Case Study 1: Sudan s expulsion of NGOs in 2009

Transcription

1 UNICEF Advocacy in Emergencies Case Study 1: Sudan s expulsion of NGOs in 2009 March 2011 (revised April 2011) A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 1

2 Contents Executive Summary... 3 Findings 1:Approaches... 4 Findings 2: Messages... 7 Findings 3: Coordination... 9 Findings 4: Collaboration Annex 1: Interviews Annex 2: Advocacy products A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 2

3 Executive Summary This case study seeks to document UNICEF advocacy in response to Sudan s expulsion of NGOs in 2009, focusing on the period March until early June. The report offers detailed findings (sections 1-4), based on perceptions of key actors collected in semi-structured interviews (Annex 1) and supported by a review of documents (Annex 2). UNICEF lacks an organizational policy for advocacy, and this case study should not be read as an evaluation of UNICEF s advocacy performance, or of the performance of individuals within UNICEF. This is one of five case studies designed to shed light on UNICEF s current advocacy practice in humanitarian situations and issues arising from it. The case studies contribute evidence to a larger Review of UNICEF Advocacy in Emergencies, which aims to strengthen the organization s advocacy in response to sudden-onset humanitarian crises. The Review is commissioned by UNICEF s Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS), and conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). The expulsion of 13 international NGOs from Sudan in March 2009 threatened to trigger a new emergency in Darfur. The government recognized this might create gaps in services provided to IDPs, but hoped the UN would help to fill them. Stressing the likely disastrous impact, the UN outlined what it could provide and stressed it would be impossible for it to completely fill the gaps. After the government refused to rescind the decision, joint Government-UN assessment missions began to identify gaps, loss of capacity and available partners for emergency risk mitigation. In particular, UNICEF feared the impact on its programmes would be significant, since the expelled NGOs were among its key implementing partners, and UNICEF was sector lead in WASH, education, nutrition, and child protection. Issues arising: UNICEF s advocacy in response to the expulsion of NGOs followed UN priorities; but according to some this was complicated by the tight coordination of UN advocacy and by the reality on the ground that put pressure on doing all possible to provide relief. Moreover, UNICEF s advocacy aimed at child protection was not conducted through public channels and therefore not visible to all stakeholders. UNICEF and others struggled to develop messages that would convince the government of the disastrous impact of NGO expulsions. Yet the UN and UNICEF may have achieved as much by engaging the government in a joint assessment, which also fostered a useful dialogue between humanitarians and the government. UNICEF actors were involved in advocacy across the agency s various levels and offices. With advocacy roles and responsibilities not always clear, UNICEF would likely benefit from a more structured process and guidelines to support strategic advocacy in emergencies. UNICEF collaborated extensively with partners in advocacy benefitting from the strengths of UN-led advocacy. Note: In the following sections, words contained within quotation marks represent phrases that were used in interviews or documents by UNICEF staff. A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 3

4 Findings 1:Approaches This section outlines UNICEF s approach to advocacy and related challenges in the three months after the expulsions of NGOs from Sudan in March Three-track plan Interviewees described how UNICEF advocacy at the CO level followed the UN s three-track action plan, as follows: Influencing the government to rescind expulsions (Track I): UNICEF advocated with other agencies, mainly at HQ-level, 1 for the expulsions decision to be rescinded and NGOs to be returned. At country level, UN agencies decided this advocacy would be done jointly to reduce vulnerability of individual agencies. It was led by the RC/HC, targeted at the government s Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner (HAC) and minister of humanitarian affairs, aimed at rescinding the decision, and involved stating implications of expulsions. Ensuring service gaps filled in the short-term (Track II): UNICEF advocated for service provision in the short term, mainly at Darfur level. UNICEF and others met with government officials and camp managers to ensure children s needs would be met. UNICEF and UNJLC, both on relatively good terms with the government, urged the HAC to release supplies seized from NGOs, to ensure safety of staff, and to cease aggressive campaign in national media. Ensuring service delivery in the mid-term (Track III): UNICEF advocated for the government to continue service delivery in the mid to long term. Seeking to put in place mechanisms to bridge the gap left by NGOs, an agreement was reached at country level (with HQ involvement) that the UN would bridge gap for three months, and after that the government would take over. By June, HQ-level advocacy focused on urging the introduction of the cluster approach to a reluctant government, which eventually accepted a sector approach. 1.2 Evolving priorities Although no document was found outlining UNICEF s advocacy plan (and no policy is in place requiring this), documents reveal how UNICEF s approach to advocacy, like that of the UN country team, shifted from priority to priority between March and June In early March, UNICEF at HQ level appeared concerned to revoke the expulsions of the NGOs, an objective known as Track I. 2 This approach was mainly pursued at the international level by the UN leadership, including by the UN Secretary-General intervening with key Member States and Deputy ERC with the Sudanese Permanent Representative in NY. 3 At country level, the UN also called for the government to rescind the decision. 4 - Two weeks later, UNICEF stressed its concern for meeting the immediate needs of beneficiaries, Track II. 5 At CO level, UNICEF sought commitments from humanitarians to meeting immediate life-saving needs for a period of up to three months. 6 The UN conducted a joint assessment with the government of the service gaps and capacity available. 7 UNICEF established the limits of its own assistance to government and remaining NGO partners, as well as possible direct implementation, to ensure that urgent needs began to be met as best possible in water, sanitation and hygiene, and in health and nutrition. 8 At headquarters, A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 4

