James E. Coughlan, THE 1NDOCHINESE REFUGEES : TOO MANY, TOO LONG? James E Coughlan

Transcription

1 THE 1NDOCHINESE REFUGEES : TOO MANY, TOO LONG? James E Coughlan Research Consultant Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations Division of Asian and International Studies Griffith University Queensland, Australia Paper presented at the Refugee Council of Australia Forum, 15 May 1989, Melbourne. James E. Coughlan, linn iiiii iini ii1'im "*' ~1-'""" $

2 INTRODUCTION ^ The Indochinese refugee problem is a very complex issue. Any discussion of this issue should be based on a multi-disciplinary perspective, rather than solely on a historical, humanitarian or political viewpoint. This paper, rather than offering a detailed presentation on the Indochinese refugee problem from a purely historical, humanitarian, or political perspective, provides a general overview of the situation from these three perspectives. At the end of 1988 there were an estimated 12,139,600 refugees in the world, of which 5,668,400 were to be found in the Asian continent. According to data compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in the order of 1,899,000 refugees, including some 160,000 Cambodians who sought refuge in Viet Nam during , successfully fled Indochina from the beginning of 1975 to 31 December As of the end of ,684,195 of these refugees had resettled in countries throughout the world, and 4,912 have been voluntarily repatriated to their homelands. At the same time, 167,892 Indochinese refugees remain in refugee camps throughout Asia; in addition, about 300,000 Cambodian displaced persons remain in camps along the Thai-Cambodian boarder. Of those refugees still in camps at the end of were Lao, 58,314 were Highland Lao (predominantly ethnic Hmong), 18,744 were Cambodian and 69,979 were Vietnamese. Of the 72,178 Indochinese refugee who arrived in Asia during 1988 about 71.4 per cent were from Viet Nam. The political factors influencing the policies affecting the Indochinese refugees - the reasons for their flight, their reception in the countries of First asylum, their Third country resettlement prospects, and the international political relations of those countries affected by the Indochinese refugees - are complex. In a single paper it is impossible to attempt to achieve an adequate discussion of these issues. Therefore, this paper is limited to consider just four broad topics : the current attitudes in the main Indochinese refugee resettlement countries to accepting additional The sub-title of this paper Too Many, Too Long? comes from a book by John Rogge which discusses the problems of the long running Sudanese refugee problem, and how this particular refugee situation has gradually drifted away from the world's attention.

3 Indochinese refugees, as well as legal immigrants from Indochina,,- the current feelings in the countries of first asylum towards the continuing arrival of the Indochinese on their boarders, the four options facing the Indochinese refugees currently in refugee camps, and the reaction of some of Australia's Vietnamese community to the proposed repatriation of those Indochinese refugees currently in refugee camps in Asia. THE ATTITUDES OF THE MAIN RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES International Relations Factors The immigration policies of most countries are influenced by both domestic and international political considerations, where frequently humanitarian considerat i ons lake a back seal. W6 Ift 1975 countries such as Australia, France and the United States of America (USA) felt a moral obligation to accept Indochinese refugees, other countries, such as Canada, believed that it was their humanitarian responsibility to accept these refugees. However, it should be noted that the main impetus behind the international response to the 1975 Indochinese refugee crisis was the political pressures exerted by the USA on other countries. Indeed, it may be said that the main driving force to the world's response to the Indochinese refugees over the past 14 years has been the influence of the USA. Thus, it is important that some brief consideration be given to the American response to the Indochinese refugees. After the communist victories in Indochina during 1975, especially after the Viet Nam debacle, America wanted to forget about Indochina2. In 1975 there was little public support for the acceptance of Indochinese refugees in America. The main impetus for the acceptance of the refugees came from some sections of the For an excellent discussion on the post-1975 relations between the three Indochinese countries and the USA see Chanda (1986: ).

4 government, and some humanitarian organisations. When President Jimmy Carter entered the White House in early 1977 there was a desire to establish diplomatic relations with unified Viet Nam, as well as to resolve the issue of the unaccounted America soldiers Missing In Action, and possible Prisioners Of War. The humanitarian policies of the Carter Administration sought to assist the Indochinese refugees. As an example, President Carter went against the advise of the UNHCR and offered to accept a large number of Lao refugees from Thailand. At the same time, President Carter ordered the US 7th Fleet to patrol off the coast of Viet Nam in order to pick up any refugees that may have fled Viet Nam. In order to assist the refugees the Voice Of America (VOA) radio regularly broadcast to Viet Nam the expected locations of vessels of the 7th Fleet3. These two measures were widely criticized for encouraging refugees to flee from Indochina. Many aspects of the Carter Administration's foreign relations policies failed due to their conflict with established American beliefs, eg establishing diplomatic relations with unified Viet Nam. Over the past 14 years the US government's response to the Indochinese refugees has gone from a guarded limited response under the Ford Administration, through a large scale humanitarian resettlement program under President Carter, to a gradual retreat through a reduction of Indochinese refugee quotas under the Reagan Administration. The direction of the Bush Administration is currently unknown, but a gradual disengagement from the Indochinese refugee and Vietnamese Orderly Departure Program (ODP) appears the most likely direction. Why? During the past four decades American refugee policy has been driven not principally by humanitarian considerations, but rather by geographical and ideological factors. That is, the regions from where the refugees came and the political ideologies of the countries from whence the refugees fled- Refugees have thus been used as political pawns by the USA in its broader international relations policies. Until the late 1970s the USA defined refugees as exclusively people fleeing communist regimes, or from the Middle East (Zolberg 1988: ). The USA's 1980 Refugee Act defines a refugee in terms of " special humanitarian concern to the United States " (cited in Zolberg 1988: 675 ; emphasis in original). Similiar VOA broadcasts in Europe during the early 1950s encouraged people to leave the Eastern European countries (Loescher and Scanlon 1986: 33-34).

