Hong Kong: criminality in a safe city. 11/22/2014 Ewen Fondrillon

Transcription

1 Hong Kong: criminality in a safe city 11/22/2014 Ewen Fondrillon

2 Table of contents Introduction p.3 Hong Kong: the safest city in China? p.3 Mutations of organized crime in Hong Kong p.6 Fighting organized crime p.9 Conclusion p.11 References p.12 Appendix p.13

3 Abstract On all accounts, Hong Kong seems to be one of the safest city in the world regarding criminality. The crime rate is one of the lowest even among developed cities, and still decreasing. However, it does not mean that all crime disappeared. First, we will study how and why crime is constructed as a non-risk in Hong Kong. Why is Hong Kong considered that safe? We have to consider several indicators and their construction: the low crime rate, the low level of corruption, and also compare Hong Kong's situation with the situation of Macau. Then, we have to consider how crime is defined as a risk (or non-risk) While indeed violent street crime seems very low, there is no reliable measure of other types of crime, and there are discrepancies between this "safety" and the regular reports of activities of organized crime groups. Actually, the very lack of data on this issue indicates that it is mostly ignored. What reasons could explain this situation? Tourism, and above all foreign investment are high concerns for Hong Kong, and a presence of organized crime might deter tourists or foreign investors. There are also suspicions of collusion between Beijing and organized crime groups, since before the reunification. In a second part, we will consider the importance of organizational transformations of the triads and organized crime, how their mutation towards a new, more flexible and elusive structure, as well as the shift in their activities from visible crime like protection racket and extortion towards less visible, but no less lucrative activities, especially trafficking and money laundering. We will also explain how criminal activities extended from Hong Kong into South China and the Pearl river Delta. Finally, we will evaluate how the persistence of organized crime poses risks both for Hong Kong, especially financial risks, and for Hong Kong citizens, particularly their vulnerability to the crime groups operating in the Guangdong province, but supported by the extension of triad activities in the region. We will also suggest ways to fight the development of the criminal network established in the Pearl river delta. Introduction Studies about criminality abound in the risk assessment literature, but most of them are about cities that are known for their long criminal history and which are often under the threat of immense crime risks. Hong Kong too has a long criminal history, being considered as the birthplace of the infamous triads so romanticized by the cinematographic industry. However, Hong Kong is also widely considered to be a safe city, and therefore, studies about the risks posed by criminality in Hong Kong are uncommon. This lack of interest might be the reason why some figures went unnoticed, such as the fact that about 50 criminal organizations are still active in Hong Kong even to this day. While Hong Kong police force and the authorities dismiss the issue of criminality, criminal activities continue to generate risks for Hong Kong and its citizens, risks that need to be properly assessed and acted against. This paper is addressed to the sub-bureau of Interpol in Hong Kong, in an attempt to elaborate new strategies to identify and counter those risks. Due to its independence from Hong Kong's administration, Interpol is the only actor both neutral and knowledgeable enough to take action on this matter. Hong Kong: the safest city in China? At first glance, contemporary Hong Kong is safe, despite its criminal history and the long lasting influence of criminal syndicates. The crime rate is low, 1122 per inhabitants in 1999 (Broadhurst, Roderic G. (2004) Crime Trends in Hong Kong: Another Look at the Safe City), and declining : 1061 per in 2012, 1015 per in 2013, according to the statistics of the Hong Kong Police Force. By comparison, the rate of burglary alone in countries such as Germany (2936), England (2452) or Australia (2130) are higher than the overall crime rate in Hong Kong. The only other countries with comparable crime rates are Japan and Singapore (1031 in 2013), both known for being particularly safe countries to live in.

