GCC Responses to Regional Challenges of the Arab Spring and Iran s Nuclear Program. Cristina Escontrela. Florida International University

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1 1 Cristina Escontrela April 10, 2014 GCC Responses to Regional Challenges of the Arab Spring and Iran s Nuclear Program Cristina Escontrela Florida International University Executive Summary The Arab Gulf Cooperation Council s (GCC) tension with nuclear Iran, and the challenges brought by the uprisings as early as in 2011, has defined the arduous integration of the GCC. These tensions are caused by the diverging views and policies that have been taken by the GCC member states as remedies to decode the challenging regional conflicts that the region is undergoing. When it comes to finding common ground, their level of cooperation has left much to be desired for the organization. Over the past years, a fast-changing environment in the Middle East, led by the events of the Arab Spring and Iran s efforts to expand its regional influence by nuclear energy buildup, has given the Gulf States much to fear. In the face of the Arab Spring, the GCC has not been immune to the mass protest demonstrations throughout the region. They have faced popular discontent and mobilizations that have triggered a variety of reactions among GCC monarchies by generating economic handouts, military

2 2 intervention, patronage as well as repression. Externally, they have been in support of Arab popular movements in countries such as Libya, Syria, Egypt and Yemen. There have been tensions and rivalries among member states as well as diverging responses to the Arab Spring. The magnitude and complexity of the uprisings have challenged GCC states, fragmenting the organization s integration, as well as leading to a double standard in its response to outside uprisings versus in-house protests. Another major concern experienced in the region by the GCC member states is Iran s nuclear deal. The Gulf s reaction to the Iran s nuclear program has been cautious. Some member states have expressed concern over reports about Iran s plans to build more nuclear reactors along the Gulf coast. This has placed a lot of pressure among GCC members who see Iran as a player attempting to change the balance of power in the region by becoming the regional hegemon. Oman s soft hand towards Iran and Saudi Arabia s hostility has challenged the GCC s collective interest. If the GCC wants to counter-balance Iran s regional power, they will have to put their differences aside and work collectively in order to emerge as a force while keeping Iran s hostile ambition in check and scrutiny. As well, it is also important for the GCC to recognize the growing importance of Iran s economy and to consider Iran as a mutual ally rather than a competitive player. In the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings and the fear towards a nuclear Iran, these two major issues have put the members of the GCC in a challenging position. Not only have diverging views prevented common ground solutions among member states, but have also questioned the effectiveness of the organization.

3 3 II. Arab Spring Introduction Since 2011, many countries including the Gulf Cooperation Council states have been confronted with multiple challenges originating from the Arab Uprisings. Domestically, all GCC members have experienced some type of protest in one form or another. In Bahrain and Oman, both countries experienced prolonged street protests, while in other states, violent protests resulted in deaths, imprisonment and countless injuries. The chain reaction of the Arab Spring that started in Tunisia ended up reaching the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is a political and economic union integrated by the countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These six countries witnessed popular protests in one form or another but they each differed in approaching the situation at hand. The situation has triggered different reactions within the GCC and their reaction to the Arab Spring has proven to be eclectic. The fear of internal chaos has prompted the Gulf States to take on some reforms and short-term measures, as well as military intervention. On the other hand, they have supported protestors against their regimes, proclaiming mediation measures and brokering deals. There have been points of collaboration, as well as points of tension that has led to a rethinking of Gulf security in regards to the Arab Spring s impact on the region. This mixed reaction has led some countries to take repressive measures, and others have enacted more political and economic reforms while supporting protest movements in Syria, Libya, Egypt and Yemen.

4 4 At first glance it was believed that the GCC member states were immune to the ideological reform movements that were affecting the countries of Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Egypt and Yemen, but that theory was proved wrong after watching popular discontent and challenges from their own populations. The Arab Spring added a new dimension of changes that have been observed in the region. These uprisings came about as a response to the popular dissatisfaction of ordinary citizens towards the regimes that were in power, as well as frustrations of young people towards the status quo. The uprisings have not only spread in a rapid fashion throughout the region, but they have also led to the takedown of four heads of state: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen; all who were in power for many years and were believed to have complete control of their governments affairs. Even though the future of the Arab Spring and the effect it has had in the region is not yet clear, it is almost certain that the Arab Spring has posed political, social and economic challenges, as well as opportunities to the GCC member states. Some countries regarded the Arab Spring as a threat, while others regarded it as an opportunity. However, they all took different approaches to deal with the uprisings. - GCC approaches Externally, some of these states have been in support of the Arab Spring s popular movements. However, internally those same GCC countries have had to face popular discontent and popular mobilizations, triggered by a reaction in the monarchies, which led to economic handouts, military intervention, patronage or in some cases, repression. The GCC countries have not been unaffected by the mass protests demonstrations

