The Capability Approach to Environmental Refugees

Transcription

1 The Capability Approach to Environmental Refugees Kyunghwan Kim Department of Public Administration, Korea University Abstract: The aim of this article is to apply the capability approach to matters surrounding environmental refugees, especially which is related to their physical and legal circumstances. The approach is based on the expanded understanding of the existing concept of development. According to the capability approach, the concept means expansion of substantive freedom, and the freedom means capability, in other words, having substantive opportunities to do something. In view of the approach, it is obvious that environmental refugees are not in substantive freedom, particularly in the situation of a deprivation of bodily integrity, bodily health, other species, control over one s environment. Moreover, pointing out that the established propositions to protect and assist them do not have concern for what what should be protected and supported, this article claims that the approach is able to play a role as an intermediate objective to be achieved for development as freedom. Therefore, the article begins with an overview of the capability approach of Sen and Nussbaum, and issues related to environmental refugees. And then based on the review, it judges what capabilities they have been deprived through the approach, and subsequently explores the existing claims and their limitations. In conclusion, implications in an application of capability approach to environmental refugees are considered. Key Words: capability approach, deprivation of freedom, environmental refugees Presented at the Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Portland, March

2 I. Introduction As Amartya Sen (1999) already pointed out, although all over the world economic affluence, democratization of political system, and expansion of political liberty have realized, people have still faced the world of the deprivation of freedom, poverty, and suppression. Rather, the issues, in particular the deprivation of freedom, seem to be more magnified than before because even what had not recognized properly as a public matter is coming out as a problem which should be dealt with in public. The reason why such the problems have not still been resolved, in spite of the increases of kinds and amount of resources both material and immaterial which are able to deal with it, is because of not only still lack of resources but also limitations in determining how the increased resources are used and distributed. In general, the decision is belong to the public sphere. In the sphere numerous actors and their interests are entangled, and thus the discussions on how to be distributed have not been disappeared. The grounds which affect the arguments can be economic, political, social, or cultural. In other words, the public decision could depend on what value individual has or a society shares, or what principle has the upper hand. According to the shared value, what distribution of resources is just, precisely could be justified, would be decided. Public philosophy is about these values or a bunch of principles to be criteria of the judgment. There are various perspectives for instance, Utilitarianism, Rawlsian Justice, and Capability Approach related to this, and each has its emphasis and limitations. Accordingly, before considering what moral principle applies to an actual public problem, it is necessary to understand each principle itself. This study examines the competitiveness of capability approach with Sen s criticism on other approaches and Sen and Nussbaum s claims. Meanwhile, the issues surrounding the Environmental Refugees are the problems in 2

3 the midst of the world of the deprivation of freedom, poverty, and suppression. The troubles of those who have no choice but to leave their own habitats because of severe environmental destruction due to various causes are no longer the domestic ones of countries in where they are living, but become accepted as the worldwide political, economic, social, and cultural ones. In spite of such recognition, however, there is nearly legal and political protection for them. Considering the growing trend and the necessity to shelter them, the proper understanding about problems surrounding them have to be preceded. As well, based on this grasp, from the viewpoint of capability approach in public philosophy, this paper evaluates Environmental Refugees, and reviews the existing arguments for their better lives, furthermore deliberates what aspects should be more considered in those. This study is ongoing in the following order. Firstly, this examines the capability approach with Sen and Nussbaum s as the centre, and then discusses the concept of environmental refugees and the problems related to those. Subsequently, the study evaluates on their situations and the established propositions to protect and support them through the suggested capability approach. Finally the implications and limitations of the study are clarified in the conclusion. II. The Capability Approach Before deliberating about who environmental refugees are, how their situation in which they are deprived of their freedom is, it is necessary to grasp a few approaches in advance, which are the criteria to assess the above. This part reviews firstly utilitarianism, Rawlsian justice, and critique of each from capability approach, and then capability approach, the arguments of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. 3