5 Over the past two decades the USA has accepted relatively few refugees from countries such as Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, South Korea, Chile, Pakistan, and the Philippines, although there are hundreds of thousands of refugees from these countries (Gallagher, et al. 1988: 39-42). The important factor in the failure to accept refugees from these countries is not because the refugees are not genuine refugees, but rather they have fled from countries, generally with repressive conservative regimes, which receive the strong support of the USA (Loescher and Scanlon 1986: ; Zolberg 1988: 650; Gallagher, et al. 1988: 18). For example, tens of thousands of Haitian and Salvadorian refugees have been denied asylum in the USA and deported, or involuntarily repatriated, with the Haitians being officially termed economic migrants by the US government. However, refugees fleeing countries which do not have strong American support have generally found little difficulty in gaining entry to the USA, for example the Indochinese refugees in the late 1970's. According to Loescher and Scanlon (1986: xviii) well over 90 per cent of the refugees admitted to the USA since 1945 have fled from communist countries. However, the international political order is always in a state of flux, as may be seen by the changes in the relationship between China, Russia and the USA over the past decade. These changes directly impinge upon refugee policy, and thus the composition of the refugees admitted to the United States. A dramatic example of such a change in political relations is the change in the relations between the USA and Viet Nam over the past decade. After the Vietnamese army entered Cambodia on Christmas Day 1978, in order to overthrow the genocidal Pol Pot regime, America's relations with Viet Nam reached a post 1975 low. Three years after the commencement of the Vietnamese ODP, in 1979, 74.6 per cent of those people leaving Viet Nam under this Program for the USA entered the USA as refugees. According to Horst (1986: 10) this was due to [a] Presidential Determination of May 1, [which] allowed residents of Vietnam to be considered and processed as refugees, a designation usually reserved for persons who had already fled their country. (Emphasis in original) During the past five years there has been a gradual improvement in American-Vietnamese relations. Hundreds of US tourists, many of whom are Viet Nam veterans, annually visit Viet Nam, there have been a large number of American governmental

6 delegations visiting Viet Nam, as well as Vietnamese academics and scientific specialists making professional visits to the USA. In addition, during 1988 the US government lifted a previously imposed embargo on non-government humanitarian aid to Viet Nam. Over the same period Lao-American relations have also witnessed an improvement. In 1985, of the 13,322 Vietnamese that left Viet Nam under the ODP for the USA 57.8 per cent entered as refugees, compared to 74.6 per cent in 1982 (Horst 1986: 20). A year later, in mid 1986 US Secretary of State Shultz recommended a 15 per cent reduction in the ODP refugee ceiling (Horst 1986: 29). For the current fiscal year only 48.8 per cent of the planned US intake directly from Viet Nam will enter the USA as refugees. Thus, an improvement of Vietnamese-American relations has been accompanied by a decrease in the proportion of immigrants leaving Viet Nam for the USA as refugees. For the current fiscal year the USA's Indochinese refugee program has a ceiling of 27,000 persons from first asylum countries, down 8.5 per cent from the previous year, and down 18.7 per cent from the 1987 fiscal year. The future direction of Vietnamese-American relations over the short term is at this time unclear, due to recent arrival of President Bush in the White House. However, the feeling in Washington, which is also eminating from several key and influential think tanks, is that the USA should gradually seek to improve relations with the Vietnamese government, while at the same time persue a gradual disengagement from the Indochinese refugee program, and accept only specific designated groups from Viet Nam under the ODP, viz. Amerasians, present and past interns of re-education camps, and persons with current immigrant visas to the USA. Another factor influencing the international response to the Indochinese refugee problem is the changing characteristics of the Indochinese refugees fleeing Indochina. During the mid 1970's most of the refugees who fled Indochina were well-educated, military, political or social elites, or individuals connected with the American presence in Indochina. These individuals perceived that they would be persecuted under a communist regime due to their position in Indochinese society. Currently, however, most of the refugees fleeing Indochina have urban working class or peasant backgrounds, with little extraordinary government intervention in their lives. For example, very few of the Vietnamese refugees

