RETHINK PAPER 09 / MAY 2013 TURKEY AMIDST THE SHIFTING GEOPOLITICS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EBRU OĞURLU

Transcription

1 RETHINK PAPER 09 / MAY 2013 TURKEY AMIDST THE SHIFTING GEOPOLITICS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EBRU OĞURLU

2 RETHINK PAPER 09 / MAY 2013 TURKEY AMIDST THE SHIFTING GEOPOLITICS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EBRU OĞURLU

3 The Rethink Institute is an independent, not-for-profit, nonpartisan research institution devoted to deepen our understanding of contemporary political and cultural challenges facing communities and societies around the world, in realizing peace and justice, broadly defined. The Institute pursues this mission by facilitating research on public policies and civic initiatives centering on dispute resolution, peace building, dialogue development, and education. Toward these goals, the Institute sponsors rigorous research and analysis, supports visiting scholar programs, and organizes workshops and conferences. Rethink Institute. All rights reserved. This publication may be reproduced in part for educational and non-profit purposes, provided acknowledgment of the source is made. No use of this publication may be made for resale or for any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in writing from the Rethink Institute. ISBN: Printed in the USA Rethink Institute 750 First St., NE, Suite 1125 Washington, DC Phone: This publication can be downloaded at no cost at

4 CONTENTS 1 Summary 3 Tension in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea 4 The New Energy Deal 7 A New Friendship: Israel and Cyprus 12 Turkey s Regional Ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean 13 Relations with the United States 14 Relations with the European Union 16 Epilogue 16 After Israeli Apology 17 Cyprus after the Financial Crisis 19 About the Author 20 Map of Hydrocarbon Contestation in the Eastern Mediterranean

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6 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean Summary Recent developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, ranging from the drilling disputes to the implications of the Arab Spring for regional countries, risk turning the Eastern Mediterranean region into an area dominated by power politics. At the heart of this region, Turkey faces a number of external challenges that directly influence developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. These challenges revolve around a number of issues including energy and the wider Cyprus problem with its impacts on both the sovereign rights over the island s resources and Turkey s EU accession process. Related to the energy issue, geostrategic reasoning coupled with economic rationale has led Ankara to diversify its energy supplies and to safeguard its position as a transit country for EU oil and gas supplies. Any possible gas export routes to European markets through the Mediterranean, connecting Israel, Cyprus and Greece, will be conceived as a threat to Turkish ambitions on the way of becoming a transit hub for gas sales to Europe. Given the best geographic position between the continental Europe the world s second-largest natural gas market and the substantial gas reserves of the Russia, the Caspian Basin and the Middle East and the web of regional gas projects around it Turkey, in the long run, aspires to become a regional hub rather than remain a simple bridge over which energy flows, and translate this role into economic and foreign/security policy gains. 1

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8 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean Tension in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea In the last few years, crucial geopolitical developments are destabilizing the Eastern Mediterranean and fuelling regional tensions. First, most of the region is in a deep economic and monetary crisis. Second, the Arab Spring is causing chaos and turmoil in the regional countries and creates uncertainties about the future. Third, if not properly managed, the recent gas and oil discoveries have the potential of destabilizing the region further due to the so-called resource nationalism 1 which implies a turbulent period of competition among the regional actors as well as temporary and reversible alliances in order to ameliorate their status in the regional power game. 2 Moreover, the Arab-Israeli conflict shows no sign of any solution and the Iranian nuclear crisis is destabilizing the whole region and causing confrontation among the leading regional actors. However, none of those factors could undermine the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean which is rapidly transforming from a poorly endowed transit zone into a potential major producer and The Eastern Mediterranean has occupied an ever more central role in Turkish foreign policy, mainly after the crisis with Israel over the Freedom Flotilla incident in late May 2010 and the recent political chaos in Syria. Regional relations were further damaged due to the competing claims and rivalry among Turkey, Cyprus and Israel concerning the energy issue. exporter of resources. 3 While regional gas discoveries can hold out the prospect of significant wealth, they also carry a number of risks and uncertainties. However, any dispute or conflicting claim among the nations in the region can easily turn into an issue of serious controversy, or worse, a confrontation. The Eastern Mediterranean has occupied an ever more central role in Turkish foreign policy, mainly after the crisis with Israel over the Freedom Flotilla incident in late May 2010 and the recent political chaos 1 Mehmet Öğütçü, Natural gas as the game-changer: implications for, and actions from, Turkey, Today s Zaman, 23 January 2013, available at [accessed in March 2013]. 2 Dorothée Schmid, Towards an Energy Revolution in the Eastern Mediterranean: Any Positive Effect for the EU? Neighborhood Policy Paper, No. 13, March 2013, available at [accessed in March 2013]. 3 Ibid. 3

