Ten Key Questions of Russian Foreign Policy

Transcription

1 Meeting Summary: Russia and Eurasia Programme Ten Key Questions of Russian Foreign Policy Bobo Lo Independent Scholar and Consultant 26 March 2012 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document s author(s).

2 1. What does Russia want? The Putin regime has three large aims for Russian foreign policy: External endorsement for the regime, or at least tolerance of Russia s specific path of development. For Russia to become one of the three global powers in a new multipolar order, along with the United States and China. Recognition of Russia as an indispensable actor in regional and global affairs. 2. How does Putin see the world and Russia s place in it? The Putin regime regards the international environment in Hobbesian terms a tough place where the strong thrive and the weak get beaten. A world where great powers are dominant, geopolitical influence is critical, and hard power matters most. Moscow believes that the West is in long-term decline, and that there is a shift in global power to the East, above all to China. This is to Russia s advantage, it believes. In the long term, Russia sees itself as an independent pole on a par with the US and China, largely because each of them will need Russia to balance the other. 3. What are the main challenges facing Russian foreign policy? The rise of Asia represents a huge challenge to a Russia that is poorly equipped to cope in a post-american world. Russia s fundamental task is to reinvent itself as an international actor. This means: demonstrating that it can make a real contribution to global governance; recalibrating its influence in the post-soviet space; developing a new quality of engagement with Asia; developing relations with the West on a post- Cold War basis; and modernizing itself so that it has the capabilities to play a major role in the emerging international system. 4. How does Russia envisage global governance in the 21 st century? Moscow sees global governance as primarily the prerogative of the great powers. Although it is keen for Russia to be a member of as many international bodies as possible, it has no desire to see multilateral institutions take over global governance. Its commitment is to great power internationalism, embodied in the notion of a multipolar order. Moscow believes in the primacy of national sovereignty and prerogatives. It dislikes notions such as the responsibility to protect, and 2

3 is ill-disposed towards popular democracy movements (e.g., Arab Spring). 5. Has Russia entered a post-imperialist stage? Moscow remains committed to promoting a dominant Russian position in the post-soviet space. This is neither imperialism in the traditional sense nor post-imperialism. It reflects a post-modern vision of empire that emphasizes economic and cultural influence instead of overt political and military domination. Moscow is pursuing a more disaggregated and selective approach toward the post-soviet space. However, it retains a patrimonial mentality, and it employs euphemisms such as regions of traditional importance to us. The Brezhnevian concept of limited sovereignty still applies. Russia is opposed to Western influence in Eurasia. The motivation behind Putin s initiative for a Eurasian Union is as much defensive as active. 6. Has Russia turned to the East? There continues to be a disconnect between Moscow s eastern rhetoric and its western inclinations, interests and priorities. Russia is less interested in engaging Asia as such than in reinforcing its strategic partnerships with the two major Asian powers China and India. Its perspective here is global rather than regional. The notion of Russia as a Euro-Pacific power remains a vague aspiration. Russia will find it difficult to penetrate Asia, where it faces competition from China and India, a reengaged US, a still-powerful Japan, and various regional powers. Ultimately, Russia does not want to go East, but to renegotiate the terms of its engagement with the US and Europe. It will retain a Westerncentric, although not pro-western, outlook. 7. What is the nature of the Sino-Russian relationship? The Sino-Russian partnership remains an axis of convenience. Moscow and Beijing have different views of the world and of their respective places in it, but see advantages in working together. However, this is becoming an ever more asymmetrical relationship. Moscow is aware of this, and is keen to open up other options, including within Asia. However, it is struggling to translate this into action. The spectre of an anti-western Sino-Russian alliance is bogus. Moscow remains apprehensive about the strategic, security and economic implications of China s rise. 3

