Case Study 5: Pakistan floods 2010

Transcription

1 UNICEF Advocacy in Emergencies Case Study 5: Pakistan floods 2010 Drafted February 2011, revised April 2011 A.L for ODI/UNICEF 1

2 Contents Contents... 2 Executive Summary... 3 Findings 1: Approaches... 4 Findings 2: Messaging... 6 Findings 3: Coordination... 8 Findings 4: Collaboration Annex 1: Interviews Annex 2: Advocacy products A.L for ODI/UNICEF 2

3 Executive Summary This case study seeks to document UNICEF advocacy in response to the Pakistan Floods in 2010, focusing on the period late July to end October. The report offers detailed findings (sections 1-4), based on perceptions of key actors collected in semi-structured interviews (Annex 1) and supported by a review of documents (Annex 2). UNICEF lacks an organizational policy for advocacy, and this case study should not be read as an evaluation of UNICEF s advocacy performance, or of the performance of individuals within UNICEF. This is one of five case studies designed to shed light on UNICEF s current advocacy practice in humanitarian situations and issues arising from it. The case studies contribute evidence to a larger Review of UNICEF Advocacy in Emergencies, which aims to strengthen the organization s advocacy in response to sudden-onset humanitarian crises. The Review is commissioned by UNICEF s Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS), and conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). From July 2010, floodwaters swept from north to south of Pakistan and affected over 18 million people. Approximately 9 million people were severely affected, including 4.5 million children. Four provinces each faced a major humanitarian crisis. Working to deliver as one with UN agencies, UNICEF mobilized national, regional and global resources to respond to the emergency and help coordinate the humanitarian response. UNICEF scaled up its capacity, and established three emergency field offices to reach the affected population. It provided clean water, sanitation, and vaccines to millions. Issues arising: While UNICEF resource mobilization increasingly became a necessary priority in Pakistan, the agency also targeted the government with substantial efforts to ensure the needs of children were adequately addressed in the response. These contributed to decisions by the government, for example, to conduct polio and measles campaigns, and to reopen primary schools. UNICEF messaging consistently emphasized the magnitude of the emergency, and the underfunding of the humanitarian response some of this was UNICEF fundraising. Messaging to donors required extensive checking of data and information management capacity. Led by the Representative function in Pakistan, UNICEF s advocacy faced numerous obstacles, including a lack of key capacities for effective advocacy at country level, and the necessary pressures to focus on fundraising and media relations. UNICEF saw benefits from advocacy collaboration with other agencies, although much of this occurred offline and was therefore hard to track. At CO-level, the agency closely collaborated with WFP and WHO on messaging and work around a child survival strategy, as well as nutrition, to promote an improved response, while UNICEF s role as Cluster Lead Agency appeared to offer more interesting opportunities for humanitarian advocacy though not necessarily public around particular issues targeted at agencies, donors, and government. Note: In the following sections, words contained within quotation marks represent phrases that were used in interviews or documents by UNICEF staff. A.L for ODI/UNICEF 3

4 Findings 1: Approaches This section outlines UNICEF s approach to advocacy and related challenges during the Pakistan floods of 2010 in the period late July through end October. 1.1 Implied aims While there was no formal advocacy plan (and no policy exists requiring one), a review of 36 advocacy-related products (see annex 2) suggests that UNICEF advocacy pursued these aims: Public awareness: Documents suggest that much of UNICEF s advocacy was targeted at the public and aimed at awareness-raising about the magnitude of the floods and its evolving impact on children. UNICEF s nine news notes and the ED statement 1 appeared to be targeted at a global public, and three press releases at the Pakistani public. While these releases appeared to serve wider institutional communications functions (including public information and fundraising), they also appeared to serve a more specific advocacy function to raise awareness about the magnitude of the floods and their evolving impact on children. 2 Similarly, some of UNICEF s media messages 3 and briefing notes for high level meetings 4 appeared aimed partly at raising awareness about the floods and children. Humanitarian funding: Documents suggest another strand of UNICEF s advocacy was targeted at humanitarian donors and aimed at adequate humanitarian funding; briefing notes prepared for high-level meetings with donor representatives, 5 and briefing notes prepared for IASC meetings with humanitarian principals seemed to be aimed in part at increasing funding. 6 Much of UNICEF s public advocacy, including news releases 7 and public messages, 8 also appeared to be aimed at generating public pressure to support advocacy aimed at humanitarian donors. The focus on fundraising and media relations at the expense of advocacy became necessary given the small window of time during which media will cover an emergency and the small fundraising window associated with this. Government commitment: Documents make little direct mention of the government as an advocacy target, although it was the authority responsible for coordinating the response. A briefing note prepared for the ED s meeting with the representative of Pakistan at the UN 9 aimed at the government s renewal of commitment for support for the flood response and longer-term recovery and agreement on mutual collaboration for the flood response and recovery. Another briefing note suggests that UNICEF sought to engage the government in linking relief with recovery and development. 10 In public, UNICEF later recognized the importance of the work of the Government of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army and local organizations in providing relief, and emphasized the importance of working together to ensure the survival of children Shifting goals UNICEF approach to advocacy appeared to maintain broadly consistent goals, although the approach shifted somewhat after the arrival of a new acting representative. Initially, UNICEF advocacy was targeted at two groups, with two sets of goals: Humanitarian actors and the government, aimed at ensuring that the needs of children were adequately addressed; and Humanitarian donors and the [global] public, aimed at resource mobilization By late tember, UNICEF advocacy was aimed at slightly different targets and goals: Stakeholders and the public in Pakistan, aimed at supporting UNICEF aid delivery and humanitarianism; and A.L for ODI/UNICEF 4