7 currently seeking asylum in Asian refugee camps are former inmates, or relatives of current or former inmates, of re-education camps. In summary, the changes in the Indochinese refugee policy over the past 14 years has been due to not only alterations in the political administration of governments, but also due to changes in the international political environment, fluctuations in governments' relationships with the three Indochinese countries, particually Viet Nam, and the varying characteristics of the Indochinese refugees fleeing Indochina. At present Indochina, and especially Viet Nam, is currently not perceived as a major threat to regional security, as it was a decade ago. However, Viet Nam is still perceived as a mild threat as its policies towards Laos and Cambodia are viewed as expansionist, in the long term, especially by Thailand. Domestic Political Factors International political considerations are only one component in the determination of refugee policy. The other salient factor is the domestic political environment. During 1975 there was generally little international support for the domestic resettlement of the Indochinese refugees. However, in 1979 when the realities of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia came to light and the Vietnamese boat people appeared enmass on the shores of South East Asian nations, there was an increase in symapthy for the refugees, which was transformed into positive action via offers to assist in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees. Currently circumstances are very different. Today, the Indochinese refugees in Asia are rarely mentioned in the Western media. While Australia discusses the desirability of Asian immigration, Americans are concerned about the increasingly large number of Latin Americans seeking refuge in the USA (who the US press have called the foot people ), an alarming increase in the number of apprehensions of illegal immigrants in the USA, and Canada is also getting its share of boat people, not from Indochina, but from Latin America. The Gorbachev policies of glasnost and perestroika have resulted in new freedoms, for some. In March this year about 3,000 Jewish refusniks were officially allowed to emigrate from Russia, which is more than for the entire three year period The growing openness of Russia and the accompanying ingrease in legal emigration from Russia, has meant that several countries have had

8 to modify their immigration programmes. For example, the US State Department announced on 12 January this year that 6,500 places which had been allocated for Vietnamese refugees had been reallocated to the Soviet immigrant quota (Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 January 1989: 14). International changes in the political environment have lead to associated changes within national immigration policies. Essentially, the changing political situations around the world have resulted in the Indochinese refugees being pushed from the lime light, while the problem still remains, though not of the same magnitude. The past few years has witnessed a large scale reduction in USA federal government funding for the various Indochinese Mutual Assistance Associations (MAA) throughout the country. The leaders of many of these MAAs believe that federal government funding for the various Indochinese MAAs will dry-up in the early 1990's, as the American government reduces its attention towards the Indochinese refugees, and as interest moves to other refugee groups and more demanding domestic social problems. Although there is domestic support for Indochinese refugee resettlement in Third countries, the level of this support is not as strong as it was a decade ago. There are three principal reasons for this change : a redirection of humanitarian concern, a growing awareness of major domestic problems, and changing attitudes to the Indochinese refugees, each of which will be briefly discussed. Redirection of Humanitarian Concer n Humanitarian assistance generally comes for two reasons : individuals/organisations are concerned about the specific nature of the crisis, eg refugees, natural disasters, etc., or they are concerned with particular countries or regions eg Africa, Indochina, etc. The Indochinese refugees initially received the support and assistance from those concerned about refugees, as well as from some of those who were interested in Indochina. Accompanying changes in the world refugee situation there is always a change in the geographical sink of humanitarian concern. For example, over the past few decades there have been several

9 refugee crises which have had strong repercussions in the Western world : Chinese refugees Hungarian refugees Haitian refugees Cuban refugees Czechoslavakian refugees Chilean refugees 1974-present Indochinese refugees 1978-present Nicaraguan refugees 1979-present Iranian refugees Accompanying these, as well as the other, refugee crises there has been media attention, humanitarian assistance and, generally, sympathy. For the Indochinese refugees the sympathy of the world and its media have faded. As noted above, an estimated 1.4 per cent of the refugees in the world today are from Indochina, with 0.6 per cent coming from Viet Nam. Over the past few years the world has also witnessed several well publicised, and significant humanitarian events : for example, Live Aid and USA For Africa. These events have contributed to the redirection of the world's humanitarian concerns away from the Indochinese refugees. In summary, as international attention has in the past moved from crisis to crisis, from refugee problem to refugee problem, then international humanitarian concern has moved away from the Indochinese refugees to the African crisis and Latin American refugees. AGrowing Awareness of Major Domestic Problems Agrowing public awareness of the level of domestic poverty in the developed world has resulted in some individuals and groups shifting their concern from international to domestic humanitarian issues. For example, in the USA many of those involved in the Live Aid and the USA For Africa programmes have now redirected their efforts to the Farm Aid and the America First programmes. This redirection of attention away from the international scene has resulted in a reduction of assistance for international problems, such as the Indochinese refugees. As developed countries increasingly become post-industerial societies, there is less need for unskilled and semi-skilled

