EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE FIELD OF COUNTERTERRORISM CAN TRADITIONAL INTEGRATION THEORIES EXPLAIN THE MEASURES

Transcription

1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE FIELD OF COUNTERTERRORISM CAN TRADITIONAL INTEGRATION THEORIES EXPLAIN THE MEASURES TAKEN TO COMBAT THE NEW THREATS FACING EUROPE? EMMA JOHANNESSON Master s Thesis Fall 2018 Department of Government Uppsala University Supervisor: Thomas Persson Word count: 19475

2 Abstract European integration has been a widely discussed topic within political science since the creation of the EU. In recent years, signs of disintegration have been observed due to widespread euroscepticism, major crises and public discontent. Simultaneously, cross-border terrorism has become an acute issue for the EU with terror attacks being executed in several member states. This study examines the development of European integration in counterterrorism from 2014 to 2017 to determine if integration in this field has continued or halted. Two traditional integration theories, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, are applied to understand the driving factors for the European integration process in this field. The results show that European integration in counterterrorism has persisted, and even accelerated in the aftermath of recent terror attacks. The driving factors for this development can be explained by a combination of the applied theories, but the framework of neofunctionalism is unexpectedly strong. Keywords: EU, European Integration, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism 2

3 Table of Contents LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS INTRODUCTION THEORY INTEGRATION THEORIES Neofunctionalism Liberal Intergovernmentalism Integration Theories in Crises - the Financial Crisis and the Refugee Crisis EU COUNTERTERRORISM METHOD AND MATERIAL METHOD MATERIAL OPERATIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OPERATIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES Neofunctionalism Liberal intergovernmentalism RESULTS INTEGRATIVE MEASURES IN COUNTERTERRORISM Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change The attack on Charlie Hebdo, January The European Agenda on Security is Launched Push From the Commission President for more European integration Coordinated Terror Attacks in Paris, November Proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism Limited Possibilities for Stakeholder Engagement Terror Attacks in Brussels, March European Political Strategy Centre Calls for More Integration The European Commission Proposes a European Security Union The Commission Portfolio for the Security Union is Introduced JHA Council Agrees on a Roadmap for Better Information Exchange The Directive on Combating Terrorism is Adopted Differentiated European Integration The European Parliament s Special Committee on Counter Terrorism is Approved Terror Attack in Barcelona, August ADDITIONAL MEASURES TAKEN BY THE MEMBER STATES THE COSTS OF TERRORISM SUMMARY OF RESULTS DISCUSSION EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES IN EU COUNTERTERRORISM CONCLUSION REFERENCES

4 List of Abbreviations AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice ECB European Central Bank EBCG European Border and Coast Guard EEAS European External Action Service EMU European Monetary Union EP European Parliament EPSC European Political Strategy Centre ESM European Stability Mechanism EU European Union JHA Justice and Home Affairs LI Liberal Intergovernmentalism NF Neofunctionalism TEU Treaty of the European Union 4

5 1. Introduction In recent years, terror attacks have been executed on European soil several times in the form of bombings, shootings and by using vehicles to run over civilians. These attacks have caused fear among the public and have put counterterrorism at the top of the agenda for the EU institutions. As of November 2017, 7456 European nationals or residents were involved in jihadist networks (CAT, 2017), and according to Europol s former director Rob Wainwright, another attempted attack is almost certain (Walt, 2016). In the latest Eurobarometer on Europeans attitudes towards security (2017), 95 percent of the respondents replied that terrorism is an important challenge to EU security. This is an increase of three percentage points since the previous survey that was done in March As counterterrorism is a concern for many Europeans, it is important to understand how legislation is achieved and who is to be held accountable for decision-making in this field. In the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), where counterterrorism is included, the EU and the member states have shared competence, meaning that the member states have the possibility to exercise its competence to the extent that the Union has not, or where the Union has ceased to exercise its competence (TFEU, 2012, Article 2 and 4). Terrorism is not a new issue for European states, but it was not until the terror attack on World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001 (9/11) that it became prioritized on EU level. Since the attacks on 9/11 up until the summer of 2013, the EU proposed 238 new measures connected to counterterrorism. De Londras and Doody (2015, Ch. 1) give a comprehensive overview of these legislative counterterrorism measures and conclude that the decisionmaking processes of these acts were done hastily and were lacking transparency and public consultations. The developments in the EU s counterterrorism work can clearly be connected 5

