The World Bank-financed Reconstruction of the Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS)

Transcription

1 The World Bank-financed Reconstruction of the Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS) RALAS Research Team: 1. Abdul Jalil 2. Delima Silalahi 3. George Junus Aditjondro 4. Sri Khairil Tarigan 5. Jufriadi 6. Darmawan Working Paper No.3, 2008 NGO in Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

2 The World Bank-financed Reconstruction of the Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS) RALAS Research Team: 1. Abdul Jalil 2. Delima Silalahi 3. George Junus Aditjondro 4. Sri Khairil Tarigan 5. Jufriadi 6. Darmawan Working Paper No.3, 2008

3 CONTENT Terms And Acronyms Used i Acknowledgement ii Foreword iii Introduction 1 Research Methodology 3 Research Findings 5 Conclusion 14 Recommendation 15 Bibliography 16

4 TERMS AND ACRONYMS USED BI BPD BPN BRI BNI BQ CDA FGD GSF INFID JBIC MDTFANS NAD NGO PNS RALAS Sekdes SKT UTU YEU : Indonesian Bank : Regional Development Bank : National Land Agency (State Land Affairs Body) : Indonesian People Bank (State Own Bank) : Indonesian National Bank (State Own Bank) : Baitul Qiradh : Community-Driven Adjudication : Focus Group Discussion : Grassroots Society Foundation : International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development : Japan Bank for International Cooperation : Multi Donors Trust Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra : Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam : Non Governmental Organization : Civil Servant : Reconstruction of the Aceh Land Administration System : Village Secretary : Land Own Letter : Teuku Umar University : Yakkum Emergency Unit - i -

5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This brief research in Aceh by the INFID Research Team has only been possible thanks to the support of friends from Grassroots Society Foundation (GSF) in Meulaboh, Yayasan PUSPA (Pusat Pengembangan Sumberdaya Alam) in Takengon, and the branch offices of the twin NGO YEU (Yakkum Emergency Unit) and CD Bethesda in Meulaboh. Hopefully, our research report can return a fraction of the good will and hospitality of these friends in Aceh. Medan, May ii -

6 FOREWORD The research on the World Bank-managed project of RALAS in Aceh is one of the three researches by INFID on the projects supported by the World Bank loans and grants from various donors through the management of the World Bank. These researches are conducted to look at whether the projects are of benefit for the people and to see its effects on the development in Indonesia. The researches also look at the effects of the projects and programs both directly on the sectors and indirectly on the government s policies as a whole. RALAS is one of strategic projects implemented in Aceh after the tsunami, that touch to the heart of the long-lasting issue in Aceh, namely the property rights to natural resources. Separatist movement was only one of the movement strategies, assuming that the independent Aceh with its own sovereignty, the people of Aceh will have more freedom to enjoy the nature s gratitude and the God s blessings for the welfare of the people of Aceh. The collective property rights over lands that contain abundance of valuable resources underneath have become the strong foundation for collective struggle. The Qanuns based on the Aceh Special Autonomy Law No. 18/2001 have also strengthened the recognition of the social collectivities and the collective ownership of the natural resources. The collective ownership and the social collectivity are the strong foundations that guarantee the achievement of welfare for all the people in the local communities. On the other hand collective ownership becomes the main obstacle for the investors to exploit the rich natural resources freely. The RALAS program is one of the strategies to destroy the local collectivities, and the tsunami has become the appropriate moment to start the total destruction. If the tsunami destroyed the physical infrastructures, this kind of program will destroy the social collectivity, which is in line with the intentions of the promoters of free market economy. Echoing the statement of the American Enterprise Institute a neoliberal think-tank in Washington commenting on Katrina in Louisiana saying that Katrina accomplished in a day. for the things that it took years for the state to make reform for free market 1, the World Bank with RALAS program might say thanks to tsunami that provided great opportunity to swipe out all obstacles to bring Aceh to global free market economy, and hence to bring whole Indonesia under the control of global free market and under the tutelage of the World Bank. When the global human solidarity was sunk into deep condolences for the victims and were busy in looking for any effort to help the people of Aceh, the World Bank prepared the fundamental strategy to prepare Aceh as an arena for global free market economy or to prepare Aceh in such a way that it would be easy for the global economic actors to control and exploit its natural resources. Like its fellow free market promoters who are happy with the Katrina disaster, the World Bank saw the tsunami as having prepared clean sheet for the start of the strategy for the control and exploitation of natural resources in Aceh without any obstacle. RALAS is the main part of the strategies to destroy or swipe out the main foundation of the collective spirit and collective identity of Aceh. Through the individual ownership system developed by RALAS the local institutions that support and control the collective management of the natural resources in Aceh will lose their roles and hence the collective ties will be easily destroyed. When the collective ties that have been long become the main spirit of the collective struggle are vanished, then Aceh will be ready to be exploited without any internal obstacle and will not be haunted by the fear of the rise of collective struggle including the armed collective struggle. 1 Naomi Klein (2007). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism ( London: Penguin Books), pg iii -