5 UNICEF prepared to reaffirm to the head of USAID/OFDA its commitment to meeting humanitarian needs in Sudan, a top foreign policy priority for the US. 9 - By mid-april, UNICEF seemed concerned with meeting the needs of beneficiaries in the middle-term, and the strategic framework for doing so, under Track III, 10 which remained a priority in late May. 11 Recognizing that the UN would have to ensure services beyond three months, UNICEF was quick to urge humanitarians to take steps to scale up their operations. 12 UNICEF scenario planning identified unmet needs as Darfur approached the hunger gap period and rainy season. 13 Meanwhile, HQ aimed to achieve agreement among UN agencies on common position on the approach to Track III, and stressed that any cluster approach should be backed by adequate human and financial resources Other activities Advocacy actors also mentioned other UNICEF advocacy activities ongoing during this time, and aimed at the government and armed groups: Mine Action: One such activity was UNICEF s successful advocacy response to the Government s suspension of UNMAO and Mine Action activities in Darfur at this time. UNICEF advocated for this to be resumed, meeting with the DG NCCW and HAC to raise this concern, briefing the HC and NCCW on the consequences for children, and referring to a recent report of the SG on Children and Armed Conflict in Sudan which highlighted that some 16 children were killed and injured in Darfur in 2008 as a result of UXOs incidents. Child soldiers: Another activity was UNICEF s advocacy on child soldiers. UNICEF conducted a lot of advocacy in the first quarter of 2009 to demobilize children in Darfur from armed groups that were signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement. This led to agreements of the six signatories to the DPA on the modality of work and operational procedures guidelines for the DDR programme during the first half of the year. The target was to demobilize 2,000 children in Darfur. At the same time, UNICEF continued its advocacy with non-state actors/armed groups non-signatory to the Darfur Peace agreement, including with SLA Unity and JEM during first half of 2010 in collaboration with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. 1.4 Government stance A particularly careful approach was needed in advocating with the government, given its evolving position towards humanitarian agencies. In such a sensitive situation, most of UNICEF s work with the government depended on evidence, for example, from the 2007 Household Health Survey and the Darfur Nutrition Updates. As a clear point of policy, this was reflected in every statement and document produced. In particular, protection took on a highly sensitive nature in Speculation that the NGOs and UN had provided information on violations in Darfur that led to the ICC decision created bad feelings toward the NGOs and UN. This created great sensitivity to publicly advocate on filling gaps on protection. At Darfur level, the Humanitarian Aid Commission suddenly became less cooperative too, and the security situation for aid workers deteriorated with a worrying increase in kidnappings. However, some UNICEF officials maintained good relations with line ministries, recognizing that the government was not homogenous. Effective advocacy required knowing the decisionmakers (governors, ministry staff, HAC), having a clear sense of purpose in dealing with them, adopting a non-condemnatory tone, and making them into willing partners instead of targets. A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 5