4 1. Public philosophy for social justice (1) Utilitarianism and its limits As John Stuart Mill wrote, the principle of utility, or as Bentham latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority (Mill, 2008: ). This evaluation on utilitarianism is not just by Mill himself who is one of advocates of utilitarianism. It might not be difficult to see that in actual this principle has played as a significant criterion regarding almost every decision making, from personal problems on which people make decision arbitrarily according to their own preferences, to public problems. For this reason, utilitarianism must be one of the most influential moral philosophy. Mill s argument begins with a talk about a universal first principle. He said, Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by good without proof (2008: 134), which is happiness in his view. According to this theory making the greatest happiness principle a moral basis, therefore, the conducts to promote happiness is morally right, but those to cause pain, contrary to happiness, is not morally right (2008: 137). Such the proposition could be a criterion of moral judgment. Regarding pleasure, Bentham focuses on the quantitative aspect of pleasure, but on the other hand Mill emphasizes its qualitative aspect. However, for both the standard of moral judgment is not simply by the greatest happiness of individual, but by the total amount to add up everyone s happiness. On what kind of pleasure is better, thus, they assert that if there is no agreement among people the judgment of majority should be respected. Furthermore, suggesting the term social utility, Mill claims that it can be a substantive standard to be able to decide the preference among the conflicting principles of justice (2008: 194). However, Sen gives criticism on utilitarianism in the following three aspects 4

5 (Alexander, 2008: 28-29). First, utilitarianism seems to be unconcerned with everything that might be regarded as reasonably valuable with the exception of happiness. Second critique is related to consequentialism implied in utilitarianism. It pursues the maximization of the common good. This consequence would be certainly good for the whole society, but it is doubtful whether it would be attractive in individual s point of view. Third, because of its stress on economic aspect, utilitarianism has a restricted partial and simplified vision on human beings. (2) Rawlsian Justice and its limits Clarifying that his basic conception comes from the critique on utilitarianism (Rawls, 1999: 23-24), Rawls argues about the distributive justice of society which is able to overcome the ethical and normative limitations of utilitarianism. For him, the most fundamental idea in this conception of justice is the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next (2001: 5). According to his argument, in order for a principle to be just, it should be built up as a result of overlapping consensus which is reached voluntarily among people who can voice their own opinions freely in just situation. Moreover, the principle should guarantee the common good of the whole society, and at the same time, for achieving it, not sacrifice anyone among members of society. Accordingly, Rawls proposes the principles of justice as a result which rational people can choose through the procedural justice based on the concept of the original position and the veil of ignorance. Two principles of justice are as below (1993: 5-6): (a) Each person had the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 5

6 opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle). The principles are the core and the practical strategy in Rawls s argument. As well, Rawls argues that the basic structure of society, including legitimate, political, economic, and social system, which a just society should have, needs to be made up based on those. Rawls emphasizes the importance of fairness by the principles, especially the difference principle, which focuses basically on alleviating social inequalities. They would stem from unequal distribution of native and social endowment which individual cannot assert their deserts. Thus, there is no reason that those who are in disadvantaged circumstance ought to take the burden of social inequalities. Meanwhile, the principles are consisted by the serial or lexical order (1999: 38). In other words, the first principle is prior to the second, and also in the second the principle of fair equality of opportunity takes priority over the difference principle (1999: 266). Therefore, this is to show that Rawls considers basically guarantee of equal liberties as the most significant. However, in the viewpoint of capability approach, Rawls s idea has several limitations. Among them Sen raises a critical objection in particular to the absolute priority of liberties Rawls claims. It is not that Sen doesn t agree with the argument per se that liberties have priority, but he definitely disagrees with the argument that liberties have the absolute and unrestricted priority. This is because weighing the gravity between the settlement of acute famine and the urgent treatment of disease, and the infringement of liberties could be insignificant for some disadvantaged people. Sen s critique is based on the understanding on capability of conversion, which is detailed in the following part. For this reason, Rawls s argument that the focal point of theory of justice is formulating the just institutions is a target of Sen s criticism, which the just institutions per se would never guarantee justice. 6

