PEACEBUILDING, EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED CONTEXTS PROGRAMME. UNICEF Yemen Annual Report

Transcription

1 PEACEBUILDING, EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED CONTEXTS PROGRAMME UNICEF Yemen 2014 Annual Report

2 Map of Yemen

3 Contents Acronyms... 1 Contribution Summary... 2 Executive Summary PBEA Programme Overview Country Profile Overview Changes in the Country Context Conflict Analysis Results Global Outcome 1 Integrating peacebuilding and education Global Outcome 2 Building institutional capacities Global Outcome 3 Developing community and individual capacities Global Outcome 4 Increasing access to conflict-sensitive education Global Outcome 5 Generating evidence and knowledge Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Partnerships Programme Management Staffing Changes and Variances in Programme Activities Inter-sectoral Engagement Challenges, Lessons Learned and Unintended Consequences Outreach and Communications Resources Cover photo UNICEF/Yemen/Sayagi/2014

4 Acronyms AQAP CFS DOE GPE MoE NGO Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula child-friendly schools District Offices of Education Global Partnership for Education Ministry of Education non-governmental organization 1

5 Contribution Summary Project Name Donor Programme Country Purpose of the Contribution PBEA Programmable Contribution Amount (2014) PBEA Reference Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) programme Government of the Netherlands Yemen To strengthen the transformative potential of education in conflict-affected contexts to support cohesive societies and human security US$1,098,750 SC UNICEF Progress Report No. 3 Date Prepared March 2015 Period Covered 1 January December

6 Executive Summary Since the uprising in 2011 and early 2012, Yemen has been going through a period of political stabilization under a Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered transfer of power, and the ensuing transition process. One mechanism of the transition is the National Dialogue Conference, which provided a space for all stakeholders including vulnerable groups who have been outside of the political process to date to participate in shaping a new Yemen through the transition process and drafting of a new Constitution in At the family level, there are some important points to note in the changing political and security landscape. First with the fuel crisis and then with the subsequent increase in the cost of fuel, families and their household budgets suffered a significant blow the cost of basic food, water, cooking gas and other essential elements of life increased. This left less resources for other essentials, such as costs associated with education. Within this context, the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) programme activities in Yemen seek to highlight the essential prioritization of children in Yemen s future plans, and the need for keener attention to educational content and service provision. UNICEF s PBEA team has worked to ensure that education is more visible in peacebuilding programming and policy, and vice versa, throughout Examples abound, such as the inclusion of social essential services in the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Priority Peace Plan and the training of 6,000 teachers and school principals in conflict sensitivity and social cohesion in the Yemen Education Cluster Common Humanitarian Appeal. PBEA funds were used to support the development and testing of a child protection mechanism inside schools, where 40 national master trainers learned how to train school staff to operationalize a child protection mechanism. Supporting gender equality is a crosscutting theme throughout this programme as a basic principle of peacebuilding. The production of the national conflict analysis report has contributed to building the capacity of UNICEF Yemen as well as the United Nations Country Team and its partners in being more aware of the key conflict drivers in Yemen, and making them more informed regarding conflict-sensitive programming. Reducing violence and promoting social cohesion through child-friendly education in Yemen is now seen as a successful model. Through the use of existing mechanisms, the peacebuilding programme promotes a sustainable approach, which helps in capacity building and community outreach. The turmoil evident in the political landscape was amplified by the accompanying challenges in the security situation. Throughout 2014, the security situation continued to deteriorate, with some international staff being relocated twice in Nonetheless, UNICEF Yemen has been able to continue its PBEA programming and scale up implementation of activities by leveraging increased international aid from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE, US$73 million) and Qatar Foundation (US$21 million). Within the unstable and politically charged Yemeni context, UNICEF Yemen has advanced the PBEA programme through its already well-established child-friendly schools (CFS) programme. With support from the Ministry of Education (MoE), the PBEA programme was built into the framework of the CFS programme, and two non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and SOUL for Development were contracted to further support the MoE initiatives in pre-primary education and violence reduction in schools. In Yemen, the best framework for integrating the PBEA programme has been through coupling social cohesion interventions with improvements in the quality of education. 3