9 Ebru Oğurlu in Syria. Regional relations were further damaged due to the competing claims and rivalry among Turkey, Cyprus 4 and Israel concerning the energy issue. Regional stability deteriorated when the Greek Cypriot government started drilling activities off the coast of the island following the discovery of huge amounts of oil and gas reserves in disputed waters. Energy politics is an important component of the whole Eastern Mediterranean puzzle. However, the dispute over natural resources in there cannot be confined only to the issue of energy. Rather, it is a multidimensional crisis, linked to conflicting sovereignty claims. Turkey is currently involved in a number of regional conflicts including its long-lasting Kurdish problem, the civil war in Syria, and the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tensions with Russia over the Syrian crisis, with Iran over both Syria and the deployment of NATO early warning radar system, and with both of them over the deployment of Patriot missiles have further complicated matters for Turkey. Further challenges for Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean have emerged with the discovery of significant natural gas deposits in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Israel and Cyprus as well as the strengthening cooperation between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. The New Energy Deal Regional competition over the right to tap the Eastern Mediterranean resources is compounding existing tensions over sovereignty and maritime borders. In theory, international law stipulates that coastal states have sovereign rights over the areas of the sea adjacent to their territories, including internal waters, continental shelves, territorial seas and EEZs. However, it is not always easy to put the theory of international law into practice. Accordingly, the most recent controversy in the Eastern Mediterranean emerged from the difficulty for the coastal states to exercise their (claimed) sovereign prerogatives at sea, particularly their rights to oil and gas exploration. This has further intensified the long-lasting, broader and serious political conflicts in the region. 4 Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 after gaining independence from Britain. In 1974, following years of communal violence between the Greek and Turkish residents of the island and an attempt to unify the island with Greece, Turkey occupied northern part of the island. Consequently, the island and its capital (Nicosia in Greek, Lefkoşe in Turkish) were partitioned into two parts divided by a United Nations buffer zone. In 1983 Turkish Republic of North Cyprus was established. According to international law, only the Greek/Southern part of Cyprus under the name of the Republic of Cyprus - is recognized as the legitimate representative of the whole island. Unless indicated otherwise, this study will use the term Cyprus to refer to the southern part of the island under Greek Cypriot rule. 4

10 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean The latest spat in the Eastern Mediterranean was a culmination of a number of previous developments in a region with considerable oil and gas reserves, which are estimated approximately 3500 billion cubic meters which could guarantee gas supplies for the region for years. 5 However, tensions were already on the rise before this recent development. In 2004, the decision by the Republic of Cyprus to claim its EEZ was met with concern in North Cyprus and Turkey, both of which recognized neither the sovereignty of Cyprus nor, consequently, its claimed EEZ, along with the rights coming with it. Moreover, while Turkey has not concluded delimitation agreements in the Mediterranean, Cyprus EEZ agreements with Egypt and Lebanon, signed in February 2003 and January 2007 respectively, added fuel to the fire. 6 On top of that, Israel discovered an overabundance of natural gas at the Tamar and Leviathan basins in 2009 and The Tamar basin, estimated to have approximately 250 billion cubic meters of gas, 7 is expected to meet Israeli domestic energy needs for the next 40 years. Estimates put the volume of gas at the Leviathan basin at double the Tamar reserves. The latest spat in the Eastern Mediterranean was a culmination of a number of previous developments in a region with considerable oil and gas reserves, which are estimated approximately 3500 billion cubic meters which could guarantee gas supplies for the region for years. This discovery by Israel occurred at precisely the same time as relations with Turkey were rapidly deteriorating due to the Freedom Flotilla incident. The proximity of the resource-rich area to the Cypriot-Israeli maritime border and then the souring Turkey-Israeli relations led to a rapprochement between Israel and Cyprus. The two countries signed a maritime border agreement in December agreeing to delimit their respective EEZs and cooperate on oil and gas explorations in Cyprus EEZ. Turkey challenged the legitimacy of this agreement of Cyprus with 5 Michael Koehler, Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for the European Union, GMF Mediterranean Policy Program-Policy Brief, October 2012, available at [accessed in February 2013]. 6 The agreement between Egypt and Cyprus which is not recognized by Turkey entered into force in April The agreement with Lebanon has not yet entered into force. 7 Brenda Shaffer, Energy Resources and Markets in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, GMF Mediterranean Policy Program-Policy Brief, June 2012, available at [accessed in February 2013]. 8 The agreement has entered into force in February