10 10 workers. The reduced demand for unskilled and semi-skilled workers has resulted in many of these workers becoming unemployed, and being unable to regain employment of any type. The reduction in the demand for these types of workers has lead governments to be more selective in choosing the immigrants, including refugees, which they select to enter their countries. In general, in most developed countries it is very difficult for immigrants and refugees to gain entry unless they have immediate family members in the host country, or they are well-educated and highly skilled. Many of the Indochinese refugees in Asian refugee camps at this time do not meet these criteria. If the refugees are not skilled then they will not obtain employment. In Australia about 36 per cent of the Vietnamese immigrants are unemployed, and most of these have been in Australia for more than four years (Coughlan 1989a: 11-12, 14-15). Domestic social and economic problems have lead to humanitarian attention being redirected away from international crises to domestic crises. At the same time, structural changes in the industries of the main developed countries has resulted in many of their semi-skilled and unskilled workers becoming unemployed, which in turn has resulted in a reduction in the demand for immigrants with few skills to offer these economies. Changing Attitudes to the Indochinese Refugees For most of this century there has generally been little public support in Australia for immigration, from any country, and the initial proposal to take Indochinese refugees found little public support, not only in Australia, but also in France, the USA, and other countries. It is therefore important that those promoting refugee resettlement, attempt to gain additional political and public support so that any program be maintained. brief diversion is necessary at this time. It is unfortunate that most Australians, even some of those working with the Indochinese refugees, believe that all Asian refugees in Australia are Vietnamese. This, however, is not the case as Australia has accepted refugees from several Asian countries, and not just the three Indochinese countries. Of the estimated 150,000 first and second generation Indochinese in Australia at present, about 51.2 per cent are ethnic Vietnamese, 35.0 per cent ethnic Chinese, 7.4 per cent ethnic Cambodian, 6.1 per cent ethnic Lao, and 0.3 per cent ethnic Hmong (Coughlan 1988). The lack of awareness of the ethnic diversity of the Indochinese communities in Australia, has, unfortunately, created some problems for members of the smaller

11 ethnic communities from Indochina. At the same time. the failure to recognise the ethnic diversity of the Indochinese refugee communities in Australia has lead to a situation where the smaller ethnic groups, viz. the Cambodian, Hmong and Lao, have not only been mistaken as being Vietnamese, but have also received a disproportionally smaller amount of much needed assistance, not only by governments, but also by those involved in resettling the refugees. The unique needs of the Cambodian, Hmong and Lao communities have frequently not been met, that alone taken into consideration. significant proportion of the people who were voluntarily involved with the resettlement of the Indochinese refugees a decade or more ago, are no longer involved with these communities. Many of those who have withdrawn their involvement have done so due to frustration and/or disenchantment with the refugees, while others have redirected their attention away from all Indochinese refugees to other specfic groups, or distanced themselves from specific groups, eg the Vietnamese community (Chan 1986). These changes have been witnessed not only in Australia, but also in Canada and the USA (Woon 1984). Often people become involved with refugee resettlement and have certain inaccurate prior perceptions of the refugees they are assisting. When these perceptions are found to be inaccurate, a disassociation from assisting the refugees may result. partial indication of the changing attitude towards the Indochinese refugees may be obtained by the shifting trends for refugee sponsorship under the Community Refugee Resettlement Scheme (CRSS). Over the past few years there has been an increase in community interest in sponsoring Latin American refugees, with concurrent fall in the overall interest in sponsoring Indochinese refugees. As part of this latter trend there has also been a reduction in Australians willing to sponsor Vietnamese refugees under the CRSS. In some countries, such as the USA and Canada, there have been violent acts of aggression against Indochinese refugees (US Commission on Civil Rights 1987: 44-53). Overall, the reduction in domestic support for the Indochinese refugees has had a direct influence on the number of Indochinese to be accepted for resettlement. The public perception of the Indochinese refugees, and more specifically the Vietnamese community, is generally not favourable. Although Goot (1988: 30) convincingly argues that the

12 perceived acceptance of most immigrant groups, both European and Asian, has never been high, there are several indications that the Vietnamese community is not favourably received, even by other Asian communities (Chan 1986). The reasons for this perception are due to a number of factors, three of which are salient to this paper. The first is the apparent size of the Indochinese refugee communities in Australia. It is believed, in some quarters, that there are hundreds of thousands of indochinese, and millions of other Asians, currently in Australia. The high spatial concentration of the Vietnamese communities, which some may call the formation of ethnic enclaves, is a significant factor contributing to this misconception. Research has shown that Vietnamese enclaves are not being formed, and that there is a set of complex forces contributing to Vietnamese community formation and spatial distribution (Coughlan 1989b: 24-25). However, although Vietnamese enclaves have not been formed, Hugo (1986: 31-33) has noted that the Vietnamese-born community in Australia exhibit degree of spatial concentration unprecedented in postwar Australian cities for any significant birthplace group. Even in the years of postwar Southern European immigrant resettlement, these levels of concentration were not approached. The high spatial concentration of the Vietnamese community, in large numbers, has contributed to creating the impression, for want of a better phrase, of an Asian invasion. The second factor is the lack of social interaction, except in formal situations such as the classroom and the workplace, between the Indochinese refugee communities and the rest of Austral ian society. For example, research into Vietnamese high school students has shown they have very few, if any, non- Vietnamese friends at school, and even fewer non-vietnamese friends outside of school (Coughlan 1989c). It is important for any new immigrant group, and especially those that are not favoured by the host society, to be seen to interact within the various institutions of society, such as schools, political parties, trade unions, broard cultural groups, clubs, etc. Only through such interaction will an understanding of the new immigrants be realised, and fears, often unwarrented, dispelled. The final factor to consider is the adverse publicity which has been given to certain criminal elements and events within the