6 1.5 Non-public approach Tactically, UNICEF and other humanitarian agencies decided that public advocacy was not feasible, since it would lead to expulsion. Almost all UNICEF s advocacy was private, including advocacy with government to return expelled NGOs, bring in NGOs, and other advocacy to fill gaps. Despite perceptions that UNICEF could have done more to speak out in relation to humanitarian principles, it remains unclear how this would have been strategic or effective. More recently, UNICEF staff have recognized the importance of informal relationships with government officials: thus, advocacy may be conducted over tea, at prayers, or playing football. Interviewees suggested that UNICEF could have achieved more through such channels. 1.6 Relief prioritized UNICEF prioritized the provision of relief in partnership with the government. After NGOs were expelled, UNICEF s main objective was to provide services to populations in need. Putting realism above principles (as one respondent put it), UNICEF decided to prioritize working with the government to ensure service delivery. UNICEF took the view the government was prepared to leave the gaps in services, that international (military) intervention was impossible, and that nothing could be gained from denouncing the government s actions. UNICEF s decision to prioritize service provision was likely driven by its designated role as provider of last resort in several sectors (WASH, nutrition, health). It also spoke to the inherent tensions between its advocacy and assistance functions. While following the three track plan, the UN made it clear at every opportunity that it would not be able to fill the gaps and that the NGOs needed to return. UNICEF articulated its advocacy position with other agencies that any mitigating support that would be provided to the Government or other NGOs partners to replace the capacity lost by the expulsions would be time-limited to six months. While understood and articulated at the senior management levels of the organization, it was not always reflected in the practical programme decisions made at the field level, where there was understandable pressure to step in and do all possible to relief possible suffering of women and children, given the imminent arrival of the hunger gap. While doing all it could to get the government to take on the responsibility, the UN jointly decided to extend the period for filling the gaps.for UNICEF, the question was Which would have been worse: to abandon what we started and walk away because we wanted to prove a point or to continue to provide critical interventions, while we sorted out issues with the government? 15 This also underscores the challenge for UNICEF in taking a strong advocacy position, when the reality on the ground impacts how that position can be maintained and followed through. 1.7 Protection questions In this context, UNICEF s advocacy targeted at government and aimed at child protection was not conducted through public channels. Perhaps as a result, some interviewees stated that little if any (public) advocacy for protection was conducted, despite the ongoing protection and displacement crises in Darfur; such advocacy was thought counterproductive, and likely to lead to more expulsions. As UNICEF noted, Since child protection has been excluded from the Joint Assessment, the humanitarian community related program is consequently currently on hold, and exactly where the GoS wants us. i.e. just delivery of relief without any protection or A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 6

7 human rights activities. 16 However, some said protection s omission from the assessment was not for lack of trying and credited the UN for being able to persuade the government to do a joint assessment in the first place, with the UN viewing the assessment as an entry point to move from a stalemate with the hope that protection would be added to subsequent assessments. The UN and UNICEF pushed for subsequent assessments to include both protection and education gaps. It was later explained that UNICEF did advocate on protection issues though not in a confrontational manner (for fear of worsening the situation for the children UNICEF was supposed to be protecting) and that most protection issues were not handled publicly. In particular, UNICEF and the UN pushed for subsequent assessments to include both protection and education gaps; UNICEF pushed for this with the RC/HC and provided relevant information on the need to include protection issues. The need for protection as part of the assessment was brought up at the Ministerial level and as well as at planning meetings with the Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner, but it was met with refusal. As Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism for Resolution 1612 became more sensitive following the expulsions, UNICEF intensified its efforts and prepared a strategy to continue on this area in spite of the sensitivity. 1.8 New directions Since the expulsions, UNICEF s has sought to use child mortality data to advocate with national and provincial authorities. A new Sudan household health survey will serve as a basis for conversations with governors; disaggregated data by state will allow for league tables to encourage official engagement. UNICEF also recognizes that the government s engagement is critical to saving the lives of children, despite the world s largest international assistance programme to the country. In addition, UNICEF has sought to go beyond doing no harm to conducting advocacy for peace. 17 Findings 2: Messages This section outlines UNICEF s messaging and related challenges in the three months after the expulsion of NGOs from Sudan in March Messaging The various messages produced by UNICEF reflected the agency s advocacy positions, including its shifting priorities following the expulsions: from initial public concern, to highlighting gaps in service provision, to calling on government to help fill gaps in the longer term. However, no single set of messages existed to support UNICEF advocacy. UNICEF s different sets of messages, in variously named products, each serving advocacy only partially, appeared to highlight disjointedness in UNICEF s advocacy. The specific advocacy functions remained unclear for the following sets of messages: Key messages: produced for public communication, appearing in a variety of products ( quicklines, talking points, media briefing notes, and factsheet ), these seemed to be produced by DOC primarily for public communications, though some were labelled internal. 18 Main messages: produced to prepare UNICEF directors for high-level meetings, these featured in some briefing notes prepared by EMOPS; others contained talking points 19 instead. A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 7