11 Ebru Oğurlu Israel stating that Greek Cypriots do not represent the whole island and are not entitled to conclude such agreements. Tensions peaked when the Greek Cypriots authorized Noble Energy Company to start exploratory drilling for gas in their Aphrodite field 9 in September Noble Energy Company is a US firm with Israeli participation and has been conducting offshore drills in the Eastern Mediterranean for Israel since Short after the drilling began, in December 2011 Noble Energy announced the discovery of gas estimated close to 200 billion cubic meters in Aphrodite, large enough to possibly meet Cyprus natural gas needs for 150 years. 10 The importance of this gas exploration for Turkey may be grasped from two different perspectives. First, it is related to the wider Cyprus problem due to conflicting claims by both sides over the ownership or sharing of the island s resources. The Greek Cypriots claim that they are the only recognized representative of the whole island. Accordingly, they claim to have sovereign rights over the whole EEZ of Cyprus. Despite Turkey s warning to Cyprus, the then Greek Cypriot President, Dimitris Christofias, has declared that the right of his country to conduct exploratory Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots argue that the Greek Cypriots should not exploit resources before reaching a comprehensive settlement on the island. Most recently, Davutoğlu warned the Greek Cypriots saying that if Greek Cyprus says the resources are ours then it means tacitly that Turkish Cypriots own the resources in the north. Against this backdrop, the energy dispute is likely to widen the already existent gap between the two parts of Cyprus. drilling is non-negotiable and has protested against any foreign meddling. 11 He has also added that even in the absence of a comprehensive solution to the dispute Turkish Cypriots, being equal citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, will also benefit from any wealth 9 The field, also called Plot. No. 12, is within the Greek Cyprus claimed EEZ and adjacent to the Leviathan field. 10 Toula Onoufriou, Cyprus a Future Energy Hub? GMF Mediterranean Policy Program-Policy Brief, June 2012, available at [accessed in February 2013]; Stephen Blank, Turkey and Cyprus Gas: More Troubles Ahead in 2012, Turkey Analyst, Vol. 5, No. 1, 9 January 2012, available at [accessed in February 2012]. 11 Turkey to continue Cyprus gas drill, Hürriyet Daily News, 3 October 2011, available at [accessed in February 2012]. 6

12 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean found in Cyprus EEZ. 12 So far, Nicos Anastasiadis, who was elected as the new leader of the Greek Cypriots in February 2013, has not directly touched on the energy issue. Given the potential of Cyprus gas volumes and the Greek Cypriot ambitions to use the resources as a source of revenue, it is predictable that Anastasiadis government will keep the status quo on the energy issue. By contrast, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots find these claims contrary to the 1960 Treaty on the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Ankara argues that the southern part should and could not have exclusive rights to these resources. The Turks also oppose the Cypriot- Israeli agreement on the ground the sovereignty is shared between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Therefore, natural resources discovered off the coasts of Cyprus belong to both sides, which should fairly participate in the prospective benefits from any reserves. As a corollary to this legal argument, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots argue that the Greek Cypriots should not exploit resources before reaching a comprehensive settlement on the island. Most recently, Davutoğlu warned the Greek Cypriots saying that if Greek Cyprus says the resources are ours then it means tacitly that Turkish Cypriots own the resources in the north. 13 Against this backdrop, the energy dispute is likely to widen the already existent gap between the two parts of Cyprus. A New Friendship: Israel and Cyprus The relationship between Turkey and Israel has unexpectedly eroded at high speed since the Flotilla Marmara incident in 2010 when eight Turkish nationals and one Turkish American citizen were killed in international waters following the Israeli navy s interception of ships carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza. Historically, the fear of marginalization and isolation with the region led Israel to accept Turkey as an ally with which it could share a Westernized orientation. Things have gradually started to change after 2008, during the second term of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 14 Internally, the AKP s rule has coincided with a shift in the balance of power from the so-called secularist military-bureaucratic establishment to a moderate pro-islamic government. Internationally, the AKP s more pronounced Islamic orientations enabled Erdoğan to distance Turkey 12 Christofias Attended Cyprus Federation Annual Gala, Greek News, 25 September 2011, available at [accessed in February 2012]. 13 Turkey ready to negotiate a two-state solution for Cyprus: Turkish FM, Hürriyet Daily News, 28 March 2013, available at [accessed in March 2013]. 14 The ruling AKP won three consecutive landslide elections in 2002, 2007 and