5 Humanitarian donors and the [global] public, aimed at highlighting needs, adequate funding, and damage control in response to criticism of UNICEF s response. 1.3 Complexity challenge Regardless of goals, UNICEF s advocacy faced complex and multifaceted demands. It was expected to articulate multiple messages through multiple channels to numerous actors on many levels at once. UNICEF reportedly sought to influence at least six different sets of actors: the government of Pakistan security forces of Pakistan NGOs in Pakistan media in Pakistan donors in Pakistan donors outside Pakistan These groups included significant sub-groups. For example, the government included two competing entities at the federal level, as well as the authorities in seven provinces. Donors included some very demanding individual governments, as well as NATO members. 1.4 Secondary priority While UNICEF s advocacy may have followed an implicit plan, formal advocacy appeared to be a secondary priority. Since UNICEF s highest priority was delivering on the CCCs, preparing an advocacy strategy was considered a second priority and left to be done by communications staff. In the end, a strategy was never developed (again, no policy exists requiring one). As one actor stated, advocacy planning is important but it cannot be the number one priority on the ground when UNICEF needs to plan the response, get an appeal, and implement programmes. Moreover, preparing an advocacy strategy was thought to require extra capacity just as demands were greatest in a crisis. Still, concerns were raised about joining up advocacy responses at different levels, and consistency of advocacy. Advocacy is ad-hoc, piecemeal, said another actor. Sometimes it is done at high level political level and sometimes at field level. It doesn t really come together. 1.5 Meeting needs UNICEF s initial advocacy to meet needs involved advocating with the government and humanitarians to ensure that: the specific needs of children were included in the humanitarian assessment process; the response would properly address the needs of children; and marginalized groups (including migrant groups, remote populations) were included in the response. 1.6 Resource mobilization UNICEF s resource mobilization advocacy increasingly became a priority. Aimed at mobilizing resources for an adequate humanitarian response, this included calling for timely funding, appropriate resources, and the engagement of donors: large international bodies, UNICEF Natcoms, non-traditional donors (in the Gulf), and corporate donors. This advocacy was done through bilateral meetings with donors, proposals, updates (facts and figures), and via the media. With the exception of the UK and the United States, donors were very slow to respond on an adequate scale. It was explained that UNICEF s focus on fundraising and media relations relates to the small window of time during which the international media would cover such an emergency and that communication here A.L for ODI/UNICEF 5

6 significantly impacts fundraising. With capacities limited, the PCO did focus on fundraising and media relations. 1.7 Targeting government UNICEF s advocacy reportedly included substantial efforts to influence relevant government departments so that the needs of children were understood and addressed. This meant advocating with senior ministers and disaster management authorities, as well as authorities in the affected provinces. In particular, UNICEF struggled to persuade authorities in Punjab and Sindh to redeploy capacities and to respond quickly. Not all government counterparts understood the need to respond quickly, nor did they understand UNICEF s role in disasters. Such advocacy with government required a huge amount of time in meetings at various levels, including high-level visits by the ED and RD, as well as interaction by UNICEF programme heads. By this type of advocacy, however, UNICEF contributed to decisions by the government to conduct polio and measles campaigns, and to reopen primary schools. UNICEF also spent a significant amount of time on on-going and challenging advocacy with the military, which was said to have resulted in better coverage, some better camps and better delivery. Notably, UNICEF advocacy in response to the floods, a natural disaster, proved considerably more straightforward than during the Swat valley offensive, a conflict. UNICEF had struggled with little success to advocate for humanitarian access, and aid worker security, in NWFP and Baluchistan. Then the government had proved effective at suppressing advocacy. 1.8 Media UNICEF was compelled to invest considerable efforts in media relations. By the third week of ust, UNICEF CO was fielding hundreds of media requests weekly; lacking the capacity to keep up with demands and any sense of control, some inconsistent information and data had been provided to journalists. Actors described media relations as a state of chaos and extreme fire fighting. As one staff said, even had the CO had an advocacy strategy, it lacked the sufficient human resources or capacity during the crucial first months of the flood response to implement it. Eventually, although UNICEF s media relations activities were reactive to the news agenda, the agency may have contributed in a limited way, to shaping the media agenda on children issues. 1.9 Principles UNICEF s advocacy seemed less clearly linked with humanitarian principles. Given that UNICEF s advocacy could be driven by media and diverted by fundraising, questions were raised in Pakistan about the application of humanitarian principles. The question also arose in mid-summer when NATO offered assistance in shipping in supplies to Pakistan; this led to long discussions with the UNCT, and consultation of civil-military guidelines before it was refused on the grounds that NATO assistance was not needed here as a last resort. Findings 2: Messaging This section outlines UNICEF s messaging and related challenges during the Pakistan floods of 2010 in the period late July through end October. 2.1 Unprecedented magnitude A.L for ODI/UNICEF 6

