occur, which

11 11 Scudder notes that most cases do not reach the third stage. The fourth stage consolidates. Cernea (1990) developed a risk model, where he points out that when displacement and relocation leave people worse off, the empirical evidence reveals a set of eight recurrent characteristics that need to be monitored closely. They all contribute to a process of impoverishment. Thus, the "risks to be avoided" in displacement are:(i) landlessness;(ii) joblessness; (iii) homelessness; (iv) marginalisation; (v)morbidity;(vi)food insecurity;(vii)loss of access to common property assets; and (viii) social disarticulation. Those eight aspects together contribute to the impoverishment of affected population in general. Both the Scudder-Colson theory and Cernea s risk model have demonstrated the negative impact of relocation on the affected population. In general, this literature showed that displacement not only resulted in asset and job loss but also in the breakdown of social and food security, credit and labor exchange networks, social capital and kinship ties. Other effects of involuntary resettlement include the social-political disempowerment of the affected people, loss of cultural identity and heritage as well as impoverishment (Baviskar, 1995). Past Experiences Based on past experiences, we know that relocation is just one item of the whole package in the resettlement process. Job training, employment and business opportunities are also important aspects that should be taken into account to make the resettlement process more sustainable for relocatees. Besides, the complexity and difficulty of involuntary resettlement results not from the number of people affected alone, but from the severity of the consequences to the affected people. Since it requires systematic planning and sophisticated political skills to ensure the resettlement process

12 12 is as harmless as possible, planning is significant in ensuring a successful resettlement. Oliver-Smith (1991) addressed the importance of planning in resettlement. He further argued that an ill-considered or hastily drawn up resettlement plan which does not attend to such crucial factors as land availability, water resources, soil fertility, plant and animal resources, employment opportunities, local housing and settlement patterns, inter-ethnic relations, physical security, leadership and local authority institutions among other dimensions will be likewise unconvincing. This statement literally covers all the important factors that the policy decision-makers should take into account when planning and implementing resettlement policies. It also reflects the complexities of the resettlement issue. Public acceptance of key decisions is another essential factor for equitable and sustainable water and energy resources development. Acceptance emerges from recognising rights, addressing risks, and safeguarding the entitlements of all groups of affected people, particularly indigenous and tribal peoples, women, peasants and other vulnerable groups (World Commission on Dams, 2000). This means a high level of public participation should be involved in the decision making process. Besides, communication and education play a significant role in negotiating with and informing the affected population from past experiences (Oliver-Smith, 1991). Even if the process is more of an informing one, sufficient information is also necessary and facilitates the implementation process. People are most afraid of the unknown, to educate them on dams so as to lessen their anxiety and reluctance to hydroelectric projects. It would be helpful for the implementation and operation of the projects on condition that their voice, perspectives, concerns and expectations to be heard by the government. Ideally, one would advocate relocating residents into a permanent settlement and more fully integrating them into modernity as well as maintaining their traditional lifestyle and culture, creating a win-win situation in which nobody has to compromise any part of their interests. But realistically, that s usually not the case.

13 13 Dam-induced Involuntary Resettlement in China History of Dam building and resettlement issue in China China has a long history of construction of hydroelectric projects. The earliest recorded dam, known as Dujiangyan, can be dated back as long as two thousand years ago. It is located in the southwest part of China and was originally built to fight against flood and later as an irrigation system. It is still in use today, serving as an irrigation system and a popular tourist spot attracting people from all over the world. Recent history saw few hydrostations being constructed until Since the foundation of People s Republic of China in 1949, dam building in China has accelerated (Wilmsen, 2011). The period between is a heyday of dam construction, which saw a number of over 70,000 hydrostations and as many as 80,000 reservoirs on behalf of hydroelectricity, irrigation and flood control (Jing, 1999; Wilmsen, 2011). During this period, dam construction was mainly controlled and financed by the central government. Currently, China is the largest producer of hydroelectricity in the world. It is estimated that over 10.2 million people in China have been uprooted as a result dam building (Jing, 1999). Such large scale of construction caused a dramatic increase in involuntary resettlement, the scale of which has been unmatched by any country in the last 50 years (World Commission on Dams, 2000). Past practices and approaches of Chinese government toward resettlement have not been highly praised but rather strongly criticized by both domestic and foreign scholars and media. Those activities were considered inhumane and against the international norms. Under the Great Leap Forward, the central government dislocated more than 1 million people (Jing, 1999). Due to a lack of comprehensive framework of resettlement policies and mismanagement, the process of resettlement has been painful