4 8. Is the Russia-US reset over? The reset has achieved important successes on START, Iran, and Afghanistan. But its time is over we are now in a post-reset period. Unfortunately, there has been little progress in developing a post-cold War agenda for cooperation. There is no agreement on missile defense, the Middle East, or Western security ties with the former Soviet republics. It is unlikely that Moscow will cooperate further on Iran, and it may make things difficult over Afghanistan. The bilateral atmosphere has soured. There is no evidence of a positive shift in the way Russia thinks about, and interacts with, the US. Putin s recent statements indicate a regression to traditional anti-americanism. Relations will deteriorate in the short to medium term, although perhaps not to the nadir of August What sort of relationship does Russia want with Europe? Russia seeks cooperation, not integration, with Europe. It believes it will be increasingly able to dictate the terms of their interaction. Increasingly, its approach to Europe will be bilateral and selective. Russia-EU relations will stagnate, as member-states attend to their own problems and Moscow pursues its Eurasian ambitions. They will remain far apart on energy policy, and on values. 10. What are Russia s prospects in the emerging international system? For all the talk about resurgence, Russia s standing in the world is modest, and its influence limited. Such influence as it does have is preventative. Russia lacks the capacity to be an independent center of power (or pole ) in a multipolar world. The idea of Russia as a geopolitical pivot between East and West is absurd. Russia can reestablish itself as a global player. But to do this, it needs to absorb several truths: it cannot base foreign policy on an inherited sense of strategic entitlement the illusion is no longer credible; there is no profit in responding to 21st century realities with 19 th century great power diplomacy; hard power is of diminishing relevance in today s world, and, in any case, Russia s hard power capabilities are much diminished; Russia has considerable soft power potential, although this is largely untapped; comprehensive modernization is crucial. A Russia that fails to modernize faces the prospect of long-term decline and marginalization. But a Russia committed to reinventing itself as a modern, capable nation can become a truly influential international actor. 4

5 Questions and discussion The US-Russia reset was a product of its time. Its main objective was to clear up messy past business. The reset has been done and now we need to move to the next stage but it is not clear whether the next stage is positive or negative. It is difficult to see immediately where the leaders minds are going to meet. Any military conflict would have a serious knock-on effect on US- Russia relations. Russia s trade with the US is tiny compared to its trade with China and the EU. When Michael McFall was first nominated as US ambassador to Russia, he had a 99% support among the Russian elite. They felt his appointment was a sign of Obama s commitment to the US-Russia relationship. By the time McFall arrived in Moscow, the situation had changed. The antagonism is not personal; it is about sending a message to the US. Moscow misunderstands the nature of soft power; they think it is good PR. In his pre-election article about foreign policy, Putin talks about soft power in dark terms, as a western subversion. He is a man driven by hard power. He holds the EU in contempt, but still considers the US important. Russia respects the EU as a trade bloc, but considers it a joke as an international political actor. Russia sees that Europe is more divided than ever, and thinks it can dictate terms because of the Eurozone crisis. The issue is not so much that Moscow thinks along the lines of divide and rule - it thinks the EU is useless as political actor. Russia thinks it only needs to deal with Germany, France and Poland. Russia is not worried about renewable energy resources; the Fukushima incident meant improved terms of trade for Russia. Shale gas is significant for Russia s relations with China more than its relations with the EU. At a certain level Russia has learnt from its misuse of the energy weapon they know now that they need to inform their European customers about cut-offs in advance. But it has not in learnt in other ways, as shown by its denial of the potential of shale gas. The regime was spooked by the past few months, but it has since recovered its equanimity. However, it could face economic problems in a couple of years time. The role of foreign policy in public consciousness is marginal. Putin will have to meet pre-election promises to some extent, but none of them concerned foreign policy. Democratisation not top of the opposition agenda either; people are more interested in good governance. It is unlikely that a liberal Russia would have a better disposed foreign policy. Even a democratic, modernised Russia with a strong rule of law would be difficult to 5