7 For the majority of human beings in the world, tsunami in Aceh and in other parts of South East Asia in December 2004 was one of the biggest human tragedies in the last century history, and therefore there is a need for strong human solidarity. But for the economic planners such as those in the World Bank, tsunami was the best opportunity for introducing and integrating the ideology of free market economy, an opportunity for developing New Aceh where the people do not need to have collective responsibility and do not need for social collectivity for social welfare. The market will provide the social welfare. RALAS is one of the foundations for the break-up of the social collectivity and collective responsibility. Tsunami has been used as the best moment to make Aceh as an area where capitalism can work freely. Natural disaster, horizontal conflicts (inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts), institutional crisis, financial crisis, fuel and food crisis, etc. for majority of human beings are tragedy, but for the promoters of the free market (such as the World Bank) are the best opportunities to develop strong foundations for free market capitalism. Conflicts in Indonesia have become instruments to break up local social solidarity and collective spirit and strategies to prepare free access to global economic actors to expropriate and exploit the natural resources that have been long owned by the local communities. The institutional crises such as the corrupt government have been used as entry to develop governance system and rules that impose the government to adopt free market economic policies. Food and fuel crises have been adopted as the best moment to push harder on the liberalizing the food market and fuel market, no matter how high the costs and burdens born upon the shoulders of the poor. The conflicts in Central Sulawesi, Papua, Kalimantan, Ambon all came from the same source and flowed to the same directions: the destruction of local social collectivity and the take-over of the ancestrally inherited natural resources by the domestic and global economic actors. In these cases the international financial institutions play the roles as financial supporters to develop infrastructures to the areas that have been left by the original owners (i.e. local communities) who are now living in fear of new potential conflicts. The irony is that the loans for developing the infrastructures to the new exploitation areas, that used to be the ownership of the poor local communities, will be repaid also by these victimized poor communities in the future. The crises and calamities have been effectively utilized by the international financial institutions to impose free market ideology and to let the people fight on their own for their own survival. This is what Naomi Klein calls disaster capitalism, which in Indonesia has been so real, obvious and blatantly clear in front of everybody s eyes and faces. RALAS is only an example of how disaster has been manipulated for the interests of the global economic actors who will not need other costs to take over the local natural resources from the local owners. The questions and findings in this research show that individual ownership is not the only way to provide certainty in property rights. There have been local institutions that can guarantee the certainty. Hopefully the research will trigger critical reflections on the ideology of the World Bank funded program and projects in Indonesia and the people of Indonesia will be more aware of the agenda behind the World Bank programs and projects. Jakarta, June, 2008 Don K. Marut Executive Director INFID - iv -

8 THE WORLD BANK-FINANCED RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ACEH LAND ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM (RALAS) INTRODUCTION ONLY six months after the 26 December 2004 tsunami hit Aceh, the Multi-Donors Trust Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra (MDTFANS) approved to finance the Reconstruction of the Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS) project. According to the project s appraisal document, approved in June 2005, the overall goal of the US$ million grant is to improve land tenure security in Aceh after the devastation caused by the tsunami and the destruction of evidence of ownership (Afiff 2006). Or, in the words of then World Bank country director, Andrew Steer and European Commission Ambassador to Indonesia, Jean Breteche, the RALAS project will enable citizens to use their land as collateral for financing homes and businesses, and thereby unlock substantial dormant capital for thousands of poor families struggling to rebuild their shattered lives (Steer and Breteche 2006). The implementation of the RALAS project officially started in August 2005 and will last until this year, 2008, when it was estimated that 600,000 land owners in Aceh and Nias would have received their legal land title documents (Afiff 2006). By the end of 2006, however, only 7,700 titles had been distributed to tsunami survivors, with some 20,000 land titles actually lying ready for distribution, all the paper work complete, at the Land Offices in Aceh. For half of these titles, all that remained was for the title certificate to be signed by the Land Office Heads, while the other half of the certificates, which were already signed, only needed to be handed to the land owners (Steer & Breteche 2006). Actually, the fault does not lie entirely with the bureaucrats of the district land office (Kantor Pertanahan), as field research by INFID s research team in West Aceh, and the two new districts split off from West Aceh, namely Aceh Jaya and Nagan Raya, in May 2007 had shown. It also lies with the enormous task of identifying the prospective land title owners, surveying their parameters, bringing the result to the district land office head, signing the newly issued land certificates, and returning it to the rightful land owners (see Aditjondro 2007). The land certification project in these districts was carried out in two stages, namely RALAS 2005 (July 2005-June 2006) when ten Adjudication Teams from BPN (Badan Pertanahan Negara, or the State Land Affairs Body) were deployed in two towns and districts, followed up by RALAS 2006 (July 2006-June 2007) with more Adjudication Teams deployed to nine towns and districts. During RALAS 2005 about 14,000 land certificates had been printed, while about 9,000 had been handed over to the rightful land owners. While during RALAS 2006 until November 2006, the boundaries and other physical data for 80,000 land parcels had been identified, but only 1,000 land certificates had been handed over to the rightful owners (idem)