6 to specific terror attacks such as the attacks on World Trade Center in New York 2001, the train bombings in Madrid 2004 and the London underground bombings in This suggests that recent attacks in Europe would further develop EU counterterrorism legislation. Several attacks have been executed in close time in Europe, for example the shooting at the Charlie Hebdo newsroom in January 2015, the coordinated Paris attacks in November 2015, the bombings at Brussels airport and metro in March 2016, the vehicle attack in Nice in July 2016, and the attack in Barcelona in August 2017 (Stonestreet & Lawson, 2018). The coordinated attacks in Paris and Brussels are especially important on EU level because of the cross-border nature. Simultaneously with these events, the political environment in Europe has changed in recent years and scepticism towards more European integration have been up for discussion in connection to the financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and the Brexit referendum Patomäki (2017) claims that the EU currently has problems of legitimacy, democracy, as well as nationalism and discontent among the public. These problems make the possibility of disintegration likely, especially as economic downturn has decreased trust for the EU. The new political landscape in Europe, along with the relatively new issue of cross-border terrorism, makes it interesting to test the applicability of traditional integration theories. By using two different frameworks for European integration, neofunctionalism (NF) and liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), it is possible to assess the willingness of more integration in counterterrorism in this new political environment in Europe. Neofunctionalism emphasizes functional, political and cultivated spillover effects to be the causes of more European integration, whereas liberal intergovernmentalism underlines that European integration will 6

7 take place in instances when member states agree that their respective preferences can be reached more efficiently if some power is transferred to supranational institutions. Many scholars have used NF and LI to examine other significant events in the evolution of the EU, but the integration literature lacks studies connected to counterterrorism since this is a relatively new issue to handle on EU level. The aim of this study is therefore to achieve a better understanding of the EU s legislation concerning counterterrorism, by applying the theoretical frameworks of NF and LI. Previous research suggests that serious terror attacks will lead to more integrative measures on EU level, but there is reason to test these claims again due to the change of the political environment. I intend to answer if more integration in the field of counterterrorism has occurred in the aftermath of recent terror attacks, and in that case, what have been the driving factors of this change? The study assesses if new initiatives and legislation on EU level regarding counterterrorism has been proposed and adopted over the last years. If this is the case, it is possible to determine that further integration has occurred in this field. The motivations for integration are found by studying official statements, press releases, speeches and background information for legislative initiatives. These are key to understand the driving forces for integration, and will support assumptions from the theoretical framework of NF, and/or LI, or neither of them. The study is divided into five sections. Section two covers previous research that the study is based on. It presents the theoretical frameworks of NF and LI and how these theories have been applied on other issues. Developments of EU policy-making in the field of counter- 7

8 terrorism are explored to understand how European integration has evolved in security and counterterrorism. Section three presents the methodology and the expectations of the study. It includes the theoretical framework and the material used to answer the research question. The fourth section presents the results, and gives an overview of new EU legislation along with motivations for integration from relevant actors. Finally, the conclusion analyzes the results, speculates around the future possibilities for EU counterterrorism work and gives suggestions for further research. 2. Theory 2.1 Integration theories European integration occurs when member states decide to shift competence from national to EU level. It can be political, social, and economic processes, and includes a legal dimension. Integration theory is interested in the underlying dynamics that result in more integration (Bulmer & Joseph, 2015). Closer cooperation and more supranational power in the field of security and counterterrorism can be viewed as an example of closer European integration. Many theoretical models have been used to explain European integration from the end of the Second World War up until today. Neofunctionalism (NF) and liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) are two of the most prominent theories used in European integration literature, presenting different motives for more integration. The distinction between intergovernmental politics and supranational politics should although not be viewed as mutually exclusive but rather as a continuum of several levels of supranationalism, where policy areas can be placed on different levels (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998) Neofunctionalism Ernst B. Haas presented NF in his book the Uniting of Europe in 1958, to challenge the dominating theories of international relations; realism and idealism. NF focuses on spillover 8

