THE FALL OF NORTH KOREA A Wikistrat Crowdsourced Simulation. July 2016

Transcription

1 THE FALL OF NORTH KOREA A Wikistrat Crowdsourced Simulation July 2016

2 SIMULATION BACKGROUND North Korea remains the last truly totalitarian regime and closed state on earth. However, it is unlikely to be able to remain as such indefinitely. During June 2016, Wikistrat ran an 11-day multistage crowdsourced simulation to explore the various pathways by which North Korea could collapse, assess which of the pathways are the most plausible/likely, and game out the ways in which other actors are likely to respond. More than 70 analysts participated in the simulation including PhDs, former military and diplomatic personnel, and other expert members of our Asia-Pacific, Russia, North America and Military desks.

3 KEY INSIGHTS China is the pivotal power in any scenario of a North Korean collapse. Securing North Korean WMD is a task likely best left to the Chinese though it will be a test of diplomacy and transparency, as Washington, Tokyo and Seoul will have to be convinced that the threat has been eliminated. The death of Kim Jong-un is a likely catalyst for major change within North Korea; however, the direction of that change will not be determined by this variable alone. Should the Kim regime falter, South Korea is prepared to take Pyongyang (unilaterally if necessary) before China can respond. Unilateral South Korean action is possible and would be tremendously destabilizing. Japan is at a strategic disadvantage in any scenario dealing with the collapse of North Korea and will be forced to depend on its relationship with the U.S. to exert any leverage over the situation. Russia may have the most to gain from instability on the Korean Peninsula. Attempts to capitalize on the situation would endanger relations with China and the United States. However, Moscow is uniquely positioned to expand its regional influence, given its comparatively fewer restraints and lack of security commitments.

4 METHODOLOGY Phase I: Backcasting the Fall In this five-day phase, analysts were asked to tell the retrospective story of North Korea s fall via the collaborative generation of scenarios. Phase II: Scenario Plausibility Voting Analysts were then asked to choose the highest-quality scenarios from the previous phase based on plausibility and likelihood. Phase III: Wargaming the Scenarios For the remainder of the exercise, analysts were divided into five teams (the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan and Russia), each of which gamed out the responses of their actor to the top four scenarios chosen in Phase II.

5 PHASE I: BACKCASTING THE FALL In this phase, analysts were asked to backcast the fall of the Pyongyang regime, exploring what led to its demise and the early warning signs that, in retrospect, would have foretold the fall. DATE OF COLLAPSE 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 2016 to to 2025 In an accompanying voting exercise, almost 65 percent of analysts predicted that the fall of the regime would occur five to ten years from now. While the projected cause of the collapse was less clearly agreed upon, analysts appeared to be fairly evenly split between military, economic and political causes. Interestingly, access to information and technology only accounted for two percent of the projected causes to to 2035 Beyond 2035 PRIMARY CAUSE OF COLLAPSE 15% 2% 24% 26% 33% Military Economic Political Social Information/Technology

6 CAUSES LISTED IN PHASE I SCENARIOS Analysts developed 40 scenarios that told the story of North Korea s fall. These scenarios were then classified according to the cause provided in the entry. (Note: Some entries included more than one cause.) Retaliatory Foreign Military Intervention Kim Dies of Poor Health Internal Coup Foreign Intervention Other Externally-Backed Coup Semi-Normalization of Relations Unforeseen but Major Accident Preemptive Foreign Military Intervention Military Near-Collapse Kim Dies Other Kim Assassinated Famine and Starvation Undermines Regime Popular Uprising Economic Near-Collapse NUMBER OF SCENARIOS WITH THIS CAUSE

7 Likelihood PHASE II: SCENARIO PLAUSIBILITY VOTING During Phase II, analysts were asked to rank each entry developed in Phase I according to plausibility (i.e., could it happen?) and likelihood (i.e., will it happen?) LIKELIHOOD AND PLAUSIBILITY RANKING The four highest-ranked scenarios were selected to explore in Phase III because of a methodological decision to examine those situations external actors were most likely to face Plausibility Selected for Phase III

8 PHASE III: WARGAMING THE SCENARIOS For Phase III, analysts were divided into five teams (the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan and Russia), each of which gamed out the response of their actor to the top four scenarios of North Korea s fall. No Yes Does Kim Jong-un preside over the country at the time of the fall? 15% 85% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

9 PHASE III SCENARIOS The scenarios voted as the most plausible/likely in Phase II had variation among two major variables: Military Cohesion and Popular Engagement. Each scenario contained its own risks and opportunities for the selected external actors (U.S., South Korea, Japan, Russia and China). Yet in all of them, China was strengthened, Japan was sidelined, Russia looked for ways to exploit the situation, and the U.S. was forced to restrain South Korea from taking aggressive action.