9 As official reports at the West Aceh Land Office have shown, the return rate of land parcels that had already been surveyed by nine adjudication teams from BPN has been very low, as the following examples may show. In Arongan Lambalek subdistrict, West Aceh, where 3,931 potential land certificates have been identified by BPN Team XVIII, only 1,842 certificates have been produced and safely handed over to the rightful land owners. While in Drien Rampak subdistrict, in the same district, from the 1,180 potential land certificates identified by BPN Team VIII, only 101 certificates had been produced and delivered to the rightful land owners. So, from the total 20,748 potential land certificate holders identified by nine BPN Teams from around Indonesia, only less than a third number of certificates had been produced and delivered to the rightful land owners, by 26 April This is what the head of the West Aceh Land Office, Budi Yazir, who also overseas Aceh Jaya, reported to the higher levels of government (idem). During an interview with Budi Yazir in his office in Meulaboh, on 2 May 2007, the land officer explained the obstacles to the land certification process. First of all, since RALAS is a national project, BPN had to recruit thirty adjudication teams from different local BPN offices in Indonesia to carry out the assessment of potential receivers of the newly printed land certificates, as well as to distribute them to the rightful owners. Consisting mainly of non-acehnese BPN staff, local BPN staff who spoke the local languages were inserted in each team, such as in the ten teams sent to West Aceh and the two new districts split off from West Aceh, namely Aceh Jaya and Nagan Raya. This identification process began in mid April 2007, with each team assigned to complete distributing 5,000 new land certificates to the proper land and other property owners (idem). This identification process, involving two companies, PT PT Tesaputra Adiguna and PT Surveyor Indonesia which assisted the adjudication teams with land mapping services, has taken a much longer time than was anticipated, since it had to faces many hurdles. The huge demographic effect of the 2004 tsunami and earth quake, which have caused the death of thousands of land and other property owners, as well as the displacement of thousands other people to the refugee barracks and other places, separated many land parcels from the rightful owners. Therefore, the task of identifying the rightful owner, or inheritor of each parcel of land was a hair-splitting job for each team, who were not accustomed to the terrain and the inhabitants of the subdistricts assigned to them (idem). These technical factors, however, may not be the only reasons for the high number of undelivered land certificates, which was still the case in July 2007, when there were still 4,467 certificates undelivered to the land owners in West Aceh and Aceh Jaya, which by that time was still under control of the West Aceh Land Office. Other factors may have had influencing effects, such as the working quality of the Adjudication Teams, the lack of involvement of village and subdistrict officials, the lack of enthusiasm of Acehnese villagers themselves to obtain land certificates, which may not be too high on their priority list, or the existence of other means of acknowledging one s land ownership, especially under customary law, which may make land certificates redundant. All these factors, then, warrant more in-depth field and documentary research carried out by young progressive researchers affiliated with INFID, employing the following research methodology

10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ACEH LAND ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM (RALAS) This research is more of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, since its main aim is to evaluate RALAS as a policy, although it uses the high number of undelivered new certificates as an entry point. This study is not as a survey in the conventional quantitative positivistic sense, where the results are obtained by administering questionnaires to a number of samples, reducing the villagers into numbers. This study is rather a semi-grounded multiple case study, with the researchers as the main research instruments, using, but not limited to the web chart as the interview guide. The research methods employed by INFID s research team consists of documentary research, field observation and in-depth interviews, assisted by graphic methods to consolidate the existing information and to guide the in-depth interviews. Although this research is more of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, the whole process is not simply falling out of the blue. Rather than to test certain hypotheses, the whole process has been be guided by assumptions claimed by those supporting and implementing the RALAS project, as well as by the INFID research team. These assumptions are as follows: A. Assumptions of the World Bank: Assisting tsunami victims to regain their land certificates; Enable citizens to use their land certificates as collateral for financing homes and businesses; B. Assumptions of the National Land Agency: To enable tsunami victims to regain their civil rights, in particular, their right to their land as protected by the state laws and regulations. C. Assumptions of the INFID research team: The RALAS project will smoothen the influx of investors, which thereby will limit the villagers access to their land; The provision of land certificates will accelerate the transformation of land from a productive asset of the Acehnese farmers which maintains the cohesion of the rural community to land simply as a commodity. These assumptions were used as a codification, in the Freirean sense, which was decodified in a focus group discussion (FGD) held in Meulaboh, West Aceh, on involving lecturers from the local university, Universitas Teuku Umar (UTU), activists from local NGOs, and the subdistrict head (Camat) of Samatiga, whose jurisdiction covers several villages included in this study