9 effects as the reasons for more integration; that cooperation in one area would spill over to other areas. Contrary to realism, Haas argued that states were not only interested in power, but interests and preferences are based on actors values. Regional integration was expected to occur when societal actors, in calculating their interests, decided to rely on the supranational institutions rather than their own governments to realize their demands (Haas & Dinan, 2004, p. *xiv). When the integration process is ongoing, interests are although likely to change to be defined in regional rather than national terms. Haas also pointed at a shift in identities and loyalty among the member states from a national center to a European center. This new European loyalty can although exist side by side with a national loyalty (Haas & Dinan, 2004, p ). Other neofunctionalists such as Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998), although believe that supranational governance can take place without a shift in identity. It is enough that transactions occur across borders, which creates interdependency, and that businesses and organizations push for common rules and standards, for states to agree on more supranational influence, since this would be beneficial for them. NF is based on functional, political and cultivated spillover. Functional spillover concerns the interdependency between sectors and political issues, meaning that organized cooperation in one area requires cooperation in other areas as well to function successfully, if no other alternatives are present. If functional dissonances occur and are not resolved with further integration, it may lead to crises, which in turn put even more pressure on functional integration (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). Political spillover occurs when there is a realization among political élites that issues will be solved better if states cooperate. These élites are interest groups of different kinds that favor more integration (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). They are able to have a say on EU legislation 9

10 through public consultations and sometimes in organized working groups and roundtables. They also lobby for their opinions in other ways, for example by hosting events and discuss issues with representatives from the European institutions (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 2013). NGOs have refocused their lobbying efforts to the European or international level, and the presence of NGOs in Brussels has increased over the years. The research of NGO involvement in the area of freedom, security and justice is although limited. Most prominent NGOs in this area are active within the field of migration, and it is also in this area that most research has been composed. NGO involvement in police and judicial cooperation has been limited (Uçarer, 2017). Cultivated spillover is connected to the power of the supranational organizations. It assumes that additional integration is promoted by supranational organizations since it gains the organization and its representatives (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). The central supranational organization in the EU is the European Commission (hereafter the Commission). The relative influence of the Commission has varied historically, from a very central role achieved in the Treaty of Rome, to a significantly weakened role in the mid-60 s. It regained influence in the mid 80 s in connection to the relaunch of the European project when power shifted from the member states back to supranational institutions. The more recent balance of power among the EU institutions is contested, but Nugent and Rhinard (2016) come to the conclusion that the Commission remains the most important agenda-setter, both directly and indirectly through other institutions. New institutions and agencies have challenged the Commission s position, but even though some influence has been transferred to these new bodies, the Commission still has the possibility to shape policies, ideas and priorities for the EU. In the legislative domain, the Commission has an almost exclusive right to propose legislation. 10

11 Nugent and Rhinard highlight that the Commission has always been initiating legislation in cooperation with other institutions and acted on feedback and suggestions to formulate proposals that will pass the co-decision procedure of the Council and the EP. Zaun (2017) also argues that several Commission initiatives have been watered down to be able to pass the legislative process and be accepted by the Council of the European Union (the Council). The Commission may therefore not always propose legislation that is too integrative since such initiatives would be voted down due to lack of support from the Council. Regarding the Commission s executive tasks, more competence has been given to the Commission in the field of financial management since the financial crisis, and new institutions as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are partly controlled by the Commission. Overall, Nugent and Rhinard argue that the perceived decline of the Commission s influence is exaggerated. In some aspects, influence has declined, but in many aspects it remains intact or has been strengthened. The NF approach has had its critics since it cannot explain all parts of European integration. Stanley Hoffman (1966) blames NF for putting too much faith in the administration to solve discrepancies between the member states and reach consensus. NF may be used to explain the start of the European project, but fails to explain the development, since the member states have been able to stop some initiatives and opt out of some when they have not seen the benefit of further integration. The supranational administration is something that the national entities try to affect, rather than the other way around. Schmitter (2005) argues that the involvement of more member states and the heterogeneity of the members complicate cooperation since it becomes difficult to find common solutions and make everyone feel as they are benefitting from the cooperation. With EU involvement in 11

12 almost all policy fields, it becomes difficult to find new areas that experiences can be transferred to. Schmitter also criticizes NF for its failure to explain the changing dynamics in Europe, the so-called turbulence that has been present in the European integration. Reflecting on Schmitter s critique today, European integration has further developed the last 15 years to include more policy fields and new member states. The cooperation has become more politicized with the additional involvement of the European Parliament (EP) and a more political European Commission. The turbulence has although persisted, and discussions about the winners and losers of European integration are widely disputed. NF has had its ups and downs since it was first presented in 1958 and has at times been undermined due to events not following its logic. The framework has proved to be useful to explain measures of integration but been criticized for not being able to answer why integration has been limited in some instances (See Niemann & Speyer, 2018, Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). NF may not be the perfect framework to explain all aspects of European integration, but it can still be valuable to understand why integrative measures have been taken in many policy areas and to better understand the role of supranational institutions Liberal Intergovernmentalism A different theoretical approach explaining integration in the European Union is liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), presented by Andrew Moravcsik in This approach recognizes that states are the main actors in deciding the level of cooperation, and dismisses the influence of supranational organizations or interest groups emphasized by NF. Moravcsik (1993) starts from the assumption that the EU should be viewed as an international regime for policy-coordination. States behave rationally in accordance with certain goals and national preferences that are shaped by societal groups who are pushing for their respective individual 12