7 1. PBEA Programme Overview Since the uprising in 2011 and early 2012, Yemen has been going through a period of political stabilization under a Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered transfer of power, and the ensuing transition process. One mechanism of the transition is the National Dialogue Conference, which provided a space for all stakeholders including vulnerable groups that have been outside of the political process to date to participate in shaping a new Yemen through the transition process and drafting of a new Constitution in There has been a marked deterioration in the security situation in Yemen, with a significant increase in attacks, assassinations and kidnappings against the Government, security apparatus and international community. Much of the conflict analysis report produced in 2013 has proven prophetic, with the exception of the magnitude and ease with which Ansar Allah/the Houthis and their supporters have taken control of much of Yemen s cities, including Sana a. At the family level, there are some important points to note in the changing political and security landscape. First with the fuel crisis and then with the increase in the cost of fuel, families and their household budgets suffered a significant blow the cost of basic food, water, cooking gas and other essential elements of life increased. This has amplified the already evident gaps at the level of the household, community and larger society with regard to available funds for education. Within this context, the PBEA programme activities in Yemen seek to highlight the essential prioritization of children in Yemen s future plans, and the need for keener attention to educational content and service provision. Based on these findings, UNICEF Yemen developed a targeted PBEA programme strategy that not only improves the quality of education in fragile areas, but also strengthens the capacity of the education system itself to build peace, focusing primarily on two main areas of intervention: 1) improving access to, and quality of, pre-primary education; and 2) reducing violence in schools. To this end, PBEA leveraged the GPE programme to conflict-sensitive education programming and planning with the MoE. Much of 2014 was devoted to establishing the details and operational framework of the programme, which is now fully integrated into the rolling workplan and endorsed by the MoE. With the coordination and necessary working mechanisms among UNICEF field offices, the MoE and NGO partners established and functioning, implementation is under way. Although the programme faces delays on account of both a late start but also due to extremely difficult implementation conditions there is a clear way forward, and the necessary technical and human resources for implementation are assembled and functioning. The MoE was an active partner in working with UNICEF at the school, district, governorate and central levels to improve quality in education, alongside broadening access, in about 275 schools in As an entry point into the education system, this allowed UNICEF to identify key gaps in fragile areas, prior to the implementation of the conflict analysis reports, and act to support communities to ensure better quality and conflict-sensitive education. When the rolling workplan was signed with the MoE at the end of March, the Education section began the process of planning the details of the activities with the MoE and the two selected NGO partners. This resulted in the development of two Programme Cooperation Agreements in partnership with the five field offices and the NGOs to cover implementation of the bulk of the programme work. Coordination with the CFS committee was somewhat slower on account of the institutional change that occurred in 2014 in the relationship between the MoE and UNICEF regarding CFS programming. It was decided at the end of 2013 that the CFS programme in UNICEF 1 The political process, brokered by the United Nations Special Representative Jamal Bin Omar and his team, has been reviewed and analysed on its merits and its weaknesses, most notably in relation to the recent political turmoil beginning in August For further information in this regard, please see the October 2014 report, by the same author as for the PBEA conflict analysis (Steven Zyke), published by the Overseas Development Institute and available at < 4

8 Yemen would expand to include both water, sanitation and hygiene in schools and child protection activities essentially any activities to take place within a school would now fall under the responsibility of the Education section of the Country Office and the CFS programme. In this respect, the planning, monitoring and evaluation structures and the platform for coordination with the Government such as the CFS committee, which formed the main counterpart for this programme had to be restructured. This required a revision of the terms of reference of the MoE CFS committee and a reissuing of the Ministerial Decree on the nomination of its participants. The nomination had to be issued twice at UNICEF s insistence on 30 per cent female participation. This complication resulted in several weeks of delay in opening negotiations on the precise activities to be implemented under the PBEA programme, and the role and responsibilities of both. Besides the bedding down and operationalization of the programme activities, there was one other development in As a result of communication and support from the Programme Management Team at UNICEF headquarters, the Yemen Country Office has explored the possibility of linking the programme to the UNICEF Innovations initiatives around real-time monitoring. Considering the breadth of geographic coverage and the complex security situation, the Education section in Sana a explored the option of real-time monitoring with the education field offices, then with management and with sister offices. When the opportunity arose to apply for seed funds to support the establishment of real-time monitoring as a complementary monitoring system to be tested with the PBEA activities specifically, the Yemen Country Office proposed and was selected for funding. This bears significant worth for knowledge management and evaluation in 2015 and ties in well with the GPE. 2. Country Profile 2.1. Overview Country profile 1. Full country name Republic of Yemen 2. Area 527,829 km 2 3. Population, male 12,144, Population, female 11,678, Life expectancy, male Life expectancy, female 65 National education indicators 7. Number per 100 population, mobile phones Number per 100 population, Internet users 9 9. Pre-primary school participation, gross enrolment ratio (%), male Pre-primary school participation, gross enrolment ratio (%), female Primary school participation, gross enrolment ratio (%), male NA 12. Primary school participation, gross enrolment ratio (%), female NA 13. Primary school participation, net enrolment ratio (%), male Primary school participation, net enrolment ratio (%), female Primary school participation, net attendance ratio (%), male NA 16. Primary school participation, net attendance ratio (%), female NA 17. Secondary school participation, net enrolment ratio (%), male Secondary school participation, net enrolment ratio (%), female Secondary school participation, net attendance ratio (%), male N/A 5