14 14 and exceptionally hard for both government and the relocatees. Yet the outcomes were devastating and controversial. The characteristics of those resettlement program launched by governments prior to 1980s were coercion, suppression and neglect (Jing, 1999). Activist Dai Qing claimed that there are no cases of successful implementation of involuntary resettlement in China (Dai, 1994). Woodman states that the practice of resettlement in China is more a model of control over information than of good practice (Woodman, 2000). Indeed, Stein (1998) observes that involuntary resettlement in China all too frequently implies the abandonment of those displaced to conditions of chronic impoverishment. Chau (1995) estimates that 30 per cent of China s involuntary resettlements have failed. According to previous research, since 1949 displacees in China have faced adversities similar to those faced by displacees of other developing nations (Wilmsen, 2011). They were considered as the victims of economic development and modernization. Needless to say, resettlement programs were mostly considered to have failed, or at least considered to be highly controversial during this period. However, over the last 50 years there has also been continuous improvement in the policies and procedures that address dam-induced displacement and resettlement in China. Among those efforts, continued improvement of policy at national level, especially compensation standards, is a significant one (World Commission on Dams, 2000). Besides recognizing the human and financial costs of substandard resettlement planning and practice, the Chinese government has endeavored to improve its approaches with respect to the resettlement issue (Nui, 2004). It gradually recognized that resettlements could be seen as a chance of developing the affected areas. The concept of resettlement with development has fundamentally changed the traditional approach of addressing resettlement, which is compensation-based resettlement (Brook, et al, 2008).

15 15 A Case Study of Involuntary Resettlement of Three Gorges Dam Project Introduction of Three Gorges Dam project Three Gorges Dam is a reservoir as long as 632 km, situated at Sandouping, Yichang, Hubei Province. The construction of the dam began in It was expected to be completed in The project is composed of the dam, two power plants and navigation facilities (Wang, 2002). It s estimated that some 20 counties or municipal districts, 227 townships and 1680 villages have been inundated (Duan & Steil, 2003) as well as ha of farmland (Chi, 1997). However, according to the government (Jing, 1999), the project has the capacity of producing 84.7 billion kwh of hydroelectricity annually, which helps alleviate the problem of electricity shortage due to increasing demand in middle and eastern China. Aside from that, it improves the navigation capacity of Yangtze River and the ecological environment by providing clean energy and thus reducing the Co2 intensity of GDP at the same time. The Three Gorges dam has received great attention ever since. Proposed by Sun Yat-sen in 1919, it became one of the most hotly debated political issues within the Chinese government due to its unprecedented scale and social and environmental impacts. Scholars criticize its profound adverse social and environmental impacts and strongly oppose this project. Some claim it s the demonstration the Chinese government has showed to the world what they can achieve. More importantly, they argue that institutional desires for political and economic gain have always played a special role in the project (Jing, 1999). The political aspect has always been a significant characteristic of this project. Prior to its approval by the National People s Congress in 1992, scholars also questioned the feasibility of this mega-project and the management skill of Chinese government in handling this kind of issue since past experiences have been painful and unsuccessful. As a result, it remains one of the most controversial water conservancy