10 SCENARIO I: COLLAPSE OF THE NORTH KOREAN STATE Situation: Disease sweeps a population deprived of food and medical aid. Entire military units defect as soldiers and officers at all levels fall ill. The Kim family retreats to a compound in the mountains, and refugees (many of them also sickened) flood out across the Chinese, Russian and South Korean borders. Risks: Naval confrontation develops between China and Japan and/or the U.S. as all countries deploy maritime forces to manage the crisis, deal with refugees and ensure North Korea remains non-belligerent. Opportunities: The crisis may generate multinational support for regime change and international cooperation to secure WMD. EARLY WARNING SIGNS NGOs begin to withdraw. Inefficiencies of healthcare system become magnified. Unrest grows within lower ranks of the military over inadequate rations. Kim Jong-un s behavior becomes increasingly erratic. China s statements regarding North Korea become increasingly negative and bellicose. Environmental degradation escalates malnutrition and decreases access to food. North Korean efforts to procure more food from fisheries violate Chinese fishing rights. Illegal immigration into/through China drastically increases as the food crisis worsens.

11 SCENARIO II: POPULAR REVOLUTION Situation: A massive demonstration for food in Pyongyang erupts in violence. Troops ordered to put it down refuse on the grounds that they have been fed inadequate rations. The small military force that does mobilize is attacked with homemade weapons. Many hundreds of civilians are killed, along with dozens of soldiers. Risks: Outbreak of a large-scale humanitarian crisis. South Korea mobilizes to prevent a spillover of the situation. The regime loses control over its WMD. Opportunities: Restoration of stability takes place via a pro- China coup, forcing the situation towards Scenario III. EARLY WARNING SIGNS Humanitarian organizations start withdrawing from North Korea altogether. Reports abound of widespread food shortages and people roaming in search of sustenance. A noticeable absence of government-sponsored rallies indicates the regime fears large public gatherings. There is an increase in the number of troops on the streets and in the countryside, but also reports that troops appear to be searching for food and/or going AWOL. South Korean troops along the DMZ begin to hear shouts from across the line to send food. Western intelligence picks up reports of growing concern with the senior military and upper echelons of the government.

12 SCENARIO III: PRO-CHINA COUP Situation: A coup takes place within North Korea. Pro- Chinese forces within the government and the military arrest Kim and other high-profile leaders and have them killed. The country is now under the control of a new pro- Chinese provisional government. Risks: South Korea attempts to undermine the rule of the new regime. Opportunities: This was the least volatile of all scenarios, with the most cooperation and the most plausible containment of WMDs. EARLY WARNING SIGNS There is a decrease in public appearances of Kim Jong-un and an increase in appearances of his trusted lieutenants. An increasing number of arrests and executions take place in the upper echelons of the ruling party and the military of those with residual ties to Jang Sung-thaek and other known moderates. We see a third reappearance of the language of the main tree of direct leadership and the cutting of side branches which preceded Jang Sung-thaek s arrest and execution. North Korea becomes increasingly belligerent, reflecting the growing strength of military hardliners over moderates despite adverse economic impacts. Intelligence is received that Chinese envoys have been in direct contact with some members of Kim's senior leadership.

13 SCENARIO IV: FALLING INTO CIVIL WAR Situation: Kim Jong-un dies of a heart attack. His sister and wife attempt to hold the country together, but are unable to do so. Pro- and anti-family forces actively fight throughout the country. Risks: South Korea invites Russian intervention to balance what they see as the risk of Chinese expansionism. The U.S., hesitant to back South Korean unilateralism, withholds intelligence. South Korea reacts aggressively out of security fears. Opportunities: China is likely to step in and secure WMDs. The backing of anti-family forces could result in regime change. EARLY WARNING SIGNS Kim Jong-un s poor health illuminates problems with the lack of a succession plan. North Korean military morale and discipline remain high. Kim sycophants and family members continue to hold certain key positions within the politicalmilitary leadership, but their influence is not seen by experts as reaching down into the junior officer corps. The military is viewed as maintaining a degree of autonomy from the regime. We see indications of a growing dissident movement in cities with increasing arrests prior to Kim s death.

14 STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS: UNITED STATES There would be enormous pressure on the U.S. to secure/seize WMD unilaterally or (ideally) with extensive South Korean assistance. The U.S. would have little incentive to contest Chinese primacy, provided the WMD issue was resolved. Chinese and U.S. interests converge in regards to securing WMD and general stabilization efforts, but cooperation will still be difficult and fraught with a degree of mistrust. Korea remains a long- rather than short-term concern and not one Washington will likely be pushed into by South Korean assertiveness. America must prioritize the relative importance of the Korean peninsula as opposed to its interests in the broader Asia-Pacific particularly as it pertains to its relationships with China and Russia. Dr. Robert Pauly, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