4 If we take a closer look at the typology of crime in Hong Kong, only 17 % of recorded offences involved violence (in 2013). This figure fall even lower when minor offences, such as drunkenness, are included in crime statistics. The homicide rate is also particularly low : 0,9 per in In 2011, Hong Kong even had the lowest homicide rate in the world. Most crime in Hong Kong is non-violent, the most common being theft and criminal damage. We referred to the criminal history of Hong Kong above, particularly the central position it held in the world of organized crime. Even the influence of triads seems to be disappearing. In 2006, triads-related crimes only made up to 3 % of recorded crime, most of them being relatively harmless, such as unlawful society membership offences. If the number can be trusted, Hong Kong is indeed one of the safest city in the world. Internations.com, a website which addresses expatriates, informs visitors that the city is «one of the safest in the world», with «little to worry about». Similarly, CNN also considers Honk Kong the «safest city». So not only crime do not appear to be an issue in Hong Kong, according to crime rates and official statistics, but the city's international reputation is to be a particularly safe place to live in. How can such a low crime rate be explained? Usually, Hong Kong's safety is considered to be a combination of several factors. The first explanation is cultural. Hong Kong is ethnically homogeneous, and Confucian values, such as compliance with the law, and the importance of family and community are part of Hong Kong's resident cultures. It partially explain solidarity between residents of the same neighbourhood, and a protection of the individual thanks to support of the community. As Jenny Robinson wrote in 1961, neighbourhood residents are «eyes on the streets», participating to crime prevention by maintaining a constant watch over public space. Second, police and security is particularly large compared to the relatively limited size of Hong Kong's territory and population. The small size of Hong Kong jurisdiction in itself facilitate the fight against crime.. The United Nations Criminal Justice System ranked Hong Kong the sixth highest police to population rate in 1994, at 640 police per ; compared to an average of 346 per in industrialized countries (Newman 1999: 124). Hong Kong security bureau reports the existence of a large private security industry. A third factor is the hostility of Hong Kong's authority toward crime and corruption, and its willingness to implement new policies to reduce it. In 1974, the Independent Commission of Corruption was established to get rid off the corruption that riddled the colonial administration of this period. This agency is still active today, and was made part of the constitution (Hong Kong basic law) in A Fight Crime Committee was established in At the same time, prevention campaign, and measures were put into action to include community as a part of the crime prevention apparatus (Lethbridge 1985; Traver & Vagg 1991; Lo 1993; Gaylord & Traver 1995; Leung 1995). Laws such as a universal Identification Document were enacted. More recently, the police received extended power as part of the Organized and Serious Crime Ordinance, which include but are not limited to the removal of a person's right to silence in a serious crime inquiry, confiscation of benefits originating from criminal activity, and extension of search and stop power. We could conclude from these observation that crime in Hong Kong is not framed as a risk, due to both its limited scope and the vigorous measures and efficient infrastructures involved in crime prevention and reduction. However, several clues indicate that it might not be as true as it seems. Hong Kong crime rates we described earlier are entirely based on recorded offences, which are the offences the police is aware of. An other study, the Hong Kong Crime Victimization Survey (HKCVS), which considers the profile of victims and crime report practices reveal discrepancies between recorded crimes and reported crimes. For example, while police reports indicates decreases in offences such as blackmail and frauds, or stable rates in sexual assaults and intimidation, the

5 HKCVS shows an increase in all of these offence categories, contradicting Hong Kong Police Force statistics. A comparison of police and HKCVS figures shows that in 1998, barely 6 % of intimidation offences were reported to the police, as well as only 18 % of blackmail offences, and 10 % of sexual assaults. As for violent crimes, HKCVS numbers shows that in 1998, only 31 % of violent crimes were reported to the police. This brief overview of the finding of HKCVS tends to indicate that police crime statistics are not a very reliable indication of crime level. A second interesting element that would dent the «safe-city» image of Hong Kong is an estimation of the presence of organized crime syndicates and triads in the city. Sources close to the police estimates that there is about 50 triads present in Hong Kong, 15 to 20 of them attracting regularly the attention of the authorities because of their criminal activity, totalling about members. In August 2013, the Honk Kong police concluded an undercover operation called