Impact of Political and Economic Integration on Labour Mobility in the Arabian Peninsula

Transcription

1 Impact of Political and Economic Integration on Labour Mobility in the Arabian Peninsula A brief overview of unionism in the Gulf and its effects on the migrant workforce structure J. G. A. Saviranta akseli.saviranta@gmail.com 1

2 Abstract The main question that this work tackles is the extent of the impact that political and economic shifts might have had on the labour market structure and regulations. Keywords: migration, GCC, unionism, Arabian peninsula, saudisation, omanisation, qatarisation, emiratisation, nationalism in the Arabian peninsula, Gulfism JEL Classification: A13, F15, J15, J61, K37, R58 2

3 Acknowledgements This document was first presented on the 24th of March 2015 at the Arabian niemimaa muutoksessa discussion panel organised by the Lähi-idän opiskelijat ry, to whom the author wishes to address his recognition for their valuable efforts. This document's version is that of March This document was produced with free and open-source software. The author's material is released under both the CC BY-SA 3.0 and the GFDL

4 1. Introduction The political and economic ongoings in the Arabian Peninsula have been accompanied by a change in labour mobility and labour structure. This works seeks to answer the following question: How did political and economic integration within the Arabian Peninsula affect workforce flows? A preliminary part of the answer would be reviewing these aforementioned shifts. 4

5 2. Political and Theoretical Context Degrees of Economic Integration Full Economic Integration Economic Union Common Market Customs Union Free Trade Area Prevalence of supranational entities' decisions Unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies All the restrictions on commodity and factor policies are suppressed Restrictions on factor movements are abolished Tariffs are equalised with non-member countries Tariffs are abolished between members 5

6 3. Integration Trends Follow the Oil Oil has and continues to shape the changes in the region. Both integration and migration trends could be traced and attributed either wholly or partially to natural resources. 6

7 3. Integration Trends Oil gave ideologies a political vector. Pan-Arabism was a prominent one, yet the question that remained to be settled was whose Pan-Arabism. Similarly, Pan-Islamism did not seem anachronistic, and continued to be pursued when Pan-Arabism was not an option ; again, bearing in mind that Islam may not be very monochromatic, the questions of whose and which Islam remained often unsettled, if not avoided. 7

8 3. Integration Trends These attempts covered North Africa and West Asia (NAWA) and even other neighbouring countries, and continue to take place even nowadays. Our focus region, id est, the Arabian Peninsula, is often viewed as a subregion of NAWA. Source: SAVIRANTA (2014) 8

9 3. Integration Trends Source: JustHere Qatar (2013) 9

10 3. Integration Trends Year Table 1: Timeline of Integration Attempts Political Economic Participants Initiated by Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Later League of Arab States (LAS) encompassing all NAWA countries except Israel. Treaty for Joint Defence and Economic Proposed for LAS members Cooperation Convention for Facilitating and Proposed for LAS members Regulating Transit Trade Arab Economic Unity Agreement All NAWA except Algeria, Bahrain, Israel, Oman, and Qatar United Arab Republic Egypt and Syria Source: SAVIRANTA (2014) 10

11 3. Integration Trends Table 1: Timeline of Integration Attempts Economic Participants Year Political 1958 United Arab States United Arab Republic and Northern Yemen 1958 Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan Iraq and Jordan Arab Common Market 1964 Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria 1970 Federation of Arab Republics Libya, Egypt, and Syria 1974 Arab Islamic Republic Libya and Tunisia Source: SAVIRANTA (2014) 11

12 3. Integration Trends Why are we talking about Tunisia and Libya, while our focus region is the Arabian Peninsula? The next rows in the table will show us a shift towards subregional integration, which is to be interpreted mainly as a consequence of the failure of pan-nawa attempts. 12

13 3. Integration Trends Oil price shocks accentuated the dichotomy between the commodity's net importers and net exporters. Natural resources were viewed as a national capital stock that should not be given away to other countries. This remains a case of possible natural selection of integration 13