11 The selection of the villages where in-depth interviews and field observation where held, were based on a typology with the following categories, namely: (1) contrasting villages with a high level of delivery with those with a low level delivery of new certificates adjudicated by the BPN teams; (2) finding a combination of urban-based villages versus more rural villages; (3) contrasting the villages in (a) and (b), with villages not covered by the RALAS project; (4) contrasting villages where the local people have obtained certificates but had to sell their land to large corporations or government projects, with villages not covered by the RALAS project, but where the villagers had to sell their land to a large government project, in this case the proposed Peusangan hydropower project. All the selected villages according to the (a) and (b) categories where located in three districts covered by the RALAS project, namely Aceh Jaya, West Aceh and Nagan Raya. Meanwhile selected villages according to the (c) and (d) categories were located in the district of Nagan Raya, which was covered by the RALAS project and the district of Central Aceh, which was not covered by the RALAS project

12 RESEARCH FINDINGS: 1. Not all the people who have received the new certificates are tsunami victims Some villagers which were not hit by the 26 December 2004 tsunami received the free land certificates, while other villagers which were hit by the tsunami did not receive those certificates. For instance, from the twelve gampong (villages) in the Samatiga subdistrict (West Aceh) which were hit by the tsunami, only people in six gampong received certificates. While those who were also supposed to receive certificates were replaced by villagers from six other gampong, which were not hit by the tsunami, namely Cot Seumereung, Cot Ploh, Cot Mesjid, Cot Seulamat, Gampong Cot and Cot Lampise. Other villagers are still waiting for their free certificates, after being interviewed by the adjudication teams since 2006, and having the photocopies of their identification card and household card being collected. This occurred for instance in Suak Seuke, Samatiga where villagers interviewed by the INFID research team claimed that they have filled in forms, have filed their identification and household cards to their keuchik, and have had their land measured by BPN staff in early January However, until the end of this field research, they have not received their free certificates. The project also allows other forms of corruption to occur. Quite often the keuchik prioritize the issuance of new land certificates for his relatives and friends. In Suak Pandan, a family close to the keuchik received three free certificates. Likewise, Mulyadi, SH, Kabag Hukum Pemkab Aceh Barat said that in the Gampong Sinebuk there was also the same case, where one individual received 3-5 free certificates. 2. The quality of the RALAS project depends heavily on the activity of the Adjudication Teams and the National Land Affairs Office (BPN). According to Budi Yazir, the head of the West Aceh Land Affairs Office, each Adjudication Team was assigned to adjudicate and distribute 5,000 certificates. In Aceh Jaya and West Aceh, however, the actual number of certificates distributed to the rightful owners was far below those targets, ranging from only 1,657 certificates distributed by one adjudication team in Johan Pahlawan subdistrict in Meulaboh (West Aceh) to 4382 certificates distributed by another team in Arongan Lambalek subdistrict (West Aceh). Overll, no adjudication teams was able to finish distributing 5000 certificates. The distribution of certificates to the rightful owners have also faced several constraints, caused partly because BPN and the adjudication teams did not informed the keuchik and Camat about the heaps of certificates in the land affairs office. According to the West Aceh BPN official, the certificates should be distributed by the adjudication teams. However, after their contracts had expired, they just left the thousands of certificates in the West Aceh office. The local BPN officials just left those certificates in their office, claiming that they have no budgets to distribute those documents

13 In Aceh Jaya, according to Sayuti MB, a villager from Kedai Panga and Teuku Marhedi, a villager from Kuta Tuha, the local land affairs office refuse to distribute those certificates, claiming that the project had already finished. Another example is in Meurebo subdistrict, where the people from fifteen gampong had provided their family data and land papers (Akte Tanah), but only the people from seven gampong had received their certificates.while the people from the eight gampong had not received their land certificates, after delivering their Akte Tanah to the Adjudication Team to be changed to land certificates. One of those victims who have lost their Akte Tanah is Anwar a member of Meurebo s tuha peut. All such things would not have happened, if the adjudication teams had finished their job according to what has been targeted, until the certificates would be in the hands of the rightful owners. 3. The implementation of the RALAS project has not involved the local communities, and has violated a number of government regulations and NAD qanun: Contrary to the World Bank claim that the process was a community-driven adjudication (CDA) process, the adjudication staff worked simply as in other projects. They only symbolically involved the local keuchik and camat, who received small honoraria. Three staffpersons from the subdistrict received a Rp 400,000 monthly honorarium for nine months. Strangely enough, those three persons were not involved in the entire adjudication process. Members of the local communities were also not involved in the adjudication process, except for determining the boundaries of each individual land plot. The local people were also not told what indicators or parameters were used to choose which village would be included in the RALAS project. These practices violates Government Regulation No. 24/1997 on the Process of Land Registration on two points, namely: a. Article 8 verse 2.b.3, which determines that the Village Head, in this case, the Keuchik, has to be appointed as a member of the Adjudication Committee, and only be symbolically involved. b. Article 26 verse 1 dan 2 states that the result of measurement of each parcel of land has to be announced on the bulletin board at the Village Head. This has not be done by the adjudication teams. The implementation of the RALAS project further violates Qanun No. 5/2005 of the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) province on the Gampong Government, which stipulates the roles of the keuchik staff in charge of agriculture affairs, known as keujreun blang and peutua seuneubo. They were not involved in the RALAS project, and neither were - 6 -