16 16 projects ever constructed (Down to Earth, 1994; Human Rights in China, 1998; International Rivers Network, 2003). Among all the criticism and controversies, the resettlement program is a frequently debated topic. Resettlement Program The resettlement of the Three Gorges dam project is not an overnight process. Instead, it has lasted for nearly two decades and is still in process up to day. The first phase of population resettlement started in Between 1993 and 1995, some thousands of people were displaced (Jing, 1999; Wilmsen, et al, 2011). Another 20,000- plus people were relocated in 1996, and more than 30,000 are being resettled before the damming of the river in November (Jing, 1999). As time goes by, more and more people were displaced. In 2003, most of the large-scale resettlement began, after the completion of the first group of electric generating units. By 2009, 13 cities, 140 towns and 1,352 villages will be flooded, and at least 1.2 million people will be relocated (Jing, 1999). Never before in China, or anywhere else for that matter, has a single hydroelectric dam project displaced so many people (Jing, 1999). The majority of the displaced people were from small rural communities. Heggelund (2004) claimed that more than 87% were classified as rural residents. In other words, most of them are peasants who rely heavily or even solely on their lands and communities as a way of living. They are considered the vulnerable group in Chinese society. The official data of people resettled is 1.13 million (Jing, 1999). But the actual number of population being resettled is between 1.3 million to1.6 million. The displacement cost approximately 40% of the officially estimated project investment of RMB 180 billion ($28 billion) in 2008 prices (Wang, 2002; Wilmsen, et al, 2011). The scale of relocation for Three Gorges Dam project is unprecedented. Findings of current literature overwhelmingly suggest that involuntary

17 17 resettlement is associated with the impoverishment of the affected population and the destruction of the social fabric (Cernea, 1990, 1997, 1998; Scudder, 1997; Scudder, & Colson, 1982; etc.). Similar to the impacts of most other resettlement programs, the overall adverse impact of the resettlement imposed upon affected population in Three Gorges Dam resettlement is that they were considerably poorer afterwards and worse off than their neighbours who were not moved (Jing, 1999) since they suffered from asset, income and land loss (Brook, et al, 2008; Wilmsen, et al, 2011) as well as psychological stress (Xi & Hwang, 2011). Political principles, Major Policies and Approaches of Resettlement Resettlement for the Three Gorges Dam Project is the most difficult task of all the projects involved for Chinese government. Unlike most developing countries, the People s Republic of China established a fairly comprehensive legal framework and a variety of regulations to support involuntary resettlement some decades ago and made modifications over time (Brook, et al, 2008; World Bank, 2000), from pre-feasibility planning, developing the Feasibility Resettlement Program, implementing the plan and monitoring the entire process. Since the mid-1980s, the Chinese government has carried out a developmentoriented resettlement policy, linking resettlement to development in order to prevent the impoverishment that has been typical of past large hydro projects. As Croll (1999) pointed out that the with the introduction of "resettlement with development" or "development-oriented resettlement," the process of resettlement not only relocates people, but also helps them by providing the means of production to generate improved incomes. In China, it puts forth the generic objective of resettlement in the slogan moving out, being stable and becoming wealthy gradually (Bryan, Hugo & Tan, 2005). It is said to have been designed to guarantee a package of economic benefits to the

18 18 targeted rural resettlers, including establishment of housing projects, production bases and an infrastructure of community facilities (Jing, 1997). Under this principle, the relative policies cover areas of support, including employment and production development, funding development, preferential treatment for resettlers, and postresettlement activities (Wilmsen, 2011). The principle is to take resettlement as a chance for development and improvement, or at least to restore the pre-relocation living standard of resettled people. This policy of near resettlement is another approach that the Chinese government has taken at the initial stage of the project, meaning to displace people to a higher level or further from the reservoir. However, in 1998, the central government realized that the deteriorating environment in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River was a significant factor causing disastrous floods and that clearing of the reservoir areas for displaced people must be restrained (Bryan, et al, 2005). Specifically, resettlement planning for each county includes the following main elements: planning for rural displaced people; relocation planning of cities and towns; inundation treatment and relocation for enterprises; special item reconstruction planning; environmental protection planning and cost-estimation. In resettlement planning, the relationship between resettlement and economic development has been fully reconciled and environmental protection is also given special consideration (Wang, 2002). Among all the policies, those around compensation are an important aspect in the resettlement issue that needs to be addressed since adequate compensation is crucial to rural relocated population who rely on agricultural production to make a living. The Land Administration Law, first formulated in 1953, outlined the principles and procedures for land acquisition (Wilmsen, 2011). It also set the standards for payment of compensation for acquired land, which set the foundation for compensation standard for resettlement and land acquisition. It has been updated and improved five times with additional regulations added to enhance the land law including the Land Acquisition and