13 preferences. Once the national preferences are formed, states bargain among themselves in a strategic manner to achieve these preferences. LI hence seeks to combine a liberal theory of national preference formation with an intergovernmental theory of international negotiation. It rests on the assumption that the EU can be viewed as an intergovernmental regime that facilitates and makes policy coordination more efficient (Moravcsik, 1993). The pooling of sovereignty and delegation to supranational institutions increase the credibility of commitments made by the member states and decrease the temptation to cheat on agreements (Pollack, 2005). States are rational actors and their preferences are based on a consideration of costs and benefits of international interactions. The national preferences are formed by discussions and pressure from domestic societal groups and can be considered the demand side of international negotiations. The supply side in the negotiations are the underlying political factors such as the intensity of the national preferences, existing linkages or agreement on issues as well as possible alternative outcomes (Moravcsik, 1993). To understand how more integration would evolve through the LI framework, it is important to understand the process of intergovernmental bargaining. The amount of bargaining power each state acquires can be viewed from different perspectives. Some of the possible discrepancies brought up are between the groups of large and small, between old and new, and between rich and poor member states. The member states with relatively low dependence on other EU economies have better bargaining power, but no evidence has been found that supports that there would be a difference between the other groupings of member states (Vilpišauskas, 2013; Bunse & Nicolaïdis, 2013; Lequesne, 2013; Waltraud, 2013). The Franco-German relationship has often been said to shape the EU, but Della Sala (2013) argues 13

14 that leadership can occur from other formations of states as well, even though support from the larger states is necessary to initiate significant changes. In conclusion, the size of the member state is important to have influence over the decisions, but smaller states have the possibility to swerve the decision in a certain direction or push forward new initiatives. The member states are the most important actors in LI, but the balance of power between the member states and the Commission is debated. Kassim and Menon (2010) argue that the member states have taken back influence from the Commission since the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, and that they are now the central actors. The Commission has been constrained by the member states that have limited the Commission s decision-making power and circumscribed its autonomy. The Commission is still considered a vital actor, but in relation to the other institutions, it is in relative decline. It has also been argued that the increased influence of the EP as a co-legislator, the enlargement process and the objections of a European constitution have made the Commission more cautious in its working methods (Kurpas et al. 2008). Moravcsik argues that the discussion concerning the democratic deficit in the EU has been exaggerated. National governments are still the major actors and hold the relatively small EU bureaucracy accountable and controlled (Kleine and Pollack, 2018). The strength of LI is considered to be its possibility to capture intergovernmental bargaining and how it affects European integration. It is although criticized for not capturing feedback effects of integration and how different junctures of intergovernmental bargaining are connected and affected by previous negotiations (Schimmelfenning, 2018). Additional critique towards LI concerns the theoretical claims and biases associated to it. Wincott (1995) argues that it is unclear if Moravcsik has presented a deductive theory or an approach based on methodological assumptions, because the arguments end up somewhere in between. Stone 14

15 Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) do not criticize the intergovernmental bargaining per se, but they question intergovernmentalism as theory. It should rather be seen as a mode of decisionmaking within the EU. Despite this criticism, LI has continued to be a prominent theory to explain European integration, and it can give valuable insights for how and why decisions have been taken by the member states to give more influence to supranational institutions. The theories of NF and LI were criticized, and the debate between the two was nearly overrun by other approaches discussing the EU in the 1990s. Following the debate between NF and LI was a mainstream international relations debate between rationalism and constructivism, where the main disagreement concerned the impact of the EU institutions on national preference formation and identities. Other approaches put less focus on integration and tried to understand the system of the EU, by using a comparative perspective or a governance approach (Pollack, 2005). However, despite these developments in the study of the EU, the traditional theories of NF and LI have made a comeback, and been useful also in recent times of EU integration. The financial crisis and the refugee crisis are two examples where they have been applied and explained important developments in the European integration process Integration Theories in Crises - the Financial Crisis and the Refugee Crisis NF and LI have primarily been used to explain critical moments in the history of European integration, i.e. when the outcomes have implied either more or less integration. This section presents examples from the financial crisis and the refugee crisis, which both have been explained by NF and LI. 15