14 3. Integration Trends Year 1981 Table 1: Timeline of Integration Attempts Political Economic Participants Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Gulf Cooperation Council Arabia, and the UAE 1989 Arab Cooperation Council Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen 1989 Arab Maghreb Union All North Africa Initially all of NAWA except Algeria and Israel Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, with other bilateral agreements existing 1997 PAFTA 2003 MEFTA 2004 Agadir Agreement Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia 2014 Maghreb Initiative on Trade and Investment All North Africa Source: SAVIRANTA (2014) 14

15 Oil also provided a vector for investment, and workforce was needed to fill in. An immense supply, coupled with a growing local aversion to menial jobs, paved the way for labour flows. The immense number of expatriates will earn the region the nickname of Expatistan. 15

16 78 Qatar 71 United Arab Emirates 62 Kuwait 43 Singapore 41 Bahrain 40 Israel 39 Jordan 26 Saudi Arabia 24 Oman 23 Switzerland Percentage of International Migrants in 2005 Source: Author's illustration based on United Nations (2007) 16

17 Population in Qatar by Nationality in 2013 Source: SNOJ (2013) 17

18 The nature of the work agreements and conditions needs to be mentioned: The vast majority is subject to the Kafala system. Legal requirements, e.g. visas, permits, employment change, must be are arranged by the kafiil, or the labourer's sponsor who is often the employer, thus granting full control over the worker's movement. 18

19 In the GCC, only Qatar and Saudi Arabia still require an exit visa. Bahrain has made slight reforms to the system in 2009 allowing employees, except domestic workers, to change employment after meeting certain notice requirements (JustHere Qatar, 2013). Outside the GCC, the Kafala system is used in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. The system draw wide criticism from various establishments including Amnesty International and the UNHRC. 19

20 4. migration Trends Net Migration Flows by Region of Origin to Saudi Arabia between 1985 and 2011 Source: Author's illustration based on DE BEL-AIR (2014) 20

21 The beginning of the oil era saw migrants from neighbouring relatively poor LAS countries, mainly Yemen and Egypt. Palestinian / Jordanian inflows were recorded following the declaration of independence of the State of Israel, as well as Iraqi inflows due to the 1968 Ba'athist coup, and Yemenis during the Yemen Civil War. Early East Asian presence is linked to ties that were developed mostly during the British colonial era. 21

22 The 1970s would bring an economic boom and migration from all of these regions, however fears of spreading undesired secular, pro-soviet, and leftist ideologies would make LAS migrants unwelcome. Most of these migrants came from Pan-Arabist countries who called for the abolition of monarchies and borders alike. These borders in particular were promoted to be the result of "Western imperialism" and a barrier to the single "Arab nation". 22

23 This would prove rather ironic in the case of many countries, such as Algeria, Morocco, Somalia, and Tunisia, that had contrasting cultures from those of the Arabian peninsula and whose political authorities emphasised on claiming a common Arab identity and even embarked on heavy Arabisation, or rather Egyptianisation, campaigns. These were equally means to legitimise an access to the "Pan-Arab oil wealth", which the Gulf authorities preferred to retain as a sovereign wealth. These authorities sought to manage these sentiments by providing other channels for wealth-sharing which would later prove inefficient. 23

24 Caricature about Arabisation in North Africa Source: Amazigh World (n.d.) 24

25 Deliberate yet timid wealth-sharing was accompanied by an aggressive 1980s prosecution and deportation of a large number of these migrants for having participated in the activities of organisations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf. The stability of some of the GCC countries, e.g. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, was equally threatened by some of these expatriate-led labour strikes. 25

26 The beginning of the 1990s would bring an exodus for Iraqis and migrants whose countries supported Iraq during its invasion of Kuwait. Overall around 1.5 million Iraqis, Palestinians, Sudanese, and Yemenis were expelled from Saudi Arabia (KAPISZEWSKI, 2006). The newer workforce was deemed cheaper, less problematic, easier to lay-off, and more obedient. Many of them were also Muslims, which was a significant factor. The monarchies still had to juggle between Pan-Arabist sentiments and politics and Gulf-exclusive interests, while gradually carrying out the Asianisation of the workforce. 26

27 Share of LAS Citizens in Total Foreign Population in the GCC Bahrain Kuwait 1996 Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia 2002 / 2004 UAE GCC Source: Author's illustration based on KAPISZEWSKI (2006) 27

