CURRENT REGIONAL POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF UKRAINE

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1 GEOGRAPHICAL SCIENCES CURRENT REGIONAL POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF UKRAINE Associate Professor, PhD of geographical sciences Valentyn Stafiichuk, Associate Professor, PhD of geographical sciences Oksana Malynovska Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Faculty of Geography, Assistant Professor of Regional Studies and Tourism Department Abstract. This research considers the current regional political and geographical position of Ukraine as a Central European state. Ukraine, in terms of centrality, is the second country in the region after Hungary. Six out of seven land neighbors of Ukraine are the Central European states, and other eight Central European countries are the second order neighbors. The most problematic issues in cooperation of Ukraine with the states of the region, especially with the most important of them (Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Romania), are contradictory interpretation of history, radical and populist political movements, support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, assimilation of national minorities, using of national languages in the education. Our findings serve to understanding and overcoming the main problems in cooperation and to development the ways of closer partnership with the Central European states for improvement of the regional political and geographical position of Ukraine. Keywords: regional political and geographical position, cooperation, partnership, priority ranking in cooperation, troubled areas, Ukraine, Central Europe, Poland. Introduction. The 21st century started for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people with a range of threats and trials. The center of their origin is again, as many times before, is Moscow, that continues to exist using its own myths about the "common cradle land", "millennial common history", "the center of Orthodoxy and the Slavs", "the Third Rome", "messianic role", "Crimea is our" etc. As it was repeatedly proved by history and world science all these myths are specially created on the order of emperors-general secretaries-presidents by local fringe scientists for covering usual Russian imperialism and chauvinism. There is unwillingness in Russia to understand that its own greatness that was built on lies and humiliating others will lead to catastrophic consequences for the Russians themselves. And if the main colonizers of the past (Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, the USA) were able not only to abandon their colonies but also to apologize for misdeeds and outrages in the middle of the 20th century, Russian colonial system still continues to exist and the relatively small territorial losses in the 1990s do not give it a rest. Therefore, current events in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine should be considered just in such context. Certainly, Russian aggression upon Ukraine did not go unnoticed by the international community and its leading agents and absolute majority of states expressed their solidarity with Ukraine. However, as three years of hybrid warfare showed, the economic interests often dominate political values in the globalized world. Voices about the dilution or lifting of sanctions against Russia are increasingly heard. Thinking about the prospect, Ukraine should define the circle of the most important co allies. In our view, besides some states of the EU, Canada and, under certain conditions, the USA, the best co allies in confrontation with Russian chauvinism would be certain states of Central Europe, as this region (albeit less than Ukraine) also suffered from "Messianism" of Russia. The indoctrination of inferiority complex, deportations and other components of the Russian presence is the most important factor in establishing a close and mutually beneficial cooperation between the states of the region. Some Central European states in particular demonstrate not only the support of Ukraine, but also the willingness to take even greater economic losses in order to remove any threats from Russia. The political and geographical position (PGP) of Ukraine repeatedly became the subject of the study of Ukrainian and foreign scientists (among the last and most important: M.Dnistryansky [4], O.Shabliy [15], Z.Brzezinski [2], S.Lototsky and S.Trokhymchuk [8], D.Baziv [1]), however, the annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in the east of Ukraine made significant correctives in evaluation of its advantage, especially at the neighboring and regional levels. It emerged that some views on the regional PGP of Ukraine, which were expressed in the first half of the 20-th century by S.Rudnytsky [10], V.Kubiyovych [6] and Y.Lypa [7] today are even more relevant than the views of contemporaries (28), Vol.1, December

2 Research results. "The regional PGP of the state is its relation to political givennesses (states, military-political blocs, international organizations) in a certain region and in relation to the "trouble spots of the planet" [13, p. 256]. Speaking about the regional political and geographical position of Ukraine, we must emphasize the belonging of our state exactly to Central Europe, and not to any other historical and geographical region. As it was noted earlier [14], Ukraine has the most common historical and socio-geographical features with the Central European states, and these features identified the position of Ukraine in the past and are determining it now. Nowadays there are 20 countries in the region, including the Republic of Kosovo, which Ukraine has not officially acknowledged. Visually Ukraine occupies south-eastern outskirts of Central Europe but due to its area and relatively a large number of neighbors