8 Aide memoire: messages produced at CO-level for advocacy were not found, with one exception Expulsions Initially, UNICEF messages stressed UN concern at the expulsions and called for them to be reversed. Publicly, UNICEF joined UN agencies in stressing deep concern that the expulsions would have devastating implications for the citizens of Darfur. The agencies appealed to the government of Sudan to urgently reconsider this decision, 21 echoing this message in a statement and video posted on its website, calling the expulsions a humanitarian crisis which will expand by leading to certain death for children and women if we are not able to sustain these operations. 22 Privately, UNICEF would stress its concern to USAID about the humanitarian situation in Darfur and the impact of the expulsions, calling for high level advocacy (including the US Government) to find a solution with the GoS that allows the NGOs to resume or continue their work. 23 Interviewees recalled how UNICEF and other agencies argued that expulsions were unacceptable, that government should reverse the decision or find alternative measures so the population would not suffer the consequences. While the UN looked to international conventions and IHL to support this position, UNICEF began to emphasize the need to fill gaps. 2.3 Agencies and gaps Soon, UNICEF messages appeared to shift away from calling on the government to reverse its decision, towards highlighting and bridging the gaps in service provision. In messages prepared by DOC, UNICEF suggested that suspensions were the problem and action by agencies to address the gaps was the solution. UNICEF s Quickline noted that UNICEF was working with government and remaining non-government partners to address immediate gaps in provision, and now called for no action by the government. A week later, UNICEF s talking points repeated these same points, substantiating them with more information. UNICEF struggled to develop messages that would convince the government of the disastrous impact of the NGO expulsions. Initially, UNICEF made stark public warnings that women and children would die or be severely affected as a result. 24 At CO-level, UNICEF and partners were quickly able to identify gaps emerging from the expulsions, with evidence from the expelled NGOs. However, the government maintained that fewer people were affected and fewer gaps existed, contested the impact of the expulsions; and not all the evidence pointed to a disaster. The joint assessment helped UN agencies to estimate the number affected, the NGOs affected, and the gaps to be filled. This provided a basis for a useful dialogue with the government, and for some, this dialogue offered a foundation for advocacy. Still, it remained difficult to dispute the government s claim that humanitarians had misrepresented the situation in Darfur, that no emergency had occurred, and that development assistance was needed instead. More recently, UNICEF has used monitoring and data gathering as a primary means by which to conduct public policy advocacy, and to focus attention on child mortality and saving lives. 25 A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 8

9 2.4 Government and gaps Not long after highlighting the need for agencies to fill gaps, UNICEF key messages began calling on the government to help fill provision gaps. It urged government to meet its stated commitment to providing necessary resources to help fill the gaps left by the suspended NGOs, adding that UNICEF working with the government cannot meet all the identified needs. 26 In private, UNICEF continued to conduct advocacy aimed at humanitarian partners about ways to coordinate service provision. 27 UNICEF s messages straddled a contradiction here: assuring donors that the agency would fill gaps in the short term, while calling for the reinstatement of the expelled NGOs; and insisting UNICEF could not fill gaps in the middle to long term. As provider of last resort in specific sectors, UNICEF found it a difficult balancing act to raise funds from donors to fill gaps while asking donors to help reverse the expulsions. An underlying message, explained UNICEF, remains that UNICEF will not, and cannot, replace the role of the suspended NGOs, and that other partners including government will have to play an increased role in service delivery, monitoring and development in the interim. Findings 3: Coordination This section outlines UNICEF s coordination of advocacy and related challenges in the three months after the expulsion of NGOs from Sudan in Multiple actors UNICEF s advocacy activities were reportedly carried out by a multiplicity of relevant actors across levels and sections: CO: At country level, advocacy was coordinated by the deputy representative (OIC), a media and external relations officer, a fundraising officer, the chief of field operations, and an EMOPS officer (surge capacity). RO: At the regional level, advocacy was supported by the regional emergency coordinator and the regional director. HQ: At the international level, advocacy was led by the Deputy Executive Director, the EMOPS Director, DOC, as well as the EMOPS Deputy Director in Geneva and senior staff from PARMO and HR (given the need for surge capacity). In addition, regular phone calls were held with Natcoms. Although the specific advocacy roles were not specified, interaction between UNICEF s CO, RO and HQ levels on operational issues appears to have worked well, relying on conference calls. For example, the CO was quick to document the need for additional resources, and share this info with RO, HQ and Natcoms. The CO reportedly received good support from EMOPS and from Programmes. 3.2HQ actors Documents suggest that UNICEF advocacy was conducted at HQ levels, with high level involvement from the DED and ED. While the CO focused efforts on assessing the gaps in service provision and identifying ways to fill these gaps, UNICEF s Deputy Executive Director, Executive Director and high officials participated in highlevel processes to coordinate UN advocacy responses. The ED met twice with IASC Principals, and participated in two ECHA meetings to coordinate humanitarian responses to the expulsions. A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 9