13 Ebru Oğurlu from the most controversial policies associated with the West (the 2003 war in Iraq and the nuclear standoff with Iran, just to give a few examples) and to expand its influence over the whole Arab world through strengthened economic and political ties to the East. Also critical in this regard have been Erdoğan s efforts to defend and promote the cause of the Palestinians. Improved ties with the Arab-Muslim countries were established at the expense of the relationship with Israel. Against this backdrop, the relationship with Israel started to crack. Suffice it to mention the public humiliation suffered by Erdoğan in late 2008, when Israel launched its Cast Lead operation in December January 2009 against Hamas in the Gaza Strip without informing him about this impending attack, even though Israeli Foreign Minister Ehud Olmert had officially visited Ankara just two days earlier. The Cast Lead Operation led to the famous incident at Davos in January 2009 when Erdoğan stormed out of a public meeting with Israel s President Shimon Peres in protest of the Israeli operation. Then came the so-called lower chair crisis in January 2010, whereby Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon publicly insulted Turkey s Ambassador to Israel, Oğuz Çelikkol. The Freedom Flotilla incident has continued to beset Israeli- Turkish relations ever since. Turkey has been asking for an official apology for the deaths of the Turkish citizens, compensation for the families of the dead and the wounded, and an end to the blockade of the Gaza Strip. Israel s refusal to apologize until very recently and the September 2011 UN report which condemned the deaths but justified Israel s blockade of Gaza, led Turkey drastically reduce its diplomatic relations and freeze military cooperation and trade with Israel. While Israel s discovery of gas and oil resources has added a new potentially explosive element to the already complex relationship, Israel s Pillar of Cloud operation in November 2012 further deteriorated the already tense bilateral relations. On top of that, the Arab Spring has further widened the gap between Ankara and Tel Aviv. While the former has shown sympathy and support for the popular uprisings, the latter is mostly concerned about impacts of the revolutionary waves on Israeli plans to secure its (moving) borders in the West Bank. Those profound changes redefined national interests and power competition between the two previous partners and left them increasingly at loggerheads. 8

14 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean The sharp deterioration of relations between Turkey and Israel has changed the political dynamics in the region. 15 As Turkey-Israel relations lie in shambles, Israel has become increasingly entangled with Greece and (Greek) Cyprus. The rapprochement was put into practice with the maritime agreement between Israel and Cyprus of December The cooperation between the two sides has stepped up with a series of high level visits as well as other political and operational links between Israel and Cyprus. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu s visit to Cyprus in February 2012 was symbolically significant. It was concluded with the defense cooperation agreement which allowed the Israeli air force and navy to intervene if there are accidents or threats against energy installations in the EEZ of Cyprus. Israel has also increased its naval patrols around its Mediterranean gas fields and upgraded its naval capacity to address potential threats. Various cooperation agreements were signed by the leaders of the two countries in the name of further collaboration in different areas including joint development of processing, transporting and marketing of offshore gas as well as protecting the energy installations. The sharp deterioration of relations between Turkey and Israel has changed the political dynamics in the region. As Turkey-Israel relations lie in shambles, Israel has become increasingly entangled with Greece and (Greek) Cyprus. The rapprochement was put into practice with the maritime agreement between Israel and Cyprus of December Such prospects and cooperation deals between Israel and Cyprus have also opened the way for Greece so far absent from the regional developments to fill the vacuum Turkey left. Greek and Israeli military forces began holding joint exercises in 2008 and signed a defense cooperation agreement in September As a result of Turkey s decision not to cooperate with Israel and its withdrawal from the regularly scheduled annual exercise Reliant Mermaid since 2009, Noble Dina was conducted with Greek participation on 26 March-5 April The Mediterranean naval exercise was repeated on 7-21 March 2013 to assess the level of operational cooperation between the three 15Jeffrey Mankoff, Resource Rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean: The View from Washington, GMF Mediterranean Policy Program-Policy Brief, June 2012, available at [accessed in February 2013]. 9