14 the Tuha Peut, a kind of council of elders, who are the counterparts of the keuchik, as stipulated in that Qanun. In addition to violating that Qanun, the implementation of the RALAS project has also not involved the Imeum Mukim (mukim head), which violates Qanun No. 2/2003 on the Hierarchy, Position and Authority of the Districts and Towns in the NAD Province, as well as Qanun No. 4/2003 on the Mukim Government in the NAD. MUKIM STRUCTURE (according to Qanun No. 4/2003) IMEUM MUKIM MPM: IMEUM MUKIM: 1. Imeum Mukim 1. Imeum Mukim 2. Keucik 2. Secretary 3. Tuha Peut 3. Tuha Peut 4. Secretary 5. Chair of Customary Institutions TUHA PEUT Secretary Imeum Keujrue Syah Pang Village Institutions Special Institutions Keuchiks According to those two Qanun, the Mukim, which is lead by an Imeum Mukim, who coordinates several Gampong, and simultaneously act as an intermediary government level between the Gampong dan the Subdistrict (Kecamatan). In other words, the Imeum Mukim is an intermediary between the Keuchik and the Camat, which is one of the uniqueness of the government administration in Aceh. The fact is, that although the Keuchik and Camat - 7 -

15 are symbolically or only pro forma involved in the work of the Adjudication Teams, the Imeum Mukim are not involved at all. The Adjudication Teams lived in isolation from the village communities, only consulted with the tsunami victims in a very limited, technical manner, and left when their contracts had expired, often even without saying good bye to the village heads. In the rush to return to the provincial capital, two members of adjudication teams died in traffic crashes. 4. There has been no coordination between the adjudication teams, BPN, and the District Government: According to Mulyadi, the Head of the Law Division of the West Aceh District Government, they have also not been involved in the RALAS project. Even the list of certificates which has not yet been distributed to the villagers has not been provided by BPN to them. Several problems have emerged because of the absence of coordination between BPN and the West Aceh District Government. Mulyadi has deplored this absence of coordination, since the Government Division of the West Aceh District Government could help to distribute those certificates, through their Government Division, 5. Land certificates do not easily enable the tsunami victims to obtain access to bank loans: The World Bank claims that the RALAS distributed land certificates, will enable citizens to use their land as collateral for financing homes and businesses, and thereby unlock substantial dormant capital for thousands of poor families struggling to rebuild their shattered lives (Steer and Breteche 2006). However, research by the INFID research team has obtained different information from several informants. In general, the World Bank s claim is not entirely true, and the majority of the tsunami victims cannot easily obtain access to bank loans with their certificates, especially those who are farmers. The biggest access to bank loans is provided to business people and civil servants. This is, according to the head of the credit division of the Meulaboh branch of BRI (Bank Rakyat IndonesiaI), because the principle of BRI s credit program is capital expansion. Thereby they only lend loans to expand existing businesses, while the tsunami victims generally had no businesses left, after all their belongings were destroyed by the tsunami. Hence, BRI is very strict in rarely allowing loans with only land certificates as collaterals, since they will be reprimanded by the Central Bank (Bank Indonesia), if they have a high number of problematic loans