7 Documents show that UNICEF messaging consistently emphasized the magnitude of the emergency and its impact on children. In ust, UNICEF stressed that 6 million children were affected and 2.7 in urgent need, 12 that the disaster reached tragic proportions 13, and was one of the largest humanitarian crises we have faced for decades a slow motion tsunami. 14 In tember, UNICEF stressed the emergency created moving targets for assistance, 15 that child malnutrition rates remained persistently high, 16 that the disaster was enormous and very complex a children s emergency with over 10 million children now affected; 17 that its scale continued to elude the imagination of the public across the world, 18 that its magnitude was unprecedented, 19 and that it remained far from being over Serious underfunding Documents also show that UNICEF messaging emphasized another problem: underfunding of the humanitarian response. In ust, UNICEF stressed that funds were needed urgently to enable UNICEF to approach the scale needed, 21 that serious funding shortfalls are jeopardizing its humanitarian operation and putting children at risk. 22 In November, UNICEF revived this message, saying serious underfunding of its emergency operation in Pakistan is jeopardizing life-saving programs for children and families. 23 If much of this was UNICEF fundraising, some appeared to be humanitarian advocacy for improved funding to the overall response. UNICEF stressed that funding levels for the response remain worryingly low - hampering humanitarian efforts. 24 The ED also called on the international community to step up their support for the victims. 25 As UNICEF s messaging began to focus on funding, actors said this implied a demand on information management. UNICEF s messaging became greater funds are required for a better response to meet the needs of 10 million people ; and immediate funding was the way to save lives at stake, and delayed funding would lead to deaths. Such messaging required rigorous checking and triple-checking of data about the impact of underfunding of programmes. It also required conveying the unprecedented scale, complexity and specificities of the emergency. It is unclear how effectively UNICEF s approach to messaging achieved this Improved response Documents show how UNICEF s messaging was less emphatic in promoting an improved humanitarian response beyond calling for more funding, with some exceptions. By late ust, UNICEF would tell DfID it had started to develop a survival strategy to deploy strong and high-level technical teams to work on the response with other agencies (across clusters). 27 In tember, UNICEF would tell the Australian mission of this interagency survival strategy aimed at addressing public health situation. 28 In October, UNICEF echoed these messages to IASC Evidence lacking Initially, UNICEF was thought to lack evidence to support its messaging. It struggled to produce quality and timely information to support its interventions; its public communications lacked information from surveys, sit reps, section reports or field reports; and the agency was criticized in the WASH cluster for lacking information management capacity for strategic planning. Initially, at least, UNICEF s use of data was considered incoherent, and usable data was not provided in a timely and usable manner. One actor explained, We got quite a lot of data, but not good data. You cannot advocate without good information. A.L for ODI/UNICEF 7

8 UNICEF recognized the risks of advocacy without evidence, particularly public advocacy on sensitive issues to the government. Evidence underpins UNICEF s credibility and provides a foundation for any advocacy strategy, while a lack of evidence makes UNICEF s message vulnerable to being shot down undermining both the message and UNICEF s wider credibility. Provision of evidence is especially important on sensitive matters, and when it comes to the behaviour of governments. 30 However, where relations with the government allow, UNICEF could highlight risks without providing hard evidence. 2.5 Technical messages As the UNICEF CO eventually began to focus on developing thematic messages, based on facts and figures from programmes and field offices, its messages may have become less suited to public communications. UNICEF s technical approach to messaging was thought to have drawbacks for its public advocacy via the media. UNICEF needed to be clearer whom its messages were targeted at. We were so technically correct that we were not communicating effectively, said one actor. We need stories. According to another view, UNICEF s messages should primarily reflect the CCCs 31. UNICEF s emergency commitments would offer relevant technical messages and recognized challenges in implementing them, with a template upon which to develop messages for different audiences. This would have the benefit of being efficient, and preintegrated with UNICEF s existing planning, enabling UNICEF to explain these commitments to governments in advance of a crisis. Findings 3: Coordination This section outlines UNICEF s coordination of advocacy and related challenges during the Pakistan floods of 2010 in the period late July through end October. 3.1 Rep leadership UNICEF s Rep was considered the crucial advocacy actor: both as the leader of advocacy and UNICEF s strongest voice for children in Pakistan. UNICEF was thought to have lost its voice while the Representative served as Humanitarian Coordinator (until the Regional Director became acting representative in tember); now representing the collective humanitarian voice, it was feared he could no longer speak specifically for children. Nonetheless, the role of the Representative was well filled by the deputy and the regional director (deployed for three months), who provided strategic leadership. 3.2 Capacity gap In addition, UNICEF CO was perceived to lack the following key capacities needed for effective advocacy: Planning: UNICEF lacked senior staff who could write a plan. While the agency was constantly putting out fires and could not develop an advocacy strategy, there was a need to think through advocacy beforehand, so that UNICEF could be proactive while dealing with media and fundraising. According to one view a strategy was needed, along with constant reflection. Information management: UNICEF recognized that it was initially not strong enough in information management. It took time for UNICEF to strengthen its capacity for data collection and analysis. It lacked capacity to synthesize key issues on a regular basis, to do the nitty-gritty information management work, and to manage facts and figures on A.L for ODI/UNICEF 8