28 Eventually, however, the question of social customs being threatened rose. The Gulf tried to resort again to official intranawa treaties and technical cooperation that were hardly implemented, remaining mostly in the declaration and memorandum status. The rising flow of Asians sparked statements that would be considered rather strictly xenophobic at best. 28

29 KAPISZEWSKI (2006) quotes James Zogby, the president of the Arab American Institute, stating in the 24th November 2005 issue of Gulf News that the guest workers represent: a time bomb waiting to explode and unleash riots like those that [recently] rocked France 29

30 The same issue quotes the GCC Secretary General, at that time Abdul Rahman bin Hamad Al Attiyah, clearly stating: Expat workers are 'security issue' The problems of the sovereignty of the employment market still persist. 30

31 The Gulf war, the failing integration, the distrust vis-à-vis the migrants, and viewing the oil as a strictly national wealth not to be lightly shared with the neighbours brought along a Gulfcentred nationalism, and the local governments turned towards labour nationalisation and other policies to counter what was viewed as alarming rates of white-collar non-nationals. 31

32 The issue of local workforce nationalisation has been around since the 1980s, however DE BEL-AIR (2014) describes a fierce but yielding opposition to its implementation: Saudi workers are costly, hard to lay off, and unwilling to engage in lowskilled tasks, while lacking the skills, training and, above all, labour productivity demanded by the private sector. 32

33 Eventually, multiple other policies were launched, e.g. Nitaqat in Saudi Arabia in 2011, which encouraged firms to hire Saudis, almost exclusively regardless of performance, and sanctioned those that did not through penalties and denial of services. Measures included fixing ceilings for foreign nationals in particular positions, as well as a wide range of scholarships and trainings for nationals. Similarly, granting citizenships to foreign nationals is almost inexistent, spare a few cases. 33

34 Similarly, Qatarisation plans have been launched in Qatar since the early 2000s. Source: Qatarization.com.qa (n.d.) 34

35 And Emiratisation plans have been equally applied in the Emirates. Source: ManpowerGroup (2012) 35

36 On the other hand, still within the Arabian Peninsula but outside the GCC, an issue less often discussed is the status of migrants from the Horn of Africa in Yemen. Many cross the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea hoping for better opportunities in GCC countries, many however stay in Yemen. Mostly Ethiopians and Somalis, these migrants face extortion, rape, slavery, beating, and end up in house cleaning jobs with hardly any legal status. 36

37 5. Conclusion The effect of the GCC was not the one sought or at least expected by economic integration theories, there was no real liberalisation of labour movement due to multiple factors including the workforce structure. Aside from a few Omanis that emigrated to Saudi Arabia and then gradually returned, and a few migrants towards Dubai, the GCC did not bring any real change labour-wise neither for its nationals nor businesses. In all of the changes that occurred, the ambition to control and benefit from natural resources remained the central variable. 37

38 Bibliography Amazigh World. (n.d.). la-passion.jpg. Retrieved 20th of March 2015 from communication/cards/img/caricature/la-passion.jpg DE BEL-AIR. Françoise. (2014). Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia. Gulf Labour Markets and Migration. GLMM - EN - No. 1/2014. KAPISZEWSKI, Andrzej. (2006). Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. United Nations Expert Group meeting on international migration and development in the Arab Region. Population Division. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations Secretariat. Beirut, may

39 Bibliography JustHere Qatar. (2013). A comparison of kafala system in GCC; Qatar lags behind on reforms JustHere. Retrieved March 20th 2015 from comparison-kafala-system-gcc-qatar-lags-behind-reforms/ ManpowerGroup. (2012). About Us Retrieved 20th of March 2015 from Qatarization.com.qa. (n.d.). Qatarization.com.qa - الخطة الخمسية الستراتيجية لتقطير الوظائف في. Retrieved 20th of March 2015 from qat_web.nsf/arapages/plan_a?opendocument. 39

40 Bibliography SAVIRANTA. J. G. A. (2014). On the Political Economy of Economic Integration in North Africa and West Asia. The SelectedWorks of Akseli Saviranta. Available at: SNOJ, Jure. (2013). Qatar's population - by nationality. Retrieved 20th of March 2015 from United Nations. (2007). Regional symposium on foreign workers in the GCC: Towards a common strategy. Population Division. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Doha, Qatar April