Thunderbolt 13, which led to the arrest of 1800 suspects of activities related to organized crime and triads. Incidentally, the thesis of continuing presence of organized crime activities is coherent with the findings of the HKCVS, given that offences such as blackmail, extortion, intimidation, which are increasing, but rarely reported to the police, are among the most triad-related offences, after membership of an unlawful society. For example, in 2006, blackmail accounted for almost 10% of triad-related offences, but since most blackmails are not reported, we can assume it is even higher than this. This clearly contradicts the image of a safe city depicted above. Clearly, the threat posed by crime, especially organized crime, exists. However, it is not among the highest topics of preoccupation of the Hong Kong population. Housing, the economy, environment, health, transport, relations with mainland China, Taiwan, and more recently the student demonstration are the most sensitive topics. Law and order do not even appear on the list. Even though, crime is still present, despite police statistics, but is not considered as a priority neither for Hong Kong authorities nor for Hong Kong citizens. Why is crime not defined as a risk, or more precisely, as a non-risk? To answer this question, we have to consider several perspectives. The first one calls for an explanation of the potential economic effects of criminal activities. Tourism in an important part of Hong Kong economy. The World Economic Forum Report of 2007 ranked Hong Kong the 6 th futuristic destination in terms of competitiveness, and the most attractive destination in Asia. In 2011, more than 37 millions tourists came to Hong Kong, a number that is growing each year. According to the Hong Kong Tourism Board, tourist expenditures in 2008 accounted for 10.5% of Hong Kong GDP. All of these figures show how important the tourism industry his for Honk Kong economy, and since the reunification of 1997 with mainland China, easier access from Chinese citizens to Hong Kong increased tourism activity even more. While it is not the only explanation for Hong Kong's attractiveness as a tourism destination, safety is part of the reason why so many people come to visit, as it is frequently stressed on tourism websites and tour guides. Keep public attention on criminal matters might deter some tourists, and it is clearly not in the interest of Hong Kong authorities, given the importance of the tourism industry in Hong Kong's economy. Moreover, Hong Kong is one of the world leading financial centres, Honk Kong Stock Exchange being the world sixth largest (CIA fact-book). It was part of the Four Asian Tigers, countries characterized by a fast development during the post-war period, and now among the world leading economies. Linked to this fast paced economy based on financial exchange is the Hong Kong real estate market, the second most expensive in the world. In some part of the City such as the Peak, the square foot of land is the most expensive in the world. Finally, the World Investment Report of 2013 ranked Hong Kong as the third recipient of foreign investment in the world. However, both of these activities are tied to the confidence investors have in Hong Kong. Setting public focus on crime could have devastating effects on Hong Kong economy. Crime could make the real estate value fall, creating the risk of a market crash. Furthermore, organized crime implies economic ties between criminal societies and legitimate business used as a front, money laundering,...activities that are susceptible to harm trust in Hong Kong's economy. Once again, keeping attention off crime is in the interest of Hong Kong's government.

6 The second perspective to consider is historical. The Hong Kong Police Force was created in 1844, when Hong Kong was under British colonial rule. For 153 years, the Hong Kong police applied British policing methods. It was even renamed Royal Hong Kong police force after the riots of Contemporary policing in Hong Kong is thus strongly influenced by the traditional focus of British police on public order. To summarize, the Hong Kong police put more emphasis on maintaining public order, suppressing visible crime in the streets, rather than a proactive war against crime. This results in the downward trend in crime registered by the police, because crime that comes to attention of the police is subjected to vigorous response. However, as long as crime is not visible, it will not trigger strong actions from the police. It is the case for trafficking, blackmail, extortion, fraud, money laundering, cybercriminality...as we explained above, criminal societies did not disappear, they shifted their activities toward less visible sectors. This focus on public order is beneficial both to criminal societies, which need stability to establish their most lucrative activities, and the Hong Kong public authorities, since public attention to criminal activities could be detrimental to Hong Kong economy. The last reason why crime is kept below the radar of public scrutiny was the subject of a classified Royal Hong Kong police Triad Unit report, which leaked (Willard Myers, 1994). It examined the ties between the triads and Chinese officials, especially in the People's