15 Ebru Oğurlu navies. 16 At the same time, high level talks between Israel and Greece have also taken place about the construction of an underwater pipeline to Europe which would supposedly make Greece the transit country for Israeli gas to reach Europe, bypassing Turkey. Such a possibility would likely reduce Turkey s centrality in the whole energy game. Therefore, Turkey-Cyprus spats over Eastern Mediterranean energy resources have soured Turkey-Greece relations and pushed back implementation of a previously agreed project on the completion of a gas pipeline to pump Caspian gas into southeastern Europe. The Greece-Cyprus-Israel alliance has emerged in parallel with the growing tensions in the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle and the Turkish- Israeli relationship. As a response to the recent regional developments, in September 2011, Turkey signed an agreement with North Cyprus on the delimitation of the continental shelf similar to that between Israel and South Cyprus. After being authorized in September 2011 to begin exploration for gas in six plots falling under the Cypriot EEZ, the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) started drilling activities in the north of the island in April Prime Minister Erdoğan also threatened to blacklist international oil and gas firms that cooperate with the Greek Cypriots and stop them from participating in energy projects in Turkey. 17 Turkey s move was important symbolically, as it sent a powerful political message that Ankara was willing to defend North Cyprus interests robustly, including by targeting third The Greece-Cyprus-Israel alliance has emerged in parallel with the growing tensions in the Turkey- Greece-Cyprus triangle and the Turkish-Israeli relationship. As a response to the recent regional developments, in September 2011, Turkey signed an agreement with North Cyprus on the delimitation of the continental shelf similar to that between Israel and South Cyprus. countries. 18 However, Turkey s measures did not deter Cyprus from launching a second tender in May 2012 for companies interested in 16 Arutz Sheva, Israeli, US, Greek Warships Conclude 'Noble Dina,' Israel National News, 22 March 2013, available at [accessed in March 2013]. 17 Turkish minister gives Cyprus confrontation signals, Hürriyet Daily News, 22 September 2011, available at [accessed in February 2012]. 18 Mustafa Kutlay, Doğu Akdeniz de Sertleşen Rekabet: Güney Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi- Türkiye Gerginliğinin Analizi, [The Toughening Competition in Eastern Mediterranean: An Analysis of the Tension between Greek Cyprus and Turkey] USAK Analiz, No. 13, September 2011, available at 10

16 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean receiving concessions for exploratory drilling in Cyprus EEZ. According to Cypriot sources the second round resulted in bids by fifteen companies and joint ventures. The evaluation report was submitted to the Ministry of Commerce in late September So far, Greek Cyprus has granted licences for exploratory drilling to France (Total SA), Italy (ENI), South Korea (KOGAS) and the US (Nobel Energy). The negotiations on the second licensing round are expected to be completed in Turkey s realignment in the Eastern Mediterranean has also allowed Russia to adjust and stage a comeback to the region from where it has been marginalized for almost two decades. Considering the region as gaining importance because of both its energy reserves and its key strategic position, Russia is systematically pursuing a policy of economic and geo-strategic penetration with the objectives of changing the regional order, diminishing the US predominance, limiting an increase of Turkey s and the EU s influence and reclaiming its former status in a renewed geopolitical context. 20 Russia s relations with Israel are expanding. Recently, the Russian gas giant Gazprom has signed an agreement to oversee annual sales of about 4.2 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) over 20 years (starting in 2017). 21 Such a move proves Russia s intention to become an important actor in the regional LNG market. On the other hand, Moscow has long been on good terms with Cyprus, which is an important channel for portfolio and foreign direct investment in Russia. 22 As a reaction to the Turkish threats, the Russian government has immediately backed the rights of Greek Cypriots to develop the gas fields in its EEZ which led Cyprus to [accessed in February 2012], p Cyprus, Israel and Greece to meet on gas, Cyprus Gas News, 01 September 2012, available at [accessed in February 2012]. 20 Patrick Nopens, Geopolitical Shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean, Security Policy Brief, No. 43, February 2013, available at [accessed in March 2013] 21 Itai Trilnick, Tamar Partners in Gazprom agree to join forces to export liquefied gas, Haaretz, 27 February 2013, available at [accessed in March 2013]. 22 For detail pls. see Central Bank of Russia, Russian Federation: Inward Foreign Direct Investment Positions by Geographical Allocation in , 4 October 2012, available at [accessed in March 2013]. For more updated figures pls. see Lenos Trigeorgis, Cyprus: Dwarfs in a strategic geopolitical game, Daily Cyprus News, 24 March 2013, available at [accessed in April 2013]. 11