16 The financial crisis The financial crisis hit the EU hard, especially some member states. Discrepancies existed between monetary and fiscal policy where the first is a EU competence and the last a national competence. Supervision of economic policy and crisis management tools were also lacking in the union, which contributed to causing the crisis. Status quo had caused the crisis, and measures were needed to safeguard the EU s key goal of a stable common currency (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). A breakup of the EMU, or exit by one or several countries, was one alternative, but this would bring high costs for the member states, and for the EU as a whole, and was therefore not a desired option (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2017). NF can be used to explain the outcomes of the financial crisis. The Eurozone was strongly interdependent but did not function properly, and the favored solution was therefore to take more integrative steps to solve the problems, what can be viewed as functional spillover (Schimmelfenning, 2018). The discourse among national leaders and EU leaders was also centered on functional arguments for more integration, which limited the policy options (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). Interest groups such as businesses, trade unions and industries contributed to political spillover as they lobbied for more integration and measures to save the euro. Financial markets also put pressure on further integration since they reacted positively to integrative measures, and negatively to inactivity or hesitation. This contributed to the development of the ESM (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). The relevant supranational institutions in the financial crisis were the European Commission, the EP and the European Central Bank (ECB). Since many crisis management solutions were intergovernmental, the possibility for the Commission to take initiatives was rather limited. Despite this, the member states agreed on more integration and the Commission gained new 16

17 competences and autonomy (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). The Commission s role in agenda setting decreased slightly while its executive power increased. Bauer and Becker (2014) found that the financial crisis increased the Commission s role in inter alia financial stability support, economic policy surveillance, and in supervision of the financial sector. This changed the Commission s role from policy entrepreneur to policy manager, but its possibility to promote political goals was maintained. The EP put significant pressure on the member states to link agreements to the treaties, to strengthen the supranational dimension in negotiations and to advance its own role of accountability in the new institutional setups. The ECB promoted deeper integration to strengthen the EMU and save the euro during the crisis, and also pushed for a future fiscal union. Overall, the power of the supranational institutions changed with the crisis, but they all managed to either use its existing power in the most beneficial way, or come out of the crisis with increased power (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). The LI framework works well to explain the intergovernmental bargaining that took place in the wake of the euro crisis. The negative externalities of disintegration would be costly, both financially and politically for the member states and the EU as a whole. A lot of resources had been put into it and the EMU had been considered a success. It was hence not viewed as a possible option to go back to national currencies and abandon the EMU (Schimmelfenning, 2018). The member states thereby agreed on more integration to deal with some of the dysfunctionalities that had contributed to the crisis. National preferences differed between creditor countries and debtor countries, and both sides pushed for the solution that would benefit them the most. Regulatory measures were preferred over more solidarity by the creditor countries, but some countries did not have the ability to comply with these measures, and it was therefore not sufficient. Interdependence between the Eurozone members was strong, but asymmetrical, which put the creditor states in a better position in negotiations. 17

18 Germany was a particularly strong financial actor and was able to set the terms for negotiations along with likeminded northern states (Schimmelfenning, 2018). This shows that the relative bargaining among member states is important when it comes to crisis management, and that strong economic member states have an advantage in economic issues. Both NF and LI, depending on the perspective, can hence explain the financial crisis. NF finds proof of functional spillover due to the interdependencies within the Eurozone. Political spillover occurred when financial markets, business organizations and trade unions lobbied for more integration. Cultivated spillover is supported by the push from supranational institutions to increase integration. The ECB had a significant role during the financial crisis, and will likely continue to push for a complete fiscal union. LI rests on the unwillingness to disintegrate due to the economic and political costs it would bring for the member states. This perspective emphasizes the outcome of the crisis on the intergovernmental bargaining that took place among the Eurozone member states. In economic issues, Germany has a particularly strong bargaining position and could shape the agenda. The refugee crisis In regard to the refugee crisis, Niemann and Speyer (2018) have presented a NF explanation to the development of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) regulation. Since this is an area of high-politics, member states are expected to be unwilling to give sovereignty to the EU. The refugee crisis is considered to be a consequence of the dysfuctionalities between the Schengen system and weak external border management. A possible solution to the crisis was therefore an updated version of the previously suggested EBCG. An alternative solution would be to limit or abandon the Schengen agreement, but this solution was not considered to be probable due to economic and political reasons (Niemann & Speyer, 2018). Schengen is 18