Republic of China. This report revealed relations between the Sun Yee On triad and officials as high ranked as the Public Security Minister, Tao Siju, who declared that Beijing was disposed to work in collaboration with patriotic triads. This report also included agreement between Sun Yee On and Beijing: the triad offered to keep in check democratic movements, in order for Beijing to avoid a second Tiananmen after the reunification of In exchange, Sun Yee On was promised that authorities would turn a blind eye to its activities. This report is corroborated by public declarations of mainland Chinese officials. Even Deng Xiaoping, in 1984, declared that not all black societies are bad. There are many good guys among them. The recent Occupy central movement has seen some protests disrupted with violence, and it has been argued that triad-related thugs were sent against the protesters. This seems to fit the frame of the agreement evoked in the 1993 report. In light of this explanations, it is easier to understand why crime, and in particular criminal societies like the triads, is defined as a non-risk by Hong Kong authorities. It is in their interest to keep crime and its consequences out of public scrutiny, as long as it is not too visible. As for the triads, an other leaked police report hints that they may actually be responsible for about a half of the crimes that take place in Hong Kong, but because of public reluctance to consider crime as a risk, the exact extent of their power and activity is not known. As Broadhurst and Wa wrote, the three pillars of Hong Kong law and order (rule of law, personal freedom, and an effective civil service) became the focus of public scrutiny (The transformation of Dark Societies in Hong Kong: the impact of law enforcement, socio-economic and political change, R Broadhurst and L.K.Wa, 2009); but this do not include criminal societies as long as they do not disturb the rule of law to visibly. Now that we have made clear that crime, despite its definition as a non-risk by public authorities, might be much more extensive than it appears at first glance, especially organized crime, we will attempt to assess the risk posed by criminal societies, and to determine if measures should be taken, and the nature of these measures, to fight organized criminality. The mutation of organized crime in Hong Kong We evoked earlier the presence in Hong Kong of around 50 triad societies, and although the figures are unreliable due to the clandestine nature of the phenomenon they are trying to evaluate, it is estimated that between and people are, or have been involved in triad activities in Hong Kong alone, which means that up one citizen out of sixty has ties, however loose they are, with organized crime. To understand the functioning and organization of the triads, and why they are so deeply integrated in Hong Kong, we have to go back over their history and the evolution provoked by

7 changes in law, socio-economic conditions, and the opportunities brought by the reunification with mainland China. The presence of triads in Hong Kong dates as far back as the opium wars, around They started as groups of opium traders, and diversified their activities as time went by. In the 1920s and 1930s, triads were powerful enough to control entire districts, and had a hand in almost every criminal activity in the city. Each had its own territory, and practised extortion and protection racket, forcing the shop-owners and residents to pay a fee or have their home or shop destroyed. They also controlled vice industries such as the opium trade, prostitution, gambling,...during that time, the most powerful triads, still active today, were created, like Sun Yee On founded in 1919, Wo Shing Wo, created in 1930, and 14K, created in The influence of Hong Kong triads also grew because of the civil war between communists and nationalists in mainland China. While other Chinese triads were eradicated during the war or the communist era, Hong Kong triads remained untouched and without competition. Triads at that time had a hierarchical organization, with a single leader, called dragonhead, and officers divided into two branches, an administrative one and a military one, the latter regrouping the gangs affiliated to the triads. Those officers had authority over the lesser members of the triad, the messengers and the thugs. To each rank was attached a title and ceremonial, and the hierarchical relations inside the triads were marked by highly symbolic rituals, such as the thirty six oath a new member had to swore before becoming a true member. This brief history allows us to understand that triads are a part of Hong Kong history, and were one of the main actor in the governance of the city for more than a century. They are part of Hong Kong society because they evolved with the city since it became to develop independently from mainland China. However, both the position of the triads as major actors in Hong Kong's governance and their visibility and involvement in street-level crime were severely tackled by the anti-corruption policies in the 1970s and the transformation of Hong Kong into a global financial centre. To evade the effects of the new anti-corruption and aggressive policing, Hong Kong triads underwent a radical