9 20. Secondary school participation, net attendance ratio (%), female N/A 21. Number of out-of-school children and youth, male 480, Number of out-of-school children and youth, female 720,000 Conflict and disaster indicators (where applicable)** 23. Number of violent deaths N/A 24. Number of conflict incidents Number of natural disasters recorded (floods, earthquakes) N/A 26. Number of internally displaced persons, male and female 306, Number of refugees, male and female 240, Changes in the Country Context In the national context, since early 2012 Yemen has been going through a period of political stabilization under a Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered transfer of power, and the ensuing transition process. One mechanism of the transition is the United Nations-supported the National Dialogue Conference, which provided a space for all stakeholders including vulnerable groups that have been outside of the political process to date to participate in shaping a new Yemen through the transition process and drafting of a new Constitution in As a humanitarian agency mandated to support the achievement of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF has engaged appropriately in the national process of drafting a new Constitution, particularly on three key issues: the age of the child (related to child marriage and child execution under the death penalty); the human rights of marginalized populations (the Muhamasheen); and the centrality of water in key areas of development including health, education, gender equality, nutrition, poverty and livelihoods, and food security. This is congruent with the working principle that civil peace and social cohesion is founded upon equal access to essential services of good quality for all people across Yemen. Despite the upstream effort in place, political turmoil erupted during the latter half of The Houthi armed group, also known as Ansar Allah, consolidated its control over parts of northern Yemen, culminating in a dramatic but short-lived battle for Sana a in September. The group took over most key institutional and governmental buildings and entered into a United Nations-brokered peace and transition agreement with the existing government. One of the conditions of the agreement was the resignation of the Prime Minister and the dismissal of the Cabinet. Separately, the southern movement has continued peaceful protests in Aden, while other southern elements have engaged in conflict with government forces, specifically in Al-Dhale. There are currently more than 330,000 registered internally displaced persons, the majority of whom are in the northern governorates of Amran, Hajjah, Sa ada and Sana a. Up until the end of 2014, the camps for internally displaced persons in Haradh continued to struggle with more than 12,000 displaced people, mostly women and children. Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), an armed terrorist group active in parts of south and central Yemen, has continued to claim responsibility for numerous attacks on military and state institutions. The first half of 2014 also saw a spate of attacks and attempted kidnapping of members of the diplomatic corps. Lastly, with the dramatic rise of the Houthi group in Sana a came an increase in the AQAP attacks against Houthi gatherings. The largest single change to the education sector is the considerable increase in funds through the GPE (US$73 million) and the Qatar Foundation grants (US$21 million). Both programmes will address access and quality in education through school construction and 6