19 19 Resettlement Regulation for the Construction of Large and Medium-Sized Water Conservancy Projects (1991 and 2006) (Shi, 2008; Wilmsen, 2011). Under the most recent Land Administration Law (2004) (Article 51) (Wilmsen, 2011), when land or housing is acquired to make way for a large or medium-sized dam, the standards for land compensation and the method of resettlement shall be determined separately by the State Council. In this case, the affected population fall under the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Regulation for Construction of Large and Medium-sized Water Conservancy Projects (Wilmsen, 2011). The regulation was first issued in 1991 and modified in According to the 1991 Regulations, compensation was calculated by determining the average annual output value (AAOV) for three years prior to the land acquisitioning and multiplying it by a factor of three or four. Land compensation and resettlement subsidies are equal to 16 times the average annual output value under the 2006 regulation (Wilmsen, 2011). Besides, the 2006 Regulations added subsidies for relocation and training for livelihoods, annual post-relocation fund support of RMB 600 per year per capita for 20 years, and community infrastructure rehabilitation and improvement based on the needs of resettlers (Asian Development Bank, 2007). Other preferential policies have also been formulated by the State Council in order to facilitate the resettlement program. The investment needed for resettlement is ensured. There are abundant natural resources, such as minerals, hydraulic resources, forests, agricultural products and tourist resources in the region offering favourable conditions for development (Wang, 2002). Other policies include: approving preferential policies such as those given to special economic (zones) for the reservoir region s area and cities; providing low interest loans for technical reforms to the relocation enterprises; and resolving that the whole country should support the resettlement of (those displaced by) TGP (Wang, 2002).

20 20 Political Factors that influence the Resettlement Process China s resettlement process has its particular characteristics due to its unique political system and historical legacy. The first factor that separates the resettlement process from other cases is the land ownership. China has a dual land ownership system. In urban areas, land is owned by the state. Urban dwellers can trade their landuse rights under a leasehold system through selling in the market, subleasing, or mortgaging the land (Po, 2008; Deng & Huang, 2004). However, in rural China, land is owned collectively, meaning that it s not owned individually but communally (usually at the village level). Rural residents are entitled to use the lands but they are not allowed to sell their land in the market (Bryan, et al, 2005; Wilmsen, 2011). In rural areas, when land acquisition occurs, it is a transfer of land ownership from the rural collective to the state or under the institutional power of the local government. However, this enables local government to expropriate land from peasants at low cost and sell it to developers at much higher prices (Ding, 2007; Yang & Wang, 2008). Besides, when households are dispossessed of their land, they are compensated not for the value of land but for the loss of use value of their land. Therefore, compensation can hardly reflect their price of land in its developed use (Wilmsen, et al, 2011; Ding, 2007; Edin, 2003). That s one of the reasons the compensation standards are still considered too low to resettlers (Asian Development Bank, 2007) even after 2006, when the updated regulations have taken the compensation standards to a historically new level. Central-local governmental relations are another factor that influences the practice of resettlement. China is a unitary state and its bureaucracy is hierarchical but devolved. Laws, decrees, regulations and decisions flow down from the central government in Beijing to officials in provinces, prefectures, counties, and townships. But local officials are embedded in a local bureaucracy: they have dual responsibilities (and,

21 21 often, dual funding too) to their superiors within a ministry as well as to the local government in which they are embedded (Wilmsen, et al, 2011). In some sense, government is localized because local governments are responsible for the implementation of all the policies that come down from the central government. This can give local governments a great deal of autonomy if the local economy is successful and strong, resulting in loose execution of policies at the local government. Thus, in this case, the central regulations can be loosely implemented at local government level as well. Under the resettlement policies, resettlement is managed by local governments and is supported by the whole nation. The hierarchy of resettlement administration for large dam project is illustrated in figure 1 (Wilmsen, 2011). In general, the administration and implementation of resettlement policies can be very decentralized. Local government can tailor resettlement plans and policies to specific local environment and situations, thus having a great deal of autonomy. However, the devolution of power to local government is not accompanied by the introduction of systems to monitor and detect the implementation of the resettlement policies (Andrews-Speed & Ma, 2008). A preference for urban and industrial forms of development over rural and agricultural forms of development is another contributing factor that makes the practice of China s resettlement experience unique (Peet & Hartwick, 1999; Wilmsen, et al, 2011). Since 1978, China s national objective is economic development while maintaining social stability and retaining existing power structures (Edin, 2003). China s modernization is characterized by an absolute preference for urban and industrial development. There is huge difference between the rural and urban systems. One example is the different citizenship systems. In rural area, people hold rural hukou (household registration system), whereas urban residents hold non-rural hukou. People holding different kinds of hukou enjoy different levels of social services, such as health