9 needs and results. This initially hindered its capacity to make its advocacy evidencebased, and respond to external criticisms. This capacity was added through surge support staff and, after initially struggling with reporting, produced a quality report at the fourmonth mark (though outside of the timeframe for this study, this does show the gap was being addressed). Analysis: UNICEF was too often caught off guard by very hard questions and potential minefields coming from bilateral donors and NATO. There was a need for someone to drive a process of constant reflection. 3.3Communications During the floods, UNICEF communications appeared to face the following challenges: Capacity: The chief of communications post was unfilled initially, and had been for almost half a year, leaving a significant gap. The team remained short-staffed even after a chief of communications took up the post during the floods, and surge capacity was provided for communications. Planning of advocacy and/or communications remained impossible. 32 Requirements: UNICEF s information products did not necessarily meet requirements of public and private audiences, demands for regular syntheses of key issues, and the need for strict coordination of external messaging to global media and external donors; total consistency was needed in messaging given the media s global reach. However, UNICEF was later perceived to have an authoritative voice in Pakistan and to have contributed more in terms of knowledge than in terms of action. Coordination: The challenge was to create messages based on facts about the emergency; supporting the CO-led approach; and reconciling these with UNICEF s global positions. Different parts of UNICEF would always want to interpret messaging for their different purposes; consistency between CO and global levels is difficult. Meanwhile, UNICEF prioritized fundraising and media relations: Fundraising: The fundraising process reportedly diverted from advocacy to influence government and humanitarian actors and to prioritize child-focused agendas; for example, when the RO decided to triple UNICEF s funding target, this created tensions with OCHA and other agencies. Media relations: The ever present media agenda, with its focus on funding and visibility ( more money, groups to be reached, and children seen on the street ), reportedly overwhelmed principled advocacy (including questions of access). When senior surge capacity was deployed, it was to meet demands arising from the huge interest from the media, and not for advocacy. When the ED visited, he responded well in the media, provided visibility to the agency, and made comments on low funding. The effect created by media demands also appears to be growing significantly along with the internet and social networking. It was suggested that criticism of UNICEF reportedly appeared on many different platforms, multiplying the risks. 3.4 ED activity Documents suggest the Executive Director played an active role in advocacy. During the floods in ust, he issued a statement, 33 met with Pakistan s representative to the UN, 34 and visited flood-affected areas in Pakistan, 35 where he called for the international community to step up our humanitarian operations to stave off a potential second wave of disease and misery, and plan for the early recovery phase of the operation. 36 He also participated in meetings with IASC principals in tember 37 and October. 38 Further, documents suggest the A.L for ODI/UNICEF 9

10 DED played an advocacy role in visiting Norway, 39 meeting with USAID/OFDA, 40 and participating in a meeting with IASC principals EMOPS Documents suggest EMOPS played a lead role in coordinating UNICEF s advocacy with humanitarian agencies at HQ-level. EMOPS prepared briefings for high-level meetings with humanitarian agencies, and participated in IASC meetings on Pakistan floods in Geneva 42 and in New York 43 during ust, as well as meetings in tember, 44 and October; 45 in each case the CO provided heavy input. The director of EMOPS participated in a joint mission on the Pakistan response. 46 In addition, EMOPS contributed to briefings for UNICEF s meetings with the government of Pakistan and humanitarian donors. EMOPS and GMA jointly produced the briefing note for the ED s meeting with Pakistan s representative to the UN; 47 and provided inputs to PARMO for meetings with humanitarian donor governments, such as Norway or the United States Coordination questions The following key questions were raised about UNICEF s advocacy coordination: Strategy: Without defined strategic goals for advocacy, UNICEF s messaging appeared to act as a substitute for advocacy. The concern was that without planning, advocacy becomes marketing, and therefore media messages lacked important information about the floods, relevant focus, and links to UNICEF s humanitarian commitments. One suggestion was that UNICEF could benefit from the preparation of higher-level core messages to be applied across the organization, and adapted for all UNICEF s sections including EMOPS, DOC, PARMO, Programmes, Natcoms. These core messages could be as simple as someone in senior meetings taking notes, which could evolve into messages. Alignment: UNICEF s advocacy appears disjointed and uncoordinated. Key actors observed that different sections were doing advocacy in many different ways at different levels; each section was focused only on their own advocacy, and they do not see who else is doing what and how. UNICEF lacks the means to see how its advocacy elements work together, let alone ensure advocacy is strategic, effective and coherent. UNICEF also lacks a collective understanding of advocacy ( we don t have that understanding engraved in us ). Further, UNICEF lacks the means for measuring advocacy. We have elements that we need to bring together, surmised one actor, we need to understand why we do it, how to do it, and then provide good information to back it up. Realism: Some actors appeared sceptical about the need for advocacy coordination. They stressed that UNICEF s internal coordination was generally strong, especially after the ED made it a corporate priority, and that the demands of the Pakistan flood made advocacy strategies and coordination unrealistic. There was a risk of over-coordination. The very different aspects and goals of UNICEF s advocacy were a reason not to bring them together; Why bring them all together? asked one actor. It would be nonsensical as they all seek different things. Findings 4: Collaboration This section outlines UNICEF advocacy done in collaboration with other humanitarian actors and related challenges during the Pakistan floods in 2010 in the period late July through end October. A.L for ODI/UNICEF 10