5 5 that have led to changes in the balance of power in many countries throughout the region. These changes have affected the internal discourse and actions taken by the GCC countries. The Arab Spring has been a crucial test for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Oman in which they have confronted with internal outbursts of disaffection, they have responded in a mixed way by combining patronage, outright repression, and outreach to the protesters (Colombo, Coates, Ghabra, Hamid, Ragab, 2012, P.4). On the one hand, the GCC countries have deployed financial assistance to key sectors of society and engaged in limited political and economic reforms. However, they have also carried out harsh repression of the revolts and even military intervention to ensure regime survival (Colombo, 2012, P.5) as it was the case with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. - Threat perceptions Different attitudes have flourished among the GCC members, and their perception of threats is essential to understand the different ways in which the Gulf States respond to the Arab Spring and to the uprisings within their countries. Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has played a particular role throughout the region, using iron-fisted tactics to combat riots and the violent clashes between the restive Shiites and the Saudi security forces (Bradley, 2011) in the country. This aggressive response by the Saudis was also a way to put a stop to Iran s Shiite influence in Bahrain, while preventing Shiite uprisings and revolutionary movements to other GCC s member states. Saudi Arabia has extensively cracked down on mass demonstrations and discontent within their territory, as well as in neighboring Bahrain, which was occupied

6 6 back in 2011 by the Saudis in an effort to cease protests by the Shiite majority in the country. The decision suppressed the popular sentiment by the Shiite population, using collective military action to halt the revolts and indirectly to cease Iran s regional influence, something the Saudis have long feared. The Gulf Cooperation Council was clearly concerned of a prospect Shiite political victory in Bahrain (Bradley, 2011), fearing that this would lead to Shiite revolts in the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia, where much of the main oil reserves are located and where the majority of the population is predominantly Shiite. The Saudis unease led to a deployment of about 2,000 troops into Bahrain territory in March 2011, approximately 1,200 from Saudi Arabia and 800 from the United Arab Emirates (Bradley, 2011). Massive deployment of military forces from Saudi Arabia repressed the revolts and manifestations that the country was undergoing. This response from the two governments prevented a spill of protests from Bahrain to other GCC countries, as well as counter-acted the dissatisfaction of the popular sector (Bronner, Slackman, 2001). From the Arab Spring s beginnings, Saudi Arabia has never let its guard down; on the contrary, they have been directly involved in local and external challenges that the Arab Spring has brought up. There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia has resorted to high levels of repression to ensure their political survival, not only by cracking down the protests but also by pumping massive amounts of money into the society. The Saudis began spending $130 billion to increase the country s civil servant salaries, promising to build 500,000 additional units of low-income housing, and substantially increasing its financial support for religious organizations (Kamrava, P.2). These monetary incentives were some of the maneuvers implemented by the Saudis to keep its citizens content

7 7 without having to resort to violence to crack down the uprisings. The same measure was taken in Kuwait, when the state increased its civil servant salaries by 115 percent at a cost of more than $1 billion, and an additional cost of $5 billion, gave a cash handout of Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) 1000 to its citizens, who were also promised free distribution of foodstuffs for fourteen months (Kamrava, 3). Despite Kuwait s relative political freedom, thousands of people took the streets in 2011 calling for better democratic governance is response to the almost 300 years of Al-Sabah family s rule over the country. Popular protests led to the dissolution of the parliament in 2012, opening the way for elections. Attempts were made by the government to favor the ruling family, which led to more protests and boycotts from the opposition groups who did not present any candidates for the new parliament elections and recorded a 70% abstention rate (Eaves, 2013). Contrary to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Kuwait, Qatar took another path in dealing with the uprisings of the Arab Spring. They stood out as the only country in the Arab region to support the uprisings of the Arab Spring. One could even argue that the Qatari leadership saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to re-affirm its regional leverage. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar supported democracy and stability in the Arab Spring countries. They focused in encouraging diplomatic activism, financial support and even military backing if requested by countries like Libya and Syria, creating opportunities of diplomatic expansion and regional power. This small, yet wealthy state was able to readjust its foreign policy and stick to its former strategy of maintaining good relations with all countries in the region, which is important to Qatar s regional power. Qatar s support for the Arab revolutions and their