19 one of the greatest achievements of the EU (European Commission, 2018) and is of high symbolic value to the EU as one of the core developments of European integration (Niemann & Speyer, 2018). The majority of member states supported a common solution to deal with the refugee crisis and insisted on better common external border controls to safeguard the Schengen area. This can be explained as functional spillover (Wolf & Ossewaarde, 2017). Business organizations also endorsed the benefits of Schengen and flagged for the increased costs and lowered wealth that would face the Union if Schengen was abolished. The umbrella organizations for businesses in Brussels, Business Europe, released statements in favor of a stronger EBCG, which may have contributed to the decision-making process (Niemann & Speyer, 2018). Concerning cultivated spillover, the Commission has been portrayed as a supranational policy entrepreneur in the development of EBCG, an actor that is willing to invest resources in an idea in the hope of future return, or because that idea is according to the actors values. Successful entrepreneurs have the claim to hearing, have political connections or negotiating skills and are persistent (Kingdon, 1984, p ). The Commission had in this case already prepared legislation on the issue, was cohesive and well-organized and acted as a broker in the trilogue between the EP and the Council (Niemann & Speyer, 2018). The Dutch Presidency negotiated the EBCG successfully by showing strong leadership, being a credible and impartial negotiator, and by combining creativity, pressure and effective bargaining to push through solutions effectively. The Council was able to gain some power on behalf of the Commission through the decision on intervention in the case of non-compliance, by making it a decision to be taken by qualified majority in the Council (Niemann & Speyer, 2018). The EP was also supportive of more integrative measures and managed to successfully push 19

20 through its core positions, inter alia to influence the appointment of the Agency s director. Even though the Council was able to win over some power from the Commission, the initiatives from the Commission were important for the outcome. All three spillover effects can be found and NF is therefore useful in explaining the development of the EBCG. From an LI perspective, the member states general approach to European integration may affect their stance on migration and asylum policy. Wolf and Ossewaarde (2018) used this crisis for the EU to study imaginaries of further integration among national representatives in the European Council. National heads of state or government express diverse support for further general European integration; some are very supportive whereas others reject it. The bargaining power of each member state should although be considered, and in that case, the member states with the strongest bargaining power (Germany, France, Italy and the UK) show greater support of more integration than the member states with the weakest bargaining power (Poland, Hungary, Romania and Greece) (Wolf & Ossewaarde, 2018). In the case of the refugee crisis, bargaining power needs to be viewed in regard to the number of refugees that has entered and the popular opinion on immigration. Greece and Italy were the first points of entry for many refugees, but Germany, Sweden and Austria were popular countries for asylum applications. These states were under pressure to handle the large amount of people entering at the same time, both practically and politically. The recipient countries supported measures on EU level that allocate refugees proportionately, whereas the countries with low amounts of refugees dismissed proposals of equal burden sharing. The non-recipient states that favored status quo had a better bargaining position, and measures to introduce a permanent quota system for allocation could be dismissed (Zaun, 2018). The mandatory emergency allocation scheme of refugees, introduced in 2015, was strongly opposed by 20

21 Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, and these states rejected to accept the number of refugees assigned to them. These countries even challenged the scheme in court due to the mandatory aspect, but the ECJ ruled the relocation mechanism to be legal (Kroet, 2017). The relocation mechanism is an example of intergovernmental bargaining where several member states did not believe more integration would be beneficial, perhaps due to domestic pressures. The relocation system rather caused disintegration as member states were unwilling to cooperate and introduced internal border controls to stop migrants. A possible explanation for this is that interdependence was not as strong in this crisis as it was in the financial crisis, and the negative outcomes of disintegration were not as significant. Schimmelfenning (2018) argues that the consequences were easier to handle compared to disintegration in the Eurozone because [i]n contrast with financial markets, migrants are powerless transnational actors that even the weakest countries on the migrant routes could block or divert. In the EBCG regulation, member states could agree on more cooperation because they could all favor from more control at the external borders and were willing to pay for it, but in regard towards the hosting of refugees, the situation was different and member states calculated the costs of accepting refugees to be higher than the costs of refusing it. The relocation mechanism proves the importance of the specific issue at stake in intergovernmental bargaining, and shows that despite three out of four of the most influential member states being pro integration, smaller states can prevent integrative measures. In regard to both the financial crisis and the refugee crisis, these studies show that support for NF or LI as the motivation for more or less integration depends on the chosen case. It is likely that the same goes for different issues connected to counterterrorism, especially since this is a 21