organizational change. They became loosely connected networks, based on the Chinese notion of guan xi, which describes a system of personal and reciprocal ties and obligations, based on mutual assistance. As Braodhurst and Wa wrote, organizational forms have been transform to become less hierarchical and visible (The transformation of Dark Societies in Hong Kong: the impact of law enforcement, socio-economic and political change, R Broadhurst and L.K.Wa, 2009). Now, a triad works as a network, an intermediary which connects the different members of a criminal enterprise, without being necessarily under the scrutiny of a leadership structure. The leadership is now detached from the basic level, and function as a broker, connecting individuals with common interests. Let us take an example: a businessman is seeking an investment with a high plus-value to be able to pay back debts. He is member of a triad to which he pays a fee. If he asks for the triad helps, a broker might put him in contact with a group of drug producer who seeks funds to establish a laboratory. If we follow this example, the triads will also engage thugs to protect the laboratory, in such a way that each member of this drug producing enterprise will be isolated from the others. Each member will obtain satisfaction, and this organization makes it very difficult for the authorities to dismantle the whole network, since individuals are isolated, and each criminal cell is very small. To the criminal entrepreneurs, who are willing to set up criminal activities, the triad provides its insight and knowledge of organized crime. To the street level gangs, the triad provides its reputation, allowing the gang to be much more intimidating, because it is believed to be backed by a powerful organization. They are the one who commit most of the triadrelated offences. Triads currently act as franchise-like (Broadhurst & Wa, 200) activities. They allow members who pay them a fee to use the triad name and network of connections to set up his or her own criminal activities. Most members now act independently from the power structure, which contributes to the impression that triads are involved in every single lucrative criminal sector. The

8 triad provides protection to their members, and collect a commission on their activities, but are no longer centralized entities with a strict hierarchy. This new organization has several advantages. First, the triads do not have a clearly identified leadership which could be the target of authorities any more. Second, they preserve their reputation of large and intricate networks, of omniscience. Finally, it makes triads activities much more difficult for the police to track down and shut down. For example, most of the dismantled criminal enterprises described by Shiu-Hing Lo ( The politics of cross-border crime in Greater China, S. H. Lo, 2009) were composed of only a few members, usually between three and ten, which only represents a small fraction of the triad's network. The 1970s reforms and changes in socio-economic conditions not only modified triad's organizations, but also provoked a shift in triads activities. With a police now relatively free of corruption, a population growing more and more hostile towards the them, the triad's activities became less and less visible. Protection racket and extortion disappeared from the streets, as well as most of the extortion-specialized gangs. It seemed that the triad left the streets, but, as we explained above, it does not mean that they ceased to exist. With the opening of Hong Kong economy, its high degree of financial circulation, and its status as a free-trade harbour, as well as the reunification of 1997 with mainland China, a lot of opportunities opened for the triads to take advantage of. However, traditional triad crime did not completely disappear. It just became a marginal part of triad-related profits. For example, we saw earlier that blackmail is still existing. Intimidation also: in 2000, a group of young people sporting extensive tattoos and using triad identification signs, apparently supported by the Sun Yee On triad, conducted a campaign of intimidation in the village of Pak-Tin, because the inhabitants refused to sell their land to a real estate company. Such a demonstration remains an exception, though. The first and main activity of triad networks nowadays is their franchise (Broadhurst and Wa, 2009) rent to criminal groups. Each member has to pay a fee, and even with the lowest estimation of members, it represents quite a lucrative business. It actually is the only direct profit for the triads, everything else is indirect, because others profits are made by individual criminal schemes, and transferred to the triad in the form of those fees. A large part of triad business is related to vice. Despite prostitution being outlawed in Hong Kong, the demand still exists, and Hong Kong has several unofficial red light districts, mainly located in Kowloon. Most of the prostitutes are mainland Chinese with a short-term visa, who try to raise as much money as possible before being caught and send back to the mainland, where they apply for a new visa. Some of them were also illegally smuggled into Hong Kong. Human trafficking and smuggling is an other of the main