it has very high centrality indicators: Bavelash index 26.51; absolute accessibility index 39. By degrees of centrality in the region Ukraine is inferior only to Hungary (Bavelash index ; absolute accessibility index - 37). Six out of seven land neighbors of Ukraine of the first order and eight out of eighteen neighbors of the second order are the states of Central Europe. An interesting fact that does not fit into the Russian myth of "Orthodox-Slavic" civilization with its center in Moscow is that in Central Europe there are 12 Slavic states (6 of them are the EU members and 7 are NATO members) and Orthodoxy is the leading religious trend in 9 states (3 of them are the EU members and 4 are NATO members; Orthodox Greece is in both organizations, while Cyprus is in the EU). An absolute majority of the Central European states either already exist or declare their intentions to become members of the EU and NATO. But only two Slavic countries (including Belarus as a part of Central Europe) and four Orthodox countries (including Belarus and Moldova) are in the CIS, under control of Russia. In general, only 3 Orthodox and 2 Slavic states are the members of the EAEU. Proceeding from the number of states (say nothing of their equality) the EU and NATO are more Orthodox and Slavic than the CIS and the EAEU. The Central European states, in particular those that are the members of the EU and NATO, have achieved much better results in terms of socio-economic development and the well-being of citizens than any of the CIS and EAEU countries. That is why the Central European states can be a good orienting point for progress of Ukraine and the implementation of its own economic and political strategies. Ukraine has diplomatic relations and exchange by diplomatic missions with all the states of the region, except Kosovo. During the years of its independence Ukraine developed a significant regulatory and legal framework for cooperation with all states on a bilateral and multilateral basis. By the end of 2017 almost all states, except Belarus (the Free-Trade Zone Agreement adopted within the CIS does not work) and Kosovo, have agreements with Ukraine about the free-trade zone. After establishment of a visafree regime with the EU all the Central European states became available to Ukrainians for tourist trips. Ukraine has common strategic goals with an absolute majority of states: participation in the EU, NATO, regional security, observance of civil rights and freedoms, free movement of citizens across borders. However, there are some certain features in cooperation with each individual state. Taking into account a set of indicators of socio-economic development and military-strategic importance of the countries, the degree of current cooperation and support of Ukraine, we have determined their priority for our state. We divided the Central European states between the six selected priority groups as follows: Group 1 the Czech Republic; Group 2 - Poland, Romania, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia; Group 3 - Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Albania; it should be noted that according to our calculations Russia also came in this group, the priority of cooperation with it is at the level of Moldova and Montenegro; Group 4 - Serbia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The level of priority of the Republic of Kosovo was not determined. The only point that made the Czech Republic belonging to the first priority group and Poland to the second priority group is the difference in the degree of economic freedom. The Czech Republic is recognized by international experts as "relatively free", and Poland, like the vast majority of the states in the region, is "moderately free". Economic freedom is an important indicator for the priority of interaction in general. If we talk just about a political priority, then the Czech Republic will be in the second priority group, among the other Central European states members of the EU (except Montenegro) and NATO: Group 2 - Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, Croatia, Montenegro; Group 3 - Moldova, Macedonia, Albania; 12(28), Vol.1, December

3 Group 4 - Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Group 5 - Belarus (Russia is in the same group). Poland is not only our greatest western neighbor, but also the true "attorney" of Ukraine in the European Union. It is clear that Polish politicians defend their own national interests before everything else, as they have already mastered the formula of Z. Brzezinski: "Without independent Ukraine there can be no independent Poland" [2]. The security situation in the region depends on the mutual actions of Poland and Ukraine, in particular, on the implementation of the Baltic-Black Sea Alliance (Intermarium) project, which, even if only thank the membership of these two states, can become a significant European player and a guarantor of regional stability. At different periods the interest of the idea was shown by almost two dozen states: Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece and ex Yugoslavia. Theoretically, all countries between the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Adriatic Sea should join the association [9]. Surely, as things stand pro-russian tuned Belarus, Serbia, Greece, the Czech Republic, Hungary and neutral Finland, are unlikely to join the association. However, its vitality will significantly depend on the willingness of the largest countries of the region: Poland, Ukraine and Romania. Moreover, even the formation of a political "triangle" will allow "to speak on equal terms" with the leading countries of Europe and the world. The strategic weight of this alliance will be significantly strengthened with the joining of Turkey, Sweden, Bulgaria, Georgia and Croatia. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia also have many common interests with these countries. Poles and Ukrainians continue to live mainly in their own discourses. Some politicians in both countries use uneasy events from the past one-sidedly in order to obtain political dividends. The Ukrainians caused the Poles great harm in the past. But the actions of the Ukrainians will have a slightly different color if we take into account two points. First, the cruel actions of the Ukrainians (for example, national liberation struggle of the XVII-th century and Volynia-1943) were mainly the responses to the no less cruel steps of the Polish colonialists (oppression of the Ukrainian language and Orthodoxy, the imposition of the Polish administration, pacification, mass ethnic cleansing in Zakerzonnia, the terror of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa), operation Vistula - elimination the Ukrainians from the Polish borderlands and the Poles from the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, that was agreed between Poland and the USSR after World War Two and without the willingness of Ukrainians. The ruthless actions of Ukrainians were a part of an anti-colonial and national liberation struggle similar to that of the Americans against the British, the Algerians and the Vietnamese against the French, the Angolans against the Portuguese. And nobody in Great Britain, France or Portugal calls them genocide and forces the newly formed countries to repent and compensate in spite of how bloody the anti-colonial wars were. Secondly, the so-called "Kresy Wschodnie" are the same returned lands for Ukrainians as Wroclaw, Szczecin, Gózów-Wielkopolski or Gdańsk for Poles. "Thus, neighborly relations have become a tragedy for both nations. In spite of the aggressor was the power of the Commonwealth of Poland, but the Polish people paid for the aggression by human victims. After six centuries of continuous struggle (if not physical, then political) finally the calm was established when the Poles were expelled from Ukraine, but fatal memory of the dead left in Poland a sense of anti-ukrainian hatred, and even more than that to the Germans, although Ukrainians never occupied Polish lands, and the struggle between the two nations took place only on Ukrainian lands and never on ethnically Polish lands" [11]. Neither Ukrainians nor Poles should automatically reject any unpleasant questions of common relations, but these questions should not be a barrier to building truly genuine neighborly relations in the future. History should be remembered, but in relations with democratic countries and equal neighbors history should not dominate. It is worth noting that myths in our countries did not replace reality, as it happened in Russia. The post-war reconciliation between Germany and France should be a good example for Poland and Ukraine. It is worth listening to the words of the Ambassador of Poland to Ukraine Jan Peklo: "History is a story, but the future is the future. I think that both the Polish and the Ukrainian governments understand: we should not quarrel in no case, we definitely have to agree, because we have common tasks" [12]. Only then, "Jagellon's vision" about an equal strategic alliance between Poland and Ukraine, and even more widely - about the Intermarium, will be a reality. The positive experience of the common nationhood in The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the negative experience of Russian colonization transform Lithuania into an important partner of Ukraine. If modern Hungarian, Czech or Slovak politicians do not really want to recall the period of compulsory stay in the social camp, then for Lithuanian politicians and citizens, the Russian occupation in continues to be a painful topic. Lithuania really understands the proofless 64 12(28), Vol.1, December

4 charges of Russia about mistreatment of "Russian-speaking countrymen", "rewriting history", "fascism" etc. L. Donskis notes: "The Russians say that Ukraine is fascist in order to conceal the spread of fascism, the atmosphere of hatred and xenophobia in Russia itself." [5, p.21]. Such factors bring together the positions of Ukraine and other Baltic states on the international scene. Multilateral cooperation with the second-order neighbors is also important for Ukraine, especially with Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic and Croatia. A significant geopolitical prerequisite for interaction of Ukraine with the Czech Republic is the lack of a common border. It fits well to the geopolitical doctrines, according to which it is important above all to be friends with the neighbors of your neighbors. Surely, the past of the Ukrainian-Czech relations in comparison with Poland, Romania and Hungary was less problematic. The Ukrainian Diaspora can play an important role in establishing the interaction with the Czech Republic: according to estimates, now every 10th inhabitant of the country is Ukrainian [Table 1]. However, the Ukrainian diaspora is lacking of solidarity nowadays, so a relatively small but highly educated and well-organized Ukrainian political diaspora of the early XXth century played a much larger role in popularizing of Ukraine. Despite a number of contradictions, relations with Romania, Hungary and Slovakia have been developing positively since the proclamation of independence of Ukraine. These countries supported the integrity of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against the aggressor. However, Russian influence groups are very powerful there. It is a pity that some European politicians have a brief memory and forgot, for example, as the Hungarians or Czechs in the 1950s and 1960s screamed about Russian (Soviet) aggression. Today, after Russia annexed the Ukrainian Crimea and fights in the east of Ukraine, V. Orban and M. Zeman do not see any signs of Russian presence in Ukraine and sing a pro-moscow