7 2. The Capability Approach (1) Development, freedom, and capability In figuring out capability approach, it is essential to expand the concept of Development and Freedom. The capability approach suggests development as a primary purpose, and which in the approach means the expansion of the substantive freedom, contrary to the general one to consider it only in economic aspect. Thus, it is able to be accomplished by eliminating the main sources to restrict personal liberty, Sen claims, and by guaranteeing positively the substantive freedom, Nussbaum claims. According to Sen, understanding development in terms of the substantive freedoms of people is significant for two reasons. One is related to evaluation, and other is related to effectiveness (Sen, 1999: 18). Whether individual has greater freedom, which means development, is a criterion not only for evaluating his overall freedom, but for assessing development of society. At the same time, in order for society to further develop, guaranteeing the substantive freedom of people is called for. In other words, expansion of freedom is viewed as both (1) the primary end and (2) the principal means of development (1999: 36). Then, what does the substantive freedom mean? As mentioned briefly above, freedom in capability approach does not mean one as a kind of primary goods every citizen wants to obtain, on which John Rawls, an egalitarian libertarian, puts emphasis, but instead as the capabilities for individual to be able to choose functionimgs in substance. 1 According to Sen s analysis, Rawls s concentration on the distribution of primary goods including rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect in his Difference Principle (Sen, 1992: 79-80) can be seen as a move toward the equality of 1 Capability refers to the alternative combinations of functionings of that are feasible for her to achieve (Sen, 1992: 75). 7

8 opportunities. However, he points out that since the conversion of these primary goods and resources into freedom of choice over alternative combinations of functions and other achievements may vary from person to person, equality of holdings of primary goods or of resources can go hand in hand with serious inequalities in actual freedom enjoyed by different persons (1992: 81). In other words, the substantive freedom cannot be guaranteed only by assuring equal distribution of primary goods according to Rawls s the difference principle. Therefore, the guarantee in more comprehensive aspects is necessary. In regard to this, Nussbaum (2000) also claims that in order to secure the substantive freedoms as capability freedom embraces even the institutional resources including the legal and social recognition beyond the economic resources. (2) The list of capabilities Accordingly, Sen proposes the following types of the instrumental freedoms in order to achieve expansion of freedom as the primary end (1999: 38-40): (1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency guarantees, and (5) protective security. To be specific, political freedoms refers to the opportunities that people have to determine who should govern and on what principles, and economic facilities means the opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or exchange. Social opportunities refers to the arrangement that society makes for education, health care and so on, which influence the individual s substantive freedom to live better. Transparency guarantees is related to the need for openness that people can expect, and protective security provide a social safety net for preventing the affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death. These are to consider personal circumstance and even social one over individuals. According to Sen, these instrumental freedoms directly enhance the capabilities of people, 8

9 but they also supplement one another and can furthermore reinforce one another (1999: 40). Sen is contented in advocating a capabilities-based understanding of justice as an open approach, without endorsing a definite list of capabilities (Alexander, 2008: 63), but there is a criticism about the approach s practical applicability. Although capability approach has provided a frame for empirical work (Gasper, 1997: 287), dissatisfaction and scepticism on it seem to exist still. Nussbaum also points out this point, which is his idea that capability, not functioning, is the appropriate political goal is an idea he sometimes supports through examples, but he has never endorsed it as a general theoretical point (Nussbaum, 2000: 13-14). In this regard, she advances it by suggesting a definite list of capabilities. The list is one of the specific differences between Sen s version and Nussbaum s. 2 According to Nussbaum s claims (2000: 75-76), the above list is not a complete theory of justice, but provides the ground for determining a decent social minimum, which could be a type of the overlapping consensus. 3 The list contains the following capabilities (2000: 78-80): 1) Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one s life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 2) Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 3) Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; having one s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure against assault, including sexual assault, child sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 4) Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, 2 According to Nussbaum (2000: 13), the significant distinctions of her version from Sen s are the argument from culture, the ground in the Marxist/ Aristotelian idea of truly human functioning, and a list of the central capabilities. 3 Nussbaum uses the term overlapping consensus in the same meaning Rawls uses: that people may sign on to this conception as the freestanding moral core of a political conception, without accepting any particular metaphysical view of the world, any particular comprehensive ethical or religious view, or even any particular view of the person or of human nature (Nussbaum, 2000: 76). 9

10 and reason and to do these things in a truly human way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing selfexpressive works and events of one s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one s own way. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-necessary pain. 5) Emotions. Being able to have attachment to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve to experience longing gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one s emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.) 6) Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience.) 7) Affiliation. A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.) B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails, at a minimum, protections against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers. 8) Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature. 9) Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 10) Control over One s Environment. A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association. B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not just formally but in terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. 10