activities of the triads. It can be the smuggling of women for prostitution, but also of illegal workers from the mainland. Moreover, according to the United Nation Office on Drug and Crime, some of these immigrants are smuggled into Hong Kong as part of a larger traffic. When they obtain a Hong Kong passport (usually, with counterfeit documents), they can move on to several countries which do not require visa for Hong Kong citizens, while they require one for mainland Chinese. An other vice sector which is prominent in triad-related crime is gambling. Illegal for a long time, gambling is amongst the most lucrative business handled by the triad. The 2014 Football World Cup provoked a spike in gambling activities, with bet placed sometimes several month before the competition started. Furthermore, gambling is illegal in mainland China, and many visitors from the Pearl River Delta come to Hong Kong to place bets. The proximity of Macau and its casinos participated in the development of triad control over gambling. The triads are also involved in all kind of illegal goods trafficking. According to the April 2013 Threat assessment of East Asia crime by the UN, most of these illegal goods are smuggled both at the international level, mainly from South and South East Asia, and at the inter-regional level, between Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macau and Shenzen, in the Pearl River Delta. This includes electronic waste from Thailand and India, to be processed in illegal recycling centres, and

9 several drugs. First, Hong Kong is an important centre in the traffic of heroin from the Golden Triangle. After being refined in Myanmar, the drug transit by Hong Kong before being shipped at the international level. The use of heroin in Hong Kong itself is declining however, but it is replaced by artificial nightclub-drugs (Dr. Chu Yiu-Kong), such as ketamine and metaamphetamine, which are produced directly in Hong Kong. Other goods such as timber, or exotic animals, also transit by Hong Kong's harbour. All of these trafficking is served by the particular position of Hong Kong: Victoria Harbour is one of the world's busiest port, only surpassed in 2010 by Shanghai. More over, the free-trade harbour status means that the responsibility of inspecting of each container is left to the recipient country. Given the time necessary to inspect each container and the amount of effort and funds which would be necessary to extend the inspection to all containers, it is impossible to prevent illegal goods to be shipped to or from Hong Kong. These activities provoked the development of new practices to cover their profit and those involved. Counterfeiting is among them. Triads have developed, especially since 1997, counterfeiting activities to enable criminals to circulate between Hong Kong, Macau and the mainland. Some of the illegal workers and prostitutes evoked earlier were also able to enter Hong Kong with counterfeit identity documents. Money laundering also became important: in 2002, the Hong Kong Police estimated that about 934 billion of HK$ were laundered, 900 billion coming from gambling, and most of the rest originating from drug trafficking. This problem is particularly delicate in an economy as financially open as Hong Kong's: law to better identify and regulate front-company used to launder money are frantically opposed by Hong Kong's legislative body. Apart from the change in the nature of triad activities, the reunification of 1997 provoked a major shift in the geographical locations of crime. Contrary to former belief that the triads would exile themselves out of Hong Kong after the reunification, they actually extended their activities onto the mainland. Sun Yee On, for example, opened the first national cinema company in mainland China. Relocating a large part of their activities in South China, particularly in the area around Shenzhen, Guangdong and the Pearl River delta proved particularly beneficial. First, the authorities and policing were much less aggressive than in Hong Kong, partly thanks to the contact between the triads and the Chinese elites, and also because of the extensive corruption of civil service and the police in the mainland (more than 2.5 times more likely in Shenzhen than in Hong Kong). Additionally, the triads provided the same franchise to mainland criminals than in Hong Kong. The Vice-director of the Narcotics control bureau suggested that the Hong Kong criminals were the mastermind behind drug trafficking activities (Broadhurst and Wa, 2009). This statement would be true for prostitution, which has been recognized as an important problem by Chinese officials in According to official figures, there would be prostitute in mainland China, but they are considered as a blatant underestimation, and the real number would be closer to 2.5 million. The same goes for illegal gambling, and we already evoked human trafficking for workers and prostitutes to Hong Kong earlier. Besides, the uncontrolled capitalism in Shenzhen was the ideal ground for semi- legal real estate companies controlled by triad members to develop, even using thugs to get rid of land-owners reluctant to sell their property. The large internal migrant population participated to this dynamic. With more than 10 