8 8 accompanying new generation of leaders would maintain the favor of these emerging regional surges and grant vast credit to Qatar (Hroub, 2012), positioning them as a key actor in the region. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates decided to withdraw its ambassadors from the country as a response to Qatar s support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the rebels combats to overthrow President Bashar al-assad in Syria. Whereas the Saudi regime supported the coup against former President Muhammad Morsi, whom they viewed with distrust, Qatar has continued to back the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that the Saudis and the Emirates see as threat to the stability of the region and to the GCC member states (Black, 2014). Oman is another GCC state that has positioned itself as neutral; they appear to escape the effects of the Arab Spring with the protests providing a minimal threat to their regime. But Sultan Qaboos reforms in the social, economic and political sphere demonstrated that his government was taking all necessary steps to control the uprisings that took place after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, as well as the uprisings in Bahrain. The demonstrations in Oman forced the government to act on problems that have been growing for years, such as the rising prices of goods, job availability and corruption (Worrall, 2012). Qaboos immediate actions were to raise the minimum wages, to offer a promise to create more than 50,000 jobs and to dismiss twelve ministers involved in corruption (Worrall, 2012). The different maneuvers taken by the member states controlled the effects of the Arab Spring within the GCC, but fell short of full integration. The cooperation was meant

9 9 to bring small Arab Gulf countries together and counter-act rising threats of Iranian and Iraqi hunger for regional power. On the other hand, the Arab Spring demonstrated a lack of collaboration between member states, showing different lines of thought within the GCC. Cooperation has been largely overlooked in each of the six states, placing sovereignty as their top priority and foreign policies reflecting individual interests instead of a collective approach. Also, the uprisings have made society evident as political actors, demanding democratic mechanisms and structural change in the Gulf States. II. GCC s reaction towards Iran s nuclear deal - Introduction The Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC), led by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and United Arab Emirates, have emerged as powerful actors within the region. They have worked together in a variety of topics from climate change to renewable energy and global issues. However, Iran s nuclear program has been a struggle. Different visions and policies towards a possible nuclear Iran expose the difficulty of achieving common ground. The Gulf s higher council has expressed concern over reports about Iran s plan to build more nuclear reactors along the Gulf coast (Kholadif, 2013). Even though Iranian president Hassan has focused on fixing previous damaged relations with Arab neighbors, caused by former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, fear still exists. - GCC Approaches

10 10 Iran s efforts to expand its regional influence, by improving their economic and military capabilities and nuclear energy programs, have caused concern among the GCC states. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates believe that a nuclear Iran represents a threat to the region and to the GCC, because it is believed that this would tilt the balance of power in the region in Iran s favor, or force the Kingdom and other GCC states to take countermeasures (Cordesman, 15). Saudi Arabia has particularly showed strong support of diplomatic efforts to halt s Iran s nuclear program (Coderman, 6), and they have placed enormous pressure on the United States, forcing Iran to comply with the demands of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran s nuclear crisis began in 2002, when newspaper and other media reports began to surface about their construction of two nuclear facilities, a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy-water research reactor at Arak (Perkovich, Radzinsky, Tandler, 2012). Tensions grew within the GCC as Iran concealed its nuclear activities, violating transparency requirements by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and despite the use of diplomacy and different strategies to avoid confrontation, Saudi Arabia has been particularly unhappy. Saudi Arabia s strong concern on Iran s acquisition of nuclear weapons has been expressed to American officials. Strategic analysts and U.S. policy makers believe this nuclear gain will obligate Saudis to follow through with similar actions, not only for their fear of a shift in power and politics but also because of the revolutionary ascendancy of its Shiite rival across the Gulf (Lippman, 2008). Saudi Arabia s oil reserves, wealth and the U.S. s assistance in security and military support has made them the region s leader,

11 11 but recently Iran s economic strength and nation, as a whole, poses a change in the balance of powers and status quo. The Kingdom has tried diplomatic efforts with Iran to eliminate nuclear programs, not much progress has been accomplished, and the fear of future expansionist policies is heavily present. Saudi Arabia believes WMDs in Iran will motivate the Iranians to heavily invest in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, further bringing these states into its orbit, which is seen with a real fear in Riyadh (Mahmood, 2014). The Saudi s conundrum on the topic limits their aggressive approach towards Iran, a fear of intense international pressure and threats of sanctions if it were to go ahead with its threats (Mahmood, 2014); confines their position. Diplomacy is their only course, first because Saudi Arabia does not have the power to directly affect any nuclear deal made with Iran (Mahmood, 2014); and second, because they will face international pressure if they were to use threatening tactics. Other members of the GCC have seized distinctive approaches due to an absence of strategic depth and power to adjust Iran s nuclear programs. Even with a history of poor relations, Oman and Iran have shared interests throughout the years. Historically, Oman has always kept channels of communication open with Iran, as well as acted as a mediator between Tehran and Arab states and between Tehran and Western powers, such as Britain and the United States (Mubarak Saeed, 2014). Oman is considered a mediator between Iran, the United States and the Saudis, empowering this role in publications as early as 2012, in the Geneva agreement between Iran and P5+1, when Sultan Qaboos urged Iran and the United States to sit and talk during an interview with the American press (Saeed, 2014). In addition, secret meetings between Oman, the United States and