11 4.1 High-level funding appeals Implicitly advocating on UNICEF s behalf, the UN s ERC and SG were active in urging adequate humanitarian funding and emphasizing the magnitude of the disaster. A review of UN News releases show that the UN system produced 70 news releases for five months of flooding in Pakistan (1 ust January 2011); substantially fewer than for Haiti s first three months. - ERC activity: The ERC made two visits to the flood-affected country and 12 statements, mainly urging adequate funding to the UN appeal and emphasizing the magnitude of the disaster. In ust, outgoing ERC John Holmes launched an appeal to donors for US$460m speaking of the huge task in front of us, 49 asking them to keep up this accelerated pace of donations 50 and warning that the disaster was still growing 51. In tember, the new ERC, Valerie Amos, visited Pakistan, warning that funding had reached a plateau, 52 that the disaster was still getting bigger, 53 that the world s attention is waning, 54 and that the flooding spawned a new disaster every day. 55 The ERC launched an appeal for the US$2bn, the largest disaster appeal ever. 56 In December, the ERC made a second visit to Pakistan, to highlight a continued unified commitment to the people of Pakistan during their time of need. 57 Ms. Amos warned that the disaster was far from over, 58 urged continued support for conflict-affected Pakistanis 59, and warned of the continuing need for a strong financial response 60 - SG activity: The SG also played an active role in defining the magnitude and calling for adequate funding. After voicing extreme concern over the floods and urging donors to contribute generously to the humanitarian response, 61 the SG visited Pakistan, and then told the General Assembly it was a global disaster, a global challenge 62 in a part of the world where stability and prosperity are profoundly in the world's interests. 63 The GA adopted a resolution calling for international assistance in support of the government s efforts to address the crisis. With the appeal just 34 per cent funded after a month, the SG again called for a generous and swift international response HC leadership HC advocacy appeared to offer mixed benefits for UNICEF s advocacy in the context of One UN. The HC was said to be very active in advocacy, speaking through both public and private channels, advocating through daily and weekly information products, advocating with donors through private channels (often targeted at government), speaking to media and giving interviews at regular press briefings, and overseeing the clusters. However, the HC did not coordinate advocacy, and agencies rarely spoke with one voice; many agencies in Pakistan sought to articulate their own messages and voice on matters pertaining to their mandate, and this resulted sometimes in conflicting messages. If all could agree on the need for more funding, their other shared advocacy objectives were less clear. Moreover, HC-led advocacy with NGOs was minimal, given their freedom to opt-out of coordination. It also remained unclear how HC-led advocacy in Pakistan could benefit from the opportunities of coherence with political actors and retain the benefits of neutrality for humanitarian actors. 4.3Strategic partnerships Documents suggest that UNICEF, WFP, WHO and NGOs collaborated to promote an improved response to public health challenges in Pakistan. 65 The interagency survival strategy was developed during tember and announced after a joint mission by the Emergency directors of UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. It aimed to provide strategic support to the inter-cluster teams engaged in the ongoing humanitarian response in order to strengthen collective and coordinated efforts specifically for the Interagency Survival Strategy. 66 The A.L for ODI/UNICEF 11

12 three agencies worked closely on messaging and work around the strategy, as well as nutrition, focusing on how to get action rather than just headlines. UNICEF promoted this strategy by warning of the urgent need to quickly scale up the response in the most recently flooded areas in the south while not losing sight of working towards an early recovery in the centre and the north of the country. 67 UNICEF made other joint statements with WFP and WHO Clusters Actors observed that clusters offered opportunities for UNICEF s advocacy. As cluster lead for four clusters, UNICEF was reportedly making progress in the cluster approach. The cluster lead s role is to advocate for the needs of the entire sector and to speak on behalf of actors in that sector. The cluster lead also speaks frequently in technical meetings with government, donors, and agencies. More broadly, clusters offer an opportunity to advocate with aid agencies to improve the humanitarian response, to ensure coverage and avoid duplication. They also offer an opportunity to advocate with donors, who increasingly wish to hear from cluster leads and not from individual agencies. However, this opportunity for advocacy may entail demands of information production to demonstrate gaps, the risk of a lead agency monopolizing the message, the need for institutional communications for fundraising or media attention, and a pervading mistrust and rivalry for cash among cluster members. 4.5 Communications UNICEF advocacy appeared to benefit little from UN-coordinated communications. While agencies shared information under the One UN approach, they continued to advocate separately on their mandates. Under the One Response framework, UNICEF found the OCHA-led information management aspect unduly burdensome, while offering no clear advocacy benefits. OCHA appeared to lack capacity to provide information for its public information and the UNIC, a systematic approach to clusters information was lacking, and success was defined in terms of media coverage (rather than strategic goals). A.L for ODI/UNICEF 12