10 The DED travelled to Khartoum from March to participate in discussions related to the joint assessment. During her meetings with the UN and government partners, Ms Johnson met with numerous high-ranking officials. 28 Ms Johnson also met with other agency representatives, obtaining a green light for UNICEF to raise additional resources in a visible fundraising strategy through Natcoms. 29 The directors of EMOPS and PARMO met with USAID/OFDA Director and the Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. 3.3 DED visit The DED was thought to have made a significant contribution to UNICEF s advocacy, when she visited Sudan March, and met senior government officials, including the Vice President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ms Johnson, who was well known in the country since Norway had been involved in Sudan s peace process, is credited with successfully advocating for reducing the aggressive tone of government statements, and for the joint assessment to take place. 3.4 Process lacking Given the lack of policy, UNICEF advocacy lacked a structured process and guidelines for designing and implementing advocacy. One interviewee said UNICEF starts with a blank sheet of paper every time there is an emergency. Such advocacy appears to rely excessively on the personal competencies of key staff, judgement calls, and playing it by ear. The following questions were raised by interviewees: - Commitments: What are UNICEF s advocacy commitments in emergencies? What commitments on key violations of child rights, towards governments, and non-state actors? - Situation analysis: What is the situation of children? What specific opportunities for advocacy? The CO, like others, had planned for the ICC ruling, but not the expulsion of NGOs. - Targets: To whom should UNICEF target its advocacy? While this information was known by some, there was no written analysis shared of where power actually lies, and whom to influence; this is not always obvious Purpose: What is the purpose of the advocacy, and what are the expected results? UNICEF staff may not be ready to seize opportunities: like the dog that barks at the bus, what would it say if the bus stopped? - Approach: What advocacy steps are needed to achieve expected results? How could flexibility be maintained to enable individuals to seize opportunities, and adapt approach on the basis of monitoring, and conduct systematic advocacy until results achieved? 3.5 Competencies lacking UNICEF could miss advocacy opportunities due to gaps in its competencies. UNICEF staff were thought to lack adequate knowledge of the basic humanitarian instruments and debates. While UNICEF staff have become stronger at programming, advocacy required key aptitudes, language skills, and skills to argue effectively by presenting issues to government officials in the most appropriate way and not just in hard dry figures. More recently, UNICEF has found the need to strengthen its capacity in the negotiation for humanitarian access, with more high-level knowledge of humanitarian principles and IHL. A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 10