6 deal with, especially in the post-soviet space. However, a modernised Russia would concentrate much more on practicalities and specific projects. There are also some external factors to consider: if China became more assertive and confident or if there was a general spoiling of the US-China relations, Russia might consider it an opportunity or strategic opening to re-engage with the West. Russia could adopt a more enlightened attitude to global governance, look towards a post-cold War agenda with the West, do a range of things in the former Soviet states. All that is possible with or without Putin, but his departure would help. Putin is not very interested in China, he's a Europhile. If he goes, it could give impetus to some positive trends with the West. There would still be huge policy differences, but they would be less acute. The Russian attitude to the West is ambivalent; they believe elites work the same way everywhere. One could say a lot of critical things about US and European approaches to Russia; the West should uphold its principles in its dealings with Russia. The most effective way that Russia could move to a post-cold War agenda is to take modernisation seriously. Pursuing modernisation would create a whole new set of practical priorities. There are different types of modernisation; Skolkovo modernisation focusing on small projects; sector modernisation; economic modernisation; or full modernisation in the western sense. Sector modernisation could happen if the leadership realised they need to run the energy sector more efficiently, but Russian economy would still be heavily resource-dominated. It may also be provoked by a realisation that as China grows and the US recovers from the recession, Russia is in danger of becoming marginalised. If the regime decides to modernise, it will be because they want Russia to be powerful. They feel they can control modernisation. A participant argued that the Russian leadership does not have an agenda for modernisation. The current administration is mostly concerned with covering up the massive mismanagement of Russian economy, dependence on foreign markets, and Russia s dwindling place in world. It would perhaps be more useful to ask what the West wants from Russia. Different Western countries want different things, but most of all they want it to be stable, calm, quiet and not to cause aggravation. Europe has lost its zeal to convert Russia. The question is more about what the West wants Russia not to do. The West struggles to understand Russian attitudes on Libya and Syria, while Russia 6

7 cannot understand why the West is complicating the situation for itself: why topple Saddam Hussein, why allow Mubarak to go down in Egypt if his successor is bound to be an Islamist? Russia sees liberals start revolutions and Islamists finish them, which is counterproductive for the West. Russia was surprised by the Arab spring but even more surprised by the western reaction. If Assad goes in Syria, a Sunni Islamist regime is likely to replace him, which would lead to persecution of Christians and Alewis and would make Syria even more difficult for the West to deal with. In case in Iran, most Russians would probably support the regime and a tougher stance towards the West from Putin. It will only take a small event for the language to become more confrontational. In the post-soviet space, Moscow has recently discovered that the old methods are not necessarily the best. It was not only the US that suffered a relative decline in power all the great powers did. Even the weakest nation state now has a greater range of choices than ever, which means Russia has to be more flexible. Many of the post-soviet states are culturally close to and economically dependent on Russia, but Russia has to be more practical in its approach, which does not come naturally. Since Putin first endorsed the US invasion in Afghanistan, Russia has faced a constant tension between security and geopolitics. Central Asia could go up in flames, but on the other hand, there is the greater threat of western geopolitical and normative presence in Central Asia. The rational response is to be cooperative but Russia s instinct is important too; one cannot always impose a western rational perspective on Russia s decision-making process. It is hard to see how Russia will approach the 2014 US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Russia s aims in the post-soviet space are political it strives to be the dominant political power, but old political instruments do not work as well as they used to. The elite now has other options. Russia often uses economic instruments to achieve political ends. Theirs is not a traditional imperial mindset: they do not want to occupy territory and take responsibility - they seek power without responsibility. The war in Georgia in 2008 was a one-off military operation. Russians were quite surprised how quickly things were achieved; it was a relatively clean operation from Moscow s point of view. The Eurasian Customs Union does not mean that Russia wants to do a lot in the post-soviet space; it just does not want anyone else doing it there. In Kyrgyzstan, the main concern is the Chinese. Kyrgyzstan is unstable and unpredictable, but China would still engage there. As much as Putin loathes 7

8 Alexander Lukashenka, Russia cannot envisage anyone else replacing him. The moment Lukashenka goes, Belarus will be lost. The situation in Ukraine is intensely frustrating for Ukrainians, the EU, and for Russia. Yanukovych thinks he can play the Nazarbaev game, but he is very bad at it. 8