13 Annex 1: Interviews Detailed interviews were conducted with the following advocacy actors in October 2010 and February Martin Mogwanja Dan Toole Karen Allen Kristen Elsby Dermot Carty Oscar Butragueno SmarandaPopa Luc Chauvin JalpaRatna Lucia Elmi UNICEF Representative until tember, HC from tember UNICEF Regional Director, acting representative from tember to December UNICEF Deputy Representative UNICEF CO Chief of Advocacy and External Communications UNICEF Deputy Director Emergency Operations (Geneva office) on surge support to Pakistan UNICEF CO Emergency Officer UNICEF CO, Chief of Child Protection Regional Emergency Adviser, UNICEF APSSC Bangkok, deployed to Pakistan EMOPS, Emergency Specialist, Humanitarian Field Support Section (Pakistan) EMOPS, Emergency Specialist, Humanitarian Field Support Section (former Pakistan) We are grateful to Rafael Hermoso, EMOPS Policy Section, for additional observations. We are also grateful to Dan Toole and Kristen Elsby for their detailed comments on the draft. Annex 2: Advocacy products This table lists UN and UNICEF advocacy products collected in response to the Pakistan Floods in Private advocacy products are shown in grey rows. Date Voice, Target Product Producer 3 UNICEF to Public News note, UNICEF sends in life-saving supplies to the millions of people affected by flooding in Pakistan, many of them children and women 6 UNICEF to Public / Humanitarian Donors 9 UNICEF to Humanitarians 11 UNICEF to Public / Donors(?) UNICEF DED to Humanitarian Donor UNICEF to Public / Humanitarian Donors UNICEF to Public / Donors UNICEF to Public / Donors(?) UNICEF DED to Humanitarians UNICEF ED to Government News note, UNICEF appeals for $47.3 million to fund its relief operation in Pakistan million children affected by the flooding Briefing Note for EMOPS Deputy Director Pakistan IASC Principals Meeting News note, UNICEF: 6 million children affected by the floods in Pakistan; some 2.7 million in need of immediate, life-saving assistance EMOPS Inputs for PARMO BN for DED s visit to Norway Pakistan Pakistan Floods: UNICEF Key Messages on Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) News note, UNICEF's life-saving operation in Pakistan in jeopardy due to funding shortfall Statement, Statement by UNICEF Executive Director, Anthony Lake, on the flooding in Pakistan Briefing Note for DED, Hilde Johnson, Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals (Pakistan, Darfur) Meeting with Amb. Abdullah HussainHaroon, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, New York, and First Secretary Mr. SuljukTarar UNICEF GVA + CO UNICEF GVA + CO EMOPS UNICEF GVA + CO EMOPS inputs for PARMO UNICEF CO=DOC(?) UNICEF GVA + CO UNICEF NY, GVA, CO UNICEF EMOPS (+CO input) EMOPS+GMA A.L for ODI/UNICEF 13

14 UNICEF / WHO / WFP Nutrition Cluster to Humanitarians (and Government?) UNICEF to Public UNICEF to Public UNICEF to Public Joint Statement from the Nutrition Cluster, Call for support for appropriate infant and young child feeding in Pakistan Pakistan floods: Media messages on the UNICEF Executive Director's visit (27 ust 2010) Press release, UNICEF Executive Director, Anthony Lake, to visit flood affected areas of Pakistan Pakistan Floods: Key messages for the UNICEF Executive Director's visit (30 ust 2010), Overarching Media Messages/Talking Points Meeting with UK Mission and Summary of the Pakistan Flood Update (as of 31 ust) Press release, UNICEF/WFP chiefs call for renewed support to Pakistan s flood victims UNICEF CO, WFP, WHO UNICEF CO + DOC UNICEF CO UNICEF CO + DOC 31 UNICEF to Humanitarian Donor UNICEF CO + DOC + WFP 31 UNICEF/WFP to UNICEF CO + Public / Donors WFP 1 UNICE F to Public Pakistan Floods: Q & A (1 tember 2010) UNICEF CO + DOC 1 UNICEF to Public Pakistan Floods: Line in response to questions UNICEF CO about UNICEF staging a fake camp for the Executive Director s visit to Charsadda (in response to a story on Dawn.com) Pre-9 Pre- 13 Pre UNICEF to Donor UNICEF / UNSG to Public / Humanitarians UNICEF ED to Humanitarians Notes for Meeting with Kathryn Yarlett, Development Adviser at the Australian Mission Suggested bullet points concerning Pakistan, for the SG's introduction of the agenda items for the next SMG meeting Monday 13 tember 2010 Briefing Notes for Anthony Lake - Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan Unknown Unknown EMOPS (+CO input) UNICEF to Humanitarians? One pager Key Issues on Pakistan Global Food Security Cluster, 15th t 2010 Unknown UNICEF to Public Pakistan Floods: UNICEF revised Key UNICEF CO Messages UNICEF to Public Pakistan Floods: UNICEF revised Q&A UNICEF CO UNICEF, WHO, WFP UNICEF to Public / Donors(?) UNICEF DED to Humanitarian Donor UNICEF/WHO/WFP to Public / Donors 28 UNICEF to Humanitarian Donor 30 UNICEF to Member states? 6 Oct UNICEF ED to Humanitarians 5 Nov UNICEF to Public / Donors(?) 5 Nov UNICEF to Public / Donors Note on Initial Findings from the Joint UNICEF/ WFP/WHO Mission to Pakistan, includes recommendations News note, UNICEF issues a new appeal for the 10 million children affected by the flooding in Pakistan Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director s Meeting with Mr. Mark Ward, Acting Director, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance News note, The United Nations outlines combined strategy to ensure the survival of millions of flood affected people in Pakistan Pakistan UNICEF 28 t Inputs for briefing notes CIDA, Talking Points 30th t Member State Brief Louis- Georges Arsenault Briefing Notes for Anthony Lake - Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan and Somalia Pakistan Floods: UNICEF revised Key Messages; Key messages on Pakistan flood emergency funding crisis News note, UNICEF: Underfunding for Pakistan flood emergency jeopardizing life-saving operations for children News note, UNICEF: Crisis far from over for Pakistan s children UNICEF CO/WHO/WFP UNICEF GVA UNICEF PARMO +input from EMOPS, DP UNICEF CO/WHO/WFP Unknown EMOPS? EMOPS (+CO input) UNICEF CO UNICEF CO + DOC 7 Dec UNICEF to Public / UNICEF CO + Humanitarians DOC + ROSA 28 UNICEF to Public / News note, UNICEF: Pakistan floods uncover UNICEF CO + A.L for ODI/UNICEF 14