11 3.6 Internal barriers The systems used by UNICEF s finance and HR sections may also undermine advocacy. The time needed to recruit the right staff means they are not in place to support advocacy. UNICEF finance systems may block important payments to government for procedural reasons, which can undermine relationships; these appear to be designed for stable situations where governments are willing partners who welcome advocacy. Findings 4: Collaboration This section outlines UNICEF advocacy done in collaboration with other humanitarian actors,and related challenges,in the three months after the expulsion of NGOs from Sudan in UNICEF UNICEF collaborated extensively with partners in its advocacy following the expulsions. At country level, UNICEF was quick to sign a joint statement with UN partners, and take part in developing coordinated positions under the UN RC/HC. The RC's leadership on advocacy placed limitations on UNICEF s unilateral advocacy, though UNICEF fought hard to get a clear position on government accountability reflected in the joint UN position. At HQ level, UNICEF also sought to coordinate its approach with partners through IASC and ECHA. That UNICEF must coordinate its advocacy with its UN partners, vs. implementing a parallel process, appears to be implicit in the concepts of One UN, UN Coherence, and Deliver as One. 4.2UN coordination In General, UN-led advocacy was conducted jointly and in private, and primarily at a higher level. HC/SRSG: Humanitarian advocacy was carried out mainly through the office of the SRSG-Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, which acted quickly to coordinate a common position among leading UN agencies, the Red Cross movement, and donors. Private channels: UN agencies decided that advocacy through private channels would be more effective than public advocacy, which they perceived would lead to expulsions. 31 High level: It was decided that most advocacy would be done at HQ level by the ERC, OCHA, donors, and governments that could talk with Sudan (e.g. USA). 4.3HC-led success UN coordination of advocacy under the RC/HC was seen as a success. It reportedly led to agreement with the government on the joint assessment of gaps, 32 dialogue on the process for filling gaps, a discussion on which NGOs could stay and not stay, and donor agreement to redirect funds. In initial meetings, UN agencies stressed the need to move in a coordinated manner, agreeing that advocacy would be done jointly because individual work would make agencies vulnerable. The UNCT decided there would be one line, and the SRSG spokesperson would be the channel of communication regarding the situation at large. Most agencies, including NGOs, channelled advocacy through the RC/HC, and even field officers were talking to the HC. These successes were attributed to the perceived usefulness of the common UN A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 11

12 framework to agencies, and the competency of the HC, who was able to work effectively with the government. The UN was reportedly caught by surprise by the government s expulsions, and its plan to fill gaps with national NGOs. 33 Agencies went into days of confusion before coming up with a common approach. They always felt in fire-fighting mode when it came to advocacy in Sudan. While some blamed the humanitarian community for failing to advocate together, another also explained the aversion to confrontational advocacy as being deemed counterproductive for the vulnerable population in Darfur, while also recognizing that many in Sudan viewed the ICC and UN as one and therefore placed the blame for the indictments on the UN. This required considerable advocacy on the UN s part to the government to tone down the public accusation of the UN. The UN also sought to act as one body to protect the interest of NGOs and make the remaining NGOs less vulnerable. Still, there was on-going advocacy at all levels (Darfur, Country, HQ levels) for NGOs to return, for their seized properties to be returned and for increased humanitarian access in Darfur.. But whether more could have been done to speak out, even internally within the UN, on the need for more respect of humanitarian principles (which had been tried for some time preceding the expulsions), and whether this would have had more impact remained open to debate. 4.3High-level leadership News releases reveal how the UN s humanitarian leadership advocated to influence the government s decision to expel the NGOs and to meet needs. A review shows 26 UN news releases on Sudan during this time; 34 around half were issued by UNAMID about the security of peacekeepers and aid workers. - The SG made three statements asking the government to reverse its expulsion of NGOs, and ultimately denounced the decision as extremely negative. 35 The SG had reportedly been calling stakeholders and was mulling a conversation with Mr. Al-Bashir The ERC made eight statements, reiterating the SG s message, and expressing surprise at the expulsions, 37 but also emphasizing international efforts to fill gaps, 38 commending the government s cooperation in the joint assessment, 39 and later welcoming a new beginning in relations with Khartoum. 40 The ERC later stated that an immediate crisis had been averted, but gaps still needed to be filled. 41 He also made a five-day trip to Sudan, partly to review living conditions for the local populations in areas affected by the NGO expulsions in Darfur NGO tensions The expulsions reportedly forged closer advocacy relations between the UN and NGOs, although important advocacy tensions existed between them at country level. Some NGOs publicly criticized the UN s unwillingness to speak up, while some UN officials devalued the voice of NGOs. UNICEF now views NGOs as best partners in advocacy, recognizing the need to involve them in planning advocacy. A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 12