11 Sen s five types of instrumental liberty and Nussbaum s ten articles of a list of the central capabilities might be the critical criteria to be able to evaluate whether the existing social and political institutions or policies have guaranteed individual s freedom, especially the substantive freedom. As already pointed out that Sen s version is somewhat abstract to apply to actual social problems, and thus Nussbaum s would be applicable as a more realistic valuation basis. (3) Dealing with the deprivation of freedom The importance and usefulness of philosophical discussion would stem from playing a role as an appraisal standard. However, more significant contribution of that could be related to the fact that it can provide political suggestions or resolutions about what is necessary to eliminate the main sources to restrict personal freedom, and then to build up the new institutions and policies positively for guaranteeing the substantive freedom. Regarding the political justification and practice of capability approach, Sen and Nussbaum have respectively a little different suggestions. Sen focuses on public discussion, and political and social participation (Sen, 1999: ) for dealing with the problem of freedom deprivation. This is because of difficulties to operationalize the capability approach for appropriate social policies (Alexander, 2008: 60). As mentioned before, which functioning is regarded as the important or which one is deficient in actual is different according to individuals and societies. Furthermore, individual s ability to convert primary goods into functionings depends on personal differences in age, gender, special talents, disability, proneness to illness, and so on (Sen, 1999: 69). Therefore, those who are in deprivation of freedom should try to reflect their needs and demands into the policies and institutions by public discussion and participation. Without guaranteeing the instrumental freedoms, however, there are many difficulties for them to discuss or participate. Therefore, 11

12 the ways should be pursued together with establishing political, economic, and social foundations which enable people to take part substantively in the process. By this they would be able to not only involve in the processes to improve their own social circumstances and redistribute resources, but also become the public as participants to be active to transformation, not as those to be passive to cooperation and be easily docile (1999: 281). These aspects would be one of the reasons Sen emphasizes public discussion and social participation. Compared with Sen, Nussbaum proposes a more radical way. In the introduction of her book Women and Human Development, she clarifies that the aim of the book is to go beyond the merely comparative use of the capability space to articulate an account of how capabilities, together with the idea of a threshold level of capabilities, can provide a basis for central constitutional principles that citizens have a right to demand from their governments (2000: 12). This means the emphasis on constitutional guarantees of a list of central capabilities. Nussbaum expects that the list can be used as a basis for international treaties and other documents drown up by international agencies or nongovernmental organizations, and moreover the community of nations should reach a transnational overlapping consensus (2000: ). Each proposal of Sen and Nussbaum could not be different thoroughly. Rather, in reality both, the social participation and constitutional guarantees, are highly likely to connect each other. The constitutional guarantees of at least instrumental freedoms are necessary to provide the foundations for social participation, and at the same time, the public discussion and involvement are necessary to consent and make a decision about which freedom among central capabilities should be guaranteed by law. Therefore, the both are required together for ameliorating the situation of freedom deprivation. The answer to a question on which one should have priority would depend just on how the given circumstance is. 12

13 III. The Capability Approach to Environmental Refugees 1. Who are environmental refugees? Prior to analysis of Environmental Refugees using the Capability Approach, first and foremost, inquiries about who they are and how the situations surrounding them are should be examined. The term of environmental refugees was firstly introduced in 1985 by Essam El- Hinnawi, which means people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life (Stojanov, 2004: 3). The causes to generate the environmental refugees are wide and various. Classifying these into five categories, it follows as below (2004: 3-4): (1) natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and severe coastal storms (including tropical cyclones), (2) cumulative (slow-onset) changes such as desertification, soil degradation and erosion, droughts and deficiency of safe water, climate change (global warming), sea-level rise, and famine, (3) involuntary cause accidents and industrial accidents such as nuclear accidents, disasters of industrial (e.g. chemical) factories, and environmental pollution, (4) development project such as construction of river dams, irrigation canals, and mining (extracting) natural resources, (5) biological warfare, destruction of environment, wars due to natural resources. In usual, the estimated number of displaced persons is different for scholars due to difficulty of measurement. According to Myers research (2002: ) which has been quoted generally, though, the estimated number of environmental refugees in 1995 reached nearly at 25 millions around the world, and even when considering the continuous increase of 13