song about the "civil war" and "Kievan junta". Another cause for growing animosity was the Education Act of Ukraine, which caused a range of criticisms from Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Serbia. Hungary has even threatened to block all the issues that Ukraine deals within the EU. The President of Romania canceled his visit to Ukraine. A part of their anxiety was generated by concerning about the fortune of their diaspora in Ukraine. To a greater extent, this concern was motivated by Russian agents (local ultra right, ultra-left and frankly populist forces) and pro-russian media that deliberately convey distorted information about the essence of this act. In defending of its own position Ukraine should emphasize the adequacy of this act to international standards, the desire to complete the decolonization and the adequacy of the protection of the rights of national minorities by all states, and not only by Ukraine. Some Central European states (Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia and Poland) in spite of the Ukrainian position continue to distinguish and strongly encourage a division between Rusyns and Lemkos as separate nations. At the same time they ultimately demand that Ukraine observes such rights of national minorities, which these countries actively ignore. After all, it is unlikely that such a dramatic assimilation of the Ukrainians could be achieved by democratic methods [Table 1]. Ukraine have to be much more active in protecting the rights of the Ukrainians throughout the whole post-socialist field. Among the Balkan countries it is worth emphasizing Croatia. An active political dialogue with this country began after the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Croatia once experienced similar actions on the part of Serbia (Yugoslavia). Deoccupation of the territories captured by Serbs, implementation of reforms, energy security, experience of joining NATO and the EU are just a part of the topics that interest Ukraine. Slovenia and Montenegro would be important allies of Ukraine in the region (especially in the context Ukraine participation in preventing of a coup organized by Russian and Serbian special services). Along with the desire of Ukraine to have friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the Central European states, actions of Russia in the region should be considered. Surely, the Russian influence on political parties and certain political figures in the states of Central Europe leads to the formation of a negative image of our state and significantly worsens relations with Ukraine, as well as carries the certain threats to preservation of the integrity of the EU and NATO. More often Russia uses its own secret agents (including so-called "preserves" the agents recruited by the KGB of the USSR), financial injections and corruption schemes to influence the policy of the states of the region. But sometimes Russia acts openly, brazenly violating the principles of international law: cyberattacks to Estonia, open interference in the President election in Moldova, violations of the Lithuanian airspace, the attempt of the coup in Montenegro etc. The Russian influence on the politicians of Belarus, Serbia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, and Bulgaria is particularly noticeable. However, in relations with these states Ukraine should before everything else look for points of contact from the past, focus 12(28), Vol.1, December

5 attention on the benefits of bilateral relations now and in the future, constantly communicate and inform the citizens of these countries about the Ukrainian arguments in confrontation with Russia. Table 1. Dynamics of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Some Central European States [made on the basis of population census data] State Number of Ukrainians, thousand people previously the latest data Main areas of modern habitation approximately 700 (in western Belarus, Belarus population census of 158,7 (2009) Brest and Gomel regions; Minsk Poland, 1931); 291 (1989) Bulgaria No Data Available 1,8 (2011) scattered Prnjavor, Derventa, Banja Bosnia and 4 (among them 133 the Luka, Devgjatyn, Kazarets, No Data Available Herzegowina Rusyns) (1991) Stara Dubrova, Kamenytsa, Bosanski Grad Latvia 92,1 (1989) 45,7 (2011) Riga, Daugavpils Lithuania 44,8 (1989) 16,4 (2011) Vilnius, Kaunas, Druskininkai, Moldova 600,4 (1989) Poland 3250 (1931) approximately 740 (mid 1940s) 442,4 (among them in Transdniester 160) (2004) 58 (among them the Ukrainians 48, the Lemkos 10 (2011) (at an estimated inclusive of migrant workers up to 1,3 million) Rumania 68,3 (1956) 50,9 (2011) Serbia Slovakia 26,2 (among them 20,6 the Rusyns, 5,6 the Ukrainians) (1971) 383,4 (1891) 90 (1930) 19,1 (among them 14,2 the Rusyns, 4,9 the Ukrainians) (2011) 40,9 (among them 7,4 the Ukrainians); according to the language 61,2 (among them the Ukrainian language 5,7) (2011) Klaipeda Transnistria; Chișinău, Bălți; Ocniţa, Briceni and Rîșcani regions West Pomerania, Pomerania, Warmia-Masuria, Lubuskie, Wielkopolska Provinces; southeast; Warsaw, Cracow, Wroclaw Marmaroshchyna, Suceava, Banat, Dobrudja Vojvodina (Ruski Krstur, Novi Sad, Bachka, Syrmia) Prashivshchyna and western regions Hungary No Data Available 6,2 (2010) scattered Croatia 10,0 (1976) The Czech Republic 19,4 (1950) 4,3 (among them 2,3 the Rusyns, 2,0 the Ukrainians) (2007) 171,4 (among them 117,8 the Ukrainian migrant workers (106,0 legally)) (2011) Petrovtsi, Mikloshevtsi, Vukovar, Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Kanjiža, Sibin, Lipovljani, Rajevo Selo Prague, Plzen, Brno; Sudetes An important point that brings together the positions of Ukraine, the Central European countries and the EU is to highlight Russian support for right-wing and left-wing radical politicians who promote Euro-skeptic views in every possible way. In general, we should state that the influence of Ukraine and the level of information about our country in the region are insufficient. For improvement of the situation the next steps should be done: presence in various regional organizations and promotion of the BBSA idea (the creation of this Alliance is not contrary to the interests of NATO and has some support in the USA and the EU; stepping up the steps towards joining NATO, expanding cooperation within the EU (with the prospect of joining); intensification of diplomatic, economic, cultural and educational activities; searching for points of contact in the shattering of the Soviet-Russian myths and using of real historical facts; constant delimitation of the concepts "Rus" and "Russia", "Rusych" and "Russian" etc.; 66 12(28), Vol.1, December