22 field connected to many others, such as human rights, radicalization, migration, technology, finance, and integration. 2.2 EU counterterrorism The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime (TEU, article 2:2) As article 2:2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states, the union should be an area of freedom, security and justice. This is legislated under the EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law, a legislative area that has undergone many changes over the evolution of the EU. Before the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty 1993, this area was purely intergovernmental and informal, but over the years it has become formalized and more influence has been given to supranational institutions such as the Commission and the EP (Peers, 2017). Legislation in this area is although debated since freedom and security concerns, two of the constitutional foundations of the EU, can be conflicting (Matera, 2017). Security, and particularly terrorism, has traditionally been a national issue. Different kinds of separatist groups have been responsible for the majority of the terror attacks, and the extent of the issue has varied largely among the member states. Counterterrorism cooperation on EU level is relatively new, and the development of cooperative measures has been characterized by different domestic experiences and views on the issue (Argomaniz, 2001, p. 3). By the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, counterterrorism was placed under the third pillar, and action in this area was to be taken by intergovernmental methods (European 22

23 Parliament, 2018a). National governments are said to still play a larger role in this area than in others and the European Council has secured its leading role while EU institutions have less autonomy to successfully fulfill their tasks (Matera, 2017). Counterterrorism is predominantly included in JHA law, but also in the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) due to its international dimension (Poli, 2017). Within the Council configurations, committees and working groups are involved in the process to prepare legislation (General Secretariat of the Council, 2018b). The first measures taken at EU level in this area was the formation of the Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and Violence (TREVI) group in 1975, an informal group of interior and justice ministers from the member states, created to exchange information and best practices (Bures, 2011, p. 60). The Maastricht Treaty formally put counterterrorism in the EU framework under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, but influence from the EU institutions was still limited. The development of counterterrorism policy was slow and remained a mainly national issue until 11 September The attacks on 9/11 quickly changed the EU counterterrorism efforts. The Commission, the Council and Europol all acted to introduce new legislation and initiatives to combat terrorism. This resulted in a Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism and the adoption of Council Framework Decision (2002/475/JHA) of June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (Bures, 2011, Ch. 3; Council of the EU, 2002). The Council Framework Decision includes a common definition of terrorism and a requirement for member states to introduce minimum penalties for activities related to terrorism. The Framework Decision has been the cornerstone of the EU s counterterrorism work. 23

24 The attacks on the metro in Madrid 2004 resulted in a declaration on combating terrorism, and the introduction of a counter-terrorism coordinator. The coordinator monitors implementation of counterterrorism measures and reports to the Council, coordinates the work within the Council and between the EU institutions, facilitates communication with third countries etcetera (General Secretariat of the Council, 2018). Over the last decade, characteristics of terrorism in the EU have changed significantly. Figure 1 shows that the number of attacks has decreased, but the number of casualties has increased. The attacks have become deadlier, and the threat has changed from being mainly internal to external as foreign terrorist fighters enter Europe from abroad to execute attacks. Radicalized individuals within Europe, so called homegrown terrorists, may travel to war-torn countries for training and then return to Europe to commit terrorist attacks. This new trend calls for an updated analysis of the EU s counterterrorism work and European integration in this area. Terror attacks in Europe between 2006 and Attacks Casualties Figure 1. Number of failed, foiled and completed attacks in the EU between 2006 and 2017 (Europol) 1 1 According to data from the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT) gathered by Europol. Number of casualties for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2011 were not reported. 24

25 Counterterrorism work on EU level has been lacking in regard to transparency. It has been difficult for the public to know what measures are being discussed and to influence the decision-making processes. Despite the commitment of the Commission to increase the number of public consultations and to better assess the impact of initiatives, only three out of 88 legally binding counterterrorism measures between September 2001 and summer 2013 were open for public consultations and 22 of the measures were examined in an impact assessment. This undermines the legitimacy and democracy of counterterrorism action in the EU (Hayes and Jones, 2015). Of interest for this study is to see if more European integration has been stated as a necessary solution to deal with the issue of cross-border terrorism, and if proposed measures follow the logics of neofunctionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism. The relatively new challenge of cross-border terrorism and foreign fighters coming from war-torn areas using new modus operandi implies that the EU would adopt legislative acts that better suit the new situation. It has although been suggested that further EU integration in general is unlikely due to the problems of democracy, legitimacy and public discontent. National sovereignty is said to be especially important in security issues, which implies that member states would be hesitant towards more integration in counterterrorism, since integration measures would restrict their sovereignty. If the member states would agree on more integration, this would probably occur through multilateral cooperation, rather than by supranational governance. Counterterrorism would consequently be a policy field where LI is expected to explain integration measures better than NF. 25