14 population lived in the Third World, the still unsolved poverty, and the intensified environmental destruction, he estimated that in 2010 the number of those will reach 50 millions, twice in Moreover, in the same year, 135 million people in all the developing countries had suffered from severe desertification and 550 million people had been troubled with chronic lack of water, but he claimed that the almost who had no choice to displace from their own habitats because of these problems were included in the number of 25 millions, the estimation in The examples of environmental refugees all over the world are as various as the causes are. Among those, one of the most representative examples is Tuvalu (Farbotko, 2005). Tuvalu is an archipelago nation located in the Pacific Ocean. It is comprised of four reef islands and five atolls, and its population was estimated to be only about 10 thousands. The country declared to abandon national territory in This is because the capital, Funafuti was already inundated and other land also was sinking into the sea gradually due to the sea level rise from global warming. After the abandon declaration of land, Tuvalu asked for immigration to neighbouring countries. However, Australia and Fiji denied this request, and New Zealand allowed the restricted immigration of people under the age of 40, and having the workplace in the country and according to the standards, now has accepted 75 Tuvaluan people per year (Patel, 2006: 736). For this reason the situation that almost people in one country belongs to environmental refugees happened. Up to the present the territory has flooded, and thus getting drinking water in Tuvalu has become increasingly difficult, and palm trees and crops are dying. 2. Status as refugee of environmental refugees Many scholars have pointed out that for those who have been forced to displace due to continuing environmental problem, so called environmental refugees, the most urgent 14

15 problem is not just the environmental destruction, but instead related to their survival the situation in which protection and assistance for them do not exist. This means, although they have been recognized as a new type of the refugees, they have not obtained the status of refugee. Such the problem would result from the conventional definition of the term refugee. Refugee is often referred to one who can receive a country s diplomatic protection legally or actually by renouncing the political loyalty relationship with the country. However, there is no general definition about whether one is to be protected as a refugee or not, but instead it virtually depends on discretion or legislative will of host countries. In granting refugee status, the refugee definition in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CSR) in 1951 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee in 1967 has been a decisive criterion (Park, 2002: 129). To be specific, it is as below: Article 1 Definition of the term refugee A. For the purpose of the present Convention, the term refugee shall apply to a person who: 1 2 As a result of events occurring before January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it. Such the definition of refugee is converged as one who has three political characters (2002: ): (1) to exist persecution on individual, (2) to be persecuted due to at least one among race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, (3) to be outside the country of his or her nationality. International society, including UNHCR, has granted the legal status as refugee to those to whom the above conditions are applicable. 15

16 Only for people granting the status, it has provided political and legal protection such as material relief work, return and resettlement to home country, assistance of family reunion, and international cooperation, etc. until they acquire new nationality. Environmental refugees, however, do not correspond to the refugee definition of the 1951 CSR. This is because for those specific persecutions don t exist, and moreover the causes for them to be suffered from are not included in the five grounds of persecution: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. Accordingly, they have not achieved recognition of refugee status, and not received any protection or support for refugee. Scholars have appealed for international society s concerns and supports on the issues surrounding environmental refugees by claiming that enlarging the existing definition of the term refugee is necessary or by showing that they could be included in the existing definition (Cooper, 1997; Park, 2002), or even by global governance perspective (Biermann & Boas, 2001) 3. The capability approach to environmental refugees To answer to the question firstly, it s no. According to other two approaches utilitarianism and Rawlsian justice aside from capability approach, only just receiving protections through obtaining the refugee status might be sufficient. Even for those who would agree with utilitarianism principle, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the assistance for environmental refugees might be underserved. Accordingly, in order to propose justification for it, capability approach would be more useful and valid. Then, in this part, the aim here is, with capability approach as the centre, to evaluate definitely the freedom deprivation situations in which environmental refugees face and to examine the existing claims for overcoming these. 16