10 rehabilitation, teacher training, recruitment of rural female teachers, pre-primary school support and programming for Yemen s 1.6 million out-of-school children. UNICEF Yemen will be the managing entity to implement both grants over the next three years. With such support, UNICEF has more than doubled the scale of implementation in 2014, working in 106 districts of the total 333, thereby scaling up its programme to reach the most marginalized and most affected by conflict and accompanying humanitarian crisis. Accompanying the destabilized political and security situation, UNICEF Yemen has maintained a strong field presence and found creative solutions to security restrictions in order to ensure that all programming, including the PBEA programme, reaches children in the country. UNICEF has responded through a range of specific activities at the field level in targeted communities, as well as through the implementation of a comprehensive national conflict analysis report and an education-sector conflict analysis report. Emerging from these reports is the clear message that unequal access to essential services and marginalization due to political or other affiliations constitutes some of the most pervasive conflict drivers across Yemen. Although UNICEF will continue to support education for peace activities through the flagship CFS programme, it has become clear through the findings of the conflict analysis reports that more tailored and unified downstream interventions designed with field staff and linked more robustly to upstream policy development are necessary going forward. Lastly, in recognizing the potential leverage and synergy possible through the unique role that UNICEF will play in the GPE and the Qatar Foundation grant, the education team will also work directly with decision-makers at district, governorate and central levels. A certified conflict sensitivity programme will be established and institutionalized within the MoE. This will ensure that the above programmes are implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner, addressing some of the conflict drivers highlighted in the conflict analysis report. 3. Conflict Analysis The conflict analysis report, which was produced for the United Nations Country Team in Yemen by International Development Innovations and completed in July 2013, will need to be revised in early 2015 considering the major political and security changes that have occurred throughout As indicated in the 2013 report, the findings and insights of the original report emerged in part from interviews and discussions with key stakeholders in Yemen. These include, but are not limited to, members of Yemeni civil society and representatives of government agencies, NGOs, the United Nations, the academic and research communities, bilateral aid agencies, and diplomatic missions in Sana a and Aden. This assessment was overseen and expertly advised by a Steering Group from the United Nations in Yemen, which was led by Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed. In light of the large number of conflicts in Yemen, the assessment began by identifying conflicts that posed the greatest threat to peace and stability. Doing so required difficult decisions and the prioritization of particular conflicts based on experts input. Following this, overarching and conflict-specific conflict drivers were identified and analysed. Overarching Conflict Drivers The overarching drivers listed below create an enabling environment for conflict and in some way feed into each of the priority conflicts (and most of the lower-priority conflicts) identified within the course of this assessment. In the full report, the following factors are divided into four categories: structural drivers, proximate drivers, triggers and enablers. 1. Legacy of zero-sum, patronage-based politics: A zero-sum approach to political authority meant that Yemeni leaders traditionally sought to establish exclusive, elite 7

11 pacts that were as narrow as deemed necessary to ensure stability. Such pacts were rooted in patronage and led to a sense of political exclusion, which has fostered grievances and eroded the state s legitimacy, thus leading large groups (e.g., AQAP, the Hirak and the Houthis) to oppose or challenge the authority of the central Government of Yemen. 2. Inadequate, unequal and discriminatory basic service provision: A sense of disappointment with basic service provision particularly related to health and education leads to disappointment with the Government, exacerbates poverty, and aids recruitment efforts by armed groups. This driver may be divided into two elements: (i) the absence of quality public services, especially health and education and (ii) the inequitable and discriminatory distribution of public services. The second element, which is rooted in the patronage system noted above, is seen to be particularly influential in driving conflict. 3. Poverty, economic inequality and rising prices: The uprising was accompanied by a 10.5 per cent decline in gross domestic product in Meanwhile, consumer prices rose by 23.2 per cent since Poverty levels increased from 42 per cent in 2009 to 54.5 per cent by the end of 2011, thereby exacerbating food insecurity and malnutrition, particularly among marginalized groups. It is possible that food prices particularly when combined with poverty and income inequality increase the likelihood of conflict by contributing to a sense of (a) frustration with the Government and (b) injustice over economic disparities and the state system that enables them. 4. Large, unemployed youth population: Approximately half of all Yemenis are below the age of 15, and unemployment among 15-to-24-year-olds rose to 52.9 per cent in Female employment outside of the home is far lower, although women play a crucial role in the informal sector, agriculture and civil society organizations. This large youth population and lack of employment opportunities feeds into conflict and instability by creating a large group of poorly educated and bored youth who feel alienated and excluded not only from the state but also from the economy. 5. Education deficits: Unemployment and poverty are exacerbated by weaknesses in the education system. Stakeholders further indicate that the basic nature of the education system and its lack of emphasis on critical thinking skills has led a portion of the population to uncritically accept the ideologies and rationalizations put forward by armed groups, particularly by AQAP and Ansar al-sharia, but also by others. 6. Importance of group membership: Unemployment and political exclusion have reportedly led many Yemenis, particularly youth, to welcome the sense of identity and belongingness that comes with participation in armed or rebellious groups. Such a dynamic has reportedly contributed to recruitment efforts by a wide range of factions. 7. Small arms proliferation: Yemen has the second-highest level of small arms ownership in the world, with approximately 10 million weapons, or more than one for every adult male. While not causing conflict, the presence of weapons facilitates violence and serves as a crucial conflict enabler. 8. Divided, Sana a-focused state security services: During 2011 and 2012, and since the start of the National Dialogue in March 2013, security forces have increasingly focused on maintaining security in Sana a and other major urban centres. This has allowed armed groups such as AQAP to assert themselves in some of the more rural parts of Yemen, such as Abyan and Shabwa. 8