million of the 13 million inhabitants of Shenzhen being migrants, often having troubles to find a job, they are usually more willing than Hong Kong citizens to engage in crime. As a result of the triads establishing power bases in the Pearl River delta, criminality in Guangdong and Shenzhen increased tremendously. The homicide rate if four times higher than in Hong Kong, and violent crimes such as armed robbery and abduction are widespread. This is true not only for Shenzhen but also for Macau. Since Macau's economy is largely dependent on casino's, this economical sector is not strictly regulated, and largely controlled by triads and other criminal groups. As a consequence of the conflicts between these groups, the homicide rate in Macau reached peaks at seven times Hong Kong's rate. This overview of sectoral and geographical displacement gives us a picture of Hong Kong as

10 an area that is, apart from prostitution and drug-related crime relatively free of the more violent and thriving crime that affects the Pearl River delta. But Hong Kong is also the rear base of these criminal activities. It serves both as a hub for trafficking drugs (usually produced in the mainland), human beings, and illegal goods. Likewise, the Hong Kong based-triads take a large part in the criminal activities conducted both in Hong Kong and the mainland. Most of the criminal cells described by S.H.Lo (Lo, 2009) were composed of a mix of Hong Kong, Macau, and mainland citizens. Money originating from criminal activities in the mainland is laundered in Hong Kong. Basically, the triads extended their activities outside of Hong Kong to benefit from a more favourable political and economical environment, while keeping Hong Kong as base to further establish their activities and networks in South China. Considering triads are more and more oriented towards less violent crimes, at least in Hong Kong, and are more preoccupied in extending their connections in the whole Pearl River Delta region, and despite their continuous presence in Hong Kong, it begs one question: to what extend does this unprecedented extension of triads influence creates risks for Hong Kong and its citizens? For what it seems, triads are a threat mainly to mainland citizens. After all, the criminal activities remaining in Hong Kong seem either marginal, like drug and prostitution, or relatively harmless, such as money laundering. Fighting organized crime The triad's resurgence in South China creates two distinct types of risks related to Hong Kong: internal risks, that can affect Hong Kong and its citizens inside the city's borders, and external risks, that are susceptible to affect Hong Kong citizens when they are in mainland China or in Macau. Internal risks include economical ones. The use of Hong Kong as a money laundering base by the triads creates financial risks. It is impossible to evaluate how deeply dirty money originating from criminal activities could affect Hong Kong's economy, but if it came to public attention that some companies, especially real estate, are front used to launder money, it could harm the trust put into Hong Kong's financial system. It is a vicious cycle of sorts: revealing that dirty money is laundered on Hong Kong's financial market put Hong Kong's economy at risk, but the deeper triads penetrate the financial market, the higher the risk. Apart from the financial risk, the remaining drug trafficking is still a concern for Hong Kong's youth. While the quantity sold in Hong Kong are limited, they pose a threat to the health and well-being of the consumers, who are mainly young, active people who often partake in the city's night-life. Yet those risks are limited in scope. They affect only a part of the population, are relatively low risks, and the costs of preventing those risks might exceed the benefits. External risks, on the other hand, are much more alarming. The development of triad-related crime in South China has created unclear criminal borders. Hong Kong citizens, who are seen as wealthy by criminals of Shenzhen, Guangdong, and the Pearl River delta, are a target of choice for attacks such as robbery and abduction. Hong Kong citizens who cross the border to visit South China expose themselves to criminal gangs, as S.H. Lo wrote, Some criminals view Hong Kong people as kidnapping targets (S.H.Lo, 2009). In 2004, four mainland Chinese were arrested for kidnapping several Hong Kong citizens and robbing their bank accounts. Chung Tze Kung, nicknamed the Big Spender, was rendered famous by his kidnapping of Victor Li, son of a Hong Kong businessman, and Walter Kwok. His crime syndicate was composed from both Hong Kong people and mainlanders, and both kidnapping were planned from the mainland. The Hong Kong government announced that 283 kidnapping targeted Hong Kong citizens in the mainland between April 2003 and March Other crimes such as car-crashing intimidation, when a criminal deliberately provoke a car accident and intimidate the victim into paying immediate compensations in cash, or armed robberies on South China's highways, are a serious concern. Hong Kong citizen are once again the preferred