17 Ebru Oğurlu embrace Moscow a shield against any threats by Turkey. 23 Novatek, Russia s second largest gas producer, was among the companies bidding for the exploration licenses in Cyprus s second tender. Along with its growing energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Greek- Cypriot financial crisis has also proved Russia s potential in the region. Russian close relations with Israel, Cyprus and Greece have strengthened its position vis-à-vis Turkey and posed a serious concern for Ankara. Turkey s Regional Ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean Turkey s increased interest in the Mediterranean stems from a shift in its economic development strategy from import substitution into exportled growth. Beginning in the early 1980s, the need for new export markets led Turkey to initiate, develop and expand new relationships with countries that had been hitherto ignored. 24 Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean emerged in Turkey s foreign policy as an area of economic opportunity rather than simply a troubled region. With such an economic orientation in mind, Turkey aimed to establish itself as a trading state 25 in the region and sought new opportunities for further investments. With the rise to power of the AKP, Turkey introduced a new dimension to its decades-long regional relations driven by trade and diplomatic concerns. With a strong desire to turn Turkey into an influential player and a leading actor in the region, the AKP governments have gradually redefined the country s regional interests, policies, and alliances. In light of such a broader foreign policy horizon, Turkey s relationship with its neighborhood has become remarkably multi-dimensional, as it has been increasingly defined by cultural affinity, societal exchanges, and intensified diplomatic contacts, in addition to economic and security interests Stephen Blank, Turkey Falls Out with Russia: Another Sign of a Foreign Policy in Crisis, Turkey Analyst, Vol. 4, No. 22, 21 November 2011, available at [accessed in February 2012]. 24 İlter Turan, Turkey and the Mediterranean: Balancing Geopolitics and Geo- Economics, GMF Mediterranean Policy Program-Series, September 2011, available at [accessed in January 2012]. 25 Kemal Kirişçi, The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40, 2009, pp Turan, Turkey and the Mediterranean. 12

18 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean Aware of its ability to maneuver among the various countries of the area and act as a bridge between the Middle East and the West, Turkey has also started using its geographical position to strengthen its geopolitical role to achieve its goals in the Eastern Mediterranean. Against this backdrop, Turkey is extremely sensitive to developments that can undermine its current status in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ideally, Ankara would want to consolidate its position by way of increasing its soft power, most notably its ever more important role as an Eastern Mediterranean economic hub. Where this turns out not to be possible, Ankara is willing to confront those regional actors that, deliberately or not, curb its regional ambitions. 27 The implications of Turkey s Eastern Mediterranean policies where the interests of major nonregional actors intersect extend beyond the region s perimeter. Ankara s problems with Israel and Cyprus weigh heavily on its relations with the United States as Israel s staunchest ally and the European Union (EU) of which Cyprus is a member state. It is therefore useful to look at how these more distant actors evaluate Turkey s changing role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is extremely sensitive to developments that can undermine its current status in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ideally, Ankara would want to consolidate its position by way of increasing its soft power, most notably its ever more important role as an Eastern Mediterranean economic hub. Relations with the United States The increasingly tense relationship between Israel and Turkey was one of Washington s most difficult and unwelcome foreign policy challenges in recent years. While traditionally close to Israel, the US has a great interest in preserving its good relations with Turkey, a NATO ally and a Muslim country with growing influence in the Arab world. After the rift over the US-led invasion of Iraq, when the Turkish parliament refused to authorize the use of Turkey s soil and air space for the US campaign, US- Turkish relations seemed to be improving thanks to a number of factors, including Turkey s permission to install NATO missile defense radars and to deploy patriot missiles/troops in its territory, Turkey s attempts 27 Mehmet Öğütçü, As Eastern Mediterranean s Waters Heat Up, Turkey Should Lead An OSCE-Type Initiative in The Middle East, The European Geopolitical Forum, October 2011, available at [accessed in January 2013], pp