16 A similar information have been provided by a clerk of the Credit Division of the Aceh Jaya branch of BPD (Bank Pembangunan Daerah) Aceh in Calang. According to this person, BPD Aceh only provides loans for business expansion, not for initial capital to start businesses. At any rate, the Aceh Jaya branch of BI in Calang provided the information that about fifty civil servants who had been tsunami victims had put their newly acquired land certificates as collaterals to obtain loans from the bank. That amount in lower than tsunami victims who are businessmen, seventy of whom had put their certificates as loans. Different information have been provided by local government officials in Aceh Jaya. According to the Camat of Krueng Sabe, 30 % of this citizens had put their certificates as collateral to a certain bank. Not individually, however, but through a contractor as middle person. While according to the keuchik of Ladang Baro, from the 80% of his citizens who have received certificates, only two or three persons had put their certificates as collateral to a bank. Meanwhile, the Land Affairs Office in Meulaboh provided the information, that from the certificates that had been provided by seven adjudication teams to tsunami victims in Aceh Jaya and West Aceh, only 5 % have been put as collateral to the local branches of BPD Aceh, BRI, and BNI. So did the head of the West Aceh Land Affairs Office, Budi Yazir, told the INFID research team. Using land certificates as collateral could become boomerangs to the tsunami victims, far from the World Bank s hope for those victims to play an active role in the local or provincial economy. In the villages of Suak Pandan in Samatiga, a citizen, R, had borrowed Rp 5 million from BRI to expand his motor cycle business, using his land certificate as collateral. But after facing difficulties in paying his installments on time, now R rarely stays at his house in Suak Pandan but has moved to his in-law house, to avoid the Bank s debt collector. According to the keuchik of Kuta Baru (Nagan Raya), many tsunami victims have put their certificates to the banks and micro-finance credit institutions. But since their loans from the banks were not for productive ventures, they will face the danger of losing their land if they cannot repay their debts and rates. The free-of-charge certificates have moved the citizens to become more consumptive, since only a small portion of the bank loans have been used for productive ventures. The complicated bureaucracy and the difficult requirements have discouraged most of the tsunami victims from borrowing money from the banks. Observations and interviews in the Meulaboh area has shown that not banks have accepted many land certificates as collaterals, but micro-finance lending institutions, while those who wanted quick money, even for very high rates, have turned to rent-seekers. Micro-finance lending institutions, according to Islamic Syariah law, which forbid high profits, or riba, such Baitul Qiradh (BQ) Amanah Ummat in Meulaboh, have attracted many tsunami victims, with its profit-sharing scheme which benefits ordinary citizens. BQ officials are, however, not only focused on land certificates as collaterals, because for them, trust is the main basis for providing loans. Most BC clients borrow money without collaterals. The - 9 -

17 BQ officials fear that in the future, many Aceh citizens will lose their land to the rent-seekers. the strong cohesion among these communities and their economic well-being (from shark hunting in the Andaman and Nicobar waters, in India s maritime sphere), enable them to lend and borrow sums of up to Rp 50 million among themselves, without collaterals, and even sometimes without bills. They are not interested to borrow money from the bank, where they fear the bureaucracy of the bank. But apart from borrowing money from fellow villagers, they also borrow money from the toke bangku, the fish middle persons, using their fish catch as guarantee. 6. Sertificates enforces the citizens to pay more tax. The certificate distribution scheme has not contributed to the local villagers economy, by the use of certificates as collaterals to borrow money from the bank. On the contrary, the scheme has contributed more to the state economy rather than the villagers economy, because the certificates have enforce the obligation of the villagers to pay taxes related to the sale of land, as well as the normal land tax, based on the size and location of the land, as stipulated in UU No. 21/1997 and PP No. 28/1997. While failing to unlock dormant capital for thousands of poor families struggling to rebuild their shattered lives (Steer & Breteche 2006), the free-of-charge certificates do incorporate the poor tsunami victims deeper into the Indonesian state economy, since, unlike other proofs of land ownership, land certificates enforce the certificate holders to pay the land taxes according to Law No. 21/1997. The tsunami victims have been tolerated to postpone paying their various forms of land tax, but after that grace period is over, they still have to pay those land taxes, which amount to tens of millions of rupiah. In other words, the certificates are free, but now the certificate holders have to pay more tax to the Indonesian State. Taxes which in turn, will partly used to pay Indonesia s debts to the foreign creditors, which include the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and bilateral creditors, such as USAID (USA) and JBIC (Japan). That is the World Bank s hidden agenda behind this free-of-charge certificate scheme. 7. Land certificates are not the only land ownership proofs recognized by the people of Aceh. Budi Jazier, West Aceh Land Office head claims that the RALAS project is very important in returning the civil rights of the tsunami victims, especially their land rights. Before the tsunami, however, there were already several proofs of land ownership which have been already recognized by the Aceh people, such as the Land Ownership Letter, or Surat Kepemilikan Tanah (SKT) and the land ownership document, namely Akte Tanah, signed by the Camat