6 strengthening the information presence (information on the Internet in the languages of the countries of the region; exchange of media). The negative aspect of the regional PGP of Ukraine is the proximity to the regions of political tension and to the certain troubled areas of the planet. Ukraine directly adjoins to the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldavian republic. In the distance of 1.5 thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border there are many regions of long-term instability: the North Caucasus, Abkhazia, The Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Nagorny Karabakh, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Kosovo etc. Each of these conflicts creates a threat of extension of the territory of instability. The annexation of Crimea and Russian-terrorist activities in eastern Ukraine have already confirmed such fears. According to J.F. Danygan and O. Bey, the situation in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, can detonate at any moment [3]. Ukraine is an active participant in the UN peacekeeping operations, so it also has the right to rely on the relevant assistance of the world community in defending its own territorial integrity. The situation in Europe can be stabilized only when Russia will receive a clear signal, supported by practical steps, that Ukraine is an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic community, that V. Putin's delusions based on the Dugin's geopolitics, and money from Gazprom will not tempt any European or also Ukrainian politicians in defending European values. The step to that is the imposition of sanctions against Russia by members of the international community. Conclusions. The regional political and geographical position of Ukraine is determined by its belonging to a group of the Central European states. Consideration of Ukraine to any other historical and geographical region is inadmissible and does not correspond to its civilizational or physical and geographical location. In addition, Ukraine is a Black Sea country. It provides access to the oceans and the possibility of establishing mutually beneficial cooperation with many countries of the world. Between states, especially which are geographically close to each other, there are rarely full confidence and understanding. More often they need very laborious and long-term work, but politicians often take care of their own one-time ratings and not the long-term results in the future. In Central Europe Ukraine has no open enemies, but there are not also many of true friends of Ukraine in the region: Lithuania, Estonia, Croatia and Montenegro. Poland is an important strategic partner of Ukraine, but it often focuses on controversial issues. A number of countries are under the strong influence of the Russian political and economic lobby. The newest pro-russian forces and the "preserves" left from the Soviet times try to destabilize the situation in the states of Central Europe by all methods and "mould" out of Ukraine the image of an unpredictable partner, enemy and incapacitated state. So far, they are in the minority and this is good for our state, but in the absence of adequate policies and active actions they can win wide support. Politicians of certain countries, depending on the political situation at any moment, can involve anti-ukrainian slogans and move to raw national interests rather than regional or pan-european interests. Some Central European states - Slovenia, Macedonia, Albania (one of the few countries outside the EU that joined the sanctions), Bosnia and Herzegovina traditionally, absolutely unfairly and only sporadically fall into the focus of attention of Ukrainian diplomats and politicians. However, at this historic period all states of the region express their support for the integrity of Ukraine and advocate the development of mutually beneficial and multilateral relations. Regional cooperation is important for all countries because "besides powerful allies it is good also to have good neighbors" [9, p. 30]. In relations with the states of the region Ukraine have to adhere to a clear position and in no case seek a compromise at the expense of its own national interests. One of the immediate external challenges to the national security of Ukraine in the region is the presence of a live conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova; absence of demarcation of the state border of Ukraine with the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Moldova; the presence of unresolved issues with Hungary, Romania, Poland; security situation in the Balkans; activities of the Russian lobby and pro-russian forces in the region. Notwithstanding the ages of Russian colonization Ukraine has always been and continues to be a part of Europe from civilization point of view, and it should not stop on the way to full integration into the EU and NATO that will significantly improve the regional political and geographical position of our state. 12(28), Vol.1, December

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