15 Jan Humanitarians dire nutrition situation DOC + ROSA 1 Statement, Statement by UNICEF Executive Director, Anthony Lake, on the flooding in Pakistan (UNICEF New York, Geneva, Islamabad, 20 ust 2010) 2 See News note, UNICEF sends in life-saving supplies to the millions of people affected by flooding in Pakistan, many of them children and women (UNICEF, Geneva/Islamabad, 3 ust 2010); News note, 6 million children affected by the floods in Pakistan; some 2.7 million in need of immediate, life-saving assistance, (UNICEF Geneva/Islamabad, 11 ust 2010); News note, UNICEF: Crisis far from over for Pakistan s children, (UNICEF, Islamabad/Geneva, 7 December 2010); News note, UNICEF: Pakistan floods uncover dire nutrition situation, Six months after the floods (UNICEF, Islamabad, Geneva, New York, 28 January 2011) 3 See Pakistan floods: Media messages on the UNICEF Executive Director's visit (27 ust 2010); Pakistan Floods: Key messages for the UNICEF Executive Director's visit (30 ust 2010); Pakistan Floods: UNICEF revised Key Messages (16 tember 2010); 4 See UNICEF, Suggested bullet points concerning Pakistan, for the SG's introduction of the agenda items for the next SMG meeting Monday 13 tember See EMOPS Inputs for PARMO BN for DED s visit to Norway Pakistan ( ); Meeting with UK Mission and Summary of the Pakistan Flood Update (UNICEF 31 ust 2010); UNICEF, Notes for Meeting with Kathryn Yarlett, Development Adviser at the Australian Mission, Thursday 9th t); PARMO, Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director s Meeting with Mr. Mark Ward, Acting Director, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 23 tember 2010; UNICEF 28 t Inputs for briefing notes CIDA; 6 See Briefing Note for DED, Hilde Johnson, Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan, Darfur, (EMOPS + CO, 20 ust 2010) 7 See News note, UNICEF appeals for $47.3 million to fund its relief operation in Pakistan million children affected by the flooding (UNICEF ); News note, UNICEF's life-saving operation in Pakistan in jeopardy due to funding shortfall (UNICEF ); News note, UNICEF issues a new appeal for the 10 million children affected by the flooding in Pakistan (UNICEF ); News note, UNICEF: Underfunding for Pakistan flood emergency jeopardizing life-saving operations for children (UNICEF 5 Nov 2010); 8 See Pakistan Floods: UNICEF revised Key Messages; Key messages on Pakistan flood emergency funding crisis (UNICEF 5 Nov 2010) 9 Briefing Note, ED Meeting with Amb. Abdullah HussainHaroon, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, New York, and First Secretary Mr. SuljukTarar (EMOPS and GMA, ) 10 EMOPS, Briefing Notes for Anthony Lake - Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan; (EMOPS + CO, 14 tember 2010) 11 News note, The United Nations outlines combined strategy to ensure the survival of millions of flood affected people in Pakistan, (UNICEF, Islamabad, 24 tember 2010) 12 News note, UNICEF: 6 million children affected by the floods in Pakistan; some 2.7 million in need of immediate, life-saving assistance (GENEVA/ISLAMABAD, 11 ust 2010) 13 Statement, Statement by UNICEF Executive Director, Anthony Lake, on the flooding in Pakistan, (NEW YORK/GENEVA/ISLAMABAD, 20 ust 2010 ) 14 Pakistan floods: Media messages on the UNICEF Executive Director's visit (27 ust 2010) 15 Briefing Notes for Anthony Lake - Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan, 14th tember One pager Key Issues on Pakistan Global Food Security Cluster, 15th t Pakistan Floods: UNICEF revised Key Messages (16 tember 2010) 18 News note, UNICEF issues a new appeal for the 10 million children affected by the flooding in Pakistan, (GENEVA, 21 tember 2010) 19 Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director s Meeting with Mr. Mark Ward,Acting Director, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 23 tember th t Member State Brief Louis-Georges Arsenault 21 Pakistan Floods: UNICEF Key Messages on Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) - (15 ust 2010) Key overarching message for use; 22 News note, UNICEF's life-saving operation in Pakistan in jeopardy due to funding shortfall (ISLAMABAD/GENEVA, 17 ust 2010) 23 News note, UNICEF: Underfunding for Pakistan flood emergency jeopardizing life-saving operations for children, (ISLAMABAD/NEW YORK/GENEVA, 5 November 2010) 24 Briefing Note for DED, Hilde Johnson, Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals (Pakistan, Darfur), 20th ust 2010 A.L for ODI/UNICEF 15