18 Those two types of land ownership proofs are very strongly respected by the Aceh people. This is now changing. The presence of land certificates obtained with the World Bank grant is changing the people s mind as if those certificates are legally the strongest proof of land ownership, causing Aceh citizens who have not yet received these documents fear that they land ownership can be challenged and they may lose their land. The strength of people s belief in already existing land ownership proofs, prior to land certificates can be seen from the case of the problems encountered during the planned expansion of the Cut Nyak Dien hospital in the city of Meulaboh. The planned expansion faced a stumbling block on piece of land which had been given as waqaf, an Islamic form of land gift, by the late owner of that land, who had stated that the land could only bne used for Islamic religious education. This shows that a waqaf letter could also not been violated by the people of Aceh. 8. Land certificates are no guarantee of the strength of individual land ownership. Although land certificates are, in the eyes of the law, the strongest proof of one s ownership of a piece of land, this does not mean that that certified land is well-protected from encroachment by big investors. With or without land certificates, the invasion of big investors on the land of Aceh villagers is still happening with the support of the Indonesian state and some mukim chiefs (imeum mukim) and gampong chiefs (keuchik). A large piece of land, 65 hectares in total owned by 30 family heads who had already received certificates for their land in Suak Puntong (Nagan Raya) has recently been bought by the State Electricity Corporation from those villagers for Rp per square meters. Initially, that land had already been certified during the 2007 RALAS project. However, within a year s time the land owners were forced to sell their land to PLN to build a steam power plant in a joint venture with Sinohydro, a huge electric power builder from China. Meanwhile, the keuchik of Kuta Makmu in Nagan Raya has collaborated with the Media Group in obtaining the land rights of the local people for a very cheap price, in order that this company, owned by Surya Paloh, a national business tycoon of Acehnese origin, to open a coal mine and build a coal-fired steam power plant in the village. The coal mine and the steam power plant are now operating, without proper consideration for its environmental impact, with barely any local villager on its payroll. None of the villagers have, by the way, obtained any free-of-charge land certificate from the World Bank. In those two cases, the role of the Village Secretary (Sekdes) is more dominant than the keuchik in facilitating the inroad of investors in taking over the villagers land. Those big companies use the services of the Sekdes, from taking over the people s land to the construction of gampong roads. This role of the Sekdes is stipulated in Government Regulation No.45/2007 on the Criteria and Procedure in Appointment of the Village Secretary as a Civil Servant ( Pegawai Negeri Sipil, PNS). Likewise, Article of LoGA No. 11/2006 has also stated that the Gampong Secretary will be appointed as a Civil Servant

19 Meanwhile, in the Gayo highlands in Central Aceh, where the local people have been exempted from the RALAS project since they had not suffered directly from the tsunami. In this mountain province, PLN has also taken over many tracts of land along the Peusangan River, the natural outlet of the Lot Tawar Lake, where the Government of Indonesia is planning to build two hydropower plants of 40 Megawatt each. Since 1995, the people of Senehen in the Silihnara subdistrict were forced to sell their land to PLN for a very cheap price, to build the diversion weir for the first Peusangan hydropower dam. Although very reluctantly, the people had to sell their land for public interest, and because they feared of being accused of being against development. 9. Land certificates facilitates the transformation of land ownership from a tool of production and social cohesion into a commodity. According to informers from Suak Pandan, Suak Seukee, Kuala Bubon (Aceh Barat), Kuala Baru and Suak Puntong (Nagan Raya), certificates increases the value of land, compared to land only equipped with land titles signed by the Camat (Akte Tanah). Land equipped with certificates can sell faster than land which are only equipped with Akte Tanah. In the people s way of thinking, certificates can be used more easily as a collateral to borrow money from the bank, according to Faisal Muhammad Ali, the keuchik of Kedai Panga. The people s desire to obtain land certificates is mainly driven by the desire to borrow money from the bank, and also to be able to sell their land for a higher price. In some places, land certificates also constitute status symbols. People who have no land certificates feel inferior to their neighbors who do have certificates. Land certificates also open the chance for outsiders to become part of Aceh s community, gradually reducing the function of land as the cohesion basis of Aceh s customary society. Obedience to Reusam Gampong, the traditional formula in allowing land to be transferred to others, which has been handed over from generations in the past, has watered down. In the past, if someone wants to sell his or her land, that person has first to offer it to his or her relatives. Only when no relative is interested, can the land be sold to the neighbor of the initial landowner. When the neighbors are not interested, the land has to be offered by fellow villagers. Finally, if no fellow villager is interested, can the land be offered to outsiders. While losing their respect to the ages-old reusam gampong, the mayority of the villagers do not realize, that the ownership of land certificates brings a new burden to the people, namely the obligation to pay land taxes, as has been described earlier. 10. This massive land certification project contradicts the spirit of honoring the historical tradition and customs of the Aceh people, where the interests of the villagers should be guaranteed and protected by the mukim and gampong chiefs and their officials, as has been stipulated in various laws on Aceh, and recognized in the Helsinki agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement on 15 August

20 This massive land certification project, which has only involved the keuchik and the Camat, has completely ignored the role of the mukim chief (imuem mukim) which structurally ignored the role of the most specific institution in protection the customary rights of the gampong people. By not involving the imeum mukim and the gampong officials in charge of managing the villagers land, water, and other natural resources, and also by not respecting the reusam gampong, all of which has been stipulated by the various qanun issued by the Government of NAD, the RALAS project is threatening the entire fabric of Aceh s customs and traditions. Although many new qanun based on Law No. 11/2006 on the Aceh Government still need to be issued, the memorandum signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement in Helsinki on 15 August 2005, stipulates in point that Kanun Aceh will be re-established for Aceh respecting the historical traditions and customs of the people of Aceh and reflecting contemporary legal requirements of Aceh. So, the Indonesian government is bound, nationally and internationally, to defend and facilitate the transition of Aceh s government and regulations to revive the more socially and ecologically sound wisdom of past generations, and not merely carry out a World Bank, which seems to be free-of-charge but in later stages force the tsunami victims to pay Indonesia s international debts