19 Ebru Oğurlu to play a mediating role in North Africa and the Middle East and, after an initial hesitation, Turkey s central role in the ongoing Syrian civil war. Turkey has also re-adjusted its position towards Iran in a manner more compatible with the US interests. Turkish cooperation is critical for the US also in Iraq, in particular with its Kurdish-inhabited northern province. It is in geopolitical interest of the US to involve in the Eastern Mediterranean to guarantee that disputes among various regional players would not flare into an overt conflict. Discovery of new energy resources could be considered as opportunities cooperation rather than conflict. So far, the US seems supportive of Turkey s participation in the future energy projects with the regional actors. Relations with the European Union The EU s own financial crisis and inability to successfully manage it hurt the image of the EU as an important strategic actor both globally and regionally in the Eastern Mediterranean. In such a chaotic environment, while working on redefining its relationship with, and strengthening its role in, the wider Mediterranean, the EU s immediate concerns have emerged in the form of preventing confrontation between one of its members (Cyprus) and a candidate country (Turkey), while safeguarding its gas supply from the Mediterranean. Since Cyprus is a member state, the EU has an interest in finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem as well as the energyrelated issues affecting the island. Principally, the EU upholds the sovereign rights of its member states to explore and develop their natural resources in its territory, its continental shelf or EEZ in accordance with the EU treaties and laws as well as international law. In that sense, the EU has shown its interest in limiting conflicts arising from exploration for gas and oil in Cyprus EEZ and in fostering Cyprus potential for natural gas exports to the European markets. The Union has been instantly calling Cyprus and Turkey to work toward the settlement of the Cyprus problem which would also contribute to solving the energy conflicts in and around the island. The other urgent concern of the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean concerns the security and diversification of its gas supply, notoriously a critical issue for the Union due to its growing dependence on a limited number of third parties (especially Russia). 28 The European Commission s 28As Eneko Landaburu, the then European Commission s Director General for External Relations, said in 2008, the EU needs a diversification strategy with the objective of depending less on Russia for gas consumption. For more detail, see EU wrong to 14

20 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean Communication on Energy Infrastructure Priorities for 2020 and Beyond, published in 2010, depicts the Mediterranean as a possible corridor for the diversification of the EU s energy supply (both in terms of geographic origin and type of energy). 29 Considering that the EU gas dependency on sources outside Europe will increase from about 60 percent in 2010 to about 75 percent in 2020 and to over 80 percent in , the EU has taken a considerable interest in the discovered gas fields. A gas supply in such a big scale would most likely guarantee the EU s energy demands and eventually diminish its current dependence on Russia. The EU also continues to engage with Turkey on energy: one of the areas of joint interest in the Positive Agenda of May 2012 encourages Turkey to take an integrated approach to its gas and electricity markets and to ensure that the planned southern gas corridor, which is important for Europe in terms of diversifying its gas suppliers and routes, is of sufficient capacity to accommodate its increased future volumes. Consequently, the EU s interest in the Eastern Mediterranean developments not only stem from its worries about a deteriorating security situation there, but also from its perceived imperative of putting its energy supply on firmer bases. The accession talks that remained stalled indicate the strained relationship between the EU and Turkey. Therefore, it is highly probable that tensions between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots may be exploited by those EU member states that are already against Turkey s membership to further complicate Turkey s dealings with the EU. The accession talks that remained stalled indicate the strained relationship between the EU and Turkey. Therefore, it is highly probable that tensions between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots may be exploited by those EU member states that are already against Turkey s membership to further complicate Turkey s dealings with the EU. In view of the rise of Turkey as a regional power and its potential as an energy hub, the relationship between the EU and Turkey needs to be redefined. Positive changes in French and German positions, the prioritize energy diversification, EurActive, 15 October 2008, [accessed in December 2012]. 29European Commission, Energy Infrastructure Priorities for 2020 and Beyond-A Blueprint for an Integrated European Energy Network, COM (2010) 677 final, 17 November 2010, available at europa.eu/lexuriserv/lexuriserv.do?uri=split_com:2010:0677(01):fin:en:pdf [accessed in December 2012], p Koehler, Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean 15

21 Ebru Oğurlu prospects of re-launching Cyprus peace process after the election of Anastasiadis in the Greek Cyprus and the potential dynamics brought about by Eastern Mediterranean gas could be used to reignite a positive wave in bilateral relations. Epilogue After Israeli Apology The recent Israeli apology in March 2013, symbolizing the dawn of a new era in Turkey-Israel relations has opened a new chapter in the whole regional equation. The apology, which is expected to pave the way for normalization of the relations between Turkey and Israel in a gradual but determined way, was declared by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after it has become apparent that both countries may gain by returning to their previous strategic partnership conditions. The rapprochement between Turkey and Israel will have important implications both regionally and bilaterally. Regionally, Turkey-Israel partnership has the capacity to change the political balance of the whole region with its unforeseeable implications on the cases like Syria, Iran, Iraq and Cyprus. Bilaterally, the shift from emotional detachment to rational realism will, undoubtedly, serve for the benefits of both countries. First, it will help Turkey in elevating [itself] to a position so that it will again have a say, initiative and power, as it did in the past. Second, Israel will feel more secure by the help of its cooperation with Turkey against the challenges it faces, i.e. Syrian instability, the threat of fundamentalism in the region and Hamas attacks against Israeli targets. Third, both sides have recognized the need to move forward and engage in regional cooperation given the common security threats coming from Syria and Iran. Moreover, normalization of relations is expected to maximize cooperation in various other fields including security, intelligence, technology, trade and tourism. The rapprochement between Turkey and Israel has raised the prospects for Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the rift between the countries has precluded any progress so far, even before the apology, Noble Energy and Delek Energy, the main investors in Israel s offshore natural gas fields, have sounded out possible customers in energyhungry Turkey. In that sense, the partnership between Turkey and Israel would make the latter a natural gas supplier to Turkey most probably by the construction of a possible pipeline from Israel to Turkey, as much more viable than any other alternatives. Moreover, Turkish- Israeli reconciliation is expected to provide benefits not only for the two countries, but also for the West by making Turkey an energy hub for 16