11 targets of these schemes. It is to be feared that the opening of the borders between Hong Kong, the People's Republic of China, and Macau, will lead to an increase of cross-border crimes, targeting Hong Kong citizens in particular. At the moment, the tools to fight against the organized crime in South China are very limited. The triads use the discrepancies between the legal and judicial system of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong and Macau at their advantages. There is conflicts between the three political entities' police force, in particular over jurisdictions and extradition policies. Several intrusion of the mainland police force in Macau and Hong Kong jurisdictions have been recorded. Moreover, Hong Kong authorities are reluctant to hand over criminals arrested in Hong Kong to mainland's authorities, fearing an unfair trial by Hong Kong. The reverse situation is fairly common, China's authority fear that the Hong Kong judicial system is too lax with criminals. The controversial prosecution of Li Yu-Hui, who assassinated five women in Hong Kong and was condemned and executed in the mainland, and Chung Tze Kung, are illustrations of these conflicts. The criminals are aware of the lack of coordination between the Guangdong province and the two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, and simply cross the border to shield themselves from prosecution. Several informal agreements are currently regulated the relations between China, Hong Kong and Macau's police forces. The reason why I directed my recommendations towards you is that the Interpol sub-bureau of Hong Kong is the only entity to have counterparts in both Guangdong and Macau. Thus you are best placed to encourage the negotiations of formal agreements over the limits of each entity's jurisdiction, and to strengthen a tripartite cooperation in the Pearl River Delta. Until both police forces and judicial system are able to cooperate efficiently, fighting the criminal organization rooted in this region will remain impossible. There are already hints of a will to cooperation: intelligence sharing between police forces already enabled to shut down several criminal syndicates, but this is not sufficient to dismantle the whole network. Perhaps would it also be beneficial to share with both the mainland and Macau the experience of Hong Kong's police over anti-corruption issues. Conclusion As a conclusion, crime is an underestimated risk in Hong Kong citizens as well as other inhabitants of the Pearl River Delta. While Hong Kong is considered safe, it is still an essential part of the criminal organizations operating in South China. Street crime is almost eradicated in Hong Kong, but the criminal activities have been displaced to Shenzhen and the Guangdong province, and are still very likely to affect Hong Kong citizens. Moreover, Hong Kong still serve as a hub for criminal organizations, in global-scale trafficking. Fighting against the criminal organization firmly established in Hong Kong and extending in South China would thus not only protect Hong Kong citizens from these organizations, but also citizens of the People's Republic of China, and would also be an important step in the struggle against global trafficking of drugs and human beings. Interpol, as an international and independent institution present both in China and the two special administrative regions of Macau and Hong Kong, is in position to help formulate a coordinated answer to the risks posed by organized crime, despite Hong Kong authorities reluctance to consider them.

12 References Transnational and organised crime in East Asia and the Pacific: a threat assessment, United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime. Roderic Broadhurst and Lee King Wa, 2009, The Transformation of Triad Dark Societies in Hong Kong:The Impact of Law Enforcement, Socio-Economic and Political Change, Security Challenges, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 2009), pp William Myers, 1996, The emerging threat of transnational organized crime from the East, Crime, Law & Social Change 24: , (~) 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. Broadhurst, Roderic G. (2004) Crime Trends in Hong Kong: Another Look at the Safe City, in Broadhurst, Roderic G., Eds. Crime and its Control in PR China: Proceedings of the Annual Symposium , chapter 14, pages pp Centre for Crimnology, University of Hong Kong. Peter Yam Tat-wing, FIGHTING HONG KONG S ORGANIZED CRIME, THE ORGANIZED & SERIOUS CRIME ORDINANCE Ganapathy, Narayanan and Broadhurst, Roderic (2008) Organized Crime in Asia: A Review of Problems and Progress. Asian Journal of Criminology 3(1):pp Alliance Development Work, World Risk Report 2014, United Nations University. Dr David Bright and Dr Catherine Greenhill, Dismantling and disrupting criminal networks: A research perspective,university of New South Wales Bertil Lintner, Le crime organisé en Asie. Du Triangle d'or à l'extrême-orient russe, dans Pouvoirs 2010/1 (n 132) Tony Kwok Man wai, Assistant Director of Operations, Independent Commission Against Corruption, Hong Kong, The Nature and Impact of Asian Organized Crime The Hong Kong Problem Alain Labrousse, Mafias de la drogue et corruption du politique, Géopolitique des drogues, page 45 à 70 Shiu Hing Lo, Politics of cross border crime crime in Greater China,

13 Appendix Comparison between Hong Kong Police and HKCVS rates.