22 22 and education. For a long time, this system has been a big obstacle for rural residents to become better off. Fig. 1 Hierarchical Structure of Resettlement Administration for Dam Projects Rural residents suffer from generational poverty. Besides, city development and modernization have always been national priorities, leaving rural areas extremely backward and poor. Although great efforts have been made to improve rural people s life and to develop rural areas, when government realized that the gap between urban and rural has been getting increasingly huge, little progress has been made. These political attitudes and social contexts indicate that peasants should give way to the needs of development and modernization. They should do what they have been told and informed. Accountability structures also stands out as an important aspect of Chinese

23 23 policies and practices. As discussed earlier, the governance of projects in China is hierarchical. At each administrative level, regardless of whether a project is nationally funded or whether it involves international donors, the lowest level of the hierarchy is always held accountable to the next highest level of administration. In other words, they are accountable to the higher level of the administration. In the Three Gorges Dam resettlement case, those who are responsible for implementing the national resettlement policy and associated regulations view themselves as accountable to the next level of government rather than the affected population. Undoubtedly, this has profound influence on the outcomes of resettlement project. Achievements and major problems The resettlement project of Three Gorges Dam is a mega-project itself. By the time of writing, it has been going for almost twenty years and has involved a number of over 1.3 million population resettled. Although there has been criticism and controversies towards the approaches, policies and practices of resettlement, one has to admit that there are achievements as well. Unlike many developing countries, China has a welldeveloped framework of legislation supporting dam-forced displacement and resettlement (Wilmsen, 2011). During the resettlement period, there has been no big social disturbance. Relocation work has been fairly smoothly implemented under the resettlement planning. The infrastructure for relocated cities and towns also has progressed (Wang, 2002). The mission of resettlement is also roughly achieved. However, these achievements can not overshadow the problems of resettlement program that have been broadly addressed. To begin with, the compensation issue in resettlement has always been highly controversial. Generally speaking, compensation lacks consistency across provinces and counties, which leads to injustice and anger among resettlers. Specifically, there are

24 24 mainly three problems in the compensation issue alone. First is the overall low level of compensation the government has provided to resettled people. As discussed before, the land is owned collectively in rural China. The compensation system reflected the land ownership system in China. Compensation was paid for the use value of land rather the value of land. Therefore, peasants do not receive compensation for the loss of land, because the land was not theirs in the first place. Local governments have substantial power in deciding the use value of the land and the value can be variable. Secondly, as abovementioned, the majority of resettled population have been rural residents. But a few of them are urban residents. Under the government's current resettlement policy, the rural people are to be compensated less than these urbanites. The disparity in compensation payments between rural and urban residents fueled great conflicts. Besides, within rural areas, there can be huge gaps with respect to compensation packages. Compensation was determined by county governments, who are entitled to assess the value of old houses and there s no standard compensation that s being used across all the affected communities, which led to the big gap between communities in terms of compensation. This reflects China s political system. Since power is devolved from center to locality within China s system of governance, county governments have a lot of autonomy with respect to compensation within their own jurisdictions when the policies and regulations come down from central government. As a result, different jurisdictions can have fairly different levels of compensation given the specific situations they face (Brook, et al, 2008; Wilmsen, 2011). This is a contributing factor that caused households to lose assets and become worse off post relocation. Lack of participation of affected people is another problem that has been frequently criticized among critics and media (World Bank, 2000). The Chinese government has been accused of using an inhumane approach of persuading people