13 Annex 1: Interviews The primary data source was in-depth interviews conducted with the following informants during October and November Iyabode Olusanmi Former Deputy Representative/OIC, UNICEF Sudan Nils Kastberg Representative, UNICEFSudan (from 4 Sept 2009) Gloria Fernandez Former Head of Office, OCHA Sudan Mahera Khatun Chief, Field Operations, UNICEF Sudan (written comments only) Edward Carwardine Chief of Communications, UNICEF Sudan (written comments only) Olushola Ismail Chief of Field Office, UNICEF North Darfur Thomas Davin Regional Chief Emergency Preparedness and Response, UNICEF Middle East and Northern Africa Abdel RahmanGhandour Regional Chief, Communication, UNICEFMiddle- East and North Africa region Francois Ducharme Francois Ducharme, Emergency Specialist, Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF New York Additional data was collected from a range of diverse documentary sources reflected in the products listed below and endnotes. We are grateful to Iyabode Olusanmi and Ghada Kachachi (OIC Child Protection during the crisis), for their detailed comments on the first draft of this report. Annex 2: Advocacy products This table lists UN and UNICEF advocacy products collected in response to the expulsion of NGOs from Sudan in March Private advocacy products are shown in grey rows. Date Target Product Producer 5 Mar UNICEF to Public UNICEF Quickline on NGO expulsions DOC(?) 6 Mar 9 Mar UNICEF (+UNHCR, UNJLC, WFP, WHO and OCHA) to Public / Govt UNICEF to Public/Government Joint statement, Statement on the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur UN agencies express concern over humanitarian aid crisis in Sudan, OCHA NY(?) DOC(?) 9 Mar UNICEF/ED to Humanitarians Briefing notes for ED, Special IASC Principals meeting on Sudan EMOPS 12 Mar UNICEF to Public Talking points suspension of 16 NGOs operations in north of Sudan DOC(?) A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 13

14 19 or 20 Mar No date UNICEF to Humanitarians UNICEF (ED) to Govt Briefing notes for EMOPS director, Meeting with USAID/OFDA Director, and with the Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Briefing notes for ED, meeting with Ms. Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of States EMOPS EMOPS 26 Mar UNICEF to Public Talking points suspension of 16 NGOs operations in north of Sudan DOC(?) 30 Mar UNICEF to Humanitarians Briefing notes for ED, Extra-ordinary IASC Principals Meeting on Sudan EMOPS 15 Apr UNICEF to Humanitarians Briefing notes for ED, ECHA Core Meeting on Sudan EMOPS Apr UNICEF to Public Media Briefing Notes, Sudan April, Background for issues that may arise in questions DOC(?) 20 May UNICEF to Humanitarians Aide Memoire for (ED), ECHA Meeting, Key messages from the Sudan Country Office CO 27 May 17 Jul UNICEF to Humanitarians UNICEF to Public Briefing notes for EMOPS director, Meeting of Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) Talking points suspension of 16 NGOs operations in north of Sudan EMOPS DOC(?) 1 This HQ-level advocacy was conducted by the ERC and OCHA, and governments such as the US -- that could talk with Sudan. Realizing the government would not rescind openly, underground discussions took place for NGOs to come back under another name. 2 See purpose of meeting, in EMOPS Briefing for ED, Special IASC Principals meeting on Sudan; Monday, 9 March Meeting: Special IASC Principals meeting on Sudan; 9 March 2009; Brief prepared by EMOPS 4 Sitrep 8 March 5 See purpose of meeting in EMOPS Briefing for EMOPS/PARMO directors, Meeting with USAID/OFDA Director, and (to be confirmed) with the Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance; 19 or 20 March UNICEF Sudan; Concept note: Suspension of operations by NGO partners in Darfur 7 Sitrep 19 March 8 UNICEF Sudan; Concept note: Suspension of operations by NGO partners in Darfur; April EMOPS/PARMO: Meeting with USAID/OFDA Director, and (to be confirmed) with the Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance; 19/20 March See purpose of meeting in EMOPS Briefing for ED, ECHA Core Meeting on Sudan, 15 April EMOPS for EMOPS director, Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), 27 May UNICEF Issues Note Government of Sudan/United Nations joint assessment on impact of NGO suspensions in Darfur, Sudan; 23 March 2009; the steps included a standardized position across the UN family on the absorption of former NGO staff either into UN agencies, existing NGOs or to government line ministries, with the necessary resources in place to support salary costs, increased administration, logistics and management support as required. 13 UNICEF Sudan; Concept note: Suspension of operations by NGO partners in Darfur; April EMOPS: ECHA Core Meeting on Sudan; 15 April However, UNICEF later attempted to draw one clear line with the government: the capacity it provided to cover the expelled NGOs would be limited to six months, to make the strong political point that the remaining humanitarian agencies did not feel it was appropriate to indefinitely fill the A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 14