13 Vietnamese community. While the media has given attention to the murders, physical assaults, stabbings, protection rackets, etc. within the Vietnamese community in Melbourne, predominantly in,the suburbs of Richmond and Footscray, at the beginning of the 1980's, attention has now shifted to Sydney, mainly in the Cabramatta and Bankstown areas. While acknowledging that crime exists in all communities, either due to media sensationalisation or otherwise, currently a month does not go by without some major criminal event within the Vietnamese community appearing in the media. The fact that this crime appears to be ongoing, and is regularly in the media is a matter for concern. Crime within other ethnic groups occassionally attracts media attention, and is essentially forgotten about a few months later. However, when any specific crime, or minority community, continually receives adverse attention, then there is a greater chance that the public will remember these events, and if the event is perceived as being against the general community interest, then adverse public opinion will result. As noted in the previous section, economic factors are frequently central in policy formulation. Cox (1987: 5) notes that one of the major operative criteria in selecting refugees to come to Australia is that they will not be an economic burden on society. According to data from the 1986 Census of Population and Housing, 37.8 per cent of the Cambodian-born labour force in Australia were unemployed at the time of the Census, compared to 22.5 per cent of the Lao-born and 35.6 per cent of the Vietnamese-born labour forces (Coughlan 1989a: 11-12). What makes the latter figure more discouraging is that the majority of the unemployed Vietnamese are not the more recent arrivals, from the refugee camps or from Viet Nam under the Vietnamese Family Migration Program, but individuals who have been in Australia for more than 4 years, and many are probably long - term unemployed. Some may therefore ask if the longer-term refugees cannot obtain employment, why should Australia take additional refugees who will go straight onto the dole, where they may remain for a long period of time, and therefore increase the tax burden on the rest of the population. Although some economists, and others, have shown that certain levels of immigration actually reduce unemployment, through increasing the demand for goods and services, the general public has yet to be convinced. In summary, the issues discussed above are making a significant contribution to creating an adverse impression, in the eyes of the general public, of the Indochinese refugee communities in Australia. If adverse impressions are held of any particular

14 group, then it will become increasingly difficult for that group to obtain sympathetic public support for additional members of their community to come to Australia. THE FIRST ASYLUM COUNTRIES In order to do justice to the discussion of the various alternatives available to resolve the Indochinese refugee problem in Asia, it is important to provide some understanding of the views of the major First asylum countries. Malaysia - The Malaysian government has consistantly stated over the past 14 years that no Vietnamese refugees will be permitted to remain permanently in Malaysia. The Malaysian government has, however, already resettled several thousand Muslim refugees from Cambodia and the Philippines. Malaysia's main concern is in three areas : providing permanent resettlement to any Vietnamese refugees will act as an incentive for additional Vietnamese refugees to seek refuge in Malaysia, Malaysia has a rather delicate racial balance at present and the introduction of any additional non-malays could result in racial unrest, and possibly a repeat of the May 1969 race riots in Kuala Lumpur, and Malaysia has fought a long war against communist insurgency, and the acceptance of any refugees from communist countries, who may not be genuine refugees but rather communist agents, would only lead to political instability in Malaysia. In summary, there appears to be very little liklihood on the part of the Malaysian government to permit the local resettlement of any of the Vietnamese refugees currently in Malaysia, the only options for these refugees is resettlement in Third countries or repatriation.

15 Hong Kong The recent changes in the Hong Kong government's policy towards the Vietnamese boat people has been widely reported in the media, and will not be duplicated here. However, the recent relaxation of policy towards those refugees who had arrived in Hong Kong before June 1988, and who had been in closed camps, appears to be due to three factors : the need to address the severe shortage of unskilled labour in Hong Hong, to reduce the growing tension within the closed camps, and to permit the refugees to obtain some work skills and money. The skills they gain may enhance their resettlement prospects, while if they have gained some new skills and have been able o t save money this may make the refugees more willing to agree to voluntary repatriation, as they would be able to return to Viet Nam with much more than they left with. Earlier this decade the government of the People's Republic of China informed the Hong Kong government that it does not want any Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong when it reverts to Chinese control in Thus there is this additional pressure on Hong Kong to resolve the problem of the Vietnamese refugees. This raises one additional issue, are we going to see Hong Kong boat people seeking refuge throughout the region after 1997? Thailand Since the beginning of 1975 approximately 62.5 per cent of the Indochinese refugees who have successfully fled Indochina have obtained initial refuge in Thailand. There are many ethnic Indochinese permanently resident in Thailand, including tens of thousands of ethnic Hmong in the north western highlands, several thousand ethnic Cambodians, about 60,000 ethnic Vietnamese, most of whom arrived before 1954 as refugees fleeing the French in Viet Nam, many of whom are supportative of the current Ha Noi government, and several million