16 25 Press release, UNICEF/WFP chiefs call for renewed support to Pakistan s flood victims (ISLAMABAD, 31 ust 2010) 26 Some in the humanitarian community called the emergency the largest ever, larger than the Haiti earthquake and the Asian tsunami; 9 million in Pakistan were affected. Others referred to the flood as a wall of water, and a rolling disaster. 27 Meeting with UK Mission and Summary of the Pakistan Flood Update (as of 31 ust) 28 Notes for Meeting with Kathryn Yarlett, Development Adviser at the Australian Mission (Thursday 9th t) at 2 p.m - 10th floor conference room 29 Briefing Notes for Anthony Lake - Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan and Somalia, Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan and Somalia; 6 October According to one interviewee, UNICEF had years earlier published data showing high malnutrition in conflict-affected tribal areas, leading to the expulsion of two staff rom Pakistan. But, later, UNICEF and WFP, acting behind closed doors, persuaded to the government to address the needs themselves. 31 UNICEF/EMOPS (2010), Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action 32 It was further pointed out that despite the magnitude of the crisis, little support was received from DOC on communications in-country beyond short-term support provided during the ED s visit. There was, though, strong backstopping and frequent teleconferences on key issues with DOC and the Office of the Executive Director. 33 Statement, Statement by UNICEF Executive Director, Anthony Lake, on the flooding in Pakistan (NEW YORK/GENEVA/ISLAMABAD, 20 ust 2010) 34 EMOPS/GMA Briefing Note, ED Meeting with Amb. Abdullah HussainHaroon, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, New York, and First Secretary Mr. SuljukTarar; 24 ust Press release, UNICEF Executive Director, Anthony Lake, to visit flood affected areas of Pakistan (ISLAMABAD, 29 ust 2010) 36 Press release, UNICEF/WFP chiefs call for renewed support to Pakistan s flood victims (ISLAMABAD, 31 ust 2010) 37 EMOPS, Briefing Notes for Anthony Lake - Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan, 14 tember EMOPS, Briefing Notes for Anthony Lake - Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan and Somalia; 6 October EMOPS Inputs for PARMO BN for DED s visit to Norway Pakistan 11 ust PARMO Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director s Meeting with Mr. Mark Ward, Acting Director, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance; 23 tember EMOPS, Briefing Note for DED, Hilde Johnson, Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals (Pakistan, Darfur); 20 ust EMOPS, Briefing Note for EMOPS Deputy Director Pakistan IASC Principals Meeting; 9 ust 2010; 43 EMOPS Briefing Note for DED, Hilde Johnson, Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals (Pakistan, Darfur), 20 ust 2010; 44 EMOPS, Briefing Notes for Anthony Lake - Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan; 14 tember EMOPS, Briefing Notes for Anthony Lake - Ad hoc meeting of the IASC Principals on Pakistan and Somalia; 6 October Note on Initial Findings, from the Joint UNICEF/ WFP/WHO Mission to Pakistan, from 21 to 24 tember EMOPS/GMA; Briefing Note for ED Meeting with Amb. Abdullah HussainHaroon, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, New York, and First Secretary Mr. SuljukTarar; 24 ust PARMO Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director s Meeting with Mr. Mark Ward, Acting Director, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance; 23 tember UN News, UN agencies call for $460 million to assist Pakistani flood victims (11 ust 2010) 50 UN News, Donor response to Pakistani flood emergency more encouraging, UN reports (18 ust 2010) 51 UN News, UN steps up flood relief in Pakistan as number of people affected tops 17 million (26 ust 2010) 52 UN News, New UN humanitarian chief spends first day at work in flood-hit Pakistan (7 tember 2010) 53 UN News, Pakistani flood emergency still unfolding, UN relief chief warns during visit (8 tember 2010) 54 UN News, UN relief chief pleads for more help for Pakistani flood survivors (9 tember 2010) 55 UN News, Pakistani floods creating a new disaster every day, UN relief chief says (15 tember 2010) 56 UN News, Pakistan: UN issues largest-ever disaster appeal at over $2 billion for flood victims (17 tember 2010) 57 UN News, UN humanitarian chief begins second visit to flood-hit Pakistan (2 December 2010) A.L for ODI/UNICEF 16

17 58 UN News, Pakistan s flood-affected people in need of more assistance UN official (3 December 2010) 59 UN News, UN humanitarian chief urges continued support for conflict-affected Pakistanis (5 December 2010) 60 UN News, More resources vital for Pakistan flood relief efforts, stresses UN humanitarian chief (9 December 2010) 61 UN News, Ban requests generous international help for flood-hit Pakistan (9 ust 2010) 62 UN News, General Assembly hears calls for global solidarity to help flood-hit Pakistan (19 ust 2010) 63 UN News, Continued commitment to relief, recovery required for Pakistan Ban (19 tember 2010) 64 UN News, Pakistan: Ban calls on world to speed up funding for $2 billion flood appeal (15 October 2010) 65 As was pointed out, this study may poorly reflect the role of advocacy across agencies perhaps because so much of it happened off line and thus hard to track. The survival strategy was just one example of very close messaging and work. Similar advocacy happened around Nutrition with WFP and to some extent WHO. 66 See Note on Initial Findings, from the Joint UNICEF/ WFP/WHO Mission to Pakistan, from 21 to 24 tember According Initial Observations from the Timeline Exercise for Pakistan Floods (February 2011), the Integrated Survival Strategy was designed to save lives and to reduce morbidity among women and children, by strengthening synergy and integration between work done by the WASH, Food, Health and Nutrition Clusters. 67 News note, The United Nations outlines combined strategy to ensure the survival of millions of flood affected people in Pakistan, ISLAMABAD, 24 tember See Pakistan Floods: Joint statement on the importance of breastfeeding (26 ust 2010) Press release, UNICEF/WFP chiefs call for renewed support to Pakistan s flood victims (ISLAMABAD, 31 ust 2010) A.L for ODI/UNICEF 17