21 CONCLUSIONS: (1) The implementation of the RALAS project has been hindered by the poor adjudication quality of the teams send by BPN from all over Indonesia to Aceh, contrary to the project s claim to carry out community-based adjudication (CBA). This low quality implementation of the RALAS project has opened the door for various forms of manipulations, such as: - Prioritizing the adjudication and delivery of certificates to persons close to the village apparatus; - Provision of certificates for villagers from villages which were not hit by the 2004 tsunami, as has happened at six villages in the Samatiga subdistrict in West Aceh; - Although there is a regulation that the free-of-charge certificates have to be prioritized to house kits, in reality certificates have also been provided to plantation land, which were subdivided into two-hectares plots. (2) The implementation of the RALAS project has violated national and provincial laws: The merely symbolic involvement of the keuchik (village head) in the adjudication process violates of the Government Regulation No. 24/1997 on the Land Registration Process (Peraturan Pemerintah No. 24/1997 tentang Pendaftaran Tanah), especially Article No. 8.2.b.3, and also violates several Qanun that has been issued by the Province of NAD (Qanun No.2/2003 on the Hierachy, Position and Authority of the Districts and Towns in the Province of NAD; Qanun No. 4/2003 on the Gampong Government; and Qanun No. 5/2003 on the Mukim Government). (3) The distribution of land certificates is not an urgent matter for many Acehnese tsunami victims, since all the pre-existing proofs of land ownership are respected by and among the villagers. (4) Rather than strengthening the local people s participation in the local and provincial economy, the widespread distribution of land certificates have not provided them with more access to the banking system, but has rather facilitated a deeper penetration the Indonesian state and business corporations into the gampong. (5) Since the mukim structure is not yet functioning properly, because it has only been revived in Aceh since the end of Soeharto s dictatorship, the people have with or without land certificates practically no bargaining power against the influx of large development projects which are backed up, or carried out by the Government of Indonesia. (6) From all that has been concluded above, it can be concluded on a higher and broader level, that the RALAS project contradicts the basic spirit of all legal reform in Aceh, namely to revive Aceh s governance based on Islamic law and Aceh s adat law and adat structure, based on the gampong and mukim system, which guarantees a stronger protection of the local people s land, water, and natural resources, which has been adopted by the national laws on Aceh s provincial government (first by UU No. 44/1999; then by UU No. 18/2001, which has been replaced by UU No. 11/2006 and also acknowledged by the August 15, 2005 MoU between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement

22 RECOMMENDATIONS: As concluded by the discussion of the INFID research team with lecturers, NGO activists and a Camat in Meulaboh, on Wednesday evening on 8 May 2008, we want to recommend two points: 1. The State Land Affairs Body, or Badan Pertanahan Negara (BPN) should not continue the RALAS project, which is funded by a World Bank grant, since this project has caused numerous problems on the grassroots level, such as: Gaps between gampongs whose villagers who have not received certificates and their neighboring gampongs who have received such certificates, apart from distrust if villagers of their keuchik, when they have not received the free-of-charge certificates; On the higher level, this massive land certification project has reduced the sovereignty of the people of Aceh in face of the strength of the Indonesian state and big capital, which contradicts the spirit of legal reform in Aceh. 2. In accordance with the spirit of this legal reform, which has been reinforced by Law No. 18/2001, which have been renewed by Law No. 11/2006, and internationalized by the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement on 15 August 2005, what needs to be strengthened instead is the function and role of the customary government system, especially the role of the mukim as the intermediary institution between the gampong people and the Indonesian state on the subdistrict level

23 Bibliography: Aditjondro, George Junus (2007). Profiting from Peace: The Political Economy of Aceh s Post- Helsinki Reconstruction. Working Paper INFID No. 3. Afiff, Suraya (2006). Notes on Some Potential Impacts of the Implementation of Reconstruction of the Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS) on Customary Land Rights Institutions. Draft of paper presented at the 11 th Biennial Conference on International Association for the Study of Common Property in Bali, Indonesia, June Harley (ed) (2008). Mukim Masa ke Masa. Banda Aceh: Jaringan Komunitas Masyarakat Adat (JKMA) Aceh. Syarif, Sanusi M. (2003). Riwang U La ot: Leuen Pukat dan Panglima La ot dalam Kehidupan Nelayan di Aceh. Banda Aceh: Yayasan Rumpun Bambu. Steer, Andrew and Jean Breteche (2006). Land Titles in Aceh: So Much Hope, but More Action Needed. The Jakarta Post, 2 December

24 Address: Jalan Mampang Prapatan XI No.23 Jakarta Indonesia Phone (6221) , , Fax (6221)