12 12 Iran took place back in 2011, with the objective of embracing a commonplace on the nuclear deal. The secret discussions between the United States, Iran and Oman took place in Muscat, concluding an estimated $7 billion in relief from international sanction for exchange of Iranian curbs on uranium enrichment and other nuclear activity (Klapper, Lee, Pace, 2013). Oman is cultivating future possible economic partnerships with Iran and an image of political importance in the region by preserving security and stability. Its mediator skills between Iran and Saudi Arabia has permitted Oman to keep the Kingdom s regional hegemony in restraint, smoothing Oman s and other GCC states distress. Oman has always sought to affiliate within the GCC, even with diverging views among member states. Oman solicits to close the bridge between Iran and the United States, as well as the GCC and Iran, with the goal of emerging as the key arbitrator both in the region and the international arena. Their cautious balance allows them to stand firmly in the face of Iran and the rest of the GCC member states. As a result, Iran has never foreshadowed a threat to Oman s security or undermined its national stability, thus inclining Oman to respect the nuclear deal (Saeed, 2014). Not considering Iran s nuclear deal as a threat to life but rather as a threat to the political self-confidence of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate, who has recently claimed to abide by U.S. and UNSC sanctions against Iran (Fulton, Farrar, Frasco, 2011). This validates Oman s importance as a mediator between the United States and Iran. Taking similar diplomatic measures, Qatar has called for a peaceful termination to the conflict over Iran s nuclear program and advised explicit conversations between the United States and the Islamic Republic. Qatari officials discussed Iran s nuclear program

13 13 with U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton back in 2010 but since then, they have limited their public statements on the matter, while not limiting their concern over a nuclear arms race if Iran were to weaponize its own nuclear program (Dorsey, 2010). Not all countries have felt at ease with Iran s desire for a nuclear deal. The United Arab Emirates shares the same concern as the Saudis. Their position towards Iran comes not only after feeling threatened by Iranian power in the region, but also after decades of dispute and tensions over three islands in the Persian Gulf: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb. They fear a nuclear Iran would lead to expansionist policies and a conventional arms build-up in the Middle East, while also becoming more influential in the region. Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has felt compelled to take the issue of a nuclear Iran seriously. They were the first GCC state to publicly signal endorsement of military force to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Due to the strain posed by Iran, the UAE has felt the necessity to ensure their security by diminishing the gap with the United States and Europe, in order to safeguard its regional stability and counter-arrest the threat posed by Iran. (Dorsey, 2010) Bahrain bears neutral views. Its officials have sustained Iran s right to enact nuclear energy, but have openly conceded their apprehension against Iran s build-up of nuclear weapons. Bahrain s crown prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa has publically admitted his belief that Iranian command is presently in pursuance of a nuclear weapons program. The prince encourages a diplomatic solution to evade destabilizing the region or potentially triggering a regional war (Fulton, Raffar, 2011). But despite the current dread, their position is somehow ambiguous. All GCC member states, perhaps exempting Oman, have perceived intimidated in

14 14 one-way or another by a nuclear Iran, some siding with Saudi Arabia, while at the same time trying to ease tensions with Iran. Still, their positions to the issue remain obscure. Many scholars postulate that a nuclear Iran can disturb the balance of power in the region. GCC countries recognize their incompetence to offer security to Iran in replacement to cease its nuclear program, because for many years the Gulf countries have been reliant on the United States for security. Saudi Arabia has supported GCC members to progress on nuclear energy for peaceful intent, but the GCC states are distant from acquiring such energy, as a result of scarcity of nuclear technology expertise and infrastructure. Their options on the matter are narrow: obtaining nuclear weapons to counter-balance Iran s nuclear program is absent, knowing it will imperil relations with the U.S., a country that for long has administered security, defense capacity, military education and training (Wehrey, 2014). From the GCC s standpoint, a nuclear Iran as the regional hegemon is intolerable. To legitimately counter-balance Iran s regional capacity, the GCC will have to surrender their differences and collectively function as a proficient organization. A common strategy is imperative. Oman s flexibility and Saudi Arabia s hostility radiate the objective, but recognizing Iran s flourishing economy while contemplating Iran as an ally will be fundamental for the organization s prosperity. III. Conclusion In the commencement of the Arab Spring uprisings and the angst of a nuclear Iran, these dichotomies have embedded members of the GCC in an arduous position. Different avenues and reactions to the issue have defied the status quo of the Gulf

15 15 Cooperation Council and questioned the competence of the organization. Diverging viewpoints among the member states have prevented common-ground solutions towards the different problems the region is facing, but for true effectiveness of the organization, the GCC will have to re-invent itself by closing the gaps in their different views and by working together to achieve common goals, leaving their differences aside to remain a meaningful organization at the regional and international level.

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