12 9. External support for political and armed factions: Regional powers continue their involvement in Yemen using the terrain for a proxy conflict and as part of much broader political moves. Analysts generally agree that all parties to any part of the conflict in Yemen receive considerable financial support from outside actors. Conflict-Specific Drivers According to the 2013 report, each conflict also involves a separate set of drivers. These primarily concern group grievances, ideological factors, political competition, territorial control, and specific forms of international/regional involvement. The drivers of each conflict are individually listed and discussed in the full report, though here they are presented in narrative form that also provides a brief bit of background on the conflict in question. - The southern separationist conflict: Conflict in and concerning the south is commonly and appropriately viewed as a considerable risk to the Yemeni nation and state. The south is home to a committed secessionist movement that represents a significant proportion of the population and which has increasingly adopted maximalist positions in favour of rapid secession. Such sentiments emerge from long-standing grievances over northern appropriations of southern lands and the dismissal of southern military officers and civil servants following the South s attempted secession in In addition, southerners feel their region has been marginalized in the distribution of public goods, economically sabotaged, and culturally manipulated, thus leading to a pervasive sense of alienation from the state. Prospects for de-escalation or trust-building between the south and the central government are highly limited and constrained by the intensity and tenor of southern secessionist sentiment. - Houthi-Islah conflict: The conflict was originally defined through Houthi-Salafist tension, culminating in the expulsion of a Salafist religious study centre from north Yemen, which in turn marked the demise of Salafist influence in the north. Currently, the conflict primarily revolves around a competition to gain support, not only in the northern provinces where the Houthis are strongest, but also in places such as Taiz, where growing numbers are taking up the Houthi label. Islah is reportedly concerned about the Houthis growing urban popularity and reputation as pure revolutionaries (unlike Islah, which had collaborated more extensively with the Saleh regime). The conflict also stems from opposition to Islah s brand of Islam, which has driven supporters of secular governance towards the Houthis (despite the group s religious affiliation). Street clashes between the two groups and, in recent months, large anti-houthi protests, have been taking place, some of which are inspired by Islah opposition, while others are inspired by a less coherent group of democratically minded activists. In the central parts of the country, mainstream opposition to Houthi dominance is being captured by the Islah movement. - Extremist violence/conflict (e.g., Ansar al-sharia and AQAP): Having been pushed out of Abyan in 2012 after holding a portion of the governorate for more than a year, Ansar al-sharia and AQAP have reportedly regrouped and established cells across much of the country. Such groups, which pose a serious threat, are driven by several factors, including generous salary payments, anger over foreign drone strikes that are believed to result in civilian casualties, and an ideological commitment to the defence of Islam against, primarily, the West and its allies. In light of the growing polarization of the population after the Houthi takeover of Sana a, many tribal groupings are allying themselves with AQAP as a convenient alliance to prevent further Houthi encroachment into the south. Current theatres for conflict are Al-Baydha and Maarib, where serious fighting has broken out during several occasions. Looking at the events of 2014, there are some prophetic elements to these rather generalized statements about the large bloc movements and forces in Yemen. The findings 9