16 ethnic Lao4. (There are actually more ethnic Lao resident in Thailand than in Laos.) Up until the election of Chatichai Choonavan as Prime Minister of Thailand in August 1988, Thailand had always had a very guarded policy towards Viet Nam. Over the past few centuries there have been many significant disagreements between Thailand, Cambodia and Viet Nam, and there is little sympathy for Viet Nam, that alone the Vietnamese refugees, in Thailand. The Thai people have traditionally had a strong distrust of the Vietnamese, and have for centuries attempted to restrict the Vietnamese influence over Cambodia, which it regards as a buffer between itself and Viet Nam. The majority of the Thai people still maintain this distrust, with some justification. The traditional Thai distrust of the Vietnamese has been exacerbated by the armed Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory since These incursions have resulted in hundreds of Thai civilians, as well as armed services personnel, being killed, and tens of thousands of Thai villages being displaced, with the associated economic disruption. These actions have done little to endear the Ha Noi government and the Vietnamese people to Thailand and its people. However, the current Thai government desires to turn Indochina into a vast market place, and wishes to invest heavily in the development of the three Indochinese countries. Since coming to power Chatichai has overseen the signing of several major development projects with Laos, including one, in conjunction with the Australian government, to build a bridge over the Mekong River, has made strong overtures to Viet Nam, and is attempting to do the same with Cambodia. Thailand's initiatives with Viet Nam and, especially, Cambodia have drawn the strong condemnation of both the other members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other important allies, such as the USA. It has often been stated that the main obstacle to Viet Nam's receiving Western developmental aid is its occupation of Cambodia. Once the Vietnamese forces have been officially withdrawn from Cambodia and free elections are held in that country, then the door will be open for foreign developmental aid and investment in Viet Nam, and Thailand wants to be in a prime position to maximinise its advantage in this regard. For an excellent, but dated, discussion on the Vietnamese refugees in Thailand see Poole (1970). A more contemporary presentation on the Indochinese in Thailand may be found in Boonyapratuang (1984).

17 In the past the Thai government was a strong supporter of the Chinese policy to bleed Viet A/am white and to assist in the destabilisation of the Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. Thailand has also permitted the Cambodian resistance forces to use its boarder region as a resistance base, and permitted the resistance forces to be resupplied with American and Chinese weapons. There is also the view that the continuing presence of the Indochinese refugees in Thailand is acting to assist the destablisation of Indochina, especially Cambodia. The three Cambodian resistance factions have bases within the refugee camps in Thailand, from whence they launch resistance missions into Cambodia. At the same time there are small Hmong and Lao resistance groups that work out of the Hmong and Lao refugee camps in northern Thailand. The presence of these resistance bases are viewed by some Thai government officials as hindering Chatichai's moves to improve relations with Indochina, and thus the removal of the refugees, and their camps, from Thailand is an important objective for the current Thai administration. It is extremely improbable that Thailand would permit the local resettlement of Vietnamese refugees. Considering Thailand's previous experience with the pro Ha Noi refugees that have been in Thailand since before 1954, Thailand has a strong fear that any additional Vietnamese refugees that would be resettled in Thailand would be fifth col umists, that is communist elements whose aim would be to work towards the destabilisation and overthrow of the democratically elected Thai government. On the other hand, Thailand may be willing to permit the local integration of some of the Hmong and Khmer refugees, but this would probably be on a very limited selective basis. However, there is a possibility that Thailand may agree to permit some of the Lao refugees to remain in Thailand if there they are willing to undergo a comprehensive screening procedure to ensure that no communist Lao are allowed to settle in Thailand, and that other countries pay the financial cost, both direct and indirect, of assisting the refugees settle and integrate in Thailand. Other Asian Countries Most of the other Asian countries which currently harbour Indochinese refugees have no desire to locally resettle these refugees. The Philippines is a partial exception to this generalisation, as they have already resettled several hundred