26 3. Method and Material 3.1 Method I have conducted a qualitative analysis of the development of counterterrorism in the EU and the motivations presented regarding further European integration in this area. To be able to determine if more integration has occurred in counterterrorism, I describe central events in the EU s counterterrorism work from 2014 to If more legislation on EU level in this area has been adopted, it would be an argument for more integration. On the contrary, if claims are found that member states sovereignty should be safe-guarded and that they better handle the problem of terrorism nationally or through bilateral cooperation, these would be signs of disintegration or the continuation of status quo. Proposals of more integration would in that case not have been launched on EU level, or have been turned down by the member states. Actions taken on EU level connected to counterterrorism have previously been assessed in a study by the European Parliament s Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, on demand from the LIBE committee. The study is, however, focused on the relevance and effectiveness of different actions, in order to give policy recommendations for future action. It critically assesses the EU s counterterrorism work based on the number of involved actors and the confusion connected to determining the impact of policies taken in various subfields to counterterrorism (European Parliament, 2017). My thesis complements the study by looking at the motivations behind some of the actions taken, rather than the impact and coherence between them. It also gives a better overview of the policy field and the connection between non-legislative documents such as guidelines and action plans, and the legislative proposals in the form of directives and regulations. This thesis also contributes with an examination of the driving factors of the new counterterrorism measures. 26

27 The driving factors of European integration are studied through the frameworks of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. By assessing the theories, I have constructed an analytical framework used to categorize the motivations and arguments for European integration in counterterrorism. European integration is in this thesis connected to integration that occurs within the EU, and is hence equivalent to EU integration. Since the theories I have applied generally use the term European integration, I have decided to use the same wording, even though all European states are not members of the EU and some EU states have decided to opt out of cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. 3.2 Material To answer the research question and to gain a better understanding of the motives for European integration, various documents are studied. The main material is official documents from the EU institutions. These are used to assess what kind of integrative measures that have been taken in recent years. The European Agenda on Security and the Directive on Combating Terrorism are central documents, but other relevant documents related to terrorism, such as Council conclusions and opinions from EU institutions are also used to understand the implementation of the Agenda and the process of agreeing on the directive. Since terrorism is an issue connected to various policy fields, such as finance, security, foreign affairs, social policy, migration, transport and the Single Market, the available material is extensive. The study has thus been limited to focus on parts of legislative acts that directly have an impact on European integration and arguments that support or contradict the integration theories. The objective is to describe initiatives and measures taken on EU level, not to make further assessments of the acts impact, effectiveness, or coherence. 27

28 The material from the EU institutions is viewed with awareness that all discussions on sensitive topics are not included in the official documents, especially since this field traditionally has been characterized by lack of transparency. The official conclusions from meetings may not reflect the specific views of all participants, no matter if the participants are national leaders, commissioners or people involved in relevant working groups. The benefit of using the official documents is that they have not been changed since the time of publication, but reflect the discussions and opinions from that specific time. The official documents are formal and are supposed to be informative and/or have a legal aspect. They are therefore written rather clearly to not leave room for excessive interpretations. Official documents from the various EU institutions may although include a certain bias in their own respective favor. All institutions would likely want to seem progressive compared to the other, and may therefore not show conflicts within the institution officially, but rather put the blame of slow decision-making on other institutions or limitations in the legislative framework. The officially published documents are usually a compromise of the participants opinions, and may reflect a minimum standard that could be agreed upon by all. Due to the restrictions of using official EU documents, the study is complemented by other sources to find motivations and arguments for integration. These sources are official statements made by national leaders and EU leaders as well as news articles and opinions from stakeholders and think tanks. Statements and press releases made in connection to terrorist attacks are of particular relevance since previous research shows that integrative measures have been proposed or accelerated in this field following serious attacks. By searching for articles connected to terrorism, terror attacks and European integration, I have been able to find news articles and interviews with relevant policy makers to complement the 28