13 of the PBEA-supported conflict analysis report have been used by the UNICEF country team as well as the United Nations Country Team at large. Evidence of this is apparent from the use of the conflict analysis report as a key document in the development of the Yemen Priority Peacebuilding Plan as part of its current application for the PBF grant. Within UNICEF, the conflict analysis has been used to inform the agency s intervention related to development activities in 106 out of the 333 districts in Yemen and the production of the first Situation Analysis in 15 years in Yemen, as well as to guide emergency response activities in more than 100 of the country s remaining districts. Lastly, the conflict analysis report has been shared broadly with the Local Education Group, the local coordination mechanism for the education sector and the coordination group for the GPE, and has been used as a tool for advocacy for increased spending in conflict-affected areas among donors and with the ministry itself. UNICEF plans to track and update the conflict analysis report throughout PBEA implementation and in the course of its regular programme through the indicators of the Country Programme Action Plan. It is proposed that the exercise be repeated at the end of 2015 as part of preparation for the next country programme development Results Two NGOs Search for Common Ground and SOUL for Development were contracted under UNICEF s Programme Cooperation Agreement to implement the programme activities in coordination with the MoE with regard to the two focus areas of PBEA: i) initiative on preprimary education and ii) violence in school components in the middle of Global Outcome 1 Integrating peacebuilding and education The UNICEF PBEA team has worked to ensure that education is more visible in peacebuilding programming and policy, and vice versa throughout, The PBF Priority Peace Plan now includes a pointed reference not only to administration essential services (as is worded by PBF globally) but also social essential services as a result of advocacy by the UNICEF education team at the Priority Peace Plan development seminars. This small detail ensures that the PBF accepts that education and related essential services are key conflict drivers in Yemen, and thus remains open to funding applications related to education and peacebuilding programming instead of only those related to administration services. UNICEF Yemen contributed to the PBF global consultation with UNICEF on its application guidelines to reflect this as well as a number of other points regarding linkages between PBF and PBEA. - The Yemen Education Cluster Common Humanitarian Appeal now includes an activity proposing to train 6,000 teachers and school principals in conflict sensitivity and social cohesion. As a result of UNICEF education staff advocacy with the Education Cluster team, the upcoming 2015 Humanitarian Appeal reflects the importance of peacebuilding in education in emergency programming to be implemented by a range of different education actors in Yemen. - Through the project Strengthening Quality and Access to Pre Primary Education for School Readiness in Yemen, UNICEF and SOUL for Development worked in partnership with the MoE in Sana a as well as in 50 sites in UNICEF-targeted districts in the governorates of Al-Jawf, Hodeida, Shabwa, Sana a and Taiz towards the two project outcomes: 1) strengthening of the national policy framework for pre-primary education to provide pre-primary education of improved quality; and 2) establishing a non-formal preprimary programme in Yemen with the MoE and testing it in 50 CFS communities. A 10

14 feasibility study will be administered in 2015 to inform the Early Childhood Care and Education Learning Outcome Framework. Four field coordinators were recruited and trained on the project plans, as well as on financial and administrative procedures. The feasibility study surveys are developed and are undergoing final revision for non-formal education. Six staff were engaged in developing the tools for the survey in formal education and to start the field study. Questions from the field study are expected to help in developing the Early Childhood Care and Education Learning Outcome Framework structure and its relevant School Readiness Assessment Mechanism. These different policy and planning interventions are very important, as they will serve to influence the role attributed to peacebuilding in education, and vice versa, by highlighting the linkages between the two in building resilience in both emergency response and longer-term development plans and subsequent programming. Challenges include the lack of a clear conflict analysis in the early part of 2013, as well as sensitivity around the term peacebuilding with national counterparts and partners. Now that the conflict analysis report has been made available, UNICEF Yemen will address policylevel needs by linking education and peacebuilding through its upcoming programme, for which preparations are already under way. Activities will include training of curriculum developers working on GPE programming regarding conflict-sensitive curriculum and textbook development and support for new policies addressing violence in schools Global Outcome 2 Building institutional capacities The PBEA programme continued contributing to increasing the institutional capacity of sectoral actors on planning and implementing conflict-sensitive education. In all, 40 national master trainers and 65 school principals and social workers in 28 test schools learned how to train school staff to operationalize child protection mechanisms, while the draft policy on eradication of violence in schools was developed with the MoE. In addition, 45 members of UNICEF country and field office staff were trained in gender-sensitive programming, with a particular focus on mainstreaming gender equality in humanitarian and conflict responses. This is particularly relevant considering the importance of women and girls in peacebuilding at a global level and as traditional peacekeepers in Yemeni society. The national conflict analysis report has helped increase awareness of key conflict drivers in Yemen, as well as enable more informed and conflict-sensitive programming. This is to the ultimate benefit of all agencies, as it guides UNICEF and its partners in designing sectoral programmes with peacebuilding principles Global Outcome 3 Developing community and individual capacities All community members surrounding the 82 CFS schools in Hajjah, Hodeidah, Mahweet and Sana a were mobilized to establish mother and father councils, while more than 2,102 parents in fragile and very poor communities received training to support community engagement in school management through school self-assessment, problem-solving techniques and school-based development. Meanwhile, arts-based summer activities were implemented among 3,075 (787 female, 2,288 male) internally displaced children during summer activities in Hajjah related to psychosocial support to alleviate stress and tension related to witnessing and being exposed to conflict, as well as to strengthen community relations between groups and ease tensions associated with the ongoing shortage of resources among internally displaced persons and host communities in and around Hajjah. Regular UNICEF reporting mechanisms implemented through school supervisors and joint UNICEF/MoE monitoring visits indicate that there is an overwhelming and positive impact of these minimal interventions in northeast Yemen. Reports are showing that once activated, parent councils prove to be key agents of change in empowering communities, with 11