22 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean distributing oil and gas to Europe. As International Energy Agency Chief Economist Fatih Birol points out Turkey offers the most economically advantageous way for Israel in transferring the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas [also] to international markets. Israel s shift to Turkey would degrade its relations with Cyprus. Even if Turkey-Israeli relations are not expected to immediately return to the halcyon of diplomatic and military cooperation due to the still existing technical hurdles, the ultimate aim seems rekindling the strategic ties in view of developments in the region. The expected result of this rekindling would force other actors to reformulate their existing regional alignments. As Israeli officials have already announced normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel will not affect any multilateral, trilateral or bilateral relations between Israel and other countries. Israel will maintain close relations with Cyprus, and continue strengthening them as we have done the last few years. However, the re-emerging Turkish-Israeli partnership could, in actuality, develop at the expense of Cyprus where the financial crisis and the gas issues come together. Cyprus after the Financial Crisis The partnership between Turkey and Israel would make the latter a natural gas supplier to Turkey most probably by the construction of a possible pipeline from Israel to Turkey, as much more viable than any other alternatives. With the hope that gas exploration would help Cyprus out of a financial hole, Greek Cypriots recently enacted a law ignoring the right of Turkish Cypriots over the resources around Cyprus. As a reaction to this unilateral action, Davutoğlu proposed a three-alternative plan, in late March, for a solution in the Cyprus problem. Invoking the argument that the use of the resources around the island would and should be a part of the comprehensive solution, each of Davutoğlu s alternatives was formulated with a reference to the use of natural resources in Cyprus EEZ. Accordingly, the first alternative emerges as forming a united Cyprus and jointly exploiting the natural resource around the island. The second road is to form a joint committee by the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to exploit and market natural gas, while peace negotiations are continuing. In the case of failure of the first two options and a unilateral use of the resources by the Greek Cypriots, the third option is structured for North Cyprus to use the resources in the North. With these proposals, Davutoğlu clearly reacted to the Greek Cypriot administration s idea of the use of gas reserves in Cyprus EEZ as 17

23 Ebru Oğurlu collateral for its international bailout package from the EU and IMF. Thus, Davutoğlu repeated once more that the use of the financial crisis as an opportunity to create new fait accompli is unacceptable for Turkey and, accordingly, the only way for the exploitation of the natural resources of the island is the clear consent of the Turkish Cypriots regarding the sharing of these natural resources. At the same time, Davutoğlu has been working on a new initiative to reach a comprehensive solution on the island. With this objective in his mind, he sent a letter to the UN Secretary General, the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council as well as to Germany and Greece to pledge Turkey s and Turkish Cypriots readiness and willingness to work with Greece and the Greek Cypriots (in the form of a four-party solution). These initiatives of Turkey, however, have seriously been criticized by the Greek Cypriots due to the perception that Turkey would exploit their desperate situations. Therefore, with such a high level suspicion, long-time adversity and deep-rooted hostilities between the two sides, a quick and an immediate solution on the island seems quite unlikely even if the regional developments would expedite a rapprochement among all related parties. 18

24 Turkey Amidst the Shifting Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean About the Author Ebru Oğurlu is a faculty member at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University, Turkey. She received BA in International Relations from Middle East Technical University, MA at London School of Economics - European Institute, and PhD in Politics and International Relations of the EU at Marmara University - European Union Institute. Her research and publications focus on history and politics of the European Union, Turkey-European Union relations and Mediterranean politics. Currently, she teaches courses on issues in EU politics, integration theories of the EU and international organizations. 19

25 Ebru Oğurlu Map of Hydrocarbon Contestation in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea 20