15 gap left by the NGOs, created by a political action of government. But this line was not always understood by field staff, who opted to meet needs before uphold these principles. UNICEF found itself paying the salaries of 300 government staff for almost a year, scaling up its water provision, and taking on new responsibilities in other sectors. Indeed, since the expulsions, UNICEF has re-asserted its advocacy role. Now CO thinking is that UNICEF must do more than provide resources, delivery services, and monitor delivery; it must provide advice, influence the way the government uses money at all levels: Cabinet, Walids, technical ministries. Thus, the current Rep has challenged the government s prioritization of defence over basic services, contrasting the number of tanks with the number of ambulances. 16 EMOPS for ED, Extra-ordinary IASC Principals Meeting on Sudan, 30 March 2009; 17 UNICEF has sought to use programmes, schools, immunization exercises to spread messages aimed at building peace 18 Talking Points labelled some parts for internal briefing and background, whereas key facts and figures included within it can be used publicly in interviews, etc 19 For example, EMOPS for ED, Meeting with Ms. Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State; date tbc 20 UNICEF Sudan Country Office; Aide Memoire ECHA Meeting, 20 May UNICEF, UNHCR, UNJLC, WFP, WHO and OCHA; Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur (6 March 2009) 22 UNICEF, UN agencies express concern over humanitarian aid crisis in Sudan, 9 March 2009 UNICEF website 'newsline' 23 EMOPS, Briefing Notes for Meeting with USAID/OFDA Director, March UNICEF, UN agencies express concern over humanitarian aid crisis in Sudan, (New York, 9 March 2009); the agency estimated that 1.16 million people, mostly in Darfur, could lose access to water and sanitation supplies, and some 1.5 million could lose access to basic health care. 25 The upcoming Sudanese household survey offers the most important evidence for advocacy; and messaging has been framed to encourage greater government responsibility for addressing humanitarian and development challenges. Governors have reacted well to messages framed in terms of threats to children and people, sovereignty and responsibility for saving lives, social services (compared to defence), comparative performance of different states, and UNICEF offers of assistance. 26 This echoed the UN HC s warning that the problem was the unsustainable nature of the current stopgap drive, the solution was to have concrete plans in place to bridge these gaps in a sustainable longterm manner, and the action needed was for various partners to ensure that funding and capacity are in place. 27 EMOPS Briefing Notes for ECHA Meeting, 27 May 2009; here UNICEF urged an ECHA meeting to make a clear distinction of roles and responsibilities between the Expanded High Level Committee and the cluster approach apparatus; indicating the need for additional resources to be able to deliver on additional responsibilities 28 Sitrep 24 March, says Ms Johnson met with the Vice President Taha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Special Advisors to the President, the head of National Security, heads of United Nations agencies, heads of NGOs and donor representatives. 29 UNICEF Sitrep 24 March 30 An interviewee noted that the Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner was known to be very powerful and a Northerner, whereas the Minister was from the south and did not seem to have much power within the government. Despite his lower rank, it was sometimes better to talk to the Commissioner who could pull strings at highest level. 31 UN agencies and NGOs agreed that the government had reached breaking point, that silence was the price for their continued presence, and this was best for people of Darfur. 32 As one well-placed interviewee put it, First and foremost credit should be given to the UN for being able to persuade the government to do a joint assessment. The government initially bluntly refused to accept that there were gaps and refused to listen to anybody or group about rescinding the decision on the expulsion of the NGOs. 33 EMOPS: Special IASC Principals meeting on Sudan, 9 March 2009, notes that in the Security Council, France called the expulsions premeditated. In addition, one donor in Sudan wondered why the UN had not seen the expulsions coming 34 All issued by the UN between 5 March and 11 June 35 UN News, Ban launches urgent appeal to Sudan to reverse expulsion of aid groups, 5 March 2009; UN News, Ban voices concern after aid workers abducted in Darfur, 12 March 2009; UN News, Ban: aid workers expulsion from Sudan impeding peacekeeping, relief efforts, 21 April 2009 A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 15

16 36 UN News, Darfur: UN working to reverse expulsions while planning to fill vital aid gaps, 9 March UN News, UN relief chief voices concern over Sudan leader s call for Sudanization of aid, 16 March UN News, Identifying and filling critical gaps priority in Darfur aid effort UN relief chief, 26 March UN News, Joint UN and Sudanese assessment of Darfur aid reveals critical gaps, 24 March UN News, In Sudan, UN relief chief reiterates regret at ejection of aid groups, May UN News, Aid groups expulsion still reverberating within Darfur top UN official, 11 June UN News, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes, 6 May 2009 A.L for ODI/ UNICEF 16