17 (1) What are environmental refugees deprived of? The judgment about the circumstance surrounding them could depend on whether liberties for achieving substantive freedom as the primary end have been guaranteed or not. The criteria in the capability approach to make a judgment about it are two, five instrumental liberty of Sen or a list of the central capabilities of Nussbaum. As mentioned before, however, the former Sen suggests has a limitation that it s somewhat abstract to apply to actual situations and judge about it. Therefore, the judgment is done according to Nussbaum s list. Among ten capabilities in the list, environmental refugees have forfeited four capabilities, Bodily Integrity, Bodily Health, Other Species, and Control over One s Environment. To examine concretely, in terms of Bodily Integrity, being able to move freely from place to place have been restricted for them. It is not impossible for them to move between places. However, their movement is never free and voluntary. As known in the El Hinnawi s definition of environmental refugees, they are forced to leave. Therefore, in actual, all of those have already been excluded from the capability of Bodily Integrity. Secondly, the capability of Bodily Health includes capabilities to be adequately nourished, to have adequate shelter, and so on. For environmental refugees, who have no choice to leave due to destruction of their habitats, the living conditions including the basic necessity of life, food, clothing, and shelter, are already devastated, and thus they cannot also enjoy the Bodily Health capability sufficiently. Seeing Tuvalu, a representative instance of those, such a deprivation is revealed more definitely. The sea level rising due to global warming has waterlogged the whole land. As a result, fresh water used as drinking water gradually becomes sea water, and the land which is able to cultivate also has flooded by sea water, and Tuvaluan people are no longer able to produce the crop, and moreover they should relinquish the established residence. Next, the Other Species capability means, as mentioned above, being able to live 17

18 with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature. Its deprivation can be magnified especially for environmental refugees. All of those who are forced to leave their habitation because of environmental problems could not enjoy and satisfy the capability. In its footnote, Nussbaum presents Norway as an example (2000: 80). According to her, Norway has not permitted any construction or development five miles outside the coast, and thereby people are able to enjoy relationship with other species and nature. Likewise, if there is a country which places an emphasis on this capability at the national level, the matters which someone suffer for becoming environmental refugees might not occur. However, on the contrary to it, if people don t have concern for this capability, at least the environment, one instance of the expected results might be desertification. In the case of severe desertification around the Saharan desert, two extreme droughts from 1968 to 1973 and from 1982 to 1984 could be an important cause, but excessive cultivation of farmers and immoderate pasturing of nomadic people fuelled the desertification (Park, 2002: ). They did deprive themselves of their own capability of Other Species, and this brought about the consequence that they became themselves environmental refugees. Lastly, the capability of Control over One s Environment contains political and material controls. Political control is related to the participation to political choices, and material control is related to one s possession and his or her property rights. An example of Chinese development could provide the specific understanding for how environmental refugees have been deprived of this capability. Three Gorges Dam constructed in on the Yangtze River generated the largest number of environmental refugees in the world. This figure is of people who were in danger of being submerged due to dam construction. In China, however, not only in this case but also in its development process residents lived in the development areas had no choice to abandon their habitation and own property rights. This is because they thoroughly excluded from the policy process although it was about the 18

19 significant political decisions in connection closely with their freedom and development. After becoming environmental refugees, they have not pulled out of economic hardship (Heming et al, 2001). Thus, environmental refugees have not been in control to their circumstance both before being the environmental refugees and after. To emphasize again, Nussbaum s a list of the central capabilities is to list capabilities everyone ought to have at the minimum. As examined above, thus, environmental refugees are in the midst of deprivation of capabilities, in particular four capabilities Bodily Integrity, Bodily Health, Other Species, and Control over One s Environment. According to Sen s argument, however, instrumental freedoms similarly, capabilities as means for freedom as the primary end do not exist independently of each other, but rather have the characteristics of mutual connection and complementariness. Therefore, direct deprivation of one capability can lead indirectly to deprivation of other capabilities. It is doubtful whether there are capabilities to be met among ten, indeed. (2) Is it enough to question about how to deal with the problems? As mentioned before, many scholars have proposed various solutions on the problems surrounding environmental refugees. Cooper (1997) arranges the conventional claims to expand the traditional definition of refugee in CSR of 1951 for instance, at the international level applying human rights to it and at the regional level the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention) in 1969 and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Cartagena Declaration) in 1984 and points out resistances to them. Instead, he argues that environmental refugees can also be included in the traditional term of refugee by showing that persecution on them induced by government exists and its cause is comprised in one among five grounds of persecution that is membership of a particular social group. On the other hand, Bienmann 19