25 25 to get out of their houses and move to somewhere they don t know, mostly in a way of coercion and informing instead of consultation (Heggelund, 2004; Jing, 1999; Tan, 2008; etc.). Peasants don t really have a say in the resettlement process regarding resettlement locations and livelihood options. Mostly, they are informed about what they have to do. Legally speaking, public participation is not the mandate of Chinese government since it s not stipulated in the 2006 Regulations. Peasants are prevented from negotiating (Cao, Feng & Tao, 2008). This is also rooted back to China s unique political atmosphere and historical legacy addressed above. China s preference for urban and industrial forms of development over rural and agricultural forms of development indicate that peasants should give way to the needs of national priorities for development and modernization. The fundamental nature of this kind of program is that the few give rights away for the benefit of the many (Wilmsen, 2011). They should do what they have been told and informed. Besides, since peasants are historically not a well-educated group in China, their input was not taken seriously and it s considered to be a waste of time to get them involved in an already demanding task. For example, at one village in Kaixian County, Chongqing Municipality, displacees were invited to participate in propaganda organized by the township resettlement office (Deng & Huang, 2004). At the meeting they were lectured on the significance of the Three Gorges Project, compensation standards, and the opportunities for livelihood development (Deng & Huang, 2004). This kind of consultation mainly takes the form of providing information. Another contributing factor that leads to poor implementation and outcomes of the resettlement policies is the accountability structures discussed earlier. One of the most common results of the earlier mentioned accountability structures is the asymmetrical relationships of power between the government officials and the affected population. In this case, what s even worse is that the affected population are mostly vulnerable groups that usually acquire limited social resources. Vulnerable groups were

26 26 not paid as much attention as they should have been paid. Since administrations responsible for implementing the resettlement policies and regulations are held accountable to the next level of government rather than the resettled people, local governments lack the incentive to consult the needs and demands of affected people. Other problems cited by scholars include: the underestimation of the number of relocated population; poor selection of designated resettlement in the early stage of resettlement that lead to secondary resettlement ; lack of detailed planning of resettlement, including analysis of land availability and carrying capacity (Bryan, et al, 2005; World Bank, 2000); corruption problems of local government (Ting, 1997; Wu, 1998); insufficient attention to vulnerable groups, including women, ethnic minorities (Bryan, et al, 2005; World Bank, 2000); mismanagement of resettlement budget and time lag (Jing, 1999; World Bank, 2000); and the lack of a monitoring mechanism for the resettlement process 2. Those problems are all micro-problems that resulted from the political characteristics of the Chinese government. Micro doesn t mean they aren t worth addressing, but rather those problems are of great significance that should be dealt with in order to improve the outcome of resettlement program. For example, the problem of corruption has caused public anger and is always worth our close attention. However, what I m trying to address here is that those problems are of managerial nature and some of them are the result of the Chinese political system. In order to address the latter problems, radical reform should be made. Above all, China s experience reflected the national objective during this time. The resettlement is a mirror that tells us the national priorities. Specifically, it indicated 2 In 1995, the Communist Party officially introduced Xinfang, a creative complaint system compared to traditional formal legal institutions. It has served as a channel for citizens to seek assistance, to appeal government decisions, and to engage in a limited level of political participation (Minzner, 2009).

27 27 that during those periods the country has been focusing on economic growth in the context of the subordination of individuals to the collective and the few to the most; preference of urban-industrial development over rural development; disparities between urban and rural; the local implementation of national plans and directives; and the structure of land ownership, which have all shaped its story and made it unique. Dam-induced Resettlement in Canada History of Dam building and resettlement issue in Canada Similar to China, Canada also has an intensive history of dam construction. It is now the second largest hydroelectricity producer in the world. It is home to some of the largest and most powerful hydro power facilities in the world (International Water Power & Dam Construction, 2012). The dams are mainly used to for hydroelectric power generation, irrigation and flood control. The first large-scale dam building began during Second World War, when governments initiated a broad hydroelectric program (Evenden, 2009). Today there are approximately 450 hydroelectric power plants operating in Canada and more than 200 small hydro plants (<10 MW). Canada also has more than 800 dams that are used for hydroelectric power generation, irrigation and flood control (International Water Power & Dam Construction, 2012). However, quite different from China, the relocation issue in Canada has frequently involved First Nations mainly due to historical and environmental factors. Historically, the geographical displacement of aboriginal group resulted from the invasion of incoming Europeans since the 1600s and 1700s. Aboriginal people had to abandon their traditional hunting, fishing and residential lands. Their homelands were restricted through land purchase agreements, the treaty-making process and the establishment of reserves (Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996).