15 increased school enrolment rates above 3 per cent in most schools after less than 12 months of implementation. Anecdotal evidence shows that such community empowerment is one of the key tipping-point CFS activities in improving girls enrolment, re-engaging out-ofschool children and kick-starting community support for better quality education. This is of particular importance, as the four governorates of Hajjah, Hodeidah, Mahweet and Sana a are among the most densely populated, with high numbers of Muhamasheen and internally displaced children as well as other marginalized groups. Psychosocial activities targeting internally displaced persons and host communities children are proving to be vital for community relations, as they engage parents and the larger communities in coming together to enjoy children s play and learning. Although it is increasingly difficult to find funds for such activities, in such pressured and resource-scarce settings, these kinds of activities can promote goodwill, openness and social cohesion Global Outcome 4 Increasing access to conflict-sensitive education The CFS programme activities have worked to ensure that more children, especially girls, have access to better-quality education in targeted provinces. This is very relevant for peacebuilding, as these areas are prone to conflict, with education deficit a clear conflict driver, as well as marginalized children, with higher levels of illiteracy, youth unemployment and related social challenges. Prior to a full-scale training roll-out, a training needs assessment was carried out to consult the MoE regarding: 1) the involvement of targeted governorates offices in subsequent training needs assessments; and 2) to assess the context in which the current Yemeni MoE planning, implementing and management system is operating, particularly the intergroup relations and how conflict-sensitive they are at both the central and targeted governorate levels. Building on the 2013 training of teachers on classroom management, child-centred and participatory teaching strategies, early grade reading and child rights, UNICEF reached 14,082 more children in 2014 through training of 550 teachers (see details below). Type of training Direct beneficiary (Teachers) Indirect beneficiary (Children) Training of young women in rural locations on school-based teacher training 30 9,662 Teacher training, provision of learning materials, rehabilitation of early childhood 520 4,420 development centres Total ,082 Through support for the implementation of a range of CFS activities in target communities, the PBEA programme helped to improve quality in education in fragile and marginalized areas. The programme contributed to teachers training for capacity development, formation and training of parents councils for supporting children to obtain improved learning environments, improving hygiene and sanitation practices among the students, and improving the overall physical environment of the schools. To support school-based development and empower schools to implement decentralized planning, schools were provided with capitation grants of US$1,000 each to invest in the long-term development of the school. The schools were trained on carrying out a self-assessment and developing a school development plan before they received the capitation grant. Through the different interventions of the CFS programme in 2014, 167,983 children were reached, of whom 83,109 are girls. 12

16 A key challenge has been coordinating with the MoE at every step. To meet this challenge, UNICEF is preparing more contained and limited programming with the MoE to focus on three aspects of CFS: school readiness/early childhood development, violence in schools and conflict sensitivity. SOUL for Development and Search for Common Ground have been engaged in strengthening implementation and support to field offices, thereby strengthening coordination between public and NGO actors in education on these key issues. There is a need for unification of the programme under common interventions at the national level that serve to improve access to good-quality and conflict-sensitive education in multiple locations. This will need to be carefully integrated with UNICEF Yemen s ongoing decentralization process in order to ensure that each area maintains clear control over its programme and that the rule of subsidiarity is respected Global Outcome 5 Generating evidence and knowledge The conflict analysis report has deepened the national development partners awareness of the complex security and political situation in Yemen. The report has provided clarity on conflict drivers and dynamics, as well as shed light on key areas for programmatic response, both as national and sectoral actors. This has been extremely useful for both UNICEF and the United Nations at large, as well as for partners, NGOs and researchers engaged in Yemen. 5. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) The PBEA team in Yemen developed a comprehensive and very detailed monitoring framework, M&E plan and process guide with the five field offices and the M&E specialists from both partner NGOs. As the PBEA is not discussed as a peacebuilding programme on account of the sensitivities in Yemen, the MoE is not involved in PBEA monitoring. The refined monitoring framework has informed PBEA-specific monitoring tools and training, as well as a detailed baseline launched by SOUL for Development and Search for Common Ground. Planned M&E activities include a short film case study, two case studies for 2015, an internal review at the beginning of the second quarter of 2015, and a final evaluation at the beginning of Progress against country-level and global outcomes is conducted through formal quarterly reviews and informal weekly/monthly contacts with partners. Owing to the diversity of the different outcomes and levels of entry point, baseline studies have been at output or activity level. In this sense, initial monitoring activities (pre-testing of trainees, perception analysis of participants, informal monitoring exercises with children, etc.) have been crucial to provide baselines against which to measure change through programme engagement. 6. Partnerships Key partners include: MoE Yemen Search for Common Ground Yemen SOUL for Development in Yemen Embassy of the Netherlands Yemen 13