18 Vietnamese refugees. However, many of the Vietnamese who have already resettled in the Philippines desire to emigrate due to the poverty of the Philippines, and their strong perception that the communists will gain control of the Philippines in the near future. OPTIONS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE INDOCH1NESE REFUGEE PROBLEM There are four possible solutions for the Indochinese refugees in camps throughout Asia : local resettlement, Third country resettlement, voluntary repatriation, and involuntary repatriation. But before discussing the viability of each of these scenarios, a brief diversion is necessary. At a 1981 meeting in Dresden, in the Germany Democratic Republic, the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches suggested that its members implement 13 measures relating to the world refugee problem. Four of these suggestions are reproduced here : - deepen the understanding of the complex social, economic and political realities that create and affect refugees, help prepare legal political and economic conditions which would facilitate voluntary repatriation, ensure that efforts to assist refugees always contain two essential elements : meeting the immediate and long-term needs of refugees and taking appropriate action at political and socio-economic levels to eliminate the basic causes of refugee movements, and ensure that refugee assistance makes a positive contribution towards meeting overall community needs, and does not adversely affect the life of local groups of oppressed and marginalised people, (cited in Matheson 1987: 8-9)

19 These four points should be reflected upon when considerating the rest of this presentation, especially the second and third suggestions. In discussing any solution to the Indochinese refugee problem in Asia, consideration must be given to the desires of the refugees themselves. In the following discussion attention is given to this factor. Local Resettlement While some of the Hmong, Cambodian and Lao refugees may like to settle in Thailand, only some of the Vietnamese refugees, and then primarily the Chinese-Vietnamese, would consider local resettlement as a viable solution to their plight. The possibility of some of the Asian countries being taken over by communism, such as Hong Kong and the Philippines, is a factor discouraging local resettlement for the Vietnamese refugees. The local resettlement option has already been discussed in some detail in the previous section. Basically this is not an option for the Vietnamese refugees, however there may be a possibility of some Lao and Hmong refugees being resettled in Thailand, but only after comprehensive screening and the financial cost of this exercise being met totally by external sources. Western countries, especially the USA and Japan, should act to encourage the First asylum countries to locally resettle some Indochinese refugees by offering generous financial aid to realise this objective. Third Country Resettlement Many studies in countries of Indochinese refugee resettlement have shown that most of the refugees would like to return to their homelands if the political situation permitted, though these findings may not necessarily apply to the younger or economically successful refugees. The same applies for those currently in the refugee camps, except the majority of the Vietnamese. Many Hmong, Lao and Cambodian refugees have declined to be interviewed for resettlement in Third countries as they wish to return to their homelands once the political situation stablises, and they are able to return with reasonable assurances of safety. The possibility of large scale additional Third country resettlement of these refugees has also been discussed above.

20 Essentially this option is of decreasing viability as most of the major resettlement countries, Australia, Canada, France and the USA, gradually disengage from Indochinese refugee resettlement, and redirect their attention to other refugee or humanitarian problems. If current trends continue then the resettlement of genuine persecuted political Indochinese refugees may continue in reasonable numbers, in the order of possibly a few tens of thousands over the next 3-4 years, and then reducing to only a few thousand per year, if the Indochinese continue to flee their homelands. Voluntary Repatriation As noted above, many refugees will voluntarily agree to retern to their homelands, once the situation permits. It should also be noted that part of the philosophy of the USA's 1980 Refugee Act encourages the voluntary repatriation of refugees (Zolberg 1988: 677). The Cambodian refugees are waiting for the Vietnamese to leave Cambodia and then most will return home. Others, who are more concerned about their safety, will only return after the Vietnamese have left and there is no chance of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge returning, in any form. The Lao refugees are also waiting for the Vietnamese to withdraw from their country and the general conditions in Laos to improve before they may be willing to return to Laos. Both of these later events appear to be occuring at this time. Some of the Hmong would like to return to Laos, but they are concerned about their future with the continuing presence of the Vietnamese. It is more probably that the Hmong would chose to be resettled in a Third country or illegally, if necessary, mix in with the Hmong communities in northern Thailand. Initially it is expected that very few of the Vietnamese refugees will volunteer to return to Viet Nam. However, if there are favourable reports on the returnees in the world media, and at the same time reliable encouraging news from those who have returned, then some additional Vietnamese refugees may consent to return to Viet Nam. But overall the majority of the Vietnamese would prepare to stay in the refugee camps than return to Viet Nam, if there is no prospect of Third country resettlement. In summary, if the Vietnamese army withdraws its forces from Laos and Cambodia, and the economic and social situations in these countries improve, then many of the Hmong, Lao and Cambodian refugees would agree to return to their homelands. On