15 STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS: CHINA The pivotal power with interest in any North Korean collapse would be China. In all scenarios, China s key policy objectives remained the same: Keep the Korean peninsula divided, maintain stability in North Korea (to prevent the U.S. or South Korea intervening), and ensure the North Korean regime remains more or less under Chinese tutelage. Chinese efforts to secure WMD will need to be done either in cooperation with the U.S. or carried out in such a way that Washington, Tokyo and Seoul are convinced the threat has been eliminated. Any coup attempt backed by Beijing would need secure support from within the inner circles of the regime itself and also be able to quickly purge rival elements and their patronage networks to ensure they cannot mount a counteroffensive or even launch retaliatory strikes against China, South Korea or Japan. A (North Korean) regime under a tight leash to Beijing will presumably be a rational one, one more open to business, and one very unlikely to take aggressive military action. Dr. Mark A. Nelson, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

16 STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS: SOUTH KOREA South Korea has the most to gain and lose in the outcome of any North Korean existential crisis. The idea of reunification dominates much of South Korean strategy. While dealing with an acute crisis will be the priority, Seoul will not ignore the opportunity to take proactive steps toward unification. Given shifting American relations with China, South Korea may not be willing to work in tandem with the U.S. in the event of a crisis in North Korea that impacts Seoul s security. South Korea is prepared to take Pyongyang before China has the capacity to resuscitate the Kim regime. Unilateral action by South Korea could have significant negative impacts for its security and economic stability. The presence of U.S. ground troops is Seoul s greatest leverage in negotiations with China. When Beijing argues it cannot accept a unified Korean Peninsula with U.S. troops on it, Seoul can counter with: Agree to unification and the rationale for U.S. troops is removed. Dr. David Kearn, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

17 STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS: JAPAN Two structural factors geography (separation from the Korean Peninsula by sea) and history (historical tensions/animosity, including colonialism) have left very little diplomatic room for Japan to maneuver. Thus, any opportunity for Japan to act must be coordinated within a multilateral approach lacking any overt political/military posturing. Japan will have to take a backseat through most phases of such a crisis. In the event of a civil war or even mass desertion of soldiers, it is unlikely that Japan would support a South Korean military intervention due to the risk of a new major war on the Korean peninsula. The best way for Japan to exert influence over events would be through cooperation with South Korea or the United States. Apart from the threat posed by Kim s WMD and weaponization programs, China, Japan, South Korea and the United States would all prefer the status quo rather than the burden of dealing with an economically, socially and politically primitive North Korea. Jeffrey Itell, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

18 STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS: RUSSIA Russia should not aim to compete with China where it cannot, but should make itself indispensable where it can. There continues to be an undertone of competition between Russia and China. Any alliance between the two will be based upon narrowly negotiated interests. While it cannot afford to make unilateral advances into North Korea in the event of a sudden collapse, Russia has diplomatic leverage on China via offering or withholding support to Beijingled action. Russia may not have the lead in this region, but it also does not have as much expected of it, giving it freedom of action. Without a strong U.S. presence in South Korea and Japan, these U.S. allies will have to reach some level of accommodation with Russian and Chinese regional interests. Lynda Roades, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

19 APPENDIX: FULL LIST OF PHASE I CAUSES Kim dies of a heart attack Kim assassinated Missile test sabotaged, Kim killed Missile test accident, Kim killed Kim attempts assassination against Park, Kim killed in retaliatory airstrike Popular dissent supported by external information operations drives demand for increased access to information, combined with a failing economy China withdraws economic and political support China expands control, turning North Korea into a puppet state and replacing Kim with a Beijing loyalist Information and social media make their way into North Korea South Korean commandos attempt infiltration, North Korea propaganda errors lead to coup Kim dies, daughter inherits country U.S. increases sanctions, naval patrols and pressures African nations not to do business with North Korea U.S. invites North Korea to bilateral talks, dividing regime Kim goes missing, prompting speculation of foul play and possible coup North Korean military aggression prompts U.S. and South Korean retaliatory strikes and blockade Bodyguard sparks panic by random shooting behavior, others respond with live fire, Kim and high-ranking officials killed in crossfire North Korean military aggression across DMZ prompts U.S.-backed South Korea to bid to overthrow, China withholds support of North Korea Palace coup Kim normalizes relations with the South Famine leads to collapse of military, leaving Kim vulnerable; family flees U.S. normalizes relations, dividing regime Russia/China-backed coup Economic and environmental collapse, rise of warlords Kim goes missing, Russian troops occupy North Korea and prop up friendly regime Russia/China competition results in overthrow of regime and imposition of pro- China military rule Soldiers along DMZ give up en masse, North Korean leadership flees, South Korea takes control Starvation pushes soldiers to brigandry, population turns against army and regime Containment failure at bio-weapons lab leads to widespread infection, decimated population North Korea hijacks plutonium-carrying ships, Japan and South Korea engage in preventative strike leading to regime downfall Mutual hostilities lead to Second Korean War U.S. authorizes preemptive strike with China on its side Kim provides WMD to jihadist group, but warhead explodes in mid-transit, killing Kim and senior leadership Starvation from reduced aid leads soldiers to refuse orders to control population, senior officers lead coup

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