20 and Boas (2010: 79-83) do not approach this issue in terms of grant of refugee status, but from a global governance perspective. The reason he emphasizes global governance is that environmental refugees often live in poorer developing countries and generally seek refuge in their own or neighboring countries, assistance from the international community including both state actor and non-state actor would be positively asked for. Then, is it enough for environmental refugees to grant the refugee status or protect through global governance? In other words, is it sufficient only with the above propositions? To answer the questions, discourse on public philosophy is picked up again. Propositions are means to achieve something as aim. Thus, in order to evaluate the suggestions, it should be necessary to clarify what their purpose is. If someone advocates utilitarianism, the questions would not need to consider, or if Rawlsian justice, the above would be recognized as proper. However, as considered before, two approaches are not satisfactory to provide relatively more comprehensive understanding on human beings. Consequently, revising the questions, in order to guarantee environmental refugees substantive freedom, are the claims sufficient? The answer is Not Sufficient. According to capability approach, there are two suggestions to improve their freedom deprivation situation. One is public discussion and social participation Sen claims and other is constitutional guarantee Nussbaum claims. From Nussbaum s perspective, expanding the CSR definition of refugee or interpreting it newly for being able to include even environmental refugees might be a basic condition for them to live with the central capabilities. And from Sen s perspective, the approach to them through global governance might be deserved to be more welcomed. However, more significant and preceding question on environmental refugees would be about what should be guaranteed or protected, not just about how to protect them. Each mean of Sen and Nussbaum is not opposed and exclusive for each other, and thus for environmental refugees development as freedom which one among the solutions is more 20

21 useful and valid can be a secondary question. This is because according to the context of situation it would be better to consider propositions together than respectively or worse. The obvious fact is, however, that it would be more effective and well-directed to prescribe a remedy which is fit for an analysis by capability approach, for environmental refugees at the present what capabilities are deprived of. In general, environmental refugees are deprived directly of four capabilities. The direct deprivation can be understood as the fact that the urgent settlement is asked for. For this reason, supporting environmental refugees without exact understanding on the specific circumstances each of them faces, what capabilities should be met firstly, would be able to bring about a result to add fuel to the fire. Improvement of one capability is likely to get connected to improvement of others. In this regard, the importance of understanding capability as a criterion to judge environmental refugees lives and an intermediate objective to be achieved for development of the primary end cannot be overemphasized. IV. Conclusion This paper applies capability approach to issues and claims surrounding environmental refugees As the solutions to deal with problems, scholars argue support for them through granting the status of refugee or global governance. However, the more significant question than how to resolve it is what capabilities should be guaranteed. According to the approach, they have not enjoyed full of the substantive freedom because of deprivation of four capabilities, Bodily Integrity, Bodily Health, Other Species, and Control over One s Environment. Therefore, selection of mean for them should be based on such judgment, or can be worse than nothing. To understand environmental refugees, the reason to employ capability approach, in 21

22 particular Nussbaum s a list of the central capabilities, is not just to show their situation. Rather, by revealing their present circumstances more specific is to become an indicator of for what protection and assistance should be accompanied in the future. However, the eventual resolution of the issues on environmental refugees is not protection and assistance for them after becoming the environmental refugees, but instead to prevent any more environmental destruction. 4 Though, this is not able to be settled only by the efforts of them. In the case of Tuvaluan environmental refugees cited before as a typical instance, one main cause is the sea level rising due to global warming. A look at carbon dioxide emission per person, which results in global warming, suggests that emission of U.S. reaches tons and that of Australia reaches tons, while Tuvalu emits carbon dioxide of 0.46 tons (IEA, 2008). Considering such the reality, the responsibility of environmental destruction not only historical responsibility of developed countries but also responsibility of developing countries such as China and India can be outside a country which suffers from environmental problems. According to capability approach which claims that development require to eliminate main resources of deprivation of freedom, therefore, such unjust and unfair structure is definitely the object to have to be removed and transformed for guaranteeing the substantive freedom. 4 Cooper (1997) and Myer (2002) do not underestimate the preventive policy for environmental refugees. 22

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