17 7. Programme Management 7.1. Staffing Changes and Variances in Programme Activities The new Education Specialist recruited in the last quarter of 2013 in order to manage the PBEA programme within the UNICEF Yemen education team based in Sana a has completed the task of designing and establishing the programming. There is a need for an M&E specialist to take the programme forward and ensure that knowledge management elements and evaluation of programme outputs and achievements are fully documented. This has been developed and confirmed in partnership with the Programme Management Team and Country Office management. As a result of challenges to recruit and staffing in the section, the programme manager for PBEA assumed management of the GPE programme and its restructuring from December 2013 to September 2014, thus limiting again the pace at which the programme was implemented. Once the necessary plans and agreements were in place, the programme was established and implementation is under way. Lastly, in terms of staffing it was originally planned that the current programme manager (an international education specialist) would design and set up the programme with two national officers who would then lead the programme implementation. The role of the international education specialist was to lead the design and establishment of the programme, and train the national staff on how to monitor and manage the implementation. However, with the destabilization of the security and political situation, the two national officers in question were moved to field offices to support field implementation, and thus a gap emerged in the Country Office. There was no clear need for a full-time international education specialist for 2015 programming, however following discussion with the Programme Management Team and management at country level, the Country Office will seek to recruit an international M&E specialist to carry forth the programme and establish the real-time monitoring component, as previously mentioned Inter-sectoral Engagement PBEA programme activities were implemented by the Basic Education and Gender Equality section, in partnership with the Child Protection section in particular. This was related not only to the downstream components such as support in schools, but also the technical support for the child protection mechanism inside schools. 8. Challenges, Lessons Learned and Unintended Consequences The most significant challenges to date include the following: 1) Integration of the PBEA into the CFS programme is optimal. This is better for sustainability of programme activities, is preferable to one-off activities, and is the best framework for making better business as usual. However, it is also more timeconsuming to revise the existing structures, re-arrange and tinker with the necessary platforms and ensure that the M&E systems and tools are all aligned so that the value of integration is realized. This causes delays and requires considered negotiation with both internal management as well as counterparts. 2) The process of designing, planning and implementing peacebuilding activities in a country such as Yemen is as important if not more important than the outputs and outcomes. The process can serve to redress imbalance and redistribute systematic and unchecked corruption and political nepotism, while also improving the capacity of local 14

18 staff and counterparts to practice participatory programming. These contribute significantly to the overall quality of the intervention, but tend to spread from PBEA-only to totally non-pbea programming, as participatory programming is experienced by the same staff in UNICEF, NGOs and the MoE as those people who work on everything else within the education (or other) programmes. 3) The peacebuilding discourse is not a prerequisite for a peacebuilding programme. In Yemen, this discourse has been potentially inflammatory in the past, but it has been possible to engage with counterparts without this and still achieve peacebuilding objectives successfully. 4) By coupling social cohesion interventions with improvements in the quality of education or access to broadening interventions, the uptake is easier and faster. The MoE is interested in a violence prevention programme, but not in a peacebuilding programme. 5) Security conditions can mean that staff have limited M&E opportunities, and thus a third-party actor or partner is needed. This can be explored with real-time monitoring if the necessary technical capacity and support are present. 9. Outreach and Communications Due to sensitivities of peacebuilding, UNICEF Yemen does not discuss the PBEA programme externally. Funds are used to achieve the programme s goals, but there is no communications strategy to highlight PBEA. This is to protect programme activities and to ensure smooth implementation and coordination with UNICEF s range of national counterparts across Yemen. 10. Resources Programme resource allocation by year Category Total PBEA funds allocated US$500,000 US$1,000,000 US$1,098,750 Total PBEA funds utilized US$281,793 US$274,469 US$485,752 15