21 the other hand, there is much less liklihood of the Vietnamese refugees agreeing to return to Viet Nam under the current situation. Again, Western governments should actively seek, in conjunction with.the three Indochinese countries, to bring about a situation whereby which the Indochinese refugees currently in refugee camps are willing to return to their homelands. Involuntary Repatriation Involuntary repatriation is viewed with alarm by the majority of the Indochinese refugees. However, at the same time, the refugees may have unrealistic expectations about their future. Concurrently, those who have been in the camps for several years will probably have inaccurate knowledge of the current economic, political and social reality of their homelands. There have been dramatic changes in the social and economic, and to a lesser degree, political, situation in the three Indochinese countries over the past year, and many of those currently in the refugee camps, as well as those Indochinese refugees that have been resettled in Third countries, are not accurately informed of these changes. If more of the refugees were aware of the reality of their homelands then they may wish to return home. THE ATTITUDE OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNITY IN AUSTRALIA TO THE PROSPECT OF REPATRIATION OF THEIR COMPATARIOTS TO VIET NAM At the onset it should be noted that most of the information presented in this section was obtained by the author through talking with a number of Vietnamese refugees and immigrants in Brisbane. The views presented here should in no way be interpreted as being representative of all the Vietnamese in Australia, nor are the comments presented in the first part of this section necessarily a reflection of the author's opinion. Members of the Vietnamese community who discussed the issue of repatriation with the author were adament that the Vietnamese government and its leaders could not be trusted. There was a general belief that all returned refugees would be imprisoned, with some suggesting that the refugees would be killed. The example of those refugees who fled in April 1975 and who asked to be returned to Viet Nam was frequently raised. On 27 October 1975, 1,543 Vietnamese voluntarily returned to central Viet Nam aboard the Thuong Tin, and, according to those

22 interviewed, were immediately placed in prison, with most subsequently being sent to re-education camps. A surprising number of those persons interviewed by the author claimed to have relatives and/or close friends amongst those repatriated aboard the Thuong Tin. Another issue raised as a reason for not trusting the leaders of Viet Nam included the mid-1975 promise of the Vietnamese authorities that re-education classes would only be for a few days or weeks, rather than the years that most re-education camp interns were subjected to. For many the internment in reeducation camps lasted more than a decade. Also, there was the agreement between the warring parties on the lunar new year cease fire in 1968, Tet Mau Than, which the communists broke and resulted in the now infamous 1968 Tet Offensive. Afew people said that the Vietnamese leaders may guarantee that nothing would happen to returnees, but local authorities have the real power, not the leaders in Ha Noi. Therefore, guarantees of the Vietnamese leaders are useless, and the local authorities were likely to incarcerate all returnees. Overall, the feeling of the Vietnamese refugees and immigrants with whom the author spoke was that the Vietnamese communists are never to be trusted, and none of the Vietnamese refugees should return to Viet Nam. When asked what the refugees would do if they were forced to return to Viet Nam, two replies were given - seek refuge elsewhere or commit suicide. However, the past behaviour of the Vietnamese communist may not necessarily be an indication of future actions. One has only to look at the developments in Russia, Poland and Laos over the past few months. The idea of semi-democratic elections in these countries a few years ago, that alone 6 months ago, would have been dismissed by many as merely yet another propoganda exercise. There is probably a universal consensus that almost all politicians and governments lie to, and deceive, their people to some degree. Former President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Viet Nam denied that there were any political prisoners in his country, until the so-called Tiger Cages on Con Son Island were revealed by the Americans. Former US President Nixon has the memory of the Watergate affair deception and the lies about the secret bombing of Cambodia to his credit. The list is almost endless.

23 In summary, members of the Vietnamese community in Australia believe that under no circumstances should the refugees currently in Asian refugee camps return to their homeland, as all returnees would be in danger of being imprisoned. The author's informants esentially believe that communist governments, especially the Vietnamese government, will never change and can never be trusted. GENERAL ATTITUDES OF THE INDOCH1NESE REFUGEES As stated above, most of the Cambodian, Hmong and Lao refugees are waiting for an improvement in the social, economic and political situation in their countries before they are willing to return to their homelands. The political improvement does not necessarily imply an overthrow of the communist regimes in these countries, but rather a liberalisation of government policies that would permit a greater degree of social, economic and political freedom. However, the same cannot be said of the Vietnamese refugees as many are against the resumption of Western developmental and humanitarian aid to Viet Nam. They are generally not only opposed to any regime that is communist or socialist in nature, but also to any individuals or organisations that support or provide humanitarian aid to Viet Nam. On the one hand they offer only condemnation of the current government in Viet Nam, while on the other hand they oppose any humantarian action that may result in an improvement of this situation. Any individual or organisation supporting the resumption of humanitarian aid to Viet Nam is labelled as a communist and places their personal well-being at risk5- Thus efforts by members of the international community to address the refugee problem at its source, by providing humantarian and developmental aid to Viet Nam, are generally viewed as collaboration with communism by members of the expatriot Vietnamese community. Their essential belief is that the Chinese policy of bleeding Viet Nam white is correct, even though their families, friends, and compatriots in Viet Nam must suffer as A tragic example of this is the famous Vietnamese author and humanitarian Duyen Anh, who spent 5 years in a Vietnamese re-education camp and fled Viet Nam as a refugee in March Resettled in Paris he was critical of both the current communist and previous military regimes in Viet Nam. For being critical of the former South Vietnamese regime he was labelled a communist, and on 30 April 1988, while on a visit to the USA, he was brutally assaulted, resulting in his suffering a cerebral haemorrhage, which in turn has left him semi paralysed (Tan 1989).